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**CONFIDENTIAL**

(15741)

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS

### PART XLII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1938



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## CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XLII.—JANUARY TO JUNE 1938.

## CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 437/197/25]

No. 1.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24, 1938.)*(No. 180.)  
Sir,*Jedda, December 18, 1937.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 10th December reports the ratification of the "Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Treaty of Arab Alliance." The text, except for misprints and the omission of odd words in error, is identical with that which appeared as Annexure I to the *Iraq Government Gazette* No. 33, dated the 15th August, 1937. At the head of this text is an official notice and a preamble, and at the end is Ibn Saud's undertaking to observe the provisions of the treaty. I attach these additions in original and in translation.<sup>(1)</sup> I would mention as a point of interest that in the preamble Ibn Saud refers to Mahomet as "the Arab Prophet," a phrase I do not remember having met before in official language.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Translation of Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura, No. 679, dated Shawwal 7, 1356 (December 10, 1937).*

*Ratification of the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Treaty of Arab Alliance.  
Official Notice No. 23.*

THE adhesion of His Majesty King Yahya, King of the Kingdom of the Yemen, to the Treaty of Alliance was ratified at Sana on the 28th Shaban, 1356, and the envoy Muhammad Shaikho, who took the instruments of ratification, has returned to this country bringing the two letters signed by His Majesty the King the Imam Yahya to His Majesty King Ghazi and His Majesty King Abdul Aziz regarding His Majesty's adhesion to the Treaty of Alliance.

<sup>(1)</sup> Translation only printed.



The following is the text of the treaty as ratified:—

(In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

Praise be to God, who has reconciled the hearts of Moslems, and prayer and peace upon the Arab Prophet Mahomet (the prayers and peace of God upon him!).

We, Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the common desire of ourselves and of His Majesty our Brother King Ghazi, which found acceptance with His Majesty our Brother King Yahya, in the matter of the adhesion of His Majesty the King of the Yemen to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance which was concluded between us and His Majesty our Brother King Ghazi on the 10th Muharram, 1355, A.H.,

And whereas His Majesty our Brother King Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamid-al-Din, King of the Yemen, has signed a document of adhesion to this treaty according to the following articles:—

(In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

(Royal seal of him who relies on God, Lord of the Universe, Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamid-al-Din, whom may God help!)

[Here follows the text as published as Annexure I to the *Iraq Government Gazette* No. 33, dated the 15th August, 1937.]

Now, therefore, we, after examining the above articles and considering them with attention, have approved, accepted and admitted them as a whole and severally in every article and paragraph, and we now confirm and ratify them and undertake and promise with our Royal and true promise that, through the might of God, we will carry out what is in them and will observe them with complete loyalty and sincerity, and if God wills we will not allow them to be contravened in any way whatsoever so far as in us lies, and in confirmation of the truth of all that is in this document we have commanded that our seal shall be affixed to it and have signed it with our own hand, and the best of witnesses is God.

Written on the 19th Jumadi-al-Thani, 1356, A.H. (the 26th August, 1937).

[No signature.]

[E 439/150/91]

No. 2.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24, 1938.)*

(No. 187.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 28, 1937.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 92, dated the 11th December, a translation of the note in which the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs reply to the note of which I sent you a copy in my printed despatch No. 175 of the 4th December. There is a passage in the middle of the last paragraph but one ("they do not believe that the company's employees will go beyond what my Government believe to be within their territories") which implies that the company may operate in the disputed territory. I am sure that this is not what the writer meant, and I am trying to clear up the point, but Fuad Bey is at Mecca and there is not time to settle the matter before the bag goes.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire and to the External Affairs Department of the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 2.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Mecca, Shawwal 16, 1356 (December 19, 1937).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 195 of the 4th December (1st Shawwal 1356) regarding the question of the frontiers between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the Arab amirates on the Persian Gulf, and the proposal of the British Government based on information which has reached them to the effect that the geologists of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company have begun prospecting in the neighbourhood of Qasr Salwa. You have been so good as to refer to the views of the British Government as to the frontier line in that region, and to their readiness to reopen negotiations with a view to reaching a settlement on the basis which they have already explained to the Government of His Majesty the King, subject to the proviso that they trust that, pending a final settlement, the employees of C.A.S.O.C. will not go beyond the frontier indicated by the British Government. The British Government have, moreover, suggested that a joint topographical mission should be formed to ascertain the position of some of the natural features of the places situated near that line.

The Government of His Majesty the King welcome the idea of opening negotiations with a view to arriving at a settlement of the frontier line in that region. They have always been ready to show their good intentions and disposed to come to an agreement and an understanding. I am compelled, however, to observe to your Excellency that the failure to arrive at an agreement in the past was not due to any lack of desire on the part of the Government of His Majesty to settle the question. The difficulty arose from their inability to agree to the renunciation of their established rights in the territories included in the definition of the frontier, which they put forward through Sir Andrew Ryan, and which represented the moderate and reasonable minimum for their frontiers. Whenever an opportunity presented itself my Government have explained the essential reasons which compelled them to adhere to the frontier which they had explained in the note which was communicated to Sir Andrew Ryan by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs on 29/12/1353 (3rd April, 1935). As, however, the British Government, in spite of the evidence and arguments communicated to them on other occasions, the last of them being the visit of Mr. Rendel last spring and the recent conversation between you and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, still adhere to the frontier mentioned in your above-mentioned note, the Government of His Majesty consider the possibility of arriving at a final settlement very difficult so long as the British Government hold to their position and do not agree to the actual situation of what is in reality in the possession and under the influence of His Majesty the King. If, however, the British Government are prepared to open the subject and to seek a solution on the basis of the actual facts—a solution which would obviate the difficulty—nothing would be more agreeable to the Government of His Majesty.

As to the employees of C.A.S.O.C. not going beyond the places still in dispute, His Majesty's Government had already explained to the company's representative the actual situation as arrived at with your Government, and had informed him of the points still in dispute, and they do not believe that the company's employees will go beyond what my Government believe to be within their territories, just as they believe that the responsible authorities in the Arab amirates on the Persian Gulf, for their part, will not allow the representatives or employees of the companies operating in their territories to cross the line laid down in the note to Sir Andrew Ryan, until a final agreement has been concluded between the parties concerned.

As to the despatch of a topographical mission to fix the position of certain natural features in the areas in dispute, my Government do not know how those difficulties can be overcome which were explained by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in the conversation which he had with you on Friday, the 10th December (7th Shawwal 1356), and would prefer to learn the opinion of the British Government, whether they do not share the point of view of the Saudi Government that it would be advisable to come to a final settlement of the

[19825]



frontier, whether by specifying places or by specifying lines of latitude and longitude, before proceeding to make a survey.

I therefore beg you to be so good as to explain the point of view of my Government on the subject to the British Government and to acquaint me with their views upon it.

FAISAL.

[E 661/661/25]

No. 3.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, January 1, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda Report for December 1937.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list in paragraph 67.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 3.

*Jedda Report for December 1937.*

*I.—Internal Affairs.*

470. The King arrived in Mecca from Riyadh after Ramadhan and came to Jedda for a two-day visit almost at once (13th–15th December). He received the foreign representatives formally, and had a private conversation with His Majesty's Minister and also, it is believed, with the Italian Minister. He seemed in very good health, though not in very good spirits. The visit made what is described as a "season" in the bazaar. Not only was all the fish and bread bought up for the royal party but the hangers-on, who seem to be paid with greater regularity than the State officials, made purchases of piece-goods, &c., on a scale which caused a distinct movement in the sluggish trade of the town.

471. The Amir Saud, on his return from Bahrein (see below), landed at Al Khubar on the 23rd December and in response to an invitation from C.A.S.O.C. went to Dhahran to see the oil wells.

472. The Amir Faisal came to Jedda on the 13th December for a few days, the main purpose of the visit being to receive the credentials of the new Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires. He seemed less languid than usual, and in a chat with His Majesty's Minister showed unusual animation in finding subjects of conversation and in dealing with them when found.

473. Fuad Bey and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who came to Jedda with the King, both had business conversations with His Majesty's Minister. Fuad Bey stayed on for a few days after Ibn Saud's departure. He had, while in Jedda, an attack of what he describes as a long-standing heart trouble. He certainly seemed very ill.

474. Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhl has been appointed assistant to the Viceroy of Mecca, the Amir Faisal. He retains his position as Vice-President of the Legislative Council.

475. The difficulty experienced in keeping track of the very numerous members of the Saudi Royal Family is illustrated by the fact that although neither the Amir Muhammad nor the Amir Khalid, brothers of the Amir Saud, accompanied him on his trip to Bahrein, the party included two Amirs Muhammad and two Amirs Khalid.

476. Except for an air display to celebrate the King's arrival, and the rehearsals for it, no flying has been done this month. Six machines took part in the display, four being piloted by Saudi flight-lieutenants. Two of the Saudis flew Italian instructional machines, one the French monoplane, the Caudron-Renault, and one a three-engined Caproni. None of them, however, did anything but straight flying of the simplest kind. The two pilot-instructors also took part in the display, the Russian on the Bellanca and the Italian on a three-engined Caproni.

477. The "purely formal" visit of Mr. Wallace, of the California Texas Oil Company (paragraphs 396 and 442) ended in his undertaking, after his interview with Ibn Saud, to supply the Saudi authorities at once with certain quantities of petrol and other oil products out of stocks now in Kenya. His story is that this represents an advance on account of quantities which C.A.S.O.C. will have to supply to the Saudi Government free when the Hasa wells begin to yield oil in commercial quantities. If this is correct it cannot in all probability be considered as an infringement of the contract between the Saudi Arabian Government and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan), Limited, as agents for "Shell," for the supply of all the requirements of the Government, those of the semi-official motor transport combine included. The area of the Gellatly, Hankey concession is not mentioned in the contract, but is tacitly understood to be the Hejaz. Mr. Lenahan represents the oil products from East Africa as a means of diminishing the Saudi Government's disappointment at the failure of C.A.S.O.C. to find oil in commercial quantities in Hasa.

478. Dr. Ghulam Mirza Rasul and Sub-Assistant Surgeon Ghulam Husain were shown the local hospital in Mecca by the Acting Director of Health. Their report shows that some advance has been effected. The X-Ray Department seemed to be working satisfactorily under a Syrian trained in Paris, the operating theatre was clean and tidy, and though the instruments were few they were at least in glass cupboards, and, moreover, there was a high-pressure steam steriliser. The surgical cases appeared, however, to be all of a simple type. There was a modern disinfecting plant for patients' clothing. About a hundred patients were waiting in the outdoor dispensary, but there were only eight patients in the medical ward, and the eye, ear and throat ward was empty owing to the absence of the doctor in charge. There was a laboratory, also under a Syrian, which was "understood to be working properly."

479. While the establishment of a system of wireless telegraph stations throughout the country does credit to Ibn Saud's spirit of enterprise and is an important factor in the maintenance of order, the skill of the operators is not always equal to the demands of western script. C.A.S.O.C., pending the establishment of private wireless communication between Jedda and Hasa, suffer great inconvenience and sometimes serious delay from this cause, while the Riyadh wireless route for communication between His Majesty's Embassy in Bagdad and His Majesty's Legation in Jedda was found, after a few experiments, to be hopeless, and had to be abandoned for the more expensive but more accurate route via Egypt. Confronted with European figures the wireless operator in Riyadh tended to treat them as boustrophedonic, but as he was not consistent even in error the product of his industry was indecipherable.

480. The Saudi authorities have been thrown into consternation by the death of the Indian who for years ran the Jedda condenser. This shows the scale on which the Saudi Government operates. The Minister of Finance, who is in charge of the condenser as of a hundred other miscellaneous duties, has appealed to Mr. Ousman, of the Legation staff, for assistance, and the essential service of the provision of water for Jedda is at present partly dependent upon the honorary spare-time work of a member of a foreign legation.

481. Heavy rain fell on Christmas day, a few days after the Jedda people, anxious at the unusual drought, had gone out in procession and prayed for rain. Even the miserable desert that comes up to the town gates usually produces some vegetation in winter, but none had appeared this year. The Jedda goats, always content with waste-paper, have been seen eating strawboard from packing-cases.

482. "Progress" is exemplified in a surprising way by the regular appearance of advertisements for wireless sets in the Mecca newspaper, *Saut-al-Hejaz*. The wireless is still supposed in theory to be used for the reception of news or readings from the Quran, but these knobs are tricky things. Recently a car was noticed travelling in the desert near Jedda, crammed with armed Bedouin retainers of the Governor of Jedda, while from the wireless set inside came the voice of one of the B.B.C. ladies, spreading with the aid of a cuckoo clock the soft influence of the Children's Hour.

483. The position of women is not affected by Saudi progress, and several well-educated Moslem ladies, wives of foreign officials, who follow European customs in their own country (India or Egypt), are mewed up in their houses in Jedda out of deference to the susceptibilities of Ibn Saud. One of these ladies,

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who was married in Egypt by proxy, came to Jedda by air (Misr Airwork) to join her husband.

484. The Amir Saud seems to have divorced the daughter of Nuri Sha'lan (paragraph 159 of 1936) a few days after his return from England. She is reported on very good authority to have left Riyadh with a new Buick car, a considerable sum in gold, the carpets of the house she had inhabited, and so on.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

485. The Amir Saud left Riyadh for the long-planned visit to Bahrein on the 9th December. At Hasa he was met by representatives of the family of His Highness the Sheikh of Bahrein. He landed in Saudi Arabia again, after his visit, on the 23rd December.

486. It was announced that M. Martel, the French High Commissioner in Syria, was to pay a visit to Jedda in January. Fuad Bey informed His Majesty's Minister that it was a purely private visit, and that it had arisen out of a wish expressed by M. Martel when he met Sheikh Yusuf Yasin during the latter's recent visit to Syria. (Later—The visit has been postponed.)

487. Two events have given occasion for references to Saudi Arabia and Syria as part of the great Arab world, viz., the floods in Syria and the so-called adhesion of the King of the Yemen to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. A subscription for sufferers from the Syrian floods has been opened. The King contributed five hundred pounds gold, Fuad Bey and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin the equivalent of over thirty pounds each. The total raised so far is over £1,500. This has called forth a telegram of thanks from the President of the Syrian Parliament. The announcement that the King of the Yemen had ratified his adhesion to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance brought a telegram to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin from the Syrian Parliament, expressing gratification at the news and the hope that other Arab countries will eventually be included in it. The Saudi representative in Damascus also telegraphed, reporting demonstrations and messages of enthusiasm on the same subject.

488. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* publishes a leading article calling for subscriptions to the fund for the relief of sufferers by the floods in Syria as a mark of "brotherly sympathy for the great Arab community." It reinforces the appeal by pointing out that even Palestine, though "suffering from the activities it is undertaking, and striving with all its strength against the dreadful danger of Zionism," has contributed to the assistance of "a member of our Arab fraternity."

489. The local press has published a spate of treaties with the Yemen:—

- (1) Ratification by the King of the Yemen of his adhesion to the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.
- (2) Annex to the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of 1934, defining the frontier.
- (3) An agreement about the settlement of disputes which may arise between the Saudi and Yemeni subjects.

The first of these instruments does not, strictly speaking, constitute adhesion to the original treaty, but (paragraph 255) is a new treaty concocted by the King of the Yemen by amending the old one as he pleased. The other two instruments are being examined. Ibn Saud has, however, ratified the instrument.

490. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires hears that money was distributed broadcast in the Yemen on the occasion of the signature of the Italo-Yemen Treaty, to the extent that some Yemenis wrote, after the Italian negotiator had left, to complain of having received nothing, or less than so-and-so.

491. References to Iraq, Palestine and the Yemen by Ibn Saud in conversation with His Majesty's Minister are recorded in the next section.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

492. In his conversation with His Majesty's Minister on the 15th December, Ibn Saud referred to several matters of common interest: Iraq, the Yemen, the Italians, Saudi aviation, and the supply of arms and Palestine.

493. *Iraq*.—The King began with Iraq. This seemed surprising at first, but the immediate cause of anxiety was found to be that certain persons in Iraq (Nuri Pasha was referred to later) were supposed to be preparing schemes for

settlement of the Palestine question "not in the interests of His Majesty's Government or of Palestine, but from personal ambition." The King also referred to the state of instability in Iraq. But he admitted that officially the Iraq Government had always behaved correctly, even in the time of Hikmet Sulaiman, whose Government, however, he was evidently glad to have seen the last of.

494. *The Yemen*.—After the conclusion of the Italo-Yemen Treaty, said Ibn Saud, he wrote to the Imam asking whether there was anything behind the treaty. The Imam assured him there was not, and Ibn Saud accepted this statement, knowing the Imam to be a wide-awake man; but he would not answer for the Imam's sons, nor for the Yemeni officials.

495. *Arms*.—Ibn Saud said that as His Majesty's Government knew he did not want Italian arms, but did not want to offend the Italians. He refused the offer of Italian rifles on the ground that his forces were equipped with Mausers and he did not want to introduce another type, but the Italian Legation then offered to provide Mausers from Germany or Austria. The King pleaded poverty, but was assured that very easy terms would be arranged. Keeping to his delaying tactics the King said that if samples could be supplied he would study the matter, and there the question rested for the moment. Had he done right? What would His Majesty's Government say? His Majesty's Minister replied in terms which had already been used at the Foreign Office in conversations with the Saudi Minister. His Majesty's Government had supplied all the arms they could spare. Ibn Saud was the sole judge of his needs. It would evidently be safer to buy from neutrals rather than from a Government like the Italian which, as the King himself said, was not actuated by pure affection for Saudi Arabia; but if in the end he could not escape the Italian offer he would at least be acting with his eyes open. Ibn Saud said that he would continue to delay as long as possible, but there usually came a moment in such cases when a decision could no longer be postponed. It may be mentioned here that according to Fuad Hamza, who thought that arrival of a supply of arms from British sources (paragraph 382) had stimulated the Italians to greater efforts, the Italian Legation had offered to sell Italian guns, anti-aircraft guns, in fact any war material that Ibn Saud might want.

496. *Saudi Aviation*.—Ibn Saud said again that he wanted to get rid of the Italians. He realised that to replace them by British or French might be awkward, but that would not apply to replacement by Moslems. Could His Majesty's Government recommend some suitable man from Egypt or Iraq? It was found that he had in mind a sort of chief of staff to advise him on all arms or, failing that, an expert to take charge of aviation. There are obvious objections to the proposal, but His Majesty's Minister has recommended it as a means of eliminating the Italians and pleasing Ibn Saud.

497. *Palestine*.—Ibn Saud spoke with anxiety of his own position as dependent upon that of His Majesty's Government, which was endangered by Zionism. Sir Reader Bullard noticed that, whereas in March it had seemed to Ibn Saud amusing that Mussolini should wave the sword of Islam, he now expressed astonishment at the extent to which, in spite of the notorious ill-treatment of Arabs in Libya, Mussolini had been accepted by the Arabs as their champion. The King could not agree that partition offered a hope of final settlement, but on the contrary considered that it would be a dangerous irritant; but he evidently could not believe that it would ever be effected. He seemed to think that alternative schemes were being examined without his knowledge, and expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would always communicate to him as early as possible any important information about their Palestine policy. On this last point Sir Reader Bullard was able to reassure him. To administer consolation on the main issue was more difficult, but Ibn Saud was brought to admit the extraordinary difficulty of the situation of His Majesty's Government by a question, to which he at once said "yes," whether, in his rise from being ruler of Nejd to his present proud position, he had not found, at every stage in his progress, that political questions became more complicated as his points of contact with the outer world increased.

498. Throughout the conversation the King was friendly and reasonable. No reference, however, was made to the question which always touches him on the most sensitive spot, viz., the frontier of Saudi Arabia with Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhs, a subject on which a note had been sent in by His Majesty's Legation a short time before.



499. The news that C.A.S.O.C. were showing signs of an intention to prospect in the Salwa region compelled His Majesty's Government to make a communication to Ibn Saud in order to forestall any attempt to prospect in the area in dispute. The communication, which was sent in by His Majesty's Minister on the 4th December, was drafted, in accordance with Foreign Office instructions, so as to have as little as possible the appearance of an ultimatum. The note referred to the activity of C.A.S.O.C. near Qasr-al-Salwa, said that His Majesty's Government assumed that the company would not overstep the frontier proposed by His Majesty's Government so long as no final agreement had been reached between the two Governments, professed readiness to reopen negotiations for a settlement on the lines already indicated, and suggested that a joint Anglo-Saudi commission should be appointed to clear up doubts as to certain topographical features. The note described again what His Majesty's Government considered to be the rightful frontier. While this note was still awaiting a reply His Majesty's Minister had an opportunity to meet both Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Bey. Sheikh Yusuf said that the basis of the King's claim was that it was he and not the Amirs in the Persian Gulf who controlled and administered the area in dispute. He added that the King had referred to the note that morning and had asked whether the British wished to treat him as the Italians had treated Ethiopia and the Japanese China, and there is no reason to regard this as exaggerated, since the statement agrees with the protest which Ibn Saud made at the time of Mr. Rendel's visit against what he describes as the "hemming-in" policy of His Majesty's Government on the Persian Gulf. Fuad Bey informed Sir Reader Bullard that C.A.S.O.C. had been told about the disputed territory, and that we need not fear they would take action in it. He, however, said that the oil company from the Gulf side had sent people into the disputed area, though he seemed to refer only to a survey of the position of Safaq (Sufuk), and he stuck to the Saudi position, the old arguments being repeated on both sides. He said that since the parties could not agree on principles the despatch of a mission would have no point, but Sir Reader Bullard said that we believed the Saudi claim to be based in part on faulty topographical information, and we wanted all doubt in this respect to be removed. Fuad repeated what is always Ibn Saud's attitude on this topic: His Majesty's Government always give him fair words, but never anything else. Sir Reader Bullard recalled to Fuad Bey several questions which had been settled in a sense favourable to the Saudi Government, and reminded him that the frontier they proposed represented enormous concessions beyond what His Majesty's Government believe to be the Saudi Government's legal frontier. Fuad Bey talked about compromise, but was unable to make any practical suggestion, even privately, for such a compromise. Nor could Sir Reader Bullard hold out any hope that His Majesty's Government could make any further concession.

500. The frontier question was not mentioned at the interview which His Majesty's Minister had with Ibn Saud on the 15th December. The Saudi reply, dated the 19th December, was received a few days later. It welcomes the suggestion that negotiations should be reopened, but asserts that if they have been abortive hitherto that is entirely because His Majesty's Government "do not agree to the actual situation of what is in reality in the possession and under the influence of His Majesty the King." It enquires whether His Majesty's Government do not agree that before sending a topographical mission it would be advisable to come to a final settlement of the frontier, by specifying either places or co-ordinates. Unfortunately, the portion of the note which dealt with the question of prospecting was badly drafted. It said that the Saudi Arabian Government had explained to C.A.S.O.C. about the points in dispute, and did not believe that it would "go beyond what (the Saudi) Government believe to be within their territories," and assumed that the companies operating in the Arab Emirates concerned would not cross the line as defined by the Saudi Arabian Government. The words quoted in inverted commas cover the disputed territory as well as what His Majesty's Government are prepared to regard as Saudi territory; they do not agree with the sense of the paragraph as a whole, and they are at variance with what Fuad Bey had said. His Majesty's Minister suggested to Fuad Bey that the ambiguous words should be corrected, but instead of adopting that simple way out of the difficulty Fuad Bey wrote a letter, in which he said that provided that the Arab Governments concerned would agree to abstention from the disputed area until an agreement should be arrived at, the Saudi Government were prepared to inform the C.A.S.O.C. of the necessity not to encroach on that area. This, in

effect, gives an ultimatum to His Majesty's Government. At the end of the month the attempt was still being made to return to the more seemly wording of the note of the 19th December, except for the amendment of the words quoted above which are obviously incorrect. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Minister is still for a policy of delay. The Jedda manager of C.A.S.O.C. has confirmed Fuad Bey's statement about the instructions given to the company by the Saudi Government as to the territory in dispute.

501. It appears certain that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin tried to read some encouragement into a colourless statement about the Hejaz Railway (paragraph 451) which was made to him by Jamil Mardam, President of the Council in Syria. The President appears to have said that while he was in favour in principle of the reopening of the line if it could be repaired, it had always been considered at Damascus that the Hejaz Railway was State property, and that each successor State inherited that portion of the line situated in its territory, and was responsible for any expenses relating to that portion. He even seems to have said that the Syrian Government had no intention of taking the initiative in embarking on negotiations on so delicate a question. His Majesty's Government, after consulting the French Government, informed the Saudi Minister in London that they would not object if Ibn Saud thought a statement desirable. The Minister stated subsequently that the King had decided against the issue of a statement, but had asked for an early reply to the note of the 28th January, 1936.

502. This note of January 1936 about the Hejaz Railway does not appear to have been mentioned in the Jedda Report at the time. It was addressed to the British and French Governments, through their representatives in Jedda. It summarised the work of the Haifa Conference of October 1935 (paragraph 368 of 1935), and noted with regret the decision on item 3 on the agenda:—

"While recording the proposal of Fuad Bey Hamza to the effect that the reconstruction of the damaged sections should be effected at the expense of the line as a whole, the conference regretted that it had not been able to reach an agreed resolution on this important question. In these circumstances, the conference could only commend the matter to the consideration of the Governments concerned."

It drew some comfort from a statement by the representative of the Syrian section, who was described as saying that contribution by this section to expenditure on other sections had been envisaged by the Lausanne (Bompard) Declaration, though so far the Syrian section had, in fact, been working at a loss. Finally, the note declared that in the opinion of the Saudi Government the only possible solution was that the line should be considered as one and should bear as a whole the expenses to be incurred on the damaged sections south of Maan. The note invited the two Governments to accept this principle as a preliminary to a discussion regarding the method of raising the money for repairs.

503. His Majesty's Government have under consideration the Saudi note of January 1936, but they consider that it will hardly be possible to give an early reply. Some of the complications of the subject were brought out a year ago when the Foreign Office instructed His Majesty's Minister to give his views on a suggestion which had been made that His Majesty's Government might perhaps be justified on political grounds in considering the possibility of bearing themselves the cost of repairing the Saudi section of the Hejaz Railway. The views recorded by Sir Reader Bullard, which received the approval of the Secretary of State, can be summarised briefly thus:—

"The railway is not necessary, and if it were rebuilt the Saudi authorities could never keep it running properly for more than a short time. His Majesty's Government are under no moral obligation to pay for the rebuilding of the line; they would get little credit if they did pay for it; our help would weigh for little in the mind of Ibn Saud, among other important considerations, and would be forgotten if the railway did not pay its way and became a burden; it is not to the advantage of His Majesty's Government that Ibn Saud should be saddled with another financial obligation; and the possibility of our being allowed to use the railway in time of war is so remote as to be, by itself, of very little weight."

Sir Reader Bullard added that some of the arguments he had adduced against the proposal would fall to the ground if it could be shown that railway receipts would cover the cost of maintenance and renewals, and that they would be used



for that purpose. He was doubtful whether the receipts would suffice, and feared that the receipts would be swept into general revenues and the railway starved.

504. M. Sillitti, the Italian Minister, returned from leave on the 7th December. According to reliable information, the former interpreter to the Italian Legation, Muhammad Ali Dafer, is to reside permanently in Mecca, while M. Pastacaldi (paragraph 359), who hailed with such joy his transfer to Jibuti in September, is to be recalled to Jedda. The Italian shipping agency, Messrs. Lazzarini, which was formerly established in a house in the centre of the town, has moved to a house on the edge of the town, next to the Italian dispensary. Thus, within a distance of about 100 yards there are now four Italian buildings all sporting Italian flags on tall flagstaves as often as possible: the Legation, the Chancery, the dispensary, and Messrs. Lazzarini.

505. M. Delicata, the Italian mechanic attached to the Italian Legation, has applied for the post of condenser engineer (paragraph 256 of 1936). The Amir Faisal is reported as having said that in no case should Delicata be employed, as they "had enough Italians already."

506. The Japanese victories in China have attracted much attention in Jedda. In the more consciously "Nationalist" circles they are represented as a victory of Asia (the Arabs being identified with Asia for the moment) over Europe. This conclusion is reached by supposing that Japan is only trying to save China from evil influences, and that one of the results of the war will be the elimination of Great Britain and America from China. In this version Italy and her friend Germany are, of course, on the side of Asia.

507. On the last day of the month His Majesty's Minister received instructions relating to the communication to Ibn Saud beforehand of the terms of the despatch to Palestine defining the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the proposals of the Royal Commission of 1937.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

508. Saiyid Lal Shah, Indian vice-consul, visited Mecca, where he was received with great amiability by Ibn Saud. The registration of Indian pilgrims is proceeding without friction and Saiyid Lal Shah has found the Saudi officials helpful, and has not been asked, as it was feared he might be, to communicate only with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

509. The air service between Jedda and Medina is to begin earlier this year—some five weeks before the *hajj*. The return ticket will cost £9 gold.

510. An Indian company, the Scindia Steam Navigation Company (Limited), propose to enter the pilgrim-carrying trade this season, and they have appointed an agent (a British Indian) in Jedda and also sent a representative to reside here for the present. It is understood that they propose to bring two shiploads of pilgrims, and to send two ships after the pilgrimage for the return journey. This may lead to trouble, as not all the pilgrims who come by a given steamer can complete the visit to Mecca, which many of them wish to include, by a given date, since the supply of motor transport is limited and irregular and some do not travel by car, but by camel, or even on foot.

511. It is reported from Bagdad that a number of Indian pilgrims have arrived there with the idea of going on to Mecca overland either by Nejed and Hail or, if that route is rendered too bad by rain, by Basra and Riyadh.

512. Wonderful things are told of the hotel at Mecca which has been built by the Banque Misr. It has, according to the taste of the narrator, 75, 100, 200, 250 rooms. It is certainly large, and affords better accommodation than any that exists at present. There is a lift, and a bath-room with hot and cold water to each pair of rooms. It is not understood how the hotel can pay when the season is so short.

513. A long silence that followed the departure of the Soviet Minister on leave obviously aroused uneasy speculation in the minds of his staff in Jedda. It is now learned, however, that he has not joined Messrs. Karakhan and Krestinski, but merely fell ill on his way home, and is now recuperating in the Caucasus and "spitting on the ceiling"—the Russian equivalent of *dolce far niente*.

514. A respectable, pious Javanese pilgrim ran amok in Mecca on the 30th December. He attacked several people, walked quietly through the courtyard of the great mosque, and then attacked several more. Fifteen persons were attacked (none of them British) and four are dead.

[E 662/662/25]

No. 4.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 17, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a regulation published by the Saudi Government regarding compensation to workmen in "technical industrial concerns."<sup>(1)</sup> The regulation is dated the 9th September, 1937, but it was not published until the 3rd December, though it was communicated to the firms concerned a few days before that date.

2. It is understood that the regulation has been drafted by Najib Salha (Personalities, No. 112) and that he has drawn his material from the compensation laws of several other countries. The badness of the drafting, which is remarkable even for Saudi laws, is probably the compiler's own. To mention only one instance: An employee who was paid 39½ Saudi riyals a month would escape the definitions in sections 4 and 5, and thus his employer would not be liable in respect of any accident that happened to him in the course of his work. Some of the other points where the drafting is defective are indicated in square brackets.

3. Judged by the standards of this country, the rates of compensation are extraordinarily high, e.g., £450 gold for permanent total disablement of a skilled workman. It is quite right that wealthy foreign companies should pay adequate compensation in such cases, and I am far from suggesting that the rates, regarded absolutely, are too high; but they are enormously greater than anything the Saudi Government would pay. Moreover, it is not certain that the victim or his next-of-kin would receive the full amount paid by the company. This doubt is founded upon the knowledge that the companies to whom this regulation applies are required by the terms of concessions to pay in gold for certain personnel who do not, in fact, receive salary at those rates. For instance, the Petroleum Development (Western Arabia) (Limited) have to pay to the Saudi Government £500 gold per annum in respect of the supervision of their concession by Najib Salha, and £20 gold per mensem for an "inspector" of very low status who is supposed to watch the drilling on the Farsan Islands. It is to be hoped that the analogy I have drawn is not sound and that the full compensation will go to the victim or his next-of-kin, but a little scepticism is permissible.

4. The provision most open to objection is contained in article 20, which makes the regulation retrospective. It was partly on this account, though also on account of the high rates of compensation, that the Jedda manager of the Petroleum Development (Western Arabia) (Limited) proposed to his principals that the regulation should be resisted; they, however, instructed him to take no action. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company, it is believed, have asked their principals for instructions. It is inevitable that in the end all companies concerned will accept the regulation without protest. It is inevitable that this poverty-stricken country should try to make money out of the few foreign concessions in various ways, and it will not pay any of the companies to enter into controversy unless larger sums are at stake than are involved in the application of this regulation.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Department of Overseas Trade (No. O.T. 3, 102/215/2).

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 1012/150/91]

No. 5.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 12.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 11, 1938.

IN my despatch No. 187 dated the 28th December, with which I had the honour to transmit to you a translation of the Saudi note on the question of the eastern frontier, I pointed out that the wording of the last paragraph but one of that note would allow prospecting in the disputed area from the Saudi side



but not from the Persian Gulf side, and that I was trying to clear up this point. The wording seemed to me neither logical nor in accordance with what Fuad Bey had said to me in an assurance which I reported to you in my telegram No. 92 dated the 11th December. I suggested to Fuad that if in the phrase "They do not believe that the company's employees will go beyond what my Government believe to be within their territories" the words italicised could be replaced by a reference to the frontier as defined in the proposals of His Majesty's Government, the note would express what I understood to be the Saudi Government's point of view. Fuad Bey, however, sent me a letter dated the 25th December (translation enclosed) containing the proposal for mutual abstention from operations in the disputed area which I conveyed to you in my telegram No. 103 of the 30th December.

2. For some time I hoped to induce Fuad Bey to withdraw his letter of the 25th December and to return to the note of the 19th December, with the amendment which I had proposed. It would have been better for the Saudi Arabian Government to say "We do not think our prospectors will go east of your line and we assume that your prospectors will not come west of ours," rather than to make the one dependent upon the other, as they have done in the letter now transmitted to you. I have, however, been unable to secure the withdrawal of the note of the 25th December, with its proposal that mutual abstention on the Saudi side should be dependent upon abstention on our side. Fuad Bey's behaviour has been peculiar about this point. He admits that he gave me the oral assurance reported in my telegram No. 92 dated the 11th December. From one or two indirect remarks he has made I can only conclude that Ibn Saud and Yusuf Yasin concocted the one-sided statement to which I objected, and that he could not induce the King to give in writing an unconditional assurance such as he had himself given me orally. However this may be, the letter of the 25th December remains the last word in writing and I send it to complete the record, though I shall quote, if need arises, the oral assurance given by Fuad on the 11th December. From what Fuad has said on more than one occasion, and from statements made by the Jedda manager of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company, I do not fear that there will be any prospecting in the disputed area by the C.A.S.O.C. at present.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, and to the Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 5.

*Fuad Hamza Bey to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Dear Sir Reader,

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
Mecca, December 25, 1937.

I HAVE referred to the text of the second paragraph of the note sent to you on the 19th December, 1937, concerning the south-eastern frontiers, and I now explain the object (of that note) to you.

The position of my Government is clear in her adhering to and insisting on their established right over the whole of the territory bounded by the frontier defined in the note communicated to Sir Andrew Ryan on 29.12.1935 (3rd April, 1935), and consider that there is nothing to prevent them from allowing the representatives of the C.A.S.O.C. from making a geological or topographical survey within that frontier, especially if the news we have received is taken into consideration, that the representatives of the companies which are operating in the amirates on the Persian Gulf have violated that frontier. If, however, those Governments agree to refrain from violating the frontier until a final agreement has been arrived at as to the places in dispute, my Government will be prepared to inform the representatives of the company of the necessity not to violate frontier described by the British Government as the green line, either for drilling or for prospecting operations.

Yours sincerely,

FUAD HAMZA.

[E 972/90/25]

No. 6.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 13. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

*Jedda, January 22, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 6.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.*

[Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from earlier reports, and those marked with a dagger from those reports with emendations or additions.]

#### *Afghanistan.*

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi presented his credentials as Minister on the 1st April, 1935. He was originally Minister in Egypt as well, but Afghan interests having been placed under the Embassy in Angora he remained with no post but that of Jedda. Nevertheless, between July 1936 and December 1937 he has spent only six weeks in the Hejaz, at the time of the pilgrimage. He has a personal grievance, owing to a rash quarrel with the Saudi Government about a house at Taif, and moreover his Government are known to regard the pilgrimage as a financial drain; it is unlikely, therefore, that much will be seen of him in Jedda. He belongs to a family enjoying great religious consideration in Afghanistan, and is believed to belong to the Nakshbandi order of dervishes. Appears to take no interest in political questions. Pompous and inclined to be fussy. Not unamiable, but hampered in dealings with Europeans by knowing no European language. Is nominally doyen in Jedda.

#### *Belgium.*

†Colonel Ibrahim Depui, an Islamised French officer (retired), was appointed honorary Belgian consul in Jedda by a Royal decree of the 30th January, 1935. He was already well known here, having been attached to the French Military Mission at Jedda during the war, and later employed as French vice-consul at Jedda, where he was distrusted and disliked by his successive chiefs, by the Sharifian authorities, and by all his colleagues. After vacating that post he paid frequent visits to the Hejaz, and was supposed to be interested in commercial schemes. He appeared to be a free lance, though he was not placed on the retired list until September 1934. His formal appointment as Belgian consul was made after he had failed in an attempt to assert a right to the post on the ground that when he was acting French consul on one occasion the Belgian Government had appointed him Belgian consul by name and that they had never revoked the appointment. He left soon after his appointment, and has been back only for a few weeks on two occasions. During his long absences Belgian interests are in the hands of the honorary consul for Czechoslovakia. Depui poses as a man of mystery, but he is a ridiculous liar and fortunately too futile to be dangerous. A distinguished French general told the present writer that he had twice turned Depui out of Syria as an undesirable adventurer, but had found him in the country a third time, so he may have influence of some doubtful kind. He has revived an impertinence which he had to use with discretion in Sharifian times, that of describing himself as "Sharif." How a Frenchman who becomes a Moslem becomes also a descendant of the Prophet has never been explained. It is entertaining to see the assumption of this title was consecrated by its use in the exequatur of the Saudi Government. The best explanation of this that can be obtained is that in the religious democracy of the Wahhabis sharifs are of no more account than any other men, and that it is a matter of indifference to Ibn Saud whether persons using the title have a right to it or not.



In 1936 M. Depui concluded a commercial treaty on behalf of the Belgian Government with the King of the Yemen. He states that he is authorised to negotiate a similar treaty with Saudi Arabia, and to that end describes himself as Envoy Plenipotentiary on his cards.

#### *Czechoslovakia.*

\*Muhhamad Abdulla Ali Reza (to use his own spelling of the name, which marks the Persian origin of his family), became honorary consul when this consular post was created in March 1936. He is a son of that Haji Abdullah who was Governor of Jedda for many years, first under the Sharifian régime and later under the Saudis. He is a young but enterprising local merchant with a good knowledge of English, and head of a firm which does a considerable amount of business for the Saudi Government. (Written in 1936.)

#### *Egypt.*

The Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, Munir Bey, informed His Majesty's Minister in June that the arrangement was to cease by which Abdul Rahman Azzam Effendi, Minister at Bagdad and Tehran (later at Kabul also), was Minister to Saudi Arabia too, and that the post would be held by a Chargé d'Affaires directly dependent on Cairo. No official announcement to this effect seems to have been published, but the information is believed to be correct. A new Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, Ilias Ismail, appeared on the 19th December and presented his credentials on the 21st. He talks English well, and makes a good impression, but nothing more can be said about him as there has only been time to exchange formal visits.

#### *France.*

†M. Maigret held the anomalous position of permanent Chargé d'Affaires at the head of a consulate from the 29th April, 1929, until the 25th February, 1936, when he presented letters of credence as Minister-Resident. On the 14th August, 1936, he presented fresh letters as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. Maigret had a long career in French Morocco, where his reputation was moderately good. Later consul-general in Iraq. Clever and witty, knows English well, has a really good acquaintance with Arabic and Arab literature and affairs, but refuses to talk Arabic and appears embarrassed in official Arab company. Is about 60 years of age. Much of a recluse, with spasmodic outbursts into society. Visits Syria often, France never, and is believed to carry little weight either with his own or with the Saudi Government. Effusive in protestations of friendship towards the British Legation, and even talks warmly of co-operation, but is, in fact, childishly secretive. As a colleague completely useless.

#### *Iraq.*

Post of Chargé d'Affaires vacant.

#### *Italy.*

Gr. Uff. Luigi Sillitti presented his credentials as Minister on the 13th March, 1937. Most of his working life has been passed in the United States, where he held various consular posts. Came to Jedda from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated partly at Grenoble and speaks good French as well as good English. Had no experience of the East before his appointment to Jedda.

M. Sillitti takes great pains to be agreeable to us. This was particularly marked after Coronation Day, when official instructions obliged him to stay away from the reception at His Majesty's Legation. He is a clubbable little man and fond of society of the "regular guy" sort. Is naturally a member of the Fascist party, but has been known to protest humorously against the extra taxation he has to bear as a bachelor, and even to say that he does not believe in trying to force a régime suitable to one country on another, though he seems to be becoming more orthodox or more discreet in his spoken views.

M. Sillitti is about 55 years of age.

#### *Netherlands.*

†M. C. Adriaanse, who succeeded M. van der Meulen as Chargé d'Affaires in 1931, is a member of the Netherlands East Indies civil service. Talks English

well, Arabic less well. A very good colleague, maintaining the traditional good relations between the British and Netherlands missions in Jedda.

In 1935 M. Adriaanse was given the additional appointment of Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad, where he presented credentials in the following year. He has also visited Sana several times on special missions.

Early in 1937 M. Adriaanse nearly died of blackwater fever, and it is understood that his health will not allow him to remain here much longer.

#### *Soviet Union.*

†M. Kerim Khakimoff is a Tartar, and nominally a Moslem. Originally a miner in Tomsk. Soviet consul-general in Jedda from 1924 to 1928, and in those days was believed to be engaged in active anti-British propaganda, though he was personally on friendly terms with the staff of the British Agency. He was transferred to the Yemen as trade agent in 1929, and during his three years' stay there he learned Arabic very well. He already knew Persian, Turkish and Russian. He has now learned enough French to carry on a conversation. After the Yemen he spent several years in Moscow, where one of his jobs was to lecture on the economics of the Arab countries. He presented his credentials as Minister at Jedda on the 25th February, 1936.

M. Khakimoff, though a sincere Communist, is not completely hidebound, and has been known to make admissions which would get him into trouble if known to the authorities in Moscow. He is a friendly, interesting and entertaining colleague, but unless one can talk to him in either Turkish or Russian it is not easy to get him going.

#### *Turkey.*

Vacant.

#### *Representatives Accredited to other Governments and Resident Elsewhere.*

#### *Iran.*

It is believed that the new Iranian Minister to Cairo, M. Javad Sineki, is to be Minister to Saudi Arabia too, as was his predecessor, M. Soltan Ahmad Khan Rad, but no official announcement on the subject has appeared. The Iranian Legation in Jedda was closed throughout the year, except for a few weeks at pilgrimage time.

[E 974/25/25]

No. 7.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

*Jedda, January 30, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a law which appeared in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 21st January, 1938, prescribing the formalities to be fulfilled by any recent convert to Islam who wishes to visit either Mecca or Medina. There is to be set up a religious committee in Jedda with authority to examine such persons and any documents which they may produce in support of their claims, and to issue a decree, where the conversion is adjudged to be genuine, which will authorise the convert to proceed to the Holy Cities.

2. As you are aware, there have been several cases during the last few years where persons claiming to have been converted to Islam have been detained in Jedda for considerable periods while their claims were being examined, and at least one case, that of Mrs. Sterling, an American lady (Jedda report for February 1936, paragraph 76), permission to proceed to Mecca was eventually refused. Article 4 of the law reserves to the Saudi Arabian Government "the absolute right to refuse permission to enter the two sanctuaries to any person suspected of political, military or other [ulterior] aims," and even were this provision wanting, no religious committee would issue a decree involving authorisation to enter Mecca without instructions from the King. Suspicion is chiefly directed against those persons who profess Islam in order to be able to visit a forbidden city, either out of love of novelty or from a desire to secure notoriety, and this suspicion will now have been strengthened by the appearance



of a book entitled *Triumphant Pilgrimage* and the discussion which it has aroused. This book, which is written by Owen Rutter, purports to give an account of the visit to Mecca of a British subject born in the United Kingdom who appears under the name of "Chale." The real name of this man is McBryan, and his appearance in Jedda and his admission to Mecca at the last moment were chronicled in the Jedda reports in 1936 (January, paragraph 36; February, paragraph 76). From reviews which have appeared and from information obtained from Sarawak, where Mr. McBryan was formerly employed, and whence he set out on his pilgrimage, it is evident that much of the story as related by him through Owen Rutter is untrue and that his religious professions, albeit supported by circumcision with a flint, are open to suspicion.

3. It is unlikely that the new law will make any practical change in regard to recent converts. They will still be regarded with suspicion and will have to satisfy the King before being allowed to enter either Mecca or Medina. But the fact that they will not be allowed to perform the pilgrimage as a matter of course is now laid down by law, so that recent converts may be aware before they set out upon the journey to the Hejaz of the conditions which they will have to fulfil.

4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura, No. 685, of January 21, 1938.*

*A Law concerning Converts to Islam, and their Entry into the two Sanctuaries.*  
(Translation.)

AN ordinance has been promulgated ratifying this law, and ordering its enforcement.

*Article 1.* Any recent convert to Islam shall, on his arrival at Jedda for the performance of 'Umra or the visit to Medina, present to the religious committee in Jedda documents supporting his claim.

*Art. 2.* Any recent convert to Islam who wishes to enter either of the two sanctuaries shall submit to the religious committee appointed by the Government at Jedda certificates legalised by the authorities before whom he adopted the Moslem faith.

*Art. 3.* Any recent convert to Islam, who possesses certificates legalised by a high Moslem committee which is recognised in other Moslem countries, or attested by any of the great Moslem Ulema (learned men) known to the Government, shall be entitled to enter the two sanctuaries after the legislation of his certificates by the religious committee in Jedda.

*Art. 4.* The application of any recent convert to Islam, who does not possess the certificates mentioned in the preceding article, shall be dealt with by the religious committee, and he shall remain in Jedda for a period of fifteen days on probation; and if his claim is found to be true and his (belief in) Islam established, he shall be permitted to enter the two sanctuaries after obtaining a decree from the Sharia Court at Jedda, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article, to the effect that he has adopted the Islamic faith.

*Art. 5.* The religious committee at Jedda which shall have the right to examine the certificates of converts to Islam and to examine any convert to Islam who is not in possession of a certificate shall be composed of the following persons:—

1. The president of the Sharia Court at Jedda.
2. The president of the Committee of Virtue.
3. One of those Ulema whom the Government may think fit for this purpose.
4. The Government of His Majesty the King shall have the absolute right to refuse permission to enter the two sanctuaries to any person suspected of political, military or other [ulterior] aims.

[E 977/30/91]

No. 8.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 24.)  
Sir,

*Jedda, February 3, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the visit of His Highness the Sheikh of Bahrein, to which your telegram No. 2 of the 6th January refers.

2. Shortly beforehand Ibn Saud mentioned the visit to me with obvious pleasure. He said what a good man the sheikh was, and reminded me that he and the sheikh were both of Anayza tribal origin.

3. Fuad Bey informed me that the King had been deeply touched by the honours and attentions paid to the Amir Saud when he visited Bahrein last December, and was resolved to repay the debt of hospitality and courtesy with interest. He asked whether it was a fact that we now gave the sheikh the title of "Highness," and, learning that this was so, he said that the Saudi Government would use that form of address. He said that it was proposed to give the sheikh a salute of twenty-one guns when he landed, and asked to how many he was entitled according to our reckoning. He made no comment when I informed him, after enquiry from Bahrein, that His Majesty's Government had accorded to His Highness a salute of eleven guns, and I forebore to comment on the proposal to give the sheikh a larger number here, feeling that that was, after all, Ibn Saud's concern. I believe that the salute fired did, in fact, consist of twenty-one guns, but it was inaudible at the quay where the sheikh landed, and was, moreover, complicated by explosions from a quarry, where a workman thought it would be amusing to let off twenty-one of a large number of charges which happened to be laid.

4. The reception provided by the Saudi authorities was very handsome. The full Saudi air fleet of six machines went out to meet the *Londonderry* and circled slowly round several times. Shortly after I had gone on board the Amir Feisal arrived, to be greeted with twenty-one guns from the ship. The meeting between the Amir and the sheikh was very friendly, and the sheikh was pleased with the programme of the ceremonial to be observed, which was read out to him by a Saudi official. On the ship the Amir insisted on the guest's going in front of him. To maintain his dignity he whispered to me that this was out of respect for the sheikh's age, but I have no doubt that it was by order of the King. In any case, the sheikh was quite equal to the occasion and accepted this not unreasonable act of courtesy with no more than the conventional resistance.

5. The sheikh seemed to have been very comfortable and happy on the *Londonderry*, and was most grateful for the attention shown to him by Captain Dowding. He left the ship full of thanks.

6. By the desire of the King, the Amir and the sheikh left in the same launch. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired for the Amir by the *Londonderry*, and after a short interval a salute of eleven guns for the sheikh.

7. The sheikh was met on the quay by the Amir Saud, who had come to Jedda for the purpose, and by a guard of honour and a great concourse of official and unofficial notables. There was a short reception in the new quarantine building, at which I had a place of honour on the right of the Amir Saud, who had the sheikh on his left. The sheikh then left for the Jedda office of the Minister of Finance, which had been prepared for his reception. He lunched with the Amir Feisal, as Viceroy, in the Khuzam Palace outside Jedda, and, after returning to his quarters in Jedda, set off to Mecca at about 4 p.m. I called on him before he left. He had not yet assumed the pilgrim garb, though ordinarily a pilgrim who intended to go to Mecca first, not to Medina, would land in the "ihram," but he put it on for the journey to Mecca. How this derogation from the religious rule was managed I do not know.

8. According to the press there was an official reception in Mecca the next morning, including a parade of troops, police, school-children, &c., and an address by the Mayor of Mecca; and on three successive days the sheikh was entertained to dinner by the King, the Amir Saud and the Amir Feisal.

9. The sheikh had accepted the proposal of Ibn Saud that he should return home by land via Riyadh after the pilgrimage. This meant that any entertainment given in his honour by His Majesty's Legation must be before the pilgrimage. It was ascertained that His Highness intended to come to Jedda on the

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28th January to meet certain members of his family who were arriving by an Indian pilgrim ship, with whom he would proceed straight to Medina, and he kindly accepted an invitation to attend a reception at the Legation on that day. In the end it was arranged that his family should be taken to him at Mecca and that they should travel to Medina by the Ashaira Road instead of by the ordinary route via Jedda, but His Highness made a special journey to Jedda to be present at the reception, which was attended by the leading members of the British community and the most important official and unofficial Saudis. The sheikh was the life and soul of the party, talking with equal enthusiasm about the kindness and hospitality shown to him by Ibn Saud and by Captain Dowding, and the restoration of order in Arabia by the King and the wonders of H.M.S. *Nelson* and the *Queen Mary*.

10. It is pleasant to see the friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and Bahrein, as compared with the friction to which an end was put only two years ago by the agreements about customs dues and other points then in dispute, and if Ibn Saud uses the occasion to make a small demonstration of pan-Arabism no serious harm will be done. The feeling found expression in a leading article in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 28th January. It is headed "His Majesty the King gives an admirable example of Moslem friendship and Arab brotherhood"—a phrase which occurs several times in the article itself. The article is not worth translating. It speaks of the welcome afforded to the Amir Saud in Bahrein as a demonstration of brotherly unity, and then comes a paragraph which may be given in full as a specimen of the whole:—

"We are sure that the Arab nation whose union has been effected by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz will take a step (please God!) towards the establishment of its great unification based on understanding and sincerity between its kings, amirs, peoples and individuals. Such admirable Islamic manifestations are the distinguished foundations on which the lofty buildings of union and unity will be firmly based."

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire (No. 263/397/38), the Political Agent, Bahrein, (No. 264/397/38) and the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, New Delhi (No. 265/397/38).

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 860/784/91]

No. 9.

*Viscount Halifax to the Earl of Perth (Rome).*

(No. 237.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 22, 1938.*

PRINCE SEIF-UL-ISLAM AL-HUSSEIN, the fourth son of the King of the Yemen, left London on the 14th February for Belgium, whence he is proposing to return slowly to the Yemen via France, Switzerland, Italy, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Egypt.

2. His Royal Highness had been in this country since last May, when he attended the Coronation as head of the official Yemeni delegation, and was entertained as the guest of The King and, later, of His Majesty's Government. Subsequently he extended his stay, ostensibly on medical grounds, and remained in London in a private capacity. But while his health was his ostensible reason for remaining, the arrest of certain of his brothers, who have now, however, been released, by his eldest brother, the Crown Prince Seif-ul-Islam Ahmed, may have increased his reluctance to start for home.

3. While here the Prince was twice received in audience by The King (apart from the Coronation receptions and such occasions as the Royal garden party), once shortly after the Coronation and once just before his departure. At the time of his departure he gave the impression of having appreciated and enjoyed his long visit, while his attitude, which had been critical on his first arrival owing to a mistaken impression that he was to be treated as a colonial, instead of a foreign visitor, had become quite friendly.

4. Shortly before he left it was reported on good authority that the Prince had been much displeased by an announcement in one of the Bari-Rome Arabic news broadcasts to the effect that he had paid a call on the Italian Ambassador. This announcement gave the impression that this gesture was unsolicited and spontaneous, whereas in fact the Prince had merely returned a call which the Italian Ambassador had made a few days previously. It was believed at the time that the visit to Italy might be cancelled in consequence, but the Prince seems to have changed his mind and accepted the invitation to visit Italy, where he is to spend a week as the official guest of the Italian Government.

5. It is understood that the Prince will also spend a week as the guest of the French Government, and it is possible that the Governments in other countries through which he passes will also entertain him.

6. I request that your Lordship will report to me anything of interest which may occur during the Prince's visit to Italy, and in particular whether any proposals of a political nature are made to him. His Royal Highness speaks no language except Arabic, but was accompanied on his departure by Mr. Ibrahim Mougy, an Egyptian who has lived many years in this country and is a good English interpreter.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 1118/195/91]

No. 10.

*Sir R. Craigie to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 39. Confidential.)

*Tokyo, February 1, 1938.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 556 of the 15th November last, I have the honour to report that His Highness Saiyid Said-bin-Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, left Yokohama on the 27th January for San Francisco by the steamship *Tatsuta Maru*, thus concluding his stay of five weeks in this country.

2. His Highness arrived at Kobe on the 23rd December by the steamship *Hakone Maru* from Hong Kong, and stayed at an hotel there. He was accompanied by his brother, Saiyid Tariq-bin-Taimur, by two secretaries, Helal-bin-Bader and Saiyid Abdulmunim Zawawi, by an official, Khan Bahadur Ahmad Shubaily, and by two negro servants. The main purpose of his visit was to see his father, Saiyid Taimur, who, having abdicated in 1932, has for the last two years been living in Kobe with a Japanese wife. The announcement of the Sultan's arrival appeared in the Japanese, although not in the foreign, press, and throughout his stay in Kobe His Highness was constantly troubled by Japanese reporters, although he refused to grant any interviews.

3. I instructed His Majesty's consul at Kobe to call on His Highness and to inform him that I desired to take an early opportunity of welcoming him to Tokyo, and that I hoped to arrange a dinner in his honour. I also asked Mr. Ovens to make discreet enquiries as to whether His Highness would like to stay at the Embassy when he came to Tokyo.

4. On the 31st December Mr. Ovens called by appointment on the Sultan, who received him most courteously and appeared to be gratified by the solicitude shown on his behalf. He looked forward to visiting the Embassy, but hoped that any entertainment which was arranged in his honour would be of a "private" nature, since he was anxious to maintain the strictest incognito while in Japan. As regards staying at the Embassy, he had already decided to stay at an hotel in Tokyo in view of his desire for as much freedom of movement and as much privacy as possible. Mr. Ovens reported that the Sultan had been very harassed by newspapermen, and that the impression which he and his suite had formed of this country up till then had not been an entirely happy one.

5. After a short visit to Kyoto, the Sultan and his party arrived in Tokyo on the 10th January, where they were met at the station by a member of my staff, who conveyed my greetings to His Highness. Fears for the preservation of the Sultan's incognito, however—to a very large extent these determined all the party's movements—led to a sudden change in their plans, and after only one night in Tokyo they left hurriedly for an hotel in Yokohama, where they stayed

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until they left Japan, and where they successfully concealed their identity, at least from the press.

6. The Sultan eventually accepted my invitation and came to luncheon at the Embassy on the 18th January, the guests consisting solely of members of my staff and their wives.

7. As he had expressed a desire to attend a session of the Diet, which was then sitting, two members of the staff accompanied His Highness, together with Mr. Zawawi and Mr. Bader, to a session of the Lower House on the 24th January.

8. On the following day, the 25th January, His Highness lunched at the American Embassy, my United States colleague having been concerned in making arrangements for his journey across the United States to Washington, where he will be the guest of the President.

9. On the 27th January the Sultan and his suite left for San Francisco by the steamship *Tatsuta Maru*. His father was in the party, but it is expected that he will soon return to Kobe.

10. The impressions which the Sultan and his party formed of Japan were far from favourable. Reference has already been made to the unwelcome attention to which they were subjected by reporters in Kobe, who on more than one occasion forced their way into the Sultan's room at the hotel, and the police, both in Kobe and in Kyoto, were as importunate as usual. As is the case with most tourists, their contacts with the Japanese were almost confined to their dealings with guides, hotel employees, taxi-drivers, shop assistants, curio dealers and others of that predatory class, which may account for the low opinion they formed of Japanese intelligence and efficiency. While the party were in Tokyo a member of my staff accompanied them at their invitation to a Japanese wrestling tournament, the classical Japanese drama and on a motor-car tour of the sights. On the whole they appeared to derive little pleasure from their visit to Japan and to find the time hanging heavy on their hands. So far, His Highness confided, Japan had proved to be the least interesting stage of his tour round the world.

11. It is unlikely that any discussion took place between the Sultan and Japanese officials. When I suggested that he might like to meet some Japanese officials at the luncheon-party, he recoiled from the idea as if nothing could have been more distasteful. In the course of a conversation with a member of my staff, he stated that Muscat was not in treaty relations with Japan, that there had been no talk of opening relations, and that it was unlikely that relations would be opened in the future. If any discussions did, in fact, take place during the Sultan's stay in Japan, the fact was concealed with considerable skill and a deliberate attempt made to suggest the contrary.

12. I was impressed by the friendly attitude of the Sultan when he came to the Embassy, and his manner towards the British officials with whom he came into contact was consistently affable. He appeared to desire to keep on good terms with us, expressed to me several times the warm feelings which he had towards the British, and seemed to appreciate the little which we were able to do for him.

I have, &c.

R. L. CRAIGIE.

[E 1251/150/91]

No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 14, 1938.

HAVING received your final instructions about the eastern frontier of Southern Arabia, conveyed in your telegrams Nos. 16 and 17 of the 27th January, I addressed a note to the Saudi Government on the 3rd February. A copy of this note is enclosed. On account of the pilgrimage, which is now at its height, a reply is not expected for a few days.

2. In my telegram No. 36, dated the 31st January, I had the honour to inform you of Fuad Bey's obvious consternation on hearing the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the letter from Mr. Calvert of the 26th September, 1935. I transmit herewith a copy of a letter on this point which he has sent me, and a copy of my reply. Fuad Bey was, perhaps, disingenuous in quoting from the Arabic translation of Mr. Calvert's letter, when he knows

that the Arabic is only sent unofficially in order to assist the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless the wording of the "assurance" was misleading, and unfortunately the Arabic is even more misleading, as the word "considerable," which has no exact equivalent in common use in Arabic, was rendered, by the temporary translator who, in the absence of both the regular translators, had been borrowed from the Sudan, by the word "adhim," which means "great."

3. If Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Mr. Zada had kept as careful a record as was kept by the Foreign Office of a meeting with Mr. Rendel at the Foreign Office on the 27th November, 1935 (Foreign Office despatch No. 346, dated the 3rd December, 1935), any misunderstanding created by Mr. Calvert's letter of the previous September would have been cleared up. The first part of the Foreign Office record reads as follows:—

"On the 27th November, the Saudi Minister, with whom I had been lunching, raised the question of the south-eastern Arabian frontiers with special reference to the Qatar Oil Concession. I found that Sheikh Hafiz had not clearly realised the position about the concession and I explained to him, with the aid of a map produced by Mr. Zada, that the concession was for a limited area which was described on a map attached to the concession, and that although, in one place, it extended slightly beyond the maximum frontier claimed by King Abdul Aziz, it did not, in fact, extend to what we regarded as the frontier between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The limit of the concession in fact lay well to the north of the maximum line which we had been able to offer to King Abdul Aziz. There was no question of an unlimited 'blanket concession,' as in the case of the Saudi concession to the Standard Oil Company of California, and in view of our known views on the frontier question there could be no question of the concession extending over territory the sovereignty over which was in any real doubt.

"Sheikh Hafiz did not dissent from this explanation and did not pursue the matter further."

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.*

(No. 22.)

Your Royal Highness,

(After Compliments.)

Jedda, February 3, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Royal Highness's letter dated the 19th December last regarding the boundary between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the territories of the Sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi. I did not fail to communicate to my Government the views expressed in that letter, as well as the substance of various conversations which I had with his Excellency Fuad Bey both before and after the date of the letter. In the course of the discussion to which your Royal Highness refers, which I had the pleasure to have with his Excellency on the 10th December, I learned that His Majesty's Government had no cause to believe that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company would take action in the disputed area, and I conveyed this information to my Government, who were very glad to receive this assurance. My Government, however, much regret to learn from your Royal Highness's above-mentioned letter that the Saudi Arabian Government attribute the failure to reach a settlement to His Majesty's Government. As Mr. Rendel had the honour to point out to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in person, my Government have repeatedly made concessions on this point, whereas the Saudi Arabian Government have been unwilling to abate their claim in the least. My Government are obliged to say, though with the most sincere regret, that they cannot see how it is possible for them to make any further concession in regard to a frontier which they adopted in accordance with history and the essential needs of the Arab States concerned. They feel that in bringing the frontier which they are prepared to accept so much nearer to the frontier proposed by the Saudi Arabian Government than they had originally considered possible they have shown a spirit of conciliation which they trust the Saudi Arabian Government have not overlooked.

[19825]

c 3



As to the proposed topographical mission, I did not fail to explain to my Government the opinion set forth in the last paragraph but one of your Royal Highness's letter. My Government have considered that opinion with the attention which they pay to every proposal made to them by the Saudi Arabian Government, but they do not find it possible to agree that the proposed mission would be pointless, since they believe that the claim of the Saudi Arabian Government is based in part upon incorrect topographical data. The sole object of the mission would be to establish certain facts, and my Government trust that the Saudi Arabian Government will find it possible to agree to its despatch.

With highest respects,

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Dear Sir Reader,

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca,  
February 5, 1938.*

AS a result of your conversation with me last Sunday evening, the 30th January, regarding the correspondence going on about the abstention of the employees of the companies operating, whether in Saudi Arabia or in the Arab amirates, on the Persian Gulf from penetrating beyond the frontier to which my Government adhere, I looked up the correspondence exchanged between Mr. Calvert and my colleague, Yusuf Yasin, of the 26th September, 1935, and the 17th Jumadi-al-Thani (? Rajab), 1354, thinking that I might perhaps find in it what you mentioned to me in your conversation that evening concerning what your Government meant. I now feel it my duty to explain how my Government understood the position, as is clear from the correspondence.

Correspondence was exchanged between our two Governments regarding the concession granted by the Sheikh of Qatar to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and Mr. Calvert wrote his personal letter to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in which there occurs the following paragraph:—

(<sup>1</sup>) "The southern limit of the oil concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the Sheikh of Qatar does not extend beyond this 'Green Line,' but lies to a considerable distance to the north of it. The concession does not, therefore, extend to any territory under discussion with the Saudi Government."

Sheikh Yusuf understood from this that, as the concession lay in an area very far to the north of the Green Line, it was naturally outside the area under discussion, i.e., the area situated to the north and east of the Green Line. Apart from that, the reply of Sheikh Yusuf to Mr. Calvert's letter was decisive to any doubt on the subject. If you will look again at the second and third paragraphs of that letter you will see clearly the fact to which Sheikh Yusuf adhered. In order to draw your attention (to it), I quote the following from the letter:—

"As regards your reference to (the fact) that the British Government, in accordance with their desire (*sic*) to deprive themselves of their strict legal rights, and offer a part of those rights to the Saudi Arab Government, &c. (literally, to the end that your statement on the subject). I am glad to draw your attention in this respect to the true facts that our Government always desire that their relations with the Amirs of those territories (literally, directions) should be lasting relations of affection and friendship, and do not desire to restrict (literally, press upon) them and their affairs, and they (Saudi Arabian Government) showed their readiness to grant them areas (territories) to the utmost extent which can be granted, on the understanding that the whole of those domains were previously subject to the fathers and forefathers of His Majesty the King Abdul Aziz. As regards the legal rights to which you refer and to which the British Government

(<sup>1</sup>) In translating Fuad Bey's letter the Legation have not translated this paragraph, where Fuad Bey quotes from the Arabic translation of Mr. Calvert's letter, but have quoted Mr. Calvert's words in English.

pretend, our Government cannot recognise and accept them and cannot consider them as basis for any discussion in connexion with those frontiers. In respect of the above, our Government therefore preserve their fullest rights in the territories and places which they cannot agree to renounce in favour of the Amirs of those territories, and (in regard to) all privileges or rights which may be granted at those reserved places, our Government cannot recognise or agree to them, and record their reservation in their regard.

"This is on the one hand, and on the other I am pleased to inform you that our Government are fully prepared at any time to discuss the settlement of the question of the frontiers in a spirit of affection and friendship to those neighbouring Amirs whenever discussion may be resumed on this subject."

(The English of this passage is taken from the translation which was sent to the Foreign Office in Jedda printed letter No. 292 of the 16th October, 1935.)(<sup>2</sup>)

This letter was apparently effective in inducing the British Government to issue instructions to Mr. Calvert to address to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin another letter, dated the 26th October, in which he stated that "Sir Andrew Ryan, who, as your Excellency is aware, is shortly arriving in Riyadh, will bring with him new proposals in regard to the frontier question. His Majesty's Government hope that these proposals will lead to a settlement."

Sir Andrew Ryan did in fact bring new proposals which modified the previous ones. This shows that the position of the British Government as indicated by Mr. Calvert in his first letter of the 26th September, 1935, was not final, as I understood from you in your conversation.

The position of my Government regarding the frontier to which they adhere is explained in the note sent by His Highness the Amir Faisal to your Excellency on the 16th Shawwal, 1356 (the 19th December, 1937). They consider that it is within their power to authorise the employees of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to penetrate right up to the line to which my Government adhere, and if you will refer to the last paragraph but one of that note you will perceive the fact.

As a result of that, personal correspondence took place between us as to the meaning of that paragraph, and I explained clearly the intention of my Government, and at the same time I explained to you their readiness, when they should have received the agreement of the authorities concerned in the Arab amirates on the Persian Gulf that the employees of the companies should not encroach upon the frontier to which they hold, to refrain from authorising the employees of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to pass beyond the Green Line. In the contrary case, they still insist on their opinion that there is nothing whatever to prevent them from authorising them to operate right up to the line by which they indicated their small claims from the Arab amirates.

FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Fuad Bey Hamza.*

My dear Fuad Bey,

*Jedda, February 9, 1938.*

IN replying to your letter of the 5th February I think it more useful to confine myself to the meaning of the letter of Mr. Calvert of the 26th September, 1935, as I tried to do in our conversation of the 30th January. I am sorry if the Saudi Arabian Government read the paragraph which you quote in a different sense from the sense in which it was intended by His Majesty's Government. I notice that you quote the Arabic translation which was sent with Mr. Calvert's letter. You are aware, however, that the official text of our communications to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the English, which is signed by the head of the post: the Arabic translation is sent for the convenience of the Ministry.

(<sup>2</sup>) "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part XXXVII, No. 47, Enclosure.



The paragraph to which you refer reads thus:—

"The southern limit of the oil concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the Sheikh of Qatar does not extend beyond this 'Green Line,' but lies to a considerable distance to the north of it. The concession does not, therefore, extend to any territory under discussion with the Saudi Government."

(In the Arabic translation which accompanied this letter this passage was inserted in English.)

This paragraph is composed of two sentences. The second is merely a corollary of the first, and was based on repeated assertions by His Majesty's Government that they were not prepared to discuss any further abatement of their claims beyond the Green Line. It is true that His Majesty's Government subsequently found themselves able to propose the line which was put forward by Sir Andrew Ryan at Riyadh, but that is beside the point for the moment. My point is that the paragraph quoted above expressed the position as it was on the 26th September, 1935, from the point of view of His Majesty's Government.

I hope that this paragraph is now quite clear.

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BULLARD

[E 1403/1403/25]

No. 12.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 34.)

My Lord,

Jedda, February 22, 1938.

IN my despatch No. 173 dated the 29th November I furnished such meagre information as had reached me in regard to the application of the Saudi "Instructions concerning Traffic in Slaves" during the first year. I have now received information from a person upon whom I can rely, tending to show that the "Instructions" are unknown or ignored on the eastern side of Saudi Arabia. My informant is a young Arab whom I knew in Jedda in 1923-25 and whom I found as Director of Customs at Ujair last July. Being in Jedda on leave he paid me a call, in the course of which he made a confidential statement which is summarised in the following paragraph.

2. Slaves are still brought to Saudi Arabia across the Persian Gulf. The slavers are usually from Dibai, the slaves "Baluchis" from the Makram coast. My informant had himself seen boys, women with babies, and young girls who had been brought over in this way. They were not black, but "children of men." In correspondence the slavers referred to slaves as "carpets" ("mafarish"), so that any letters of theirs that went astray should not betray them. He had seen one such letter and the owner had explained the position quite frankly. The dhows engaged in the traffic travelled at night in order to evade the British patrol. The traffic to Hasa by sea seemed to have fallen off considerably during the last few months, but according to his information slaves were still being imported by land from the Persian Gulf. This traffic, said my informant, was repugnant to his feelings, and he wanted me to know about it in case His Majesty's Government might be able to do something to put a stop to it.

3. To my surprise I found that he had never heard of the Instructions of the 2nd October, 1936. He was astonished when I showed him the first clause, which prohibits the importation of slaves by sea completely, and allows importation by land only under such conditions as would usually be difficult to fulfil. He explained that the Mecca newspapers hardly ever reached Ujair, and that in any case he could hardly act without instructions from his superiors. Eventually he took note of the issue of the *Umm-al-Qura* containing the text of the Instructions, and said that he would seek an opportunity to ask the authorities whether he was supposed to act upon the text which had appeared in the press.

4. The indifference of the Saudi authorities to the enslavement of free persons from foreign countries is in striking contrast to the treatment awarded to smugglers. My informant stated spontaneously, thus confirming information which I have already reported on two or three occasions, that Ibn Saud has any persons caught smuggling executed.

5. In the Jedda report for November 1936, paragraph 399, I mentioned a story which had reached me that there was then at Taif, living in slavery, an 11-year-old boy named Khumais, who was alleged to be the son of one of the leading merchants of Daubai and to have been stolen and sold for 400 rupees to the Director of Wireless Operators at Riyadh. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was unable to find any foundation for this report. Perhaps the misspelling of "Dibai" misled the search. The Indian vice-consul, who gave me the information, was quite certain that the report was true in the main. It is curious that my present informant should report that the slavers to-day are all Dibai people.

6. In view of the source from which I have obtained the above information about the slave trade into Hasa I would request that it should be regarded as confidential.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Political Agents at Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1637/139/25]

No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to Sir L. Oliphant.—(Received March 21.)*

(Confidential.)

Jedda, March 3, 1938.

My dear Oliphant,

WHEN you see the enclosed programme of the visit of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice you will realise to what extent we exploited her kindness. The programme was a little fuller than I had expected owing to the fact that after I had drawn up an agreed list of engagements with Fuad Bey and sent it to Egypt for the approval of Her Royal Highness, the King decided to give a dinner, and the Governor of Jedda a picnic.

Let me run through the list of engagements and tell you what happened. My letter may be on the long side, but it is better to tell too much than too little.

Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and the Governor of Jedda followed me on board H.M.S. *Enterprise* to greet the visitors, and on the quay the Amir Faisal received them. This reception may appear among the news items at the cinemas, as the Egyptian sound-film people who had come to film the pilgrimage seized the opportunity to take pictures of the visitors' arrival and their meeting with the Amir. Other moving pictures were taken at Ibn Saud's tea party and at the Amir Faisal's picnic.

From the quay the party were taken by Sheikh Hafiz and the Governor to the Kandara Palace, which had been specially prepared for them. When the King first resolved to provide accommodation for the party I was a little anxious, as there was then nothing suitable for them in Jedda, but in the end I was glad that he had insisted, as they were much better housed than they would have been at the Legation, which, though a good house for Jedda, is small and not too convenient for a considerable party. Within the space of about three or four weeks a large house standing in the desert about half a mile from Jedda was completely transformed. Two rooms were fitted up as modern bathrooms, a dressing-room was built on, several floors were tiled, electric light was installed and adequate furniture was supplied. Fuad Bey appears to have been responsible for the plan of operations, and Najib Salha, who is a kind of Director of Works under the Minister of Finance, acted as stimulator of workmen, who were kept at it, by high pay cash-down, even through the feast of the pilgrimage. The visitors were very comfortable, I believe, the more so as they had not reason to expect a very high standard in this respect.

After tea on the first day the British community (less the purdah ladies) were presented to Her Royal Highness. With her permission I brought all of them in, in two relays, down to the dispensers who assist the Indian doctor. A number of them were Indians and two or three Malays. A distinguished Indian Moslem member of the Indian Political, who happened to be on the pilgrimage, thought himself very fortunate to be among those presented. As Her Royal Highness left the Legation she saw the eight British messengers of the



Legation, from Aden, the Hadramaut and Nigeria. The reception was very small in numbers, but, owing to the diverse places represented, a feeling of contact with the Royal Family will be carried to many corners of the Empire.

Arab dinners are not very bright as a rule, but they are short. The Amir Faisal's dinner, however, was exceptional in being long and gay—thanks in both respects to Her Royal Highness. It was also exceptional in that ladies were invited. Besides Her Royal Highness there were five ladies present—three British, one American and one Dutch. The dinner, which was very good as a meal, was followed by Arab coffee, and soon afterwards Her Royal Highness, having learned that it was the custom for visitors to leave early, made a movement towards taking leave. The Amir Faisal, however, so evidently hoped that she would stay longer that she sat down for perhaps another forty-five minutes. And a most animated forty-five minutes they were. I have never seen such animation at any function in Jedda. It seemed to radiate from the top of the room, where Her Royal Highness was sitting. She talked for a time to the Amir, with myself interpreting—all about the grass on the desert, and the migration of tribes, and the goat and its ways, and the inferiority of the goat tribes to the sheep and camel tribes. Her Royal Highness then had various Saudi notables brought to her in turn, and, with Sheikh Hafiz as interpreter, maintained the animation to the incredible hour of 10.20. Only about a week before we had been to dinner with the Amir Saud, and had left, to his relief or at least without protest on his part, at 9.10. When the Amir had said good-bye to Her Royal Highness and Lord Athlone and turned to shake hands with me, he was obviously moved, and could not speak the usual words of farewell.

Ibn Saud was very happy at his tea-party. He had never entertained a European lady to a meal before; he had never met a foreign lady of rank; and he did not know in the least how to manage the cakes and things that were piled on his plate; but his remarkable natural manners carried him through not only unmoved but with perfect dignity. He explained at the beginning that he was bound to make many *gaffes* from the English point of view, but since the house was the Princess's house she would, he said, never notice them. In his struggle with a piece of iced cake he dropped his fork, and he just sat patiently while the servants cleared away first the fork and then the victorious cake. He was in good form, ragging Fuad and Yasin for being fat, and for getting horribly seasick when he took them on the Persian Gulf. Sheikh Hafiz protested that *he* wasn't sick, and the King admitted that. After tea we went back to the reception room, where we were given cups of that bitter Arab coffee to which the visitors eventually became quite attached. While we were there a diffident hope expressed by Mlle. Boutet, Her Royal Highness's companion, that she might be allowed to see the King reached His Majesty through Sheikh Hafiz, and the King not only allowed her to come in but shook hands with her.

That same evening a reception was given at the Legation to a considerable number of Saudi officials and notables (headed by the Amir Faisal), nearly all the Diplomatic Corps, and the leading members of the British and other foreign communities. Having already met the Saudis and the British, Her Royal Highness was able to talk to the ladies and some of the men of the foreign official and non-official communities, and to leave them, as I have reason to know, full of pleasure and admiration. Lord Athlone, too, was most kind in talking to as many of the guests as possible. The Amir Faisal left early, with a graceful reference to the greater freedom (*i.e.*, to smoke and to drink something other than lemonade) which would, he suggested, be felt after his departure.

The third day began with a departure at about 11 o'clock for a picnic at Wady Fatma, about half-way to Mecca. It had rained heavily the night before, and although, owing to the long drought, the rain was welcome, we feared that it might be too wet for the picnic. However, on ringing up the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, we found that the Amir Faisal, who was giving the picnic, had already gone out to the spot, so we also set out. Fortunately there had been less rain inland, and at Wady Fatma there was even some sun. The picnic had been organised on an immense scale. There was a huge reception tent, and the lunch was spread in another tent. The food, most of which was done in the Arab style, was excellent. After lunch the guests, who included many foreigners, strolled about for an hour or so, during which time the Amir and the other Saudis said the afternoon prayer. Mr. Philby was present, looking slightly absurd with very pink feet in sandals where all the Saudis were wearing socks and shoes or

slippers, but he was very interesting on the topography of the place. He had brought with him the maps of the locality which he has made, and he pointed out the hills round Mecca, and explained how they lay in relation to the town. The journey to and from Wady Fatma lay over a very bad road, much cut up by pilgrim traffic, but the car provided for the visitors by the King, a Dodge, was very comfortable, and they declared that they were not fatigued. This was fortunate, as they were to dine with the King that night.

For the King to invite a lady to dinner, albeit so great a lady as Her Royal Highness, was so remarkable that it is said the King's favourite wife refused to believe, when she heard of it afterwards, that it had really happened. No other ladies were allowed to be present, and the only members of the Legation invited were myself and Mr. Gault, but there were a number of Saudi officials and Jedda notables present, and Mr. Philby. The King had Her Royal Highness on his right with myself on her right, so that I was able to interpret for her. He talked a good deal during dinner, indulging at one moment in his pastime of teasing Mr. Philby. But it was after dinner that he really came out strong. A request was made in the name of the visitors that he should relate the story of the capture of Riyadh. While expressing diffidence at his narrative powers, he was evidently very pleased and flattered to be asked. He started rather too far back, and the story was rather too full of undefined "he's," but on the whole it was a great success. The account of the way in which Ibn Saud and the enemy played tug-of-war in the doorway of the fort with the body of the Governor of Riyadh was very stirring. Nor was the tale without touches of humour, and when the King related how, in climbing over the roofs to get into the outer fort, they came upon a man and his wife asleep, and bundled them up in their own bed-clothes and shoved them into a room to wait until morning, he laughed so much that he rolled about in his chair. I feared that the tale was becoming too long before it ended. I translated as rapidly as possible, but now and then there was a pause while we found out which "he" had done what, or when the King used some strange word. He defeated me for a moment by using the verb universally used for "take" or "capture" in the sense of "to defeat," and again by using for "to be born" a word which I was gratified to find Mr. Philby had never heard and which is not given in the dictionaries. He used this word when he was telling us how each of his first four living sons was born at a critical moment of his career. We forbore to ask him for the list of events coinciding with the births of the rest of his sons, or the tale would have been unduly prolonged. But in spite of the fatigue of listening to a rather long-drawn-out story through an interpreter, Her Royal Highness and Lord Athlone expressed great pleasure at hearing about this extraordinary military feat from the chief actor in it.

On the morning of the fourth day Lord Athlone was to see Ibn Saud at 11. We were on the point of setting out when a train of men arrived with presents. There were Arab robes for the whole party, and in addition—

For Her Royal Highness: An elaborate pearl and emerald necklace and a handsome ornament or (Arab?) work consisting of chains of flat gold links.

For Lord Athlone: A sword of honour, with an embroidered "bucket" to carry the sword and a rifle from a camel saddle.

For Lord Frederick Cambridge: A dagger.

For Mlle. Boutet: A watch.

I am sending home by bag, as enclosures to a separate letter, the two ornaments presented to Her Royal Highness and the sword of honour.

Her Royal Highness kindly consented to receive the Moslem ladies of the British community, who have to observe strict purdah in this country, and therefore could not attend any of the public functions, and the reception was arranged for this last morning. The hearts of some of the ladies invited failed them at the last moment, and only six or seven appeared. One or two of the ladies were Indians, but most were of Hejaz or other Arab origin. Mrs. Ousman, the wife of a member of my staff, acted as interpreter in Arabic. I hear that the ladies who had the honour of being received had a wonderful time, and I am sure that they will never forget the gracious princess who told them about Their Majesties King George and Queen Elizabeth and their children.

Meanwhile, Lord Athlone and I had been to see the King. There had been some fear lest he should try to talk politics, but either the fear had been



exaggerated or the measures taken to avert the possibility had been successful, for there was no reference to politics. Lord Athlone began by apologising for being a little late; the magnificent presents sent by His Majesty had arrived just as he was setting off, and he could not go without looking at them. "A few cheap things," said the King. Lord Athlone then gave Ibn Saud a personal message from His Majesty King George which obviously gave him great pleasure. Ibn Saud was also pleased when Lord Athlone told him about the effort that was being made to increase the facilities for Arabic studies at the School of Oriental Languages, and said that after his visit to Saudi Arabia he would support the project with renewed vigour, in his capacity as Chancellor of London University. The rest of the conversation was general. Lord Athlone took his leave after a cordial talk of an hour or rather less. Before he left, the King allowed Sheikh Hafiz to take several photographs of himself and Lord Athlone standing side by side.

The Kaïmakam of Jedda had organised a great picnic "with fishing" for the afternoon of the fourth day, at a place some 20 miles from Jedda. Unfortunately, we allowed ourselves to be guided by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who tried to make up for an absence of a sense of direction by dashing over every kind of ground at full speed, and arrived rather late. But it would in any case have been too late to allow of fishing, since the sun sets early by local time and everyone wanted to get home in daylight. The Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, who is a confirmed fisherman, had intended to fish all day and to arrive at the picnic with his catch. He alleges that he made a good haul, but he did not reach the rendezvous until all the guests had left. For this he was much ragged by the Amir Faisal at a dinner which I gave at the Legation that night. I was afraid that at my dinner Her Royal Highness, who had the Amir on one side and Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman on the other, would be fatigued with the conversation, but I placed Mr. Philby in a strategic position and myself talked across the table a good deal to the Amir, translating for the benefit of Her Royal Highness, and the result was, I hope, not too tiresome for her. By luck we hit upon a subject which interested the Amir and caused a great flow of conversation—the Yemen habit of chewing a leaf *qat*, which has an effect like that of hashish. The Amir described how, when he captured Hodeidah in the war with the Yemen, he was unable to maintain the blockade of the highlands which he had contemplated because they are the source of the supply of *qat*, and without *qat* the whole population would have left the town; and gave a description of the arrival of the daily caravan crying *qat* (just as a hawker in London cries oranges) and of the people rushing out to replenish their stocks.

At the picnic that afternoon it had been realised that the King's favourite wife, Umm Mansour, from whom the presents for Her Royal Highness had nominally come, was in Jedda, and negotiations were set on foot for Her Royal Highness to pay her a visit. Unfortunately, it was already evening, and the only possible time for a meeting was the next day, before the departure for Riyadh. Knowing the risks of the road even at the best of times, we had arranged for the hour of departure to be advanced from 9.30 to 8.30 A.M., while the King, fearing that to attempt to reach Taif in one day would tire his guests, had arranged for a camp to be pitched for them at Muhditha, some two hours short of Taif. This plan was, however, upset. Her Royal Highness called at the appointed time at the house where Umm Mansour was staying, but was kept waiting a long time while the queens (the second wife was there too) dressed up for the occasion, and it was 10.20 when the convoy eventually left Jedda. But the interview with the two queens was an engagement which Her Royal Highness would not willingly have missed, and that she asked for it, and kept it at inconvenience to herself, will have been highly pleasing to the Royal ladies, and certainly gave great pleasure to Ibn Saud.

With two members of my staff I accompanied the party to Madraga, about 90 miles from Jedda. It is on the road to the gold mine, and the Mining Syndicate have built there a rest-house, where we had lunch. Here, after seeing Her Royal Highness depart for Taif, we had with great regret to turn back. Mr. Gault went on with the party. He took with him an excellent Sudani butler, who will assist the servants provided by the Saudi Government whenever required. The road by which we had come was in good condition in spite of the rain there had been (we did the 88 miles in four and a half hours), but it was known that there was a good deal of mud on the plateau, and I feared that the second half of

the day would be more difficult than the first. These fears were only too well founded. I learned next day by telephone from Taif that instead of reaching Muhditha at about 7 P.M., in time for dinner, the party had to have some kind of a meal, late at night, at Birka, where the track to Taif branches off from the mine road, and did not reach camp until 3 A.M. However, the excellent man who runs these convoys, an Egyptian named Abdul Salaam, telephoned down to Jedda at about 1.30 A.M. to say that the guests were nearing Taif, that they were none the worse for the adventures of the day before, and that they were in excellent spirits. This was later confirmed by the Governor of Taif.

The authorities had certainly made the best possible arrangements for the journey. The touring cars were comfortable, the servants efficient; and Her Royal Highness's liking for fresh fruit was acknowledged by the inclusion of fifteen cases of oranges among the stores—though the condition of the ground at Madraga after the lunch interval suggested that Her Royal Highness was not alone in the convoy in liking oranges. Acting on a suggestion which I encouraged, the King has now allotted a travelling wireless station to accompany the party to Riyadh, so that he and the Legation may be in constant touch with them. He has also ordered that messages from Mr. Gault for the Foreign Office for broadcasting are to be sent free.

I wish that you could have been here to see the extraordinary success of the visit in which you believed so strongly. That Her Royal Highness and Lord Athlone would delight all the Europeans, whether British or not, whom they might meet was a foregone conclusion; but what of the Arabs? Well, it is impossible to imagine a more complete success. Of course, that the visit should be made at all was a great compliment which Ibn Saud and his people appreciated at its full value, but that alone would not have accounted for their pleasure, and certainly not for the ease and warmth of the many meetings. I have found that Arabs are always pleased to find points where they and we are alike, and I think that the Saudis were pleased to find that the English, like themselves, manage to combine respect for rank with feelings of human equality. I have just been to see the Governor of Jedda to thank him for all he did for the King's guests, and he discoursed on this theme. It is not possible, we agreed, giving the size of the population of Great Britain and our system of government, for any person with a grievance to walk into the presence of His Majesty King George, as within limits he can approach Ibn Saud on certain occasions, and to say "O George, grant me this!" But the kind way in which Her Royal Highness talked to all whom she met, without distinction, showed, the Governor held, a lack of arrogance and a respect for man as man such as is held by the Arabs, whether sheikhs or other rulers or common men. It was evident that the King felt at home from the first moment, and that he realised that he had met in his visitors, for all their close connexion with the British King-Emperor, that simplicity and sincerity of character which are among his own most striking qualities. But I will not labour the point. The King was already well disposed towards us, on personal and—except for one melancholy subject—on political grounds, and this visit has set the seal on his liking. It seemed to me that he found in the visit the confirmation of his convictions that, as he said to me once, the English are the best people. If anything could turn the scale with Ibn Saud if the Palestine trouble becomes desperate, it will be the memory of Her Royal Highness's visit.

Yours ever,

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 13.

*Visit of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice and the Earl of Athlone to Saudi Arabia.*

*Programme at Jedda.*

February 25.

- (1) Her Royal Highness and Lord Athlone, accompanied by Lord Frederick Cambridge, arrived in H.M.S. *Enterprise*. Met on board by His Majesty's Minister and by the Saudi Minister in London and the Governor of Jedda.
- (2) Reception on the quay by His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal.



(3) British residents presented to Her Royal Highness at His Majesty's Legation.

(4) His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal gave a dinner in honour of the visitors.

February 26.

(1) His Majesty King Abdul Aziz entertained the visitors and His Majesty's Minister to tea. This was the first occasion on which the King ever received a European lady in his own house.

(2) Reception at His Majesty's Legation.

February 27.

(1) The Amir Faisal gave a large picnic at Wady Fatma, half-way to Mecca, and invited, besides the visitors, the Diplomatic Corps and many Saudi officials and notables.

(2) His Majesty the King entertained the visitors to dinner, with His Majesty's Minister and some Saudis.

February 28.

(1) Princess Alice received the Moslem ladies of the British community.

(2) Lord Athlone, with His Majesty's Minister, received by the King.

(3) The Governor of Jedda gave a large picnic on the sea-shore some 20 miles from Jedda. The Amir Faisal was present, besides most of the persons who had been at his picnic the day before.

(4) Dinner at His Majesty's Legation. The Amir Faisal was present.

March 1.

The visitors said good-bye to the King, and Her Royal Highness paid a visit to the two senior queens.

[E 1742/233/91]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 39. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, March 8, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that during a talk which I had on the 6th March with Fuad Bey about the international situation, with particular regard to Italy and the Red Sea, the conversation turned at one moment to the Aden Protectorate, as to which, Fuad Bey said, the Italians had been showing suspicion. I said that one of the things which had aroused their suspicions was the journey of Mr. Philby. At this Fuad Bey made a statement to the following effect:—

2. Many Arabs who came on the pilgrimage from Shabwa, the Sei'ar area, and other places thereabouts, had come to Mr. Philby. Some of them had come to Ibn Saud, and a few had even brought letters to him. He talked to them and told them that if they were not independent they could not do better than be under the British. He related some of his experiences with various European Powers, designed to show that the British were the best; and he advised them to behave themselves, and to try to get on well with the British. His advice was listened to attentively, and Fuad Bey hoped that it would have a good effect.

3. I did not feel called upon to show very lively gratitude at this news, since the correct course would have been for Ibn Saud to refuse to receive people from the British side of the frontier who came to make such advances, of which he must have been aware beforehand; but as he doubtless meant well, and as the applicants might never have come to him but for the instigation of a British subject, Mr. Philby, I said that whatever our opinion of Mr. Philby we had never had any doubt as to the friendship of His Majesty for the British Government and the correctness of his attitude towards the interests of His Majesty's Government in the Aden Protectorate. Fuad Bey was thereupon emboldened to make just such a suggestion as, in my despatch No. 18 dated the 1st February, I reported him to have made in regard to the Zubara dispute: if His Majesty could

be of any use in bringing about agreement (or some such word) he would, of course, be very glad. I reminded Fuad Bey that the people in question were on the British side of the frontier, and said that if there was ever any trouble there it was because they would fight each other and would block the roads to take toll from travellers. Fuad Bey did not dissent from this statement.

4. Fuad Bey said that there are many Arabs who distrusted Mr. Philby (he did not say that he was one of them, but he obviously is). He attributed to Mr. Philby the attempt of the Aden authorities to extend their control on the Protectorate borders: once Mr. Philby had advertised to the world that there was no control in those parts, the Government at Aden were bound to take action. And now, said Fuad Bey, Mr. Philby was boasting to the Hadhramis that he had compelled the British Government to consider the abandonment of the policy of using bombardment from the air as a police measure.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to his Excellency the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

P.S., March 11. 6. Ibn Saud referred to this subject in an interview which I had with him to-day. I had to modify the feeling which I recorded in paragraph 3 above, since he was so clearly anxious to be helpful and open about the business. He said that people had come to him from Hadhramaut and had said: "You're an Arab and a Moslem and all that," and he had replied that for all he was an Arab and a Moslem he felt bound to remind them that if the British were not in their country some other foreign Power would be there, and that in the circumstances they might think themselves fortunate. And he seems to have criticised them for precisely the faults which I mentioned to Fuad Bey: constant quarrelling among themselves, and brigandage on the roads. But, he said, they could be managed with a little care. Philby, of course, did not agree with his policy in regard to Hadhramaut. "He says I am a Conservative. And I am a Conservative."

7. I thanked the King, and said that I would transmit what he said to His Majesty's Government who, I was sure, would be very glad to hear it, both because of his known friendship towards them and because of his unrivalled knowledge of the Arabs.

R. W. B.

[E 1698/1698/25]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, March 7, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a Saudi regulation governing the residence of foreigners in this country. Every foreigner over 18 years of age who wishes to reside in Saudi Arabia for a period of more than one year in addition to "the period allowed in the passport" must take out a Residence Permit and pay certain fees. Provision is made in article 6 for the withdrawal of such permits from certain classes of persons and their deportation.

2. Large numbers of foreign Moslems, particularly from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, will come under this regulation, which may well prove a little complicated to apply, the Saudi police and other officials being what they are, and it is difficult to believe that any serious attempt will be made to apply it to the penniless African pilgrims who stay on from year to year. The regulation may even be vitiated by article 2, which gives a definition of permanent residence based on the hypothesis that the national passport "allows" the holder to reside for a given period in Saudi Arabia. However, the regulation is being brought to the notice of the British community, who are being invited to comply with its provisions.



3. I should be glad to be informed, with reference to article 12 of the regulation, whether the official staff of diplomatic missions in Great Britain are obliged to register as aliens or to comply with any similar regulation.

4. The wording of article 13 suggests that when the Saudi authorities issue a residence permit to a foreigner they keep his national passport. The Legation will resist any attempt by the Saudi police authorities to keep the passports of British subjects.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosure to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, New Delhi; his Excellency the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore; and his Excellency the Governor of Nigeria, Lagos.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 15.

*From the Mecca Umm-al-Qura No. 686 of the Dhu'l Qa'ada, 27, 1356  
(January 28, 1938).*

#### RESIDENCE REGULATION.

(Translation.)

A DECREE has been issued ratifying this regulation and bringing it into force.

Article 1. Any foreigner of more than 18 years of age who desires to reside permanently in the territory of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom must apply to the police authorities with his passport together with an application form as indicated in article 4.

Art. 2. Permanent residence means a stay of more than one year in addition to the period allowed in the passport.

Art. 3. The Police Department shall issue to any applicant for permission to reside (in Saudi Arabia) a book entitled "Residence Permit" containing all the particulars given in the passport of the applicant, together with his photograph stamped by the police department, and all the particulars given in the form referred to in article 4.

Art. 4. The application form must be accompanied by two photographs and contain the following particulars:—

- (a) The object of residence.
- (b) The period of residence.
- (c) The number, date and place of issue of the passport.
- (d) The nationality and origin (? race).
- (e) The town of intended residence.
- (f) The quarter in which (the applicant) desires to live.
- (g) The names of the members of the applicant's family mentioned in his passport and particulars concerning them.

Art. 5. The Police Department shall keep a record of all the particulars given in the residence permit in a register entitled "Residence Register," and affix beside these particulars the photograph of the applicant with his signature or thumb print thereon.

Art. 6. The proper authorities may withdraw the residence permit from the (classes of) persons referred to in the following paragraphs:—

- (a) Persons who commit acts tending to a breach of the peace.
- (b) Persons whose continued residence the Governments thinks undesirable.

Art. 7. The police authorities shall warn persons from whom residence permits have been withdrawn to leave the country within fifteen days subject to their being under police supervision during the period (of delay) granted to them. Directors of police in the provinces shall not warn any person to leave without asking for permission from the Administrative Governors who, on their part, shall obtain instructions on the subject from the Viceroy's Office. The headquarters of the Police Department shall be notified of this for information and purposes of record.

Art. 8. In case of *force majeure* the period of (delay granted to) the person from whom the residence permit has been withdrawn may be extended beyond fifteen days by order of the Viceroy's Office in the capital, and in the provinces by an order of the Administrative Governor, provided that it is based on an order from the Viceroy's Office.

Art. 9. The period of validity of the residence permit is one year, which may be extended on expiry by means of an endorsement, on payment of the prescribed fees.

Art. 10. The Police Department shall record in the residence register mentioned in article 4 all judgments pronounced in the courts against the persons whose names are shown in the residence register.

Art. 11. The Police Department shall give a residence permit to anyone who may have lost his permit and shall endorse it thus:—

"Given in place of permit No. \_\_\_\_\_, dated \_\_\_\_\_,  
which has been lost."

They shall collect from the person concerned half the original fee.

Art. 12. Diplomatic and consular representatives and their families are exempt from the obligation to apply for residence permits. The official staff of diplomatic missions shall be treated on a reciprocal basis.

Art. 13. On the expiry of the period allowed to the applicant, he should notify the police authorities accordingly and forward to them the residence permit, and they shall hand him his passport if he proposes to leave, or grant him another residence permit if he applies for one and his application is sanctioned after the legal formalities have been effected.

Art. 14. The fee for the form referred to in article 4 is 3 Saudi piastres.

Art. 15. The fee for the residence permit referred to in article 3 is 10 Saudi riyals.

Art. 16. The Passport Office shall forward to the police authorities a list of the names of persons arriving in the kingdom as well as the period (of residence) allowed them in the passport, together with the number and date of the passport.

Art. 17. Any person who intentionally changes his name and gets a permit and a form made out in a false name or holds a forged or falsified permit or form, whether the forgery has been done by his own hand or indirectly, shall be liable to a fine of from £1 to £5 gold or to imprisonment (for a term) of not less than one week or more than one month.

Art. 18. Any person who connives with another person who intentionally conceals his identity, and bears witness on that person's behalf to an untrue statement, or knowingly guarantees anyone who dares to conceal his identity, shall be liable to a fine of not less than £2 or more than £10 gold or to imprisonment (for a term) of not less than six days or more than two months.

Art. 19. The police authorities shall warn persons whose period (of residence) has expired. Notice shall be given during the month preceding the expiry of the period and shall be made by means of an official document entitled "Warning."

Art. 20. Any person who stays on after the expiry of the period allowed him in his passport and fails to apply to the police authorities within ten days shall pay double the residence fees unless it is established that he had a legitimate excuse.

Art. 21. The Police Departments in all localities shall forward to police headquarters every year statistics showing the number of foreigners who have received permission to reside (in their respective districts), and the Director-General of Police shall forward to the competent authorities a general list of persons permitted to reside in the kingdom.

Art. 22. Any foreigner who desires to stay for less than one year after the expiry of the period allowed him in his passport shall apply to the Passport Office and have his passport endorsed.

Art. 23. The police authorities may endorse the passport of any person who applies for permission to stay for less than one year and collect from him 5 Saudi riyals.

Art. 24. Every foreigner who was resident in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom before 1356 A.H. (March 13, 1937) shall present himself to the police authorities



within four months after the promulgation of these regulations and furnish the following particulars:—

- (a) His name, surname, occupation, place of birth, age, origin (race), nationality, and his place of residence before coming to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.
- (b) The date of his arrival in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.
- (c) His place of residence in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the occupation which he follows.
- (d) The names of the members of his family who are residing with him and particulars concerning them.

Art. 25. The police authorities may request that official documents in support of the correctness of his statement be produced by any person giving such particulars.

Art. 26. The persons mentioned in article 24 shall produce to the police authorities, with the afore-mentioned particulars, the passports or *laissez-passer* on which they entered the kingdom.

Art. 27. If any person fails to present himself to the Police Department during the period mentioned in article 24 or produces false statements or documents, the competent authorities, after the necessary investigation, shall deport him from the kingdom and execute the requirements of the regulations.

Art. 28. The police authorities shall give residence permits to the persons referred to in article 24 and apply all the regulations concerning them.

Art. 29. The Directorate-General of Police shall apply these regulations with effect from 1357 A.H. (March 2, 1938).

[E 1701/196/25]

No. 16.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, March 11, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Ibn Saud summoned me to a final audience to-day before his departure for Mecca and thence to Nejd for his annual holiday. I was thus able to convey in person to the King, as well as by letter to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the congratulations on the discovery of oil in Hasa which you sent in your telegram No. 37 dated the 9th March. The King was much pleased at this mark of sympathy and expressed his appreciation and thanks. I have since received a letter in the same sense, written on the King's behalf, from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. What with the visit of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice and Lord Athlone, every detail of whose journey he follows personally with the greatest interest, and the discovery of oil, the King was in an excellent humour. He talked a good deal about European politics, going to pieces over names like Czechoslovakia, but showing a shrewd knowledge of the situation, but he did not refer to the projected negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Italy, as I had thought he might do.

3. Much of the talk was about the Yemen. The Imam, said the King, was always worrying about something. He made a lot out of Philby's journey, and the other day he said that the British were working up to Nejran and asked what the King was going to do about it. This seemed to amuse the King, who always seems to find the Imam slightly ridiculous. He proceeded to criticise the Yemenis as thoroughly factious and savage and untrustworthy, and related various incidents in support of this thesis. He then talked about the Hadhramaut in the sense of the communication from Fuad Bey which I have reported in my despatch No. 39 dated the 8th March. I hope to have time before the bag closes to give the gist of the King's remarks as a postscript to that despatch.

4. The King repeated the kind invitation which he gave me on the occasion of Lord Belhaven's visit (my despatch No. 9 dated the 19th January) to spend some time with him in the desert next spring, if the rains should be good. As he

pressed for a reply, I could only say that, if His Majesty did not mind my being no great sportsman, I should be very glad to come. It seemed to me that I might do more good in camp with the King for a week or so, than sitting at a desk in Jedda, and I trust that you will approve my general acceptance of the invitation.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2059/1573/25]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)*

(No. 55.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, March 22, 1938.*

SEVERAL communications which I have had the honour to send you recently will have suggested that the Iraq Government are pursuing a very active policy in Saudi Arabia. This activity has coincided with the arrival of the new Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, Saiyid Thabit Abdul Nur (Iraq Personalities No. 83 of 18th January, 1937), a very busy-minded man of Christian origin. When I first received information from the Saudi authorities of the various proposals made to them by Saiyid Thabit I was inclined to suppose that he was acting to some extent on his own account, but in each case I have been shown documents proving that the proposals were official. The proposals are three in number:—

- (1) For the conclusion of a military agreement to implement article 7 of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance (my telegram No. 76, dated the 19th March).
- (2) For unification of the currencies of Iraq and Saudi Arabia (my telegram No. 75, dated the 19th March, and my despatch No. 51, dated the 21st March).
- (3) For the conclusion of a triangular quota arrangement by which Saudi Arabia, in return for a commission, would refuse to take Japanese exports unless Japan agreed to take Iraq exports up to the same value (my telegram No. 75, dated the 19th March, and my despatch No. 44, dated the 11th March).

2. There are indications that the Iraq Government have not informed His Majesty's Government of their intention to put these proposals forward. Whether this secrecy is compatible with the provisions of article 1 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 is not for me to say. My concern is with the interesting fact that Ibn Saud turns to a non-Moslem and "imperialistic" Government for disinterested advice about proposals from a Moslem Government which is, moreover, bound to him by a treaty of Arab brotherhood and alliance. He is clearly afraid lest he should be lured into some arrangement injurious to his interests, and he has now extended to the economic field the suspicions which he has always held about the political activities of the Iraq Government. Of those suspicions the Foreign Office have been kept informed. They rose to their highest point during the Hikmet Sulaiman régime, but they have not subsided completely since it came to an end. Ibn Saud does not regard Iraq as a purely Arab country. He is fond of saying that the Iraq Arabs are from Nejd, but he regards the country as largely non-Arab in policy as well as in population and as liable if not to be pro-Turk at least to act under Turkish influence or menace.

3. One thing which Ibn Saud resents in his relations with Iraq is the tendency which he detects in them to try to take the lead in the Arab world at his expense. He has spoken of this more than once, in connexion with the Palestine question and with the negotiations with the Imam about the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. That the Iraq Government may sometimes be heedless of Saudi feelings is illustrated by a remark which Saiyid Thabit made to me recently, in connexion with the arrangements for a joint Saudi-Iraq survey of their common frontier. It appears that the Iraqi representatives arrived at the spot where the survey was to begin, but the Saudis were not there, and the Saudi Government said that their party could not arrive for another fortnight or more. "I do not understand," said Saiyid Thabit, "why the Iraq party could not act for both sides, but though I talked to Fuad for an hour,

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he couldn't see it." The supposition that a Government under a Nejd king, and administered largely by Syrians (one of them Fuad Bey), would fall in with such a suggestion showed some lack of imagination.

4. A similar lack of imagination on the part of the Egyptians in the Hejaz is suggested in my despatch No. 60, dated the 30th March, 1938, where I reported their wish to flaunt Egyptian flags with offensive freedom. Apparently common membership of the "Arab world" is not of itself sufficient to create sympathy and imagination and confidence between the various members.

5. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2340/1698/25]

No. 18.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 59.)

My Lord,

Jedda, March 30, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the regulation on the residence of foreigners in Saudi Arabia, of which I transmitted a translation in my despatch No. 21 dated the 7th March, has aroused great indignation among the communities of foreign Moslems resident in this country. As Ibn Saud frequently asks the advice of His Majesty's Government and begs for frankness in our dealings with him, I felt it right to mention this subject to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in the course of a recent interview.

2. I began by repudiating any desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia, and explaining that I was speaking personally. The Legation, I said, had invited British subjects to comply with the provisions of the regulations, and whenever any objection had been raised, as by certain British Moslems in Mecca, we had explained that the registration of aliens was compulsory in most countries, and that it was not out of the way to charge a fee for the work involved. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that many foreign Moslems objected to the regulations on religious grounds, as drawing a distinction between one Moslem and another, and implying that certain Moslems described as aliens had not the right to be in their Holy Land. It was not for me to comment on such claims, but only to inform the Saudi Government, as a friend and a well-wisher, that the regulation had aroused great hostility, and that it was to be expected that persons hostile to the Saudi Government might profit by the occasion for propaganda purposes abroad.

3. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin thanked me for these remarks. The Government were aware of the hostility which the regulation had aroused. The object of the regulation was merely to enable some check to be placed upon the residence of foreigners who continued to reside in Saudi Arabia with no ostensible purpose and whose activities might be undesirable. Instructions were being issued to the police to be very lenient in the matter of fees and to exempt any persons who were really poor, and it might be that after the experience of a year or two the fee could be reduced. I reminded Sheikh Yusuf that he had told me not long before that if the oil wells in Hasa yielded a good revenue the King's first object would be to reduce the charges levied on pilgrims, and I suggested that the Saudi Government might wish to examine the charge for residence permits from the same point of view. The proposed charge of 10 riyals (about 16s. 8d.) for a residence permit had, I admitted, aroused criticism, but the Legation had met such criticisms, as it met those frequently levied against the Saudi charges levied on pilgrims, by the explanation that Saudi Arabia had little agriculture and no industries, that the Saudi Government had to perform many services for pilgrims, and, in particular, to maintain law and order (which it did admirably), and that it was natural that charges should be levied in return for these services.

4. It is possible, then, that the Saudi Government will endeavour, by leniency in the levy of fees, to make the regulation less unpalatable to the many thousands of foreign Moslems who live in the Hejaz, principally in Mecca. In my earlier despatch I said it was difficult to believe that any serious attempt would be made to apply the regulation to the penniless African pilgrims who remain on from

year to year, and there are other communities whose members could not pay so heavy a fee as 10 riyals without great hardship. My Netherlands colleague tells me that there are hundreds of Javanese students in Mecca who live thirty or forty in one house and cannot afford to spend more than 3 or 4 riyals (from 5s to 6s. 8d.) a month on food.

5. I took the opportunity to point out to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin the obscurity of the second article in the regulation, which defines permanent residence as a stay of more than one year "in addition to the period allowed in the passport." Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said that he believed the reference was to the period of validity of any Saudi visa the passport might bear, but nearly all the foreigners in this country are pilgrims who have travelled on pilgrim passes, which do not require a Saudi visa. However, that is an obscurity which can be amended easily.

6. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department at New Delhi, his Excellency the Governor of the Straits Settlements at Singapore, and his Excellency the Governor of Nigeria at Lagos.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2499/13/91]

No. 19.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 2.)*

(No. 162.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 19, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in the course of a visit which I paid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th instant, the Minister raised the question of the international status of Koweit.

2. His Excellency began by saying that the Persian Minister had more than once discussed with him the position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, and had implied that His Majesty's Government had no more right to exercise a protectorate over Koweit than they had to do so over Bahrein. He had maintained that Bahrein belonged to Persia, and he had suggested that Koweit might very well be claimed by Iraq.

3. Taufiq Suwaidi said that he had replied that the Iraqi Government regarded the Persian claims to Bahrein as a matter for settlement between Persia and Great Britain, and he had refused to be drawn into a discussion about Koweit. Nevertheless, the seeds sown by the Persian Minister had evidently begun to germinate in Taufiq Suwaidi's mind. He had with him Volume XI of *Aitcheson's Treaties*, and read out to me article 6 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement (unratified) of July 1913, inviting my particular attention to the reference to the Sheikh of Koweit as an Ottoman Kaimakam which occurs therein. What, he said, did this mean? Surely it indicated that Koweit was not really an independent State, and was it not arguable that, since in 1913 Koweit had been technically a Kaza of the Basra Vilayet and as the sovereignty of this Vilayet had since then passed from the old Ottoman Empire to the new Iraqi Kingdom, Koweit now stood in relation to Iraq in the same position as it had stood in relation to the Ottoman Empire at the time when the Anglo-Turkish Agreement had been negotiated.

4. Iraq, Taufiq Suwaidi said, had in fact never recognised any change in the status of Koweit. The Iraqi Government had, it was true, in a letter written by Nuri Said as Prime Minister, recognised a certain line as being the frontier between Iraq and Koweit, but as this line was the same as that laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, the reaffirmation of this frontier could not be held, he thought, to have brought any change to the status of Koweit which, judging from the agreement, seemed to have been that of an autonomous Kaza or Kaimakamlik of the Ottoman Empire.

5. The Minister explained that the matter was one of some importance in relation to the ideas which the Iraqi Government had already put forward concerning the stopping of smuggling from Koweit through the control of the Koweit Customs (see Mr. Morgan's letter to Mr. Baggallay of the 15th March) and the extension of the Iraqi railway to Koweit Bay, in order to provide Iraq with a port on the Persian Gulf (see my despatch No. 116 of the 30th March).

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He thought that in view of the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance, His Majesty's Government should see no serious objection in principle to these projects and it had occurred to him that a re-examination of the status of Koweit on the basis of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913 might reveal a way to overcome any political difficulties of a technical character to which it might seem that these schemes would give rise.

6. I said that the question was one which was largely new to me and I could not undertake to make any statement about the status of Koweit until I had had time to study the relevant documents. It seemed to me, however, that his Excellency was overlooking the Treaty of Lausanne. Under article 16 of that treaty, Turkey had renounced all rights and title whatsoever over Koweit and with that renunciation these rights had finally ended. There could, therefore, be no question of their having been inherited by any of the States which had been set up in any part of the territory which, under the Treaty of Lausanne, had been detached from the Ottoman Empire. I made it clear, however, that this was a personal view given with all reservations, and I explained that I could give no formal or authoritative reply to the Minister's enquiries until I had referred to your Lordship for instructions.

7. From such study as I have since been able to make of this question (please see particularly Sir John Simon's despatch No. 865 of the 13th December, 1934), it appears that Koweit is recognised by His Majesty's Government as an independent Government under British protection (Political Resident's letter to the Sheikh of the 3rd November, 1914) and that from the point of view of international law Koweit's independence began from the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne (6th August, 1924). On this date also, Turkey renounced all rights over Koweit and these rights, whatever they may have been, thereupon terminated and were not transferred to any other State.

8. I should be glad if you would inform me whether I may give oral explanations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the above lines, and I should welcome any additional arguments that it may be possible to put forward, with which to refute the suggestion that Iraq has acquired certain rights over the territory of Koweit. In particular it would, I feel, be an advantage to show that the Iraqi Government had in some way recognised both the independence of Koweit and the special relations between His Majesty's Government and the Ruler of Koweit. Failing that, evidence of the recognition of Koweit's independence by other Powers would be of value.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2604/237/91]

No. 20.

*Italo-Yemeni Treaty, signed at Sana on Jamad-al-Sani 28, 1356 A.H., equivalent to September 4, 1937.—(Received May 6, under cover of Colonial Office Letter of May 5.)*

[The following is a literal translation from the Arabic text, which appears to be the master text, made in the office of the Governor of Aden, from the monthly Sana newspaper *Al Imam* for Ramadan 1356 A.H. (about November 1937). A translation from the Italian text, published in the Italian *Official Gazette* No. 5 of the 8th January, 1938, shows slight differences, which do not, however, make any important change in the sense. The exchange of ratifications took place, according to the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the 15th November, 1937, on which date the treaty entered into force.]

*Text of the Treaty.*

[In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.]

AS His Majesty Victor Emanuel the Third, the great King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, and his Government, and His Majesty Imam Yahya, son of El Imam Muhammad, son of Yahya Hamid-ud-Din, Commander of the Faithful and King of the Yemen, and his Government, have been convinced that

the relations between the two kingdoms, under the shade of the treaty concluded in Sana on the 2nd September, 1926 (the 23rd Safar, 1345), have proved to be successful in strengthening and consolidating the friendship and the economic bonds between the two kingdoms, and being desirous that the same spirit of friendship which led to the conclusion of the previous treaty should appear in a more progressive and stronger form in the interests of the two high contracting parties,

His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, and His Majesty the Commander of the Faithful, King of Yemen, have resolved for this purpose to renew the treaty through their plenipotentiaries:

For His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia:

His Excellency Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, Member of the Senate of the Kingdom;

For His Majesty the Commander of the Faithful, King of the Yemen:

Their Excellencies Qadhi Abdullah-bin-Hussein-al-Amri, Prime Minister, Seiyid Ali-bin-Ahmed-bin-Ibrahim, Officer Commanding the Army, and Qadhi Abdul Karim-bin-Ahmed Mutahhar, Head of the King's Private Cabinet,

who, after having exchanged their credentials and found them in due form, have agreed to the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia assures and upholds its recognition of the complete and absolute independence, without condition or restriction, of His Majesty King Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamid-ud-Din, Commander of the Faithful, and his kingdom.

The Italian Government has no right of interference whatsoever in the kingdom of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, in any form which might be contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of this article.

ARTICLE 2.

The two Governments undertake to facilitate commercial exchanges between their two countries.

ARTICLE 3.

The Government of His Majesty the Commander of the Faithful, King of the Yemen, declare their desire to continue in the future to import their requirements from Italy, that is to say, means and mechanical instruments, also the provision of technicians, and the esteemed Italian Government declares that on receipt of each demand it will endeavour to send the means and mechanical instruments and persons which shall be the most suitable as far as kind, price and salaries are concerned.

ARTICLE 4.

Whatever is mentioned in articles 2 and 3, it does not restrict the freedom of the high contracting parties in commerce and purchases.

ARTICLE 5.

No one of the merchants of either Government shall import goods for trading purposes prohibited by the Government of the country to which they were imported. Each of the two Governments has the right to confiscate the articles imported in contravention of the prohibition issued against their import for trading purposes.

ARTICLE 6.

The two high contracting parties shall start appointing political agents and consuls after negotiation and agreement by both parties when time is convenient to carry this into effect. For this purpose the two high contracting parties reserve the right to maintain the exchange (of representatives) between them on the most-favoured-nation basis.

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## ARTICLE 7.

Absolute security and protection is guaranteed for the subjects of the two high contracting parties who hold passports and go to the countries of the other, in as far as their persons and properties are concerned, subject to the rules and regulations in force in their respective countries, and shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment.

## ARTICLE 8.

The vessels of each of the two high contracting parties and their cargoes shall receive in the ports of the other the treatment accorded to cargoes of the most favoured nation.

## ARTICLE 9.

This treaty shall not be in force until the two copies have been exchanged by their Majesties the two Kings.

## ARTICLE 10.

This treaty shall be for a period of twenty-five years from the date referred to in article 9, and shall be considered automatically renewed if neither of the two high contracting parties notifies its cancellation six months before the termination of its period.

This treaty was signed at Sana, Yemen, in two original copies, in the Italian and Arabic languages. Each of them has one power and value, and, should any difference arise as to the interpretation, the Arabic copy shall be considered or acted upon.

Done in Sana on the 28th Jamad-al-Sani, 1356 (the 4th September, 1937).

JACOPO GASPARINI.

ABDULLAH-BIN-HUSEIN-AL-AMRI.

SEIYID ALI-BIN-AHMED-BIN-IBRAHIM.

ABDUL KARIM-BIN-AHMED MUTAHHAR.

[E 2782/196/25]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 78. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, April 25, 1938.*

IN my two despatches No. 66 of the 17th April and No. 70 of the 19th April, 1937, I had the honour to report to the Foreign Office on a society called "The Friends of the Hejaz," which was alleged to have been formed in Egypt. I said it was doubtful whether any Hejazis resident in this country would venture to join a society aiming at the independence of the Hejaz, but admitted that Hejazis had a grievance, in that the income from the pilgrimage, which was for centuries a perquisite of the Hejaz, now has to support the whole of Saudi Arabia. In a later despatch, No. 91 of the 8th May, 1937, I reported the issue of a proclamation in which Ibn Saud invited his subjects to return to religion and uttered strong criticisms against "modernisation" and "civilisation." In the Jedda report for May 1937 there appeared this comment:—

"This proclamation came as something of a surprise, as nothing had been heard of any movement for reform, and enquiries made since have discovered little to justify Ibn Saud's alarm. The young Syrians, and the few Saudis who have been educated in Egypt, may sigh for the cinema and stronger drinks than pink lemonade; the Italian-trained pilots are said to give themselves European airs; and one rich young merchant uses his position as an honorary consul to frequent places where greater freedom of speech and refreshment is possible than in any Saudi house; but it doesn't amount to much."

2. The rich young merchant in question is Muhammad Ali Riza, son of the late Haji Abdullah, Kaimakam of Jedda. At a recent party at a foreign Legation he drank too much, as he usually does on such occasions, and in conversation with Mr. Ousman, a member of the Legation staff, he spoke strongly against Ibn Saud and the Saudi Government. He professes to believe that the death of the Amir Khalid, which I reported in my despatch No. 64, dated the 4th April, was not the result of an accident, though he has nothing but suspicion upon which to base such a conclusion. He has a private grievance, in that he believes that Ibn Saud shortened Haji Abdullah's life. It is true that Haji Abdullah was much harassed by his official duties, which he would gladly have laid down if Ibn Saud would have let him, but he had already held the same position, under compulsion, under King Husain, and my own memories go back to the trials he suffered under that monument of unreason and unaccountability. Muhammad Ali Riza professes to belong to some sort of society the members of which, he says, intend to meet in Egypt this summer "to see what can be done." They have no intention, he states, of doing anything during the life-time of Ibn Saud, so the young men may be middle-aged before the time for action comes, since Ibn Saud is not more than 60 and shows no signs of failing powers. Muhammad Ali Riza complains of the financial exploitation of the Hejaz by the Central Government, and indicates that the party to which he belongs have a separatist policy. He claims that the movement has the sympathy of Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, the Minister of Finance, who would be useful, he suggests, because of the large fortune he has accumulated. He also claims as supporters the King's third son, Muhammad, and Fuad Bey Hamza, but describes Sheikh Yusuf Yasin as very hostile. He adds that he and his friends expect to find Great Britain in favour of the established régime and, therefore, strongly opposed to their movement. I should explain that Mr. Ousman had nothing to do but listen to this outpouring, Muhammad Ali Riza being too drunk to expect either approval or opposition.

3. The statements made by Muhammad Ali Riza were confused and vague. It is not to be supposed that the Hejazis would welcome a Najdi like Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman as one of their leaders, nor is it probable that he and Fuad Bey would work together in such a movement. A much more likely sympathiser is Muhammad Tawil, Director of Customs in King Husain's time, and at present director (under compulsion) of the new Nejd Motor Transport Company, yet his name was not mentioned. Nevertheless, the statements are of interest as voicing Hejazi dissatisfaction at Saudi rule, and as referring definitely to discussions to take place in Egypt, though no hint of the identity or of the number of the other malcontents was given. I do not think it likely that they are numerous or important, and I attribute Muhammad Ali Riza's statements largely to the bragging of a rather conceited young man, whose inherited wealth would enable him to play a much larger part in a world not dominated by the shadow of Ibn Saud.

4. The conspirators, if they deserve this name, are probably well advised to wait for the death of Ibn Saud. His contempt for the Hejazi and his intention to stand no nonsense from them are well known: they were expressed in a speech at Mecca which I reported in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 91, dated the 8th May, 1937. Whatever the grievances of the Hejaz or of any other part of the country, no one expects that a revolt will be ventured upon in the lifetime of Ibn Saud. On the other hand, both Arab tradition and the particular circumstances of the case suggest that the succession may be disputed at Ibn Saud's death. If the Arab custom has its advantages, under which the best man in the ruling family tends to secure the rule, it has a drawback in that the succession is always liable to be contested. Ibn Saud has tried to secure the succession by appointing the Amir Saud, his eldest surviving son, as his successor, and requiring the oath of allegiance to be taken to him as heir apparent. This is a compromise: it is not in conformity with Arab custom, yet it does not recognise the principle of primogeniture, since Ibn Saud's eldest son, Turki, who died in the influenza epidemic of 1918, left a son, Faisal, who is still alive.

5. There is always much gossip about alleged differences between the sons of Ibn Saud and the possibility of their quarrelling after their father's death. The Amir Faisal, for instance, is represented as being jealous of his eldest brother, Saud, and as being not only cleverer but more popular because of his superiority as a warrior and a horseman. But it is from the third son, Muhammad, that



opposition is considered to be most likely to come. During his stay in Riyadh last summer, Mr. Ousman found that the Amir Muhammad was considered the most ambitious and unruly of all the princes, and it is suggestive that Muhammad Ali Riza should mention him as a sympathiser. The name of the Amir Muhammad is usually associated with that of his next brother, Khalid. Not only are they full brothers, but among the older members of the family they are supposed to be the favourites of Ibn Saud, as the sons of his Queen, Jauhara, whose death in 1918 is known to have caused the King deep sorrow. It is known that Muhammad shows jealousy towards Saud and tries to compete with him in magnificence and generosity, and at the time of the Athlone visit to Riyadh Mr. Gault noticed that he seemed to resent being asked by Saud to do anything, and to sulk at having to help organise a tribal dance, whereas the other Amirs took part with no sign of dissatisfaction. Possibly the King's object in sending Muhammad to England with the Amir Saud for the Coronation was the establishment of better relations between them.

6. It is not only from rival brothers that opposition to the succession might perhaps come. The hostility of the Amir Khalid-bin-Muhammad, whose death occurred a month ago, to his cousin the Amir Saud was always taken for granted, and as a rule he accompanied the Amir Saud and remained under his observation. He was in the suite of the Amir Saud during the recent visit to Bahrein, and the political agent has recorded what precautions were taken for the security of the Amir Saud at night. Possibly the object of the arrangement by which Feisal-bin-Turki, son of Ibn Saud's first-born son, has been brought up as the son of his uncle Saud is not only to give him a home, but also to take away any sense of grievance he might feel and to enable him to be kept under supervision. Not long ago the political agent at Koweit mentioned several Saudi tribal leaders living in exile who were believed to have common plans for making trouble on Ibn Saud's death, while many people believe that the loyalty of the Governor of Hasa, son of the great Ibn Juluwi, will not outlast the life of Ibn Saud. Then there are the members of the Ibn Rashid family, who live in honourable but irksome exile in Riyadh, with their womenfolk still in Hail. Finally, there are all the tribes to whom *pax saudica* means boredom and deprivation of the opportunity for men to distinguish and enrich themselves by raiding. It seems hardly possible that there should not be some trouble when Ibn Saud dies, and it may be true that only an Ibn Saud could deal with such trouble if it arose. His ability and experience are unique in the Arab world, and enable him to apply the personal methods of the sheikh to the large and complicated State into which his tribal *dura* has grown. Even if his successor had Ibn Saud's natural ability, which seems unlikely, it will not have been sharpened by years of hard and dangerous experience. Then there is no permanent civil service with a vested interest in stability. The provinces are run by Nejdīs, who may be amirs to-day and nothing to-morrow, while the departments are largely in the hands of men who seem to use their opportunities to fill their pockets and are assisted by a crowd of spiritless small officials who receive very low pay which is often in arrears.

7. It is not necessary to take these gloomy speculations very seriously, since Ibn Saud may live for twenty years yet. Moreover, it is possible that the discovery of oil in Hasa may make for stability—a point which will be dealt with in a later despatch.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Bagdad, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem, and to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3127/405/25]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 83 E.)

My Lord,

Jedda, April 30, 1938.

IN my despatch No. 38 E. dated the 11th March, 1937, I had the honour to submit some comments on the financial situation of Ibn Saud and its effect upon policy. After the lapse of a year I offer some remarks to bring that despatch up to date. The details of the economic and financial side of Saudi administration

have been given in the Economic Report for 1937, which was forwarded under cover of my despatch No. 74 E. dated the 17th April, and it is not my intention to repeat them here, but to examine the situation in a broader aspect.

2. The Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate are sufficiently satisfied with the supplies of water which they have discovered to continue working with energy towards the exploitation of the gold mine at Mahd-al-Dhahab. They feel, however, that the importance which their enterprise formerly held in Saudi eyes has greatly diminished since the discovery of oil in Hasa in considerable quantities, in view of the vastly greater royalties to be expected if the hopes which are being built upon the Hasa oil-field are realised. According to a statement made to me recently by the acting manager, a net profit from the gold-mine of about £50,000 a year would mean a satisfactory profit for the syndicate, but the corresponding royalties would not make very much difference to the Saudi budget.

3. The revenue obtained from the pilgrimage being irregular, and depending upon delicate political, economic and social factors which far transcend the borders of this country, the only hope of a considerable and permanent increase in revenue is in oil. It is not surprising, then, that, when No. 7 well in Hasa began to yield oil at a rate which eventually increased to something like 900 tons a day, the Saudi Royal family and officials began to make eager calculations as to the revenue to be expected from royalties. To a Government which raises revenue from subscriptions, from such devices as taxing sheep and camels at so much a head, or most invidiously by squeezing visitors to the House of Allah, the prospect of just sitting still and collecting about a pound sterling for every 3 tons of oil that flows out of the earth is naturally attractive. But what the revenue from that source will amount to is still a matter of pure speculation. I have made a rough calculation, and I find that, if Hasa proved to be as rich in oil as Bahrein, the Saudi Government might draw about £350,000 a year in royalties, and that this annual sum might increase to £1,200,000, or to £1,900,000, or to £2,500,000, if Hasa proved to be as rich in oil as Iraq, Mexico or Iran respectively.

4. While no one can say what the extent of the oil-field in Hasa is, it seems reasonable, on the evidence of No. 7 well, to conclude that oil revenue will form an item of importance in the Saudi budget, and therefore to speculate on the effect it will have on Saudi policy. The belief of this Legation, that Ibn Saud must regret the invidious necessity which compels him to raise most of his revenue by taxing pilgrims, was borne out recently, when Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed me that, if the oil in Hasa produced a considerable revenue, the King's first care would be to reduce the charges which he was at present obliged to levy on pilgrims in order to subsidise the tribes for the maintenance of order. I can believe that this benevolent intention exists in Ibn Saud's mind, but I am doubtful whether a reduction in pilgrim dues will be the first charge upon the revenue to be obtained from oil, for there will be many rival objects claiming attention, from military defence to private extravagance. It would take a considerable sum to accumulate such a reserve as would enable the Saudi Treasury to avoid the ruinous devices which it at present adopts from time to time to raise ready money, e.g., the purchase of goods in Jedda in exchange for orders exempting future consignments from customs dues, and their sale for cash down. Then the King could spend a large sum on defence, and probably anything up to £100,000 on the restoration of the Hejaz Railway, not to mention roads and other public works which have long been under discussion.

5. The question of private extravagance deserves a paragraph to itself. I have mentioned it before as the least admirable side of Saudi rule. A Saudi fault which is even admitted by Mr. Philby must be serious. It is not unfair to say that in all probability one of the first charges on the revenue from oil will be the acquisition of more motor cars and more women. Ibn Saud has the traditional generosity of the Arab sheikh, and the number of expectant beneficiaries is enormous. Each of the young princes, and each other Saudi dignitary of importance, is the centre of a smaller circle of extravagance, and the total waste must be immense. Last year the Legation were requested to provide the Grand Chamberlain with a letter of recommendation to the authorities in India, where he was going on the King's business. His business was to buy stuffs for the ladies of the Royal household, and the information I have obtained that he spent some £50,000 on this purpose is not difficult to believe, the more so as he and his assistant both travelled to India by air on their mission. When Ibn Saud



travelled from Mecca to Riyadh after the pilgrimage, with his followers and his ladies, his convoy consisted of 558 motor vehicles. Now it is not to be supposed that the extravagance, of which I have given two out of many striking examples, will stop just there, and will not grow with growing opportunities, and the clamour of family and hangers-on for more money and more presents may well drown at first the protests of pilgrims against over-taxation. I hope that my scepticism will prove to be unjustified, but, apart from the existence of competing claims, it must be remembered that to make an appreciable reduction in pilgrim dues would cost a large sum of money. It is calculated that the third-grade Indian pilgrim, who uses the cheapest form of transport, viz., the camel, spends about £30 on the pilgrimage from start to finish, even if he does not go to Medina. A reduction of £1 would not make a great difference to his total bill, whereas an all-round reduction of the charges on overseas pilgrims by £1 would cost the Saudi Treasury over £60,000 in a season like that of 1937-38.

6. However, although pilgrims are not likely to have the first call on any increase in revenue, if the increase is considerable, they will certainly get a share. Now the less the pilgrim pays in fixed charges for taxation and transport the more money he is likely to spend in the Hejaz in other ways, to the profit of those elements whose traditional perquisites have been so sadly cut down in recent years. The Hejaz has been accustomed to have its own revenue supplemented, not to have to supplement that of other provinces. The Turks spent more in the Hejaz than they took out of it, but the Hejazis were parasites long before that—in the days when a considerable part of the spoils of the early Arab conquests flowed down towards Mecca and Medina. It is conceivable that Nejd and its dependencies may become the richer half of Saudi Arabia, and that the Hejazi will decide that the interests of the Hejaz lie in union, not in separation.

7. In my despatch No. 78 dated the 24th April I considered the various sources from which trouble might perhaps come at the death of Ibn Saud. These considerations might be affected fundamentally if a considerable and steady revenue were forthcoming from oil in Hasa. Not only might the Hejaz be kept in a state of tolerable contentment, but the task of maintaining order among the tribes by the regular distribution of subsidies would be facilitated. Thus the oil revenue should be a factor making for stability and for an undisputed succession upon the death of Ibn Saud. It is not only the amount of the oil revenue, but the method of payment that would be of importance. The main item of revenue at present has to be collected through officials from a large number of individuals over a period of several months, but the oil royalties can be paid into a bank in another country, out of reach of all except those whose signatures are recognised by the bank. There is in Riyadh a Treasury to which it is said that only Ibn Saud and the Amir Saud have keys, but a treasury can be seized and its contents distributed on the spot. A banking account in a foreign country is much less vulnerable.

8. These speculations might be affected by the discovery of oil in the Farsan Islands in commercial quantities, but that seems to be a remote contingency.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Bagdad, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem, and the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3334/1698/25]

No. 23.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 8.)*

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

Jedda, May 17, 1938.

IN my despatch No. 41, dated the 7th March, I reported the promulgation of a Saudi regulation governing the residence of foreigners in this country. I now have the honour to report the settlement of various small difficulties which arose out of the application of the regulation.

2. The complaints which I mentioned in a later despatch, No. 59, dated the 30th March, have been met by a decision, which was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 13th May, to the effect that foreign students who can show by

documentary evidence that they are following courses in religious instruction will be exempted from payment of the fee, though in other respects they will have to comply with the provisions of the regulation. This welcome concession is stated in the newspaper notice to have been decided upon in response to requests made to the King by many such students. It may be true that some direct appeals were made to the King, but my Netherlands colleague made strong representations on the subject, in writing. My own intervention was confined to the private talk with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, which I have already reported.

3. My reading of article 13 of the regulation (see paragraph 4 of my despatch of the 7th March) was correct: the authorities had intended to keep the national passports of foreigners and only to return them when the owners wished to leave the country. As soon as it became clear that this was the intention, I sent a private letter to the Amir Faisal suggesting that the retention of British passports was perhaps due to misapprehension of the regulation by the authorities concerned, and explaining that a British passport is considered to be the property of the Government by whom it is issued, and that the United Kingdom and other countries register aliens without finding it necessary to retain their passports. After a considerable interval His Highness replied that the passports had been kept only because the preliminary formalities took a long time, and promising that orders would be issued for the passports to be returned to their owners. This explanation has now appeared as an official notice in the *Umm-al-Qura*, which states that the passports will be returned when the residence permits are issued. This satisfactory result is not attributable entirely to the private representations from this Legation. At least one other Legation (that of the Netherlands) protested officially, though I hear that both the French and the Italian Ministers stated that they proposed to take no action.

4. About a month ago the Governor of Jedda sent me a list of fifteen persons, who, he said, were undesirable Indians, were entirely without papers and had no position and no work. He alleged that under the residence regulation they could not remain in Saudi Arabia, and asked that His Majesty's Legation should issue emergency passes to them and repatriate them. There is no provision in the regulation that covers such cases, though article 6 provides for the withdrawal of a permit from an undesirable, and article 27 allows the deportation of a person who fails to apply for a residence permit within the prescribed period, or who makes false statements or produces false documents; but in any case there were other grounds for refusing to comply with the Governor's request. I reminded him that His Majesty's Legation arrange every year for the repatriation of Indian pilgrims who are destitute, and said that, if any of the fifteen persons in question fell within that category, I was prepared to consider their repatriation if they applied to the Legation; but I said that I could not accept responsibility for the repatriation of undesirables, which I considered to be the business of the Saudi authorities. The Governor accepted this point of view without demur, and it is possible that the alleged Indians, who, I understand, are none of them recent pilgrims and are all without visible means of subsistence, have been sent southwards in a dhow and dumped just inside Yemen territory. This is the ordinary method of deportation adopted by the Saudi authorities, and it may seem a little severe by our standards, but as most, if not all, of the Indians to whom it is applied will have come to the Hejaz mainly on foot, and have entered the country in contravention of the local law, without complying with the passport and sanitary regulations or paying the fees, I do not consider that there would be a good case for lodging an objection, even if the identity of the persons was fully established.

5. The application of the new law will have the good effect of clearing up the doubt as to the nationality of many persons who may have been tempted hitherto to play off one State against another. This applies in particular to those Hadhramis who have regarded themselves as British-protected persons, but in Saudi Arabia have kept this claim dark in order to be allowed to remain in possession of real property. The Governor tells me that hundreds of applications for naturalisation as Saudi subjects are being received by the authorities, and I have no doubt that some of these are Hadhrami property-owners. It is probable that in many cases the mere prospect of having to pay heavy registration fees is sufficient to decide a person of foreign origin to take out Saudi papers.

6. Foreigners of the poorer class have occasionally had trouble with the police when applying for residence permits. This was not surprising, the police



being ignorant, untrained and underpaid. In particular, persons who had applied to His Majesty's Legation for passports for the first time and had been given provisional documents to keep until a decision could be received from the authorities in the country of origin appear to have been abused and threatened by the police when they presented such documents, but this was stopped as soon as the Legation reported it to the Governor. On the whole, given the ignorance of the authorities and the magnitude of the task of applying such a regulation in such a country for the first time, there is little to complain of.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department at Simla, to their Excellencies the Governors of Nigeria at Lagos, Straits Settlements at Singapore and Aden.

I have, &c.

R. BULLARD.

[E 3337/405/25]

No. 24.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 8.)*

(No. 103 E.)

My Lord,

Jedda, May 22, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to submit a few items of financial information about Saudi Arabia to supplement my despatch No. 83 E., dated the 30th April.

2. The following estimate of Hejaz revenue and expenditure was given to me by Muhammad Ali Riza, the Hejazi "nationalist," if I may so describe him, whose views were reported in my despatch No. 78, dated the 25th April:

	£ gold.
Customs from all the Hejaz ports ... ..	600,000
Revenue from other sources (mainly the pilgrimage)	700,000
	1,300,000
Expenditure in the Hejaz, at most ... ..	200,000
Taken by the Central Government not less than ...	1,100,000

The manager of the Netherlands Trading Company, who is well informed, kindly examined these figures for me. He considers that £700,000 gold is a reasonable estimate for the revenue from other sources than the customs for the year 1356 A.H. (roughly 1937-38), but he does not believe that the customs at Jedda can bring in much more than £200,000 gold a year, and the customs revenue at the other Hejaz ports is relatively unimportant. I am trying to obtain another independent estimate of the customs revenue, to check these figures. It is to be expected that Muhammad Ali Riza would be tempted to exaggerate the revenue of the Hejaz in order to support his grievance against the Government for what he considers the selfish exploitation of his country.

3. Muhammad Ali Riza has recently spoken to me about this alleged exploitation of the Hejaz. On this occasion his views, like himself, were sober—at least more sober than in the interview reported in my above-mentioned despatch No. 78 of the 25th April. According to him, the Hejasis believe that they are deliberately kept on the subsistence line so that they may be too busy getting a bare living to think about politics. Even the Hejaz tribes, he said, get nothing from Ibn Saud: it is only to the Nejd tribes that subsidies are paid. The picture of a future in which the revenue from Hasa oil would be so great that the Central Government could dispense with the revenue from the pilgrimage did not appeal to him. He said that if the Hejaz was left to itself it could live on its own resources, but how it would be governed, and how it would defend itself, he did not say, and the discretion with which the conversation had to be conducted on my side prevented my asking direct questions. He made great play with the extravagance of the Saudi Court—a matter on which the whole country has a real grievance. I have no doubt that he is telling the truth when he says that he has seen valuable lorries, which are worn out after a few journeys, carrying sticks of native furniture from Riyadh for use in Mecca, where similar articles could have been bought for a few riyals.

4. According to their own statement, the Netherlands Trading Company now do most of the business for the Saudi Government, who have emancipated themselves first from the local merchants, Messrs. Zainal Ali Riza (this may have affected Muhammad Ali Riza's views) and certain Hadhramis, and then from the Banque Misr, whose nominal 4 per cent. for credits was swollen by various extras until it exceeded the all-in rate of 5 per cent. charged by the Netherlands Trading Company. This interest, by the way, is described as "commission" in order to spare the religious susceptibilities of the Saudi Government, or at least to save their faces. The Netherlands Trading Company consider that the financial position of the Government has improved greatly during the last few years, not only because of the increase in revenue from the pilgrimage, but also because of the more orderly business methods adopted.

I have, &c.

R. BULLARD.

[E 3469/2478/91]

No. 25.

*Note on Petroleum Developments in the Arabian Peninsula. (Prepared in the Petroleum Department, June 1938.)—(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)*

General.

FOR the purposes of this summary the Arabian Peninsula may be said to lie south of a line joining Aqaba at the northern end of the Red Sea to Koweit at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. Included in this area are the following States, sheikhdoms or territories, in most of which petroleum concessions have been, or are likely to be, obtained:—

(A) Under British sovereignty or protection—

Koweit.  
Bahrein.  
Qatar.  
Trucial Sheikhdoms—  
Ajman.  
Abu Dhabi.  
Debai.  
Ras-al-Khaimah.  
Sharjah.  
Umm-al-Quwaim.  
Aden Colony.  
Aden Protectorate.

(B) Independent States—

Saudi Arabia—  
(i) Red Sea Area.  
(ii) Nejd—  
(a) Hasa.  
(b) Remainder of Nejd.  
The Yemen.  
Muscat and Oman.<sup>(1)</sup>

(C) Miscellaneous—

Koweit Neutral Zone.

*Petroleum Concessions (Limited).*

2. As Petroleum Concessions (Limited) are interested in the majority of the above-mentioned territories it has been thought worth while to include in this summary a short note on the genesis and composition of the company.

<sup>(1)</sup> His Majesty's Government exercise by custom only a considerable degree of influence over the affairs of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.



3. The company, which was first registered in October 1935, is a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the change of name was decided upon in order to facilitate the securing of concessions outside Iraq. The whole of the shares in Petroleum Concessions (Limited) are held by the same interests and in the same proportions as obtain in the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the boards of the two companies are similarly composed, except that the Board of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) does not include an Iraqi Government Director. Lord Cadman is chairman of both companies. The shareholding of the Iraq Petroleum Company is divided as follows:—

	Percentage.
British—	
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ... ..	23.75
Dutch—	
Royal Dutch Shell ... ..	23.75
French—	
Compagnie Française des Pétroles ... ..	23.75
American—	
Near East Development Company ( <i>i.e.</i> , Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum in the proportion of 50-50) ... ..	23.75
Participation and Investments (Limited)—	
C. S. Gulbenkian ... ..	5.00
	100.00

#### Koweit.

4. The concession for this territory is held by the Koweit Oil Company (Commercial Agreement, dated the 23rd December, 1934; Political Agreement,<sup>(\*)</sup> dated the 5th March, 1934), the capital of which is held jointly by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Corporation of America (Mellon Group).

5. One well was put down on the north side of Koweit Bay, but only small quantities of oil were found. Another well has been drilled at Burgan, south of Koweit Bay, and was successful in striking oil.

#### Koweit Neutral Zone.

6. The boundaries between Koweit and Nejd were settled at the Uquair Conference of November 1922, when certain territory was recognised as common to these two States. Under this settlement the Rulers of Koweit and Nejd were to enjoy equal rights in the zone until such time as a fresh agreement should be arrived at between them. Consequently, neither Ruler can grant an oil concession in the zone without the consent of the other.

7. Matters in regard to oil negotiations in the Neutral Zone have, in consequence, reached a deadlock. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) cannot move because the Sheikh of Koweit, to whom application has been made, refuses to grant an option in respect of his share of the oil rights in the zone, since he considers that he is entitled to all the rights in the zone and hopes to obtain them when Ibn Saud dies. Petroleum Concessions (Limited), however, have been informed by the Sheikh of Koweit that he will, if he changes his mind, inform them before any other company. On the other hand, Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, who is now thought to favour exploitation of the zone by a British company, is committed to the Standard Oil Company of California by reason of a special agreement with that company, under which they received a preferential position in respect of Ibn Saud's rights in the zone much the same as that which they received in regard to the unallotted areas in Nejd (see paragraphs 24-28 below).

#### Bahrein.

8. Oil development in Bahrein is being undertaken by the Bahrein Petroleum Company (Limited) under a lease granted to the company by the Sheikh of Bahrein on the 29th December, 1934, and modified on the 3rd June, 1936. The

(\*) By "Political Agreement" is meant in this memorandum an agreement between the concessionary company and His Majesty's Government, to which the Ruler concerned is usually an assenting party, by which the company undertakes not to transfer the concession to non-British interests and to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government generally.

lease covers practically the whole of the Island of Bahrein, and runs for a period of fifty five years from the 1st January, 1935. Up to the end of 1937 58 wells had been drilled or were about to be drilled, 33 were producing, and 14 were shut-in. Production during 1937 amounted to approximately 1,108,894 tons.

9. Negotiations in respect of the area belonging to the Sheikh of Bahrein, but not allotted to the Bahrein Petroleum Company in their lease, have been carried on between the sheikh on the one hand and both Petroleum Concessions (Limited) and the Bahrein Petroleum Company, on the other, but so far without definite result.

10. The Bahrein Petroleum Company was incorporated in Canada in 1929, the whole of the share capital being subscribed by the Standard Oil Company of California. In 1936 an agreement was reached between the Standard Oil Company and the Texas Corporation, whereby the latter company obtained a half interest in the Bahrein Petroleum Company. As the Texas Oil Corporation has markets in various Eastern countries, this arrangement secures an outlet for the refined products obtained from the refinery recently erected in Bahrein.

#### Qatar.

11. The oil rights in this territory were originally granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on the 17th May, 1935. A political agreement was entered into on the 5th June, 1935. The agreement, which runs for a term of seventy-five years, was transferred to Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited) (the operating company of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) in Qatar) on the 5th February, 1937. Geological survey work has been carried out and arrangements have been made to commence deep drilling operations in the autumn of 1938.

12. Considerable difficulty has arisen between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government with regard to the boundaries between Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud claims a frontier which in effect overlaps the limits of the concession held by Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited) and indicated in the map attached to the concession. His Majesty's Government do not admit Ibn Saud's claim, but have offered him a frontier which, while lying to the south of the Qatar concession boundary, is nevertheless beyond what they regard as the legal limit laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.

#### The Trucial Sheikhdoms.

13. The position in the Trucial States is as follows:—

14. *Ajman*.—Petroleum Concessions (Limited) held an option giving them the exclusive right to explore for oil in this territory for a period of two years. The option period expired on the 22nd January, 1938, but the company have so far failed to induce the sheikh to grant an oil concession.

15. *Abu Dhabi*.—The option of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) expired on the 3rd January, 1938. Negotiations for a concession were recently suspended as the sheikh is proving difficult.

16. *Debai*.—Petroleum Concessions (Limited) hold a concession in respect of this territory for a period of seventy-five years (Commercial Agreement dated the 22nd May, 1937, and Political Agreement dated the 5th February, 1937). No work has so far been carried out.

17. *Ras-al-Khaimah*.—The option of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) expired on the 1st August, 1937. A political agreement, preceding the conclusion of a commercial agreement, was signed on the 25th March, 1938. Negotiations for the latter are in suspense.

18. *Sharjah*.—Petroleum Concessions (Limited) hold a concession in respect of this area for a period of seventy-five years (Commercial Agreement dated the 17th September, 1937; Political Agreement signed the 12th November, 1937).

19. *Umm-al-Quwaim*.—No option or concession has yet been obtained in respect of this territory, but the sheikh recently informed Petroleum Concessions (Limited) that he was "willing to negotiate."

#### Aden Protectorate.

20. An application for an oil exploration licence in respect of this territory has been made by Petroleum Concessions (Limited) and also jointly by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) have priority, and the Protectorate authorities have been



recommended to grant that company an exclusive exploration permit for a term of two years, after which the other companies could be given an exclusive permit in respect of the territory not retained by Petroleum Concessions (Limited). A draft of the exploration permit has been agreed between the Colonial Office and the company, and sent to the Governor for consideration. In the meantime, Petroleum Concessions (Limited) have been given permission to send an exploration party to the Protectorate (see also note under "Muscat and Oman").

*Saudi Arabia: (i) Red Sea Area.*

21. The petroleum rights in this area were granted to Petroleum Concessions (Limited) on the 9th July, 1936. The concession runs for a period of sixty years and covers the whole of the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia to a depth of 100 kilom. (together with the Farsan and other islands and territorial waters). Prospecting work has been carried out by Petroleum Development (Western Arabia) (Limited)—the local operating company of Petroleum Concessions (Limited)—but with the exception of the Farsan Islands and a very small stretch of the coast the results have been disappointing.

*Saudi Arabia: (ii) Nejd.*

22. (a) *Hasa*.—The oil rights in this area were conceded to the Standard Oil Company of California by Ibn Saud on the 27th May, 1933. The concession has since been transferred to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, a subsidiary company, the share capital of which is wholly owned by Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation equally. The concession runs for a period of sixty years. The area of the concession as set out in the relevant article of the concession agreement is as follows:—

"All of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters), westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north, 30 degrees west, to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana, such boundary shall continue in a straight line south, 30 degrees east, to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia."

23. Drilling has been carried out by the company and some oil has been found. It has recently been reported that a well giving 3,400 barrels of oil per day has been brought in. Some of the oil from Hasa is being taken to Bahrain for refining. It is also understood that plans for the development of a port on the Hasa coast are under consideration and that the necessary chart will shortly be prepared by the Admiralty on the basis of information supplied by the company as the result of a survey carried out by them.

24. (b) *Remainder of Nejd*.—The position as regards oil exploration rights in territory of Saudi Arabia not included in the Red Sea area or Hasa area concessions, referred to above, is uncertain. It was believed at the time that the Hasa concession agreement had been supplemented by a special agreement or "secret clause," giving the Standard Oil Company of California some kind of an option on this territory, but details were lacking.

25. Information has recently been received, however, which points to the probability that on the 29th May, 1933, the Saudi Arabian Government and the company agreed upon a modified form of the concession signed on the 27th May (referred to in paragraph 22), the modifications consisting of the addition of two extra articles, numbered respectively 3 and 7, which have been inserted in their appropriate positions in the body of the original agreement of the 27th May, the subsequent articles being appropriately renumbered, and a revised version of the (renumbered) article 35.

26. The effect *inter alia* of these additional articles (or special agreement) is to accord to the Standard Oil Company of California—

"a preference right to acquire an oil concession covering the balance of Eastern Saudi Arabia extending as far west of the westerly boundary of the exclusive area (i.e., the Hasa concession area) as the contact between the sedimentary and igneous formations."

His Majesty's Government are not at present aware whether or where this "contact line" has been established. There is presumably an area uncovered by any concession or preference rights between the "contact line," wherever that may be, and the eastern boundary of the Red Sea concession.

27. A further provision is that the Standard Oil Company of California shall have the right to recover "by means of deductions from one-half of the royalties due to the Government" the amount of two loans totalling £50,000 gold received by the Saudi Arabian Government from the company.

28. On the same date as the conclusion of this modified agreement letters were exchanged by the company and the Saudi Arabian Government defining the company's preference rights in regard to (a) "the balance of Eastern Saudi Arabia" referred to in paragraph 26 above, and (b) the Koweit Neutral Zone (see paragraph 7 above). The effect of these preference rights in (a) is to entitle the company to acquire an oil concession on terms equal to those which may be offered to the Saudi Arabian Government by another company. If the Standard Oil Company of California elect not to exercise their right, the Saudi Arabian Government is free to accept the other company's offer. Otherwise, the Standard Oil Company of California's preference right shall continue at least so long as the provisions of the special agreement remain in force.

*The Yemen.*

29. No concession has so far been obtained in this territory owing to the attitude of the Imam Yahya, who opposes the exploitation of his country by foreign interests. The French interests in Petroleum Concessions (Limited) have, however, been successful in inducing the Imam to permit two geologists to visit the Yemen for a period of six months.

*Muscat and Oman.*

30. Two concessions<sup>(\*)</sup> have been obtained from the Sultan of Muscat and Oman by Petroleum Concessions (Limited), one in respect of Muscat and Oman except the district of Dhofar and the other in respect of Dhofar. Both commercial agreements are dated the 24th June, 1937, and run for a period of seventy-five years. The Sultan at first showed himself averse from being associated in any way with any political agreement between His Majesty's Government and the company. This question was, however, discussed with the Sultan during his visit to this country in April of this year, and the Sultan in the end agreed to be associated with such an agreement in a modified form.

31. An aerial exploration which it is hoped to carry out in the eastern portion of the Aden Protectorate will probably include the western portion of Muscat and Oman.

*Refinery Agreement with Petroleum Concessions (Limited).*

32. A general Refinery Agreement was entered into between His Majesty's Government and Petroleum Concessions (Limited) on the 5th February, 1937. Briefly, the agreement provides that whenever the production of crude oil in the areas over which the company hold, or may hold, oil concessions in the Persian Gulf area reaches a total of 500,000 tons per annum, the company shall erect, on a site to be agreed, a refinery or refineries with a total capacity of not less than 250,000 tons per annum, unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government that this would be precluded by commercial considerations. The agreement also provides for a re-examination of the question of the refinery capacity in the event of the total annual production exceeding 1 million tons per annum.

*Pre-emption of Oil in the Event of an Emergency.*

33. The political agreements entered into between His Majesty's Government and Petroleum Concessions (Limited), in respect of the concessions secured by the company in Qatar, Debai, Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah, provide, *inter alia*, that in the event of a state of national emergency or war (of the existence of which His Majesty's Government shall be the sole judge) His Majesty's Govern-

<sup>(\*)</sup> A separate concession may be granted by the Sultan later for his Asiatic territory, i.e., Gwadar.



ment shall have the sole right of pre-emption of all crude oil obtained under the concessions and of all the products thereof. His Majesty's Government have also the right to require the company to the extent of any refining capacity it may have in each State (but see the preceding paragraph defining the refinery position) to produce oil fuel that shall comply with the Admiralty specifications at the time, provided that the oil is of a suitable kind and quality for this purpose, and to take control of the company's works, plant and premises. Similar provisions appear in the political agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Koweit Oil Company. In the case of Muscat and Oman pre-emption will not be provided for in the modified form of political agreement with which the Sultan will be associated (see note under Muscat and Oman above) but in a separate agreement between His Majesty's Government and Petroleum Concessions (Limited).

34. No political agreement was entered into between His Majesty's Government and the Bahrain Petroleum Company in respect of the concession in Bahrain (nor is pre-emption provided for in the lease granted to the company by the Sheikh of Bahrain), but in view of the Sheikh's special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government it is not anticipated that any difficulty would occur in securing the pre-emption of Bahrain oil in the event of an emergency.

*Petroleum Department, June 10, 1938.*

[E 3627/193/25]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 107.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, May 30, 1938.*

IN my despatch No. 75, which I had the honour to address to you on the 21st April, I mentioned in the fourth paragraph that a flight of Saudi aeroplanes to Wejh, which had been contemplated for some time, had been abandoned. The project was revived, however, under the stimulus of the more generous budget for the new year, and eventually a flight to Yanbu, though not to Wejh, was effected. I understand that the flight might have been prolonged to Wejh, only the landing ground there was not ready. Yanbu is about 175 miles from Jedda in a straight line, measured on the map, and roughly half as far as Wejh.

2. Four machines took part in the flight. M. Naidyonoff piloted the Bellanca, and Major Ciccu was in one of the Capronis with one of the Saudi pilots. Two other Capronis were left to the entire charge of four Saudi pilots. According to M. Naidyonoff all five Saudis took a hand at piloting, and the take-off and landing were quite well done. Thus the Saudi Government now have five pilots who can follow the coast to Yanbu and land without harm. A sixth pilot, Abdullah-al-Mandili, who is as good as any of the others, was not on this flight, having decided to go to Egypt to train for civil aviation.

3. The time of the flight is given in the press as two hours and ten minutes going and two hours and a few minutes for the return journey. The press puts the speed of the Capronis at 160 kilom. (100 miles) per hour, M. Naidyonoff at 150 kilom. Judging by the map I conclude the lower figure to be the more probable.

4. It would appear that the Saudi policy of trying to weary the Italian air mission out by neglect has recently changed to some extent. Interesting evidence of this is afforded by two notices of the flight to Yanbu which appeared in the same newspaper, the *Saut-al-Hijaz*, a week apart. The earlier report stated that the first machine carried the Russian pilot, the second "an instructor and three engineers." Thus, as on an earlier occasion reported a few months ago, the Italian nationality of the instructor was suppressed. A week later the *Saut-al-Hijaz* says: "There was missing from that account the name of the Italian instructor who led the flight of aeroplanes and supervised the journey." It describes "the Italian technical trainer, Signor Ciccu" as giving the signal to start, mentions the Italian "engineers" (i.e., mechanics), and puts the Russian aviator last. It even transfers the Commandant and Officer Commanding

Aviation, Said-al-Hurdi, from the Bellanca, in which he travelled with the Russian pilot, to Major Ciccu's Caproni.

5. This later report bears out information which I had received from M. Naidyonoff, to the effect that Major Ciccu was making determined efforts, supported by the commandant, Said-al-Hurdi, to increase his influence. He did not succeed in obtaining executive powers, as he wished to do, but he secured the new French monoplane as an addition to his "flight." There are now, in theory, two flights:—

(1) Major Ciccu—

3 Capronis.

2 Italian instructional machines.

1 new Caudron-Renault.

(2) M. Naidyonoff.

1 Bellanca.

1 old Caudron-Renault.

4 Wapitis (one completely repaired, one nearly ready, and two much out of order).

Each of the two foreign instructors has thus six machines in his charge, and the balance in favour of Major Ciccu, all of whose machines are in working order, is redressed to some extent by the fact that he refuses to fly the new Caudron-Renault, which he professes to regard as difficult and even dangerous, and that M. Naidyonoff has been using it to train some of the Saudi pilots.

6. It is said that Major Ciccu has recently made an attempt to teach navigation to a class of Saudi pilots that began with five, but fell almost immediately to two. The task of imparting any theoretical training to these pilots is made almost impossible by their lack of mathematical and other education and of the practice of mental concentration, but the fact that some of them attend a class conducted by Major Ciccu shows that the boycott of the Italian mission has ceased.

7. The change in the attitude of the Saudi authorities towards the Italian mission affords an interesting subject of speculation. I think there is no doubt that until recently Ibn Saud regarded the Italians with suspicion and wished to prevent their getting a hold of any kind in his country. It may be that the Anglo-Italian Agreement, by removing Ibn Saud's fear of Italy, has tempted him to put some of his eggs into Mussolini's basket—a policy which may have been encouraged by the recent course of events in Europe. And perhaps he has begun at last to despair of inducing His Majesty's Government to modify their Palestine policy.

8. The press state that the flight to Yanbu is only the prelude to a series of flights to other coast towns, for the purpose of training Saudi pilots for flights "in the heart of the kingdom and its parts." There has been greater activity in the air during the last few weeks than at any time since the Italian air mission arrived, but it is the beginning of the financial year, and it is unlikely that petrol will be provided later in the year with the relative liberality with which it is supplied now. Whether the Italian Government can properly continue to provide an air mission at their expense if the Anglo-Italian Agreement comes into force is a matter of interpretation. To provide an officer and about eight mechanics, all drawing overseas allowances, and to change the mechanics every six months or so, must cost the Italian Government a considerable sum, and, as I have suggested before, it is for consideration whether the effect of this arrangement is not the acquisition of a privileged position of a political character. On the other hand, what of the rights which the Iraqi Government wish to be free to exercise under the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, not to mention a suggestion that has recently been made, that the activities of the British Council should be extended to Saudi Arabia?

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. BULLARD.



*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 110.)  
My Lord,

*Jedda, May 31, 1938.*

AN article published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 20th May suggests that Ibn Saud is not unaware of the criticism to which his régime is subjected in the Hejaz. The article is entitled: "The present situation in the Hejaz, as people see it and as the fair-minded admit it to be." It reproaches those who complain because the Hejaz has not become the wonder of the world in a moment. They make the mistake of comparing this country with certain other countries, instead of comparing the country as it is now with what it was a short while ago. Important changes for the better have been effected: (1) Public security has been established everywhere; this is the most important improvement, since it affects the lives and property of pilgrims; (2) public health is cared for by a sufficiency of doctors, with an abundance of medical stores; (3) transport is now effected easily by comfortable cars, and distances which formerly took ten days are now covered in one; (4) everything possible is now done for the comfort of pilgrims and the comfort, progress and prosperity of the citizens in the matter of development, culture, morality and public order. What a contrast to the state of affairs which existed until the recent past, when the country had never seen a motor car or an aeroplane, and did not even know what security was! Any fair-minded person who compares the present of the Hejaz with the past must admit that remarkable results have been achieved by the Government of His Majesty the King. But some people are never satisfied, and cannot see that the Hejaz is progressing normally with the greatest possible speed. The thing to be done is to pray for success, and not to cavil about small defects which are inevitable, and to expect perfection.

2. So far as the question of public security goes, the complacency of the article is justified, and it is also true that the Hejaz public do not realise what that involves. In some other respects, however, the Hejazi malcontent could produce valid retorts to the claims advanced on behalf of the Hejaz Government. It is true that a considerable number of doctors have been imported, but their professional skill is often doubtful, and the assertion that they are provided with an abundance of medical stores is an absurd overstatement. Nor would any of the pilgrims I have seen admit that transport in the Hejaz is comfortable. It is true that motor transport has been introduced, but almost nothing has been done to make roads suitable for it. It is one of the strangest lapses in the record of Ibn Saud's Government, that the short stretch of 45 miles between here and Mecca remains very much as it was when Ibn Saud occupied the Hejaz over twelve years ago.

3. The article naturally makes no reference to the main Hejazi grievance, viz., that the Hejaz would be in much better case than it is if it had not to support the rest of Arabia besides paying for its own administration. This grievance overlooks the fact that, during the only period for centuries when the Hejaz tried to live as a separate unit, i.e., under King Hussein, it failed not only in defence against aggression from outside, but also in the maintenance of internal order. It may be that if the budget of Saudi Arabia were published, it would be found that public security, including the maintenance of order among the tribes by means of subsidies, swallows up most of the revenue, and, consequently, since public security matters much more to the Hejaz, with the pilgrim traffic as its one industry, than to the rest of the country, that a better case could be made out for the Saudi Administration than the Hejazi is prepared to admit. In the absence of figures, however, the Hejazi will continue to think that he is fleeced for the benefit of the Nejd, and, in particular, for the support of an extravagant and much too numerous Royal family.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 10, 1938.)*

(No. 496.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, December 18, 1937.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the letter, which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in answer to the representations addressed to him by Mr. Scott on the receipt of your despatch No. 561 of the 7th October.

2. The assurances contained in this note in regard to the oral declaration made by Dr. Naji-al-Asil at the time of the signature of the Saadabad Pact, would appear to be of a satisfactory character.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 28.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Clark Kerr.*

(Translation.)

*Bagdad, December 15, 1937.*

My dear Ambassador,

I WISH to refer to your letter No. 614, dated the 17th December, 1935, and to the conversation which took place between us concerning the Saadabad Pact (Treaty of Non-Aggression), and have the honour to state that my predecessor had upon signing the pact declared that the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Great Britain, signed at Bagdad on the 30th June, 1930, was among the treaties alluded to in clause 3 of the preamble to the pact in question.

I avail, &c.

TAUFIQ-AL-SUWAIDI.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 10, 1938.)*

(No. 508. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 25, 1937.*

THE dumbshow of the Iraqi elections took place some days ago and, as was to be expected, all the Prime Minister's nominees, by no means a bad lot, secured their seats in Parliament. It cannot be said that they won them, for, in this country, the unhappy elector has no choice but to vote for the name that is put before him, and outside the Prime Minister's list there were no names. And so Jamil Madfai may be said to have assured himself of a robust majority. But I much doubt whether he has thus girt himself with any new strength. Indeed, it is more probable that from now onwards fresh difficulties will begin to gather about him. I mean the kind of difficulty that will sooner or later bring about his fall, for the pleasant calm that always goes before elections is over and the time has come for malcontents to sniff the air for trouble.

2. Jamil Madfai came into office in admittedly uncomfortable circumstances. That he has given his country four months of unbroken calm is something which calls for praise. At the same time, it should be remembered that he has been helped by the very circumstances that brought him to power—the impact of the murder of Bakr Sidqi upon the Iraqi mind and, with the deep relief at his disappearance, a general determination that lessons must be learned and that such things must never be allowed to happen again; and, from all this, a genuine and widespread desire for a spell of political peace. But Iraqi memories are short and this heyday is now probably touching its end. The quiet of the past few months and what the Prime Minister has contributed towards it will soon



be forgotten, all the more so because his Government have little else to their credit. They have been much the same as any other Government. No freshness has, in fact, blown through Iraqi affairs with the coming of Jamil Madfai. It is to be foreseen, therefore, that the volatile Iraqis will soon be asking themselves why he should remain in office. By the law of averages, his term should be about nine months. Four have already run, and I am disposed to doubt whether he will survive to complete the remaining five.

3. Most of his present difficulties are a legacy from his predecessors. They are by no means inconsiderable—King Ghazi's failure to play his part in the affairs of State, the army, the problem of the murders of Jafar and Bakr Sidqi and, most portentous, the homing of the exiles, who have all in their time tasted power and are now excluded from it. Of these, Nuri Said has been the most notable and the most disquieting.

4. The question of King Ghazi is no new one. It has often been my duty to report that His Majesty continues to shirk the part required of a Sovereign in a polity which depends for its usefulness upon the proper balance of the Crown, the Executive and the Legislature. He seems to draw but little profit from the several lessons he has had in his short reign. His heart still leans towards internal-combustion engines and his own private pleasures and away from the affairs of his country; and he leaves empty the place of the head of the State which his father so amply filled. Thus the equilibrium is upset. This emptiness has long preoccupied Iraqi statesmen of all parties. In his day Yasin-al-Hashimi felt it and turned over in his mind a project for the creation of a Crown Council to advise King Ghazi. But circumstances obliged him to be harsh with His Majesty and, perhaps for this reason, he never saw his way to put the project into effect. Hikmat Sulaiman, in his turn, glanced at it only to reject it as inexpedient for the moment. Now Jamil Madfai has taken it up again and seems bent upon pushing it through. He claims to have secured the assent of King Ghazi and the support of all Iraqi politicians of account. His Majesty's acquiescence looks like an admission of failure, or can it be that he has learned one thing—that his throne is at best but a precarious affair? When I saw him on my return from leave, he told me that amongst the papers left behind by Bakr Sidqi was a plan for the setting up of a dictatorship which left no room for a King. I gathered that he had been somewhat shaken by this uncomfortable discovery.

5. As now foreseen, the Crown Council would be under the chairmanship of the head of the Senate and would include the President of the Chamber, *ex officio*, and two ex-Prime Ministers chosen Pope-wise from amongst the other ex-Prime Ministers. The function of the council would be to advise King Ghazi upon certain specific matters. I do not propose to describe the plan now. That may be reserved for another despatch. Neither the Prime Minister nor anyone else with whom I have discussed it regards the council as a solution of the problem. They have all taken refuge in the view that it is at any rate better than the present state of nothingness and must be given a trial. This is probably the best that can be said for it, since it will, I think, take the Iraqis a couple of generations to produce a handful of elder statesmen who may be counted upon to have the wisdom and the courage to set aside their personal and political ambitions and give disinterested advice.

6. With the army Jamil Madfai claims to be working with determination, but he is moving with characteristic slowness. He assures me that, if given time, he will be able to convince the corps of officers that politics do not pay. It has been for this very purpose that he has kept for himself the portfolio of Defence. It may be worth while to note in passing that Amin-al-Umari, who was, it seems, sharply checked, now abstains from any overt attempt to exercise political influence. Nevertheless, there are many, and Nuri is amongst them, who scoff at the Prime Minister's optimism and predict that more trouble is to be expected from the army so soon as time has deadened the shock of recent events. For myself I have no means of testing the result of the Prime Minister's efforts, nor are the members of the British military mission able to help me. But at present I tend to agree with those who think that the recent military intrusion upon politics will prove to be no passing one.

7. In the matter of the murders of Jafar and Bakr Sidqi, Jamil Madfai is moving with great caution. As I see it, his inclination is to let the one murder cancel out the other, and in this, I should say, he is probably wise. In order,

however, to placate one school of thought, he is trying some of the assassins of Jafar for the attempt on the life of Maulad Nukhlis and for the murder of Dhia Yunis, the courts having ruled that the actual killing of Jafar is covered by Hikmat Sulaiman's Act of Indemnity. But so far the evidence has been slight and a conviction seems doubtful. Meanwhile, as we know, the officer responsible for the murder of Bakr Sidqi has been exonerated and is now on holiday in England. Pressure to bring him to justice will have been much less strong than that which is being brought to bear upon the Prime Minister by friends of Jafar. Whether Jamil Madfai will be able to resist them I cannot say. But it may be taken as certain that Nuri will not rest until Jafar's death is avenged. Indeed, he talks of the necessity of a purge of all "criminals," which is to go as far back as Simel, for it is only thus that the body of Iraq can be cleansed. When next he comes to power, therefore, it may be foreseen that many Iraqis will be well advised to leave the country.

8. The list of returned exiles is not unimpressive—Nuri Said, Rashid Ali, Ali Jaudat (three ex-Prime Ministers), Maulad Mukhlis, Taha-al-Hashimi and Rustam Haidar, not to speak of many of the lesser breed that suffered with them. Of these, Rashid Ali and Ali Jaudat are now living in retirement, from which, it is to be hoped, they will never re-emerge. Taha, on the other hand, is showing signs of activity. On his return he demanded, as a matter of prestige, to be reinstated as Chief of the General Staff, but he has had to content himself with a seat in Parliament, as has also Rustam Haidar.

9. Jamil Madfai's main preoccupation has, of course, been with Nuri. With what hopes Nuri came back to this country it would be idle to guess. But there is little doubt that he thought that a place would be found for him in the Cabinet and that his return would be the sign of a quick and joyous rallying of old supporters. But he was left out in the cold and supporters tended to hang back. Nevertheless, the restless presence of so formidable a personage was disturbing to the Prime Minister and his colleagues; and it soon became clear to Jamil Madfai, who needed none of the frightened promptings of King Ghazi, that, so long as Nuri remained in Iraq, the Government's declared policy of appeasement had only a meagre chance of success. As you are aware, his first move was to offer Nuri the Legation in London. This Nuri refused, but not in such a way as to dash all hope that he might end by accepting. Some few days after my return from leave the Prime Minister came to see me and asked me to use my influence in one of two directions: First, to persuade Nuri to go to London, and, failing that, to seek your assent to a plan, put forward by Nuri himself, to the effect that he should be sent on a mission of mediation between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews. Jamil Madfai explained that he had no reason to think that it was Nuri's wish to upset the Government, but that if Nuri stayed in Bagdad and kept his house open, there would inevitably gather about him all the disaffected elements in the country, who, sooner or later, would force him, willy-nilly, to make a bid for power. In the best interests of Iraq, therefore, it was essential that Nuri should leave the country for a time and the Prime Minister was anxious that his departure should be brought about in a way that would not be displeasing to Nuri himself. If I failed to induce Nuri to become Iraqi Minister in London, would I put the alternative plan before you? Nuri had many friends amongst the British, the Jews and the Arabs and seemed peculiarly fitted for the task of mediation. I told the Prime Minister that I shared his opinion that in the general interests of peace and quiet in Iraq it was best that Nuri should take a long holiday. If the Iraqi Government wished to appoint him to London, I was sure that he would find a welcome there, but I could hold out no hope that you would take a favourable view of the suggested mediation, which could only have the effect of complicating still further a difficult and painful situation. I consented, however, to see Nuri, and I did so on the evening of the same day.

10. I found him more than disinclined to accept the offer of London and, inasmuch as I knew that you were well enough contented with Raouf Chadirji, I did not feel justified in putting any pressure upon him. To my surprise, however, Nuri himself said that he felt his presence in Iraq to be embarrassing to the Government and professed to be quite willing to go away. He lost no time in putting forward his scheme for mediation between the Arabs and the Jews, and I was obliged to tell him that I saw no chance of its being accepted. He then said that in these circumstances he thought that he would go to Egypt, where,



in a quiet way, he might be able to use his influence for peace in Palestine, but he would do nothing without consulting me.

11. About a week later he called upon me and reverted to the proposal that he should become Iraqi Minister in London. He said that, upon reflection, he was now ready to accept the post if I could give him an assurance that, in the event of another political upheaval such, for instance, as that of October 1936, His Majesty's Government would not remain aloof in face of the anarchy that was bound to follow. He said that, without some such guarantee as this, he would be unable to accept from the Iraqi Government any appointment which might stand in the way of his speedy return to Iraq if his country needed him. For rather more than two hours he pressed me hard on this point, without, however, being able to give any clear answer to the questions I put to him upon what he meant by His Majesty's Government's not remaining aloof. In the end I said that, with the best will in the world, it was impossible for me to give him the assurance he asked for. His Majesty's Government, as he knew, were deeply interested in the welfare of Iraq and, for this reason, I would give all the help and support in my power to the present Government in their efforts to restore stability and tranquillity after the disturbing events of the last two years. If more help were asked for than had been needed in the past, it would not be refused. But, as he was well aware, His Majesty's Government would not in principle wish to impose their advice upon any Iraqi Government. It was hard to say precisely what they would do if there were any violent change of government, but I could at any rate tell him that their influence and help would always be upon the side of law, order and good government. After another unsuccessful attempt to engage my sympathies in his scheme to mediate in Palestine, Nuri left me with the impression that he would now give his favourable consideration to the proposal that he should go to London. But, some days later, he came to see me again, in order to tell me that he had finally decided against it and was leaving Bagdad on a visit to Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt and, finally, England, where he expected to arrive in the middle of January. To the great relief of the Iraqi Government, he left for Damascus on the 15th December.

12. It would be profitless to speculate upon what is passing in Nuri's uneasy and wayward mind, but we may, I think, take it that he means to keep a close watch upon events in this country from some point whence he may be able to reappear at a moment's notice, when he thinks that his time has come. We may also assume that he is aiming at an early return to office. He has, indeed, hinted more than once at what he will do in this event. I am inclined to think that the time at which he will try is not far off and that his stay abroad will be a brief one. With this in my mind, I ventured to advise him, before going away, to do all he could to make his reconciliation with King Ghazi more convincing. He acted upon my advice to the extent of seeking an audience with His Majesty, which seems to have passed off agreeably enough.

13. Although he is an old and tried friend, I should not like to see Nuri return to upset the Government of Jamil Madfai, who, humdrum and commonplace as they are, seem to be what Iraq now most needs and have shown themselves to be readier to co-operate with us than many of their predecessors. But we must, I think, be prepared for some attempt on Nuri's part to take the lead in Iraqi affairs, and, if he is successful, the sum of old scores still to be paid off will make his reign a troublesome one.

14. It would be inappropriate to end this despatch without some mention of Hikmat Sulaiman. I have seen him more than once. He has assured me that he is taking long leave from politics and devoting himself to the tilling of his land. He is on friendly terms with Jamil Madfai and unlikely to do anything to embarrass the present Government. The breach between him and his former colleagues, Jafar Abu Timman and Kamil Chadirji, remains unended.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Jerusalem and Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 45/45/93]

No. 30.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 511.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 28, 1937.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 501 of the 20th December reporting the conclusion of the general election which took place as the result of the dissolution of August last, I have the honour to inform you that King Ghazi opened Parliament with the customary ceremony on the 23rd December.

2. The Speech from the Throne, of which I enclose a summary taken from the *Iraq Times*, contained nothing unexpected. His Majesty, after an opening reference to the exceptional circumstances in which the Government had been formed and to their special task of restoring tranquillity and stability, spoke of the satisfactory state of Iraq's foreign relations and of the desire of the Government to do their best to strengthen the ties of friendship and alliance with Great Britain. He also referred to the policy which would be continued of cultivating the closest relations with brother Arab countries.

3. On the subject of internal affairs, His Majesty spoke of the vital importance of the army and of the efforts which would be made to increase the number of units and to equip them with modern weapons. Education would also, His Majesty announced, receive full attention and great endeavours would be made to raise the general standard of education throughout the country.

4. At the first meetings of the two Houses, Saiyid Muhammad-al-Sadr was elected President of the Senate and Saiyid Maulad Mukhlis President of the Chamber.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 30.

*Extract from the Iraq Times of December 24, 1937.*

THE opening of Parliament yesterday by His Majesty King Ghazi was a spectacular pageant conducted in accordance with the usual procedure. At 10 o'clock in the morning His Majesty arrived at Parliament House, where the following Speech from the Throne was delivered to the assembled Senators and Deputies:—

"In the name of Almighty God I open your Majlis and welcome you, wishing you success. The new Cabinet was formed in somewhat difficult circumstances which made it necessary that steps should be taken to maintain peace in order that the reconstruction of the country, morally and materially, should continue. It was considered advisable that the nation should be consulted and asked to give their verdict on the programme and policy of the new Cabinet. Now that you have been successful in the general election, I have no doubt that you will do your best to serve your country's interests.

"It is a source of great satisfaction to us," continued His Majesty, "that our relations with foreign States are very friendly, more particularly with neighbouring States. The Government are doing their best to strengthen the ties of our friendship and alliance with Great Britain. The Government are also continuing the policy of strengthening the friendship and brotherhood between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The visit paid us by the Saudi Crown Prince did a great deal to cement the cordiality existing between us. The fact that the Kingdom of the Yamen has joined the Treaty of Alliance recently concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has given us great satisfaction. The Government are now trying to strengthen our brotherly relations with the new Syrian State and the other Arab States. Our relations with the Turkish Republic are highly satisfactory, being based on a policy of mutual co-operation. Similarly, our relations with Iran are based on friendship and co-operation, and they have been further improved lately by the conclusion of the Frontier Treaty and other agreements. In order to preserve peace in the Near East the Sa'adabad Pact between Iraq, Iran, Turkey



and Afghanistan was lately signed in Tehran. These treaties will be submitted to you for examination."

His Majesty concluded: "Our Government are now engaged on the preparation of the new budget in a manner that will show a balance between income and expenditure. It is hoped that this aim will be realised chiefly by reducing the expenditure of the State. Development schemes are receiving great attention. These schemes have been provided for in the Five-Year Plan, for which the revenue from the tax on petrol has been set aside. New legislation regarding financial affairs, land settlement, and banks is now being prepared and will be submitted to you in due course. The Government will do their best to preserve from any interference the independence of the judicial machinery, and a new law to ensure this will be submitted to you. The strengthening of the army being of vital importance for the defence of the country, the Government are doubling their efforts to increase the number of units and provide them with modern weapons. The importance of education for Iraq's continued progress being fully recognised, great endeavours are being made to raise the general standard, and the Government have sent many students to foreign countries to complete their studies."

[E 177/127/34]

No. 31.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 10, 1938.)*

(No. 517.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 29, 1937.

WITH reference to Mr. Scott's despatch No. 427 of the 19th October, concerning the special position of His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations, which have been sent to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of a note addressed by him to my Iranian colleague and of the latter's reply.

2. You will see that Taufiq-al-Suwaïdi insists in his note on the special precedence granted under the Treaty of Alliance to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Iraq, and that reply contains an assurance that the Iranian Government will not appoint an Ambassador so long as the treaty remains in force.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, to Iranian Minister, Bagdad.*

(Translation.)

My dear Minister,

Bagdad, October 30, 1937.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that it is understood that article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Iranian Empire, signed at Tehran on the 18th July, 1937, shall be given effect to in a manner reconcilable with the provisions of the annexure to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which is held as forming part of the said treaty, and under which the Iraqi Government have granted all Ambassadors of the Government of His Britannic Majesty accredited to the Court of His Majesty the King of Iraq special right of precedence over the diplomatic representatives of other countries in Iraq.

I therefore beg your Excellency to take note of this fact and inform me of your having done so.

Please accept, &amp;c.

TAUFIQ-AL-SUWAÏDI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

*Iranian Minister, Bagdad, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

(Translation.)

My dear Minister,

December 7, 1937.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Excellency's letter dated the 30th October, 1937, in which you refer to article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship between the States of Iran and Iraq, and to the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, concerning the precedence of the British Ambassador over the diplomatic representatives of other countries, and to inform your Excellency as follows:—

My Imperial Government have not given any undertaking to the Royal Iraqi Government in this connexion. Moreover, they do not regard the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 as binding on them in any respect. As, however, the British representative holds the rank of Ambassador, while the representative of the Imperial Iranian Government is a Minister Plenipotentiary, it is obvious, having regard to the recognised principles of international law, that any Ambassador takes precedence over any Minister Plenipotentiary. Nevertheless, so long as the Royal Iraqi Government are bound by such undertaking towards the British Government under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, the Imperial Iranian Government will not raise their Minister Plenipotentiary to the rank of Ambassador.

In conclusion, I avail, &amp;c.

[E 299/3/93]

No. 32.

*Note on Past and Present Arrangements for Financing Assyrian Settlement.*

#### Part I.—General Financial Arrangements.

FOR nearly two years after the Assyrian Committee of the League was set up in October 1933, its special expenses, which were not very considerable and arose mainly out of missions of investigation to Brazil and British Guiana and other similar services, were charged to the working capital fund of the League, for reimbursement from an eventual Assyrian settlement fund. (NOTE.—The salaries of the League Secretariat staff concerned with Assyrian work have never been charged to the special Assyrian funds, nor have the salaries or expenses of the representatives of Governments on the Committee, apart of course from special missions.) Concurrently, the Iraqi Government were spending within Iraq considerable sums on repairing the damage caused to the Assyrians during the 1933 disturbances; this expenditure comprised the upkeep of the Mosul refugee camp, relief in money and kind to pillaged Assyrians, &c. Further, the French mandatory authorities in Syria incurred expense in 1933-34 over the maintenance of some 500 Assyrian refugees, who crossed into Syria from Iraq after the fighting in August 1933.

2. Towards the end of 1934, expenditure on Assyrians became more considerable through the French and the Iraqis coming to an agreement for the transfer to Syria of the families of the original Assyrian refugees. This brought the Assyrian community in Syria up to over 2,000, and, faced with the need of settling them, the French began the Khabur settlement in the autumn of 1934, that being by far the cheapest and easiest place of settlement at short notice. The transfer of the Assyrian families was accompanied by a payment of £10,000 from the Iraqi Government to the French High Commissioner, and it should be noted that this sum, and all the considerable expenditure incurred by the Iraqi Government within Iraq (apart from the relief measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Iraqis have provided free the motor transport to the Syrian frontier for all the various Assyrian convoys), have been a unilateral charge on Iraq—the Iraqis maintain of over £30,000—and have never been counted towards the League fund, or for the purposes of the *pari passu* arrangement with the United Kingdom. In addition to using the Iraqi £10,000, the French High Commissioner proceeded in 1934-35 to considerable extra expenditure on the equipment of the Khabur settlement and the maintenance of the Assyrians.



3. In April 1935 the French first agreed in principle to envisage a comprehensive Assyrian settlement in Syria, and after long negotiations the Ghab plan was worked out and approved by the League of Nations and all concerned in September-October of that year. Meanwhile, the prospect of finding a solution of the Assyrian problem within Syria led to the transfer, between June and November 1935, of a further 4,000 indigent or discontented Assyrians from Iraq to the Khabur, with a consequent large increase in the expenditure on that settlement. The budget for the Ghab scheme drawn up by the League in November 1935 showed an estimated total expenditure of 86 million French francs, which, at the rate of exchange then obtaining, was approximately £1,146,000. Of this amount, about £830,000 were for engineering works to reclaim the Ghab marsh, and the balance for the estimated expenses of actual settlement, and also for the reimbursement to the League of Nations of the administrative expenditure charged to its working capital fund since 1933 (about £7,000), and to the French High Commissioner in Syria of the arrears of expenditure incurred directly by him in the past (about £20,000). (NOTE.—These reimbursements were duly made: as mentioned above, the Iraqi Government were obliged to bear unilaterally the direct expenditure incurred by them in Iraq.)

4. The contributions offered (as maxima) towards the estimated expenditure on the Ghab scheme were:—

Contribution of French mandated territories towards reclamation works, in view of their value to Syria ...	380,000	} On a <i>pari passu</i> basis
Contribution of United Kingdom ...	250,000	
Contribution of Iraq ...	250,000	
Fixed contribution of League of Nations ...	86,000	
Total ...	966,000	

It should be explained that the contributions of the mandated territories, the United Kingdom and Iraq were fixed after considerable negotiation, and that the League, as an institution, was then invited to accept liability for the whole of the balance required, and indeed to incur an unlimited liability if the estimates for settlement proper were exceeded. The French High Commissioner, on behalf of the mandated territories, took responsibility for any expenditure in excess of the estimates for the reclamation-works side of the scheme. The League, however, refused to accept this liability, and only agreed to a fixed and final contribution of 1,300,000 Swiss francs, or £86,000 at the then exchange. This amount was arrived at somewhat fortuitously through the Committee of the League Assembly having stated that certain miscellaneous receipts were hoped for in the way of contributions from the Assyrians, loans secured on the eventual Assyrian lands, &c., which it was hoped might reduce the gap to be filled to £86,000, a sum which the League then agreed to provide in annual instalments. In actual fact, it was soon clear that the miscellaneous receipts referred to could not be counted on, and the Ghab scheme therefore had to be begun at the end of 1935 with a prospective deficit of £1,146,000 less £966,000 = £180,000.

5. When the Ghab scheme broke down in July 1936 the position was that Iraq and the United Kingdom had each made an initial payment of £60,000 out of their maximum offer of £250,000 each, and a first *tranche* of 400,000 Swiss francs had been drawn from the League contribution and used almost entirely for reimbursing to the League's working capital fund the League's past advances towards the Assyrian Committee's expenses. Expenditure on the reclamation scheme was stopped when the net cost to the committee was not more than some 1,400,000 French francs, and the expenditure on settlement proper had been almost confined to the Khabur.

6. On the collapse of the Ghab scheme, the contribution promised by the French Government in the name of the mandated territories lapsed with the reclamation works. But at the League session in September-October 1936 the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq gave general assurances of their readiness to co-operate in financing any alternative scheme of settlement, and agreed in the meanwhile to contribute *pari passu* towards the "continuing expenses" of the Assyrian Committee (*i.e.*, chiefly the administration and upkeep of the Khabur settlement and expenditure in connexion with the search for a

new scheme). The Assembly of the League of Nations, for its part, agreed at the same time to contribute towards these continuing expenses in the proportion which the League contribution to the Ghab scheme bore to the combined maxima offers by the United Kingdom and Iraq, and it also agreed to allot the balance of its Ghab offer of 1,300,000 Swiss francs to any new scheme that might emerge, subject to its being approved by the Supervisory Commission (the Assembly's permanent financial body), provided that the total figure of £86,000 was not exceeded. The resultant arrangement was that the League became responsible for 14.78 per cent. (*i.e.*,  $\frac{66,000}{586,000} \times 100$ ) of the "continuing" expenditure, and

His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government for 42.61 per cent. each.

7. Matters went on on this basis until the League Council adopted in September 1937 the scheme for the reorganisation of the Khabur settlement at a maximum estimated cost of £50,939. The United Kingdom, Iraq and the League of Nations each agreed to contribute towards this scheme, up to the maximum estimate, in the proportion—42.61 per cent. in the case of the United Kingdom and Iraq, 14.78 per cent. in the case of the League—in which they share the continuing expenditure. At the same time the Iraqi Government expressly agreed to continue to contribute towards the "continuing" administrative expenditure of the Khabur settlement for "a short period," provided that the administrative budget should not exceed £14,000, and also on the understanding that there would not be any necessity to include in that budget free food supplies for the Assyrians after the end of 1937. (NOTE.—Since then the necessity of continuing free food supplies in 1938 has been revealed, and there is at present a controversy with the Iraqi Government about how this item should be met.)

#### Part II.—Arrangements for United Kingdom Contribution.

8. The position as regards the internal arrangements in the United Kingdom for giving effect to the promise by His Majesty's Government to contribute towards Assyrian settlement is as follows: The original offer of £250,000 *pari passu* with Iraq was a maximum offer, and, according to British parliamentary practice, Parliament can only be asked to vote in the ordinary budget estimates for a financial year, or by means of a supplementary for a broken period up to the end of a financial year, the amounts which are estimated to be actually required from British funds for expenditure within that period. The first action taken on the offer by His Majesty's Government of a contribution to the Ghab scheme was to present to Parliament in February 1936 a supplementary estimate for £60,000 for the period up to the end (*i.e.*, the 31st March) of the financial year 1935-36. At the same time, the whole maximum offer of His Majesty's Government was, of course, explained to Parliament, and in passing the supplementary estimate Parliament in effect gave its general approval to the Ghab scheme and the total United Kingdom offer. The £60,000 was then transferred to the League in March 1936. It should be explained that the figure of £60,000 for this initial payment was selected to preserve the *pari passu* arrangement with Iraq, which had already transferred this amount in the previous year. (NOTE.—This Iraqi instalment of £60,000 was quite distinct from the original Iraqi payment of £10,000 to the French in 1934, and from the cost of relief in Iraq, convoys to the frontier, &c. Only the £60,000 counted towards the Iraqi contribution to the Ghab scheme.)

9. In the light of the estimated expenditure of the Council Committee in the period covered by the United Kingdom financial year 1936-37, an estimate for £110,000 as the United Kingdom grant-in-aid towards Assyrian settlement was included in the League of Nations vote in the ordinary United Kingdom budget submitted to Parliament in April 1936. Owing to the breakdown of the Ghab scheme in July 1936, and the fact that there was a sufficient balance in hand from the instalments already paid to meet current administrative expenditure, nothing was ever drawn from this credit.

10. In the ordinary United Kingdom budget for 1937-38 the figure of £14,000 for Assyrian purposes was inserted and passed by Parliament, the explanatory note attached to the estimate making it clear that the Ghab scheme had broken down and that this sum was to cover the share of His Majesty's Government in respect of the continuing administrative expenditure of the



committee. By implication it was thus made necessary (as, indeed, was inevitable in view of general parliamentary practice) for the approval of Parliament to be given to any offer by His Majesty's Government of a contribution towards any new specific settlement scheme. Of this £14,000, £4,000 was advanced to the League of Nations in October 1937, concurrently with a similar payment by Iraq, to replenish the funds available for meeting current administrative charges.

11. When His Majesty's Government agreed in September 1937 to pay their share of 42·61 per cent. of the estimated cost of the Khabur reorganisation scheme, it thus became necessary to submit a supplementary estimate as soon as possible to Parliament, not only to provide the necessary additional funds, but also to obtain the approval of Parliament in principle to the use of United Kingdom funds for the new scheme. But meanwhile it was essential to make an immediate payment to the League to enable an option to be secured on the necessary additional lands on the Khabur. It was clear that only His Majesty's Government could make funds immediately available, and for this specific purpose, in agreement with the Treasury, and taking into account the general approval expressed by Parliament in favour of United Kingdom assistance for Assyrian settlement, the Foreign Office advanced the sum of £5,000 direct to the Trustee Board at Beirut in October 1937. The amount of the supplementary estimate was fixed at £8,000, in the light of information supplied by the Trustee Board as to the requirements of the reorganisation scheme and taking account of the advance of £5,000 from the United Kingdom funds and of the balance of £5,000 remaining from the ordinary 1937-38 credit.

12. Meanwhile, for various reasons, it is clear that the expenditure of the Trustee Board on reorganisation will be much less than was originally expected in the period up to the 31st March, 1938. The League of Nations has accordingly restricted its requests to Iraq and the United Kingdom in the financial year 1937-38 to an initial payment of £7,000 each, followed by a further payment of £3,000 later in the financial year. The Treasury consider that a reduction should therefore be made in the amount of the supplementary estimate, and Mr. Wardley and I have agreed provisionally on the telephone (subject to official concurrence) that a safe figure for the supplementary would be to halve the present estimate to £4,000. (NOTE.—Even if a margin of funds were not required, a "token" supplementary would be required to secure Parliament's approval in principle.)

13. Meanwhile, the preliminary demand of the League for £7,000 from His Majesty's Government has been completed by a recent payment of £2,000 to supplement the advance of £5,000; although the Iraqi Government have not actually paid over anything so far towards reorganisation, it was felt that His Majesty's Government could safely act in view of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad reporting the formal decision of the Iraqi Government in favour of meeting the League's request for £10,000 for reorganisation in the current financial year. It should be explained that the Treasury have agreed to this payment being made—and also to the further request for £3,000 being met when it is definitely required by the League and the Iraqi Government are in step—out of the unexpended balance of the ordinary 1937-38 estimate of £14,000 without waiting for the supplementary estimate and in anticipation of the approval of Parliament. This course is inevitable owing to the postponement of the supplementary estimate from November to February (due to pressure of parliamentary business). It is felt that this procedure can be justified, in any case, by the fact that the purposes for which the funds are now required—purchase of lands and live-stock—are necessities for the existing settlement, quite apart from the reorganisation scheme, and could really be considered as forming part of the ordinary upkeep of the Khabur settlement, towards which Parliament has already agreed to contribute. The £4,000 which will probably be voted in the supplementary estimate will be by way of a reserve to meet unexpected calls, since the League calculate that there should not normally be any further demand to Iraq or the United Kingdom in the current financial year, either for reorganisation or administration, beyond the £10,000 already requested from each country before the 31st March, 1938.

J. G. WARD.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
January 14, 1938.*

[E 435/435/93]

No. 33.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24.)*

(No. 2.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 4, 1938.*

WITH reference to your circular despatch of the 28th May, 1935, I have the honour to transmit herewith a revised report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1937.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure in No. 33.

*Report on the Leading Personalities in Iraq.*

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## THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *Ghazi, King of Iraq.*

Youngest child and only son of King Feisal. Born in the Hejaz at Mecca in 1911. Came to Bagdad in 1923 with his mother and sisters. Was educated first by an English governess, and later at Harrow, where he made little progress, owing to the inadequate preparation which he had received before entering the school. On his return to Iraq he went through the normal course of training at the Iraqi Military Cadet College. He learnt to be a good horseman, but was a poor student of military science. Left the college early in 1933 and became aide-de-camp to his father, King Feisal. Acted as Regent during King Feisal's absence from Iraq in the summer of 1933. Succeeded to the throne on King Feisal's death on the 8th September, 1933. Soon after his accession he was married to Aliyah, the eldest daughter of his uncle, ex-King Ali of the Hejaz. A son was born in May 1935 and named Feisal, after his grandfather.

In May 1936 his sister, the Princess Azzah, while visiting Athens, made a runaway marriage with a Greek hotel servant, a native of Rhodes. This created a great scandal in Iraq and for a time seemed to have destroyed King Ghazi's personal prestige. By the end of the year, however, the incident had been largely forgotten. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that this *mésalliance* would be counted against him if he ever found himself in difficulties in his relations with his people. In 1937 his second sister married a young officer in the Iraqi air force. Though it brought no prestige to the Royal family the marriage was apparently a happy one.

He shows no aptitude or taste for public affairs.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Highness the Amir.*

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926 after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at a private school in England.

A serious and scholarly young man who compels the respect of the Iraqis by the utter blamelessness of his life in comparison with that of his cousin, King Ghazi. Yasin and his colleagues used to regret that it was not he who was on the throne of Iraq. He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and granddaughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

3. *Zaid, His Highness the Amir.*

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Shereefian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

He is said, with the passage of time, to have slightly deteriorated.

## OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.*

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi.*

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

3. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaïmakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister for the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri.*

Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Shereefian army. Since 1920 has been editor of the Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935. His paper, the *Istiqal*, was suspended in November 1936 for one year by Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet for publishing articles defending Yasin-al-Hashimi's administration.



This order was cancelled when Jamil-al-Madfai succeeded Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937.

Elected Deputy for Kut, December 1937.

6. *Abdul Husain-bin-Ali-al-Hujaiji.*

Shiah of Kadhimain. Elder brother of Abdul Ghani Chalabi and representative of the house. Wealthy landowner of Kadhimain, born 1877. He took a somewhat passive part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922, but went to Persia on business in July 1922 before the crisis. He returned in November 1922. Minister of Education, November 1922, and subsequently has frequently held this portfolio in different Cabinets. He has little influence in politics, but is often included in Cabinets as an amenable Shiah.

Minister for Education in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet which came into office in March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Appointed Senator, November 1933. Again appointed Minister for Education in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934.

He resigned with the Prime Minister in February 1935, but was again made Minister for Education in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March. Twelve days later this Cabinet resigned, and since then Abdul Husain has taken no part in public life.

7. *Abdul Latif Nuri.*

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *aqid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (brigadier-general) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (major-general) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

8. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).*

Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid.*

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

10. *Abdul Wahid, Shaikh.*

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful shaikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

11. *Abdullah-al-Damluji.*

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi consul-general, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

12. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan.*

A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months



they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935.

13. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937.

14. *Ahmad-i-Taufiq.*

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

15. *Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat.*

Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

16. *Ajil-al-Yawar.*

Paramount Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba (Arab) tribe of Iraq.

His tribal authority is exercised over the Northern Jazirah from the Sinjar to the Aqarquf depression to the west of Bagdad. A fine man physically, who has cleverly adapted himself to the changing political conditions which have followed the British occupation of Iraq. For some years after the division of the Jazirah between the British and French mandates, tribal troubles were caused by his rivalry with Diham-al-Hadi, the chief of the Shammar, whose territory now lies in Syria. Latterly (1933), however, both Diham and Ajil have settled down to a mutual acceptance of the division of the tribes, and have seemingly agreed to leave each other in peace. Ajil is eager to adopt modern methods of cultivation, and has a number of irrigation pumps. He has also profited largely from the activities of the British Oil Development Company, whose field lies in the Shammar tribal territory.

His eldest son, Sufuq, was educated at the American college at Beirut, but has now finished his schooling and has returned to live with the tribe. He is a great help to his father.

Ajil visited England for the Coronation in May 1937 and afterwards travelled in Germany and France.

17. *Ali Jaudat.*

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sharif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

18. *Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali.*

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

19. *Amin-al-Umari.*

Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914-17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfa'i) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-ez-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance



brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

20. *Arshad-al-Umari.*

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made *Amin-al-Asimah* (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad.

21. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid.*

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

22. *Ata Amin.*

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Faisal. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935.

23. *Babekr Agha.*

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

24. *Daud-al-Haidari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, *Amin-al-Umana* (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. *Hazb-al-Shah* and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April–November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

25. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

26. *Fadhil Jamali, Dr.*

Born Kadhima 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921–27. Columbia University New York 1927–29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education, where he soon made his mark. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction, and has filled this post with success. Keen and competent, but with a natural predilection for American methods.

27. *Fahmi-al-Mudarris.*

Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria, and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed Rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937.

28. *Faris Agha.*

Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918–19 until 1923, he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River. Elected Deputy in February 1937.

29. *Hanna Khaiyat.*

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937.

30. *Hikmat Sulaiman.*

Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.



31. *Husain Afnan Saiyid.*

Grandson on the maternal side of Baha Ullah, the Persian reformer. Born at Acre in 1889; educated at the Quaker School at Brumana, the American College, Beirut, and Cambridge, where he graduated. He is married to a tiresome woman. Freethinker, but very proud of his grandfather. Appointed Secretary to the Council of Ministers in November 1920, which post he filled with distinction until dismissed in 1924 by Yasin Pasha. He then took up commerce in partnership with Shafiq Haddad, but failed. In 1928 he was appointed *chef de protocol*, and in January 1930 secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London. Transferred in September 1932 as secretary to the Legation at Ankara, but the post was abolished soon after his appointment. In May 1934 he was given a good post in the Railway Directorate.

32. *Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan.*

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

33. *Ibrahim Hilmi-al-Umar.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1895. Clever writer and experienced journalist. Was in Syria during the war and at one time worked for T. E. Lawrence. Came back to Bagdad in 1921 and started the *Lisan-al-Arab* on pro-Feisal and pro-British lines. A year later he changed sides and joined the Shiah agitation against the first elections. Went to Persia with the Ulema and attacked British policy in the Persian press. Returned to Bagdad in March 1923, and in May 1924 became editor of the *Mufid*, a newspaper run by Jafar Pasha. Continued active in journalism until 1931, when he was made Superintendent of the Press Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior. Since then he has kept quiet. Ibrahim Hilmi is a thoroughly worthless and contemptible character, who will do anything (or anybody) for money or drink. Appointed Acting Director of the Department of Propaganda and Publicity in the Ministry of Interior in June 1935. Placed on pension in November 1936 after the fall of the Hashimi Cabinet, but later he was re-employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and put in charge of foreign propaganda. In August 1937 he was reinstated in his old post as Director of Propaganda and Publicity in the Ministry of the Interior.

34. *Ibrahim Kamal.*

Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

35. *Jafar, Abu Timman.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwanayah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa.

36. *Jafar Hamandi.*

Shiah. Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

37. *Jalal Baban.*

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister for Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister for Economics and Communications.

38. *Jamal Baban.*

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928.



Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

#### 39. *Jamil-al-Rawi.*

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine.

#### 40. *Jamil-al-Madfai.*

Of Mosul. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yeman to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figurehead in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinions in an honest, downright manner.

#### 41. *Jamil-al-Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

#### 42. *Kamil Chadirji.*

Sunni, born Bagdad 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha-al-Watani*, and his paper was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha-al-Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt-al-Ahali*, of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months. When he returned in the autumn he was suspected of encouraging communistic propaganda.

#### 43. *Khalid Sulaiman.*

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

#### 44. *Khalil Ismail.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

#### 45. *Khushaba, Malik.*

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

#### 46. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed *Amin-al-Asimah* (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and *Amin-al-Asimah* October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the *Amin-al-Asimah*, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.



47. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh.*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

48. *Mahmud, Shaikh.*

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstalled as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and lives in Suleimani. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, has been sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

49. *Mar Shimun.*

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholikos of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraqi army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

50. *Maulud Mukhlis.*

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Shereefian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement

between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraqi army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925. He was elected President of the Chamber in December 1937.

51. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi.*

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

52. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud.*

Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet. He has a reputation for moderation and sound judgment and has played no part in politics.

53. *Muhammad Amin Zaki.*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

54. *Muhammad Husain Qashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid).*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance. Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater



share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

55. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi.*

Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He was, however, reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937.

56. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz.*

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released.

57. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid.*

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhmain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925 and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937.

58. *Musa Shabandar.*

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and has since been living in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin. Has frequently contributed anti-British articles to the Bagdad press, using the pen-name of "Alwan Abu Sharara."

Came to Bagdad in autumn of 1932, and in January 1933 was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah December 1937.

59. *Mustafa-al-Umari.*

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts include the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

60. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931 and shortly after Minister for the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the *Amin-al-Asimah*. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva.

61. *Dr. Naji-al-Asil.*

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi consul-general and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence.

62. *Naji Shaukat.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

63. *Naji-al-Suwaidi.*

Born in Bagdad 1883. Educated at Bagdad and in the school of law at Constantinople. Speaks French and English. Public Prosecutor in the Yaman 1905; president of the Commercial Tribunal, Basra, 1908; member of the Bagdad Court of Appeal 1910; Kaimakam of Kadhmain 1910-11; of Najaf 1911; and of Hindiyah 1912; Civil Inspector for Diarbekr, Urfa and Mardin, 1913; Inspector for the Eastern Region (Adana to Mosul) 1915; Civil Inspector of the Adana Vilayet 1916, whence he was transferred to Konia; Civil Inspector in the



Ministry of the Interior, Constantinople, 1917. Returned to Syria after the armistice and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Bagdad, but resigned the appointment after a few days and returned to his former post in Aleppo. Returned to Bagdad in March 1921, and was active in the preparations for the reception of the Amir Feisal. Was appointed Minister of Justice in September 1921 and held the post till November 1923, having served for a short time also as Minister of Interior. Deputy for Bagdad in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924. He opposed the treaty and voted against it. Became Prime Minister in November 1929. His Cabinet resigned in March 1930. Re-elected for Bagdad in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 as a protest against the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Government. Accompanied King Feisal to Tehran in April 1932. Appointed Senator January 1933. Joined Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in February 1934 as Minister for Finance, and resigned with his colleagues in August 1934. He presided over the Arab Congress held at Bludan (Syria) in August 1937, to protest against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, and on returning to Iraq reorganised and strengthened the Palestine Defence League.

#### 64. *Nasrat-al-Farisi.*

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

#### 65. *Nishat-al-Sanawi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. *Amin-al-Asimah*, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936.

#### 66. *Nuri-al-Said.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became

Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

#### 67. *Rashid Ali-al-Gilani.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the *Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani* (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

#### 68. *Rashid-al-Khojah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jedda, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister for Defence in February 1934, resigned



with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

69. *Rauf-al-Bahrani.*

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

70. *Rauf-al-Chadirji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

71. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi.*

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaïmakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Anqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

72. *Rustam Haidar.*

Shiah of Baalbak (Syria), where his family owns considerable estates. Born 1889. Well educated, speaks French and English. Pleasant mannered, quiet and well bred. He came to Iraq with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and after the coronation was appointed head of the King's diwan. Appointed Minister for Finance November 1930, in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Acted as Prime Minister twice during Nuri Pasha's absence from Iraq. Went to Europe with King Feisal in summer of 1931. Resigned from the Ministry of Finance when Nuri Pasha's Cabinet fell in October 1932. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and was reappointed to the same Ministry under Jamil Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, and returned to the Palace as Rais of the Royal diwan in November 1934.

Resigned in November 1936, when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office. Was offered the Iraqi Legation at Paris, but refused. He left Iraq for Syria in December 1936, but came back in November 1937.

73. *Sabih Najib.*

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister.

74. *Sadiq-al-Bassam.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

75. *Said-bin-Ali.*

Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

76. *Said-al-Haji Thabit.*

Born Mosul 1883, Sunni. Merchant. Elected Deputy for Mosul 1925. Delegate to the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem 1931. Deputy 1933-34-35. Nationalist. He has taken a prominent part in all movements in Iraq in support of the Arabs in Palestine. President of the Palestine Defence Society which was particularly active in raising money for the Arabs of Palestine during the disorders of 1936. He attended the Bludan Arab Congress in August 1937.

77. *Salman-al-Barrak.*

A tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

78. *Salih Jabr.*

Young Shiah lawyer of Najaf employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935 where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfai formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

79. *Sami Shaukat.*

Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

80. *Shakir-al-Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the Armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to



King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O.1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious and is one of the few officers in the army who are of good family, have a decent private life and presentable manners. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

#### 81. *Taha-al-Hashimi.*

Brother of Yasin-al-Hashimi (*q.v.*). Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *farig* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

He is popular with the British officers of the military mission. In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

#### 82. *Tahsin Qadri.*

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

#### 83. *Talib Mushtaq.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was head clerk in Baquba. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931 when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937. His brother Akram Mushtaq succeeded Muhammad Ali Jawad as Officer Commanding the Iraqi Air Force.

#### 84. *Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.*

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister

for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935, and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

#### 85. *Thabit Abdul Nur.*

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

#### 86. *Yusuf Ghanimah.*

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rappporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general-manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

#### 87. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din.*

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad, 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

#### *Obituary.*

The following persons, formerly included in this report, died during the course of 1937:—

Ali Sulaiman, Shaikh.  
Bakr Sidqi-al-Askari.  
Khalil Zaki.  
Muhammad Ali Jawad.  
Muhammad Zaki.  
Yasin-al-Hashimi.



[E 436/171/93]

No. 34

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24.)*

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 4, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for 1937.

I have, &amp;c.

(For the Ambassador),  
JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure in No. 34.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.*

[The portions marked with an asterisk are copied from previous reports.]

*Egypt.*

Abdul Rahman Azzam, who is also accredited to Tehran, Kabul and Jedda, presented his letter of credence to King Ghazi on the 3rd August, 1936. He spends much of his time travelling between his posts, which is irksome to him because he feels that his usefulness lies mainly in Iraq. He tells me that his Government have accepted (subject to the necessary financial provision) his recommendations that separate missions should be set up at Tehran and Jedda, and he should restrict his activities to Bagdad and, when the time comes, to Damascus.

It will be remembered that at one time he was under a sentence of death by the Italians. But he was, he tells me, informed by his Italian colleague in Tehran that he had now been amnestied.

He professes great and, I think, genuine faith in Anglo-Egyptian friendship, more particularly now that the Treaty of Alliance has been concluded. He has engaged the affection of a large number of Iraqis, who believe in him and listen to him and, for this reason, his influence in Bagdad is likely to be wide. This is all to the good, for his judgment is wise and his advice sound. He is an old friend of mine and I have found him a most useful and trustworthy colleague. He speaks fluent English.

He is married to a daughter of Khalid-al-Qarqani, his comrade-in-arms in Tripoli, who is now in the service of Ibn Saud.

*France.*

M. Paul Lépiessier left Bagdad for Bangkok in the autumn and his successor has not yet arrived.

*Germany.*

Dr. Fritz Grobba came to Bagdad as Chargé d'Affaires in March 1932, and was promoted to be Minister Plenipotentiary on the 13th December of that year. Before then he had served as consul at Jerusalem, Minister at Kabul, in the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office and, during the war, with the Turkish armies in Palestine. This means that he has a fairly wide experience of the Middle East.

I should say that he is a man of some ability. He is certainly zealous and energetic in pushing German interests in this country. Buttoned rather tightly into his somewhat old-fashioned black cutaway coat, which he seems always to wear, he suggests at first glance a typical middle-class German official of before the war—wooden, correct, formal and a little inhuman. But most of this soon passes, and, when he unbuttons (still, I am bound to say, very correctly), he reveals some geniality and humour. He does his best to be a friendly colleague, and is always ready to talk freely about current events in Iraq, upon which he seems to be well informed, and about his own difficulties. But the very nature of his duties has obliged him to try to secure for his country things which we tend to claim as ours. About this he is secretive and, when detected, shamefaced.

He went on leave in 1935 for the first time for four years. He told me that he had no particular wish to go to Germany, but that he had been told to do so by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Berlin, in order that he might get into personal touch with his new masters and acquire something of what he described as the "atmosphere" of nazism. When he returned he was in many ways a changed man, clearly much impressed by all he had seen and heard and full of the breezes of Nuremberg. Since that time he has pursued a more forward policy than in the past.

For the purpose, presumably, of gathering information, he and his wife, who are both at ease in the English language, move freely amongst the British colony and the officers of the Royal Air Force, whom they are at pains to entertain. With the Iraqis perhaps Dr. Grobba's position has been slightly damaged on account of his intimate association with the late Bakr Sidqi, but he will doubtless live that down.

*Iran.*

Mr. Moudhaffar A'alam, who succeeded Mr. Samii as Iranian Minister, presented his letter of credence on the 22nd April, 1936. Mr. A'alam probably owes his appointment to the fact that he was a member of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913-14, and as such is well fitted to handle the complicated question of the Shatt-al-Arab. In the past he has been Governor of Bushire and of Shiraz. He was a contemporary of Nuri-al-Said at the Military College at Istanbul. His air of authority, his loud voice and genial manner at first misled the Iraqis into the belief that his word would carry more weight at Tehran than that of his predecessor and that he would be easier to deal with; but time has shown them that he is as powerless as was Samii to influence the policy of his country, and not only more difficult, but mendacious also, and successive Iraqi Governments have distrusted him and tended to hold him at an arm's length. He speaks French, Turkish and Arabic.

*Italy.*

M. Luigi Gabbrielli, the first Italian representative who has been accredited to Bagdad with the rank of Minister, presented his letter of credence on the 5th December, 1936. He has served for many years in Cairo and Beirut and is said to have a good knowledge of Near and Middle East questions. He is a red-headed Piedmontese of unprepossessing appearance. He is an active propagandist of his country, but so far his work has been without effect. He carries no conviction with the Iraqis. He is a bachelor. He speaks French and some English.

*Saudi Arabia.*

Sheikh Muhammad Id-al-Rawaf was appointed Chargé d'Affaires in the course of the summer in succession to Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Muammar, and presented his credentials at Bagdad on the 10th July, 1937.

Sheikh Muhammad, though not a man of particularly striking personality, has, as Sir Reader Bullard has elsewhere stated, "a sense of dignity and propriety" which has so far preserved him from the indiscretions of which his predecessor is alleged to have been guilty.

*Turkey.*

Tahir Beg Lutfi Tokay has been Turkish Minister in Bagdad since the 2nd January, 1930. Hitherto he had served mainly in the Balkans.

M. Tokay has proved to be a good and trustworthy colleague. He is slow-witted and uninteresting, but he possesses qualities—honesty, solidity and calm—which command respect. He has the confidence of the Iraqis and has been from time to time fairly close in their councils. He professes to have much at heart good relations between Turkey and Great Britain, and in this I think he is sincere. His wife is deservedly popular.

*United States of America.*

Mr. Paul Knabenshue has been in Bagdad as Minister Resident since the 7th November, 1932. It is his first diplomatic post. He came from Beirut, where he



had been consul-general. Before that he had served in Jerusalem and Cairo. He likes to talk of the happy times he had at both these places and of his close personal relations with His Majesty's High Commissioners. His father was consul-general at Belfast, and it was there that he met and married his Irish wife.

As American colleagues go, Mr. Knabenshue is, I should say, on the whole a good one. He is always friendly and ready to pass on any information that has reached him, and when, in his turn, he comes to the Embassy to seek it, his enquiries are invariably discreet and reasonable. I confess that I do not find him stimulating, but his views seem to be shrewd and his judgment sound enough. His interests in Iraq are of necessity restricted, and he appears to be mainly absorbed in the building of a new Legation, which is to be modelled upon the White House.

In 1936 he paid an official visit to Muscat in order to convey to the Sultan the good wishes of the President on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and Muscat, America's oldest treaty, he tells me. But it was said at the time that he was more interested in oil in the Persian Gulf than in the treaty.

He and his wife have won some popularity in the rather narrow and critical European society of Bagdad, and this is no mean achievement. The Iraqis seem to like him. He educates his children in England and professes great faith in British institutions in general.

#### *Representatives Accredited in Iraq but Resident Elsewhere.*

##### *\*Austria.*

Herr Carl Buchberger, who is Austrian Minister at Angora, where he lives, and at Tehran, presented his letter of credence on the 22nd October, 1934. He made a short stay here and has not since returned. He was my colleague in Stockholm, and I have pleasant memories of his intelligence, friendliness and agreeable manners. (Written in 1937.)

##### *Belgium.*

M. T. J. Clément presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad on the 30th May, 1937. Like his predecessor, M. Clément, who only spent a few days in Bagdad, will live at Beirut. He was transferred to his present post from the Belgian consulate-general at Bagdad, where he spent eight years.

##### *Czechoslovakia.*

Dr. Vladimír Fric was appointed Chargé d'Affaires on the 1st December, 1934. He is also in charge of the Czechoslovak Legation in Tehran, where he lives. I have done no more than meet him for a few minutes when he passed through Bagdad a year or so ago on his return to Iran from leave of absence.

##### *Hungary.*

M. Zoltan de Mariassy, who is the first Hungarian Minister to be accredited to this post, presented his letter to King Ghazi on the 15th November, 1937.

First impressions were favourable, but as he only spent a few days in Bagdad, I had no time to form an opinion of his character or abilities.

M. de Mariassy, who is also accredited to Iran and Turkey, lives at Angora.

##### *Netherlands.*

M. C. Adriaanse was appointed Chargé d'Affaires on the 9th May, 1936. He came from Jedda, where he is also accredited and where he lives. He stayed no more than a few days in Bagdad, but he liked it and told me that he hoped to persuade his Government to transfer his headquarters from Arabia to Iraq. It would seem that he has not been successful.

##### *Poland.*

Dr. Stanislas Hempel became Polish Minister on the 1st May, 1933. He represents his country also in Tehran, where he lives. He visits Bagdad once a year.

##### *\*Sweden.*

M. Hugo von Heiderstam, who was appointed Swedish Minister to Iraq in succession to Baron Gyllenstierna and presented his letter of credence on the 11th December, 1936, is accredited to Iran also and proposes to spend most of his time at Tehran and to make short yearly visits to Bagdad. I knew him slightly in Stockholm. His mother was a Scotswoman and he speaks good English. A pleasant, talkative man, who seems inclined to restrict his interest in Iraq to the hope of securing some public works contracts for Swedish firms. He is married. (Written in 1937.)

[E 660/3/93]

No. 35.

#### *Memorandum on the Session of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations between January 26 and 29, 1938.*

I ARRIVED in Geneva on the 25th January and spent the greater part of that day in informal interviews and conversations. An unofficial gathering at which the president of the committee, M. Feldmans, was present gave an opportunity of meeting M. Cuénod, of the Board of Trustees, who had been brought specially from Beirut, largely to enable the committee to cope with the difficulties raised in connexion with the administrative budget by the Iraqi delegate. Although at first I doubted whether the expense of this journey was justified, in the course of the proceedings I was satisfied that the money had been well spent. Not only did the Iraqi delegate have the opportunity of satisfying himself that M. Cuénod is a serious and capable person with his heart in his difficult work, but also for M. Cuénod himself it must have been heartening to find that the committee was, on the whole, interested in the problem with which it has to deal and also ready to support him.

One of the chief reasons for the gathering at which M. Feldmans was present was to devise means of inducing the Iraqi delegate to take a reasonable line. There seemed to be considerable doubt as to Nasrat Bey's intentions, and I was asked to endeavour to ascertain them. I went, therefore, to see him the next morning. I was then disappointed to find that his attitude seemed still to be that outlined in Foreign Office telegram No. 4 to Bagdad of the 4th January. It appeared, therefore, that either the instructions foreshadowed in Bagdad telegram No. 9 of the 16th January had never been sent or, if they had been sent, Nasrat Bey was keeping them dark. Further reference to this matter will be made under the heading *Administrative Budget, 1938*.

The official meetings (Nos. 100 to 102) dealt with a number of matters, and the discussions were sometimes prolonged and discursive. It will, therefore, be best that the matters dealt with should be grouped under various headings.

I should add that the meetings were attended by all the members of the committee, even the Ecuadorean representative being present, although consistently silent throughout, and that before the work of the committee began the president paid a suitable tribute to the memory of the committee's interpreter who had suddenly died about Christmas-time.

#### *2. Situation in Settlement.*

M. Cuénod's statements were on the whole reassuring. While it would be inaccurate to suggest that there is no discontent, it would appear to be less active and less harmful. The effects of the message sent by the committee in December (see section 4 of Mr. Ward's memorandum of the 30th December, 1937) had been good. The message had been sufficiently impressive in form (special reference was made to its important seal) to carry a good deal of conviction and to inspire belief in its statement as to the permanency of the Khabur settlement. In the circumstances, it had not been necessary to invoke the aid of the French High Commissioner in the matter of removing the leading malcontents. This may, of course, later prove to be necessary. If so, they will be removed, but in the view of M. de Martel it will then be best to send them to some place such as Deir-ez-Zor where they could earn a living. The view was expressed in all quarters that the acquisition by the Assyrians of Syrian nationality by naturalisation would greatly ease this aspect of the question. The settlement would become more elastic and the square pegs would be able to drift away and find square holes. A reference to this question is made later under the proper heading.



The agricultural prospects seem to be at present unusually good. The winter rains fell early and in abundance. Pasturage is plentiful and an area of some 250 hectares has been sown. Part of this was sown by Assyrians who had money to buy seed corn. The Administration itself has sown an area of about 70 hectares, hoping thus to provide itself with the straw necessary for the construction of the houses in the new villages to be created under the reorganisation scheme. When M. Cuénod left there was plenty of mud, which helped to keep the people quiet by preventing too much movement. It is not wise to be over-optimistic, for much may happen before the harvest is reaped, but the outlook is encouraging.

The question of the absconders to Iraq was not raised in any quarter. I was glad of this as I entirely share the views expressed in Captain Holt's letter of the 7th January to Mr. Ward.

### 3. Administrative Budget, 1938.

The main trouble over this had come from the Iraqi delegate who, apparently from a desire to acquire merit in the eyes of his superiors, had raised a number of questions of secondary importance and one of very real importance. For some time neither the explanations of M. Cuénod nor the views of the members of the committee were able to move him.

The Iraqi demands were that in Chapter B, items IV (supplies), VI (c) (supplies, fuel-oil, petrol, &c.), and VI (d) (seed) should be reduced each by two-thirds and that items VI (a) (staff), VI (b) (travelling), VIII (buildings), IX (a) (agricultural implements) and IX (d) (hydraulic installations), totalling £1,751, should be transferred from this budget to the reorganisation budget. Item IV was of vital importance. While a small part of it (£486) represents the balance of maintenance, due in virtue of a promise, to the last batch of arrivals, the bulk (£2,700) represents relief which has, in the absence of a national authority, to be granted by the Trustee Board to the members of the settlement to help them tide over a crisis caused by the failure of the 1937 harvest.

At the close of the first (100th) meeting the position was that, with the approval of M. Cuénod, it had been agreed to reduce items VI (c) and VI (d) each by one-third, which Nasrat Bey accepted, that the latter had agreed, owing to the opposition of the United Kingdom and French representatives, that the transfer to the reorganisation budgets of a sum of £1,751 was impossible and that the items VI (a), &c., should remain in the administrative budget. Finally, Nasrat Bey agreed to accept a diminution of one month's relief. The committee, however, accepted the view of M. Cuénod, who had obtained the opinion of the French High Commissioner on the subject, that the maximum reduction compatible with safety was one of only fifteen days' supplies. As the committee had confidence in M. Cuénod, it felt it must follow his advice and could make no further concession. In these circumstances the Iraqi delegate was asked to refer the matter to Bagdad and obtain the earliest possible reply. This he promised to do.

At the 101st meeting the Iraqi delegate produced, in less than forty-eight hours, the reply of his Government. In the circumstances there is ground for the belief that he either already had the authority or did not ask for it, but decided himself. It may only have been a matter of saving face. In any case, the reply was favourable and accepted the committee's suggestion. After a rather futile discussion as to the precise result of the deduction, a matter of a few pounds, an agreement was reached at the figure shown in the budget as annexed.

The committee itself had earlier made reductions in items I (a), II (c) and IX (d) and had suppressed item IX (e) as being more properly a charge on the reorganisation budget. The net result of these changes was to reduce the total of the budget (both chapters) from £13,924, as proposed by the Trustee Board, to £12,113. The budget for 1938 was therefore adopted and approved at the latter figure. A copy of the budget in sterling is attached. A copy of the budget converted into French francs is being prepared by the League Treasury and will shortly be available.

During the discussion of the budget M. Cuénod raised a question of a technical nature, viz., that of *virements* (transfers of sums not needed under one heading to another heading). Up till now such transfers could be made by the Trustee Board if not exceeding 25,000 French francs. Owing to the change in the exchange position, it was necessary to alter this. The committee agreed to a change and fixed the maximum at £300 sterling. The secretary of the committee is to inform the Trustee Board of this in writing.

### 4. Reorganisation Budget.

The original rough estimate of the cost of the reorganisation scheme prepared by Mr. Ward and M. de Panafieu (Annex 1 to report of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, dated the 25th September, 1937) was £50,930.

The revised estimate prepared by the Trustee Board and submitted to the committee and considered at the session now under review was £48,700.

The budget, as approved by the committee after examination and amendment, is £50,000.

As the adoption of this reorganisation budget will shortly entail a request for the provision of funds by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it will be more convenient if I deal with that aspect of the question in a separate memorandum. It will suffice here that I record certain explanations given and statements made during the discussions which supplement the written explanations of the Trustee Board attached to their budget which forms part of the League document of the 6th December, 1937. The new information is exclusively connected with articles I (purchase of land) and V (agricultural equipment and live-stock).

As regards purchase of lands, the position is that no land has yet been acquired. It had been hoped to secure the Zeidi-el-Farhan Estate in November at the agreed price of £13,502 (£T. 8,900 gold). The arrangement made, and believed to have been accepted by all parties, was that a part payment of £T. 5,000 should be made, against which the title-deeds should be handed over. When the members of the Trustee Board arrived with the gold, one of the two Farhan brothers jibbed at the last moment. Under existing procedure, when title-deeds are handed over and the change of ownership officially recorded, the seller has to declare that he has received payment in full. The doubting Farhan said that, in these circumstances, they had no guarantee that the Trustee Board might not refuse to pay the balance. If so, the board was too strong to be successfully attacked by the Farhans. Therefore nothing could be done and the gold was returned to the bank, where it now is. In M. Cuénod's view there is no urgency about buying the estate. The matter may well be left till May. It cannot now be cultivated for the benefit of the Assyrians. Also it is not necessary to provide the straw for the houses in the new villages to be formed. That will be forthcoming from another source. Further, the fellahs who now work for the present owners have to be got off the ground. In answer to the French representative, who asked if, when the Farhan estate had been acquired, the purchase of the "two other smaller estates" would be necessary, M. Cuénod explained that there was really only one small estate (that mentioned in paragraph 72 (b) of the Ward-de Panafieu report), of which the acquisition was necessary, but not a matter of urgency. What was really urgent was the purchase of live-stock.

A matter which was carefully examined was that of the land now occupied and cultivated by the Assyrians. The latter have still only occupation rights, which they acquired for small sums from the Bedouins previously in occupation. These occupation rights have to be transformed into rights of possession. The matter is receiving careful consideration and the co-operation of the French High Commissioner has been secured. It is not yet possible to estimate the cost. The land will have to be valued by a commission and the price will be the value prior to the Assyrian occupation. It is expected that the cost will not be high and that it will not upset the reorganisation budget. It was with this expense in view that the committee increased the item I (d) of that budget from £1,592 to £4,085. The question of naturalisation enters into the question. The land is State (*miri*) land and cannot be transferred to foreigners, such as the Assyrians still are. In the first place, it will have to stand in the name of the Trustee Board, which will in due course and as soon as possible distribute it, probably to groups of families.

The provision of oxen and sheep is a matter of real necessity. The Trustee Board was, at the December meeting of the committee, authorised to buy a certain number of sheep. It will now be formally authorised to buy oxen also. The details of acquisition must be left to those on the spot, who have to take into consideration the climatic conditions as the live-stock must be moved across the desert from Iraq, where it will have to be bought, thus satisfying the request of the Iraqi delegate that it should be bought in his country.

Items II, III, IV and VI gave rise to little discussion. The Trustee Board had already fully explained the methods by which it had calculated the cost of the various items.



Item VII had to be slightly reduced in view of the increase in item I (d) so as to bring it within the figure of £50,000 adopted by the committee.

A statement of this budget as approved is attached.

#### 5. *Ghab Liquidation Budget.*

The statement, being the account of the French High Commission, of which a copy is attached, was laid before the committee. This shows a surplus of 30,910-13 French francs, transferred to the credit of the Trustee Board. As the League Treasury had not had time to examine all the vouchers and to furnish the committee with its opinion, all the committee could do was to take note of the figures, with a view to the submission in due course of a report to the Council of the League.

#### 6. *Naturalisation.*

It is not generally recognised that it is most important that the Assyrians should receive Syrian nationality by naturalisation at the earliest possible date. Frequent references to this matter were made throughout the meetings of the committee. Almost at the end of the last (102nd) meeting, the French representative made, with the authority of the French High Commissioner, a statement to the effect that, on the completion of five years' residence, a simplified form of naturalisation would be applied, by which the names of the Assyrians would be inscribed on the *État-civil* register and identity cards issued to them. M. de Panafieu pointed out that this meant that the Syrian authorities had officially recognised the situation, and had acquiesced in the permanent settlement of the Assyrians in Syria. If the five years' residence is insisted upon, this will, of course, mean that the Assyrians will become eligible for naturalisation, not in a block but in batches, according to date of arrival. M. Cuénod, from what he said to me, evidently hoped to obtain something better by working on the Damascus Government with the help of the French *délégué*. We can only hope that he will succeed.

#### 7. *Provision of Funds.*

- (a) For arrears in respect of administrative budget.
- (b) For reorganisation.

As regards (a), seeing that we have under the *pari passu* arrangement already paid more than the Iraqi Government, which has still to provide £10,000 before the 31st March, I made particular enquiries as to when these payments might be expected. The payment is to be in two parts of £4,800 and £5,200. According to information supplied by M. Bieler of the League Treasury, the £4,800 are actually on the way and may be received at any moment. As for the balance of £5,200, all I could get out of the Iraqi delegate was an assurance that the money would certainly be paid before the 31st March. Knowing that our last £3,000 must be paid before the 31st March, but cannot be paid until we have clear information that the last Iraqi contribution has been, or is on the point of being, paid, I made special arrangements with the secretary of the committee and M. Bieler that the position as regards the Iraqi contribution should be examined on the 15th February and such steps as might be necessary taken. If need be, we shall have to ask the Bagdad Embassy to intervene unofficially.

As regards (b), the Iraqi delegate, who several times pressed for the speeding up of the Trustee Board's operations, made at the 102nd meeting a statement to the effect that the Iraqi Parliament should meet towards the end of April, when it would be in a position to deal with the Iraqi contribution to the reorganisation budget. He added that his Government was most anxious that things should be speeded up and that all the live-stock should be bought in Iraq. On this latter point satisfaction had necessarily to be given him, as there is no other source of supply.

#### 8. *Time Limit for Operations of Trustee Board.*

At the 101st meeting of the committee, the Iraqi delegate had already asked for speeding up, and had stated that in Bagdad it was hoped that the 1938 administrative budget would be the last of its kind. The British and French representatives and the president of the committee all agreed in assuring Nasrat Bey that, while it was not possible to fix a definite time limit, no one

wished the work to go on longer than was necessary. The representative of Iraq had, indeed, on the 24th September, 1937, stated that his Government agreed to contribute to the expenses of administration "for the short period" for which it would be necessary to retain the services of the Trustee Board, but with the reorganisation not yet actively started, it was impossible to make any promise of cessation by a definite date. I had hoped that the forecast of the Iraqi Government's attitude made at the end of Bagdad telegram No. 9 of the 16th January, 1938, would have proved to be incorrect, but this was not the case.

#### 9. *Miscellaneous.*

Under this heading it may be mentioned that a letter from M. Burnier to the president of the committee was read, in which the former agreed to be the honorary adviser to the Trustee Board, and that when the effect of the committee's message in the settlement was under discussion, I mentioned that the Archbishop of Canterbury's attempt to get the Mar Shimun to send a suitable message had failed and that the matter had now been dropped.

H. E. SATOW.

Foreign Office, February 1, 1938.

#### Annex I.

#### BUDGET FOR ASSYRIAN SETTLEMENT, 1938.

(Revised to take account of the decisions taken by the Council Committee at its January 1938 session.)

#### Chapter A.—*Expenditure for Central Administration.*

					Total £ sterling.
Item I.—Trustee Board—					
(a)	Salaries and allowances ...	...	...	...	1,755
(b)	Miscellaneous expenditure (telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c.) ...	...	...	...	472
Total ...					2,227
Item II.—Beirut Office of the Trustee Board—					
(a)	Control ...	...	...	...	...
	Treasury Department ...	...	...	...	...
(b)	Office staff—				
	Secretary-accountant ...	...	...	...	166
	Shorthand-typist ...	...	...	...	96
	Chauffeur-orderly ...	...	...	...	94
(c)	Office expenses—				
	Office ...	...	...	...	130
	Travelling ...	...	...	...	34
	Miscellaneous and unforeseen ...	...	...	...	28
Total ...					548
Item III.—Expenditure of the Council Committee and of the Secretariat of the League of Nations ...					236
Total of Chapter A—					
	Item I ...	...	...	...	2,227
	Item II ...	...	...	...	548
	Item III ...	...	...	...	236
Total ...					3,011



## Chapter B.—Khabur Settlement.

## Part I.—Current Expenditure.

	Total £ sterling.
Item I.—Administration—	
(a) Control ... ..	...
(b) Office staff ... ..	228
(c) Supervision ... ..	540
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c. ... ..	74
Item II.—Land ... ..	...
Item III.—Transport ... ..	...
Item IV.—Supplies ... ..	2,961
Item V.—Sanitary service—	
(a) Staff ... ..	344
(b) Supplies ... ..	284
Item VI.—Upkeep of material—	
(a) Staff and labour ... ..	626
(b) Travelling ... ..	24
(c) Supplies, fuel-oil, petrol, &c. ... ..	1,239
(d) Seed ... ..	661
Item VII.—Education ... ..	94

## Part II.—Capital Expenditure.

Item VIII.—Buildings ... ..	245
Item IX.—Plant, live-stock, &c.—	
(a) Agricultural implements ... ..	196
(b) Motor-lorries ... ..	...
(c) Live-stock ... ..	...
(d) Hydraulic installations ... ..	524

## Part III.—Unforeseen.

Item X.—Miscellaneous and unforeseen expenses—	
(a) Loss on harvest ... ..	...
(b) Miscellaneous and unforeseen ... ..	1,062
Total ... ..	9,102
Total expenditure for 1938—	
Chapter A ... ..	3,011
Chapter B ... ..	9,102
Grand total ... ..	12,113

## Annex II.

## BUDGET FOR THE REORGANISATION OF THE KHABUR SETTLEMENT.

I.—Purchase of Land—	£ sterling.	£ sterling.
(a) Enclaves on the right bank ... ..	1,654	
(b) Sheikh Aissa Sleiman's land ... ..	759	
(c) Zehdi-el-Farhan estate ... ..	13,502	
(d) Reserve for exchange, expenses of purchase, topographical surveys, &c. ... ..	4,085	20,000

II.—Building of New Villages—	£ sterling.	£ sterling.
(a) Six new villages to house the population removed from the northern villages ...	3,325	
(b) Small villages for the surplus population of Tell Maghas and Tell Tamer ...	1,469	4,794
III.—Transport Expenses—		
Petrol, tyres, repairs ... ..		826
IV.—Irrigation—		
(a) Purchase of eight motor-pumps ... ..	1,368	
(b) Construction of new wooden norias ...	510	
(c) Dismantling and re-erection of three pumping units at Tell Oumrane ...	200	2,078
V.—Agricultural Equipment and Live-stock—		
(a) Provision of oxen, ploughs and carts ...	8,706	
(b) Purchase of sheep ... ..	9,402	
(c) Removal and re-erection of the metal shed at Tell Oumrane ... ..	377	18,485
VI.—Supervision ... ..		500
VII.—Miscellaneous and Unforeseen ... ..		3,317
Total ... ..		50,000

## Annex III.

## GHAB.

## Compte du Haut-Commissariat.

Dépenses—	Francs.	Francs.
Exercice 1935 ... ..	95,471·87	
Exercice 1936 prolongé jusqu'à la clôture de la gestion ...	1,345,371·25	
Total ... ..		1,440,843·12
Recettes—		
(a) Liquidation du matériel ... ..	132,107·43	
Recette accidentelle (assurance) ... ..	380·00	
	132,487·43	
(b) Intérêts des fonds en banque ... ..	19,265·82	151,753·25
La dépense effective du Haut-Commissariat est donc de ... ..		1,289,089·87
Les sommes transférées par Genève se montent à ... ..	1,320,000·00	
	1,289,089·87	
La différence, soit ... ..	30,910·13	
a été transférée au compte du Conseil des Trustees.		



[E 1010/45/93]

No. 36.

*Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 53.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 8, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a debate of some interest took place in the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th February on the occasion of the second reading of a Bill to indemnify all those who took part in the events which followed the murder of General Bakr Sidqi in August 1937.

2. Most of the speakers strongly condemned the intervention of the army in politics, and many spoke harshly of Hikmat Sulaiman's administration. One or two speakers, including Taha-al-Hashimi (a brother of the late Yasin-al-Hashimi), while supporting the Bill, warned the Government against the danger of repeatedly giving free pardons to all those who committed political crimes or defied the authority of the State. This practice would, they argued, encourage reckless men to believe that the law could be defied with impunity.

3. The Prime Minister closed the debate with a speech which contained several noteworthy points. It was, he declared, the determined policy of his Government to draw a veil over the past and to work for internal peace and stability. He had always himself steadfastly opposed the intervention of the army in politics, and had been one of the few who had publicly criticised the activities of General Bakr Sidqi at the time when, as Chief of the General Staff, he was the dominant influence in the affairs of the country. The Chamber could therefore be sure that he and his colleagues would take all steps necessary to keep the officers of the army from interfering either in politics or in the conduct of the Administration. The Prime Minister also announced that the Euphrates sheikhs, who had for some time been detained in the north under police orders, would soon be permitted to live in Bagdad.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governor-General of India and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 2013/2013/93]

No. 37.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)*

(No. 114.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, March 29, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the opening of the new air-port at Basra was performed by His Majesty King Ghazi on Friday, the 25th March.

2. By the courtesy of the Air Officer Commanding I was enabled to fly to Basra with Air Vice-Marshal Courtney, leaving Bagdad at 9 A.M. on the morning of the 25th. The oriental secretary to the Embassy accompanied me. Most of the other guests from Bagdad, who included the Cabinet, important Iraqi officials and heads of the diplomatic missions, travelled by train, leaving Bagdad on the evening of the 24th.

3. King Ghazi, travelling in His Majesty's own aircraft and with an escort of nine Iraqi machines, reached the air-port at about 3.20 P.M. His Majesty was invited to declare the air-port open in a speech made by Sir John Ward, Port Director and Director-General of Navigation and Railways, to whose forceful initiative the excellent arrangements on this occasion, as well as the creation of the air-port itself, appear to be entirely due.

4. His Majesty, having declared the air-port open in the fewest possible words, was conducted on an inspection of the offices and hotel, which are of the most up-to-date description. Thereafter, the King passed on to the landing ground, where a number of machines were drawn up for his inspection. These included three Royal Air Force "Blenheim" bombers which had come from Dhibban, as well as other Royal Air Force machines from Shaibah, one of the latest German Lufthansa commercial machines, a French military aeroplane and other aircraft, including, as it happened, that of Flying Officer Clouston.

5. King Ghazi made a thorough inspection of one of the "Blenheim" bombers, but evinced no particular interest in any of the other machines.

6. At tea, which was served in the hangar, His Majesty was presented by Sir John Ward with a silver inkstand in commemoration of the occasion.

7. In the evening His Majesty gave a party on the yacht *Sans Peur*, which has recently been acquired from the Duke of Sutherland for the Port Administration.

8. After spending the night as the guest of Sir John and Lady Ward, and lunching on the following day with Mr. Brickell, His Majesty's consul at Basra, I returned to Bagdad by air, in company with the Air Officer Commanding, on the afternoon of the 26th.

I have, &amp;c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2014/45/93]

No. 38.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)*

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, March 30, 1938.*

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 84 of the 9th March, I have the honour to report the following developments in the internal political situation:—

2. After what they regarded as their successful handling of the agitation against the ratification of the Persian Frontier Treaty, the present Iraqi Government seemed to be settling down again comfortably in the saddle and to be looking ahead with renewed confidence. During the last few days, however, events have occurred which have once more disturbed their equanimity.

3. At a debate on the Bill to indemnify those who took part in the events which followed the murder of Bakr Sidqi last August (referred to in Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 53 of the 8th February), which took place in the Senate on the 17th March, Rashid Ali-al-Gilani attacked Hikmat Sulaiman's Government, and, with much sanctimoniousness, deplored the methods which they had adopted to overthrow Yasin Pasha's last Cabinet (in which Rashid Ali had been Minister for the Interior). This was too much for the Prime Minister (who had himself been turned out of office in 1935 by a tribal insurrection engineered by Rashid Ali and Yasin), and, rounding on Rashid Ali, he upbraided him with unparliamentary frankness for his own political past. This wordy quarrel in the Senate was taken up gleefully in the newspapers, whose editors had for some while been busily engaged in mutual recriminations concerning the inconsistency of their respective attitudes towards Yasin's Government, firstly, while Hikmat Sulaiman was in office and, later, since the recent apotheosis of Yasin as a national hero.

4. Some outspoken attacks on the work of Yasin's Cabinet developed in this manner, and the surviving members thereof felt obliged to take action to defend their reputation. They accordingly submitted a joint petition asking that Parliament should order a judicial enquiry into the charges which were being made against them.

5. When this petition came before the Chamber there was a good deal of public washing of dirty linen, and Rashid Ali was the particular target of some of the tribal Deputies' sallies. The Prime Minister appealed to the Chamber to bury the past, and the majority of Deputies were evidently in favour of that course. The result was a resolution passing the petition to the Legal Committee, from which it will probably never return.

6. As often happens in this country, however, the consequences of events of this kind are felt much more outside than within Parliament. The ex-Ministers of Yasin Pasha's last Cabinet are now saying that the Prime Minister has broken his pledge to hold the balance between them and their enemies, and that, while preaching forgiveness and forbearance, he has allowed their detractors to drag their names in the mud. The conclusion which they are said to draw is that they

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are no longer under any obligation to abstain from intriguing against the Prime Minister. In addition, Rashid Ali has, the story goes, sworn revenge for his humiliation in the Senate (which made the coffee-shop public hug themselves with glee), and has inspired an attack on the most vulnerable member of the present Government, the Minister of the Interior. Mr. Morgan has already reported that this Minister, Mustafa-al-Umari, has for some time been much criticised for corruption, and small leaflets have now been put into circulation giving a short account of some ten instances in which it is alleged that he has accepted large bribes.

7. The Prime Minister is upset and has begun to think of reorganising his Cabinet. He has tentatively offered the Ministry of the Interior to Umar Nazmi (a former Mutessarif of Mosul and now Director-General of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance), but Umar Nazmi has shown his unwillingness to join the Cabinet unless other changes are also made. He would like Nuri Said to be included at Defence or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and he advises that Nasratal Farisi (until recently permanent Iraqi delegate at Geneva) should be put into Finance or Justice. The Prime Minister is pondering these things in his mind, but he is also, it is said, thinking of the advantages or resigning altogether. In that event, he has confided to a friend, he would recommend King Ghazi to invite Naji Shaukat or Taufiq Suwaidi to form a Government. Of the two, I think the former would be the better choice. But while it may be true that Jamil Madfai is thinking over these ideas, it is not, of course, at all certain that he will put any of them into effect, and there is an almost equal probability that he will decide to let things go on as they are.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2094/2094/93]

No. 39.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 12.)*

(No. 116.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, March 30, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that early in March the Minister for Foreign Affairs, during a conversation with Mr. Morgan, stated that Iraqi statesmen had recently been thinking a great deal about Iraq's position on the Shatt-al-Arab. The frontier negotiations with Persia had, he explained, brought it home to them that, if access to Basra from the sea should ever be made difficult through trouble with Persia, Iraqi interests would be gravely prejudiced, and, for this reason, they felt strongly that an Iraqi port on the sea was most desirable.

2. Taufiq Suwaidi then pointed out that Koweit offered an obvious solution to this problem, and he asked Mr. Morgan whether His Majesty's Government would be likely to agree to permit the Iraqi Government to extend their railway through Koweiti territory to the coast in Koweit Bay and to build a port there under their own control. He indicated that they would be willing to compensate the Sheikh of Koweit for the grant of these facilities, and he thought that they could reach agreement with His Highness, provided His Majesty's Government raised no political objections.

3. I have discussed this matter with Sir John Ward. He told me that the plan which he himself was recommending to the Iraqi Government was that the railway should be extended to Fao and that the Iraqi Government should buy three good 5,000-ton steamers with which to maintain a regular service between Fao and Karachi. He thought that this undertaking would be most profitable, since it would save a day's journey up the Shatt-al-Arab and would increase tourist traffic to the Holy Places in Iraq. He also thought that, so soon as the Taurus route had been linked with Bagdad, many people would travel to Europe from India via Iraq, if there were a good steamer service from Karachi to Fao.

He told me privately that he had his eye on three vessels of the kind required, which could be bought at a favourable price.

4. Sir John Ward's objects in making these suggestions to the Iraqi Government were, of course, different from those which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had in mind when thinking of an outlet at Koweit. A port at Fao would not be free from the menace of Persian interference and, in order to maintain access to it, the Iraqi Government would still have to make sure of their control of the Rookha Channel. Indeed, from the point of view of freedom from Persian interference, Fao seems to offer but little advantage over Basra.

5. Nevertheless, the history of Great Britain's relations with Koweit suggests that there is little likelihood that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' scheme for an Iraqi port in Koweit Bay would ever be welcome to His Majesty's Government and, subject to any instructions which your Lordship may think fit to send me, I shall do my best to discourage Taufiq Suwaidi from pressing his proposals and to persuade him to devote his attention instead to Sir John Ward's plans.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2835/45/93]

No. 40.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 187.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, April 28, 1938.*

WITH reference to Mr. Scott's despatch No. 379 of the 11th September, 1937, I have the honour to report that after several months' forced detention in Bagdad, permission has now been given to Abdul Wahid-al-Haji Sikkar, Muhsin-abu-Tabikh, Alwan-al-Yasiri and one or two other men of less importance who were arrested in 1937 to return to their homes in the Diwanayah Liwa.

2. I learn unofficially that before leaving Bagdad they all took solemn oaths never again to take part in any movement against the Government.

3. To judge from experience such pledges are of little value but the Government may hope that these sheikhs are now chastened enough to exercise restraint over their tribes for a while.

4. King Ghazi told me yesterday that he had himself received these sheikhs before they left Bagdad, had warned them of the consequences of repeated disloyalty and had accepted their assurances for the future. This is one of several indications tending to show that His Majesty is endeavouring to shoulder his responsibilities.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2989/45/93]

No. 41.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 23.)*

(No. 213.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, May 11, 1938.*

IT occurs to me that some account of the latest Cabinet "crisis"—if anything so essentially trivial can be so described—may be of interest as showing conditions in this country.

2. The black sheep in the present Cabinet is possibly Jalal Baban, the Minister of Economics and Communications. So far as I have been able to discover, this gentleman's sole qualification for ministerial office lies in a somewhat nebulous claim to represent the Kurdish part of the population. His

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defects are more obvious and consist, in part at least, of the usual vices of nepotism and corruption. In particular, he recently cancelled the contract of a British official in his department, who had repeatedly protested against the Minister's authorisation of money advances to the contractor—apparently some kind of a relative of his—engaged in the construction of the road from Ramadi towards Syria. (I hasten to add that proper compensation was paid to the British official concerned, Mr. Pover, that the latter did not appeal to this Embassy and that he had, I believe, left the country before I heard of the affair at all.) Jalal Baban, however, carried his championship of the contractor into the meetings of the Cabinet. Having advocated that the latter should be paid at a higher rate than that authorised in the contract, on the ground that he found himself compelled to employ more expensive materials than he had expected, the Minister appears to have been taken sharply to task by his colleague of Finance, and heated words were exchanged. My authority for this last incident is Taufiq Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister.

3. Jalal Baban thereupon presented his resignation, which would, I think, have been accepted had it not been that the Finance Minister took the opportunity to demand a thorough Cabinet reconstruction. To this the Prime Minister, who is essentially conservative, was most reluctant to agree, preferring apparently to consider resigning himself. Efforts were accordingly made, and have now proved successful, to induce Jalal Baban to withdraw his resignation.

4. The Foreign Minister, at my weekly meeting with him yesterday, spoke of these efforts and assured me that any danger of the Cabinet's resignation was then over, whatever might be the fate of the Minister of Communications. I remarked that it might be a mistake to apply too much pressure on this particular Minister to reconsider his decision, but that, while I did not feel called upon to pronounce whether the existing Cabinet was, in fact, a good or a bad one, it did appear to me very necessary that the Iraqis should break away from their habit of short-lived Ministries, since continual change gave a feeling of instability in the country and conveyed a sense of weakness abroad.

5. The Foreign Minister thereupon hinted in unmistakable terms that the danger of the Cabinet falling, such as it had been, had been due to the King and that, in fact, if His Majesty had had his way, there would have been two or three changes of Government in the last few months. His Excellency had heard that I was to pay my fortnightly visit to King Ghazi to-day and expressed his anxiety that I should speak to His Majesty on exactly the same lines as I had spoken to him.

6. I gave this promise all the more readily in that I had already decided to do what the Minister asked.

7. At my audience with King Ghazi this morning I therefore told His Majesty that I assumed he would be delighted that the crisis was over, since it was only two or three weeks ago that His Majesty had expressed to me his great confidence in his present Prime Minister and his anxiety that the Government should continue in office. I went on to speak of the inconveniences and dangers of these continual changes. The King assured me that he was indeed delighted that matters were back where they were before, but added that he thought the Prime Minister had made a mistake in not getting rid of the Minister of Communications. In this I felt obliged to agree.

8. I have in recent despatches attempted to show that His Majesty is now making serious efforts to play a rôle in the government of the country. It must, I fear, be added that the King is too much under the influence of whomever he may have last spoken to to be trusted not to confuse the proper exercise of his influence with mere purposeless changes of his Government.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 3429/434/93]

No. 42.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 225 E.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, May 20, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, with reference to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch No. 299 E. of the 20th July, 1937, the budget estimates of the Iraqi Government for the financial year 1938-39, as recently passed by the Iraqi Parliament.

2. A memorandum by the financial adviser to the Iraqi Government on these estimates as submitted to Parliament was enclosed in Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 93 of the 15th March last. At the risk of repetition, I have reproduced Mr. Hogg's comments where appropriate in the analysis now submitted.

3. The estimated and actual revenue and expenditure (ordinary) in recent years has been, in Iraqi dinars:—

			Revenue.	Expenditure.
1935-36—				
Estimated	...	...	4,496,170	4,494,496
Actual	...	...	4,729,089	4,254,901
1936-37—				
Estimated	...	...	4,728,780	4,727,338
Actual	...	...	5,384,527	4,611,026
1937-38—				
Estimated	...	...	5,322,000	5,318,885
Actual (in round figures)	...	...	5,827,000	5,041,000

4. The net ordinary revenue, realised after deducting ordinary expenditure, has been, in round figures (thousands Iraqi dinars)—

	1935-36.	1936-37.	1937-38.
March 31	...	...	...
	474,000	773,000	786,000

Over-estimation of ordinary expenditure has thus been considerable.

5. The estimates for the financial year 1938-39 allow I.D. 5,665,490 for revenue (ordinary) and I.D. 5,469,813 for expenditure (ordinary), giving an estimated surplus of I.D. 195,677. If favourable conditions of trade continue, this surplus is likely to be realised, but not greatly exceeded; since the estimates, both in respect of revenue and expenditure, have, in the opinion of the financial adviser to the Iraqi Government, been more closely drawn than in past years.

6. I have the honour to enclose, for convenience of reference, a comparative summary of the budget estimates for the years 1937-38 and 1938-39, and of actual revenue and expenditure for the year 1937-38.

7. On the revenue side, the estimates for land and animal taxes exceed by I.D. 94,000 those provided in the budget for the year 1937-38. They are, however, conservatively drawn in the light of actual receipts under that head during that financial year. Increased yields under income-tax and stamp duty are allowed for. Customs and excise receipts are estimated at approximately the actual figure accruing in 1937-38. Posts and Telegraphs yielded in 1937-38 I.D. 46,000 more than their budgetary provisions; a further I.D. 5,000 has been anticipated.

8. Miscellaneous and departmental receipts (chapters III and VI) are affected by the omission of Currency Board and British Oil Development Royalty contributions. The comparable adjusted figures are:—

	I.D.
Actuals to March 31, 1937	532,000
Actuals to March 31, 1938	696,000
Estimated, 1938-39	612,000

9. Expenditure is estimated at I.D. 5,469,813, as against the 1937-38 estimate of I.D. 6,318,885. As, however, it includes this year provision for I.D. 630,000 for military stores, which in last year's budget was charged to capital works, there is a net reduction of I.D. 60,000 in other respects.

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10. The principal variations in the 1937-38 and current estimates are:—

	Estimates. 1937-38.	Estimates. 1938-39.	Actuals. 1937-38.	Variation.
Parliament ... ..	80,930	51,883	70,000	- 29,000
Council of Ministers ... ..	14,930	12,830	15,000	- 2,000
Foreign Affairs ... ..	96,416	90,810	83,000	- 3,500
Finance and Customs ... ..	535,057	499,780	499,000	- 35,000
Interior ... ..	389,616	448,765	418,000	+ 37,000
Police ... ..	628,987	636,314	655,000	+ 7,000
Defence ... ..	1,400,820	1,354,300	1,205,000	+ 153,000
Education ... ..	610,146	708,056	397,000	+ 98,000
Communications and Works ... ..	812,157	666,405	689,000	- 125,000
Health ... ..	316,920	551,520	368,000	+ 34,000

11. The total increase in the Ministry of Defence Estimates is less than the increase due to the transfer of stores expenditure from Capital Works to the ordinary budget.

12. I.D. 30,000 of the increase in the Ministry of Interior estimates is due to the increased share of municipalities in certain assigned revenues.

13. The Government's interest in expansion of the programme of the Ministry of Education is revealed in the increased estimates approved for expenditure during the current year. The estimated expenditure of the Public Health Department also marks an increase.

14. Assuming that the estimated surplus of I.D. 195,000 is realised, the following sums become available for Capital Works expenditure during the year 1938-39:—

	I.D.	I.D.
Iraq Petroleum Company's royalty on 4 million tons ... ..	800,000 gold	
Less Turkey's 10 per cent....	80,000	
	720,000 gold	
Or (say) ... ..		1,100,000
British Oil Development Company and Currency Board payments (say) ... ..		350,000
Surplus revenue ... ..		195,000
		1,645,000

15. The Government have based on this expectation their five-year plan of Capital Works Expenditure, which spreads a sum of approximately I.D. 8 million over a five years' programme. I hope to report to your Lordship on this Capital Works Programme at an early date.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

Statement (A): Expenditure.

Chapter.	I.D.
I. Pensions and gratuities ... ..	178,500
II. Civil List of His Majesty the King ... ..	58,000
III. Parliament ... ..	51,883
IV. Comptroller and Auditor-General ... ..	8,950
V. Council of Ministers ... ..	12,830
VI. Ministry for Foreign Affairs ... ..	90,810
VII. Ministry of Finance ... ..	317,530
VIIA. Customs and Excise ... ..	182,250
VIII. Ministry of Interior ... ..	446,765
VIIIA. Iraq police ... ..	636,314
VIIIB. Health Service ... ..	351,520
IX. Ministry of Defence—	
Ministry ... ..	37,600
British mission ... ..	36,000
Fighting forces ... ..	1,012,700
River forces ... ..	21,000
Air forces ... ..	183,000
Civil aviation ... ..	5,000
Meteorological services ... ..	9,000
Stores and animals ... ..	230,000
Works ... ..	20,000
	250,000
	1,554,300
X. Ministry of Justice ... ..	147,410
XA. Tapu Department ... ..	38,290
XI. Ministry of Education ... ..	708,056
XII. Ministry of Economics and Communications—	
Ministry ... ..	25,350
School of Engineering ... ..	4,095
Survey Department ... ..	46,275
	75,720
XIIA. Agriculture and Veterinary ... ..	93,410
XIIB. Irrigation and Public Works Department—	
Irrigation ... ..	116,655
Public Works ... ..	193,300
	309,955
XIIIC. Posts and Telegraphs Department ... ..	207,320
	5,469,813

Statement (B): Receipts.

Chapter.	I.D.
I. Taxation on agricultural and natural produce, animals and rents of Government properties ... ..	936,800
II. Property tax ... ..	120,000
Income tax ... ..	300,000
Stamp duty ... ..	131,000
III. Miscellaneous revenues ... ..	216,950
IV. Customs and Excise ... ..	3,300,000
V. Posts and Telegraphs ... ..	265,300
VI. Other Government services and institutions ... ..	395,440
Total ... ..	5,665,490



## Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

## Comparative Summary of the Iraqi Budget Estimates for 1937 and 1938.

REVENUE.			
Chapter.	Actuals <sup>(1)</sup> 1937-38.	Estimates. 1937-38.	Estimates. 1938-39.
I. Taxation on agricultural and natural produce, animals and rents of Government properties ...	I.D. 949,000	I.D. 870,800	I.D. 936,800
II. Property tax ...	115,000	132,000	120,000
Income tax ...	266,000	260,000	300,000
Stamp duty ...	146,000	126,900	131,000
III. Miscellaneous revenues ...	228,000	511,560	216,950
IV. Customs and Excise ...	3,286,000	2,730,000	3,300,000
V. Posts and Telegraphs ...	257,000	211,600	265,300
VI. Other Government Services and Institutions ...	578,000	479,140	395,440
Total ...	5,827,000	5,322,000	5,665,490

(<sup>1</sup>) These are the preliminary figures of actual receipts on March 31, 1938. The final account, not yet available, may show minor variations.

EXPENDITURE.					
Chapter.	Ministries and Departments.	Actuals <sup>(1)</sup> 1937-38.	Estimates. 1937-38.	Estimates. 1938-39.	
		I.D.	I.D.	I.D.	I.D.
I. Pensions and gratuities ...		194,000	178,600		178,500
II. Civil List of His Majesty the King ...		58,000	58,730		58,000
III. Parliament ...		70,000	80,930		51,883
IV. Comptroller and Auditor-General ...		8,000	9,370		8,950
V. Council of Ministers ...		15,000	14,950		12,830
VI. Ministry for Foreign Affairs ...		83,000	96,416		90,810
VII. Ministry of Finance ...		324,000	350,662		317,530
VIIA. Customs and Excise ...		175,000	184,395		182,250
VIII. Ministry of Interior ...		418,000	389,616		446,765
VIIIA. Iraq Police ...		655,000	628,987		636,314
VIIIB. Health Services ...		368,000	316,920		351,520
IX. Ministry of Defence—					
Ministry ...		41,690		37,600	
British Mission ...		35,450		36,000	
Fighting Forces ...		1,126,800		1,012,700	
River Forces ...		26,010		21,000	
Air Forces ...		136,785		183,000	
Civil Aviation and Meteorological Services ...		18,085		14,000	
Stores and animals ...				230,000	
Works ...		1,205,000	1,400,820	20,000	1,554,300
X. Ministry of Justice ...		144,000	148,440		147,410
XA. Tapu Department ...		38,000	37,746		38,290
XI. Ministry of Education ...		597,000	610,146		708,056
XII. Ministry of Economics and Communications—					
Ministry ...		33,000		25,350	
School of Engineering ...		4,770		4,095	
Survey Department ...		61,000	44,732	82,502	46,275
XIIA. Agriculture and Veterinary Departments ...		98,000		130,550	93,410
XIIB. Irrigation and Public Works Departments—					
Irrigation ...			121,360		116,655
Public Works ...		317,000	274,840	396,200	309,955
XIIC. Posts and Telegraphs Department ...		213,000		202,905	207,320
Total ...		5,041,000	5,318,885		5,469,813

(<sup>1</sup>) These are the preliminary figures of actual expenditure on March 31, 1938. The final account, not yet available, may show minor variations.

[E 3501/3501/93]

No. 43.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 238 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 28, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Capital Works (Five Years' Plan) Law, No. 45 of 1938, which received the Royal assent on the 28th April last and was published in the Arabic edition of the *Official Gazette* on the 1st May, 1938.

2. The law allots a sum of I.D. 8,230,000 to the Government's capital works programme over a period of five years. Of this, I.D. 2,650,000 goes to army buildings and equipment; I.D. 1,976,000 by way of loan to the railways and port administrations, to municipalities and to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank; I.D. 1,400,000 to roads, bridges and telephones; I.D. 1,080,000 to irrigation works; I.D. 930,000 to buildings and expropriations; I.D. 90,000 to municipal schemes for drinking-water supply, village planning and housing, &c.; and I.D. 54,000 to Artesian wells, sheep dipping and agricultural assistance.

3. This allotment of I.D. 8,230,000 is budgeted for on the following basis: Iraq Petroleum Company oil royalties: I.D. 5,900,000; British Oil Development Company royalties: I.D. 1,475,000; Currency Board profits: I.D. 500,000; recoveries of loans to the railways and port administrations and to municipalities: I.D. 240,000; proceeds of sale of Government property: I.D. 115,000.

4. Schedules showing details of the projects intended to benefit, and of the new buildings, bridges, roads and telephone installations in contemplation, are annexed to the law.

5. The press has hailed this law as the sixth of its kind to be submitted to the Iraqi Parliament. It was passed with an enthusiasm reflecting hope rather than experience. However soundly designed, five-year plans in Iraq so surpass in their scope the normal expectation of life of an Iraqi Cabinet that their very elaboration is a temptation to optimism. No Government can be blamed, however, for economic planning ahead of its own probable survival point.

6. In the field of irrigation the Habbaniya escape project, which was omitted from Yassin-al-Hashimi's capital works programme, reappears in the current five-year plan. Tenders for this were first called for in February 1933, when the lowest tender offered stood at I.D. 1,240,282. A revised call for tenders in October 1933 produced a lowest tender of I.D. 999,845 for a forty-two months' contract; the next lowest being I.D. 999,976 for a sixty-six months' contract. Work on this important measure of flood control has been entrusted to the Iraqi State Railways Administration, who will be able to make use of the considerable supply of excavating machinery necessitated by construction work on the Baiji-Tel-Kotchek line.

7. Of other irrigation projects, the Kut barrage is, of course, already in course of construction by Messrs. Balfour, Beatty and Co. The Gharraf canalisation scheme is an essential corollary to this barrage. Notes on these projects, and on the Naqara (Cataract) preventive works and the Diala dam project, were enclosed in Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch O.T. No. (A) 10 of the 20th March, 1933. Present estimates reflect the rise in steel prices, &c., since that date.

8. The road programme is an ambitious one, aiming at the endowment of a country where communications are still largely at the mercy of the weather with 5,000 kilom. of new and good roads. No allocation has been made under the heading of bridges for the proposed railway bridge over the Tigris at Bagdad. The two "Bagdad bridges" and the "Musaiyab Bridge" mentioned in the relevant schedule are those at present under construction. The strategic importance of a railway bridge at Bagdad was emphasised in parliamentary debate by Saiyid Taha-al-Hashimi, late Chief of the General Staff; and, as reported in Mr. Montgomery's letter to Mr. Baggallay of the 11th May, Sir John Ward is endeavouring to exploit these military apprehensions in his discussions on the subject.

9. Army buildings and equipment remains at I.D. 2,650,000, the largest item of expenditure in the Five-Year Plan. An item of I.D. 230,000 for military



stores, which appeared in the capital works programme of 1937-38, has been transferred to the general budget.

10. The establishment of an automatic telephone exchange in Bagdad is likely to receive early attention. Tenders were invited through the Crown Agents for this exchange in 1936, and I recently reminded the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of this, in the hope that the Iraqi Government may refrain from cancelling these tenders and issuing a call for an international tender, in which United Kingdom firms would be unable to compete with continental offers.

11. The building programme is sufficiently explained in the relevant schedule. Hospitals, police posts and schools account for the greater part of estimated expenditure under this head.

12. The sum of I.D. 1 million to be lent to the railways administration will be expended in accordance with a separate Railway Capital Works Law, which authorises a total expenditure over five years of I.D. 1,250,000 on railway development.

13. The loan of I.D. 400,000 to the Basra Port Administration, to be similarly expended under a separate Port Capital Works Law, includes provision, estimated at I.D. 350,000, for the construction of a grain silo at Basra.

14. Expenditure under Chapter V of the main schedule calls for no detailed analysis.

15. On the revenue side, it is interesting to note that allowance has not been made for the estimated surplus of ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure, as anticipated in the financial adviser's memorandum enclosed in Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 93 of the 15th March, 1938. Oil royalties and Currency Board receipts are, however, somewhat more liberally estimated than was assumed in that memorandum. The Minister of Finance defended these estimates in the Chamber of Deputies as conservatively drawn.

16. The bulk of the sum of I.D. 115,000 to be derived from the sale of Government property is expected to accrue from the projected sale of the present customs-house in Bagdad, the site of which is assessed at I.D. 100,000. This building was the pre-war office and residence of His Majesty's consul-general.

17. While much of this programme can be carried out with local materials and labour, it offers numerous opportunities for United Kingdom industry, which, it may be hoped, will play a full part in the realisation of this five-year plan. A serious threat to such participation is found, however, in the offer of Messrs. Kampsax, reported in my telegram No. 84 of the 20th May, to direct the Iraqi Government road programme on a 5 per cent. commission, provided annual expenditure reaches at least I.D. 150,000, and in the expressed desire of the Iraqi Government, to whom this proposal offers many attractions, to entrust Messrs. Kampsax in due course with the direction of other large-scale capital works.

18. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 43.

*Extract from Al Waqayi' Al 'Iraqiya, dated May 1, 1938.*

*Capital Works of Development (Five Years' Programme) Law, No. 45 of 1938.*

WE, King of Iraq, with the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, do hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1. A sum of 8,230,000 dinars is voted for expenditure, during the years 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, on capital works of development, as set forth in Schedule A attached to this law.

Art. 2. Revenues for the years mentioned in the preceding article are estimated at 8,230,000 dinars, as set forth in Schedule B attached to this law.

Art. 3. The Minister of Finance may make reappropriations from one article to another within the same vote.

Art. 4. The Minister of Finance is empowered to distribute the estimate voted in article 1 above among the years mentioned therein and to transfer allotments from one year to another.

Art. 5. The estimates voted under this law shall be regarded as forming a supplementary budget annexed to the general budget for the year to which they belong.

Art. 6. The Minister of Finance is authorised to make the loans, set forth in Chapter VI of Schedule A attached to this law, to the municipalities, Railways Administration and the Port Administration in accordance with terms to be approved by the Council of Ministers, provided that the rate of interest shall not exceed 4 per cent. per annum and the period for the redemption of these debts not to exceed twenty years.

Art. 7. This law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 8. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this law.

Done at Bagdad this 27th day of Safar, 1357, and the 28th day of April, 1938.

GHAZI.

JAMIL-AL-MADFAI,  
Prime Minister.

IBRAHIM KAMAL,  
Minister of Finance.

SCHEDULE A.

Chapter I.—Irrigation Works.

Section.	Dinars.
1. Habbaniyah scheme ... ..	400,000
2. Kut barrage ... ..	175,000
3. Shamiyah scheme ... ..	40,000
4. Huwaija scheme ... ..	60,000
5. Diyala dam scheme ... ..	30,000
6. Al Fawar scheme and Shatt-al-Diwaniyah regulator ...	30,000
7. Gharraf canalisation system (digging of) ... ..	50,000
8. Musaiyab main canal scheme ... ..	40,000
9. Daghara canal scheme ... ..	30,000
10. Bagdad bunds ... ..	75,000
11. Cataracts (Naqqarat)—combating of—and other irrigation works ... ..	150,000
Total, Chapter I ... ..	1,080,000

Chapter II.—Roads, Bridges and Telegraph and Telephone Lines.

12. Roads ... ..	750,000
13. Bridges ... ..	450,000
14. Telephone lines ... ..	200,000
Total, Chapter II ... ..	1,400,000

Chapter III.—Army Buildings and Equipments.

15. Army equipments ... ..	2,200,000
16. Army buildings ... ..	450,000
Total, Chapter III ... ..	2,650,000



## Chapter IV.—Buildings and Expropriations.

Section.	Dinars.
17. Buildings ... ..	850,000
18. Expropriations ... ..	130,000
Total, Chapter IV ... ..	980,000

## Chapter V.—Grants-in-Aid and Other Schemes.

19. Grants-in-aid to municipalities—	
1. Filling-in of marshes ... ..	25,000
2. Village planning and poor and workmen housing scheme ... ..	25,000
3. Drinking-water supply scheme ... ..	40,000
20. Other schemes—	
1. Artesian wells and underground water supply (Kahriz) ... ..	24,000
2. Sheep-dipping scheme ... ..	10,000
3. Purchase of agricultural products ... ..	20,000
Total, Chapter V ... ..	144,000

## Chapter VI.—Loans and Banking Organisations.

21. Loans to municipalities ... ..	476,000
22. Loan to Railways Administration ... ..	1,000,000
23. Loan to Port Directorate ... ..	400,000
24. Agricultural and Industrial Bank ... ..	100,000
Total, Chapter VI ... ..	1,976,000
Grand total ... ..	8,230,000

## SCHEDULE B.

## Revenues.

## Chapter I.

	Dinars.
1. Government royalties payable by the Iraq Petroleum Company ... ..	5,900,000
2. Government royalties payable by the British Oil Development Company ... ..	1,475,000
3. Government share from the profits of the Currency Board ... ..	500,000
4. Recoveries on account of loans to municipalities ... ..	80,000
5. Recoveries on account of loans to the Railways Administration ... ..	130,000
6. Recoveries on account of loan to the Port Directorate ... ..	30,000
7. Proceeds of sales of (State) property ... ..	115,000
Total ... ..	8,230,000

## Detailed List of Buildings included in the Capital Works Budget for the Five Years 1938-42.

1. Nurses quarters.
2. Nursing school—with residential (? boarding).
3. Khaniqin Hospital.
4. Kufa Hospital.
5. Suq-al-Shiyukh Hospital.
6. Nasiriyah Hospital.
7. Kirkuk Hospital.
8. Hillah Hospital.
9. Qurna Hospital.
10. Eye Hospital, Bagdad.
11. Hospital for Lepers, Amarah.
12. New Lunatic Asylum, Bagdad.
13. Extensions to the Royal Hospital, Bagdad.
14. Four twelve-bed hospitals.
15. Quarantine stations and other small hospitals.
16. Serai at Ramadi.
17. Serai at Shahraban.
18. Other serais in the Qadhas.
19. Other serais in the nahiyas and guest houses.
20. New Bagdad jail.
21. Other jails.
22. Building for the police mobile force.
23. Building for office of the Commandant of Police, Bagdad.
24. Seven police barracks (in Liwas) and other police posts.
25. Post and telegraph office, Basra.
26. Head post office and telephone exchange, Bagdad.
27. Other post and telegraph offices.
28. Veterinary buildings in Abu Ghuraib.
29. Other veterinary hospitals (Bagdad, Mosul and Arbil).
30. Directorate of Agriculture buildings in Abu Ghuraib.
31. Combined Public Works stores and district office, Bagdad.
32. Sewage draining system for the hospital and schools in North Gate (Bagdad).
33. New building for the Directorate of Surveys.
34. Primary Women's Teachers Training School with boarding quarters.
35. Rural Teachers' Training School, Abu Ghuraib.
36. Law College and Household Arts School.
37. Five secondary schools in the liwas.
38. Three intermediate schools in the liwas.
39. Other expansions for schools.
40. Iraqi Museum.
41. Building for the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.
42. New customs building, Bagdad.
43. New customs building, Mosul.
44. Other customs offices.
45. New law courts building, Bagdad.
46. New law courts building, Mosul.
47. Olympic Athletic Club.
48. Extensions to the Royal Court and Qasr-al-Zuhur, including new constructions.
49. Bagdad Tapu Office building.
50. Basra Tapu Office building.
51. Mosul Hospital.
52. Isolation Hospital, Bagdad.
53. Evening secondary school.
54. Technical School.
55. Customs office and tobacco store, Sulaimani.
56. School of Engineering.



*Detailed List of Bridges included in the Capital Works Budget for the Five Years 1938-42.*

1. Two Bagdad bridges.
2. Musaiyab Bridge.
3. Dokan Bridge.
4. Taq-Taq Bridge.
5. Diyala Bridge (on the road to Kut).
6. Kufa Bridge.
7. Tuwairij Bridge.
8. Masiriyah Bridge.
9. Other bridges.

*Detailed List of Roads included in the Capital Works Budget for the Five Years 1938-42.*

1. Mosul-Arbil-Altun Kupri Road.
2. Arbil-Rayat Road.
3. Baiji-Mosul-Tel Kotchek Road.
4. Baqistian-Jama Road.
5. Gali Ali Beg-Sarshama-Barzan Road.
6. Sulaf-Amadiya Road.
7. Arbil-Koi Sanjaq Road.
8. Kirkuk-Koi Sanjaq Road.
9. Sulaimani-Dokan-Mirza Rustam-Qal'at Diza Road.
10. Mirza Rustam-Bangrad-Mirga Road.
11. Sulaimani-Jwarta-Mawit Road.
12. Sulaimani-Penjwin-Halabja Road.
13. Bagdad-Qizil Robat Road.
14. Ramadi-Syrian Frontier Road.
15. Bagdad-Mahmudiyah-Mafraq-Hillah Road.
16. Karbala-Musaiyab-Mafraq Road.
17. Basra-Zubair Road.
18. Resurfacing of roads in northern Iraq.
19. Mosul-Zakho Road.
20. Mosul-Aqra Road.
21. Sulaf-Harik-Barzan Road.
22. Koi Sanjaq-Khadran Road.
23. Kirkuk-Tuz-Kifri-Qizil Robat Road.
24. Asphalted of 50 kilom. of road on both sides of Rutba.
25. Bagdad-Kut-Al Wadi (left bank) Road.
26. Kut-Hai-Suwij Shajar (left bank) Road.
27. Bagdad-Baiji Road.
28. Baquba-Balad-Ruz Road.
29. Hillah-Diwaniyah Road.
30. Hillah-Kafal-Kufa Road.
31. Hillah-Tuwairij-Kerbala Road.
32. Diwaniyah-Suq Sha'lan Road.
33. Diwaniyah-Samawah Road.
34. Basra-Fao Road.
35. Basra-Amarah-Al Wadi Road.
36. Nasiriyah-Suwij-Shajar Road.
37. Other roads.

*Detailed List of Lines and Telephones included in the Capital Works Budget for the Five Years 1938-42.*

1. Bagdad automatic exchange and underground cables.
2. New telephone lines.
3. Long distance wireless telephone apparatus.
4. Wireless apparatus.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 35/1/31]

No. 44.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 3.)*

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, January 3, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 114 to Jedda.

In response to a request from High Commissioner, Palestine, I am arranging for full text of Secretary of State for the Colonies' despatch of 23rd December to be published here on 5th January.

I foresee, however, that explanations which this despatch contains will draw a hot fire from all sides in this country.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 2.)

[E 23/10/31]

No. 45.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 3, 1938.)*

(No. 1466.)

Sir,

*Cairo, December 23, 1937.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter which Prince Omar Toussoun has sent to the High Commissioner in Palestine and which was published in the Arabic press on the 14th December.

2. I have, on several occasions, tendered my views on the dangers to our whole position in the Near East of the situation in Palestine, and in my judgment our best hope of liquidating the present *impasse* is a solution on the lines advocated by King Ibn Saud (see my Secret telegram No. 645 of the 16th November, paragraph 7).

3. Whilst it remains true that Egypt is still greatly preoccupied with her own internal difficulties, it would be unwise to blind ourselves to the fact that there is now a growing body of influential opinion which views with the greatest concern the repressive measures which the situation in Palestine is necessitating. Should a turn of events—internal or external—in this country lead to a change in the present friendly feeling towards ourselves, the fact that our policy in Palestine is distasteful to a large and influential section in Egypt will undoubtedly add greatly to our difficulties.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),  
D. V. KELLY.

Enclosure in No. 45.

*Extract from the Mokattam of December 14, 1937.*

(Translation.)

His Excellency,

British High Commissioner for Palestine,

THE situation in Palestine is much to be deplored. We firmly believe that the British people do not approve of these bloody events, which humanity itself must condemn.

The world suffers the more at these terrible incidents, in that they are still continuing and that there is as yet no indication that they are likely to end in a manner calculated to reassure the minds of the nations of the world and of the Arabs in particular. We consider that these incidents have become so grave that they can no longer be accepted or tolerated. It is this that leads us to express in the name of the whole Egyptian nation our deep concern. We therefore urge your Excellency in your wisdom and justice to put an end in a just manner to this conflict, which will otherwise entail grave consequences, and not to deprive Palestinian Arabs of their lawful rights in a land where they established themselves since olden times.

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In the name of humanity we therefore urge you to use all your efforts to end this conflict as soon as possible and do justice to the Arab people of Palestine and so to prevent the shedding of the blood of these innocent persons. This is in a spirit of mercy for oppressed humanity in that country and for the maintenance of amity and accord between Great Britain and the Arab nations.

Please accept, &c.

PRINCE OMAR TOUSSOUN.

[E 326/10/31]

No. 46.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 23. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, January 17, 1938.*

I SAW Ibn Saud on the 15th January at Shumaisi, where he gave dinner on the occasion of visit of Lord Belhaven, and he talked to me about Palestine afterwards. Much of what he said was a repetition of earlier remarks about his dislike and fear of Italians, and his conviction that his interests and Arab interests in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government, but following deserve special mention:—

(1) If sufficient force were used Arabs of Palestine might acquiesce in partition for the present, but sooner or later, probably at a moment when His Majesty's Government were gravely embarrassed, they would break out. They would never recognise that Jews have any right to sovereignty over any part of Palestine. Nor would any other Arabs.

(2) The Ulema of Nejd had spoken to him on the subject the day before. He had pointed to British record in India, Iraq and Egypt, and had told them that he would never help those who attacked His Majesty's Government. (I told Lord Belhaven that I do not take this as a blank cheque that since it is associated with his conviction that in the long run His Majesty's Government will not impose on Arabs any policy which cannot reasonably be considered just.)

(3) The hostility of Arabs to Jews was based on fear for their honour, religion, and even existence, and was enjoined by the Koran. Ibn Saud quoted extensively, e.g., verse 82 of chapter 5, which represents Jews as the worst enemies and Christians as the best friends of Islam, and said that Arabs could not understand alliance of Christian England with Jews against Moslems. (I do not accept this description of attitude of His Majesty's Government, nor do I regard the precepts of the Koran on the subject as elevated, but the feeling exists and must be taken into account.)

(4) Both before and after his comments Ibn Saud referred to a memorandum on recent despatch to High Commissioner, Jerusalem, which he proposes to communicate to His Majesty's Government, and said that in his remarks to me and in memorandum he was speaking not as Ibn Saud or even as an Arab, but "as a member of the British [group undecypherable]" whose interests were his interests. He added that this was most secret. Obviously he could never commit such a statement to paper nor would he repeat it anywhere, but it was true.

[E 345/10/31]

No. 47.

*Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 16.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 12, 1938.*

WITH reference to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's telegram No. 4 of the 3rd January, I have the honour to inform you that the text of the despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated the 23rd December last to the High Commissioner for Palestine, on the subject of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, was published in the Iraqi press on the 5th January.

2. Comment has been unfavourable. I enclose translations of two articles which show the general trend of newspaper criticism, and which seem to reflect with reasonable truth the general reactions of enlightened public opinion.(')

(') Not printed.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he found the despatch so cautiously worded that it was difficult to understand what it really meant. He inclined, however, to think that it indicated that His Majesty's Government were moving, though very slowly and hesitatingly, towards a revision of the policy laid down in the White Paper published in July last (Command 5513).

4. He was pleased to find what he thought to be signs of the influence of some of his talks with you, sir, at Geneva last year, but did not feel able to hope that the despatch would give much comfort to the Arabs or appease the situation in Palestine. He spoke sadly of the position of the Arabs there, and said that heart-rending stories of their sufferings had been received in Iraq.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Angora, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 406/10/31]

No. 48.

*Consul MacKereth to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Damascus, January 13, 1938.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 24 of the 30th December, 1937, I have the honour to inform you that I visited Jerusalem on the 11th January for the purpose of discussing with Sir Charles Tegart and Sir David Petrie the question of the organisation in Damascus of terrorist activity in Palestine. Owing to fog over the Damascus airport, the Royal Air Force aircraft sent to convey me was unable to land, and the French air force kindly flew me to Jerusalem to enable me to keep to the programme arranged. I returned to Damascus the following day in an aeroplane of the Royal Air Force.

2. I took tea with His Majesty's High Commissioner, and later met Sir Charles Tegart and Sir David Petrie, with whom I had a long discussion on Tuesday evening and a shorter one on Wednesday morning. I enclose a memorandum summarising these talks for your information.

3. Sir Charles Tegart had apparently been persuaded during his investigations into the terrorist activities in Palestine that these had been almost entirely organised in Syria.

4. Were it possible to persuade the French mandatory authorities, who recall that in October 1936 the gang leaders were allowed to go safely through Transjordan to Syria and Iraq with their loot after they had been conducting a revolt in Palestine lasting six months, to be bolder it might serve to reduce Syrian participation in the Palestine disturbances, but it would not end them. On the other hand, it is tempting to exaggerate the importance of Syrian participation.

5. On my return, M. de Martel asked me to call on him, and he questioned me about the situation in Palestine. I said that it appeared to have changed slightly for the better, but that it was still highly unsatisfactory. To him I ascribed this to the sanctuary afforded in Syria to agitators and some terrorists. I added that in the view of Sir Charles Tegart (whose mission I explained) the heart of the terrorism in Palestine was to be found in Syria. M. de Martel said it was very easy to blame the neighbour, but he could not deny, even if he could not prove, the hostile activities of some Syrians and Palestinians within the Syrian borders. His problem was, first, finding grounds for taking action, and, then, in the action itself. He drew my attention to the very great difficulty he had had in getting Muin-al-Madi banished to Alexandretta (he apparently went there on the 12th January). He had done this at my request, more as an example to others than with a conviction that it would serve any useful purpose. He argued that even were he able to put every Palestinian agitator in Syria under lock and key, there would be dozens of Syrians eager to step into their places and the Arab fires would burn all the brighter for it.

6. He asked me if we had any complaint about the Mufti's activities. I said that, so far as I knew, all we regretted in his case was the number of political visitors he received. M. de Martel said he would enquire into that, but here again he felt that the Mufti, by being left alone under discreet surveillance,

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was rapidly becoming of no consequence. To adopt openly repressive measures would only end in his being talked back into popularity.

7. I said I understood the delicacy of the local political situation, but I asked whether he did not think a closer watch could not safely be kept on the Palestinian and Syrian agitators. I mentioned particularly Izzet Darwaza and Nabih-al-Azmeh. About the last named, M. de Martel said that he had been seeking an opportunity for months to have him locked up on account of his subversive activities against the French authorities, but the necessary proof had so far been unobtainable. He added that he and his staff were most anxious to help us in every way that was politically possible. They kept the agitators in constant fear of arrest by having them summoned at frequent intervals to report to the Sûreté. They could not; it was materially impossible; haul terrorists out of the fanatical quarter, the Meidan, in Damascus, where they invariably hid. He thought that the close and cordial collaboration between Commandant Bonnot and myself, which was, as I knew, whole-hearted and loyal, had produced excellent results in restricting the Syrian participants in the Palestine disturbances to insignificant proportions. He claimed that more drastic action by the French could not have done more, and might, indeed, by exciting popular passions, have done less.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador and consul-general in Paris and Beirut respectively.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 48.

*Memorandum summarising the Talks on January 11 and 12 in Jerusalem between Sir C. Tegart, Sir D. Petrie and Lieutenant-Colonel G. MacKereth on Terrorist Activities in Palestine organised from Syria.*

SIR CHARLES TEGART opened the discussion, which was informal, by explaining that he had come to Palestine in order to advise the Colonial Office on means of restoring public security. After covering in a general survey the widespread disorders, he said that he had been particularly struck by the fact, which had been reiterated to him on all sides in Palestine, that the solution of the main problem of terrorism was to be found in Damascus. He had been led to believe that almost every, if not every, case of terrorism had been conspired and financed in Damascus by Palestinian or Syrian political agitators. He thought that the French would never assist us by exposing and repressing the conspirators unless we forced their hands. In order to bring this influence upon the French he proposed obtaining approval to attach to my staff at the consulate an "intelligence officer" to work under my orders and to spend his whole time in trying to detect terrorist plots directed against Palestine. He sought my opinion on this.

2. I expressed the view that the proposal was not at present politically feasible, and that if it were it would produce results even less satisfactory than those of the present system, which was based on seeking to obtain, and obtaining in large measure, friendly co-operation with the French Intelligence Service and the French Sûreté. I pointed out that the French authorities had on several recent occasions taken strong exception to the practice of the three British intelligence services in Palestine (Criminal Investigation Department, Army Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence) in sending secret agents to Syria for the purpose, which, incidentally, seemed never to be achieved, of picking up information about terrorist activities. I, too, took exception to the practice, as it tended to render more difficult my task, already delicate, of obtaining direct news from members of the terrorist groups and through the French services, and then requesting or coaxing the French and Syrian authorities to take positive preventive action. To adopt Sir Charles's proposal would, I thought, involve discarding a bone, admittedly not as meaty as could be wished, for a shadow as illusory as that in the fable.

3. I pointed out that there was no longer any difficulty about personnel, for the Foreign Office had now attached to my staff a second vice-consul. As for the quantity and reliability of information, it was in direct relation to the money

spent, given, of course, adequate means of checking such as now existed. This amount would represent the extent of the risks run by the spies sent to move intimately in terrorist circles, where discovery of their activities would entail their death. Sir David Petrie asked me to name the annual cost of obtaining such services. I explained that it was impossible to be precise as to the amount until I was given details of the extent and nature of the information they could usefully employ in Palestine. I added that during the past six months I had informed the Palestine police of the departure from Syria and the probable transit place across the frontier of eighteen convoys of arms, but it had never been possible to arrange for their interception. I had also, on thirty odd occasions, supplied information, which had been confirmed from two or more sources, of the passage across the frontiers of small parties of Syrians. Here again it had not been possible to capture any of them. During the same period I had notified the Palestinian authorities when leaders of the bands had gone backwards and forwards between Syria and Palestine; moreover, they had frequently stayed in Palestine several weeks, yet the Palestine authorities had never succeeded in arresting them, with the one exception of Farhan Saadi; he was captured only by the accident of his having just previously murdered a police informer, a member of an important Palestinian family, who, from motives purely of revenge, had disclosed the bandit's hiding-place.

4. It appeared to me, in view of these failures to utilise information (the accuracy of which had in the majority of cases been confirmed by subsequent events) that it was in the first place essential to obtain a clear view of the nature of the information which it was desirable to obtain in the future. The means of supplying it could thereafter be studied with a greater possibility of satisfactory results.

5. I then explained briefly our present system, the backbone of which was the French Intelligence Service in Syria and the Lebanon. I explained the physical and political difficulties that had to be contended with; the latter arising out of the strong pan-Arab and anti-Zionist sentiment in half-emancipated Syria.

6. Sir Charles Tegart appeared to think that what was required was the complete break-up of what he termed the terrorist organisation in Damascus, which lay, he had been led to believe, behind all the terrorism in Palestine. I said I had reason to doubt that there existed, in fact, any one organisation and I should be glad to learn of any evidence pointing to it. In my view, the terrorist activities in Palestine that appeared to receive encouragement in Syria were of three different kinds and not interconnected:—

- (1) Fanatical anti-Zionism organised by the remaining members of the Izzadine-al-Qassam gang, some of whom were in Palestine and others in Damascus. They seemed to work in small groups. They were inspired by motives of Jew hatred and revenge for their fellow fanatics who had been arrested by the police in Palestine. They had little interest in pan-Arabism.
- (2) Bands more or less controlled by the political agitators, Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian, some of them residing in Damascus and in the Lebanon. They were bent on rendering the task of government in Palestine as difficult as possible, in order to induce His Majesty's Government to give way to the demands of the Arab politicians. The bands were largely composed of persons with a past criminal record, highwaymen, and starving peasants. They assembled under Palestinian gang leaders.
- (3) Parties of young men, who had not yet been absorbed into gainful business. They were filibusters with vague pan-Arab enthusiasms and came from Palestine, Iraq and Syria and formed themselves into small bands. They slipped over the frontiers with the object of indulging in the sport of shooting at motor-buses, motor-cars and small detachments of police and troops and hastily ran back over the frontiers to safety. Their places were then taken by other similar bands. They affected a kind of uniform resembling that adopted by the late King Feisal's followers in 1918. They received no payment, but obtained ample supplies of arms when they got into Palestine. They were mainly in search of excitement, but would no doubt wish to be called patriots.



The essential feature of group (2) and to a certain extent group (1) was money and arms; most of the money could be traced to Palestine itself and was the product of extortion and free subscription. All the arms were provided in Palestine, where the supply appeared to be ample. Without money and arms there could be no terrorism.

7. Sir Charles Tegart then referred to the case of the remnants of the Mufti's party, now political refugees in Syria and the Lebanon, and also to Sheikh Attiyeh (leading member of group (1)). He asked what further steps I thought we could get the French to take against them. I said I thought we could hope for very little until the authorities in Palestine could furnish me with something approaching proof of their subversive activities. I had myself nothing beyond strong inferences against them. If such proof could be made available to me I thought I might obtain from the French authorities repressive measures against the persons concerned. I suggested that a ready test was available for gauging the strength of the case that ought to be put up to force the hands of the French to oblige the Syrian Government to take action so obnoxious to the local population in the matter. The test I proposed was that the case should be examined as though the tables were reversed and the French were dealing with the problem in Palestine as it is to-day and we were holding the mandate in Syria without emergency regulations to strengthen the hand of the Administration. If our case was strong enough for us to be able honestly to say that we should be prepared to deal sternly with the Palestinian agitators or alleged terrorists, then I had little doubt that I could get the French or Syrians to do the same. I then mentioned the benevolent attitude adopted by the Palestinian, Transjordanian and Iraqi authorities towards the refugees from French military justice who fled to Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq during and after the 1925-26 revolt in Syria. I pointed out that many of the persons now behind the disturbances in Palestine were those to whom we had provided sanctuary after they had committed murder and had been in open rebellion against the French in Syria. Had they then suffered punishment for their crimes they would not to-day be stabbing us in the back as an expression of gratitude for our hospitality.

8. Sir Charles said that if we could not attack the terrorist organisation at its heart in Syria the task in Palestine was hopeless. I suggested there was much to be done in Palestine itself and in particular I expressed my conviction that owing to the language difficulties and the refusal of the local population to co-operate with the police it was of the utmost importance to introduce the identity card system. Sir Charles said that he had seen the papers about the proposal I had made for the introduction of this system and he personally favoured it. He was shocked by the rarity of Arabic-speaking officials and police officers. He had, however, been considerably impressed by the fact that practically every senior official in Palestine had declared that it would be impossible of application in Palestine. I responded that it should be ascertained what, if any, experience these officials had had in the emergency introduction and working of the system. I added that the French had had practically no difficulty when they introduced it in 1926 and that it had considerably aided the suppression of terrorism, which had not reappeared in Syria, notwithstanding many political upheavals since that date. I gathered that the opposition of the Jewish Agency was looked upon as insurmountable and I gave it as my opinion that such opposition would provide a convenient opportunity for the abolition of an inconvenient institution.

9. At the close of our discussions I invited Sir Charles Tegart and Sir David Petrie to pay me a visit in Damascus as soon as they could. I said that I should then be able to bring them in touch with the French officials with whom I had to deal and who had had very long political experience in similar questions in Syria; an experience from which we could with great advantage benefit. With this proposal Sir Charles fell in readily; Sir David Petrie, however, could not fit in the visit owing to his early return to England.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

Damascus, January 13, 1938.

[E 440/10/31]

No. 49.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 1.)  
Sir,

Jedda, January 5, 1938.

AT the time when I had the honour to receive your telegrams Nos. 118 and 119 of the 31st December regarding the despatch to the High Commissioner for Palestine and the communication of a summary to Ibn Saud on the 4th January, Ibn Saud was no longer in Jedda, but out on a shooting expedition. I believed, however, that he was within reach and that he would wish to receive the communication himself, so I wrote offering to come to any place he might appoint unless he preferred to nominate some person to receive the communication from me in Jedda on the 4th January. The King replied asking whether I minded going to Muhditha, about 20 miles from Ashaira, and sent word that all arrangements for my journey would be made. He, in fact, sent the unfortunate Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to Jedda to arrange about the transport and to take me to Muhditha and bring me back to Jedda again.

2. I reached Muhditha at 8 p.m. on the 3rd January and saw the King at 8.30 on the morning of the 4th January. I first saw him alone for a few minutes, and told him that as a mark of friendship and confidence between him and them His Majesty's Government wished him to have advance knowledge of a communication which would be broadcast from Jerusalem that evening and published in the press on the 5th. Ibn Saud was pleased at this message, and particularly pleased to learn that according to my information no other Government was to be told about the communication beforehand. I then handed to the King, and to the Amir Feisal, who had now been called in with Fuad Bey Hamza and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, copies of an aide-memoire in Arabic in the sense of your telegram No. 117, and suggested that I should retire for a while so that the King might examine the document and discuss it with his advisers first. I was absent about half an hour, during which Fuad Bey came out once to ask about one or two points which seemed to them to require elucidation. I was then received again by the King, the circle being completed by the addition of the Minister of Finance and of Mr. Judd, whom I had brought with me. The King talked directly to me, and on this occasion made his clipped Nejd Arabic almost completely intelligible to me, though on two or three occasions I referred to Fuad Bey to make sure that I had understood the King completely, or to make a remark which I wanted to reach the King in the most accurate form possible.

3. The King began at the beginning, as he always likes to do. He spoke of the identity of his interests and those of His Majesty's Government. Friendship with His Majesty's Government was essential not only to him but to all Arabs. All must admire what Great Britain had done in Iraq and Egypt within the last few years—not to mention her record in India. It was true that she had no doubt been thinking of her own interests too, but others would have done less. But there was one black spot—and a danger spot: Palestine. He himself was actuated by self-interest, he admitted, but he was an Arab and a Moslem, and he had feelings. For four months he had not listened to the Jerusalem wireless; he had the news taken down and brought to him, but to listen with his own ears to the accounts of what was going on in Palestine was more than he could bear. The evening before he had decided, however, that he would listen to the inauguration of the Arabic broadcasts from London, and he filled his tent with Arabs to give them a treat. What were his feelings when he heard the announcement that an Arab had been executed in Palestine! He felt as though the rope were round his own neck and could not refrain from tears, and the Arabs with him wept too.

4. At this point the King was deeply moved, though with a restraint which was more affecting than a violent outburst. His eyes filled with tears which he tried to ignore at first but at length had to wipe away. I had myself heard the broadcast the evening before, with Fuad Bey and his brother and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and had wished that I was somewhere else. Not that I question the wisdom and honesty of telling the world in the Arabic broadcast that an Arab has been hanged. Only, one cannot expect Arabs to receive the news with pleasure or even with indifference. Nor can one explain their feelings away by calling them "pan-Arabs," which is almost becoming a term of abuse. It is true, as I

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said to the King, that Arabs are not punished for their politics, but it is not easy to find a convincing reply to the King's question, whether the crimes for which the British were hanging and imprisoning Arabs in Palestine would have been committed had it not been for the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government.

5. Throughout his discourse Ibn Saud spoke with particular solemnity. At one point he called upon God and his Prophet to witness to his sincerity, in which I fully believed, and reminded me that we were in one of the three sacred months of Islam, when an oath was particularly sacred.

6. The trouble in Palestine, continued the King, constituted a great danger for His Majesty's Government. He followed everything that happened in Europe or in the Near and Middle and Far East, and whenever they went in favour of Great Britain he rejoiced, and whenever they went against her he was grieved. This was a time of great danger. When he was visiting the Anglo-Persian Oil Company refinery at Abadan there was a tremendous fire, but the wind blew the flames away from everything else and the fire just burnt out. But with Palestine this was not so. The fire was small, but there was a steady wind of intrigue blowing the flames straight at the living tree. The East was full of propaganda: newspapers, even proclamations. Whenever they came to his notice he had them burned, but there must be other copies. The King referred with anger to the treatment which the Italians formerly meted out to the Arabs in Libya, but said that that did not prevent their being a great danger to His Majesty's Government now.

7. I now asked His Majesty whether he did not think that the explanations in the aide-mémoire would have a good effect on public opinion in Palestine. There ensued some discussion, with which I need not trouble you in detail, and in the course of it two points that seemed to the King of particular importance were examined closely, viz., the terms of reference, obviously very carefully worded, of the new commission, and the words "if as a result of the investigations of the technical commission, which will undoubtedly occupy many months, a scheme of partition is regarded as equitable and practicable . . . ." In the end Ibn Saud said that he was now inclined to be optimistic. It must not be supposed, however, that he thought that all our troubles, and his, were over. He is optimistic, I gathered, because while, as he says, you find able and honest men proposing the oddest things, he yet seems to feel that a commission of well-informed and honourable men, working on the lines laid down in the despatch to Palestine, cannot possibly decide that any scheme of partition is either just or practicable. And even this conditional optimism was limited by his knowledge that the atmosphere in Palestine was highly unfavourable to the proper working of the proposed commission. Outrages were going on, many of the principal men were in exile, many others were in prison. Would not the publication of the despatch itself bring about a favourable atmosphere, I asked? That would not be enough, said Ibn Saud. People would not be in a state to listen to it properly. Fuad Bey suggested a general amnesty, but was at once silenced by Ibn Saud. "You can't do that straight off," he said. "That would never do. You can perhaps invite people to co-operate with the commission, and if they demand an amnesty first, you can ask who is going to stand security for all these people whose pardon or release is demanded. Something like that." And he suggested that perhaps there could be some reduction in the severity of the sentence passed by the courts-martial in Palestine as a contribution to a general appeasement. I did not discuss this point because it is outside my province and because I wanted to ascertain the feelings first roused in Ibn Saud's mind by the explanation of policy furnished by His Majesty's Government, and I merely put it down as part of the record.

8. Ibn Saud ended with a strong diatribe against the Jews. Perhaps a few Arabs might be found who, like King Feisal, would give their assent to the Zionist policy, but with these few exceptions that policy, based as it was on Jewish greed, was hateful to all Arabs. It did not seem to me the moment to engage in an argument, which must inevitably have been long, about the spiritual side of Zionism as opposed to the economic, though I did protest against the error of believing that Palestine was ever intended by His Majesty's Government to be used as a dumping ground for all the poor or persecuted Jews of Europe. What Ibn Saud cannot understand is the purpose of His Majesty's Government in taking part of an Arab country to give it to the Jews, which is what he considers partition amounts to. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin has told me in so many

words that the Arabs, the King not excepted, consider that His Majesty's Government are under Jewish dominance; if they do anything the Jews do not like they are made to withdraw it. Anyhow, Ibn Saud grew quite warm about the Jews, and ended by enquiring whether His Majesty's Government could not place them in one of the colonies they were so proud of, instead of in the little country of Palestine. Ibn Saud is coming to Jedda again soon, and I hope to try to give him a better view of Zionism, but my business yesterday, having ascertained what he thought about the despatch to Palestine, was to set off on the seven or eight hours' bumpy drive back to Jedda (we had spent over ten hours on the way the day before) in order to write this despatch for the Foreign Office bag leaving next morning, and I withdrew after expressing the hope that the good intentions visible in the despatch would be noted by all Arabs and that they would co-operate in the enquiry. Fuad Bey told me afterwards that the King was already wondering what he could do to help to bring about the right atmosphere.

9. There is one point I have left until the end. Ibn Saud asked whether the aide-mémoire was given to him for information only or for his comments: he meant his comments on the principle of the case as it would be considered by the new commission. I replied that since His Majesty's Government would consider the report of the commission who would hear opinions from all quarters, I could see nothing to prevent His Majesty from expressing his views, which I was sure would be examined by His Majesty's Government with the attention which they always showed to what he said. I heard from Fuad Bey afterwards that the King was planning to send to His Majesty's Government a considered opinion of partition from the point of view of justice and practicability.

10. The essential points in this despatch are being telegraphed to you to-day in my telegram No. 5.

11. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 443/10/31]

No. 50.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 24.)*

(No. 20.)

Sir,

*Cairo, January 9, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a petition I have received from a number of Senators and Deputies, requesting me to submit to His Majesty's Government their appeal for the settlement of the Palestine question on a just and equitable basis.

2. It will be seen that the note (which, although dated the 21st November, only reached the Embassy on the 6th January) is couched in moderate terms and stress is laid on the friendship for Great Britain which the Egyptian people now feel for her as an ally.

3. It will be noted further that the list of names is representative of various shades of opinion, and includes the journalists Mohamed Tewfik Diab and Ahmed Hafez Awad as well as persons like Dr. Hamed Mohammed and members of the Basel and Abaza families.

4. In a recent despatch (No. 1466 of the 23rd December) I ventured to urge that, whilst Egyptian public opinion had remained outwardly calm as regards events in Palestine, we must not blind ourselves to the fact that there was a growing body of influential opinion in Egypt which viewed with the greatest misgiving the present developments in that country. The attached petition is a moderate and genuinely friendly expression of that feeling which merits sympathetic attention.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.



Enclosure in No. 50.

*Petition addressed to the British Ambassador, Cairo.*

Your Excellency,

Cairo, November 21, 1937.

WHEREAS the Egyptian nation is closely related to the Palestine Arab people by the ties of language, religion, blood, traditions and neighbourhood, and bound to the British people by mutual friendship and alliance;

And whereas the Egyptian people are greatly concerned over the well-being and existence of the people of the Holy Land, and the safeguarding of their legitimate rights;

And whereas the Egyptians are eager to uphold their friendship with the British people, we feel that it is our duty to submit the following to your Excellency:

The Palestine Arab people have never failed to assure and persuade the British Government of their sincere desire to uphold and continue their friendship with the British people.

They have resorted to all legal and peaceful methods to prove to the British Government that the Zionist policy was wrong and incompatible. In the recent years, owing to that policy the incompatibility of which has now been admitted even by the British Government itself, the Palestine Arabs have become threatened with imminent dangers to their integrity and national existence. In the meantime, again owing to that same policy, Arab-British friendship has been seriously jeopardised.

The recent developments in the Palestine case were regarded to be indications forecasting a just solution of that problem, in accordance with British traditions. Simultaneously, the friends of Great Britain in Egypt and other Arab and Moslem countries were working towards the strengthening of good relations between the Arabs and Great Britain. They were endeavouring to remove the gloomy and threatening clouds that hang over the Arab and Moslem worlds as a result of the British Government's policy in Palestine, which denies to the Arabs their legal rights and aims at the partition of their country. And while the leaders were confident that Great Britain will appreciate this friendly desire of the Arabs and Moslems, and reciprocate for it, they were astonished and shocked by the ominous measures resorted to by the British authorities in Palestine, such as the suspension of the recognised national bodies; the persecution and deportation of the Arab leaders; the arrest and internment of many notables including religious dignitaries and sharia judges, and the application of the most stringent of emergency laws against the Arab people. Those measures on the part of the Government indicate a strong desire to stifle the voice of the Arabs of Palestine which has been raised in the East and West, and echoed by representatives of many Eastern and Western Powers in the League of Nations; nay, a desire to exterminate that Arab people whose only guilt is that of defending their threatened homes, and upholding their national right to a free and honourable life.

The Egyptian people look upon the Palestine Government measures with sorrow and regret, and do not regard them as conducive to the establishment of justice, peace, and tranquillity in the Holy Land. On the contrary, they believe that those measures are such as will do away with the possibility of a just solution of the Palestine problem—which both the British people and the League of Nations desire—and will widen the breach created by the Zionist policy between the Arab and British peoples.

We respectfully request your Excellency to submit the Egyptian view-point and expression of sympathy to His Britannic Majesty's Government. As friends and allies of Great Britain, the Egyptian people hope that the British statesmen will find their way to a fair and honourable settlement of the Palestine problem on the basis of the recognition of the unquestionable rights of the Arab people. The denial or disregard of those rights will never establish justice or peace in the Holy Land. The Egyptians appeal to the British Government to hasten to heal the wound which recent measures have created, to the detriment of peace and any amicable settlement in sight.

We have, &c.<sup>(1)</sup><sup>(1)</sup> List of names not printed.

[E 796/10/31]

No. 51.

*Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 11.)*

(No. 49.)

Sir,

Bagdad, February 4, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on Friday, the 28th January, the Palestine Defence League of Iraq issued an appeal to the public to observe the day as one of prayer and intercession for the peace of the souls of the innocent martyrs in Palestine, where, it was stated, atrocities had been committed which were without parallel even in the darkest pages of history. It was announced that the day would be similarly observed in Syria and Egypt.

2. The appeal was supported in the press by articles on familiar lines. The *Istiqlal*, in a leader headed "Outrageous Aggression in Palestine," declared that the Arab world re-echoed with indignation at the brutal policy of Great Britain, which would continue to inspire the Arabs with hatred of the English. The *Zaman* asked of what crime the Arabs had been guilty that they should be subjected to such sufferings and that all the might of imperialism should be brought to bear upon them to force them to surrender their homelands to Zionist refugees from all parts of the world.

3. The public in Bagdad and the larger towns responded well to the appeal of the Palestine Defence League and the mosques were full for the special services held at mid-day. There were, however, no street demonstrations and no breaches of the peace. Telegrams of protest were afterwards despatched by different groups to the League of Nations, some foreign Governments and foreign representatives in Iraq. I enclose herein translations of two such protests which were received at this Embassy.<sup>(1)</sup>

4. Interest has been aroused by the news that a large number of Egyptian Deputies have signed a protest to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, and there is a movement afoot for a similar protest to be presented to His Majesty's Embassy here.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jerusalem and Jedda, and to the Government of India.

I have, &amp;c.

JAMES MORGAN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 973/10/31]

No. 52.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 25, 1938.

IN the last paragraph of my telegram No. 23 dated the 17th January, I referred to a memorandum on the subject of Palestine which Ibn Saud said that he proposed to communicate to His Majesty's Government. I now have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of this memorandum. Its transmission to you has been delayed slightly because Fuad Bey took back one page to delete a reference to the interview between Mr. Ormsby Gore and Dr. Weizmann which was reported in the *Jewish Chronicle* of the 13th August last, on my showing him a copy of the letter sent by the Foreign Office to the Saudi Minister in London on the 24th December, in which the account in the *Jewish Chronicle* is described as an unauthorised and inaccurate summary of a private and quite informal conversation which should be entirely disregarded. When he returned the amended page Fuad Bey produced the annex in which arguments are brought forward with the object of convincing His Majesty's Government that no scheme of partition can be regarded as just or practicable.

2. The wording of the memorandum shows that it is largely, if not entirely, the King's work. Had it been written by a European it would suggest a lack of precision in the writer's mind, but it would be a mistake to apply our criteria to Arabs. The memorandum is written as Ibn Saud talks, with that tendency to



repetition and to the use of synonyms which make the Koran tedious to a western ear, but there is no doubt about the activity combined with caution with which the King's mind works.

3. Much of the memorandum consists of a repetition of sentiments which His Majesty's Government have heard from Ibn Saud on more than one occasion. He is grateful for the confidence which His Majesty's Government have shown him, their readiness to listen to his views about Palestine, and their courtesy in communicating the despatch to Jerusalem to him before publication. His great aim is that friendship between the British and the Arabs (and Moslems in general) should be maintained. This is in the interests of His Majesty's Government, which he puts first. Only think of the present position and of what might be! His Majesty's Government perhaps find it difficult to realise how painful to Arabs and Moslems is the effect of the failure to arrive at a just solution of the Palestine question, and how apprehensive the Arabs of Palestine are at the measures adopted "to detach Palestine or part of it for the Jews and gradually to evict the Arabs and Moslems, with the result that the Jews would spread and their influence extend to places which they redeem with their souls and their wealth." As he has informed the British Government on various occasions, all Moslem and Arab countries are determined to defend the sacred places of Islam against Jewish domination and protect the interests of the Arabs in Palestine. His Majesty's Government must realise how difficult the position of "those Arabs who possess wisdom" is in the face of international intrigue. "They are also aware that Palestine enjoys particular respect and importance in that it contains the first of the two qiblas and the third of those holy sanctuaries revered by millions of Moslems who regard it as a religious duty and an important command to combat and fight the Jews and to repel the danger of them from their sacred places and their sanctuary, as is clearly shown in verses of the Koran and traditions of the Prophet which are doubtless well known to the British Government." There is no need to dwell upon the dangers inherent in any solution which "does not reassure (Arabs and Moslems) about the future of Palestine in a manner which leaves no room for doubt or ambiguity."

4. The memorandum then refers to what it calls the policy of rigorous severity adopted after the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission. Ibn Saud saw the breach between His Majesty's Government and the Arab and Moslem world becoming wider and was about to make a communication to His Majesty's Government on this subject, in their interests and his own. The severity of the British policy has enabled the enemies of Great Britain to turn against her the feelings which the Arab and Moslem world used to feel against certain (other) European Powers for atrocities committed in Arab countries. That His Majesty's Government should get such a reputation is a cause of great regret to him. He therefore welcomes the ray of hope offered by the despatch of the 23rd December. He still has complete confidence in British justice and moderation. He is prepared to do his best to induce the Palestinians to put their case before the new commission, but cannot set about this until His Majesty's Government have done something to improve the atmosphere, for he advised them once and their hopes were disappointed, and, moreover, their fears have found justification in the ambitions and hopes published by the Jews. His views on the permanent solution of the Palestine problem have already been communicated to His Majesty's Government, but if they wish he would be glad to draw up a detailed proposal after consulting persons in whom he has confidence. But, first, something must be done to clear the atmosphere for the new commission. He does not presume to advise His Majesty's Government, but he thinks that it would be for the general good that they should consider whether the immigration of Jews into Palestine and the sale of land should not be stopped until a permanent solution has been adopted, or at least for two years, and whether steps should not be taken towards the restoration of normal conditions, by "lightening the severity of the military courts, allowing the exiles and the deportees to return, pardoning persons who have been imprisoned politically or administratively, and inviting all to co-operate with the new commission."

5. The annex is brief and speaks for itself.

6. The outstanding points in the memorandum were sent to you in my telegram No. 32 dated the 27th January.

7. When telegraphing about this memorandum I said: "I send this without comment since His Majesty's Government have all the information required for

the estimation of its value. Moreover, they know what I do not know, viz., whether we can struggle out of the Palestine marsh unaided." Everything that could be said about the Palestine problem seems to have been said over and over again, and Ibn Saud's present and potential attitude has been studied fully. To Ibn Saud's demand for an unambiguous policy which will reassure the Arabs about the future of Palestine, His Majesty's Government might say that the tentative welcome which they extended to the partition proposal was based upon a desire to discover a final solution which would show both sides where they stood, but if Ibn Saud then asks, as he is inclined to do, what evidence there is that the Jews would have been contented with the small State that was to be allotted to them and would cease to demand and to try to obtain more, it is difficult to find a convincing reply.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 52.

*Fuad Hamza Bey to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Sir Reader,

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,*

*Mecca, January 17, 1938.*

IN compliance with the commands of His Majesty the King during our meeting on Saturday last, the 14th Dhul Qada (the 15th January) at Shumaisi, I have pleasure in enclosing herewith His Majesty's secret memorandum to His Britannic Majesty's Government about the problem of Palestine, with the request that you will be so good as to take the action which you may think fit in this connexion.

With highest respects, &c.

FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

(Translation.)

(Secret.)

*Memorandum.*

WE wish to offer our thanks to the British Government for the consideration and friendship which they showed to us in deputing Sir Reader Bullard to communicate to us a *note verbale* containing the policy they have in view concerning the Palestine question and the appointment in the near future of a technical committee for investigation and study within the terms of reference set forth in the despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem which the British Government, out of their friendship towards us and our mutual confidence, thought it necessary to communicate to us before its publication.

We also wish to offer our thanks for the attention paid by the British Government to the statements and explanations which we have had the pleasure of transmitting within the last six months, expressing our views and fears resulting from the failure to find a just solution such as would be satisfactory to the Palestine Arabs and would convince their brothers the Arabs and Moslems in other countries in the Arab and Moslem world of the justice of the policy which it was proposed to adopt; and also for their real readiness to listen to our suggestions, in a strictly confidential way, regarding the best solution for the adoption of a final and definitive settlement of a problem of the most complicated and dangerous character and the elimination of anything that might excite the feelings of Moslems and Arabs, disturb the co-operation between them and Great Britain and create between the two sides a wide and impassable gulf, thus opening the door wide for the weaving of intrigues and the stirring up of discord between them.

First of all, we wish to explain to the friendly British Government, as we have already done on various occasions in written communications and private talks, the essential reasons which have led, and still lead, us to attach great



importance to the Palestine question and induce us to state our opinions and views to the friendly British Government with complete clarity and frankness in a secret manner free from all self-advertisement or ostentation.

Those reasons were explained in sufficient detail in the memorandum which we had the pleasure to transmit to the British Government after the return of our Minister from Riyadh in the month of Rajab (September 1937), but in view of the special importance which we attach to the explanation of this fact, we think it useful to lay particular stress upon certain of those reasons in order that the friendly Government may realise how important we consider it is that the truth of the matter should be understood without ambiguity or private motive or personal interest. Foremost among the motives which impel us to this course is our incontestable friendship towards the British Government and our strong desire for the continuance of the good understanding and friendship between them and the Arabs in particular and Moslems in general. If we speak of this and of the necessity to strengthen this friendship and to ward off any factor which might affect it, our object is not the interests of Arabs and Moslems alone; our aim first of all is to serve the real interests of Great Britain also. As you are aware, we are in a position to estimate the real sympathies of our race and of the sons of our faith and to judge of their deep feelings. We imagine ourselves in the position of the British Government, and make a careful and accurate comparison between the present state of affairs and the conditions which might be developed between the two sides. We have had reason on many occasions in the past to believe firmly that the British Government will not misapprehend our intentions nor misunderstand the various motives which compel us at this critical moment to desire profoundly to avoid anything which might disturb the many interests which the two sides have in common. It may perhaps be difficult for the British Government to imagine the pain of the deep wound which the failure to arrive at a just solution of the Palestine question has inflicted on the body of the firm relations between them and the Arabs and Moslems. We are not exaggerating or departing from the truth when we assure them that there is no Moslem or Arab whose heart does not bleed at the events now taking place in Palestine, and the fears which possess its people and the doubts planted deep in their souls regarding the truth of the intentions involved in all the measures which have so far been adopted to detach Palestine, or part of it, for the Jews and gradually to evict the Arabs and Moslems, with the result that the Jews would spread and their influence extend to places which they redeem with their souls and their wealth.

We have explained these facts to the British Government on various occasions, but at the last meeting with Sir Reader Bullard at Muhditha we tried to explain to him the feeling of excitement which prevails among all who have Moslem or Arab sentiments, and we acquainted him with what we had heard of the firm determination in all Arab and Moslem countries to defend the sacred places of Islam against Jewish domination and protect the interests of the Arabs in Palestine. The British Government are aware how difficult is the position of those Arabs who possess wisdom, and how impossible in face of those international intrigues which can be employed to mislead the common people and to spoil Anglo-Arab relations. They are also aware that Palestine enjoys particular respect and importance in that it contains the first of the two qiblas and the third of those holy sanctuaries revered by millions of Moslems who regard it as a religious duty and an important command to combat and fight the Jews and to repel the danger of them from their sacred places and their sanctuary, as is clearly shown in verses of the Koran and traditions of the Prophet which are doubtless well known to the British Government. As to the importance which Palestine has in the eyes of the Arabs, nothing shows so clearly the anxiety which has seized the minds of all Arabs as the attitude which they have adopted irrespective of country or Government. From what we know of the desire of the British Government to retain the affection of Arabs and Moslems and to strengthen the bonds of friendship with them, and because of the statements and explanations we have already forwarded to them, we think that there is no need to dwell upon the dangers inherent in any solution which wounds the feelings of the Arabs and Moslems and does not reassure them about the future of Palestine in a manner which leaves no room for doubt or ambiguity.

The Palestine problem has doubtless been a source of great preoccupation to Arabs and Moslems, as has already been explained, but the danger has greatly

increased as a result of the policy of rigorous severity which was adopted after the publication of the report of the Royal Commission last summer. This policy, which we, as the sincere friend of the British Government, permit ourselves to describe as disturbing and distressing and completely out of harmony with the traditional British love of justice and respect for Moslem religious feelings, has become a dangerous instrument and effective means for the widening of the breach between Great Britain on one side and the Arabs and Islam on the other. When we saw that the danger of that policy was increasing, we found it contrary to our interests and to those of our friend Great Britain not to refer to it and to the grief and sorrow we feel on account of the measures taken and the deep wounds they cause and the wide opportunity they offer for intrigue, and we were therefore intending, a few days before our meeting with Sir Reader Bullard, to transmit a memorandum drawing attention to the painful effect of the present policy in Palestine upon the Moslem and Arab world in general and within the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in particular, and of its effect upon the enemies of Great Britain, who seized the opportunity to create misunderstandings between them and the Arabs.

As we stated orally to Sir Reader Bullard, the situation has developed to a dangerous point as a result of the acts done in Palestine in the way of hanging, punishment, destruction, exiling and frightening away, and the enemies of Great Britain have changed their method of attacking her reputation on account of the acts attributed to her, and wish to create in Islam and among the Arabs feelings such as the Moslem and Arab world cherish against certain European Powers for the atrocities committed by them in Moslem Arab countries. It grieves us very much, on account of the bonds of friendship and affection between us of which the British Government are well aware, that Great Britain should have such a reputation in Moslem and Arab lands. A resolute examination of the matter by the statesmen of Great Britain will suffice to put the situation right, give effect to justice and equity, and put an end to the present state of affairs.

We rejoice greatly that the British Government have opened the door to help towards the elimination of the fears which have occupied the [sic] minds since the publication of the report of the Royal Commission. We still place the greatest trust in their justice and equity, and do not despair of that justice and moderation which we are accustomed to find in them. We have witnessed this in the statement of policy which they made on the 4th Dhul Qada (the 5th January, 1938), and trust that this may be the beginning of good and happiness for all.

In conformity with our policy of firm friendship, we are ready to do our utmost to try to induce important and influential persons in Palestine to use the present opportunity to establish their case a second time in a practical manner, and to convince the commission of the justice of their claims, and to ask in the name of justice that their country should not be taken from them nor the Jews allowed to take possession of it in various ways. We refrain, however, from proceeding with our intention to exert our influence in order to induce them to be quiet and calm, until the British Government have taken some steps to improve the electric atmosphere and to convince them (the population) that they mean them no harm, lest this attempt of ours should fail now that the people of Palestine have been disappointed in the hopes which they founded on the advice we gave them, more especially if we take into consideration the fact that their intense fear finds justification in the ambitions and hopes published by the Jews.

It seems to us, therefore, that the wise policy which our friend Great Britain should follow in dealing with this problem consists of two parts:—

- (1) Measures to be adopted in order to lighten hearts and eliminate doubt and suspicion before the final policy is adopted for the solution of the problem, in order that the new commission may be able to work in a tranquil atmosphere full of mutual confidence and trust.
- (2) Measures which will lead to a permanent solution of the Palestine problem, which shall be, as the British Government themselves have said, "just and practicable."

As to the measures in the first category, we do not wish to arrogate to ourselves the right to give advice and guidance to the British Government, being prevented by (knowledge of) their justice and far-sightedness from doing so; but



we believe that it would be for the good of all that the British Government should think over these three suggestions:—

- (a) To stop the immigration of Jews into Palestine until a final solution of the problem is adopted, or at least for two years.
- (b) To stop the sale of land for that period.
- (c) To take preparatory steps for the return of the situation to normal as it was before the declaration of the strike, by lightening the severity of the military courts, allowing the exiles and deportees to return, pardoning the persons who have been imprisoned politically or administratively, and inviting all to co-operate with the new commission and to present to it their complaints and proposals.

As to the question of a permanent solution, we wish to state most emphatically that the principle of partition proposed by the Royal Commission and referred to the new commission for investigation, from the point of view of justice and practicability, does not seem to us a useful solution, and we earnestly hope the new commission will arrive at the same conclusion. We have already transmitted to the British Government in a brief form our opinion as to the solution which seems to us practical and (likely to prove) successful. If they now think that we should make a detailed proposal, we should be delighted to do our best to ascertain the opinion of those persons on whom we rely, and to draw up on that basis a proposal that would satisfy all and remove the difficulties. We wish to assure our friend Great Britain that in this matter we have set their permanent interests before our eyes, and that it is to that end that we have set forth our views.

We have already expressed orally to Sir Reader Bullard, on the 4th and the 15th January, our views on the subject, and what is necessary in the interests of Great Britain and of the relations of Great Britain with Islam and the Arabs.

#### Annex to Enclosure 2.

In paragraph 4 of the despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem, there appears the words:—

"The final decision cannot be taken in merely general terms, and the further enquiry will undoubtedly provide the necessary materials on which, when the best possible scheme has been formulated, to judge of its equity and practicability."

In paragraph 7 there is a passage to the effect that if the British Government consider (any) scheme of partition which is put forward to be practicable and just, they will submit it to the League of Nations.

It is understood from this that any scheme of partition must comprise those two qualities, viz., justice and practicability.

Now we consider that partition cannot be just in any circumstances, and that on several grounds—

- (1) Because the Arabs consider it contrary to the treaties between Great Britain and themselves;
- (2) Because they consider it contrary to all legal and natural principles;
- (3) Because it means introducing into their home an element foreign to them and detaching an important part from it;
- (4) Because, in addition to detaching an important part of the Arab territory, it prepares the way for the driving away of the inhabitants or their gradual destruction;
- (5) Because it is an act without precedent in history, and ignores established historical rights, while recognising imaginary claims having nothing whatever to support them;
- (6) Because it is in its very nature contrary to all principles of justice and equity, whatever justification some foolish Jews, ambitious or seeking notoriety, may bring forward in support of their ambitions.

And not only is the principle of partition unjust, but it cannot in any case be practicable, and that on various grounds—military and strategic, administrative, financial and economic, apart from matters relating to public security, communications, and the possibilities and perils inherent in the establishment of three separate administrations unable to stand by themselves, whose end could not be guaranteed. To this must be added the effect of partition upon the neighbouring countries and the possibility that public order and security may be disturbed and the atmosphere rendered electric and liable to explode.

This deals with the two limited points. As to the other points of view in general, they have been dealt with in the detailed memorandum.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca,  
January 15, 1938.*

[E 1104/10/31]

No. 53.

*Mr. Morgan to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 59.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, February 16, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 49 of the 4th February, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a protest which I have received from the Palestine Defence League of Iraq on the subject of recent events in Palestine.<sup>(1)</sup> I also enclose a translation of a resolution on the same subject, passed in the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th February, which has been transmitted to me through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with the request that I should forward it to you.<sup>(2)</sup>

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I discussed the matter, told me that, although the Government had done, and would continue to do, their best to restrain agitation in Iraq concerning Palestine, they had felt obliged to permit some expression of public anxiety regarding the severity of the measures now being applied to repress lawlessness. He also took the opportunity to renew the hope, already so often expressed, that His Majesty's Government would do their utmost speedily to restore tranquillity, and to put an end to the distressing events which are now causing so much concern to all Arabs.

3. He added that there were Deputies who had wished to make the situation in Palestine the subject of a full debate, but that the Government had resisted this plan, and had arranged that the resolution to which I have referred above should be passed without any opportunity being given to members to make inflammatory speeches.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 1279/1/31]

No. 54.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Morgan (Bagdad).*

(No. 37.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 15, 1938.*

YOUR letter to Mr. Baggallay of the 23rd February: [Proposed statement to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Palestine].

I agree generally.

2. Sir Maurice Peterson may inform Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government realise difficult position in which Iraqi Government no doubt find themselves as result of strength of public feeling in many sections of population over Palestine question, and appreciate their efforts to ensure that this feeling does not manifest itself in objectionable forms. They are sure that Iraqi Government on their side realise difficulties in Palestine which confront His Majesty's Government.

3. With regard to future of mandate, Sir Maurice Peterson may say that, as has been made clear in the House of Commons on more than one occasion, His Majesty's Government adhere to view that a scheme of partition on general lines recommended by Royal Commission appears to offer best and most hopeful

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solution of present deadlock. As regards future procedure, this is summed up in paragraph 7 of white paper of 23rd December. Position might be further explained on lines of Lord Cranborne's conversation with Nuri Pasha on the 24th January (*i.e.*, that "after careful study" &c). Sir M. Peterson might also recapitulate the advantages of partition, if viewed dispassionately, to Arabs as well as Jews, as stated in last chapter of Royal Commission's report.

4. With regard to law and order, Sir Maurice Peterson may say that His Majesty's Government deplore as much as anyone the necessity for severe repressive measures, but that such measures will unfortunately remain necessary so long as there are people who think that their cause can be served by covert rebellion and by murder of innocent persons and similar crimes, and so long as those guilty of such crimes can rely on assistance from many of population. His Majesty's Government do not deny that these measures may occasionally work hardship for other innocent persons, but they ask the Iraqi Government to believe that every care is taken to reduce these hardships to a minimum, and not to believe (or willingly allow others to believe) exaggerated accounts of repression which are spread by those whose obvious interest it is to aggravate an already overwhelmingly difficult situation.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 141; Jedda, No. 42; and Jerusalem, No. 104.)

[E 1730/10/31]

No. 55.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 104.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, March 21, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 44 of the 21st March, I have the honour to inform you that, on the 20th March, I made a verbal communication to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs embodying the substance of your telegram No. 37 of the 15th March.

2. His Excellency appeared much gratified by the receipt of your message, and assured me that the Iraqi Government were above everything anxious not to embarrass His Majesty's Government. He added that public opinion in Iraq was content to leave it to him personally to determine at what moment, and to what extent, further intervention in Palestinian affairs should be attempted. Taufiq Suwaidi went on to say, as reported in my telegram under reference, that while the Iraqi Government had at one time intended to make some additional suggestions to His Majesty's Government, they had now decided to wait for the report of the new commission before taking any further action.

3. Not only was the Minister clearly delighted to have received a message from His Majesty's Government, but he appeared not altogether dissatisfied with the tenor of the communication itself. This, however, did not prevent him from reverting to what he called the "Magnes proposal" (he did not mention Nuri) for the establishment of a permanent Jewish minority in an independent Arab State. Since it seemed to me undesirable to encourage undue optimism, I thought it well to advise the Minister not to allow his hopes to be unduly raised. It was, I said, evident that the final solution of the Palestinian problem could be nothing but a compromise calculated to give satisfaction to none of the parties interested.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 1947/10/31]

No. 56.

*Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 23.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, March 30, 1938.*

I HAD the honour, in my printed despatch No. 21 of the 25th March, to transmit to your Lordship a copy of my note of that date to the French High Commissioner regarding the present press campaign in this country against the British authorities in Palestine and against Great Britain in general.

2. I do not propose, unless you so desire, to trouble you with translations of the enclosures to that note, the nature of which was adequately indicated therein. Suffice to say that, with hardly an exception, the Arabic press of both Beirut and Damascus has since the beginning of this year indulged in a campaign of exaggeration, misrepresentation, and slander in regard to British policy and British authorities in Palestine. Fantastically distorted and enlarged accounts of military operations, usually couched in the form of "communiqués" from gang-leaders under headlines such as "Great Arab victory in Palestine: British troops routed"; oft-repeated allegations of cruelty, wanton destruction, rape, and even sodomy against British troops and officials there; inflammatory leading articles breathing encouragement to terrorists and defiance to Great Britain; all these have appeared with monotonous regularity in the columns of first one, then another of the newspapers of Damascus and Beirut, both Moslem and Christian.

3. Attacks of this nature had been of fairly frequent occurrence since the outbreak of the 1936 troubles, and had been dealt with by the exclusion, or threat of exclusion, from Palestine for a greater or less period of the offending paper, by direct remonstrances to editors, or by representations to the French authorities resulting in the issue by them of warnings, or, in one or two cases, of periods of suspension. The 1938 campaign has, however, surpassed all previous ones in virulence and continuity, largely on account of the productions of the Bureau national arabe, directed by Fakhry Baroudy at Damascus, which was set up in the latter part of 1937 as a result of the Bluden conference of that year. Most of the papers concerned are already excluded from Palestine, and such action as the French could be induced from time to time to take has proved useless. I felt, therefore, impelled to address the High Commissioner in the sense indicated.

4. As a result, M. de Martel asked me to call on him on the 29th March. After rallying me lightly on "reading him a lecture," as he put it, on the subject, he enquired what action I thought he could take. He was always anxious to do what he could to help the Palestinian authorities, as was witnessed by the thanks he had recently received from them for action he had taken on the frontier to control the movements of terrorists. I suggested that the best from our point of view would be if he could instruct the Syrian and Lebanese press to publish no news on Palestine whatsoever, except the communiqués of the Palestine Government. This, he replied, he was quite unable to do under the existing press ordinances. In fact, he had little real control over the press. Warnings and the imposition of short periods of suspension were practically useless: in this I concurred. He then asked why I myself did not send for the editors of offending papers and remonstrate with them: I replied that I had done so on more than one occasion, but without the slightest effect. He went on to say that press campaigns of this nature were endemic in the Near East; he himself had been the object of several in the Palestinian press when troubles had broken out in Syria. I pointed out that the present campaign here far transcended mere personalities, and amounted to a definite incitement to hostility to Great Britain; it was, moreover, producing most regrettable effects. Several Lebanese youths of good family, undoubtedly fired by what they had read in the local press, had recently run away to Palestine and joined the gangs, and one or two had been killed; while in Iraq, as I had recently learnt from an Intelligence report, a similar kind of press campaign against Great Britain had been running of late, the majority of the articles being copied from Syrian papers. I asked, finally, whether his Excellency could not confiscate the monetary guarantees deposited by local newspapers in the event of their giving me cause to complain. This possibility he agreed to examine.

5. The impression I gained from the interview coincided with that I had previously formed, namely, that M. de Martel, while ready to help us in any way which will not bring him into immediate conflict with the politicians of these countries, is not prepared to take any step which is likely to cause the French authorities any trouble. The strength of feeling in this country in favour of the Arab cause, and against British policy, in Palestine has undoubtedly strengthened of late, as is shown by the fact that even the Christian Arab papers of Beirut, the editors of which cannot be expected to have the same sympathy with the Moslems of Palestine as the Moslems of Syria and the Lebanon, have to adopt as violent an attitude on the subject as do the Moslem

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papers if they wish to sell. There is not, I consider, any further action that I can take here to control them; and, apart from any action which your Lordship might find it possible or desirable to take elsewhere, it would seem that the campaign is likely to continue unabated.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.  
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 2206/10/31]

No. 57.

*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 397.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Alexandria despatch No. E 29 of the 2nd April, respecting the Palestine situation.

Cairo, April 8, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 57.

*Consul-General Heathcote-Smith to Sir M. Lampson.*

(No. E 29. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Alexandria, April 2, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 26th March I met Dr. Weizmann, the Jewish leader, and had a most interesting conversation with him regarding the intentions of the Zionists. We met in the house of Baron Felix de Menasce, who was for many years one of the most active Zionists in Egypt.

2. While undoubtedly much of what Dr. Weizmann said is already known in official quarters in London, it is quite possible that he revealed certain new aspects of his intentions. These intentions cannot fail to be of interest and, indeed, of importance, in view of the very determined and, I would almost say, drastic programme he outlines for his more militant co-religionists.

3. Dr. Weizmann first laughed at the idea that the Jews could possibly be deflected from their set purpose. He said he had wished and intended that the partition scheme should go through, and this at the earliest possible moment. He would then arrange that within the briefest space of time there should be 1 million inhabitants in the Jewish State. It was a matter of policy and arithmetic. He would have to abandon the older Jews to their fate in Europe, they must die off as best they may; he wished only for youth. He was resolved to have forthwith 60,000 well-armed, highly trained young Jews as the nucleus of an army which, once the partition scheme had materialised, he would increase to some 300,000 Jewish bayonets. There would be then in Palestine a force so formidable and sufficient that no Arab State would dare to attack them; but more than this, they would be ready to fight for the British Empire. The Jews must win their spurs. He welcomed the idea of a well-equipped, formidable Jewish army fighting for the British. This would involve the British, who have historically proved that they can be grateful, in continuous support of the Jewish cause. Dr. Weizmann declared that, while there were as many as 16 to 17 million Jews in the world—a figure which his chief assistant said might be nearer 25 million if crypto-Jews were not afraid to declare themselves—he would not work for the grant of some big territory for their eventual occupation now, but it would be their hope and ambition to acquire such a territory as soon as the Palestine Jews had won their spurs in battle fighting for the British Empire. At this point he said the Archbishop of Canterbury himself told him that the Jews should have Jerusalem. . . .

4. The picture of the Zionists in Palestine as painted by Dr. Weizmann was that of a Jewish State which at first would be contained within its narrow

borders and whose mission would be to exploit, aid and assist all surrounding Arab countries by the superior intelligence and activity of its inhabitants.

5. Dr. Weizmann did not specifically state, but certainly gave me to understand, that he would feel that the new Jewish State would have failed in its purpose if it did not find some means of extending its borders beyond the limits set out in the partition scheme.

6. Dr. Weizmann said that in June he would go to the United States to work up the 4½ million Jews to form a para-military organisation and to influence the United States not only to side with, but to come in with, Great Britain in the event of a war. He continued: "We in Jewish Palestine, with our comparatively small, but efficient, army, will be ready for anything; we are in a desperate condition, and we realise that the worst may happen to our race. If the whole world goes up in smoke, nothing will be lost if we disappear, but if there is a fight and the democracies win, then not only the Jewish State in Palestine, but the Jews everywhere else, will benefit once a purely Jewish army has fought and rendered real service to the cause of the democracies. After this it will be essential that a really extensive territory be procured and the requisite steps taken to finance and prepare it for the reception of Jews expelled or emigrating from the different countries where they are no longer welcome; and their number may be immense. At present, whenever there is a question of Jews in any large numbers forming a settlement in some foreign country, when escaping from persecution in Europe, at once the frontiers of such a country are closed against them, as recently in Ecuador and elsewhere."

7. Dr. Weizmann was emphatic that, if it were Great Britain that endeavoured to find the territory for the Jews, this territory should not be Tanganyika, as he was convinced that the Germans would, in course of time, recover that former colony of theirs, and then a worse persecution of the Jews would begin. He thought Uganda was a possibility. He would wish to see Palestine become a Dominion at once, and then a further Jewish State elsewhere would be not only a possibility, but even a natural corollary, once Palestine—that is, Jewish Palestine—had reached the status of an independent Dominion.

8. Dr. Weizmann produced the impression of a man very much in earnest, who is ready to go to any length because he recognises that the plight of the Jews in the world is desperate. His host, Baron Felix de Menasce, who was talking to my wife at the time I was conversing with Dr. Weizmann, expressed the same conviction to her in an even more emphatic manner; he said: "Madame, notre race est maudite."

I have, &c.  
C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH.

[E 2250/880/91]

No. 58.

*Sir H. Montgomery to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 205.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at The Hague presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to The Hague telegram to the Foreign Office No. 10 of the 14th April, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 13th April, 1938, respecting the Kamaran quarantine station.

*The Hague, April 14, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 58.

*M. Patijn to Sir H. Montgomery.*

M. le Ministre,

*La Haye, le 13 avril 1938.*

ME référant à la demande que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire oralement un de ces jours, tendant à être renseignée sur le point de vue du Gouvernement de la Reine par rapport à l'adjonction éventuelle d'un médecin italien à l'équipe médicale de la station quarantenaire sur l'île de Kamaran dans la mer

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Rouge, j'ai l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance qu'en principe le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas n'a pas d'objections contre une telle adjonction.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement néerlandais voudrait suggérer que le changement dans la gestion de trois médecins à attacher à la station quarantenaire ne se fasse pas tous les huit mois mais chaque saison, afin de prévenir que deux différents médecins fassent successivement fonctions pendant la même saison de pèlerinage.

Je saisis, &c.

J. PATIJN.

[E 2311/10/31]

No. 59.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 22.)*

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*San'a, April 20, 1938.*

PERMETTEZ-MOI, inspiré par mon plus profond respect envers votre Excellence et ses hautes fonctions, de rappeler à sa dignité très précieuse les demandes réitérées adressées à l'Etat anglais par mon magnanime Souverain l'Imam Yahia, Roi du Yémen, concernant la très regrettable question de Palestine.

2. Cette question intéresse l'Islam entier. Aussi solliciterai-je de votre équité et de votre haute conscience de prendre ce non [*sic*: ? longue] exposé en considération gracieuse.

3. En premier lieu j'ai le devoir de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Imam, Roi du Yémen, comprend les conséquences et les nécessités qui incitent le Gouvernement royal britannique à sauvegarder ses très importants intérêts en Palestine et surtout apprécie son désir de la considérer comme une voie importante pour ses communications ou ses relations avec ses colonies.

4. M'inclinant devant cette nécessité crois-je, cependant, que dans cette question doit être notamment sauvegardé la dignité d'un peuple arabe musulman qui est dressé dans l'indépendance de sa patrie propre, consacrée par des siècles de gloires les plus sacrées, considérée comme la plus précieuse des couronnes joyaux [*sic*] de l'Islam.

5. Il me semble bien juste et acceptable, ou plutôt digne, même nécessaire, pour tous Musulmans ou Chrétiens indigènes de Palestine, qu'une solide et désirable alliance entre la Grande-Bretagne et Palestine soit envisagée comme il en a été pour l'Égypte et l'Irak.

6. En ce qui concerne les Juifs rassemblés en Palestine, Musulmans comme Chrétiens indigènes consentiront sans aucun doute par sentiment d'humanité à les soumettre à la généreuse et équitable surveillance de la Grande-Bretagne, se fiant à sa haute bienveillance, à la condition de donner dorénavant une fin absolue à l'immigration juive en Palestine.

7. De ce qui précède, que l'on envisage la promesse Balfour ou qu'une décision soit prise, même suggérée, par la Société des Nations, je dois sans arrêt dire que promesses ou réalisations ne pourront jamais [*?* comparaitre] comme droits, ni comme ordres divins célestes.

8. Votre Excellence sait mieux que personne combien les décisions des hommes et des États sont instables et soumises à l'épreuve du temps et exposées aux modifications imposées par les nécessités réelles.

9. Il est incontestable que les corrections et les interventions armées contre le peuple arabe musulman indigène de Palestine n'ont abouti aucune fois qu'à des résistances opiniâtres et à des rébellions sanglantes et réitérées. Cela conduit à la ruine inévitable un pays saint et sacré tant pour les Musulmans que pour les Chrétiens.

10. Mon Gouvernement ne pourra pas imaginer ni croire jamais que l'on ose par des massacres systématiques à une substitution des Juifs aux nationaux musulmans, arabes et chrétiens de Palestine, en aboutir à la création d'un État israélite en opposition aux sentiments de tous les peuples chrétiens et musulmans du monde.

11. Mon Gouvernement a toujours sa confiance dans les vertus de la Grande-Bretagne et exprime l'espoir que cette grande nation très respectée ne consentira

jamais à mépriser ni avilir les quatre cent millions de Musulmans répartis sur la terre, sachant en outre qu'une pareille insulte serait aussi universellement ressentie des Chrétiens.

12. J'espère de toute âme que la Grande-Bretagne honorable, maîtresse de la civilisation, ne s'abaissera, ni consentira jamais à inscrire pour son illustre existence une telle page à l'histoire qui ne contient pas de si malheureux et si douloureux exemple.

13. Je crois aussi que la Grande-Bretagne n'a aucun besoin de sacrifier les prestige et droits des nations chrétiennes et musulmanes pour la gloire de devenir la créatrice et protectrice de l'indépendance juive en Palestine arabe.

14. Et si elle voulait elle pourrait à présent établir ailleurs les Juifs en leur créant une patrie dans ses immenses colonies, car rien n'oblige la Grande-Bretagne à se soumettre, contrairement aux intérêts moraux des autres, aux rêves chimères des Israélites et leur édifier un État indépendant à Palestine.

15. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Imam, Roi du Yémen, se fie aux hautes vertus, à l'honneur et à la justice très connue de la Grande-Bretagne et sollicite avec le profond respect, que lui inspire le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre, de reconnaître et respecter les droits des peuples musulmans et ceux des Chrétiens indigènes de Palestine, et permettre, par sa haute grâce, d'autoriser à retourner dans leur patrie les exilés absolument innocents de toutes prétendues mauvaises actions.

16. En transmettant à votre Excellence la suggestion qu'exprime ma dépêche présente, et la priant de bien vouloir y prêter sa bienveillante attention, j'ai l'honneur, M. le Ministre, d'être, de votre Excellence, le très humble et très obéissant serviteur, Mohamed Raghib, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Yémen

[E 2362/10/31]

No. 60.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 151.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, April 11, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 104 of the 21st March, I have the honour to report that during a recent debate on the budget estimates for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, several Deputies spoke at length on the situation in Palestine.

2. The most outstanding speech was that of Rustam Haidar who, after opening with appreciative allusions to the value to Iraq of her alliance with Great Britain, went on to deplore the course taken by British policy in Palestine. It was, he said, impossible to understand why His Majesty's Government should persist in their present policy in the face of the acute and widespread dissatisfaction which it had aroused throughout the Arab world. Some Englishmen sought to attribute Britain's championship of Zionism to humanitarian motives, but such explanations were incompatible with the work of bloodshed and destruction now going on in the birthplace of Jesus, the messenger of love and peace. No, the true reason for British policy was gold and the great influence which gold exercised throughout the world.

3. In the British Parliament, Palestine was constantly the subject of debate. How much more necessary and natural it was, he said, that this sad question should be discussed in the Iraqi Parliament. He hoped that the voice of the representatives of the Iraqi people would often be raised in the Chamber in support of the cause of their brothers in Palestine. Iraq's friendship with Great Britain made it desirable that they should speak frankly and point out the evil consequences to which the present state of affairs would lead. Rustam Haidar was loudly applauded by the Chamber.

4. Another speaker who made an impression was Ali-al-Immam. He said that the calamitous situation in Palestine had for several years been the subject of much talk and many protests and urgent representations, but all this had failed in any way to influence British policy. It would seem, therefore, that they must conclude that might was right whether it was the might of arms or of gold, and he wondered whether further speeches would be of any use unless they were backed by force. Perhaps the best course would be for Iraq to work out a solution

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in consultation with the other Moslem States and then to press the British Government to adopt it.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in winding up the debate cautioned the Chamber against violent speeches and reminded members of the unhappy effect which such speeches might have on the international relations of Iraq. As regards the Government's policy concerning Palestine, he recalled his own speech at Geneva last year and assured the House that the Government had not ceased to make representations to the British Government with a view to protecting the interests of the Arabs in Palestine.

6. The debate has been extensively reported in the press and has naturally provoked articles which echo the sentiments expressed in the Chamber.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2324/10/31]

No. 61.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 166.)

My Lord.

Bagdad, April 20, 1938.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 69 of the 20th April, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the memorandum handed to me by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th April.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jerusalem and Jedda.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 61.

*Memorandum communicated by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

AS His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is well aware, the question of Palestine has been occupying the attention of the Royal Iraqi Government. It will be remembered that his Excellency Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of the Royal Commission's Report on Palestine a few days before its official publication. Having studied that report, the Iraqi Government could not find in it anything which might help to realise the hopes entertained by the Arab and Islamic world, since the report did not go beyond the scope of partition and the measures to be taken for its enforcement.

2. His Britannic Majesty's Government are no doubt aware of the effect which the events in Palestine are having upon the whole of the Arab and Islamic world. The continuance of those events is intensifying a feeling of resentment and animosity. This is not in harmony with the traditional friendship which the noble people of Great Britain is known to have for Arabs and Islam, and is not in harmony with the benefits sought by the Iraqi Government from that friendship, which is in the interests of both Iraq and His Britannic Majesty's Government, especially in such times as the world is facing to-day.

3. The Government of Iraq are constantly receiving communications in the form of telegrams, letters and petitions from prominent Arab personalities and from various Arab and Islamic institutions, requesting that the Iraqi Government should use their good offices for the solution of the Palestinian problem. In view of the fact that the Iraqi Government are bound to their ally, Great Britain, by the closest ties of friendship and alliance, and are similarly bound to the Arab countries by racial and religious ties, they are exceedingly anxious that amicable and friendly relations shall continue to grow on a firmer basis between their ally, Great Britain, on the one hand, and the whole of the Arab and Islamic world on the other hand; for such friendly relations are calculated to be in the interest of

both sides. As for Palestine itself, that country is in the eyes of all Arabs and Islam the most sensitive part of the Arab world, because any events which may take place there are bound, sooner or later, to produce repercussions in all Arab and Islamic countries. This is amply evidenced by the excitement in those countries which usually follows events in Palestine and the difficulties experienced by those countries in allaying such excitement.

4. The Iraqi Government have in consequence always watched the course of events in Palestine with anxiety, and fervently hope, as the ally of His Britannic Majesty's Government, that an end will be put to the periodical disturbances in Palestine, and that a solution will be found consistent with the interests, rights and political existence of the Arabs of Palestine, who are the legitimate inhabitants of that country, so that in that way the friendship of the Arab world may be preserved.

5. His Britannic Majesty's Government recognise that the case of Palestine, which is an Arab country detached from the Ottoman Empire in the same way as other Arab countries were detached, cannot be dealt with except by the method by which the cases of those Arab countries were solved. The question of a Jewish National Home was not originally a part of the Palestinian problem, and, according to the principles of right and logic, it cannot be so considered; and it is further to be observed that its existence has been the cause of insecurity and grave anxiety throughout the whole period.

6. None the less, Britain's obligations towards Zionism, which are embodied in the Balfour declaration and in the terms of the mandate, do not contain any obligation for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine or the allocation of a part of that country to the Jews. Those obligations only provide for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. In the statements made in 1922 by Mr. Churchill, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the British Government had interpreted the Jewish National Home in a way which was very remote from an interpretation leading eventually to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine or the allocation of a part of that country to the Jews. This interpretation had in fact confined the meaning of the national home to a centre of culture of which the Jews would be rightly proud.

7. The Balfour declaration, the terms of the mandate, the interpretation of 1922, and all the official statements and declarations subsequently made by the British Government have contained clear references to the fact that the establishment of the national home will not be harmful or prejudicial to the rights of the inhabitants of Palestine, and will not alter their political status or position. In their report of 1937 the Royal Commission have admitted that the British Government have done what is necessary for the fulfilment of their obligation towards the Jews: thus the Jews have in Palestine at present a prominent cultural position owing to their growth in numbers and the establishment of purely Jewish colonies, towns, institutions, councils, schools, societies and other activities. All this was accomplished at the expense of the Arabs, who are the inhabitants of the country, and contrary to the declarations made and undertakings given to the effect that the national home will not be harmful or prejudicial to the rights of the Arabs, the inhabitants of Palestine, or to their status and position: thus the proportion of the Arab inhabitants has fallen from 91 per cent. to 71 per cent., and they have been deprived of the national self-government enjoyed by their brothers in other Arab countries.

8. The mandate system is temporary, and the British Government has recently declared that it is time to terminate the mandate over Palestine, and that the inhabitants of Palestine are as fit to govern themselves as their brothers of Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the termination of the mandatory régime in the same way as it was terminated in Iraq and is about to be terminated in Syria, and the restriction of the Jews to the limit which they have reached in fulfilment of Britain's obligations to them, will be hailed with satisfaction by public opinion in all Arab countries.

9. The lands owned by the Jews form only one-twentieth part of the aggregate total of the area of Palestine. As these lands are not adjacent to each other, the establishment of a State with a minimum political and economic foundation and workable political and economic frontiers is not within the bounds of possibility. Moreover, the presence of Arabs within the narrow confines of the proposed Jewish State will be a source of continued anxiety and troubles between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews and likewise between Arabs in general and



Jewry; this would be the natural consequence of the economic competition which takes place in such a narrow environment. If it were to be admitted for the sake of argument that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is possible, nevertheless it will not solve the Jewish problem, but will make it more complicated, first, because all of Palestine will not be large enough to absorb the Jews who may desire to immigrate and settle there, and, second, because of the international difficulties which it will create.

10. Furthermore, the Arabs of Palestine and of the neighbouring Arab countries, on the north, south and east, rightly see in a Jewish political entity in Palestine a national, social and economic danger in the face of which they cannot stand with folded hands. They consider that the insistence on the creation of such a political entity will cause grave anxiety and concern to present and future generations of both Arabs and Jews without solving for the Jews even a part of their problems, and that, in addition to the harm it causes, it will be a fresh factor in aggravating the problem of world Jewry.

11. Therefore, the action of His Britannic Majesty's Government in resorting to this idea without any regard to the interests and sentiments of the Arabs of the various countries would tend to affect the traditional friendship known to exist between the British Government and the Arab people. Moreover, the establishment in a part of the Arab world of a Jewish State in spite of the Arabs and in spite of the threat to their interests, unity and existence which they feel its dangers involve, must lead to hostile relations between Arabs and Jews in the various Arab countries where the Jews have been, and are still, enjoying perfect peace and protection. Such a state of affairs would always tend to endanger security and stability in the Arab countries of the Orient, and would not be in the interest of the Arabs, or of Britain, or even of the Jews themselves.

12. A great number of prominent Jews have realised the danger to the Jews of the plan of partition and the difficulties and crises it will lead to. They are therefore opposing the plan and demanding that the solution of the Palestinian problem should be based on an understanding with the Arabs.

13. The essential point is that the Palestinian problem is an Arab problem. It should therefore be solved accordingly, and on the precedent set in the cases of Iraq and Syria. The treaty under which the mandate would be terminated will naturally embody explicit provisions guaranteeing—

- (1) The interests of the British Empire.
- (2) The safety, the protection and the freedom of the Holy Places.
- (3) The rights and the position of the Jews, as a minority, living in Palestine.

14. The Iraqi Government earnestly hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the good relations and mutual interests by which they are linked with the Arab world, will take the contents of this note into consideration, and will appreciate the soundness of the Arab point of view, which does not exceed the bounds of right and equity.

[E 2440/10/31]

No. 62.

*Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 28.)*

(No. 183.)

My Lord,

*Angora, April 22, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs returned, on the 18th April, to Angora from Egypt, via Beirut and Aleppo. On the following day, in the course of a conversation with the counsellor of this Embassy, Dr. Aras spoke to him of Palestine.

2. He said that, before his journey to Egypt, the Palestinian question had interested him very little. In Egypt, however, he had found it a very live issue, and had given it some thought. As a result, he had spoken to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo and had expressed his views that partition was the best solution of the Palestinian problem. His Majesty's Government could make partition more palatable to Arabs by pointing out to them that the limitation of Jews in Palestine to their own area, and their exclusion from the Arab

area, meant, in effect, a restriction of Jewish immigration into Palestine, as there would be a smaller portion of Palestine available than at present for absorption of Jews. At the same time, His Majesty's Government could gild the pill of partition for the Arabs by promising them help to make themselves self-supporting, and to attain prosperity. The Arabs would thus have cause to bless British guidance and help.

3. On leaving Egypt, Dr. Aras sailed to Beirut, where the warmth of his reception by the population, and the goodwill manifested by them to his country and himself, genuinely surprised him. When younger, he had lived for a considerable time in Beirut and numerous old friends came to see him. Among these was Samih Farouhar (? Fakhoury), a relative of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who spoke with pride of his share in the campaign in Palestine, and foreshadowed a relentless continuation of the struggle. Dr. Aras told him plainly that he was following the wrong course, and that the only result of the heroism of himself and of his comrades would be a Palestinian people reduced to misery and despair. His campaign would lead him and his fellow Arabs nowhere.

4. Samih Farouhar asked for Dr. Aras's advice. Dr. Aras said: "Plump for partition! Take advantage of the arrival of the new commission to co-operate with them, and to obtain the most advantageous partition possible. By partition, Jewish immigration into Palestine will be effectively reduced, for it will be directed to a small part of Palestine only, and not to the whole."

"But," said Samih Farouhar, "we lose the coast."

"No matter," said Dr. Aras, "you are still too backward economically to be able to make effective use of the coast."

"What about the Arabs left in Jewish areas? Should they stay?"

"Yes," replied Dr. Aras, "let them stay! Should proposals be made later for their transfer to Arab areas, let them secure satisfactory compensation for so doing. In any case, my general advice is that you should accept partition, and make it a condition of co-operating with His Majesty's Government that Great Britain should help to raise the Arabs of Palestine to higher levels, and put them in the way of prosperity."

5. Samih Farouhar interjected that Dr. Aras's advice was practically identical with that given by Nuri Pasha Es Said (who, incidentally, had also called on Dr. Aras), with the difference that Dr. Aras's advice was backed by the prestige of the Turkish Government. Dr. Aras, on this, emphasised that he was speaking in the name of Turkey, and that Turkey was Britain's friend. He believed that if his advice was followed, there would eventually be a happy and prosperous Arab people in Palestine living in its own frontiers.

6. Samih Farouhar, said Dr. Aras, was much impressed by Dr. Aras's words, and, having come to the interview resolved to continue the fighting in Palestine, went away thoughtful, with something new to reflect on. He asked if he could repeat to the Grand Mufti the counsels given him by Dr. Aras. The latter urged him to do so, and to emphasise that Turkey was England's friend.

7. The counsellor to this Embassy congratulated Dr. Aras on his efforts in the cause of Palestinian peace and expressed the opinion that the Grand Mufti would take to heart Dr. Aras's advice because of the prestige which Turkey enjoyed among the Moslems in Syria and in Palestine and because of Dr. Aras's affirmation of Anglo-Turkish friendship.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and to the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAIN.

[E 2780/10/31]

No. 63.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, April 21, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith in translation a letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its enclosure, viz., the memorandum from Ibn Saud about Palestine, whose receipt I reported to you in my telegram No. 89, dated the 20th April. It will be seen that the second paragraph of the



memorandum contains an explanation, amounting almost to an apology, about the misinterpretations placed upon the silence which Ibn Saud has preserved on the subject of Palestine, and the attempts, "which may or may not be well-intentioned," to place him in an awkward position before the Arabs and other Moslems of the world. I have no doubt that it was with extreme reluctance that the King consented to participate in this joint appeal, and that if the action is made known it will not be through Saudi sources. There is internal evidence that parts at least of the memorandum were drafted in Saudi Arabia and not at Bagdad; in one or two places in particular it has required some ingenuity to knit up the loose construction of the original.

2. The memorandum uses the old argument that partition "will not settle the Jewish world problem, since Palestine could not absorb the Jews scattered about the world." Ibn Saud used this argument in the course of the interview which I had with him on the 4th January, and he now repeats it in spite of the protest I made on that occasion (see paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 1, dated the 5th January), "against the error of believing that Palestine was ever intended by His Majesty's Government to be used as a dumping-ground for all the poor or persecuted Jews of Europe."

3. I have acknowledged receipt of the memorandum and have informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that I am transmitting it to His Majesty's Government by the first opportunity.

4. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 63.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

*Mecca, April 20, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the memorandum which I have been charged by His Majesty the King to communicate to the British Government in his name, in the hope that you will forward it to the proper destination.

FAISAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 63.

*Memorandum respecting Palestine.*

HIS Majesty the King has explained to the British Government on several occasions, in the name of the friendship which exists between him and them, his views and feelings about the Palestine question, but in spite of his explanations His Majesty sees that the situation in Palestine continues to go from bad to worse, and that, on the other hand, the British Government continue to persist in their policy of establishing a state for the Jews in Palestine and bringing about a condition of affairs which will make the Jews a majority there. His Majesty, however, in spite of all the incidents which he has seen, still feels such confidence in the well-known love of the British people and the British Government for right and justice, that he has not completely lost hope that the British Government will reconsider their position with a view to changing the policy which they have adopted in this sacred Moslem Arab land, which has never committed any crime against Great Britain.

2. His Majesty has been and is still exposed not only to the action of his own feelings, but also to criticisms from Arabs and Moslems because of his silence about the Palestine question. He feels that the spirit of friendship between him and the British Government compel him to bear these criticisms patiently, on account of the obligations of friendship and also of the demands of policy which require him to adopt an attitude of concealment and not to reveal what is between him and the British Government in regard to the Palestine question; but there are certain movements, which may or may not be well-intentioned, which are

designed to place the King in a difficult position before the Moslem and Arab world in this connexion.

3. His Majesty wishes to take this opportunity to appeal to the British Government, in the name of the friendship which binds them to the Arabs, and in the name of that justice and right for which the British people are well known, to reconsider the Palestine question with the eye of justice and equity, and to place themselves in the position of those poor weak people whom it is desired to split up, whose country is to be divided, and who against their will are to be replaced by a people who will humiliate them, and will threaten neighbouring countries and be a menace to peace in the Arab East. His Majesty the King wishes to record once more his opinion that the solution by which Palestine is to be divided and its population split up into pieces will not settle the Jewish world problem, since Palestine could not absorb the Jews scattered about the world; and that Palestine would be a centre for disturbances and troubles apart from the eternal hostility between Arabs and Great Britain to which this policy would give birth.

4. The Palestine question cannot be solved justly, except in the manner in which the Iraq and Syrian questions have been solved, viz., in a manner which safeguards three points:—

- (1) The protection of British interests.
- (2) The protection of the holy places.
- (3) The protection of the rights of the Jews at present in the country, and their treatment as a minority therein.

5. As to the régime of violence and severity with which the poor weak population of Palestine are being treated at present, it is abhorrent to the feelings, and His Majesty urges the attention of the British Government to the advisability of the use of clemency and wisdom in what is going on, and he hopes that this appeal of his will be effective with the British Government, who, he feels confident, will receive his advice in all sincerity and friendship.

[E 2914/10/31]

No. 64.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 19.)*

(No. 217.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, May 13, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 79 of the 9th May last, I have the honour to submit the following report on the events which took place in Bagdad on the 12th May, which was observed in Iraq as the first day of Palestine week, as well as the birthday of the Prophet.

2. A large gathering assembled in the Haidar Khanah mosque at 4.30 P.M. After prayers for the martyrs of Palestine and for the triumph of the Arab cause, the meeting was addressed by the general secretary of the Palestine Defence League. He opened with a highly-coloured account of the tyranny and ruthlessness with which the British authorities in Palestine were treating the Arabs, and concluded by declaring that only two courses now remained open to the Arabs: to organise a boycott of all British and Jewish goods or to declare a Holy War. Others followed with similar speeches. The meeting ended with the reading out of the protest which it was resolved to send to the Technical Commission in Palestine and to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem. A translation of this protest is enclosed herein.

3. A procession was then formed, which marched from the mosque to the North Gate shouting slogans and carrying banners bearing various inscriptions. Some of these were: "Down with the Balfour Promise!" "Down with Zionism!" "Arabia must not be Divided!" "Long Live Palestine Free and Arab!" Up to the present it does not appear that any disorder occurred.

4. To-day, at the midday services, special prayers will again be read for the martyrs of Palestine.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and to the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.



Enclosure in No. 64.

*Translation of a Resolution passed by a Public Meeting at Bagdad  
on May 12, 1938.*

THOUSANDS of demonstrators protest most strongly against the scheme for the partition of Palestine and against the barbarous acts which are now being committed by the authorities in Palestine. They solemnly pledge themselves to God on this sacred day of the birthday of the Prophet to confound any scheme which may harm Holy Palestine. They are ready, if necessary, to march under the banner of *Jihad* to deliver their brave Palestinian brothers. The Palestine Defence League and all its branches throughout Iraq, which represent fully the public opinion of this country, warn the British Government of the disastrous consequences to which their present policy will lead.

[E 3034/10/31]

No. 65.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir L. Oliphant.—(Received May 24.)*

(No. 2/7/89. Private and Confidential.)

Dear Oliphant,

Beirut, May 17, 1938.

IN August 1936 Furlonge sent, on instructions, a memorandum dealing with the repercussions in the Lebanon of the situation in Palestine (his despatch No. 81 of the 14th August, 1936). Since that time no comprehensive report on the subject has been furnished from this post. The change in feeling here has, however, been so striking during the last few months that I feel I should make you aware of it by submitting to you the enclosed revised memorandum, which, as I have not been asked for it, I do privately. I cannot, of course, speak for more than my own district; but, because all I see and hear convinces me that the opinions attributed in this report to the various sections of Lebanese are not peculiar to the Lebanon, but are felt, more or less strongly, in all Near Eastern Arab countries, I feel I should try and portray to you the situation in which we find ourselves for what appears to be our constant refusal to grant to the Arabs even the smallest satisfaction to their insistent demands.

Amongst the Moslem Arabs especially there is a deep and genuine feeling of resentment which may well develop into hatred of ourselves and all our works.

Another thing that I observe here is that, although the terrorist campaign in Palestine is not approved by the more enlightened Lebanese Arabs, yet behind that campaign exists a unity of Arab sentiment against the idea of Jewish domination over any part of Palestine. The goal of this sentiment, which has largely been founded on fear of eventual Jewish domination, is the cessation for a period of years of further Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Arabs feel that if they could attain that objective calm would be immediately restored and a breathing-space obtained in which, if Allah wills, some equitable régime for the future will be established.

Yours ever,

G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 65.

*Memorandum on Lebanese Opinion on the Palestine Situation.*

(Confidential.)

A REPORT from this post, dated the 14th August, 1936, described the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine as being at that time "unpopular with all, and hated by many," sections of Lebanese opinion, though it was added that no positive action was likely to result from this feeling.

2. Lebanese opinion on the Palestine situation has developed much for the worse, from the British point of view, since that time. The development has been

most marked since the inauguration by the British authorities in October 1937 of more vigorous repressive measures against the Palestine dissidents, measures which, as will be shown later, have created a most unfortunate impression here.

3. All Lebanese feelings on this head have, moreover, been assiduously exploited by the local press, which (in the words of a recent report from this post) has since the beginning of 1938 "indulged in a campaign of exaggeration, misrepresentation and slander in regard to British policy and British authorities in Palestine. Fantastically distorted and enlarged accounts of military operations, usually couched in the form of 'communiqués' from gang leaders under head-lines such as 'Great Arab Victory in Palestine: British Troops Routed'; oft-repeated allegations of cruelty, wanton destruction, rape, and even sodomy against British troops and officials here; inflammatory leading articles breathing encouragement to terrorists and defiance to Great Britain, all these have appeared with monotonous regularity in the columns of first one, then another, of the newspapers of Damascus and Beirut, both Moslem and Christian."

4. An important influence, too, has been the presence in the Lebanon of many Palestinians of good position, not only the avowed enemies of the Palestine Government headed by the Grand Mufti, but also respectable Arabs of moderate opinions who have been obliged to leave Palestine because their lives were in danger from the Arab extremists, and the Palestine authorities were clearly incapable of protecting them. The stories related by these persons have had an unsettling effect and given the general impression that a Government policy which produces these results cannot be other than wrong.

5. Trade disturbance between this country and Palestine has likewise been a contributory factor. The volume of trade exchanges actually increased in 1937, as compared with 1936, although at a slower rhythm, but since the beginning of this year appears to have notably declined, while the difficulties experienced in concluding sales of property in Palestine and the dangers attendant on travelling in that country have gravely prejudiced the interests of an important class here.

6. Lebanese opinion is not, of course, unanimous on the subject of Palestine any more than on anything else. Three main trends are, as before, observable: those of the Christians, the moderate Moslems and the extreme Moslems.

7. The Christians form an absolute majority in the Lebanon, and, under present conditions, have a preponderating influence, which would last so long as the French remain in the country. They, on the whole, are chiefly affected by the disturbance to trade caused by the disturbed condition of Palestine. But there is no doubt that a large, and increasing, proportion of them are shocked and deeply moved by what they hear and read relative to events in Palestine; and of these, not only the manufactured or distorted newspaper accounts of atrocities and tortures, but the substantiated facts of executions, imprisonments, searches and destruction of houses, the last of which in particular has created the worst possible impression in their minds. They have not the same religious and racial affinities with the Palestinian Arabs as have the Moslems; but they feel quite genuinely that a great wrong is being done to a neighbouring people with whom they have much in common, and they resent profoundly the policy which is, in their opinion, perpetuating that wrong.

8. All Lebanese Moslems are, naturally, heart and soul with their Palestinian brethren. They feel, even more strongly than the Christians, all that the latter feel regarding the military and civil measures of repression. But in addition they object, almost passionately, to the present line of British policy. The Royal Commission's report was, on the whole, well received by them: they admitted the justice of its facts and conclusions. The partition recommendations are, however, anathema to them, including as they do the abandonment to an alien race of a portion of the land which they regard, rightly or wrongly, as having belonged to their fathers and putting an end to their dream of an Arab federation embracing all Palestine and Syria. From the first, they say, they have feared, and protested with every means in their power against, Jewish domination of Palestine or any part of it, and they affirm that nothing short of military force exerted permanently will make their Arab brethren accept it.

9. The more moderate Moslems never lose sight of the fact that they may some day be in need of Great Britain, either to support their independence or to resist foreign aggression, and they regret bitterly that they are forced to be hostile to her now. To them her policy seems incomprehensible; for, they say, she may some day soon have need of the Arabs, yet she is recklessly alienating them for



the sake of a Palestine scheme which will not even begin to solve the Jewish problem in Europe.

10. As for the more extreme Moslems, who are not numerous, they claim that only force on the part of the Arabs brought His Majesty's Government to the point of sending a Royal Commission, and only more force can compel her to drop the hated partition plan and take at last to some positive action to redress the grievances of the Palestinian Arabs.

11. Concrete action in favour of the Palestinian Arabs has, in the Lebanon, been confined to almost negligible proportions: a few youths enlisted in the armed bands, a little money collected, some arms run. The French control the country far more completely than they control Syria, and in consequence the Lebanese Government's attitude has remained strictly correct and is likely to continue so. The bulk of the people are, besides, too spineless to carry words into action.

12. Nevertheless, the growth of anti-British feeling here has already led to one wholly deplorable result, the press campaign, referred to above, which, owing to the comparatively high standard of Lebanese journalism, has already resulted in induced press campaigns, largely based on articles copied from Beirut newspapers, in Iraq and elsewhere. As a centre for anti-British action the Lebanon is negligible. As a centre for anti-British propaganda, stiffening the attitude of all other Arab countries against British policy in Palestine, and ultimately against Great Britain herself, the Lebanon is already dangerous, and may well become more so if Arab sentiment is not to be appeased.

Beirut, May 16, 1938.

[E 2955/10/31]

No. 66.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).*

(No. 1138.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1938.*

WITH reference to my predecessor's despatch No. 106 of the 31st January last, I have to inform your Excellency that the counsellor of the French Embassy called here on the 20th May, to announce the action taken by the French Government as a result of the request which I made to M. Bonnet on the 29th April, during the Anglo-French conversations, that he would move the French Minister concerned to assist in curbing the activities of Haj Amin-el-Husseini at Beirut (see p. 36 of the record of the Anglo-French conversations).

2. M. Cambon stated that further instructions had, in accordance with my request, been sent to the French High Commissioner in Syria. These instructions, which were dated the 9th May, were admittedly of a rather general nature: but my request had itself been couched in very general terms. Moreover, the French Government did not feel able to take any very drastic action against the ex-Mufti without making a martyr of him, and thereby exposing themselves to criticism, in Parliament and elsewhere. Thus, they did not feel that they could put the ex-Mufti in prison, or prevent him from receiving visitors. The instructions to Comte de Martel had simply informed him of my request, reminded him of his previous instructions to supervise Haj Amin's activities, and requested him to redouble his efforts in this connexion. M. Cambon suggested that if His Majesty's Government wished to bring any point of detail to the French High Commissioner's notice, to supplement these instructions, this might be done through His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

3. M. Cambon was thanked for this account of the action which his Government had taken. It was true that the ex-Mufti's political activities and plots had been causing His Majesty's Government some concern and the French Government's action would, it was thought, be very helpful.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 1237/1237/25]

No. 67.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 10, 1938.*

YOUR despatch No. 86 [of 1st May: Ibn Saud's connivance in supplying munitions to Palestine rebels].

It is vitally important to stop all channels by which fresh supplies of munitions can reach Palestine rebels.

2. Unless you see objection, you should, in continuation of your former communication, inform Saudi Arabian Government that Palestine Government have received further reports from various sources in Syria and Iraq that Palestine rebels have had good reason recently to count on Ibn Saud's practical assistance, including financial assistance, and the purchase of munitions in Europe, ostensibly for despatch to Saudi Arabian Government, but in reality for Palestine Arabs; that persistence of these reports cannot be ignored by His Majesty's Government, who out of friendship are compelled to bring them to Ibn Saud's notice in case those persons of ulterior motives to whom Ibn Saud has already referred are seeking to discredit him or involve him without his knowledge.

3. For your own information, it is thought here that communication of this nature, referring to "sources in Syria and Iraq," may serve to strengthen Ibn Saud's conviction of lack of secrecy in Syria and that he will accept suggested source of our information without suspicion, and, as a result, may materially reduce the volume of his support. If this result is obtained it will seriously embarrass the rebels.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 229.)

[E 3791/10/31]

No. 68.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 116. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, June 6, 1938.*

YOUR secret telegram No. 72, dated the 26th May, informs me of an arrangement by the party of the Mufti, apparently with the consent of Ibn Saud, to purchase in Germany ammunition nominally for the Saudi Arabian Government but in reality for the insurgents in Palestine. This compels me to change the opinion I held in regard to the alleged attempt to smuggle arms and ammunition into Palestine from Jauf (reported to me in Palestine telegram No. 75, dated the 27th April), which was that there would be no smuggling of arms at present with Ibn Saud's connivance, and that it could hardly take place without his knowledge; and that if Ibn Saud eventually decided to support the Palestine Arabs otherwise than by giving private advice to His Majesty's Government, the change of policy would take some more public form. I have reported on more than one occasion that Ibn Saud seemed unable to believe that His Majesty's Government would persist to the end in their partition policy, and although little has happened during the last few months to encourage this belief it seemed probable that he would at least await the recommendations of the second Royal Commission before changing his policy of neutrality. An apologist for Ibn Saud might argue that to assist the insurgents with arms and ammunition, secretly, is no worse than to subscribe to insurgent funds, as many highly-placed Moslems in Iraq and Egypt have done, and that his conduct still compares very favourably with that of the authorities in Syria, or even in Iraq. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to ignore any sign that Ibn Saud is giving the insurgents concrete help, and I have been going over the history of the last few months with the object of assessing the forces which may be tending to induce Ibn Saud to abandon his traditional policy of friendship towards His Majesty's Government.

2. In the matter of Palestine, Ibn Saud, like other Moslems, is not only under the stress of political events, but is influenced by the dislike and suspicion of the Jews which is inculcated by the Moslem religion. In the first of the two enclosures to this despatch, I have given excerpts from despatches sent from this post during the last year or so, illustrative of Ibn Saud's personal attitude towards the Jews, and above them I have placed a quotation from Mr. Philby's first book:

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"Ibn Saud in his more confidential moods will readily confess to an intense dislike for the Jews." This dislike was not created by the Zionist policy of His Majesty's Government, which, at the time to which Mr. Philby's book relates, consisted of nothing more than the little-understood Balfour Declaration, but was the natural feeling of a man soaked in the precepts of the Koran, which are full of hostility towards the Jews. The observer, who is neither Moslem nor Jew, may well consider Muhammad's treatment of the Jews as a black page in his career, and may feel, when Moslems allege that the Jews have designs on Medina and Khaibar, that the allegation is a symptom of a guilty conscience; but however that may be, the fact must be faced that the Moslem who hates the Jew does so on the highest authority he knows.

3. In the second enclosure I have listed in chronological order the events from the beginning of December, which might be expected to influence Ibn Saud's attitude. It was always realised that the final decision of His Majesty's Government as to the eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia in the Qatar region could not fail to disappoint and anger Ibn Saud, and for that reason it was postponed as long as possible. In the end the decision reached him at an unfortunate moment, as the other events in my list will show, and what was still more unfortunate was the discovery that he had read in a sense favourable to his own claims a letter written in September 1935, which is admitted to have been worded ambiguously, and which will, I fear, have made him suspect the honesty of His Majesty's Government. Ibn Saud was, therefore, not in the best mood for the examination of the despatch about Palestine, which was published on the 5th January. It is true that the despatch held out some vague hopes, from Ibn Saud's point of view, in particular in implying, as he thought, that His Majesty's Government would only go on with the partition scheme if proposals could be put before them which could be considered both practicable and equitable (an impossibility in his opinion); but little occurred to support his hopes, and I have no doubt that all the time he was examining the despatch in the light of his suspicion that His Majesty's Government are dominated by the Jews in regard to their Palestine policy. It is true that Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement about the Weizmann interview had been communicated to him, but the report of the interview was in accordance with his prejudices, and will not have been completely effaced by the repudiation. Moreover, Ibn Saud will have learned very speedily of the resolution carried unanimously by the Executive Council of the Zionist Federation on the 29th December, which protested against any attempt to impose a minority status upon the Jews in Palestine or "artificial" restrictions upon Jewish immigration, affirmed the right of the Jews to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, and suggested that the Jewish State should eventually have a place within the framework of the British Empire. Nor will the public references to the second Royal Commission have given him much comfort, since they tended to minimise its functions and to suggest that partition in some form or other was a foregone conclusion. Even the change of High Commissioners in Palestine, which was generally interpreted as foreshadowing a "firmer" policy, must have helped to quench his faint hopes. And all this time, *i.e.*, for some weeks before Pilgrimage Day (9th February) and some weeks after, Ibn Saud must have been subjected to tremendous pressure, supplementing the permanent pressure from the religious leaders of his own people, from Palestinians and Syrians and others who had nominally come to Mecca for the pilgrimage, but in reality to urge Ibn Saud to assist the insurgent movement in some way or other. We can be sure that he was reminded not only of his obligations towards his fellow Moslems, but of the fact that if the partition scheme went through he would probably have his enemy, the Amir Abdullah, as an independent ruler on his Hejaz frontier, and Akaba and Maan would be lost to him for ever. Pressure to induce him to take a public stand for Palestine was also being applied by the Yemen and Iraq Governments, and in the midst of the perplexities resulting from the conflict of all these forces with his earlier policy and instincts, there came the tremendous fact of the annexation of Austria.

4. Ibn Saud would take it for granted that many of the Austrian Jews would now find their way to Palestine, in spite of the declarations of spokesmen of His Majesty's Government that Jewish immigration into Palestine is governed by other considerations than the condition of the Jews in certain European countries, since he knows that it was during the first four years of the Nazi persecution of the Jews that the number of Jews entering Palestine was at its

highest, that the Zionists openly speak of Palestine as an outlet for Jews who are starving or persecuted in their own countries, and that there are many Jews in Palestine who managed to enter in defiance of the elaborate organisation of the mandatory Power. But he might also conclude that the annexation of Austria, and the opening of the Anglo-Italian negotiations, meant a heavy diplomatic defeat for His Majesty's Government, and begin to wonder why he should cling to the losing party, when that party could not even give him satisfaction on the points in which he was vitally interested. It is conceivable that some communication from Germany may have reached Ibn Saud during the first month or two of the year. We know that German investigators were visiting the Near East, and although the one who, according to private information, was to have come to Jeddah, Herr van Beck, one of the early Nazis and a former editor of the *Angriff*, did not, in fact, come, and perhaps never even applied for a Saudi visa, it does not follow that messages were not conveyed to Ibn Saud by pilgrims from Egypt or elsewhere. This, however, is pure speculation.

5. We have, then, a poor case. But we have always had a poor case, and if we remained on good terms with Ibn Saud, that was partly because of the momentum of the past, and partly because of his distrust of Italy, while if even now he has taken no more active part in the Palestine conflict than to try to supply arms and ammunition in secret, most of the credit must go to the Athlone visit, which came as a counterweight at a critical moment. The facts which I reported in my despatch No. 107 dated the 30th May suggest that Ibn Saud has abandoned the attitude of suspicion and dislike which he hitherto maintained towards the Italian air mission. In bringing about the agreement with Italy we have perhaps contributed towards this change of attitude, in diminishing Ibn Saud's fears of Italian penetration. Or it may be that he has begun to ask himself why he should pay more attention to hypothetical encroachment by Italy when Akaba and Maan, Jabal Nakhsh and Khor-al-Odeid, which he regards as his, are in British hands, from which they are unlikely to be detached without the use of force. But it is unlikely, it seems to me, that he will throw himself altogether into the arms of Italy. He is extremely cautious, and he will estimate Italian assurances, like M. Mussolini's proclamation of himself as Protector of Islam, at their true value. Moreover, if the agreement is to be what His Majesty's Government hope it will be, the Arab hopes hitherto encouraged by Italy must be disappointed. Nevertheless, we may expect Ibn Saud to be less cordial than he has been hitherto, and to counteract this tendency we have only one question of importance on which he could perhaps be given some satisfaction—the Hejaz Railway. The disinterested advice which he is receiving from His Majesty's Government on various matters, mostly connected with Iraq, should continue to count in our favour, and to counteract to some extent the fears and suspicions which certain items of British policy in Arab affairs may have aroused.

6. One hesitates to make prophecies in matters so complicated, but I repeat two which I have ventured to make before. One is that no bribe would buy the support of Ibn Saud for the proposal to partition Palestine. The other is that, if a European war should break out, we should have reason to consider ourselves fortunate if Saudi Arabia remained neutral, since we have everything that Ibn Saud would like to have, while the countries likely to be opposed to us have nothing that he covets. What he will do if the partition proposal is confirmed by the present Royal Commission and adopted by His Majesty's Government I do not know, but I believe that he will move slowly and will hesitate to make a complete breach with His Majesty's Government. But he may wink at the passage of armed men into Transjordan to assist the insurgents in Palestine, or even announce openly that he can no longer prevent it. Unfortunately, he is out of our reach for nine months in the year, and the normal means by which a tendency to hostility could be counteracted to some extent—frequent contact with the person responsible for foreign affairs and discussion of the general situation—is closed to us. It is fortunate that Ibn Saud follows the wireless reports closely, and that those of the B.B.C. have a high reputation for accuracy.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



## Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

*Ibn Saud and the Jews.*

FROM *The Heart of Arabia*, by H. St. J. B. Philby (published in 1922, but the passage quoted refers to the period 1917-18), vol. 1, p. 301:—

"But this tolerance towards Jews and Christians, or rather towards Christians alone—for Ibn Saud in his more confidential moods will readily confess to an intense dislike for the Jews—is a recent growth. . . ."

2. From paragraph 21 of the enclosure to Jedda despatch No. 41 dated the 23rd March, 1937:—

"The Arabs were now really alarmed by the Zionist policy. They feared that a Jewish Government would be established in Palestine and would include Transjordan in its scope, and they were even beginning to fear that there might be designs on Medina itself, the burial place of the Prophet Mahomet."

3. From paragraph 8 of Jedda despatch No. 1 dated the 5th January:—

"Ibn Saud ended with a strong diatribe against the Jews. Perhaps a few Arabs might be found who, like King Faisal, would give their assent to the Zionist policy, but with these few exceptions that policy, based as it was on Jewish greed, was hateful to all Arabs. . . . What Ibn Saud cannot understand is the purpose of His Majesty's Government in taking part of an Arab country to give it to the Jews, which is what he considers partition amounts to. Sheikh Yusuf has told me in so many words that the Arabs, the King not excepted, consider that His Majesty's Government are under Jewish dominance; if they do anything the Jews do not like, they are made to withdraw it. Anyhow, Ibn Saud grew quite warm about the Jews and ended by enquiring whether His Majesty's Government could not place them in one of the colonies they were so proud of."

4. From paragraph 3 of Jedda telegram No. 23 dated the 17th January:—

"The hostility of the Arabs to the Jews was based on fear for their honour, religion and even existence, and was enjoined by the Koran. Ibn Saud quoted extensively, e.g., verse 82, chapter 5, which represents the Jews as the worst enemies and the Christians as the best friends of Islam, and said that the Arabs could not understand the alliance of Christian England with the Jews against the Moslems."

5. From a secret memorandum by Ibn Saud, enclosed in Jedda despatch No. 16 dated the 25th January, 1938:—

"They (i.e., His Majesty's Government) are also aware that Palestine enjoys particular respect and importance in that it contains the first of the two qiblas and the third of those holy sanctuaries revered by millions of Moslems who regard it as a religious duty and an important command to combat and fight the Jews and to repel the danger of them from their sacred places and their sanctuary, as is clearly shown in verses of the Koran and traditions of the Prophet which are doubtless well known to the British Government."

## Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

*Programme of Relevant Events from December 1937 to April 1938, inclusive.*

To appreciate these events at their full value it is necessary to remember that throughout this period Ibn Saud was receiving regular news of armed conflict in Palestine and of what anti-British circles describe as British expansion by means of bombing in the hinterland of the Hadhramaut.

1937—

December 4.—British note to Saudi Arabia objecting to prospecting for oil in disputed territory from Saudi side of eastern frontier, and holding out no hope of further concession by His Majesty's Government.

December 19.—Reply in which Saudi Government claim right to prospect in disputed territory, but dispute that of companies from the British side. After much discussion, this claim softened down, but only to point of offering to refrain if His Majesty's Government will do the same.

December 29.—Executive Council of the Zionist Federation pass unanimously a resolution in a sense completely contrary to the policy of Ibn Saud.

1938—

January 3.—Influential Zionist meeting in London, presided over by the Marchioness of Reading, in support of the resolution of the 29th December.

January 4.—Ibn Saud listens in state to the inaugural broadcast of the Arabic news from London, and is thereby informed that an Arab insurgent has been hanged in Palestine.

January 5.—Publication of the colonial despatch defining the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the report of the Royal Commission of 1937.

January 17.—A secret memorandum by Ibn Saud on the question of Palestine is sent to His Majesty's Legation.

January 30.—Fuad Bey learns from His Majesty's Minister, to his obvious consternation, that a letter which was written to him by Mr. Calvert on the 26th September, 1935, did not constitute an assurance that Jabal Nakhsh was not included in the Qatar oil concession.

February 3.—British note to Saudi Arabia adhering to position about eastern frontier and taking for granted that there will be no penetration from Saudi side while giving no corresponding undertaking.

February 5.—Fuad Bey writes to Sir Reader Bullard trying to prove that Mr. Calvert's letter of the 26th September, 1935, did convey an assurance that Jabal Nakhsh was not covered by the Qatar concession.

February 9.—Sir Reader Bullard controverts the arguments advanced in Fuad Bey's letter of the 5th February.

February 9. *Pilgrimage Day*.—The centre of the period of propaganda conducted in Mecca against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine.

February 28.—"Technical" Commission appointed to report about Palestine.

March 11.—The end of Austria.

March 10 to 20 (roughly).—The Yemen and Iraq Governments urging Ibn Saud to take some joint public action with them about Palestine. The Imam also urging him to appeal to Great Britain and Italy to do something about Palestine in the course of their negotiations.

March 15.—Publication of figures of Jewish immigration into Palestine for the next six months.

March 17.—His Majesty's Legation communicate a message in which His Majesty's Government express their regret (the only reference they had been able to make to Ibn Saud's memorandum of the 17th January) that it had not been possible to follow a recommendation of His Majesty that immigration should cease pending the report of the Royal Commission, and assuring him that his views were always regarded by His Majesty's Government with great respect.

April 16.—Anglo-Italian Agreement.

[E 3577/10/31]

No. 69.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).*

(No. 1399.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 28, 1938.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency the accompanying copies of a letter from the Colonial Office<sup>(1)</sup> and of a despatch from the High Commissioner for Palestine<sup>(1)</sup> on the subject of the political activities of Haj Amin-el-Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem, and of other Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon.

2. As you will observe, the Secretary of State for the Colonies is of opinion that the time has come when further and most emphatic representations should be made to the French Government with a view to the removal of Haj Amin from the Lebanon and the exclusion of his chief Palestinian supporters from the French mandated territory.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

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3. This question of further representations to the French Government has been examined by the departments of His Majesty's Government principally concerned, and in order to place you in possession of the points which have received consideration I enclose a record of a discussion which took place at the Colonial Office on the 2nd June and of the resultant interchange of telegrams with the High Commissioner for Palestine.<sup>(1)</sup>

4. In view of the facts and arguments set out in Sir Harold MacMichael's communications, I am satisfied that a serious attempt must now be made to secure the departure of Haj Amin-el-Husseini and his more immediate lieutenants from territory in such close proximity to those northern districts of Palestine which have become the main field of activities of terrorists and rebels inspired, paid, armed and munitioned by the organisation which Haj Amin has been enabled to set up with impunity from his retreat at Djounieh.

5. Full consideration has been given to the suggestions advanced in the enclosed correspondence as regards the actual steps which the French Government might be asked to take with a view to assist His Majesty's Government in this matter. Unquestionably, the ideal solution from the point of view of His Majesty's Government and the Palestine authorities would be that the French should surrender the Mufti to the authorities in Palestine. This would, however, be extradition, not deportation. A person who is being merely deported is always permitted to remove himself voluntarily out of the country to any destination he likes before he is compulsorily deported to his country of origin. The Mufti is, however, unquestionably a political refugee and the Government of Palestine are not in a position to put forward a demand for extradition. I am advised, moreover, that the French Government could not forcibly convey him from Syria to France or other French possession and compel him to reside there against his will, and therefore it would be useless and perhaps only irritating to put forward such a request, which in converse circumstances His Majesty's Government themselves would certainly be obliged to refuse.

6. On the other hand, there is no legal obstacle to the French Government requiring him as a political refugee to seek a residence in some other country, and to informing him that he will be deported forcibly to his country of origin if he does not leave, and that, if he wishes to continue to reside in French territory, he may go to France or some other French possession but he cannot remain in any of the mandated territories in the Levant.

7. I request therefore that, subject to any observations which your Excellency may wish to offer, you will address a communication to the French Government in the sense of the following paragraphs.

8. The attention of the French Government should be recalled to their note of the 5th November, 1937, enclosed in your despatch No. 1279 of the 7th November, 1937. In this communication the French Government volunteered the view that the selection of Djounieh for his residence would, for the reasons stated therein, particularly facilitate surveillance over Haj Amin. They went on to explain in some detail the instructions which had been sent to the High Commissioner at Beirut. These instructions envisaged a strict control over the Mufti's actions, a formal undertaking from him to refrain from political activities (which in effect he is stated to have given in writing), and a clear warning that any failure in this respect would lead eventually to measures of constraint. To the warning implied in this last instruction His Majesty's Government at the time attached, and continue to attach, considerable importance. Finally, the High Commissioner also received instructions that measures should be taken to prevent the regrouping around Haj Amin of dissident elements from Palestine and the re-entry into Syria of such of these as were not then in the French mandated territories. Confident in the assumption that these instructions would be faithfully observed and that the mandatory authorities would see to it that the formal undertaking of Haj Amin was strictly carried out, His Majesty's Government tacitly accepted the situation. They are now compelled to observe with regret that the Mufti has failed to observe his undertakings to refrain from political activities, and has thus rendered himself liable to those further measures of constraint which the French Government envisaged in their note under reference.

9. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs will recall that on several occasions their attention has been drawn to the freedom with which Haj Amin has been able to participate in plots against public security in Palestine. On each such

occasion the Ministry, while explaining the difficulties of the situation—difficulties which His Majesty's Government to some extent appreciate—have returned assurances that fresh instructions would be or had been sent to the French authorities in Syria to exercise a closer surveillance over this individual and his adherents; and at the same time they have indicated that what was required—so as to strengthen the hands of the French authorities—was tangible proof of the complicity of these persons in conspiracies in Palestine. As the French Government are aware, tangible proof, such as can be produced as evidence in a court of law, is in such cases hard to come by, and in the present case is frankly not available. It is impossible to produce documentary proof of instructions conveyed orally from a rebel leader to his trusted supporters. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge all over the Middle East that, so far from abstaining from politics, Haj Amin, with the help of his intimate adherents, has since his arrival in Syria organised and continues to organise an unceasing campaign of terrorism and murder in Palestine in the hope of securing thereby his political ends.

10. It will be as well known to the French authorities as it is to our own authorities in Palestine that Haj Amin keeps in close and continuous touch with visitors from Palestine and with Palestinian *émigrés* in Syria and the Lebanon and with Syrians themselves. His proximity to the port of Beirut enables Palestinians from Egypt to visit him in safety by ship, without running the risk of travelling through Palestine. While the above contacts do not in themselves constitute crimes, they are, nevertheless, in the circumstances, contacts which provide the ways and means for the conduct, from the shelter of a friendly territory, of as bitter a terroristic campaign against established authority as any Government can experience. From a mass of information (derived from diverse sources) in the possession of the authorities in Palestine and of His Majesty's Government it is established that Haj Amin regularly and frequently sends messages and directions by personal messengers to his adherents in Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries and that these messages are of an undeniably subversive character, directed to one end, namely, the continuance of active rebellion by a variety of means. It is equally clear that he receives from many quarters of the Arab world considerable sums of money which are devoted to the same object, and that it is he who directs the expenditure of these contributions. These facts cannot be unknown to the French authorities in Syria. That they are known to his Excellency Jamil Mardam, the Prime Minister for Syria, is borne out by the fact that on more than one occasion, in conversation with His Majesty's consul at Damascus, he has expressed surprise at the freedom with which the Iraqi Government have permitted the collection of funds in Iraq and their transmission to the Palestine Defence Committee of Damascus, whose activities are known to the Syrian Government, to the French authorities in Syria and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus to be organised by the Mufti and to be devoted to the purchase of arms, the hiring of terrorists and the compensation of casualties among the Palestine rebels. There is, therefore, less reason for the French authorities to require the Palestine authorities to produce documentary evidence of these subversive activities and the more reason to recognise the overwhelming weight of the circumstantial evidence outlined above.

11. Furthermore, I consider it not out of place to remind the French Government that Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon are all territories administered under "A" Mandates of the League of Nations, and, without desiring to overstress the point, I feel that it is totally incompatible with League principles that territory under one League mandate should be permitted to serve as a base for an effective campaign of organised terrorism against and resistance to the Government of a neighbouring territory also administered under mandate from the League.

12. You should proceed to suggest another and most important reason why the French Government should take drastic action in this matter. The Mufti's campaign of terrorism and murder in Palestine, and the severity of the consequent measures which have, unfortunately, had to be introduced to suppress gang warfare, have had a serious effect on opinion in neighbouring Arab countries. It is as much in the interests of the French Government as of His Majesty's Government to check the activities of unscrupulous agitators who are attempting to excite Arab opinion in the Middle East against the Western European Powers. It is certainly also in the interests of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to see order restored in Palestine and the continuance of normal trading conditions with



that country. Every effort is being made in Palestine to check the present disorders, and to calm Arab opinion, and the French Government will no doubt wish to co-operate in these efforts by taking effective steps to put an end to the Mufti's political activities in their mandated territories.

13. In conclusion, your Excellency should request the French Government, in the light of the facts and observations set out above, to put a term to Haj Amin-el-Husseini's residence in the Lebanon. You should suggest for consideration that the Mufti should be informed that his continued presence in the Lebanon or in Syria is likely to be the cause of international complications and that he should, therefore, make his arrangements to reside elsewhere. This communication might, it is suggested, be accompanied by a warning that, failing compliance with this requirement by a given date, he will be arrested and deported to his country of origin. At the same time, a cordial invitation, if the French Government were willing, might be conveyed to him to reside in France or in some French territory outside the Middle East.

14. You should also request the French Government, if they adopt the course asked for in the preceding paragraph, to cause the earliest possible information to be given to the Government of Palestine of Haj Amin's movements if he should leave the Lebanon voluntarily and go to some other country.

15. You should also furnish the Ministry with the list of Haj Amin's known chief supporters, which forms enclosure IV<sup>(\*)</sup> to the High Commissioner's despatch attached hereto, and urge that instructions shall be sent to the French authorities in Syria to withhold from these individuals the privilege of further residence in or entry into the French mandated territories.

16. It would be well for your Excellency to supplement the foregoing official representations by a personal appeal to M. Bonnet, who will, no doubt, remember that I mentioned the matter to him during his visit to London some weeks ago. This appeal might, if you agree, take the form of drawing attention to the serious position in Palestine, as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Colonial Office letter of the 27th May. A reference might also be made to the point about the Mufti's escape from Jerusalem to Syria, which is mentioned in paragraph 6 of the Colonial Office letter. You might proceed to state that the present situation, whereby the Mufti conducts his warlike operations against Palestine from a safe refuge in a territory under French mandate, is obviously indefensible. It is clearly in France's own interest to assist His Majesty's Government in this matter. The French have their own difficulties in the Middle East, for example, at Alexandretta, and will, therefore, no doubt, be all the more ready to accede to the present request for assistance in regard to British difficulties in Palestine. Moreover, M. Bonnet will realise that any serious deterioration in the Palestine situation will inevitably entail the concentration in the Middle East of large numbers of Imperial forces, and this may have important reactions, which the French Government will appreciate, on the strategic situation in other parts of the world. Again, the French Government must wish to see an end of the disorders in Palestine, realising, as they assuredly do, the urgent importance for our two countries of retaining the goodwill of the Arab States in the Middle East.

17. The personal communication to M. Bonnet might then proceed to draw attention to the fact that His Majesty's Government are not asking for the Mufti to be arrested forthwith and handed over to the authorities in Palestine. They appreciate the difficulties which such a request would entail for the French Government, although, of course, should the French Government feel themselves able to adopt such a procedure, their decision would be very welcome. All that His Majesty's Government are in fact asking is that the Mufti should be made to leave the Lebanon and invited to reside in future in France, or in some other French territory where his political activities, if they cannot be stopped altogether, will be less dangerous and thus less opposed to the joint interests of our two countries.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

(\*) Not printed.

# CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 88/88/89]

No. 70.

*Sir P. Lorraine to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 6, 1938.)*

(No. 764.)

Sir,

*Angora, December 30, 1937.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Syrian Prime Minister spent three days in Turkey on his return from his recent visit to Paris.

2. Arriving in Istanbul on the 19th December, M. Djemil Mardam left the following day for Angora, where he stayed until the evening of the 22nd. The customary visits were exchanged, and M. Mardam had an opportunity of meeting the President of the Republic at the principal restaurant of the town, where Atatürk invited M. Mardam to his table, and, after asking him to carry his affectionate greetings to the Syrian people, said that Turkey would be happy to see Syria independent and prosperous.

3. In conversation with the counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy on the 23rd December, the Iraqi Minister in Angora said that, in his opinion, M. Mardam's visit had definitely done good, and had ended on a decidedly cordial note. M. Mardam had made a good impression on the Turks with whom he had come into contact. M. Naci Sevket himself, with the agreement of the French Ambassador, "who was a man of large ideas" (I knew, moreover, beforehand that he was going to put no obstacles in the way of a Turco-Syrian fraternising), had given a party, where the Syrians and Turks had been able to get together as it were without control. The result of this party and of other meetings had been that such tension as there was between Syria and Turkey had been much lessened. M. Naci Sevket added that the meeting at the restaurant between Atatürk and M. Mardam was deliberately arranged, and that the press report of Atatürk's greetings to Syria, referred to in the preceding paragraph, was correct. Both sides had been well pleased as a result of the interview, and this has since been confirmed to me by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. A copy of a communiqué issued at the conclusion of M. Mardam's visit is enclosed herewith.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORRAINE.

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Communiqué.*

DURANT son séjour à Ankara, le Président du Conseil de Syrie, son Excellence Djemil Mardam Bey, s'est entretenu avec le Président du Conseil de Turquie, son Excellence Celâl Bayar, et a eu plusieurs entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le Dr. R. Aras, ainsi que différents contacts avec les autres personnalités du Gouvernement de la République turque. A la suite de ces entretiens, qui se sont déroulés dans une atmosphère de grande cordialité et au cours desquels toutes les questions intéressant les deux pays ont été l'objet d'un échange de vues détaillé, il a été décidé de travailler à l'avenir dans le cadre de la concordance de vues qui a été si heureusement constatée.

*Ankara, le 22 décembre 1937.*



*Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 6, 1938.)*

(No. 765.)

HIS Majesty's representative in Turkey presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Angora telegram No. 190 of the 29th December, 1937, has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram from the French Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 18th December, 1937, to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of a note of the 24th December, 1937, from the Turkish Ambassador, Paris, to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, respecting Alexandretta.

*Angora, December 30, 1937.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

*Télégramme adressé par Son Excellence M. Camille Chautemps, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires étrangères ad interim, en date du 18 Décembre 1937, à Son Excellence le Dr. T. R. Aras, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Turquie.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR sa lettre du 2 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des préoccupations que causeraient au Gouvernement turc les conditions dans lesquelles est graduellement installé le nouveau régime du Sandjak d'Alexandrette.

Le souci dont votre Excellence s'est ouverte à moi me paraît procéder d'un dissentiment sur la portée des accords du 29 mai dernier. Or, toute méprise à cet égard comporterait un risque assez sérieux, à mes yeux, dans la mesure où elle pourrait affecter l'atmosphère amicale dans laquelle doivent être exécutés les arrangements de Genève. Il est donc de l'intérêt commun de nos deux pays de s'attacher à la dissiper.

C'est l'article 55 du statut qui gouverne la distribution des responsabilités : pendant la durée du mandat, il subordonne à l'exercice de ce dernier l'application des deux textes organiques. Depuis le 29 novembre 1937 et jusqu'à la constitution effective des pouvoirs publics, la France, en tant que Puissance mandataire, est investie de l'ensemble des attributions exécutives. Du cours de cette phase provisoire, qui ne se prolongera pas, en tout cas, au delà du 15 avril prochain, auront lieu les premières élections. Dévolutive de l'autorité intégrale en raison même des circonstances exceptionnelles qui commandent cette période, le Gouvernement français ne se dissimule ni le poids ni l'étendue de la responsabilité qu'il a assumée. Il a d'autant plus à cœur de répondre à la confiance qui lui a été faite, et nul ne saurait craindre de le voir mesurer du surcroît de pouvoir que le Conseil de la Société des Nations et, par conséquent, la Turquie elle-même lui ont délégué. Aussi bien les divers éléments de la population du sandjak trouveraient-ils, si besoin était, une garantie supplémentaire de leurs droits dans les prérogatives dont, à cet effet, est munie la commission chargée d'organiser et de surveiller les opérations.

Ainsi la France ne pouvait-elle se dérober à la tâche qui lui incombe depuis le jour où, conformément à l'esprit du statut, l'Administration syrienne a été dessaisie. Mais elle envisage elle-même comme une libération l'échéance qui lui permette de remettre aux organes issus d'une libre consultation les attributions dont, à titre provisoire, elle a dû accepter la charge. A cette date, le Haut-Commissaire de la République déposera entre les mains des autorités régulièrement constituées ses pouvoirs exceptionnels, pour ne plus conserver que ceux que le mandat confère normalement à mon pays. Ainsi s'ouvrira la deuxième phase, qui, marquée par la coexistence de l'Administration nationale avec le mandat, laissera encore peser sur la France la responsabilité intégrale du maintien de l'ordre, mais n'en conduira pas moins le territoire, par la voie d'une transition graduelle, à l'affranchissement définitif de la tutelle à laquelle il reste encore soumis.

A la lumière de ces données fondamentales doivent être examinées, non seulement les questions que posent les pourparlers prévus à l'article 3 du traité portant garantie de l'intégrité territoriale du sandjak, mais encore celles que soulève l'application des accords de Genève au cours des deux premières phases du nouveau régime.

Pour en revenir, plus précisément, à la controverse relative à l'affaire du drapeau, le Gouvernement français n'a jamais contesté que l'Assemblée, une fois constituée, ait qualité pour adopter un emblème distinct, mais, tant qu'une mesure de ce genre n'aura pas été régulièrement prise, la persistance du *statu quo* reste de droit.

Quant aux conditions dans lesquelles l'Administration syrienne s'efface, les pouvoirs devaient être provisoirement concentrés entre les mains de M. Garreau; ce serait méconnaître une situation de droit que de laisser dénaturer le rôle de cet agent comme le font les critiques malveillants qui qualifient de coloniser sa gestion. Je ne doute pas que mes éclaircissements ne permettent à votre Excellence de se former une juste opinion des intentions de la France, fermement résolue à ne pas garder au delà du terme fixé la charge exceptionnelle dont elle se doit de s'acquitter. Je suis certain, en tout cas, que le délégué du Haut-Commissaire n'a en rien transgressé l'instruction qu'il a reçue de rester toujours à l'écart du débat électoral, de s'abstenir de tout acte susceptible de peser sur la libre détermination des habitants, de protéger enfin ces derniers contre les pressions qui menaceraient de s'exercer sur eux. J'ai invité M. de Martel à renouveler à son représentant ces prescriptions et à veiller, lui-même, à leur stricte exécution. Je suis persuadé, d'ailleurs, que les autorités turques auront l'occasion de se convaincre elles-mêmes de la correction et de l'impartialité de M. Garreau, dont, en maintes circonstances, il m'a été donné d'apprécier les qualités. Les consuls de Turquie dans le sandjak trouveront auprès de lui l'accueil le plus franc et le plus cordial, de même qu'ils sont assurés de trouver, auprès de la commission électorale, l'accès le plus large.

J'espère que les explications ci-dessus énoncées suffiront à apaiser les inquiétudes du Gouvernement turc. S'il estimait, néanmoins, ne pouvoir se rallier à mon interprétation des textes de Genève, je comprendrais parfaitement qu'il saisisse de la question le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Pour ma part, je vois dans la collaboration franco-turque un facteur trop essentiel à une politique de paix et de progrès pour ne pas avoir hautement à cœur, en cette occasion comme en toute autre, de conserver aux relations de nos deux pays leur caractère de pleine et amicale confiance.

Veuillez, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

*Note responsive remise au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de France par l'Ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris.*

M. le Ministre,

*Paris, le 24 décembre 1937.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre responsive que son Excellence M. le Président Camille Chautemps a bien voulu m'adresser le 18 décembre 1937 en sa qualité de Ministre *ad interim* des Affaires étrangères.

Je me suis empressé de transmettre le contenu de cette communication à mon Gouvernement, qui me charge de porter les quelques observations suivantes à la haute connaissance de votre Excellence.

Dans l'esprit du Gouvernement turc, il ne s'agit nullement d'une question d'interprétation de texte ni en ce qui concerne l'article 15 de la loi fondamentale relatant les pouvoirs conférés à la commission de la Société des Nations ni de l'article 55 du statut subordonnant le plein fonctionnement de l'Administration nationale du sandjak aux exigences du mandat.

Toutefois je ne saurais m'abstenir, en ce qui concerne l'article 55 du statut, d'attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur le fait que le Conseil a certainement voulu reconnaître à la Turquie un rôle plus ou moins étendu dans l'application du nouveau régime, étant donné qu'il a exigé dans le paragraphe 5 du rapport adopté le 29 mai 1937 que les traités prévus au paragraphe 7 des principes fondamentaux puissent entrer en vigueur non pas à la fin du mandat, mais bien le 29 novembre 1937, date où ces traités sont d'ailleurs entrés en vigueur.



Une interprétation devient évidemment superflue là où les textes sont clairs et c'est le cas pour les résolutions du Conseil du 29 mai 1937. Mais les textes ne peuvent avoir de valeur que s'ils sont appliqués autant dans leur lettre que dans leur esprit et si l'autorité chargée de leur exécution ne les met pas au service d'une cause non visée lors de leur élaboration, même si cette cause lui paraît être légitime et équitable.

Même le souci de sauvegarder les intérêts des différents éléments qui composent la population du sandjak ne devait permettre aux autorités du mandat d'agir dans un sens qui oblige le Gouvernement de la République à mettre leur impartialité en doute.

Les conversations de M. le délégué du Haut-Commissaire avec les éléments non turcs du sandjak, les conseils et encouragements qui leur sont prodigués, les pouvoirs étendus octroyés au Directeur des Finances dont l'acharnement contre l'élément turc ne peut être mis en doute aussi bien par M. le délégué, le maintien dans leurs fonctions des anciens ressortissants turcs exclus du bénéfice de l'amnistie lors de l'élaboration du Traité de Lausanne, l'inscription aux registres d'état civil de quelques fonctionnaires importants de la Syrie sous le prétexte qu'un long établissement leur a conféré le droit de devenir citoyens du sandjak, malgré le fait que cet établissement était motivé exclusivement par les nécessités de leurs fonctions, l'emploi dans des charges importantes des perturbateurs anciens ressortissants turcs ayant fui les rigueurs de nos lois, le recrutement de la gendarmerie dans sa plus grande partie parmi des éléments non turcs, son encadrement par des officiers citoyens du sandjak également non turcs, constituent des faits qui, exercés par le représentant qualifié de la Puissance mandataire avec la conviction donnée à chacun que la tutelle de la France n'est pas près de prendre fin sur le territoire du sandjak, ne sont pas de nature à donner toute assurance quant à l'esprit de bienveillance qui doit animer les autorités du mandat à l'égard de tous les éléments de la population du sandjak sans aucune distinction quelconque.

Mon Gouvernement pense que, ni l'article 55 du statut ni même l'exercice direct, bien que temporaire, de l'autorité par la Puissance mandataire ne sont de nature à justifier une ingérence des agents du Gouvernement provisoire dans les luttes électorales et dans la préparation morale des élections.

Il y aurait donc intérêt à ce que la Puissance mandataire fasse comprendre aux populations du sandjak que sa présence à la tête des affaires est provisoire non seulement en ce qui concerne la période allant jusqu'au 15 avril mais surtout et également après la constitution du Gouvernement national.

Il semble, d'autre part, indispensable que le Gouvernement provisoire éloigne du pouvoir les fonctionnaires de quelque importance hérités de l'ancien régime, que ceux-ci soient des Turcs, des Arabes ou des Alaonites, quitte à laisser à l'autorité nationale régulièrement constituée la possibilité de les reprendre au service de l'Etat, s'il les en juge dignes.

En un mot, il y a dans le sandjak une autorité qui, consciemment ou involontairement, tient la balance fortement penchée du côté des non Turcs et, comme cette autorité y exerce le pouvoir le plus absolu, le déséquilibre qui en résulte n'est pas de nature à faire considérer à la Turquie que le compromis du 29 mai est appliqué impartialement.

Ainsi qu'il appert des considérations ci-haut formulées, les doléances du Gouvernement turc ne s'adressent uniquement qu'à l'Administration mandataire dans le sandjak et non pas spécialement à la personne de M. le délégué du Haut-Commissaire. Et il va sans dire que toute amélioration apportée dans l'attitude de cette Administration, de même que de son chef à l'égard des éléments turcs, ainsi que M. le Président a bien voulu le faire entendre dans sa lettre précitée, sera accueillie avec une réelle satisfaction par le Gouvernement de la République.

La lettre de M. le Président Chautemps fait spécialement mention de la controverse se rapportant au drapeau. Votre Excellence voudra bien me permettre de lui faire remarquer qu'il y a incompatibilité entre la conception du dessaisissement complet de la Syrie, mentionné dans la lettre susindiquée, et celle du maintien du *statu quo* pour la raison même qu'un emblème national n'a pas encore été choisi par les autorités régulièrement constituées du sandjak.

Je ne veux pas m'étendre davantage sur ces considérations, mais je tiens à insister sur le fait que l'attitude des autorités du mandat dans le sandjak n'est pas conforme aux exigences de la collaboration amicale franco-turque que M. le Président Chautemps veut bien considérer comme un facteur essentiel d'une

politique de paix et de progrès, tout en affirmant qu'il a à cœur, en cette occasion comme en toute autre, de conserver aux relations de nos deux pays leur caractère de pleine et amicale confiance.

Ces sentiments reflètent entièrement ceux de mon Gouvernement à l'égard de la France et son désir de collaboration confiante.

Votre Excellence sait déjà que mon Gouvernement est intervenu auprès du Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations pour protester contre la procédure de communication de textes pour simple information. Il a décidé, par ailleurs, de porter à la connaissance du Conseil les arguments de forme et de fond qu'il invoque en faveur des réserves formulées sur l'élaboration, la mise en application et le contenu du règlement préparé par la commission *ad hoc*. Ce règlement, qui constitue, dans son ensemble, un malentendu, est manifestement contraire à l'esprit des accords de Genève et, dans plusieurs de ses dispositions essentielles, aux textes des résolutions du Conseil.

Ceux que la commission a consultés dans le sandjak—et elle ne peut avoir préparé un règlement de cette nature sans nulle consultation et sans que des suggestions précieuses lui aient été faites—ont eu à cœur de léser fortement les intérêts électoraux de la population turque et de faciliter ainsi la constitution d'une Assemblée fidèle et soumise aux autorités du mandat et à leurs agents.

Mon Gouvernement, qui désire fermement l'établissement d'une réelle collaboration confiante entre la Turquie et la France et l'élimination totale de tous les motifs de friction, me charge de déclarer expressément qu'il ne peut accepter que la consultation populaire du sandjak se fasse dans cette atmosphère et avec ce règlement inconcevable. Il croit, d'autre part, qu'il ne peut y avoir entre la Turquie et la France un objet de collaboration plus précis et plus adéquat que celui de la préparation du nouveau régime du sandjak.

L'amitié entre la Turquie et la France ne peut être édifiée sur une erreur ni consolidée par un malentendu. Elle ne peut être féconde si un différend essentiel persiste entre les deux pays au sujet du régime qui sera bientôt instauré dans le sandjak en raison d'un règlement injuste, même si celui-ci est fait par un organisme international mal renseigné ou insuffisamment édifié sur l'importance de la question.

Mon Gouvernement estime donc que le désir de collaboration exprimé dans la lettre responsive de M. le Président Chautemps doit présider également au règlement du différend qui vient de réapparaître, et il tient à assurer le Gouvernement français que c'est dans les dispositions les plus amicales possibles qu'il est prêt à rechercher avec lui la solution la plus conforme aux intérêts des deux pays.

Mais faut-il encore que, sur un objet aussi important, la collaboration turco-française soit réelle et effective. Si nos deux pays ont été absents d'un débat ayant pour but de sceller le fondement du nouveau régime au sandjak, la solution intervenue n'est certainement pas une solution de conciliation de nature à les satisfaire ni le résultat d'une collaboration destinée à consolider leurs relations futures par une juste compréhension réciproque de tous les éléments du litige. C'est dans cet esprit que mon Gouvernement me charge de proposer à votre Excellence d'intervenir d'un commun accord auprès du Conseil de la Société des Nations afin que le règlement élaboré soit soumis à une révision au sein d'un organisme qui pourrait parfaitement être la commission déjà en fonction et au sein duquel la Turquie et la France seraient représentées à égal titre.

[E 264/29/89]

No. 72.

*Memorandum respecting the Franco-Turkish Dispute over the Sanjak of Alexandretta.*

ON the 29th May, 1937, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution approving the texts of the Organic Statute and of the Fundamental Law of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. According to these instruments, the sanjak was to constitute a separate entity, enjoying full independence in its internal affairs, while the State of Syria was to be responsible for its foreign affairs. The statute and the Fundamental Law were to enter into force on the 29th November, 1937, and it was laid down that during such time as the mandate for Syria remained in operation they should be applied to the fullest extent compatible with the exercise of the mandate.



2. Article 15 of the Fundamental Law provided that the whole of the proceedings involved in the first elections held for the purpose of choosing Deputies for the Assembly of the sanjak should be organised and supervised by a commission, the members of which should be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. This commission was to be composed of nationals of States members of the League of Nations other than France and Turkey. In accordance with this provision, the Council set up a commission of five members to prepare and to supervise the elections. The president of this Electoral Commission was the British member, Mr. T. Reid.

3. After a short stay at Geneva, the commission left on the 14th October, 1937, for Alexandretta, where it remained until the 19th November. During its stay in the sanjak the commission made the necessary enquiries and preparations with a view to the electoral proceedings, including the registration of voters. The commission left the sanjak towards the end of November and, at a further session in Geneva, from the 30th November to the 10th December, completed its plans for the organisation and supervision of the elections, and, more particularly, drafted a document entitled "Regulations for the First Elections to the Assembly of the Sanjak of Alexandretta."

4. It should be explained at this point that, by chapter I of the Fundamental Law, the elections are to be conducted in two stages. Those who are entitled to vote at the first stage of the elections (*i.e.*, males over 20 years of age) must, in order to be included in the electoral list, first register in the presence of the delegates of the Electoral Commission as members of one of seven specified racial-religious communities. The number of second-stage electors, and ultimately of Deputies, allotted to the various communities in the sanjak as a whole will be determined by the number of first-stage voters registered as belonging to each community. Consequently, the registration of voters will, in effect, decide the proportions in which the various communities will be represented in the Assembly.

5. It became clear to the commission during its stay in the sanjak that the Turkish element, with the assistance of the Turkish consul and with the unofficial support of the Turkish Government, intended to influence the non-Turkish elements by bribery and intimidation to register themselves as Turks, which would subsequently compel them to vote for Turkish candidates in the elections. The commission determined, however, to oppose this plan, and certain provisions of the electoral regulations (see paragraph 10 below) are meant to ensure that no undue pressure to register in any particular community shall be exerted by adherents of that community upon voters who do not really belong to it.

6. The first indication that the Turkish Government were taking serious exception to the activities of the Electoral Commission was contained in a note of the 2nd December sent by the Turkish Government to the French Government. This note complained that the mandatory authorities in the sanjak had exercised illegitimate pressure on the Electoral Commission and were, by various unfair administrative methods, conspiring to ensure that the coming elections in the sanjak should be as unfavourable to the Turkish element as possible. This communication was followed on the 15th December by a telegram from the Turkish Government to the Secretary-General of the League. This telegram contained two grounds for complaint. In the first place, the Turkish Government alleged that the commission had collaborated with the mandatory authorities in the sanjak and that the electoral regulations had been drafted in consultation with them and were the result of this collaboration. In the second place, exception was taken to the fact that the electoral regulations were communicated officially to the mandatory Power for enactment into law, whereas they were only communicated unofficially to the Turkish Government.

7. As regards the first point, the president of the commission has explained that the regulations were not the result of collaboration between the commission and the mandatory authorities. Communications between the commission and the mandatory authorities were confined to requests by the former for information and the supply of this information by the latter. It was clearly impossible for the commission to devise a practicable electoral procedure without first obtaining information on numerous details from the authorities in the sanjak, supplemented by unofficial information obtained from representatives of all the different communities. Further, the mandatory authorities never attempted to influence the commission's decisions, nor to ascertain what these decisions were. The commission was consequently solely responsible for the electoral regulations.

8. As regards the second complaint, the president has explained that the regulations were communicated officially by the commission to the mandatory Power, not for approval or for criticism, but as the final decision of the commission, which it was necessary to communicate to the mandatory Power as it alone possessed the necessary legislative power to enact them into law. In so far as the Turkish Government were concerned, the Secretariat of the League, on its own initiative, communicated a copy of the regulations to the permanent delegate of Turkey at Geneva, simply as a matter of courtesy to a Power which was naturally interested. It should be noted here that there is no provision in the Geneva Settlement of the 29th May for submitting the decisions of the Electoral Commission to Turkey, either for approval or for criticism, and that the Turkish Government have no ground for complaint in that the regulations were not communicated to them officially. Nor, however, is there any provision for submitting the decisions of the commission to France, as the mandatory Power, or for that matter for their submission to the Council or the Secretariat of the League.

9. A further telegram was sent by the Turkish Government to the Secretary-General of the League on the 24th December. This telegram reiterated the allegation contained in the telegram of the 15th December that the regulations were the result of collaboration between the mandatory Power and the commission and complained that Turkey, the other Power interested in the arrangements adopted for the sanjak, was not consulted even on points of detail. It, furthermore, made certain detailed criticisms of the regulations.

10. For instance, exception was taken by the Turkish Government to the penal provisions in the regulations, which are claimed to be excessively harsh. Mr. Reid has pointed out that these penal provisions are based upon the Syrian practice and are very considerably milder than those normally applied in Syria. Then, again, the Turkish Government complained of the registration procedure. They claimed that it was the intention of the Council, in its resolutions, that there should be no supervision over the first stage in the elections, except for the purpose of preventing duplicate registrations, and no indirect influence exercised over the free expression of the people's will. With regard to this complaint Mr. Reid has pointed out that the commission, realising the intentions of the Turkish element, as stated above, to intimidate the non-Turkish elements, have in fact devised a procedure which shall ensure that no one shall register in a community to which he does not belong, and has with this end in view reserved to itself a final decision in cases of dispute regarding the community in which any elector shall be registered.

11. This last point is the crux of the whole dispute, and it is necessary to consider it in rather greater detail. Although the Turkish Government's telegram of the 24th December does not specifically raise the point, it might be argued that there is a discrepancy between articles 9 and 14 of the Fundamental Law of the sanjak and articles 15 to 24 of the electoral regulations regarding the freedom of voters to decide as to the communities to which they shall belong. Article 9 of the Fundamental Law states that electors at the first stage shall register in the presence of delegates of the commission as members of one of the specified communities, while article 14 states that "each elector shall receive only one voting paper, which shall contain the list of the candidates of the community to which he has declared himself to belong," the last phrase possibly implying that the elector has complete freedom to choose the community in which he wishes to vote. On the other hand, the electoral regulations reserve, as has been said, to the commission the final right to decide to what community the elector shall be registered as a member.

12. The Turkish Government may therefore argue that the commission, in reserving to itself the ultimate final decision on this point, are interfering with liberty which the Fundamental Law intended to give every voter. The answer, if this point should be raised, appears to be that the electors are in danger of being subjected at present to so much illegal pressure that the only way to protect them against such pressure and to give them effective freedom is for the commission to assume the ultimate responsibility for deciding in cases of doubt in which community any particular voter should be included. If the Turkish view were to prevail that the commission should have no right of this kind, the elections would, it is said, inevitably be accompanied by riots and bloodshed on a large scale.

13. It will be clear from the above that the Turkish Government have no moral justification for their complaint, against the draft electoral regulations,



which are designed to secure a fair election. The legal position is, however, less certain and a note by Mr. Beckett, in which he expresses the opinion that the regulations may be *ultra vires* the powers of the commission, forms an annex to this memorandum.

14. On receipt of the telegram of the 24th December the League Secretariat telegraphed to Angora enquiring whether the Turkish Government wished the question to be included in the agenda for the next session of the League Council. The Turkish Government replied that they did desire this.

15. It remains to consider the position of the three Powers principally interested in this dispute. The Turkish Government apparently hope that, by bringing the whole question up once more at Geneva, they will be able to secure a compromise involving further concessions by the French Government which will make it easier for them to exert sufficient influence over the non-Turkish elements to secure a majority and thus obtain ultimate control of the sanjak and eventually (perhaps) its separation from Syria.

16. As regards the attitude of the French Government, there is as yet no definite information. There are, however, indications to suggest that the French authorities may be anxious to disinterest themselves from the affairs of the sanjak, and that the French Government might be willing to consider some compromise which would go some way to meet the Turkish Government's veiled demand for a greater degree of influence in the sanjak.

17. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government they are close friends both of France and of Turkey, and their sole desire is to see a just settlement of this dangerous question arrived at on the merits of the case. At the same time, for the reasons contained in Part III of Mr. Ward's memorandum of the 11th January, 1937,<sup>(1)</sup> His Majesty's Government would be strongly opposed to any solution which might lead to a change in the international status of the sanjak.

M. S. WILLIAMS.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
January 12, 1938.*

#### Annex.

*Note by Mr. Beckett.*

#### *Registration of Voters for the Assembly of the Sanjak of Alexandretta.*

I THINK that the word "organised" in article 15 of the Fundamental Law may be held to imply the power to draw up regulations. But the regulations must not contravene the Fundamental Law. I should certainly draw the conclusion myself from article 14 of the Fundamental Law that the electors had merely to state "I belong to this or that community," and that they had to be registered under article 9 of the law according to their declaration; and since the commission in articles 15-24 of their electoral regulations set forth a procedure specially designed to check the effects of Turkish bribery and pressure on the electors, which may, I fear, be held to be *ultra vires* the powers of the commission, I am not altogether surprised that the Turkish Government are attacking the commission.

W. E. BECKETT.

*January 7, 1938.*

<sup>(1)</sup> "Franco-Turkish Dispute over the Sanjak of Alexandretta." This memorandum describes fully the earlier history of the question (Print: "Eastern (Syria)," January 11, 1937, Section 1).

[E 311/29/89]

No. 73.

*Consul Davis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 17, 1938.)*

(No. 121. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, December 23, 1937.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 17 of the 19th December, 1937, I have the honour to report that the situation of somewhat unstable equilibrium which has prevailed in the Sanjak of Alexandretta since the announcement of the Geneva settlement of May last is now beginning to show signs of developing along disquietening but not unexpected lines as the date fixed for the elections approaches.

2. It is, of course, fundamental to realise from the outset that the much-heralded Geneva settlement was in its very essence a compromise giving complete satisfaction to none of the parties interested. The Syrians have never regarded it as anything but a base betrayal of their interests by the French and have from the outset resolved to accept it only in as far as they are absolutely obliged to do so by their complete lack of the means of forcible resistance. The Turks, on the other hand, accepted it only with the mental reservation that the new régime was by hook or by crook to be applied in such a way that the Turkish element in the sanjak would from the outset have complete preponderance and would later consolidate their ascendancy to an extent that would render the sanjak, in cold fact, if not immediately in name, a mere province of the Turkish Republic. The French reaction I am not in a position to gauge, but in the Levant, if not in the metropolis, there has been in French circles a distinct undercurrent of satisfaction that in the Geneva negotiations the Syrian Nationalist Government had been made to realise the exact measure of its own unimportance and negligibility and the true degree of its dependence on France.

3. The reception of the Geneva settlement by the various elements of the population of the sanjak differed in no way from their reactions to the proposals adopted by the League of Nations on the 27th January last as reported in my despatch No. 14 of the 4th February, 1937. The great mass of moderates in each section would be very happy to proceed peaceably with the application of the new statute and to co-operate harmoniously for the future welfare of the sanjak as an autonomous district under the aegis of the League. They are, however, not left to their own devices, but are particularly subject to outside influences, the Arabs naturally depending on Damascus and the Turks as naturally on Angora; and neither Damascus nor Angora, as suggested in the second paragraph of this despatch, have any intention of allowing the new statute to be applied impartially.

4. In the conflict of intrigues which has ensued it must be admitted that the advantages are with the Turks. The very new and rather inchoate Arab State, with organisation and resources distinctly inferior to those of the Turkish Republic and with its hands full of thorny problems, has failed to produce an effective union among the various sections of the non-Turkish majority or to organise them for the coming electoral campaign. Its appeal to natives of the sanjak residing in Syria and elsewhere to return to Alexandretta and register themselves as voters has passed unheeded. Its efforts to organise Arab clubs and Arab youth movements to counter-balance those of the Turks have met with scant success. The administrative officials in the sanjak, formerly more or less dependent on Damascus and inclined to support the Arab cause, have deserted the sinking ship since the Mohafiz, Husni Barazi, was sent back to Damascus when the independence of the sanjak was proclaimed on the 29th November last. Frequent Arab demonstrations of protest in Damascus and Aleppo have not made up for the lack of Arab success in the sanjak itself. The Turks, on the other hand, dealing with a more compact, disciplined and better educated body of supporters through the direct channel of their specially appointed consular representatives in Antioch and Alexandretta and being more freely supplied with funds, have had far more success in the preliminary campaign. Their clubs and youth organisations are well organised and ready for the fray. Their emigrants residing in Turkey proper, at least 3,000 in number, are even now returning to the sanjak, each one of them receiving from the Turkish authorities a free passage and 25 liras for expenses. Their pressure on Arabs whom they wish to register as Turks has, in some cases, amounted to such sheer intimidation that the French delegate has had to intervene.

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5. The appointment by Turkey of two consular representatives in the sanjak, reported in my despatches Nos. 93 and 94 of the 11th October, 1937, has caused considerable inconvenience to the French authorities in the district and even to the moderate party among the local Turks. The Turkish consul-general has regarded himself from the outset as *ex officio* head and champion of all the Turkish-speaking element in the sanjak and has even gone so far to claim to speak in their name in official interviews with M. Garreau who has been obliged to declare roundly that the Turkish-speaking natives of the sanjak are still Syrian nationals under French mandate, not citizens of the Turkish Republic, and that the Turkish consulates have accordingly no *locus standi* where they are concerned. M. Garreau finds it necessary to remind the Turkish consul-general at Antioch at frequent intervals that the Geneva agreement has not established a Franco-Turkish condominium in the sanjak, an error which appears to persist ineradicably in Turkish circles. The Turkish consulates helped to mislead the local Turks into expecting that on the 29th November last when the independence of the sanjak was officially proclaimed they would see the Turkish flag hoisted throughout the district, an expectation which gave place to considerable dissatisfaction when they saw the French tricolour replace the Syrian flag on all public buildings on the day in question. The Turkish consuls are naturally anxious to earn marks for zeal and activity in the good cause and therefore prone to exaggerate every incident and exacerbate every sentiment which can be made to serve their purpose.

6. The opprobrium which has in Turkish circles been showered upon M. Garreau for his supposed anti-Turkish attitude over the affair of the flag and other matters has been at least equalled by the resentment engendered in Arab circles by his alleged anti-Arab bias. The flag incident, the closing of the sanjak branches of the Arab League of National Action and the arrest of Zeki Arsouzi reported in my despatch No. 120 of the 17th December last have been seized upon as so many proofs of the alleged bias. The decision now announced to put Arsouzi out of harm's way by keeping him in enforced residence at El Ourdou will certainly do nothing to dissipate this impression.

7. It is very regrettable that whereas the leaders who claim to speak for Arabs and Turks in the sanjak are equally extremist and uncompromising, the vast majority of both communities, probably 75 per cent. at least, who would be quite willing to get the new statute working smoothly and successfully are inarticulate and politically negligible. An attempt has recently been made to launch a "Sanjak" party embracing moderates of both the Turkish and the Arab elements to co-operate for the welfare and progress of the sanjak as a separate entity quite apart from Syria and Turkey. This enterprise, which was not without the approval of the mandatory authority, unfortunately called forth the ire of the extremists and paid agitators on both sides, and the direst retribution was promised to any Arab or Turk who had the temerity to express approval of so intensely disloyal a programme. Needless to say, the proposed party was a complete fiasco. Yet it is undoubted that most of the Turks and all of the Arabs would hate to witness the introduction into the sanjak of many of the typical features of the Turkish republican régime, particularly the unveiling of women and the laicisation of the State.

8. The uncertainties of the present situation give rise daily to false rumours and alarmist propaganda, which, of course, strengthen the hands and consolidate the influence of the extremists. Unfortunately, it is not generally believed here that the Geneva settlement is in any sense final; the Turks hope, the Arabs fear that the sanjak will one day again become Turkish territory, and no one is prepared to subscribe to the opinion that France would in the last resort use armed force to resist the Turks should they make an attempt to occupy the sanjak. The fact that responsible Frenchmen here are apt to say quite publicly that their country would never fight for the Syrians, a pack of troublesome ingrates, does not tend to dissipate this fear. The lukewarmness, real or supposed, of France gives the Turks every reason to persist in an attitude of truculence from which they have much to gain and nothing to lose.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Angora, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 501/47/89]

No. 74.

Consul-General Havard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 18, 1938.

ALTHOUGH, as I had the honour to state in my despatch No. 93 of the 30th November last, the Ahdab Cabinet was able to defend successfully in the House its action in dissolving the coloured shirt groups in Beirut during the third week in November, it became clear as time elapsed that many Deputies only voted for the Government because they considered that it was their duty to uphold its prestige against agitation in the street. A majority in the House and of the intellectual classes outside it considered that unnecessary and wanton brutality had been displayed by the police in their dispersal of the Phalangists on the 21st November, and although superficially the question was settled when the Government received a vote of confidence, considerable resentment continued to exist and several influential organs of the local press lost no opportunity of attacking the Government on every conceivable occasion, warning them that their period of office was rapidly drawing to a close.

2. It was therefore evident that as soon as any question of relative importance came before the Chamber, the Government were going to meet with difficulties. Such an opportunity arose early this month when the Deputies were confronted with a request to vote certain extra credits for sums of money which had been spent over and above the regular budget expenditure. Amongst these credits figured a sum of £.Syr. 32,000 for expenses in connexion with the parliamentary elections of October 1937. It was common knowledge that owing to an agreement between the two parties every seat had its occupant designated in advance, and the sum appeared, therefore, a large one to spend on an election which was, in fact, nothing but a mere formality. Members of the Government were closely questioned and even heckled by a group of Deputies determined to upset the Cabinet on this issue, but the only reply given was that it was a State secret and could not be divulged. The leading member of the Opposition party—M. Bechara Khoury—was so closely examined that he finally said that he could only disclose what he knew if President Ahdab would free him from his bond of secrecy. M. Ahdab then made the question one of confidence in his Ministry and, in spite of much lobbying by the attacking group of Deputies, was able to obtain a vote of confidence by 37 votes against 21.

3. The evening before this vote, M. Selim Tacla, the Minister of Public Works, resigned at the behest of his party and it was clear that the united front, on which agreement the elections had been held in October 1937, no longer existed. Before M. Ahdab was able to find a Greek Catholic to fill the vacancy, Emir Majid Arslan, the Minister of Agriculture, also a member of the Constitutional party, resigned. This resignation was followed by that of M. Abi Chalila, the Minister of the Interior, and it was evident that the Ministry was disintegrating, and the united front completely broken. M. Ahdab therefore referred the matter to the President of the Republic, who requested him to form another Ministry.

4. On the 14th January M. Ahdab succeeded in forming his fifth Cabinet in the space of twelve months. Its composition is as follows:—

President of the Council and Minister of Justice: M. Khairaddin Ahdab (16).

Interior: M. Georges Tabet (35A).

Finance: M. Musa Nammour (33).

Public Instruction: M. Khalil Kseib (31).

Public Works: Dr. Xamel Gargour (23).

Agriculture: M. Hikmat Joumblat.

Public Health: M. Ibrahim Haider (25).

5. The numbers in brackets are references to Lebanese Personalities, 1938. M. Hikmat Joumblat, the new Minister of Agriculture, was born about 1906 and belongs, like his predecessor, to a well-known Druze family. He is a Deputy in the present Parliament and belongs to M. Ahdab's party. His only title to recognition is the fact that he is the nephew of Sitt Nazira Joumblat, generally supposed to be the heroine of Pierre Benoit's book *La Châtelaine du Liban*. He was educated at the American University at Beirut.

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6. The newly formed Cabinet has little to distinguish it from its four predecessors of 1937, and like them may last for a month or two. Experience would seem to show that the Lebanese have yet much to learn if they are to derive advantage from constitutional government. No party with any definite political programme—or indeed any other sort of programme—has emerged. Clan leadership still holds sway and in a small country with a population of 600,000, the present machinery of government composed of seven Ministers and sixty-three Deputies appears largely superfluous.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's consuls in Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.  
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 612/29/89]

No. 75.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ONE-HUNDREDTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL.

*Provisional Minutes of the Fifth Meeting (Public), held on Monday, January 31, 1938, at 6.15 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 3.)*

President: M. ADLE.

THE members of the Council were represented as follows:—

Belgium: M. Langenhove.  
Bolivia: M. Costa du Rels.  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Viscount Cranborne.  
China: Mr. Quo Tai-chi.  
Ecuador: M. Quevedo.  
France: M. de Tessen.  
Iran: M. Adle.  
Italy:  
Latvia: M. Munters.  
New Zealand: Mr. Jordan.  
Peru: M. Garcia-Calderon.  
Poland: M. Komarnicki.  
Roumania: M. Cretziano.  
Sweden: M. Unden.  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Litvinov.

Secretary-General: M. Avenol.

QUESTION OF ALEXANDRETTA.

On the invitation of the President, M. Sadak, representative of Turkey, came to the Council table.

M. Unden presented the following report and resolution (document C. 65. 1938), and added that the report was the result of a compromise which had been reached during the consultations that had taken place since Friday:—

*Report by the Swedish Representative.*

Following upon the exchange of views that took place at the Council meeting on the 28th January, 1938, and in order to settle the difficulties that had arisen, I first of all contemplated the creation of a body of three *rapporteurs*, which would have been asked by the Council to make such adjustments, with the co-operation of French and Turkish representatives and the assistance of the president of the Electoral Commission, as might prove to be necessary in the regulations drawn

up by that commission. That method not having been accepted, I am led to submit to the Council the following proposals, in agreement with the French and Turkish representatives:—

Within the limits of the provisions and texts adopted by the Council on the 29th May, 1937, and accepted by France and Turkey, a Committee of the Council, consisting of representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Turkey, will endeavour to make such modifications as may prove necessary in the regulations drawn up by the Electoral Commission. The president of the Electoral Commission will afford the committee his assistance. The committee's decisions must be unanimous.

In the probable event of this work being completed before the Council's next session, the committee will submit to the President of the Council the regulations finally adopted by it. The President of the Council will then immediately communicate those regulations to the mandatory Power, on behalf of the Council, for promulgation in the sanjak.

Furthermore, the committee will take the decisions mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report adopted by the Council on the 29th May, 1937, concerning, on the one hand, the appointment of officials and staff, and, on the other, the date of the first elections, it being understood that it will postpone the latest date mentioned (the 15th April, 1938) as far as may be necessary.

If my colleagues are prepared to accept the above proposals, I suggest that they should adopt the following resolution:—

"The Council adopts the report of the representative of Sweden."

M. Sadak (interpretation): Now that the Council is called upon to give its approval to the report by the representative of Sweden, I desire, in the first place, to thank M. Unden for his meritorious efforts to bring about agreement between the parties. I also desire to thank the Governments of Belgium and the United Kingdom for having kindly accepted the position of members of this committee in order to facilitate the important work that is to be entrusted to it by the Council.

In my statement on Friday last, as the Council will remember, I reserved the right to submit during the procedure any other requests that we might think it necessary to make in this discussion concerning the various aspects of the problem of the sanjak. During the private conversations that we have had during recent days, I have continually drawn attention to this point, to which my Government attaches an importance that is as great as it is justified.

In the hope that it will subsequently be possible to record practical and satisfactory solutions in this matter, I shall do no more to-day than emphasise that I shall, if necessary, make use of this right before the Council.

As regards the report submitted by the representative of Sweden, I desire to state that I agree with its adoption by the Council.

M. de Tessen (France) (interpretation): Mr. President: It is a very pleasant duty, in the first place, on behalf of the French Government, to thank M. Unden for the fortunate discharge of the duty which the Council entrusted to him. Once more he has given evidence of that loftiness of view, serene impartiality and devotion to the cause of international collaboration of which his country has given us so many and so constant proofs in the past. I am no less grateful to the representatives of the United Kingdom and Belgium for having with Sweden agreed to associate themselves with the two parties, in order to set up the committee which will have to deal with the question now before the Council. The decisions that will emerge as a result of the deliberations that are about to start will gain from the authority with which they are thus backed a striking character of equity which no one could think of contesting. We are glad to note that it is thanks to the League of Nations that the arrangement has been possible. It is all the more pleasant to emphasise this, since the detractors of the League lose no opportunity to count its failures one by one. By submitting this question to the Council, Turkey has proved that she retains all her faith in the League of Nations. I gladly give the representative of Turkey the assurance that in our turn we shall, in the study of the complaints that she has put forward regarding the electoral regulations, show a spirit of comprehension which, in the particular circumstances, we are called upon to consider she is entitled to expect



from us. By adopting this attitude, moreover, we have a firm conviction that we are working for the political stability of the Levant, a stability upon which depends not merely Franco-Turkish relations, but also, and above all, the future of Syria itself.

In these circumstances, on behalf of the French Government, I desire to express my approval of the report submitted to the Council by M. Unden.

*Viscount Cranborne:* His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have learnt with satisfaction of the agreement which has been reached as to the procedure to be followed in dealing with this difficult question. They wish to pay a tribute to the skill and patience of the *rapporteur* and to the spirit of conciliation shown by all concerned. The method which the *rapporteur* has proposed with a view to settling the differences which have arisen over the electoral regulations prepared by the League Electoral Commission is somewhat unusual; but as it has the support of the two members of the League mainly concerned, there is no need for me, as representative of a nation whose interest in this question is indirect, to offer any observations of detail on the procedure which has been agreed. I will therefore confine myself to assuring the Council that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, both as a member of the League and as a close and cordial friend of the French and Turkish Governments, will lend such assistance as they can with a view to facilitating a settlement. It is their sincere hope that the method proposed will prove effective in bringing about an early and equitable solution of the problem, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the agreement which was so happily reached under the ægis of the League in May 1937.

(The report was adopted.)

*M. Unden (interpretation):* Mr. President: I should like to thank earlier speakers for the observations they have been kind enough to make with regard to the *rapporteur*. I would take this opportunity to express the hope that an impartial examination within the framework of the texts adopted in May 1937 will lead the committee to reach a satisfactory settlement, which the Electoral Commission—to whose devotion and unremitting zeal I should like to pay a tribute—will be able to apply to the satisfaction of the Council and of the Governments concerned. I should also like to invite members of the committee just appointed to meet immediately after the conclusion of the present meeting in order to determine their methods of work.

*M. Sadak* withdrew.

(The Council rose.)

[E 1359/29/89]

No. 76.

ALEXANDRETTA.

*Proceedings of the Committee of the Council appointed to revise the Draft Electoral Law, March 1938. Note No. 2.*

(Confidential Record by Mr. G. W. Rendel.)

FOLLOWING on my note of the 7th March recording the informal discussions which took place that day, it may be convenient to summarise briefly the subsequent proceedings, particularly as the minutes of the meetings of the committee may not be ready for some time and are likely to be very lengthy.

2. The first meeting of the present session of the committee was held on the afternoon of the 7th March. The League Secretariat had prepared a paper showing the Electoral Commission's draft law and the Turkish counter-draft in parallel columns. It was a complicated document, as while the commission's draft was divided into chapters with clear and logical sequence, the Turkish draft followed no such principles, so that a great number of cross-references, &c., were necessary

3. The Turkish counter-draft had not made any provisions for penalties, but the Turks agreed that such provisions were necessary. A sub-committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of the Belgian, Turkish and French representatives, to prepare a draft on this subject.

4. The chairman then suggested taking the two drafts article by article, asking the Turkish representatives to explain in detail their objections to the commission's draft, then asking Mr. Reid to reply, and continuing the discussion accordingly. It turned out, however, that the Belgian representative, M. Bourquèn, was engaged on examinations at Geneva University for the whole of the next day. It was therefore proposed that the committee should adjourn and defer the consideration of any important points until the 9th March.

5. I raised strong objection to this, pointing out that it would greatly delay the work of the committee, and urged that the main questions of principle should be taken up at once. I explained that, owing to the fact that the number of Deputies representing each community in the new Chamber would be fixed by the number of voters registering in each community, the question of registration by communities was really the vital point of the whole elections. The Electoral Commission had produced a law intended to establish existing facts on which to decide to what communities voters belonged. The Turkish draft, on the other hand, had suppressed the greater part of the provisions intended to supply evidence on this subject, and had substituted provisions which would enable voters to choose their communities, irrespective of their previous affiliations. This would amount virtually to a plebiscite, and it seemed to me that the committee might advantageously take up this question of principle at once, with a view to deciding the major question of policy involved.

6. The committee having agreed to this, M. Numan made a very able, though extremely disingenuous, speech defending the Turkish proposals. He pointed out that, while there were certain compact communities, such as the Turks and the Armenians, there were many other communities where it was far more difficult to establish a clear dividing line. The criterion of religion, which had been universally adopted under the old Ottoman Empire, was no longer applicable, while so many inhabitants of the sanjak were bilingual that language would also be of little use as evidence. In any case, the Turkish Government could not agree to the Electoral Commission having any right of decision in this matter. The commission could only base its decisions on the evidence produced by the local authorities. M. Numan made it clear that he did not trust such evidence. He explained that the Turkish Government had always raised the strongest objection to any kind of census by communities, but that the procedure contemplated by the Electoral Commission would be nothing but a new census. The Turkish Government could not accept this.

7. Mr. Reid pointed out that it was an essential preliminary to any election that accurate registers of voters should be drawn up on the basis of existing facts. The commission had very carefully gone into the text of the Fundamental Law, and had come to the conclusion that their draft law was the only way of establishing the communities accurately and objectively and of protecting the electors against intimidation or undue pressure. He saw the strongest practical objections to the Turkish proposals. Mr. Reid added that, as a result of close experience and of his personal investigations on conditions in the sanjak, he was satisfied that there would be no difficulty—except in a very few cases—of deciding clearly and definitely to what community each voter belonged.

8. I reminded the committee that the task before us was to decide precisely what was meant by the Fundamental Law. There was a clear-cut distinction between the establishment of facts and the holding of a preliminary vote which would really render the subsequent proceedings nugatory. It seemed to me that articles 9 and 10 of the Fundamental Law were quite clear, and that what was intended was simply the establishment of existing facts. The various questions regarding religion, language, &c., which the commission proposed to ask would between them furnish ample material on which to decide to what communities individual voters belonged. For that matter, no doubts had hitherto been cast upon the distinction between the various communities, and it seemed rather late to argue that they were so difficult to distinguish from each other.

9. The Belgian representative, M. Bourquèn, who had been president of the committee of experts which drafted the Fundamental Law, then virtually conceded the Turkish point by saying that it was, indeed, the case that the Turks had

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strongly objected, during the committee's discussions a year ago, to any form of census. For this reason the committee had purposely left the provisions of the Fundamental Law on this point as vague as possible, and he thought that there was no doubt that the intention of the committee had been that individuals should be free to state to which community they wished to belong, without being bound by the actual facts of the situation. I subsequently understood, from M. de Haller, that this was a very incomplete and misleading account of the situation, but it naturally made it much more difficult to continue to argue the case on the basis of the Fundamental Law.

10. The discussion was eventually adjourned with this point left in suspense.

11. The next morning the committee met again at 10, without M. Bourquèn, and took the Electoral Commission's draft article by article. It is unnecessary to record here the various points which arose, as they are all fully dealt with in the minutes. Generally speaking, the Turks concentrated on reducing the powers and scope of the Electoral Commission, and on producing new regulations which would have had the effect of giving unofficial organisations—and particularly those of the Turkish community—greater power and freedom.

12. The most important points discussed were all connected with the question of the representation, &c., of the various communities, and an important discussion took place over the question of the appointment of representatives of the committee to attend and watch the electoral proceedings. The Turks pressed for the insertion of provisions by which these representatives should be appointed by the communities themselves without the intervention or approval of the Electoral Commission. Mr. Reid pointed out that this would lead to endless trouble, since the communities were much divided into parties and factions, and the only satisfactory way of selecting their representatives was to do so by getting the various parties to choose representatives and appoint a certain number of suitable individuals from the resulting panel. M. Numan gave no indication of the system by which he contemplated that the communities should "elect" their representatives without the intervention of the commission. M. Numan also pressed very strongly that an opportunity should be given for representatives of every community, without exception, to attend the electoral proceedings in every district, irrespective of what communities were represented in that district. It soon became clear that the result of this would be to enable the Turkish Government to send specially selected Turks from Turkey to every polling station in the sanjak, whereas, in certain cases, the non-Turkish communities would have the greatest difficulty in finding suitable men to send to districts where they were not represented. Moreover, it turned out that the League Commission had already appointed community representatives, and that in many cases these would, under the Turkish proposals, have to be dismissed, with great resulting confusion.

G. W. RENDEL.

Geneva, March 9, 1938.

[E 1358/29/89]

No. 77.

ALEXANDRETTA.

*Proceedings of the Committee of the Council appointed to revise Redraft Electoral Law, March 1938. Note No. 1.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 11.)*

(Confidential Record by Mr. G. W. Rendel.)

WE received on Saturday, the 5th March, both by air mail from the League of Nations and from the Turkish Embassy, copies of the Turkish redraft of the proposed Electoral Law. We studied this in the train in consultation with Mr. Reid, who travelled with us. It was clear that there was only one point of major importance, i.e., the question of the method of registration of electors by communities. Once this has been carried out, the relative proportions in the

Chamber of Turks, Alawites, Arabs, &c., will be permanently decided, and all the elaborate machinery for the election of particular individuals will be of little importance. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Turkish redraft should have concentrated on altering in this respect the provisions of the draft law prepared by the Electoral Commission. The effect of the Turkish redraft would be to remove all checks and precautions against intimidation, &c., and, in practice, to ensure an overwhelming majority for the Turkish community. Mr. Reid regarded the law as going far beyond even what he had expected the Turks to put forward, and made it clear that it would be quite impossible for him to continue to serve on the commission if anything so fraudulent were adopted. He doubted, in fact, whether it would be possible to find any kind of electoral commission, with any self-respect at all, prepared to work elections on the basis of the Turkish draft, and anticipated that if it were adopted there would be serious riots in the sanjak, involving a great deal of bloodshed.

2. Soon after our arrival in Geneva, I got into touch with the French delegation, and went with Mr. Bowker to see M. de Tesson and M. Lagarde. They asked me what I thought of the Turkish counter-draft. I replied that I had come to find out their views. They then embarked on a very lengthy explanation, which was apparently intended to justify the French attitude. They explained that the question was a purely political one and could only be decided on political grounds. It was necessary, for reasons of international politics, to meet the Turkish wishes. The decision had really been reached in January 1937, and it was impossible now to draw back.

3. They explained that the Turks at present consisted of at least 40 per cent. of the population in the sanjak, and formed a compact block. The Armenians also formed a compact block, amounting to perhaps 15 per cent. of the population. These blocks would register as Turks and Armenians respectively, irrespective of any provisions contained in the draft law. But the other communities were more difficult to define. There were all kinds of gradations between them, and the Turks would almost certainly have succeeded in obtaining a majority in any case after a few years. No real injury would be done to Syria if this majority were secured for them at once. The French were therefore prepared to concede to the Turks a majority of 52 or 53, or even 55 per cent., and they were quite prepared, for political reasons, to accept any electoral law which would secure this result.

4. I said that, as I read the Turkish counter-project, there was no question of its merely giving the Turks a 55 per cent. majority. As far as I could see, if it were adopted, the Turks would get a 70 or 80 per cent. majority without any difficulty at all. This majority would be entirely artificial, but it would enable the Turks to do what they liked with the sanjak. It would be very easy for them to arrange that an ostensibly spontaneous demand should then be put forward for a plebiscite, and that this plebiscite should spontaneously ask for union with Turkey. It would not be easy to resist this, but once the Turks had got the sanjak in full sovereignty, would they not apply the same arguments and the same procedure to get control of other areas, and to put forward claims to Mosul? The French themselves might be affected by this, since they had a nearly 24 per cent. share in Mosul oil, and these developments might therefore cause a good deal of inconvenience and disturbance all round. Was it wise, then, to yield so readily and so completely to the Turks, and should we not, by giving in to what was admitted by everyone concerned to be nothing more than blackmail, be starting a process which it might be extremely difficult to arrest?

5. M. de Tesson and M. Lagarde said that, of course, it would not do at all for the Turks to get so large a majority as 70 or 80 per cent. But would they, in fact, do this? Could not a system be devised by which the process of registering electors under different communities should be carried out confidentially? I said that it seemed to me that this would be most difficult to do, and that I thought the French would be wise, in their own interest, not to give way to the Turks too readily on every point.

6. We then discussed the procedure to be adopted in the committee. The French had apparently at first thought of not taking the Electoral Commission's law as a basis. I pointed out the drawbacks of any other course. If we worked on the basis of the Turkish draft, the whole initiative in criticising that draft would rest with us. If, on the other hand, the Electoral Commission's draft were adopted, it would be for the Turks to raise objection to passages they



disapproved of and to justify their objections, which it might be difficult for them in certain cases to do. It was agreed, in these circumstances, that it would be best to take the Electoral Commission's draft as a basis.

7. I then went with Mr. Bowker to see M. de Haller, whom I found with M. Westman. M. Westman was very indignant when I told him of the French attitude. He felt that we owed it to the League and to ourselves to produce at any rate a measure of honesty in the new law, and that merely to design a law for the purpose of giving the Turks an artificial majority would be quite out of the question. In his view, the essential thing was for the three neutral members of the committee to stick together. If the French and Turks wished to agree on a fraudulent law, it would be possible for the three neutral members of the committee to wash their hands of the business and refer it back to the Council.

8. M. de Haller was somewhat nervous of this procedure, as he pointed out that the three neutral members were acting as representatives of their countries, and that it would be impossible, therefore, for the delegates of those countries on the Council to take a different line from that taken by the representatives of those countries on the committee. He agreed, however, that we must certainly work on the basis of the Electoral Commission's law, and that this would, in fact, be in accordance with all League precedents and with the resolution of the Council of last January. He was anxious to arrange for Mr. Reid to be called in to give any necessary explanations. M. Westman and I supported this suggestion.

9. At M. de Haller's suggestion, I then went and saw M. Avenol, whom I found very disturbed about the whole question. He said that it was likely to bring little credit on the League and to produce an extremely difficult, if not disastrous, situation later on. Enough harm had already been done by the creation of the Danzig question. This question was a close parallel, but in his view more dangerous. He felt that the French attitude was short-sighted and unwise in the extreme, and showed no political judgment. The Turks imagined that they were so necessary to us and to the League that they could ask whatever they liked. It was a great mistake to encourage them in this attitude, which could only lead to increasing trouble. It would certainly do no good to the League if it were now to give its blessing to an entirely fraudulent electoral law. I cordially agreed, and said that it seemed to me an exceedingly anomalous and peculiar proceeding to decide first on who was to have a majority and of what size and then to arrange the electoral law afterwards. I did not think the neutral members of the committee would be able to subscribe to a law merely designed for such a purpose. At the same time, this might mean referring the question back to the Council, which, of course, would give a great deal of trouble.

10. M. Avenol said that he saw no objection at all to the matter being referred back to the Council. In fact, he thought there would be many advantages if the question were to be reopened before the Council. He had never liked the decision that had been reached, but had hesitated to interfere lest he should be accused of partiality on the ground of his nationality. He had been wrong, and he now felt that he owed it to the League to keep a watchful eye on this question. If the matter were referred back to the Council, it might be possible to obtain an entirely new solution, such as the partition of the sanjak, which was the solution he had always advocated, and which would, in his view, be far less dangerous in the end than the solution now in contemplation, which would be merely the beginning of our troubles.

11. It was agreed that the committee should meet at 4 o'clock this afternoon, and that Mr. Reid should be available to give any explanations which might be required, though M. de Haller anticipated that the Turks would object to his presence.

G. W. RENDEL.

Geneva, March 7, 1938.

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No. 78.

*Records of Leading Personalities in Syria and the Lebanon.*

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4. Michel Akras.
5. Naim Antaki.
6. Mar Ignatius Aphram I.
7. Dr. Yussef Aractingi.
8. Najib Armanazi.
9. Amir Adel Arslan.
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16. Atta Bey al Ayyoubi.
17. Raouf al Ayyoubi.
18. Abd al Kader al Azm.
19. Abd al Kader al Muayyad al Azm.
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21. Khaled al Azm.
22. Nazih al Muayyad al Azm.
23. Wasseq al Muayyad al Azm.
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31. Negib Agha Barazi.
32. Moustapha Barmada.
33. Fakhri Baroudi.
34. Dr. Albert Beylouni.
35. Abud Combaz.
36. Sheikh Dahham al Hadi.
37. Antoine Eddeh.
38. Haj Sami Sayem al Dahr.
39. Salim Djambart.
40. Hassan Bey Djebbana.
41. Michael Elian.
42. Mgr. Antoine Faraj.
43. Amir Fa'ur bin Mahmoud al Fa'ur.
44. Said al Ghazzi.
45. Lutfi Haffar.
46. Taufiq Haiyani.
47. Yussuf al Hakim.
48. Hassan Bey al Hakkim.
49. Shakir al Hanbali.
50. Abu al Huda al Hassibi.
51. Ahmad Hassib al Hassibi.
52. Subhi al Hassibi.
53. Grégoire Hindié.
54. Henri Hindié.
55. Edmond Hornsy.

56. Youhanna Houbbi.
57. Rashid al Hussami.
58. Hussein al Ibish.
59. Nuri al Ibish.
60. Haasan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha.
61. Yussef al 'Isa.
62. Said Bey Ishak.
63. Ihsan Bey el Jabri.
64. Sa'adullah al Jabri.
65. Amir Ja'far al Jezairi.
66. Amir Said al Jezairi.
67. Ata al Kassem.
68. Abdurrahman Kayali.
69. Rushdi Kekhia.
70. Sheikh Abdul Qader Keyhani.
71. Nessib Keyhani.
72. Behij al Khattib.
73. Zeki al Khatib.
74. Faiz al Khoury.
75. Farès al Khoury.
76. Nazem Koudsi.
77. Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Kueishish.
78. Mohammed Kurd Ali.
79. Mustafa Bey Kusseiri.
80. Kyrillos IX, Mughabghab.
81. Yussef Liniado.
82. Said Mahasin.
83. Sami Maidani.
84. Dr. Abdul Rahman Malak-Zadé.
85. Haidar Mardam Bey.
86. Jamil Mardam.
87. Sami Pasha Mardam.
88. Nebih el Martini.
89. Bedros Milletbashian.
90. Sheikh Meizan bin Abdul Muheisen.
91. Emir Moustapha el Chehabi.
92. Bedi al Muayyad.
93. Mohamed Khalil Mudarres.
94. Amir Mujhem bin Muheid.
95. Habib Na'asaneh.
96. Mohammed Nahas.
97. Rahmo Nahmad.
98. Damad Ahmed Namy.
99. Hamdi al Nasr.
100. Sheikh Nawwaf al Salih bin Sharkh.
101. Raphael Nimr.
102. Sherif al Nuss.
103. Nuzhat al Mamlouk.
104. Mahomet Aref Quwatli.
105. Shukri Quwatli.
106. Edmond Rabbath.
107. Sheikh Rakan bin Murshed.
108. Sheikh 'Id Rawwaf.
109. Mazhar Reslan.
110. Khalil Rifant.
111. Mahomet Ali Ridha al Rikabi.
112. Macarios Saba.



113. Rushdi al Safadi.
114. Georges Sahnaoui.
115. Riza Said.
116. Sheikh Abdel Kader Sarmini.
117. Dr. Mohamed al Sarraj.
118. César Sayegh.
119. Amir Fawwaz Sha'alan.
120. Amir Nuri Sha'alan.
121. Dr. Abdul Rahman Shabbandar.
122. Taufiq Shamie.
123. Amir Bahjat al Shehabi.
124. Ihsan Sherif.
125. Mousallam Sioufi.
126. Mgr. Iyuni Stati.
127. Herant Sulahian.
128. Afif al Sulh.
129. Ardavazt Surmeyan.
130. Alexandros Tahhan.
131. Sheikh Taj ed Dine al Hassani.
132. Jemil al Ulshi.
133. Sheikh Yahya Zamaita.
134. Mohammed Said al Yussef.
135. Louis Ziade.

#### Chapter II.—Lebanese Personalities.

1. Habib Abi Chahla.
2. Sobhi Aboul Nasser.
3. Nejib Aboussouan.
4. Mgr. Pierre Antoine Arida.
5. Amir Majid Arslan.
6. Amir Rafik Arslan.
7. Amir Khalil Bellama.
8. Ahmed Berjawi.
9. Abdullah Beyhum.
10. Assad Bustany.
11. Amir Fayek Chehab.
12. Amir Jemil Chehab.
13. Amir Khaled Chehab.
14. Omar Daouk.
15. Emile Eddé.
16. Hussein Bey el Ahdab.
17. Khair ed Din El Ahdab.
18. Sayyed Ahmed El Hussein.
19. Colonel Sheikh Khalil El Khazen.
20. Sheikh Beshara Bey El Khouri.
21. Sheikh Sami El Khouri.
22. Captain Nur ed Din Rifahi.
23. Habib Pasha El Saad.
24. Riad El Solh.

#### Chapter I.—SYRIAN PERSONALITIES.

##### (Damascus and Aleppo Consular Districts.)

1. *Mehmet Ali Bey al Abed*.—Born 1874. A son of Ahmet Izzet Pasha al Abed, the power behind the throne of "Abdul the Damned." Of Kurdish extraction (which he is anxious to forget). A prudent pan-Arabist. At one time was employed in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, and for six glorious weeks was Turkish Minister in Washington. Spent the war in Switzerland and on the Côte d'Azur encouraging, at a safe distance, the Allied cause. Was elected President of the Syrian Republic in 1932 as a neutral. Has two good-for-nothing sons and an intelligent but indiscreet daughter who, by pan-Arab zeal and advanced nymphomania, worries her parents and by outspoken affection for the English (especially unmarried British liaison officers!) offends the French. Resigned from presidency bowing before the minatory attitude of the Nationalist *bloc*, which sought to make speedy way for Hashim al Atassy (*q.v.*) December 21, 1936. A wily old man who, like Mr. Jingle, "hides the grin of cunning beneath the mask of friendship." No longer of any political account. (February 1938.)

25. Dr. Nicolas Fayad.
26. Dr. Kamel Gargour.
27. Sheikh Mustafa Ghalaini.
28. Ibrahim Haider.
29. Sobhi Haider.
30. Georges Haimari.
31. Sheikh Hussein Hamadi.
32. Gabriel Kabbaz.
33. Sheikh Tewfik Khaled.
34. Khalil Kseib.
35. Musa Moubarak.
36. Musa Nammour.
37. Izzed Din Omari.
38. Dr. Ayoub Tabet.
39. Georges Tabet.
40. Selim Tacla.
41. Pierre Trad.
42. Gebran Tueni.

#### Chapter III.—French Officials.

1. Bailly, Pierre.
2. Bonnot, Commandant.
3. Bringuier, Col. Henri.
4. Colombani, François.
5. David, Philippe.
6. Dewatre, Lieutenant.
7. Dubecq, Henry.
8. Fanquenot, Emile, M.B.E.
9. Fernet, Rear-Admiral.
10. Forgeois, Gaston.
11. Fougère, Général de Division.
12. Garreau, Roger.
13. Gennardi, P.
14. Hauteclocque, G.-M.-F., Comte de.
15. Huntzinger, Général.
16. Kieffer, Louis.
17. Lafond, Pierre.
18. De Martel, Count.
19. Mentque, Jean, Vicomte de.
20. Meyrier, Jacques.
21. Monet, Général.
22. Noiret, Général E.
23. Purifié, Paul.
24. Reclus, O.
25. De Sandfort, Barthe.
26. Seyrig, Henri.
27. Valluy, Claude.
28. Vasselet, Paul.

2. *Suleyman Sylvain Abouchar*.—Born about 1890. Greek Orthodox. Son of Naaman Bey Abouchar. Received his secondary education as a civil engineer in the United States. Chief engineer of the Public Works Department. Has had experience in Mexico. Speaks French and English. Intelligent, capable, straight. Very hot-tempered and dislikes being contradicted. (May 1936.)

3. *Mahomed Bey Adali*.—Born about 1857. One of the most prominent and influential Turkish notables of Antioch. A francophile, he was Deputy for Antioch in the Constituent Assembly, 1928, and Minister of Agriculture and Economics in Taj-ed-Din's Cabinet from 1934 to 1936. Again elected Deputy for Antioch in 1936 after the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, he has been pilloried by the Turks in the sanjak for supposedly pandering to the Syrian Nationalists and his house at Antioch was attacked by them in 1937. (January 1938.)

4. *Michel Akras*.—Maronite Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Maronite College at Beirut. Concealed certain British consular archives during the war. Francophil. (July 1936.)

5. *Naim Antaki*.—Born 1900. Educated in the American University, Beirut. Of the Greek Orthodox communion. A lawyer, he formerly worked with Maître Louis Ziadé and was at one time dean of the Order of Barristers at Aleppo. Has visited India. Secretary to the Syrian delegation in Paris for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. On his return he became in July 1937 Director of Foreign Affairs, but resigned in December 1937, being dissatisfied with the way in which he was ignored by his Moslem colleagues whenever important decisions were to be taken. Formerly an ardent Nationalist, his views are now considerably more moderate. (January 1938.)

6. *Mar Ignatius Aphram I*.—Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Patriarch of Antioch. Born 1884. Educated by the Dominicans at Mosul and received into the Roman Catholic communion. Subsequently reverted to his original church and was ordained in it. A travelled and cultured man who avoids partisanship. Now resides permanently at Homs. (January 1938.)

7. *Dr. Yussef Aractingi*.—Born about 1885. Educated at Jesuit College in Beirut. Director of Public Health. In the Turkish Army Medical Corps during the war. A mine of inaccurate information on Bedouin and Syrian customs and folk-lore. A poor doctor but an ardent Francophil. (May 1936.)

8. *Najib Armanazi*.—Born about 1900. From Hama. Docteur en Droit ("à titre d'étranger") of Paris. Was private secretary to President Abed, and so anathema to Taj-ed Dine, who persuaded de Martel to oblige Abed to get rid of him. Now 100 per cent. Nationalist. Appointed private secretary to President Atassy in 1937. (February 1938.)

9. *Amir Adel Arslan*.—Born about 1890. A Druse. Was pro-Turk in the war and enjoyed a kaïmakamship in the Lebanon. Member of the Party of Independence 1919-20. Took an active part in the rebellion of 1925-26, and was condemned to death by the French. Amnestied in 1937. Expelled from Egypt in 1931 after anti-Italian agitations. Lived for some years in Iraq. Accompanied Syrian Prime Minister to Paris in 1937 to discuss ratification of Franco-Syrian Treaty, and subsequently returned to Syria, where he received a warm welcome. Holds no Government post at present. Has for several times visited the United Kingdom, where he has business interests. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Is inclined to be pro-British. (February 1938.)

10. *Amir Shekib Arslan*.—Born about 1882. Druse. Brother of Abel (*q.v.*). Was a kaïmakam of the Shouf in the Lebanon during the war. Collected £700 for war fund of General Officer Commanding Damascus. Proposed the disarmament of the Maronites. Wrote violent anti-British articles in the *Sharq* newspaper of Damascus. Is credited with recommending to Jemal Pasha the hanging of the Syrian Nationalists. Was condemned to death by French court-martial for participation in 1925-26 rebellion. Fled to Palestine and then to Switzerland. Pardoned in April 1937 and returned to Syria a month later. At one time member of the Syrian Nationalist delegation at Geneva. With Ihsan Jahri (*q.v.*) published, when in Geneva, an incendiary and puerile journal



called the *Nation Arabe*. During the Abyssinian war was bought lock, stock and barrel by Italian Intelligence Service. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Intelligent, self-seeking, treacherous. (February 1938.)

11. *Fathalla Assioun*.—A local lawyer of Armenian origin. Moderate. Of the Armenian Catholic faith. Born 1899. Elected an Aleppo Deputy. (December 1936.)

12. *Hashem al Atassy*.—Born about 1865. Of Homs; good landed family. Prime Minister and president of the Constituent Assembly under Feisal, and president of the Constituent Assembly of 1928. Went to Mecca to be one of the three mediators in conflict between Imam Yahia and Ibn Saud. Succeeded Hanano as leader of the Syrian Nationalist *bloc* in January 1936. Led the Syrian delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty after the disturbances of January-March 1936. A Nationalist who tempers courage with discretion. With the Syrian delegation in Paris his moderating and soothing influence was of great assistance to the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Elected President of the Syrian Republic December 21, 1936. (March 1937.)

13. *Abdul Ghafar Pasha al Atrash*.—Born about 1880. A Druse from Jebel Druse (Suweida). Took part in rebellion of 1925 together with Nassib al Bakri (*q.v.*) and Sultan Atrash (*q.v.*). True to the Druse tradition of having a member of the family in each camp, Abdul Ghafar discovered French sympathies when the rebellion failed, and was one of the first to offer his submission. Beyond the three members of the Atrash family, it is doubtful whether any Druse took an interest in the broader questions of Syrian unity, or in anything except his own affairs. Co-operated with French Intelligence Service in Syria in encouraging the idea of Druse autonomy and non-inclusion in Syrian Republic. Since the advent to power of the Nationalists is rapidly changing his spots. Self-seeking and has little influence. (March 1937.)

14. *Hassan al Atrash*.—Born about 1880. A rising personality in the Jebel Druse, in the running for the appointment of Mohafiz. A cousin of Sultan al Atrash (*q.v.*). At present supporting the Syrian Nationalists, but he is notoriously a political opportunist. (February 1938.)

15. *Sultan bin Hamud Pasha al Atrash*.—Born about 1875. (Sultan is a name, not a title.) Family originally from Rashaya. Migrated to Jebel Druse in the 1860's and became the paramount Druse family in the Jebel Druse. Sultan is generally regarded as the head of the family, though his cousin Hassan al Atrash (*q.v.*) appears to be ousting him. Under the Turks Sultan displayed craftiness and avoided open conflict with the Vali of Damascus. He adopted a less compromising attitude with the French, and in 1925-26, although not, perhaps, the soul and direction of the revolt against the mandatory, was certainly the centre around which the various insurgent leaders moved. When the revolt was crushed Sultan fled to Transjordan, where he found political sanctuary although condemned to death by French court-martial. He was amnestied in April 1937 and returned to Syria and threw in a half-hearted lot with the Syrian Nationalist party, leaving the field clear for his cousin Hassan to dominate the Druses of the Jebel. Has but a rudimentary education and of less than average intelligence; he is crafty, treacherous and inspires confidence as a leader of banditti. Lives in the hope of returning to the enjoyment of his past influence with the advent of his erstwhile rebel associate Dr. Shahbandar (*q.v.*). (February 1938.)

16. *Ata Bey al Ayyoubi*.—Born about 1877. Head of the old and well-to-do Damascus family of Ayyoubi; claims to be Ansari. Was Mutessarif of Lattakia and Kaimakam of Rasheya in the time of the Turks. Director of the Ministry of the Interior under Haqqi al Azm (*q.v.*) 1921-24, and Minister of Justice under Subhi Bey Barakat (*q.v.*) 1924-25. Has gained the reputation of being honest. Affects pro-Turkish sentiments and is thought pro-French by the Nationalists. Entered abortive elections December 1931 on Sheikh Taj ed Dine's list, but did not stand in those of 1932. Made Minister of Justice under Taj ed Dine's Government, March 1934. Nominated by French to be Prime Minister to replace Taj ed Dine after the disturbances of the spring of 1936. Is on the board of

directors of the National Cement Company. In Turkish times he was an Arab-phobe—this has not been forgotten by the pan-Arabists. Resigned the office of Prime Minister in December 1936 to make way for a purely Nationalist Government. A pleasant person and an experienced administrator. Generally liked. (March 1937.)

17. *Raouf al Ayyoubi*.—Born about 1880. Cousin of Ata al Ayyoubi (*q.v.*). Mutessarif of Damascus and Administrative Inspector 1922-25. Minister of the Interior on reshuffling of Damad's Ministry 1927. Man of no consequence politically. (December 1935.)

18. *Abd al Kader al Azm*.—Born about 1885. Rector of the Syrian University. Mixed at one time in politics, and in 1927 was Minister of Finance, but soon returned to the university, where he enjoys universal consideration. (March 1937.)

19. *Abd al Kader al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1865. Azm family of Damascus and Hama. Brother of Shefik Bey al Azm, who was hanged by the Turks as a traitor during the war. Rich landed proprietor. He is the father-in-law of Abdul Rahman Shahbandar (*q.v.*). Good manners and reputation. (March 1937.)

20. *Haqqi al Azm*.—Born about 1875. President of the Conseil d'Etat. First Governor of the State of Syria (1921-24). One of the French nominees for 1932 elections and accepted by the Nationalists. Made Prime Minister in the first Parliament (1932). Found his Cabinet too much for him and resigned in 1934, when he was replaced by Taj el Dine, the High Commissioner's appointee. He was one of the original members of the "Arab Club," but to-day manages to compress his Nationalist ideals within a French frame. Owns cotton lands in Egypt which, although heavily mortgaged, yield him a modest income. A wise old man but spineless. (May 1936.)

21. *Khaled al Azm*.—Born about 1895. Son of Mohammed Pasha al Azm. Does not take an active part in politics except an occasional intervention in agricultural matters. Member of the municipal council. Managing director of the National Cement Factory. A mild pan-Arabian. Enjoys considerable popularity. Has pronounced pro-German sympathies. (March 1936.)

22. *Nazib al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1896. Brother-in-law of Dr. Shahbandar. A rebel leader in 1925, but pro-French before that date. Prepared to work with Rikabi or Shahbandar or Haqqi al Azm against Nationalists in Syria, and has a cordial dislike for the Syrian Party of Independence in Egypt. Changes his mind every twenty-four hours. Was sentenced to death by court-martial in 1926 in his absence, but had already fled the country. He was pardoned in 1931. Now said to be in the service of the Imam Yahia. (April 1936.)

23. *Wasseq al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1885. Was in Turkish diplomatic service and occasionally Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid until 1919. From 1923 Director of Public Domains. Minister of Agriculture under Damad 1926, and Minister of the Interior after the split 1927. Appointed Director of Police 1928. Administrator of the liwa and president of the municipality 1929. Promoted Director of Cadastral Survey Department 1934. Now Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Hopes to be first Syrian Minister in Paris. Married to an Englishwoman of lower middle classes who is a devoted mother to his children. Heavily in debt. Starves his family to maintain his mistresses. A prig; for ever boasting of his achievements. (February 1938.)

24. *Adil al Azmeh*.—Born about 1882. A *diplomé* of the Turkish School of Law. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Internal Affairs. Obtained his appointment under the Nationalist Government in recognition of his services to the Syrian cause whilst a political refugee in Transjordan, where he formed with his brother, Nabih al Azmeh (*q.v.*), the "Istiqlal party," whose first objective was the expulsion of the French from Syria. During the 1925-26 revolt in Syria he collected, as treasurer of his party, large sums of money from Palestine, Transjordan and other countries. After keeping more than half himself, he provided the rebels in Syria with money and arms on a considerable scale. His



flagrant abuse of British political asylum earned him a contumacious condemnation by French court-martial. He was included in the general amnesty of 1937. On his return he was acclaimed as a great patriot and given high office. Back in Syria he used his influence to repay the consideration he had received from the British authorities in Transjordan and Palestine by facilitating the supply of arms and ammunition to the rebels in Palestine during the disturbances of 1936 and in 1937 of going a step farther in employing the Syrian Government machinery, from his key position in the Ministry of the Interior, to assist the recruitment of bandits in Syria for thuggery in Palestine. As unscrupulous with his friends as with his enemies. (February 1938.)

25. *Nabih al Azmeh*.—Born about 1876. Head of the "Palestine Defence Committee" in Damascus, prominent member of the Syrian Nationalist bloc, brother of Adil al Azmeh (*q.v.*). Graduated from Turkish Military Academy in 1900. His advance in Turkish army was slow as he was only a lieutenant when the war broke out in 1914. Was taken prisoner by British forces in 1916, but obtained his release to join the Amir Feisal's followers, where, like the Duke of Plaza Toro, he led from the rear. When Feisal was placed in charge of the "Occupied Enemy Territory East," he was made chief of police, but fled Syria on the French occupation in 1920. He was made welcome by the Amir Abdullah as a political refugee. He and his brother formed the "Istiqlal party" in Transjordan. This led to his banishment, and he went to the Hejaz, then to Egypt and so to Palestine, where he continued to foment trouble in Syria. He was one of the first of the Syrians amnestied in the general amnesty of 1937 to return to Damascus. In August and September under the direction of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini, and in concert with the Palestinian Muni al Madi, he organised the anti-British pan-Arab Congress of Bludan. He has, in an astonishingly short time, considerably enriched himself from the subscriptions obtained by the "Palestine Defence Committee." A thoroughly contemptible rascal who has betrayed his friends one after another. (February 1938.)

26. *Salah al Din Bey Baki*.—Born at Alexandretta, leader of the Arab Nationalist party in the sanjak. Good social position. Anti-French. (January 1938.)

27. *Fozi al Bakri*.—Born about 1880. Was president of the Arab Club in Turkish times. Was condemned *in absentia* by Turkish court-martial in 1916. Eldest son of Ata Bey al Bakri, landed family claiming descent from the second Caliph. During the war the Emir Feisal stayed in his house. After fleeing before Turkish retribution he joined in the Arab revolt 1917. Took leading part in the 1925 rebellion, but was specially amnestied at Taj-ed-Dine's request in 1928. Failed in the 1932 parliamentary elections. Overshadowed in politics by his younger brother, Nassib al Bakri (*q.v.*). A xenophobe. (May 1936.)

28. *Nassib al Bakri*.—Born about 1885. Governor of the Jebel Druse. Younger brother of Fozi al Bakri (*q.v.*). Acted at one time as honorary Chancellor to the Shereef (afterwards King) Hussein. Joined in Arab revolt 1918. Chief secretary of Feisal after occupation. One of the leaders of the 1925 revolt. Amnestied with his brother. Elected in 1931 to Syrian Parliament as moderate Nationalist and as a full-blooded Nationalist in 1936 elections. An ardent supporter of pan-Arabism. The gross political blunder of the French authorities in banishing him to Hassatjeh in January 1936 raised him to the pedestal of a popular hero who had suffered for the cause. Because of this he has, at present, considerable political influence. Appointed Mohafiz of the Jebel Druse in January 1937 in recognition of his devotion to the Nationalist cause. Forced by violent Druse opposition to relinquish the post shortly afterwards. Owns some property in Palestine. (February 1938.)

29. *Subhi Barakat*.—Born about 1886. Once an undistinguished officer in the Turkish army, which he hastily deserted in an Arab cloak on the approach of the British forces in 1918, now one of the foremost Syrian politicians. He has played, always unsuccessfully, many parts; rebel leader against the French in the Alawite territory (1920), Chief of the State of Aleppo as French nominee (1922), president of Syrian Federation (1923), and president of the Chamber—Speaker—(1932). In April 1932 a neurotic Syrian student attempted to assassinate him.

A "whole-hogger" Nationalist, and rather truculent, but is not above truckling on his own behalf. Although often distrusted, he is still a political force, and flourishes best in opposition. Socially agreeable. (March 1937.)

30. *Husni Barazi*.—Born about 1882. Son of Suleiman Agha Barazi, a rich Kurdish landed family of Hama. Minister of the Interior under Damad 1926. Deported on suspicion of assisting rebels in July 1926. Member of Constituent Assembly 1928. Opposed by Nationalists in elections of 1932 and was not elected. He was, however, appointed Minister of Education in Taj-ed-Din's Government in March 1934, and resigned with Sheikh Taj in February 1936. Appointed Mohafiz of Alexandretta in January 1937, he sought to prove his attachment to his new Nationalist masters by intriguing with the Arab parties in the sanjak against the Turks and the mandatory, but was ejected in November 1937, when the new statute of the sanjak came into force. Reported to have been appointed Mohafiz of the Jezireh, January 1938. (January 1938.)

31. *Negib Agha Barazi*.—Born about 1862. A Kurd. A landlord of Hama. Moderate in politics, but elected in 1932 as Nationalist Deputy. The wealthiest inhabitant of Hama. A political nonentity. (March 1936.)

32. *Moustapha Barmada*.—Born about 1885. From Aleppo. Governor of that town in 1921-22 and senior member of the Bar. Nationalist. Does not appear in politics nowadays. Of no account, not even among his colleagues of the Bar. (March 1936.)

33. *Fakhri Baroudi*.—Born 1893. Rich Damascene family. Strong Nationalist. Narrowly escaped execution in 1925-26. Leader of local youth and *intelligentsia*. Deputy in 1932, and a man of sincere convictions. Possesses considerable rhetorical powers in low Arabic which the crowd understands. Was exiled by the French during the 1936 troubles; this only served to increase his political popularity. Unbalanced and rather a windbag. A heavy drinker and a man of coarse tastes whom the Nationalist party would be glad to drop. Is "Inspector-General" of the Iron Shirt organisation. (March 1937.)

34. *Dr. Albert Beylouni*.—Born about 1890 at Souedieh, doctor of medicine, has a good social position at Antioch and is leader of the Arab Orthodox Community. Formerly a supporter of Subhi Barakat (No. 24), after the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty he came to an understanding with the Alaouite leader, Zeki Arsouzi, and adopted the policy of union of all the Arab parties of the sanjak in opposition to the Turks. (January 1938.)

35. *Abud Combaz*.—Born 1890. Native of Aleppo. Greek Catholic. Served with the Foreign Legion and took part in the Verdun fighting in 1916. Professional letter-writer. Said to be a police-spy. Has recently organised a body of Christian young men known as the "White-Shirts" as a counter-movement to the Nationalist private militia known as the "Steel-Shirts." Suspected of having promoted the sanguinary incidents of October 1936, he was imprisoned for over forty days and subsequently released by order of the High Commission. Now living a retired life and believed to be a French secret agent. (January 1938.)

36. *Sheikh Dahham al Hadi*.—Born about 1896. Bedouin chief. Deputy-head of Al Jarba-Shummar confederation. He is the first cousin of Sheikh Meizan (*q.v.*), paramount chief of the confederation. Elected Deputy for the Jezirah tribes December 1936 (March 1937.)

37. *Antoine Eddeh*.—Born about 1895. Greek Catholic by religion. Chief secretary of the Municipality of Damascus. Specially appointed by the mandatory Power to exercise effective control of the whole administration. He draws a higher salary than his chief, Tewfiq-el-Haiyani, the Mohafiz. The Nationalists are for ever seeking to have him displaced as his influence is feared and alleged to be pro-French. A man of considerable ability and an indefatigable worker. (May 1936.)

38. *Haj Sami Sayem al Dahr*.—Born 1896. Wealthy industrialist, and head of a weaving business. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry. Has contributed largely to the Nationalist party funds, but takes little part in politics. (January 1938.)



39. *Salim Djambart*.—Born 1873. Merchant. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce. Formerly Syrian Minister of Public Works, but resigned in 1933 since he was not prepared to endorse M. de Martel's draft treaty. A moderate Nationalist, he was defeated in the last Syrian elections and is now considered as a member of the Opposition party. (March 1937.)

40. *Hassan Bey Djebbara*.—Born about 1897 at Alexandretta, where he was educated in the French Collège des Frères. Worked in the Deutsche Palestina Bank and on the Bagdad Railway before the war. After the armistice he supported the French, and in 1924 was appointed Director of the Finance Department in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Went to Geneva in 1937 to assist the League of Nations experts in drawing up the statute of the sanjak. An opportunist and self-seeker, he has supported the Alaouite element in the sanjak which he has done much to organise. (January 1938.)

41. *Michael Elian*.—Born 1900. Professes the most extreme form of nationalism. Spendthrift. Trimmer. Appointed "Garçon d'Honneur" of Nation's Home at Aleppo. (January 1938.)

42. *Mgr. Antoine Faraj*.—Born about 1884. Greek Catholic Vicar Patriarchal. Damascene. An intriguer, without influence. (March 1936.)

43. *Amir Fa'ur bin Mahmoud al Fa'ur*.—Born about 1900. Chief of the El Fadl Bedouin (sedentary), near Lake Hula. Friend of Amir Said Jezairi (q.v.). The lands of his tribe are astride the Syria-Palestine frontier. Elected Deputy for Kuneitra, December 1936. Strongly suspected of being engaged in smuggling arms and men to Palestine during the disturbances of 1937. (February 1938.)

44. *Said al Ghazzi*.—Born about 1895. Lawyer. Lost his popularity with the Nationalists by supporting Taj ed Dine. Pressed for Nationalist participation in 1932 elections. When negotiations with High Commissioner's delegate came to a deadlock (Ihsan Sherif insisting on standing), Said al Ghazi withdrew his own candidature. Reputation enhanced by not being a party to the subsequent deals. Withdrew a second time in favour of Afif al Sulh in July by-election. Included in Ata Bey al Ayyoubi's Cabinet as Minister of Finance in March 1936. Refused the post of Mohafiz of Lattakia, January 1937. Appointed Director-General of Ministry of National Economy. Good-natured, intelligent, comfortably off. Too colourless to be either useful or dangerous. (February 1938.)

45. *Lutfi Haffar*.—Born about 1890. Textile merchant. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and deported for Nationalist sympathies some months later. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the present Nationalist leaders; has a reputation for a knowledge of economics. Accepted post as Administrator of Ain Fijeh waterworks. Deputy 1932. A moderate Nationalist of ability. Elected Deputy again in 1936. Elected Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. (February 1938.)

46. *Taufik Haiyani*.—Born about 1895. From Aleppo. Kaïmakam of Douma in 1925 and Mutessarif of Hauran since 1930. Secretary to the Syrian Government after the dismissal of Sheikh Taj ed Dine. Acting Governor of Damascus during the elections of April 1932. President of the Municipality of Damascus 1936 and Mohafiz of Damascus. He is a keen official but has no friends at court. (February 1938.)

47. *Yussuf al Hakim*.—Born about 1875. Greek Orthodox from Lattakia. Brought up in the Ottoman magistrature. Was president of the Cour de Cassation but accepted interim portfolio as Minister of Justice under Damad 1926 at instance of the French High Commissioner, who promised to keep his original post for him, which was done. Still working for Damad's return as Prince of Syria. Not a bad fellow. Intelligent. Tries to hunt with the Nationalist hounds while running with the French hare. (March 1936.)

48. *Hassan Bey al Hakim*.—Born about 1886. Director-General of Moslem Wakfs (August 1937). Was an Inspector of Finance and later Director of Posts and Telegraphs in Feisal's Syrian Government (1918-20). He was held responsible for delay in sending off Feisal's reply to General Gouraud's ultimatum in July 1920. (It was the absence of a reply that provided the excuse for

General Gouraud to order the French troops to advance on Damascus.) He fled to Egypt and later went to Iraq. Then he obtained an appointment as manager of the Arab Bank's Jaffa branch. Amnestied in 1937, he returned to Damascus and received, as a loyal Nationalist, his present employment. Integrity good; politics, pan-Arab. (February 1938.)

49. *Shakir al Hanbali*.—Born about 1880. Lawyer. Mutessarif of Damascus 1924. Minister of Education under Damad 1926-27. Minister of Justice 1930. Acting Minister of the Interior 1932. Disliked by the Nationalists. Now out of office. Professor in the Syrian School of Law. Intelligent, moderate, of no moment. (March 1936.)

50. *Abu al Huda al Hassibi*.—Born about 1891. Landlord. Elected a Deputy in 1932 elections as French nominee. Re-elected as Deputy for Katana, December 1936. (March 1937.)

51. *Ahmad Hassib al Hassibi*.—Born about 1865. Naqib al Ashraf. Large properties in Katana district. Appointed President of the Municipality by his brother-in-law, Rikabi, but proved incapable. Chief of committee collecting money for relief of Arabs in Palestine after troubles in 1929. Pious. Avoids politics at present. Distinguished manners. Unpopular. Of no account. (April 1936.)

52. *Subhi al Hassibi*.—Born about 1895. Son of Ahmad al Hassibi. Agricultural engineer. Acting president of the Municipality 1925. Was at one time president of the Agricultural Bank. Now Director of the Locust Bureau. Was a member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. Strong Nationalist but not noisy. Keen on his job, intelligent and a good fellow. (April 1936.)

53. *Grégoire Hindié*.—Armenian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1895. Educated in the Armenian Seminary in Rome. Member of a wealthy Aleppo family with political connexions. A brother was at one time Minister of Finance. Formerly known as a Francophil, after his brother's resignation from the Finance Ministry he became a vehement critic of the French Administration in Syria and is now just as critical of the Syrian Nationalist Administration (January 1938.)

54. *Henri Hindié*.—Born 1899. Partner in Hindié Frères, one of the more considerable Aleppo business houses. Formerly Syrian Minister of Finance. At one time Francophil, after his resignation he became a critic of the French Administration in Syria and is now very hostile to the Syrian Nationalist Administration. (January 1938.)

55. *Edmond Homsy*.—Born 1897. Son of Albert Homsy, a private banker with interests in Egypt, and reputed to be a very rich man as wealth goes in Aleppo. The father is Roumanian consul here, and during the war was, it is said, exceedingly intimate with Jemal Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Vth Army Corps, with whom he did lucrative business; successively he has shown warm pro-Turkish, pro-German, pro-British, pro-Arab and pro-French sentiments.

The son as a young man spent a few months in Switzerland and a few months as an undergraduate at Oxford. He is of pleasant address but reputed indolent. Syrian Minister of Finance, March to October 1936. Member of the Syrian Delegation for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Elected as Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (March 1937.)

56. *Youhanna Houbbi*.—Born about 1889. Syrian Catholic Archbishop of the Jezireh. A confirmed opponent of the Syrian Nationalists and leader of the separatist movement in the Jezireh. Went to Paris in September 1937 with the Syrian Catholic Patriarch, Cardinal Tappouni, and is believed to have succeeded in securing from the French Government certain additional safeguards for the Christian minorities in the Jezireh. It is understood that the Nationalists are insisting that he should be translated by his Patriarch to a see in Iraq. (January 1938.)

57. *Rashid al Hussami*.—Born about 1881. A lawyer. Ex-procureur général of the Court of Cassation. Nationalist in feeling, but does not appear in politics. Has returned to the bar. Well respected and popular. (April 1936.)



58. *Hussein al Ibish*.—Born about 1890. A Kurd. Son of Ahmad Aga al Ibish. Well known in Cairo as dealer in race-horses. Married sister of Abdulrahman Yussef and inherited large properties near Hijane, which he farms. Hunted big game with Yussef Kemal. Takes no part in politics, but in close touch with Bedouin. Sportsman. Has had a succession of bad years with his farm, is rather short of money, has grown disheartened and seems to be going steadily downhill. (April 1936.)

59. *Nuri al Ibish*.—Born about 1895. Younger brother of Hussein. Was at Cirencester Agricultural College. Very like his brother, in whose continued misfortunes he shares. (April 1936.)

60. *Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha*.—Born 1866. Medical practitioner and expert in forensic medicine. Influential member of the Nationalist party; fanatically anti-French. Apt to attribute the difficulties of Syria to her separation from Iraq and Palestine. Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (March 1937.)

61. *Yussef al 'Isa*.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox from Jaffa. Deported by the Turks. Editor of *Alif Ba*. Leader of anti-Zionist demonstrations 1929. Syrian Monarchist in 1931-32. Thought to have been the author of a forged manifesto, said to be by Hanano, in elections of 1931. Failed in 1932 elections. Able journalist. Probably, like his kind in Syria, for sale. Has lately shown a disposition to see the wisdom of controlling his Anglophobia, which seems now to be less pronounced. His newspaper has the largest daily circulation of any Syrian paper (3,000 to 4,000). (April 1936.)

62. *Said Bey Ishak*.—Born 1897. Elected Christian Deputy for the Jezireh in 1937, despite the opposition of the Syrian Nationalists. One of the leaders of the separatist movement in the Jezireh. (January 1938.)

63. *Ihsan Bey al Jabri*.—Brother of Sa'adullah al Jabri ("Aleppo Personalities," No. 13). Deputy for Aleppo in the Parliament at Constantinople during the Turkish régime and for a time A.D.C. to the Sultan. Returned to Aleppo after the war and proceeded to Damascus, where he was Chamberlain to King Feisal during the latter's short reign. Fled with King Feisal at the time of the French occupation of Damascus, first to Palestine and then to Iraq. In 1924 he was delegated by the Syrian Arabs to go to Geneva to uphold the cause of Syrian independence at the League of Nations in company with the Druse leader, the Emir Shakib Arslan. Sentenced to permanent banishment from Syria and remained in Europe working for this cause from 1924 to 1937. Amnestied in April 1937, and appointed Mohafiz of Lattakia in November 1937, in succession to Mazhar Arslan. (January 1938.)

64. *Sa'adullah al Jabri*.—Born 1890. An extreme Nationalist who helped to organise armed opposition to the French in 1920 and has worked against them ever since. He was a member of the Syrian delegation for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty and was elected a Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. After his return from Paris he became much more moderate. He is Minister of the Interior in the present Nationalist Government and also first Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A pleasant personality combined with a certain ability. (February 1938.)

65. *Amir Ja'far al Jezairi*.—Born about 1895. Conservateur du Musée Arabe. Son of Amir Taher. Nationalist sentiments, but does not appear in politics. Cultivated, honest, but of no account. (April 1936.)

66. *Amir Said al Jezairi*.—Born about 1872. Head of the family. Proud of descent from Abd-al-Qader. Takes himself very seriously and likes to be called "Altesse." Pretends to aspire to the presidency or Kingship of Syria. Headed electricity boycott, Italian boycott and Hedjaz railway agitation during the summer of 1931. Has properties in Palestine and so likes to keep in with the British authorities. Up to the neck in debt. Narrowly escaped being sold up in 1931. His son tried to murder him in 1934, because of his supposed stinginess. Not very clever, nor entirely sane. Rather a joke with everyone. (April 1936.)

67. *Ata al Kassem*.—Born about 1884. Mufti of Damascus. Unpopular and corrupt even for a mufti. (April 1936.)

68. *Abdurrahman Kayali*.—Born 1890. Educated in the American University at Beirut. Married into the Mudarres family. King Feisal's chamberlain at Damascus. Prominent Nationalist and inclined to preach moderation. His influence is probably less than might be expected. Intelligent, but not masterful. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. Minister of Education and of Justice in the present Government. Went to Geneva in December 1936, to put forward the Arab claim for Alexandretta. Sent from Damascus to Aleppo in February 1937 to apologise to the French for the Steel-Shirts clash with the French gendarmerie. Known for his peaceful feelings. (March 1937.)

69. *Rushdi Kekkha*.—A youth with ardent Nationalist tendencies. Born 1905. Belongs to a well-known Moslem family. Elected an Aleppo Deputy. (December 1936.)

70. *Sheikh Abdul Qader Keylani*.—Born about 1875. Of Hama. Descendant of 14th century namesake. Rich and respected family. Had a legal training in Constantinople. Deputy under Turkish régime. Minister of Agriculture under Taj ed Dine 1928-29. Nationalist. (April 1936.)

71. *Nessib Keylani*.—Born about 1896. Of Hama. Deputy for Douma in 1932. French nominee. Non-party. Not re-elected in 1936. Has almost succeeded in dissipating the sufficiency his father left him. (March 1937.)

72. *Behij al Khatib*.—Born about 1893 in the Lebanon and educated at the American Protestant College. Appointed a Government clerk in Feisal's Administration (1919-20) and went to Palestine on the occupation of Syria by the French. He returned in 1923 and obtained a minor Government post. During the revolt of 1925-26 Behij Bey served in the Ministry of the Interior and earned the reputation of being a pro-French official. He afterwards served under Sheikh Taj ed Dine in 1928 and as private secretary to Hakki Bey al Azm in 1932, thus incurring the displeasure of the Nationalist party. He was then sent as Mutesarrif to Deir-az-Zor until 1934, when Sheikh Taj ed Dine, once more Prime Minister, appointed him Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior. He also filled the posts of head of the municipality and Director-General of Police. In 1937 the Nationalist party, who had come into power, dislodged him on account of his alleged pro-French sympathies. He was, however, retained in Government service on French insistence and did much to quieten down the situation in the Jebel Druse, where he went as Administrator in November 1937. He has earned the unusual reputation of being a painstaking and incorruptible public servant. He speaks both English and French fluently. (February 1938.)

73. *Zeki al Khatib*.—Born about 1890. Not known before the elections for the Constituent Assembly 1928. Lawyer. Nationalist Deputy in 1928 and 1932. Inflammatory speech on the 20th December, 1931, contributed largely to the troubles of that day. Is an extremist. Quarrelled with the Nationalists over the terms of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Not re-elected in 1936 elections. Rapidly becoming a windy nonentity. (March 1937.)

74. *Faiz al Khoury*.—Born about 1891. Greek Orthodox. Professor of Roman law. Educated by Irish Presbyterian Mission and at Beirut and in France. Originally Protestant, but converted to Orthodoxy in 1935 as latter community has representative in Chamber and Protestants have not. Elected to the Constituent Assembly 1928 as mouthpiece for his brother Farès. Nationalist, probably Xenophobe. Nationalist Deputy in 1932. Great following among university students. Played a leading part in the first session of Parliament and again during the general strike of 1936. Tempers his ambition with prudence. Re-elected Deputy, December 1936. Head of the Damascus Bar since 1936. (March 1937.)

75. *Farès al Khoury*.—Born about 1870. Protestant. Educated American College at Beirut. Was a dragoman at the British consulate, Damascus, from 1899 to 1909. Lawyer; Minister of Finance under Feisal, when he discreetly lined his pockets. Minister of Public Instruction under Damad 1926. Deported some months later on suspicion of assisting rebels, thus winning martyr's crown of glory and confidence of Moslems. Well off. Chairman of board of directors of [19825]



National Cement Company; professor of the School of Law; legal adviser to the municipality. Took leading part in the general strike of 1936. Went to Paris in March 1936 as member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Deputy, December 1936. Elected president of the Chamber of Deputies (Speaker) the 21st December, 1936, in recognition of his services to the Nationalist *bloc* in the treaty negotiations. Has since tried to justify the paradox of his inclusion in an otherwise all-Moslem Administration by being "plus royaliste que le Roi." Brother of Faiz. A prudent, skilful and unscrupulous politician. (March 1937.)

76. *Nazem Koudsi*.—Born 1906. Lawyer. Hot-head. Active during troubles of February 1936. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (March 1937.)

77. *Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Kueishish*.—Born about 1890. Bedouin chief. Head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira (Amir Mujhem, *q.v.*, is the paramount chief). More pugnacious than the paramount chief, whose successor he will probably become. (March 1937.)

78. *Mohammed Kurd Ali*.—Born 1875. Formerly editor of *Muqtabas*, but handed over to brother on accepting office under the French. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi-al-Azm 1921 and Taj-ed-Dine 1928-30. During war wrote ferocious leaders against British and French, and in 1921 was foolish enough to visit Jemal Pasha in Berlin and was dismissed by the French. Was made president of the Syrian Académie arabe, but was removed from the office in 1934 on the ground of the insufficiency of his knowledge of the Arabic language. Was Minister of Public Instruction till 1932. Now in Egypt seeking admission to the Arab Academy of Egypt. Pompous turncoat. (April 1936.)

79. *Mustafa Bey Kusseiri*.—Born 1876. A prominent Turkish notable of Antioch. Minister of Agriculture and Economics in Ata Bey Ayoubi's Provisional Cabinet during the negotiation of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, he lost popularity with the Turks of the sanjak for his supposed pro-Nationalist policy and his house in Antioch was attacked by them in 1937. (January 1938.)

80. *Kyrrillos IX, Mughabghab*.—Born about 1858. Greek Catholic Patriarch, Lebanese, formerly Bishop of Zahlé. Generally considered anti-French. Tried to remove Greek Catholic priests from seminary of St. Anne at Jerusalem (Pères blancs), without success. Unpopular with his flock and the French High Commission, who pointedly gave Légion d'Honneur to his vicar-general. Spends half his time in Egypt and half in Syria and Lebanon. Has recently earned hostility of Moslems on account of his efforts, which were unsuccessful, to get the Christian churches to combine to send a delegation to France in March 1936 to protect the interests of the "minorities" in connexion with the Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations. A Vicar of Bray. (May 1936.)

81. *Yussef Liniado*.—Born about 1872. Jew. Formerly a banker, but now penniless. Deputy in 1928 and 1932. No party, but Zionist in feeling. Never opposes the Nationalists. Re-elected Deputy, December 1936. Chameleon. (March 1937.)

82. *Said Mahasin*.—Born about 1885. Poor Damascus family. Educated Constantinople. Lawyer. Minister of the Interior under Taj ed Dine. Rigged elections to the Constituent Assembly 1928; was attacked by Nationalists and jettisoned by Taj-ed-Dine. Now become a Royalist. Member of the Damascus bar. His Royalist activities were the consequence of his personal objection to Taj ed Dine. Professor of Civil Law in the Syrian University. One of the best lawyers in Damascus (a partner of Sami Maidani, *q.v.*). Keeps as free of politics as his ambitions, which are tawdry, permit. (April 1936.)

83. *Sami Maidani*.—Born about 1895. Son of Sadiq Maidani, wheat merchant in the Maidan. Studied law in Germany and has a German wife. A professor in the School of Law. Formerly member of the Municipal Council. Entered 1932 elections as Independent and received only twenty votes. A sound lawyer who now keeps out of politics. Has pronounced German sympathies. (April 1936.)

84. *Dr. Abdul Rahman Malak-Zade*.—Born at Antioch about 1892, doctor of medicine, a Turk. Formerly a member of the Supreme Administrative Council of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, he is the real leader of the pro-Turk party in Antioch and since 1935 has been living in exile in Turkey. (January 1938.)

85. *Haidar Mardam Bey*.—Born about 1900. Wealthy landlord. Son of Sami. Was secretary to Feisal. Formerly chief secretary to the municipality. Appointed Administrative Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and "chef du protocole," January 1938. Married to a Christian woman. Pleasant and open-minded. (February 1938.)

86. *Jamil Mardam*.—Born about 1890. Cousin of Sami Pasha. Nationalist. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928, and member of various deputations sent by the Constituent Assembly to the French High Commissioner. Deputy in 1932 and Minister of Finance. Formed and led a party of Syrian Arabs to try to effect a settlement between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahia in 1934. His counsel carries great weight in the Nationalist party. Was member of the Nationalist delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Formed Nationalist Government December 1936 and became Prime Minister (Président du Conseil) and Minister of National Economy the 21st December, 1936. Popular and ambitious. A skilful politician of agreeable personality. (March 1937.)

87. *Sami Pasha Mardam*.—Born about 1860. Formerly a rich landlord, but now heavily in debt. Enjoys general respect, but is of little account politically. Uncle and father-in-law of Jamil Mardam. (March 1937.)

88. *Nebih el Martini*.—Born 1884. "Administrator" of Aleppo, still generally referred to as the Vali. Began his career as a clerk in a Turkish police office. Held various administrative positions and was Mutessarif at Deir-ez-Zor during the British occupation. Appointed Vali of Aleppo in 1925. Well-meaning, but weak and unreliable. Put on the retired list in February 1937, when he was replaced by Mustapha Bey el Shahabi, a Damascene, member of the delegation which went to Paris for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty. (March 1937.)

89. *Bedros Milletbashian*.—A local lawyer of Armenian origin. Moderate. Of the Armenian Gregorian faith. Born 1893. At Aintap in Turkey. Established in Aleppo since 1921. Elected an Aleppo Deputy. (December 1936.)

90. *Shaikh Meizar bin Abdul Muheisen*.—Born about 1899. Bedouin chief. Head of the Al-Jarba-Shummar Confederation, mainly settled in the Jezira. (May 1936.)

91. *Emir Moustapha el Chehabi*.—Born at Damascus in 1893. Studied at one of the French schools in Damascus, then at Istanbul and, finally, in France, where he entered the School of Agriculture at Grignon.

Since 1919 he has occupied many high and important posts. Firstly, Director-General of Agriculture and Economical Services, then for twelve years he occupied the post of Director-General of State Domains. He was Director-General of the Exhibition held at Damascus in 1936, then Minister of Public Instruction, and he accompanied the Syrian delegation to Paris during the negotiations of the Franco-Syrian treaty.

Appointed Mohafiz of the Vilayet of Aleppo, February 1937, replacing Nebih el Martini Bey. Considered a man of high character and moderate political feelings. (January 1938.)

92. *Bedi al Muayyad*.—Born about 1870. Rich landlord. Educated at Constantinople. Deputy for Damascus under Turkish rule. President of the Representative Council 1921-22. Minister of Justice to Haqqi-al-Azm 1921-24. Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Public Works under Sheikh Taj ed Dine, and Minister of the Interior when Taj ed Dine was dismissed. Took a holiday in Paris and was made a great fuss of by the Quai d'Orsay. Held office in Taj ed Dine's Ministry in 1935 and retired with it after the general strike of 1936. (April 1936.)



93. *Mohamed Khalil Mudarres*.—Born 1894. Member of a family of wealthy landowners. Industrialist. President of the Aleppo Cotton Spinning Company. Moderate Nationalist. (January 1938.)

94. *Amir Mujhem bin Muheid*.—Born about 1886. Bedouin chief. Head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira. Elected Deputy for the Jezira, December 1936. Generally respected. (March 1937.)

95. *Habib Na'asaneh*.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1894. Educated in the Jesuit College at Beirut, and a man of some culture. Francophil; on good terms with his Patriarch. (July 1936.)

96. *Mohammed Nahas*.—Born about 1890. Ex-Turkish officer. Ex-Director of Finance at Damascus. Director of Finance of Ibn Saud for about two years. Again Director of Ministry of Finance. Reported to be thoroughly inefficient. (February 1938.)

97. *Rahmo Nahmad*.—Born 1876. Well-to-do business man. Head of the Israelite community in Aleppo and member of the Administrative Council of the Vilayet of Aleppo since the Turkish régime. (March 1937.)

98. *Damad Ahmed Namy*.—Born about 1885. Circassian origin. Grandfather was Emir Mahmoud, and Governor of Tripoli. Father was Fakhro Bey and had large estates in Beirut. Ahmed Namy was son-in-law to Abdul Hamid, and retains, rather questionably, the title of Damad, although divorced. Became Chief of State of Syria 1925-26 at a critical moment and worked conscientiously at a policy of conciliation. The French High Commissioner dropped him without ceremony and replaced him by Taj ed Dine. Supported Nationalists in the Advisory Council 1931. Has lately been sedulously cultivating de Martel. Still clings to the hope of being made King of Syria. Has far less political influence than he thinks. Well meaning, perhaps a little fatuous. (April 1936.)

99. *Hamdi al Nasr*.—Born about 1885. Damascene. Started as a clerk in the Finance Department and has risen to the post of Directeur général. Was Minister of Finance under Damad 1925, and left with him in 1928 and returned to his Government office. Dismissed from his post by the Nationalist Government January 1937. An intelligent and conscientious civil servant. (March 1937.)

100. *Sheikh Nawwaf al Salih bin Sharkh*.—Born about 1880. Bedouin chief. Head of the Hadidi tribe, one of the largest and wealthiest of the Syrian desert. Sheikh Nawwaf was educated in the tribal school at Constantinople. An astute and benevolent ruler. (May 1936.)

101. *Raphael Nimr*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Balamand Monastery, near Tripoli. On bad terms with his Patriarch. An intriguer. (July 1936.)

102. *Sherif al Nuss*.—Born about 1880. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Avoids politics. Acting president of the chamber of commerce and member of the board of the National Cement Company. Like most Syrians, he is Nationalist in sentiment. Influential, good Moslem. (March 1937.)

103. *Nuzhat al Mamlouk*.—Born about 1882. Of Damascus. Commandant of Police in Aleppo. Was educated in Damascus and later in Constantinople, where he obtained a military proficiency certificate, and in 1909 was commissioned into the Turkish cavalry. In 1910 he was engaged in a punitive expedition against the Druses. Went in 1912 on Turkish military mission to Afghanistan. Joined Turkish Flying Corps in 1916 and served with it in Persia and Iraq during the rest of the war, after which he left the Turkish army and in 1922 joined the Syrian gendarmerie. In 1926 he was acting Commandant of Police in Aleppo, but was later retired on political grounds.

In May 1936 he was called upon by the Nationalist party to organise and command the Hadeedi (Iron Shirts). In January 1937 was appointed Commandant of Police in Aleppo.

104. *Mahomet Aref Quwatli*.—Born about 1875. Landlord. President of the Chamber of Agriculture. Old-fashioned country squire, fond of shooting.

Keeps out of politics, and has suffered losses through his family's connexion with the rebellion. Has one son, Saadi, aged 26, a pleasant but spineless lad. (April 1936.)

105. *Shukri Quicatli*.—Born about 1886. Landlord. Nationalist during the Feisal régime and anti-French. Removed himself to Palestine on the French occupation, but returned later. During the rebellion of 1925 afforded every assistance to the rebels (except, of course, personal participation in fighting), for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment by court-martial. He fled to Palestine and was amnestied in 1931, and again returned to Syria. Interested in his farm and a "National" fruit-preserving project. Vice-President of the Nationalist bloc. Made Finance Minister and Defence Minister (combined) in Jamil Mardam's Cabinet, the 21st December, 1936. Sincere extremist so long as his personal safety is not involved. Has decided German sympathies. During Palestine disturbances of 1937 pretended officially to oppose terrorism in that country, but secretly facilitated financing of the terrorists in Palestine both directly and in respect of arms purchases made in Syria. A shifty chauvinist. (February 1938.)

106. *Edmond Rabbath*.—An Aleppo lawyer. Born 1903. He renounced his Greek nationality on attaining his majority and became a Syrian subject; father has also divested himself of his Greek nationality. Joined the Nationalist bloc and was elected a Deputy for Aleppo in 1936. Formerly an extremist, his views are now decidedly more moderate. (January 1938.)

107. *Sheikh Rakan bin Murshed*.—Born about 1905. Bedouin chief. Head of the small but predatory El Kmasah-Saba'a tribe, which is usually encamped in the Salimiyeh district. Elected Deputy for the Damascus tribes December 1936. A sheikh after the novelist's heart. (March 1937.)

108. *Sheikh 'Id Rawwaf*.—Born about 1898. Consul of Hejaz and Nejd at Damascus 1930-33. Now occupies a position in Saudi Arabian Government. One time camel merchant in Damascus. (April 1936.)

109. *Mazhar Reslan*.—Born about 1883. Native of Homs. During war was Kaïmakam of Mosul. After war was made Director of Education under the Feisal Government. Subsequently, was appointed Mutessarif of Deir-ez-Zor and, later, of the Belqa district. In April 1921, after the establishment of the Amirate of Trans-Jordan, he was appointed Mustashar al Haqqania (Chancellor) by the Amir, and was later made Mustashar Mali (Treasurer). In July Reslan formed a new Government, taking himself the office of chief Minister. He was replaced by Rikabi in March 1922, yet returned to power in February 1923, but resigned in September of the same year. He subsequently held office as Minister of Finance, but in May 1924 he again threw his hand in and came back to Syria. In 1926, however, he fled the country after having been implicated in the 1925 revolt. He returned in 1928, was Deputy for Homs in the Constituent Assembly 1928, again in 1932, and then made Minister of Justice and Education, but was not employed by subsequent Governments until 1937, when the "Nationalist" Government appointed him the first Mohafiz of Lattakia in January 1937 attached temporarily to the headquarters of the Nationalist bloc, December 1937. He is a typical specimen of Turkish-trained Arab official. He is courageous but slow-witted, holds ultra-nationalistic political views, but moderates his passions in matters affecting the administration of his district or department. (February 1938.)

110. *Khalil Rifaat*.—Born about 1880. Educated at Constantinople. Lawyer. President of the Criminal Court of the First Instance, under Feisal and Haqqi al Azm. Director of police under Damad. Superseded by Wasseq al Muayyad, his enemy. Procureur général to the Courts of Cassation and Appeal. Now Inspector-General to the Ministry of Justice. Good reputation. (February 1938.)

111. *Mahomet Ali Ridha al Rikabi*.—Born about 1860. Educated at Constantinople. Good Damascus family. Under Turkish régime was Vali of Basra. General in Turkish army. Commandant at Bagdad and, at outbreak of war, Vali of Medina. Transferred to Jerusalem to command of troops. Is said to have been reduced to President of Municipality at Damascus. In 1918, after fall of Nazareth, deserted to British forces, entered Damascus with them, and



was made a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. Appointed Military Governor of Syria by Feisal and Prime Minister on departure of British troops. Disputes with French led to their dismissing him in 1921. Removed to Transjordan and became Prime Minister to Abdullah 1922-23. Quarrelled with Mr. Philby (then British representative at Amman) 1923 and went to Palestine. Put up for Representative Council without success. After a period of apparent inactivity, intrigued unsuccessfully to become Prime Minister of Syria under Damad. Anti-French and anti-British, too. Cordially hated in Damascus. Never forgets an offence or misses an opportunity to pay off old scores. Put up as candidate in 1931 elections, but was not returned. Avaricious, unscrupulous and past-master of Turkish methods of intrigue. Rapidly becoming senile. (February 1938.)

112. *Macarios Saba*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1873. Educated at Ain Traz, in the Lebanon. Was a patriarchal vicar in Egypt, where he is said to have accumulated a competence. One brother, Costaki Saba, is a Nationalist Deputy. Another, Amin, is employed in the Banco di Roma at Aleppo. The Greek Catholics were at one time the largest Christian community in Aleppo, and their archbishop is regarded as dean of the archiepiscopal body in that town. (July 1936.)

113. *Rushdi al Safadi*.—Born about 1875. Educated at Constantinople. Hussein's commander in the Taif fighting, smartly defeated by Ibn Saud. President of the Municipality, Damascus, 1925-26. Kaïmakam of Idlib in 1932. Promoted to be Mutessarif of Euphrates district in 1935. Dismissed by Nationalist Government in January 1937 for refusing to "co-operate" with the Nationalists during the elections. Has property in Amman and poses as a lover of England. No particular politics. If pro-anything, pro-Rushdi. (March 1937.)

114. *Georges Sahnaoui*.—Born about 1885. Greek Catholic of humble extraction. Successful merchant (building materials). Was a Nationalist. Member of Constituent Assembly. Elected Deputy December 1936. Member of the firm Michel Sahnaoui et Fils, who are agents of the Shell Oil Company. His brother Jean was appointed Spanish honorary vice-consul in 1936. Clever and pushing. (March 1937.)

115. *Riza Said*.—Born about 1875. Educated in Constantinople and Germany. Specialist in eye diseases. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi al Azm 1921. Rector of Syrian University until he was removed in 1936 from the office by the French on account of his Nationalist sympathies. A pedant with political ambitions which are not likely to be realised.

116. *Sheikh Abdel Kader Sarmini*.—Born 1865. Lawyer practising in the Shari' Court. Prominent Nationalist, but not extremist. Son, Zafar, condemned to term of imprisonment for incitement in February 1936. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (March 1937.)

117. *Dr. Mohamed al Sarraj*.—Born about 1905. Owns property in Hama. Took a diploma in political science in France. Returned to Syria and supported the Nationalist cause. Elected a member of the Committee of the Ironshirts. Appointed in January 1938 as Director of the Political Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (February 1938.)

118. *César Sayegh*.—Born about 1877 at Alexandretta, a leading member of the Arab Nationalist party there. Formerly president of the Municipality of Alexandretta, but compelled to resign owing to continuous disagreement with the French authorities. (January 1938.)

119. *Amir Fawwaz Sha'alan*.—Born about 1907. Grandson of Nuri and prospective successor. Spends much of his time in the Damascus cabarets. Tendency to consumption. Not without qualities. Has a strong following in the Rualla, whom he commands during their Razzias. Treacherously slew his rival and cousin, Farhan bin Mashur, near Palmyra in April 1935. Has married both his sisters into Ibn Saud's family, one to Ibn Saud himself, and the other to the Amir Saud. These matches are looked upon by the Bedouin as having a political significance in connexion with the Wadi Sirhan grazing lands and the Jauf Oasis.

Elected Deputy December 1936 under the Nationalist banner. His political allegiance depends on his pocket or his vanity—sometimes both. May yet become the force in the desert that his grandfather was; he, too, is for sale. (March 1937.)

120. *Amir Nuri Sha'alan*.—Born about 1860. A treacherous blackguard who has committed enough crimes to merit being hanged many times over. Murdered his brother in order to take his place as sheikh of the tribe. Chief of the Rualla Bedouin, and nominated in 1932 Deputy for the Bedouin in the Syrian Parliament. Assisted Feisal 1918. Superlative ruffian, completely and frankly venal; boasts of having sold himself in turn to Turks, Arabs, British and French. Still for sale, but to-day not worth his price. To please Ibn Saud he pretends to have become a Wahabi. Commander of the Legion of Honour. Grows of less and less account as his grandson Fawwaz increases his influence among the tribesmen. Still rather a "bogey-man" in Damascus. (April 1936.)

121. *Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar*.—Born about 1885. Extremist. "Star" student at Beirut American Protestant College (1905-10). Connected by marriage with the Azm family. One of the principal figures in the rebellion of 1925 and sentenced to death by court-martial. Fled to Egypt, where he now practises medicine, with success, in the Syrian and Lebanese colonies of Cairo. He is the spiritual head of the Syrian Nationalists and very popular (except, of course, with the Nationalist leaders). His exile has made him seem greater than he was when in Syria. For many who have never seen him he is superhuman. His inflexibility and undoubted sincerity, coupled with his rhetorical talents, combine to make him a formidable political personage. Employed the skill he acquired at a foreign educational missionary institution to modernise the practices of desert law by amputating under anaesthetic, with due regard for asepsis, hands of Syrians condemned by the rebels' tribunal for assisting the French in 1925. He introduced the novel method of first dislocating the wrist before severing the hand from the arm in the single stroke required by tradition. He stated in 1932 that he would never take advantage of an amnesty from the French, but in 1936 he tried to get it in order to join, if not lead, the Nationalist deputation in Paris and gladly accepted it in April 1937. Through his partisans, staged a triumphant return in May, stayed about a month, then, with promises to his followers to re-settle in Syria and become their political leader, went back to his lucrative medical practice in Cairo. He still loves to meddle in Syrian and Arabian politics. Intelligent, but obsessed by his own opinion. (February 1938.)

122. *Tawfiq Shamie*.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox. Head of Feisal's political bureau. One of the leaders of the People's party 1924, but for having supported Taj-ed-Dine in 1928 Nationalists have now dropped him. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and Minister of Public Works under Taj ed Dine 1928-29. Minister of Finance 1931, but unemployed after the elections until June 1936, when he was appointed Mohafiz of the Euphrates. Also acting Mohafiz of the Jezirah during 1937. Well educated, speaks English and French. (February 1938.)

123. *Amir Bahjat al Shehabi*.—Born about 1885. Studied law in Constantinople. Given an appointment in the Damascus police during the Feisal régime, but dismissed by the French. Elected head of the Damascus Bar in 1932; replaced in 1936 by Faiz al Khoury (*q.v.*). Appointed Mohafiz of the Jezirah 1937. A Moslem. Able and of good character. (March 1937.)

124. *Ihsan Sherif*.—Born about 1892. Lawyer. French degree ("à titre d'étranger"). Secretary of the People's party 1924. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the most uncompromising Nationalists. Insisted on standing for elections in 1932, thus nearly spoiling the agreement with the High Commissioner's delegate. Nationalist Deputy 1932. A man of sincere convictions, with a violent temper. (April 1936.)

125. *Mousallam Sioufi*.—Born about 1885. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Member of the chamber of commerce and director of the National Cement Company. Nationalist sentiments, but steers clear of active politics. (April 1936.)



126. *Mgr. Iyunis Stati*.—Born about 1884. Of Homs. Syriac Catholic Bishop of Damascus. Unlike his predecessor he is not a fanatical Christian, that is to say, he can bear the sight of Christians not members of his Church. Is an ardent defender of the "minorities" cause. Generally esteemed. (April 1936.)

127. *Herant Sulahian*.—A local merchant of Armenian origin. Moderate. Of the Armenian Gregorian faith. Originally from Aintap in Turkey. Rendered valuable service to his people during the massacres of Armenians at Aintap in 1895. A member of the Armenian political party called "Hintchak." A good speaker. Born 1872. Elected an Aleppo Deputy. (December 1936.)

128. *Afif al Sulh*.—Born about 1890. Originally from Beirut. Lawyer, but does not practise. Active Nationalist. Interested in politics and opposed the Turks before the war. Sent on a mission by M. de Jouvenel to Jebel Druse in 1926 to negotiate with leaders of the revolt. One of the leading Nationalists willing to co-operate with the French for the independence of Syria. Organiser of the Nationalist party in 1927. Hated by Dr. Shahbandar and his party. Accused of giving the names of the Arabs hanged by Jemal Pasha, but no proof forthcoming. Deputy of Damascus. Took an active part in organising the general strike in January 1936, was exiled by the French, but was released with the others in March of the same year. (April 1936.)

129. *Ardavazt Surmeyan*.—Armenian Gregorian Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1892. Educated in the Gregorian College at Constantinople. A travelled man of the world and an energetic shepherd of his flock. A Turkish national and said to have some relations with Soviet Armenia. (January 1938.)

130. *Alexandros Tahhan*.—Born about 1867. Damascene. Greek Orthodox Patriarch, elected by the Damascene vote. Bishop of Tripoli before his election. Has been criticised for his weak handling of the Epiphanius revolt in the Orthodox Church in 1935, which led to the formation of an independent Greek Orthodox Church of Latakia in 1936. Does not interfere in politics. Not popular outside Damascus. Pleasant and cultivated. (April 1936.)

131. *Sheikh Taj ed Dine al Hassani*.—Born about 1885. Algerian origin (Tlemsen family). Son of Badr ed Dine. Haqqi al Azm appointed him Qadi of Damascus on account of his father's popularity; had no other qualifications. Became ally of Jemil Elchi and Wasseq al Muayyad when the Damad's Ministry split in 1927. Persuaded by the High Commissioner that he could secure a subservient majority in the Constituent Assembly and distributed much of the secret funds to rig the elections, but without success. Formed the Government in 1929, entirely subservient to the French. Frankly stated in 1928 that he was prepared to take office on any terms and as representative of any party that would support him. Always busy feathering his nest. Apt to be oriental towards women when drunk, and has caused embarrassment at official dinners and receptions. Succeeded in maintaining himself until his illicit interference caused election riots in December 1931, when M. Ponsot served him up as a sacrifice to public resentment. Insisted on standing as a candidate against French wishes and spent a good deal of money, but failed hopelessly. Dropped out of favour in 1932. Received a gratuity of 400,000 fr. when he lost his post, but won his way back with M. de Martel, for whom possibly the sheikh's tub-thumping had a special attraction. Was appointed Prime Minister by the High Commissioner in 1934, and his partial and corrupt administration led directly to the general strike in 1936. Was forced to resign in March 1936 and fled to France in a complete funk, his life having been threatened by the Nationalists. Now living in Paris and reputed to be working hard to discredit the present Syrian Government and to sabotage the Franco-Syrian Treaty. Uneducated, completely venal, prepared to truckle to anybody. (February 1938.)

132. *Jemil al Ulshi* (Elchee = Ambassador).—Born about 1880. Damascene of modest extraction. Major in the Turkish army. Was Feisal's liaison officer in Beirut, and is credited, quite wrongly, with playing into the hands of the French. On the French occupation of Damascus succeeded Ala ed Din as Prime Minister, but was dismissed after a few months. Attached himself to Taj ed Dine, who appointed him Minister of Finance 1928 and Minister of Interior 1930. Lined his pockets well. Was included in the Taj ed Dine Government 1934. No longer of any account. (March 1936.)

133. *Sheikh Yahya Zamaita*.—Born about 1875. Damascene. Sheikh Imam in Turkish army during war and was chief disciple to Badr ed Din. Exerts a certain influence among simpler sections of the people and political agent to Taj ed Dine. Since death of Badr ed Din had been trying, not yet with success, to establish himself as leader of the ulema. Shrewd and intelligent. (April 1936.)

134. *Mohammed Said al Yusef*.—Born about 1899. A Kurd and landowner. Son of Abdurrahman Pasha and hereditary chief of Kurds in Syria and Palestine. He received his education in Austria and Germany during the war in company with many young Syrians who, for political reasons, were made much of by the German authorities. Speaks German and some French and English, and affects the pose of the perfect man about town. Had great influence among Kurds owing to his position, but has now lost it. Not a bad fellow. Has a German wife. (April 1936.)

135. *Louis Ziade*.—Born 1886. Prominent member of the Aleppo bar. Ambitious, insinuating manners, prefers to settle cases out of court. (July 1936.)

#### Obituary.

Said Hamzeh.  
Sheikh Barjes bin Hudeib.  
Amir Taher al Jezairi.

#### Chapter II.—LEBANESE PERSONALITIES.

(Beirut Consular District.)

1. *Habib Abi Chahla*.—Born about 1903. A Greek Orthodox of Beirut practising as a lawyer. Studied law in Paris and is a "docteur en droit." In the El Ahdab Cabinet of January 1937 was appointed Minister of Defence, Public Health and Education. A successful lawyer and an eloquent speaker. Has great influence in the Greek Orthodox Community. Said to be "fast" and somewhat of a gambler. Appointed Minister of Interior in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinets of July and November 1937. (January 1938.)

2. *Sobhi Aboul Nasser*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1880. Is Director of Interior. In pre-war days was an official in the Turkish Administration. Member of a well-known Beirut family. (December 1935.)

3. *Nejib Aboussouan*.—A Palestinian Christian by origin. Born about 1875. Practised as a lawyer in Jerusalem before the war. From 1923-33 was first president of the Lebanese Supreme Court of Appeal. In 1929 was Minister of Justice. Was, and still is, a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Honest and capable. (December 1935.)

4. *Mgr. Pierre Antoine Arida*.—Maronite Patriarch. Born about 1865. Owing to the number of Maronites in the Lebanon is the most influential ecclesiastic in the country. The ancient traditional friendship between the Patriarch and the French has been somewhat impaired of late owing to the attitude adopted by Mgr. Arida towards certain economic measures taken by the mandatory authorities, notably in the case of the tobacco monopoly 1935. Visited Rome in May 1937 to express his gratitude to the Pope for the Pallium. Subsequently visited Paris before returning to the Lebanon. (January 1938.)

5. *Amir Majid Arslan*.—A young Druse landowner. Born about 1907. Is a cousin of the notorious Amir Shekib Arslan. Appointed Minister of Agriculture in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937. No great ability and little personal influence. (January 1938.)

6. *Amir Rafik Arslan*.—A Druse. Born about 1900. Director of Agriculture. Was a Deputy in all previous Parliaments. (December 1935.)

7. *Amir Khalil Bellama*.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Of the Lebanese family the Emirs Bellama. Son of Emir Youssef Ismail and grandson of the Emir Haidar (cf. Churchill's book on the Lebanon). Practised as a lawyer in



Cairo for twenty years, now retired. Well off. Is a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. (December 1935.) Appointed to a vacancy in the Lebanese Chamber in 1936. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Finance and Customs in the El Ahdab Ministry, January 1937. Omitted from the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of March 1937, but appointed Minister of Health and of National Defence in that of July 1937. Nominated a Deputy to the Chamber in October 1937, but was again omitted from the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937. (January 1938.)

8. *Ahmed Berjawi*.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1888. Is administrator of Mount Lebanon. Is an ex-judge and was once chief of police in Beirut. (December 1935.)

9. *Abdullah Beyhum*.—A Beirut Moslem. Born about 1871. A well-to-do merchant before the war, but his business suffered badly during the war period and he was obliged to make a composition with his creditors. When the Senate was created, he was appointed a Senator and after the amalgamation of both Houses, became a Deputy. Appointed Secretary of State in 1933, which post he still holds. Is not a dominant character, but generally liked. (December 1935.) Superseded as Secretary of State by Dr. Ayoub Tabet (*q.v.*) in January 1936.

10. *Assad Bustany*.—A Maronite. Born about 1890. Chief of the secret police. Honest and hardworking. (December 1935.)

11. *Amir Fayek Chehab*.—A Maronite. Born about 1875. A direct descendant of the Amir Beshir Chehab. Chief of the Lebanese State Secretariat. (December 1935.) Retired on a pension January 1937.

12. *Amir Jemil Chehab*.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Finance. Full of zeal and tenacity and consequently unpopular. (December 1935.)

13. *Amir Khaled Chehab*.—A Moslem. Born about 1893. Minister of Finance in 1927. Deputy in former Parliaments and president of the present Parliament. (December 1935.) Again elected a Deputy in October 1937, but superseded in the presidency of the Chamber by Pierre Trad. (January 1938.)

14. *Omar Daouk*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1874. Is president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce. Is the largest and richest landowner in Beirut. (December 1935.)

15. *Emile Eddé*.—A Maronite. Born about 1883. A Beirut lawyer with a good practice. Was a member of the Lebanese deputation to Paris in 1919 to beg for a French mandate. Was president of the Representative Council of the Grand Liban. Became president of the Council of Ministers in 1929 and held, in addition, the portfolios of Interior and of Public Health. He tried to realise economies, lost popularity, and resigned. Is now one of the more favoured candidates for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Is clever and energetic, but too impulsive. His relations with the mandatory Power are very cordial. (December 1935.) Elected President of the Lebanese Republic in January 1936. By a decree of the 6th October, 1937, article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution which fixes at six years the term of office of the President of the Republic was reaffirmed. (January 1938.)

16. *Hussein Bey el Ahdab*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1870. Was Governor of Beirut under the pre-war Ottoman Administration. In 1921 appointed Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. In 1928 was Minister of Finance and Minister of Public Works and Agriculture from 1928-31. During his tenure of office at the Ministry of Public Works showed energy and capacity—especially as regards road-making. Was afterwards accused of irregularities in the Ministry. Has held no office since. (December 1935.)

17. *Khair ed Din El Ahdab*.—Born about 1893. A Sunni Moslem of Beirut. Studied law in Paris for three years before the War. After the War was employed in the French High Commission and later given a Vice-Governorship in the Lebanon, which appointment he held for two years. Later he founded a newspaper, the *Ahd el Jedid*, in company with Riad es Solh (*q.v.*). Elected to the Chamber in 1934 as a Deputy of Beirut. In January 1937 after the re-institution of the Lebanese Constitution he was appointed Premier with the additional

portfolios of the Interior and of Justice. Is a nephew of Hussein Bey El Ahdab (*q.v.*). Married to a Christian wife. Intelligent and tactful. (January 1937.) Reformed his Cabinet successively in March, July and November 1937. (January 1938.)

18. *Sayyed Ahmed El Hussein*.—Born about 1882. A Shia Moslem of the Bekaa. Appointed a Senator in 1926. Was a Deputy in 1929. Has been at different times Minister of Agriculture, of Finance and of Public Works. Appointed Minister of Public Works and Agriculture in the reformed Cabinet of Ahdab in March 1937, but was omitted from the two later Cabinets. Elected a Deputy in October 1937. Uneducated but honest. (January 1938.)

19. *Colonel Sheikh Khalil El Khazen*.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Belongs to a leading family in the Lebanon. Is senior native officer commanding the Lebanese gendarmerie. Happy-go-lucky and full of humour. (December 1935.) Retired from active service in 1937. (January 1938.)

20. *Sheikh Beshara Bey El Khouri*.—A Maronite. Born about 1890. A lawyer by profession. In 1925 was appointed president of the civil section of the Court of Appeal. Minister of Interior in first Lebanese Cabinet 1926. Prime Minister and Minister of Education in 1927, and Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education in 1928. After a short interval, again became Prime Minister in May 1929, as well as holding the portfolios of Interior and Public Health. He resigned before the end of the year. Was a strong candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic in 1931, but was beaten in the final ballot. Became a Deputy in 1933 in the present Parliament. Is a rival of Emil Eddé for the next vacancy in the presidency of the Republic. This rivalry has degenerated into a bitter hostility which, fanned by their partisans, has vented itself in much mutual recrimination in the local press and has not enhanced the personal prestige of either principal. Beshara-el-Khoury is a capable lawyer, and has sound views, but is not a dominant character. He is somewhat effusive. (December 1935.) Nominated a Deputy in October 1937. (January 1938.)

21. *Sheikh Sami El Khouri*.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Justice in the present Lebanese Administration. A brother of Beshara Bey-el-Khoury. (December 1935.)

22. *Captain Nur Ed Din Rifahi*.—Born about 1898 at Beirut. Served in the Turkish army during the war. Entered the Lebanese gendarmerie in 1919 and promoted chief of the mobile unit in 1932. Appointed Inspector-General of Lebanese police in 1937. (January 1938.)

23. *Habib Pasha El Saad*.—A Maronite. Born about 1860. Was president of the Lebanese Council under the Ottoman régime. Exiled to Adana during the war. In 1920 was president of the Administrative Council when he denounced some of his colleagues to the French as being partisans of Feisal, for which they were exiled. Was again President at a later period and then Secretary-General of the Government of the Great Lebanon. In 1928 he was made President of the Council and Minister of Justice. Has been a Deputy, either elected or nominated, in nearly every Parliament. Appointed President of the Lebanese Republic for one year in December 1933 and his tenure was prolonged for a further year in December 1934. He is typical of the old school of officials brought up under the Ottoman régime. His present post is a sinecure, and he was evidently put there by the mandatory authorities as a reward for past services, since it is clear that he is too aged to work. (December 1935.) Was superseded in the presidency of the Republic by Emile Eddé (*q.v.*) in January 1936 and retired into private life.

24. *Riad El Solh*.—A Moslem of an old and influential family of Sidon. Born about 1892. His father Ridha Bey el Solh had held various administrative posts under the pre-war Turkish régime, and it was doubtless for this reason that the son, although known to be an adherent of the Arab movement, was not molested during the war. Riad Bey is very intelligent, a born politician and is looked upon generally as one of the most influential leaders of the Arab National movement. He has visited Geneva several times with Ishan Jabri and Shekib Arslan and is in touch with the Arab leaders in Iraq and Palestine and with Saudi Arabia. Clever and persuasive and ready to use his own private means



in the Arab cause. He has considerable influence in Moslem circles. Was exiled to Kameslieh in the spring of 1935 on the accusation of having encouraged the taxi-drivers' strike in Beirut. After a couple of months of exile he was permitted to return. He is by profession a lawyer, and is in practice at Beirut. (December 1935.)

25. *Dr. Nicolas Fayad*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1885. Director of Posts and Telegraphs. Is a doctor of medicine and practised in Alexandria until 1931 when he returned to Beirut and was appointed a Greek Orthodox Deputy in the Chamber. Speaks well. (December 1935.)

26. *Dr. Kamel Gargour*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1890. Director of Public Health since 1929. Capable surgeon and doctor. (December 1935.)

27. *Sheikh Mustafa Ghalaini*.—A Moslem. Born about 1895. Cadi of the Lebanese Republic. Studied under various well-known Moslem divines as well as at Al-Azhar. Well versed in the Arabic and Turkish languages and in theology. Before his appointment as Cadi was well-known as a poet and orator. In 1910 when one of the ulema, he taught in various schools of Beirut and was also part-editor of the newspapers the *Ittihad-el-Osmani* and the *Mufid*. Later on he published an Arabic review entitled the *Nibras*. Was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Jemal Pasha appointed him military chaplain on the Palestine front during the war when his special task was to fan the religious fanaticism of the Turkish troops. In 1919 he entered the service of the late King Feisal and was tutor to the children of Feisal and Abdullah. He also contributed anti-French articles to the press. With the departure of Feisal, Mustafa Ghalaini went to Egypt and Transjordan finding employment at police headquarters in the latter country. Is said to have been a close friend of Moureiwed, who organised the attack on General Gouraud on the Kuneitra Road. During 1922 he occasionally visited Beirut where his presence usually coincided with local troubles and he was eventually expelled on the suspicion that he was implicated in the murder of Assad Bey, Director of the Interior. He returned secretly to Beirut in 1924, but was arrested and deported. General Sarraill cancelled the deportation order in 1926. Elected president of Beirut Moslem Council in 1928. In 1929 he was active in organising anti-Zionist propaganda and demonstrations and was in close touch with Amin-el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. When the Cadi Kasti died in 1933, he was appointed Cadi of the Lebanese Republic and has since refrained from politics. He is now on good terms with the mandatory authorities. (December 1935.)

28. *Ibrahim Haider*.—Born about 1892. A Shia Moslem, member of a leading family of the Bekaa. Studied agriculture in France before the War and returned there later, subsequently joining the Syrian delegation which went to Paris in 1919 to ask for a French Mandate over Syria. Has been a Deputy in every Lebanese Chamber and is a former Minister for Agriculture. In the El Ahdab Cabinet of January 1937 was appointed Minister for Agriculture, for National Economy and for Public Works. Intelligent and cunning. (January 1937.) Again a Deputy in the Chamber in October 1937, and in November appointed Minister of Public Health and of Posts and Telegraphs. (January 1938.)

29. *Sobhi Haider*.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1885. Is Director of Public Instruction. Has formerly been Director of Finance and Agriculture. (December 1935.)

30. *Georges Haimari*.—A Maronite. Born about 1899. Was formerly chief of the Cabinet to the Governor of the Grand Lebanon and later to the President of the Lebanese Republic, a post he still holds (1935). Has a reputation for honesty and for eschewing political intrigue. Is generally liked. (December 1935.)

31. *Sheikh Hussein Hamadi*.—A Druse of Baakline (Lebanon). Born about 1875. Is grand Sheikh-ul-Akl of the Druses. (December 1935.)

32. *Gabriel Kabbaz*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1898. Editor and proprietor of the French paper the *Orient*, published in Beirut. Is a Deputy in the present Chamber (1935). His newspaper is pro-French, and he is generally believed to receive a subvention from the mandatory Power. Is the usual type of oriental journalist and inclined to confuse licence with liberty. (December 1935.) Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber, October 1937. (January 1938.)

33. *Sheikh Tewfik Khaled*.—A Moslem. Born about 1880. Appointed in 1931. Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. (December 1935.)

34. *Khalil Kseib*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1880. President of the Press Association of Beirut and editor of the Arabic daily paper *Saut-al-Ahrar*. A somewhat stupid individual who carries no weight with the staff of his paper, which is run by the sub-editors. The paper is widely read, but, unfortunately, it lacks supervision, with the result that its news is often unreliable. Its general tone is pro-French. (December 1935.) Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937. (January 1938.)

35. *Musa Moubarak*.—A Maronite. Born about 1903. Is chief of the Secretariat of the French High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government, and is thus the channel of communication between the High Commission and the Lebanese Government. Is an intelligent and active young man. (December 1935.)

36. *Musa Nammour*.—A Maronite. Born about 1882. A lawyer with a certain following. Was a Deputy from 1926 to 1929, being once President. Was also at times Minister of the Interior, of Justice, and of Finance. Since 1929 has held no Government post. Now runs the Arabic newspaper *Al-Bilad*. Is said to be unpopular with the mandatory authorities. His honesty is doubtful. (December 1935.) Elected a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937 and in November appointed Minister of Finance and of National Defence. (January 1938.)

37. *Izzed Din Omari*.—A Moslem of Iraqi origin. Born about 1880. Was for several years president of the Criminal Court of First Instance. Afterwards he was administrator of Mount Lebanon and is now Chief of Police. Intelligent and cunning. (December 1935.) Retired on a pension 1937, and replaced by Captain Nur ed Din Rifahi (*q.v.*). (January 1938.)

38. *Dr. Ayoub Tabet*.—A Protestant. Born about 1882. Deputy in the present and in the last two Chambers. Minister of Interior and of Public Health in 1928, when he tried to make improvements. Although a Doctor of Medicine by profession, he does not practise. An energetic and honest man. Lived in United States before and during the war, and during the period 1914-18 was an active French propagandist. Whenever the question arises of giving the presidency of the Chamber or the Secretaryship of State to a representative of the religious minorities, Dr. Tabet's name is generally mentioned. (December 1935.) Was appointed Secretary of State in January 1936, but post was abolished on the formation of the El Ahdab Ministry in January 1937. Elected a Deputy to the Chamber 1937. (January 1938.)

39. *Georges Tabet*.—Born about 1886. Member of a leading Beirut family. Has been previously a Deputy and was once previously Minister of the Interior. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Ahdab Cabinet of July and in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937. Minister of National Economy and Education. A likeable and popular man of average ability. (January 1938.)

40. *Selim Tacla*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1893. Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. Began his career as a judge and has been a provincial administrator and Director of the Interior. Clever and active. (December 1935.) Appointed Administrator of North Lebanon 1936. Elected a Deputy to the Chamber in October 1937 and in November appointed Minister of Public Works. (January 1938.)

41. *Pierre Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1873. A lawyer and ex-leader of the Bar. Succeeded the late M. Debbas as President of the Chamber for the first year of the present Parliament, but was not a candidate for the second term. Clever and bright talker. Cherishes the hope that he may become President of the Republic some day. (December 1935.) Elected President of the Chamber in October 1937. (January 1938.)

42. *Gebran Tuani*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1892. Formerly Minister of Public Education. Editor and proprietor of the Arabic daily paper *An-Nahar*. He is a clever journalist, and his paper, which is often critical of the



mandatory Power, has a wide circulation. An intelligent but somewhat unscrupulous man. (December 1935.) Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937. (January 1938.)

#### Obituary.

*Auguste Pasha Adib.* Died at Beirut July 1936.

#### Chapter III.—FRENCH OFFICIALS IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

1. *Bailly, Pierre.*—Born 1897. Principal inspector, second class, in French Customs Administration. Inspector of Customs at Aleppo. Socially agreeable and always helpful. Married. (January 1938.)

2. *Bonnot, Commandant.*—Born 1888. Head of French "Special Services" for the mandated territories. A very shrewd intelligence officer. Has been in Syria and Lebanon since 1922 and has served in almost every corner of the country and distinguished himself especially in the suppression of terrorism in Northern Syria in 1926 and later by organising defence against the incursion of armed bands and smugglers from Turkey along the 700 kilom. frontier. Has worked in friendly co-operation, on instructions of High Commissioner, with the British consulate in Damascus in efforts to thwart activities of Palestinian political agitators in Syria. Outspoken and trustworthy. (February 1938.)

3. *Bringuier, Colonel Henri.*—Born 1880. French officer commanding the Syrian gendarmerie. An artillery officer, who, after serving in Morocco and later during the war with distinction, transferred to the gendarmerie, where, before coming to Syria, he held the command of the Pyrénées Brigade. Notwithstanding the delicacy of his position as Commandant of Gendarmerie under the orders of the Syrian Government, he has been outstandingly helpful to the British consulate in Damascus in connexion with endeavours to restrict the number of Syrian participants in the Palestine disturbances, 1937-38. Is a Knight of the Légion d'Honneur. (February 1938.)

4. *Colombani, François.*—Born about 1892. Appointed Director of the Sûreté Générale in June 1937 in succession to Paul Bouchède. Was chief of the French secret police in Constantinople during the post-war occupation. Lately head of the Sûreté at Montparnasse (Paris). Active and appears to be friendly disposed. Married. (January 1938.)

5. *David, Philippe.*—Born 1894. Doctor of law. Administrator in Chief of Colonies, French Colonial Service. French delegate and consul at Aleppo from 1934. Has also held posts at Damascus and Beirut. Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, Croix de Guerre. Energetic, tactful, socially charming. Speaks English only if absolutely obliged to do so. Not always convinced of Britain's *bona fides* in Near Eastern matters. Married. (January 1938.)

6. *Dewatre, Lieutenant.*—Aide-de-camp to the High Commissioner. A young cavalry officer who, thought somewhat casual, appears to discharge his duties satisfactorily. Underwent a vacation course at Cambridge in the summer of 1935 to learn English. (December 1935.)

7. *Dubecq, Henry.*—Born 1896. Principal Inspector of Special Police, first class, in French Administration. Chief of the Sûreté Générale for Northern Syria. Very obliging. Good company. Married. (January 1938.)

8. *Fauquenot, Émile, M.B.E.*—Born 1893. Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. Is a member of the French Colonial Service, in which he holds the rank of "chef de bureau." Is liked by Syrian officials, but looked askance at by his compatriots on account of his, it is said, too hearty espousal of the Syrian cause. Both he and his wife were in the French espionage service during the war. For their assistance to British prisoners of war they were each made members of the Order of the British Empire. Untrustworthy. (May 1936.)

9. *Fernet, Rear-Admiral.*—Born in 1881 at Paris. Took over command of the French Naval Division in the Levant on the 15th July, 1936. Entered the French navy in 1899. Served in the Dardanelles in 1915 and on the Syrian coast

in 1916. Was liaison officer with the British Rear-Admiral Commanding in the Eastern Mediterranean 1916-17. Later commanded the French gunboat *Vaillante*. French naval attaché at The Hague 1919 and 1920. Commanded the Rhine flotilla 1921 and 1922 and first torpedo squadron 1925 and 1926. Commanded the *Waldeck Rousseau* 1929-30. Promoted Rear-Admiral March 1935 and commanded at Cherbourg until May 1936. Married. (January 1937.)

10. *Forgeois, Gaston.*—Born 1890. Procureur, second class, in French Ministry of Justice. Procureur général and Inspector-General of Justice at Aleppo. Pleasant personality, but quiet and retiring. Married. (January 1938.)

11. *Fougère, Général de Division.*—Born about 1884. G.O.C. French troops in Syria. Was previously chief of staff in Morocco, to which country he was especially brought when Maréchal Pétain reorganised the military forces there during the Riff campaign. Has the reputation of a capable, as well as amiable, commander. He finds his present position in existing political conditions extremely irksome and, contrary to his predecessors, is most reluctant to expose his troops to the unprofitable hazards of civil disturbances. In the purely military sphere, is active in arranging manoeuvres to test and train the units of his command in tactics arising out of the advanced mechanisation in the French army. With his wife, who ably seconds him, he does more than is usual in the French army to promote concord in the garrison by social activity. (March 1937.)

12. *Garreau, Roger.*—Born 1891. Assistant delegate of the French High Commissioner at Alexandretta. Studied law at the University of Paris and obtained diplomas from the School of Oriental Languages in Chinese, Russian, Siamese and Malay. Appointed vice-consul in Siam in 1913, Chargé d'Affaires at Bangkok in 1914-15. Served with the army in France, 1916-18. Appointed to the diplomatic service in 1919; second secretary at Peking, 1922-25; first secretary at Moscow, 1925-27. Seconded to the Ministry of the Colonies and served in Indo-China, 1927-31. Served at Paris in the Press Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1931-32. In charge of the French consulate at Zagreb, 1933-35. Counsellor of the French Legation, Cairo, 1935-37. Officer of the Legion of Honour. Appointed assistant delegate at Alexandretta, July 1937, in which capacity he has shown himself to be active, energetic and firm. Very sociable and especially fond of dancing. Speaks English. (January 1938.)

13. *Gennardi, P.*—Born about 1886. Inspector-General of the control of Moslem pious foundations and of the land registry. A Corsican married to a Lebanese Moslem. Served in the French secret service in North Africa before 1914. Lost an arm, a leg and an eye in the war of 1914-18. Came to Syria in 1919 and was attached to the military tribunal. Appointed to his present post in 1921. Intelligent, shrewd and well-informed though hard and vindictive. Is a Moslem and is influential in Moslem circles. (January 1937.)

14. *Hauteclouque, Jean-Marie-François, Comte de.*—Born 1893. Has served in diplomatic posts in Rio de Janeiro, Berne, Constantinople and Bucharest. Promoted counsellor 1934. Delegate designate at Damascus 1938.

15. *Huntziger, General.*—Born in 1879. Is General de Corps d'Armée. Arrived in Beirut on the 13th April, 1934, to take up his post as Commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Levant. A colonial soldier who served with distinction on the staffs of the 24th Division and the II<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps in France and later in Salonica. He commanded the French Army Corps in China in 1924, became Inspector-General of Colonial Troops in 1928 and chief of the French military mission in Brazil in September 1930. Promoted major-general in 1933 and to his present rank in 1935. A smart, dapper figure, with a pleasant, open face and kindly smile. Generally liked. Married. (December 1935.)

16. *Kieffer, Louis.*—Born in 1899. A student of the Paris School of Oriental Languages, he failed to enter the French consular service. Was formerly employed in the commercial secretariat of the French Embassy in Moscow. Transferred to Beirut a few years ago and is now Acting Director of the Political Cabinet of the French High Commission. Writes poetry and lacks personality. Wife is a Russian. (December 1935.)

17. *Lafond, Pierre.*—Born in 1897. Belongs to the French consular service. Has been in the country since 1926; was previously in Tunis. Was first employed



in the High Commission, then was French consul in Beirut before being transferred to Tripoli as delegate of the High Commissioner. Transferred to Beirut at the end of 1934 and appointed High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government. Is perhaps not a strong personality, but is socially very agreeable and generally liked. Married. (December 1935.)

18. *De Martel, Damien, Joseph, Alfred, Charles (Count)*.—High Commissioner for the Levant States under French mandate. Born the 27th November, 1878. Appointed High Commissioner in July 1933 and arrived on the 12th October. He was previously French Ambassador in Tokyo. During the two years that M. de Martel has been High Commissioner he has endeavoured to persuade the inhabitants of these territories to cease dabbling in politics and to collaborate with him in trying to foster local well-being and progress by means of economic measures. Having suspended the Syrian Parliament shortly after his arrival, he has steadfastly refused to talk politics and has devoted most of his time to laying the foundations of an economic revival. Whilst he has received little or no help from the native element—they, in fact, bitterly opposed at least one of his plans—he has stuck to his purpose with silent determination and has allowed nothing to deter him from pursuing steadily a work which he is convinced—and rightly—will ultimately be to the good of the States confided to his care. M. de Martel possesses both ability and determination. He has, moreover, a sense of humour and can be sociable and agreeable when he likes. He unfortunately appears to have no hobby, and to relieve his "ennui" he frequents cafés and cabarets. He has also rather too openly thrown his cap at the feet of the Russian wife of a foreign consular official, and although it may only be a platonic friendship mingled with, on his part, a sense of protection, it has set numerous tongues wagging, and, in what is after all an oriental atmosphere, has not redounded to the good of his personal prestige and reputation. Speaks English. Mme. de Martel, who is a niece of Mme. Aimé de Fleriau, arrived here last winter. She is intensely keen on horse racing, and her colours are to be seen regularly at the weekly races. Mme. de Martel is enormously liked and finds life in Beirut agreeable. Speaks English perfectly. (December 1935.)

19. *Mentque, Jean, Vicomte de*.—Born about 1897. Assistant to the delegate of the High Commissioner at Alexandretta since 1931 and has been acting delegate on several occasions, the last in June–October 1937. Formerly the head of a financial firm in France which had to close down owing to the crisis. Well educated, intelligent, speaks good English, and a good administrator in normal circumstances but apt to be an alarmist in times of crisis. Served in the Jebel Druse for a short time in 1933. (January 1938.)

20. *Meyrier, Jacques*.—Born in 1892. Entered the French consular service in 1919 and appointed vice-consul at Constantinople. Transferred to Shanghai in 1923 and later to Tientsin. Returned to Shanghai and remained there as consul-general until 1936 when he was appointed Secretary-General to the French High Commission at Beirut. Married to the daughter of a former French official on the board of the Ottoman Debt. A capable official, has much personal charm and is well liked. (January 1937.)

21. *Monet, General*.—Appointed General Officer Commanding Troops in Northern Syria in October 1937 with the rank of colonel. Promoted general on the 1st January, 1938. Has served at Timbuktu and Dakar and in Indo-China, and came to Aleppo from Sarraube on the Lorraine frontier. Speaks German and Russian. An agreeable personality, and likes to stress the advantages of Anglo-French co-operation in the Near East. (January 1938.)

22. *Noiret, General E.*—Born about 1887. Arrived in Beirut in October 1935 as Brigadier-General Commanding the Troops in the Lebanon and Inspector-General of local native troops. (December 1935.) Transferred to the command of the Aleppo district in 1936.

23. *Purifié, Paul*.—Born 1879. President, second class, in French Ministry of Justice. President of the Court of Appeal at Aleppo. Slippery. Married. (January 1938.)

24. *Reclus, O.*—Born about 1882. Counsellor at the High Commission for Economic Affairs. Belongs to the Tunis Administration and holds the rank of

assistant secretary-general in that service. Is a hard worker and appears to be capable, but he has a difficult situation to deal with, and thus has acquired the reputation of being stiff and difficult. Socially is most agreeable. Married. (December 1935.)

25. *De Sandfort, Barthe*.—Born about 1885. Succeeded M. Périer as director of the diplomatic bureau of the French High Commission in September 1937. Was previously French consul at Naples. Pleasant and courteous. (January 1938.)

26. *Seyrig, Henri*.—Born about 1897. An archaeologist. Came to Beirut in 1929 from the French school in Athens. Was also at New College, Oxford. Is Inspector-General of Archaeology. A pleasant and cultured man. Married. (December 1935.)

27. *Valluy, Claude*.—Born about 1892. Adviser to the Ministry of Finance. Has a great reputation among both French and Syrians as an administrator. Has made Syria his career. Has a Syrian Christian wife. His first wife was from the Lebanon. A keen official who should, but may not, go far. (March 1937.)

28. *Vasselet, Paul*.—Born about 1890. Is an official of the French Ministry of Public Works. Since 1921 has been employed in the High Commission and has risen to be Inspector-General of Public Works and Controller of Concessionary Societies (railways, transport, port, &c.), and thus wields great influence. Is unpopular with the native element, who accuse him of strangling local enterprise for the profit of the concessionary companies. Married. (December 1935.)

#### *French Officials who left Syria and the Lebanon in 1937.*

Bouchède, Paul.  
Collett, Commandant Robert.  
Fain, G. F. J.  
Périer, Philippe.

#### Chapter IV.—ALPHABETICAL LIST OF DEPUTIES IN THE SYRIAN PARLIAMENT, 1936.

Member.	Party.	Constituency.	Religion.
Shayesh ben Abdelkarim	Nationalist	Tribes of Aleppo	Sunni.
Mohamed Yahya Adali	Nationalist	Antioch	Sunni.
Haj Mohamed al Aisha	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Mahavash Vehbeh al Ajili	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Munir al Ajlani	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mohamed Kheir Akil	Nationalist	Kalamoun	Sunni.
Hussein Awni	Nationalist	Jebel Akrad	Sunni.
Nuri al Asfari	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Sabri al Assali	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Fatallah Assioun	Nationalist	Aleppo	Armenian Catholic.
Makram al Atassy	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Nassib Bakri	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Najib Barazi	Nationalist	Hama	Sunni.
Fakhri Baroudi	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mohamed Hadi Beikar	Nationalist	Azaz	Sunni.
Ibrahim Dahieh	Nationalist	Homs	Alawiyin.
Omar Dallal	Nationalist	Hama	Sunni.
Wahid Duwaidri	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Mohamed al Farah	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Abdallah Farkouh	Nationalist	Homs	Greek Orthodox.
Amir Fa'ur al Fa'ur	Nationalist	Kuneitra	Sunni.
Mohamed Nuri Fetaya	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Dahham al Hadi	?	Jazirah Tribes	Sunni.
Lutfi Haffar	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Abdul Aziz Hallaj	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan	Sunni.
Hikmet Haraki	Nationalist	Maara	Sunni.
Ismail al Hariri	Nationalist	Ezra	Sunni.
Abul Huda al Hassibi	Nationalist	Katana	Sunni.
Hikmet Hakim	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Hussein Hilmi	Nationalist	Munbej	Sunni.
Edmond Homay	Nationalist	Aleppo	Greek Catholic.
Mujhem al Bashir al Huweidi	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Refik Hussein	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Jamil Ibrahim Pasha	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan	Sunni.
Khalil Ibrahim Pasha	?	Jezirah	Sunni.



Member.	Party.	Constituency.	Religion.
Said Ishaq ...	?	Jezirah ...	Syrian Orthodox.
Saadallah Jabri ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Sunni.
Saad ed Din al Jabri ...	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan ...	Sunni.
Movsia Der Kaloustian ...	Nationalist	Antioch ...	Armenian Orthodox.
Rushdi Katkhuda ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Sunni.
Dr. Abdurrahman Kayali ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Sunni.
Said al Kayali ...	Nationalist	Harem ...	Sunni.
Ghanem al Khaiti ...	Nationalist	Douma ...	Sunni.
Yunis al Khanshur ...	Nationalist	Douma ...	Sunni.
Faiz al Khoury ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Greek Orthodox.
Farès al Khoury ...	Nationalist	Damascus (Minorities) ...	Protestant.
Nazem Koudsi ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Sunni.
Mustapha Kousseiri ...	Nationalist	Antioch ...	Sunni.
Ahmed al Lahham ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Yussef Liniado ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Jewish.
Suleiman Maasarani ...	Nationalist	Homs ...	Sunni.
Sadek Maarouf ...	Nationalist	Antioch ...	Alawiyin.
Assem Mahmoud ...	Nationalist	Kuneitra ...	Sunni.
Mohamed Mahmoud ...	Nationalist	Kalamoun ...	Sunni.
Jamil Mardam Bey ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Mustapha al Mekdad ...	Nationalist	Deraa ...	Sunni.
Trad Milhem ...	Nationalist	Damascus Tribes ...	Sunni.
Bedros Milletbachian ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Armenian Orthodox.
Mohamed al Mufleh ...	Nationalist	Deraa ...	Sunni.
Amir Mujhem ben Muheid ...	?	Jazirah Tribes ...	Sunni.
Rakkan bin Murshed ...	Nationalist	Damascus Tribes ...	Sunni.
Turki al Najrass ...	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor ...	Sunni.
Said Orfi ...	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor ...	Sunni.
Al Haj Ali Bey Qaddur ...	?	Jezirah ...	Sunni.
Shukri al Quwatli ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Mazhar Rezlan ...	Nationalist	Homs ...	Sunni.
Edmond Rabbat ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Roman Catholic.
Abdelkader Rahmo ...	Nationalist	Bab ...	Sunni.
Daoud Rihani ...	Nationalist	Alexandretta ...	Alawiyin.
George Sahrawi ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Greek Catholic.
Nawwaf al Saleh ...	Nationalist	Aleppo Tribes ...	Sunni.
Abdelkader Sarmini ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Sunni.
Fawwaz Sha'alan ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Buzan Shatin ...	Nationalist	Jerablus ...	Sunni.
Mustapha Shatin ...	Nationalist	Jerablus ...	Sunni.
Jamil Shammat ...	Nationalist	Zibdani ...	Sunni.
Ihsan Sherif ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Dr. Toufik Shishakli ...	Nationalist	Hama ...	Sunni.
Asif al Solb ...	Nationalist	Damascus ...	Sunni.
Hrante Sulahian ...	Nationalist	Aleppo ...	Armenian Orthodox.
Amir Suleiman ...	Nationalist	Selimieh ...	Ismaili.
Mahmoud Pasha Bey Zadeh ...	Nationalist	Kirik Khan ...	Sunni.
Abdul Hadi Zarzur ...	Nationalist	Abou Kamal ...	Sunni.
Farès Zobbi ...			

Chapter V.—ALPHABETICAL LIST OF DEPUTIES IN THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 1937.

Name.	Party.	District.	Religion.
*Aad, Elie ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Abi Chahla, Habib ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Greek Orthodox.
*Abdallah, Aly ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Abdul-Kader, Khaled ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
Abou Jaoudeh, Khalil ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Abou Nader, Roucos ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
*Ammoun, Charles ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Arsalan, Emir Majid ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Awad, Tewfik ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Azar, Ibrahim ...	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Maronite.
*Bellama, Emir Khalil ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Beydoun, Rashid ...	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Biitar, Wakim ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Boulos, Jawad ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Boustani, Alexandre ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Chamoun, Camille ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Daher, Negib Hanna ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Daoud, Nassib ...	Unionist	Bekaa ...	Druse.

\* Denotes Deputies appointed.

Name.	Party.	District.	Religion.
El-Abbud, Mohamed ...	Constitutional	Akkar ...	Moslem Sunnite.
*El-Ahdab, Khairaddin ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Moslem Sunnite.
El-Assad, Ahmad ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Fadel, Bahige ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Fadel, Nassouh Agha ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
El-Khazen, Sheikh Farid ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
El-Khalil, Kazem ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Khoury, Sheikh Bishara ...	Constitutional	Beirut ...	Maronite.
(Leader)			
El-Zein, Yussef ...	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Frangie, Hamid ...	Constitutional	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Ghosn, Nicolas ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Greek Orthodox.
Haidar, Ibrahim ...	Unionist	Bekaa ...	Moslem Shi'a.
Hamadi, Sabri ...	Constitutional	Bekaa ...	Moslem Shi'a.
*Harfouche, Emir Rashid ...	Unionist	Bekaa ...	Moslem Shi'a.
Husseini, Sayed Ahmed ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Istephan, Sheikh Yussef ...	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Jabr, Kamal ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Moslem Sunnite.
Jounblat, Hikmat ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Jounblat, Rashid ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Kabbaz, Gabriel ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Greek Catholic.
Kanaan, Maroun ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Maronite.
Karameh, Shafik ...	Unionist	Tripoli ...	Moslem Sunnite.
Kazhoun, Mohamed A. ...	Constitutional	Bekaa ...	Moslem Sunnite.
Khatib, Ahmed Yunis ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
*Kseib, Khalil Khoury ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Greek Orthodox.
Lababidi, Dr. Selim ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Moslem Sunnite.
*Lailakian, Wahram ...	Constitutional	Beirut ...	Armenian Orthodox.
Moukaddem, Rached ...	Unionist	Tripoli ...	Moslem Sunnite.
Mounzer, Sheikh Ibrahim ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Greek Orthodox.
Nakad, Negib ...	Constitutional	Bekaa ...	Greek Orthodox.
Nammur, Moussa ...	Constitutional	Bekaa ...	Maronite.
Nassif, Shafik ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Protestant.
*Nassouly, Muhieddin ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Moslem Sunnite.
Osseyran, Negib ...	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Salem, Youssef ...	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Greek Catholic.
Shehab, Emir Khaled ...	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
Skaf, Elias ...	Constitutional	Bekaa ...	Greek Catholic.
*Tabet, Eyoub ...	Unionist	Minorities ...	Protestant.
Tabet, Georges ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Maronite.
Tacla, Salim ...	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Greek Catholic.
Tobia, Zakia ...	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Toutounjian, Khosroff ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Armenian Orthodox.
*Trad, Pierre ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Greek Orthodox.
(President)			
*Tuani, Gabriel ...	Constitutional	Beirut ...	Greek Orthodox.
Yafi, Abdallah ...	Unionist	Beirut ...	Moslem Sunnite.

\* Denotes Deputies appointed.

[E 1445/29/89]

No. 79.

ALEXANDRETTA.

*Proceedings of the Committee of the Council appointed to Revise the Draft Electoral Law, March 1938. Note No. 3.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15.)*

(Confidential Record by Mr. Bowker.)

THE committee met again on the afternoon of the 10th March. Discussion centred round the question whether, as regards the actual machinery for carrying out the elections, the committee should adopt the system set out in the Electoral Commission's draft law or that proposed by the Turkish delegation. After M. Menemencioglu had given his reasons for preferring the Turkish system, which was based mainly on its greater simplicity, Mr. Reid gave a very effective explanation of the principles on which the commission had based their system, and answered a number of questions put by M. Menemencioglu on points of detail. As a result, M. Menemencioglu agreed to accept the commission's system as a basis on which the committee should work, reserving to himself the right to

[19825]

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suggest modifications on points as they might arise in the course of the subsequent examination of the individual articles.

2. The committee then continued its examination of individual articles, starting from the point where it had left off yesterday. The articles examined were those laying down the procedure to be followed for the registration of electors by communities, and most of the amendments which the committee provisionally adopted in the commission's draft law were the logical outcome of the decision already reached on the main point of principle, namely, that the electors should be given complete freedom of choice regarding the community to which they registered themselves as belonging.

3. The committee will meet again on the morning of the 11th March to continue the first reading of the two drafts, taking, as hitherto, the commission's draft as the basis, and introducing such modifications in the light of the Turkish proposals as may be considered necessary.

R. J. BOWKER.

Geneva, March 10, 1938.

[E 1446/29/89]

No. 80.

ALEXANDRETTA.

*Proceedings of the Committee of the Council Appointed to Revise the Draft Electoral Law, March 1938. Note No. 4.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15.)*

(Confidential Record by Mr. Bowker.)

THE committee met again on the morning of the 11th March and continued the first reading of the Electoral Commission's draft law in the light of the Turkish proposals. As a result of the very clear and detailed explanations given by Mr. Reid on each point as it arose, the Turkish member accepted, practically without amendment, most of the remaining articles up to but excluding the chapter on penalties. The articles regarding the registration of electors by communities having been already dealt with, it was natural that the Turkish member should be less critical of the articles dealing with the actual voting, which is now of very little real importance.

2. M. de Haller has prepared a table showing which articles of the commission's draft law have been adopted as they stand, and which have been reserved for later consideration. The committee will meet again to-morrow morning and try to put the amended law into final shape.

3. Examination of the chapter on penalties was delegated to a sub-committee consisting of the Belgian and French members and one of the members of the Turkish delegation. The sub-committee met in the afternoon of the 11th March and should finish its work at its next meeting. The only important question to emerge during the discussions, at which I was present as a listener, was what tribunal should decide the cases which arose. It was decided in principle that the best solution would be to constitute an *ad hoc* tribunal from the personnel of the commission, and this suggestion is being considered.

R. J. BOWKER.

Geneva, March 11, 1938.

[E 1622/29/89]

No. 81.

ALEXANDRETTA.

*Proceedings of the Committee of the Council appointed to revise the Draft Electoral Law, March 1938. Note No. 7.*

(Confidential Record by Mr. G. W. Rendel.)

I HAVE already recorded in my earlier notes Nos. 1 and 2 how the French explained to me that it was their policy to concede the Turkish demand that the elections in the sanjak should be so arranged as to ensure a Turkish majority, but that they still hoped to arrange matters so that that majority should not

exceed 55 per cent. It was clear, on the other hand, that the Turks were out to arrange the elections in a way which would ensure them a majority of not less than 85 per cent., *i.e.*, to ensure that the Arab and Alawite communities should all vote Turkish, leaving only the Armenians and possibly the Greek Orthodox in the non-Turkish camp, with the result that the vast majority of the forty Deputies in the new Chamber would be allotted to the Turkish community.

2. It occurred to me that, given this situation, it would be far simpler to try to reach agreement at once as to the number of Deputies to be allotted to the various communities. A fair election being now quite impossible, it seemed a legitimate matter for negotiation, and I hoped that by these means a compromise might have been arrived at between the French and Turkish figures, and all the elaborate, expensive and dangerous pretence of the so-called "registration by communities" might have been avoided.

3. At the meeting on the afternoon of the 8th March I therefore made a long statement intended to bring the two parties into the open. I explained that we all appreciated the positions of the Turkish and French delegations, but that it was clear that the difficulties in the way of evolving a satisfactory system for the free registration of electors by communities were likely to prove insuperable. The Turks had, in fact, developed a strong case to show that it was likely to prove impossible even for the electors themselves to decide to which community they belonged. The Turks had objected to anything in the nature of a census, *i.e.*, of registration on the basis of existing facts, and had rejected any system intended to establish the facts. They based their case on what they called "volonté raciale," *i.e.*, the wish of the electors to see a particular race in control. At the same time, the difficulties in the way of any kind of plebiscite seemed insurmountable. It seemed clear that there need be no fundamental disagreement about which community should have the majority of votes. I ventured therefore to suggest, as a purely tentative and personal suggestion of my own, that an effort should be made to decide forthwith the *total* number of Deputies to be allotted to each community, and not merely the minimum number, as provided for in the fundamental law. This would, of course, involve an alteration in the fundamental law, but there seemed no insuperable difficulty in the way of this. If the Committee of Five, which included the two parties, was unanimous in recommending such an alteration, I could not believe that the Council of the League would raise any objection. I have recorded this speech rather fully because, though I made it in English, the record of it was taken from the French translation, which was a very shortened form of what I actually said.

4. The Turks immediately raised the strongest objections to my suggestion. They said the same proposal had been put forward during the discussion of the Committee of Experts and had then been turned down at their instance. They were not prepared to reopen it.

5. The French, who had told me on the previous day that they were most anxious to prevent the Turkish majority exceeding 55 per cent., and who must have realised that my proposal offered them what might be a last chance of securing this limitation, also failed to support me. M. Westman and M. Bourquin were both obviously nervous of anything so drastic, and the suggestion was therefore abandoned.

6. When the discussion of the question of registration by communities was resumed on the following day, I made a great effort to ensure that, in cases where there was *prima facie* reason to believe that an elector was registering himself in a community to which he obviously did not belong, an enquiry might be made into the facts at the request of the representative of the community to which the elector appeared to have belonged. If it was established that the elector was, in fact, registering in an entirely new community, he would be told that he was perfectly free to change his community, but that the change must be a permanent one and that he would henceforth belong to the new community, with any subsequent change in his rights or obligations which this might involve.

7. My object in urging this was to counter what was obviously the intention of the Turks, *i.e.*, that the majority of the Alawites and Arabs should be compelled by every form of illegitimate pressure to register as Turks, but should do so without fully realising the consequence of their action. It is proposed that the electors, on registration, should receive a card of a particular colour according to the community in which they register. It is easy to see how those who bring back from the registration stations cards not of the Turkish colour will be



penalised by Turkish landlords, agents from Angora, &c. I confess that I shall be surprised if more than a very small number of Alawites and Arabs register as anything but Turks under this system. If, however, the Alawites and Arabs concerned were obliged formally to abjure their allegiance to the Alawite or Arab community before finally registering as Turks, they would still have the freedom to register as Turks, which the Turks desire, but they would be less likely to do so as a result of temporary intimidation or misrepresentation of the true facts.

8. M. Menemencioglu, who realised that under this system he would probably still be able to get a substantial Turkish majority, and that it was, in fact, entirely compatible with the anxiety of the Turks to ensure that neither the local authorities nor the electoral commission should have a decisive voice in deciding to what community any elector actually belonged, seemed disposed to consider this suggestion. He asked for an adjournment of the meeting for ten minutes while he consulted his delegation. I should explain that throughout the proceedings two somewhat sinister, but rather bovine, members of the Turkish delegation watched every step which M. Menemencioglu took. I understood that they were personal representatives of the Gazi, sent to make sure that M. Menemencioglu secured a 100 per cent. Turkish solution. It is hardly surprising in the circumstances that M. Menemencioglu, after the adjournment, announced that he could not accept my proposal. He explained that, while there might be a basic difference between the Armenian and the Turkish or the Orthodox Greek communities, there was no real difference between the Alawite, Arab and Turkish communities, which were all of the same religion and merged into each other. This is, of course, not strictly true, and the Turks themselves have in the past emphasised the distinction between these communities when it has suited them to do so. The excuse was therefore a poor one, and I might still have fought for my proposal and taken the line that Turkish intransigence would cause a bad impression on His Majesty's Government and that I must refer to the Foreign Office for further instructions, had not M. Lagarde at this moment—as on previous occasions—suddenly come forward as a supporter of the Turkish case and remarked—rather inconsistently with many of his earlier statements—that what M. Menemencioglu said was quite true.

9. The whole committee were clearly anxious to concede the maximum Turkish demands without more ado, and, in view of this and of the general instructions which I had received before coming out to Geneva, I felt that it would be hopeless for me to raise further objection. The Turkish demands were thus accepted, and it will now be possible for the Turks to ensure that the great majority of the Alawites and Arabs, if not of the Armenians and Orthodox Greeks, all register as Turks. This will give the Deputies representing the Turkish community a very strong majority in the new Chamber, and I think it can safely be said that it is now only a question of time before arrangements are made for the complete incorporation of the sanjak in Turkey. If one may compare a small matter with a great one, the course of events is probably likely to follow closely that of recent events in Austria. Possibly an even closer parallel may be found in the case of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

10. With this decision, the proceedings of the Committee of Five appeared to me to lose all further importance. I accordingly felt no hesitation in leaving Geneva that evening.

G. W. RENDEL.

Rome, March 18, 1938.

[E 1676/29/89]

No. 82.

*Report on the Proceedings of the Committee of Five respecting the Sanjak of Alexandretta.*

THE Committee of Five, constituted in order to introduce into the draft regulations prepared by the Alexandretta Electoral Commission such amendments as might be considered necessary to meet the Turkish objections, opened its meetings at Geneva on the 7th March and finished work on the 19th March. Mr. Rendel sat on the committee as the United Kingdom representative during the first three days, his place being taken thereafter by myself. A copy of the revised regulations, as adopted by the committee, together with the committee's

report to the Council, is attached.<sup>(1)</sup> The minutes of the meetings will be received later.

2. The main Turkish objection to the regulations drawn up by the commission was that they provided that the electors should register under the communities to which they in fact belonged, and left the final decision in the matter, in case of doubt, to the commission. The Turkish Government contended that, according to the Fundamental Law of the sanjak, on which the whole electoral procedure was based, electors should be free to choose the community to which they were to register themselves as belonging. As the Fundamental Law provides further that the number of Deputies allotted to each community in the Assembly is to be in proportion to the number of electors registered as belonging to it, the registration is the decisive stage of the elections. The commission's view was that the registration should be based on facts. The Turkish view was that it should be a form of plebiscite. Unfortunately, the Committee of Experts which drew up the Fundamental Law were unable to reach a clear decision on this important point and left it purposely vague in the law. Owing to Mr. Rendel's firm lead, this fundamental question of principle was brought to the fore at the outset of the committee's deliberations. The cogent arguments put forward by Mr. Rendel in favour of the commission's interpretation and the final acceptance of the Turkish view, rendered unavoidable by the attitude of the French Government, have been fully reported in Geneva telegrams Nos. A and B (Saving) of the 9th March and his notes Nos. 1 and 2 on the committee's proceedings.

3. The main embodiment of the Turkish view will be found in articles 19-25 of the revised regulations, which leave the elector complete freedom of choice as regards registration, and allow for objection to be made only regarding the elector's identity and his qualifications to be an elector. The corresponding articles in the commission's regulations (15-21) made it possible to ensure that the elector's declaration regarding his community corresponded with the facts. The significance of this decision lies in the fact that the Turkish community in the sanjak, being the only properly organised community, and comprising most of the bigger landlords, will now be able to induce large numbers of non-Turks, by means of threats and bribes, to register themselves as belonging to the Turkish community and so ensure that the elections shall result in an overwhelming Turkish majority.

4. The decision reached on this main point determined the course of the subsequent deliberations of the committee. The amendments proposed by the Turkish representative were, in almost every case, calculated to restrict the determining authority of the commission and to facilitate the activities of the Turkish agents. In view of the inability of the French representative to offer any opposition, the vague wording of the Fundamental Law and the fact that, by the terms of the committee's composition, its decisions had to be unanimous, it was not possible to save more than a few shreds of the commission's regulations. Apart from the main point referred to above, the most important amendments which were introduced into the commission's regulations are the following:—

*Representatives of the Communities.*

(a) The revised regulations require that representatives of the communities shall be attached, not only (as provided by the commission's regulations) to the electoral bureaux at which the registration and voting proceedings are to take place, but also to the commission itself and the committee which is to hear appeals regarding decisions taken by the electoral bureaux on the subject of a person's eligibility to register (article 4). Article 15 of the Fundamental Law provides that: "Cette commission comprendra des ressortissants d'Etats membres de la Société des Nations autres que la France et la Turquie, auxquels seront adjoints des représentants locaux des communautés. . . ." I pointed out to the committee that, as the electoral bureaux were composed of members of the commission or their delegates, the community representatives, when attached to those bureaux, would, in fact, be attached to the commission, and that there was no occasion to attach them also directly to the commission itself, where they would simply be an encumbrance. The rest of the committee considered, however, that the text of the Fundamental Law supported the Turkish

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



requirements, and the most that it was possible to obtain was the insertion of a clause (article 4, paragraph 3) making it clear that the function of the representatives was merely consultative, that they should be consulted only on matters regarding the electoral operations on which the commission had to make a decision in plenary session, and that the commission itself should determine the conditions in which this consultation should take place. In addition, an article (5) was inserted making it impossible for the representatives, by obstruction, to hold up the work of the organ to which they were attached.

The attachment of these representatives to the commission is considered by Mr. Reid, the president of the Electoral Commission, to be one of the most objectionable features of the revised regulations. He considers that they will seriously hamper the commission's work, and that the representative of the Turkish community, who is sure to be picked by the Turkish Government, will take every opportunity of undermining the commission's authority.

(b) Under the new regulations (article 11) each electoral bureau is to have attached to it a representative of *every* community, whereas the commission had provided merely for "representatives of the communities," the idea being that, in districts where there were few or no members of a particular community, there was no object in attaching a representative of that community to the electoral bureau. The result of this amendment is likely to be that, whereas some communities may fail to provide representatives in certain cases, the Turkish community will be fully represented throughout the sanjak.

#### *Penal Clauses.*

These were cut down and the penalties reduced. At one moment during the discussions the Turkish representative even went so far as to raise the question whether, in view of the declaration which, under article 19, paragraph 2, of the revised regulations, an elector might be called on to make when registering, to the effect that his decision regarding his community had been freely taken, it would be possible to inflict any penalty on him whatsoever if it afterwards came to light that his decision had been influenced by a bribe.

#### *Disabilities.*

As a result of the opinion given by the Legal Section of the League Secretariat, the additional disabilities regarding voters contained in article 9 of the commission's regulations were dropped.

#### *Special Tribunal.*

The Turkish representative having raised serious objection to the proposal that the penal clauses should be operated by the local courts, it was decided, after the French representative had referred the matter to his Government, to set up a special tribunal (article 7), consisting of a judge and two assistants, who are to be nationals of States members of the League other than France and Turkey.

5. The committee fixed the 15th July as the ultimate date by which the elections should be finished, adding a recommendation that the commission should do their best to finish operations by the 30th June. These dates were fixed after consultation with Mr. Reid, who, however, said that it was impossible to foresee how long the commission would require under the revised regulations, and after I had urged on the committee the importance of giving the commission a certain latitude. The French and Turkish representatives were both most anxious that the elections should be finished at the earliest possible moment.

6. The principal part in the committee's discussions was naturally taken by the Turkish representative, M. Menemencioglu, who put forward the Turkish case with great skill. M. Lagarde, the French representative (M. de Tessen had to return to Paris after the first meeting), was frequently in the embarrassing position of having to support the Turkish case by special pleading. Franco-Turkish understanding was conspicuous throughout the proceedings. M. Bourquin, the Belgian representative, gave in particular valuable help in the revision of the penal clauses, and in general drafting. The Swedish representative,

M. Westman, presided with geniality and patience, though he has insufficient drive and personality to be a good president. The issue on the main point of principle was decided before Mr. Rendel left. My rôle, as his successor, was mainly to try to mitigate as far as possible the difficulties of the executive officers whose task it would be to put the regulations into effect.

7. Mr. Reid was present at all the meetings, and, although it must have been highly disagreeable for him to watch the drastic revision of the work on which he and his commission had spent so much time and trouble, he nevertheless gave the committee his full, and invaluable, assistance, and with unfailing good humour.

8. The committee's proceedings were inevitably long. An amendment adopted in one article often entailed several other amendments elsewhere in the text. The Turkish representative questioned every word of the commission's regulations which could possibly be interpreted unfavourably to the Turkish cause. Moreover, seemingly small points frequently gave rise to discussions lasting an hour or more. I was told that the Turkish delegation had expected the proceedings to last considerably longer.

9. Under the revised regulations it will be impossible for the commission to carry through fair elections, and the Turkish element in the sanjak, which, according to generally accepted figures, comprises about 40 per cent. of the population, will be able to secure anything up to 80 per cent. of the seats in the new Assembly.

R. J. BOWKER.

March 21, 1938.

[E 1686/1120/89]

No. 83.

*Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 13. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Damascus, March 9, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 3 and 4 of the 26th and 27th February on the subject of the oil extraction concession negotiated by Petroleum Concessions (Limited) with the Syrian Government, I have the honour of supplying you with further details of the agreement.

2. The period of the concession is seventy-five years and covers the whole of Syria north of the Damascus parallel. The company accepts the obligation to drill down to 3,000 metres unless a million tons a year of crude oil is made available for export or sale locally before reaching that depth. The company must, within fifteen years, achieve an annual production of a million tons of oil or surrender the concession.

3. The scale of royalties starts at 2s. 6d. gold and rises to 4s. gold (equivalent at to-day's rate to about 4s. 3d. and 6s. 2d. sterling respectively).

4. Cash payments of £50,000 gold (£83,000 sterling) on ratification are fixed with minimum annuities during the first fifteen years, starting at £15,000 gold (£25,000 sterling) and rising to £80,000 gold (£132,000 sterling) in the thirteenth year; alternatively, £100,000 gold (£166,000 sterling) when exports or sales begin at a rate of a million tons of oil a year. If the company should decide to withhold available production from the market, then payments rising from £200,000 gold (£335,000 sterling) to £400,000 gold (£658,000 sterling) shall be made to the Government annually according to the quality of the oil extractable.

5. If no oil is discovered within ten years, the agreement shall be cancelled. Exemption from taxation up to £2,000 per annum is granted to the company until oil is discovered; thereafter exemption will be at the rate of £15,000 per annum.

6. The company has undertaken no refining obligations beyond agreement to supply a limited quantity of refined products for the use of the Government.

7. Pending ratification, the Syrian Government specially ask that the terms be not published. Mr. Skliros, managing director of Petroleum Concessions (Limited), who has put the above information at my disposal, has kindly promised that a printed copy of the completed concession will be supplied to you by the London office of the company in due course.



8. In order to satisfy local feeling the company will be styled "The Syrian Petroleum Company (Limited)." As an act of goodwill, the Iraq Petroleum Company, of which Petroleum Concessions (Limited) is a subsidiary, has promised to employ its influence in Paris to hasten ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

[E 1790/47/89]

No. 84.

*Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Beirut, March 23, 1938.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 18th January, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 20th March the Ahdab Cabinet resigned.

2. M. Ahdab had presided over five Cabinets during the last fifteen months, but during the last few months it had become evident that his position was gradually growing weaker, and, when at the end of last week some of his supporters in the House informed him that he must no longer count on their votes, he realised that his majority had disappeared and decided to make way for somebody else.

3. After consultation with the leading personalities in the Chamber, President Eddé called on the Emir Khaled Chéhab to form a Government. He has now done so and the new Cabinet is composed as follows:—

President of the Council and Minister of Justice: Emir Khaled Chéhab (13).

Interior and Defence: Sheikh Yussef Istéphan.

Finance: Camille Chamoun.

Public Works and Foreign Affairs: Selim Tacla (40).

Agriculture: Hikmat Joumblat.

Public Instruction and National Economy: Khalil Kseib (34).

Public Health: Ahmed-el-Assad.

(Numbers in parentheses are references to Lebanese personalities.)

4. This Ministry consists of four members of the former Government party in the House and three of the former Opposition. Two of its members (Joumblat and Kseib) belonged to the outgoing Cabinet, and three, Istéphan, Chamoun and El Assad, are newcomers.

5. Of the newcomers, Sheikh Yussef Istéphan was born about 1883, is a Maronite by religion and is at present a Deputy for North Lebanon. He was a Senator previous to the abolition of the Senate in 1928, and later a Deputy. He is a person of some importance in his own district.

Camille Chamoun was born about 1903, is a Maronite by religion and a lawyer by profession. He was a Deputy in the last Parliament and is also in the present one. He is said to be intelligent.

Ahmed-el-Assad was born about 1903. He is a Shiah Moslem and Deputy for South Lebanon, comes from an old Moslem family and was educated at the American University at Beirut. He has a certain influence in South Lebanon.

6. This Cabinet would seem to be neither better nor worse than the one it has displaced. It is not likely to do more for the country and it can hardly do less. It will be presented to the Chamber in the course of the next few days, and will perhaps succeed in obtaining a vote of confidence, but nobody expects it to last very long. There is little doubt that, in the absence of clearly-defined political principles, constitutional government of the kind at present existing in the Lebanon is a luxury. Patriarchal rule has held sway in this country for centuries, and it would be too much to expect eighteen years of mandatory government to be able to change the ingrained sentiments of the mountain population. Democratic institutions therefore appear little more than a farce and are not understood. Direct rule by the head of the State, assisted by a small council of elders, with the various Departments of Government functioning under directors, would, in the

opinion of many, be a form of government more suitable to the needs and economy of this small and poorly-equipped country. So long as the mandatory Power is in the offing, and its intervention can be invoked, the Lebanese can go on playing at parliamentary government without doing much harm, except for the waste of time and opportunity, but presumably the time will come when the mandate expires, and when that comes to pass there will be some justification for apprehension.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's consul in Damascus and the acting consul in Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 2277/1237/25]

No. 85.

*Acting British Consul to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Aleppo, April 20, 1938.

ON 16th April Governor of Jezireh returned from Damascus to join his post. He failed to bring back with him person detained in Damascus and was received in a hostile attitude. The police force used their firearms; four killed, many wounded. If French army had not intervened situation critical. The district now under martial law; although statement that district calm, situation considered dangerous.

(Repeated to Paris, Bagdad, Angora, Beirut and Damascus.)

[E 2943/47/89]

No. 86.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 20.)*

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 14, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to report that as a result of the events in the Jezireh, recorded in Aleppo telegram No. 11 of the 20th April, 1938, the new Muhafiz, Haidar Mardam Bey, promptly sent in his resignation. At the same time, the population of the province declared a strike of fifteen days which was most strictly observed. The towns reopened on the 2nd May, but at the same time sent a telegram to the French High Commissioner in Beirut informing him that this move did not in any way imply an abatement of their claims and that they were resolved to accept no more officials from Damascus. The boycott of Syrian Government officials in the Jezireh is still continuing, to such a degree that shopkeepers refuse even to sell them the necessities of life, which they are obliged to bring in from Deir-ez-Zor.

2. Toufik Bey Chamié, Muhafiz of Deir-ez-Zor, having meantime been appointed Inspector of Finance at Damascus, Haidar Mardam Bey has been appointed to Deir-ez-Zor, and the post of Muhafiz of Jezireh is again vacant, and it is to be anticipated that the Syrian Government will have difficulty in finding a suitable nominee to fill the vacancy. Certain untimely utterances made in the Syrian Chamber by less responsible Deputies to the effect that a little more massacring and shooting of the recalcitrant Christians in the Jezireh would soon put an end to the separatist movement there have been given much prominence in the local press and have not had a calming effect.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Angora and Bagdad and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.



*Further Meeting of the League Committee of Five which drew up the Revised Regulations for the Elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.*

(Confidential Record by Mr. Bowker.)

THE permanent Turkish delegate at Geneva having addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the League and to the president of the League Committee of Five which drew up the revised regulations for the elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta protesting against the way in which the Electoral Commission were interpreting article 17 of the regulations as regards registration of electors under "other communities," the president of the Committee of Five called a meeting of the committee for the 21st May. On instructions, I attended as United Kingdom representative. The committee held a short preliminary meeting in the morning, at which the Belgian representative was unable to be present, and a second and final meeting in the afternoon.

Besides the Turkish protest regarding registration under "other communities," the committee considered also the request of the Electoral Commission that the period of the elections should be extended and their wish, communicated to the Secretariat-General of the League, and by the latter conveyed semi-officially to the committee, that the commission should be released, in view of the extra delay and the practical difficulties involved, from the obligation imposed by article 30 of the regulations, of publishing the results of the registration operations.

Copies of the committee's decisions on these three points are attached (Annex 1). The minutes of the meetings will be received later.

*I.—The Turkish Protest regarding the Commission's Interpretation of "Other Communities."*

A copy of the letter from the Turkish delegate is attached (Annex 2). In this letter the Turkish delegate stated that certain Turks had expressed a wish to register themselves as Sunni Moslems, on which they had been told that such a community did not exist for the purposes of registration. They had thereupon been advised by the "official and unofficial agents of the mandatory authority" to register under the group "other communities," and this the commission had allowed them to do. The Turkish delegate contended that this action of the commission was a flagrant misinterpretation of the regulations, since the group "other communities" was clearly intended to comprise only the smaller minority communities which were not specifically mentioned.

2. In examining the Turkish protest, the main task of the committee was to reach a settlement which, while giving reasonable satisfaction to the Turks, would at the same time safeguard the position of the Electoral Commission. In the event, the second consideration gave the greater anxiety, since it transpired that the commission had addressed a telegram to the Secretary-General of the League protesting most strongly against the charge of partiality contained in the Turkish delegate's letter, and indicating that if further such accusations were levelled against them it would be impossible for them to continue their task. Mr. Walters, an assistant Secretary-General of the League, in conversation with members of the committee between the two meetings, expressed himself as extremely apprehensive that, if the committee were to reach a decision which put the commission in the wrong, the latter would resign. On the other hand, the Turkish representative showed himself less unyielding than had been expected. This may have been due to the fact that the three neutral representatives on the committee (*i.e.*, the Swedish, Belgian and myself) all expressed the opinion that the commission's interpretation of the regulations as regards "other communities" was fully justified. The Belgian representative, who is a professor of law at the University of Geneva, and whose opinion therefore carried considerable weight, was particularly categorical on this point. It was probably as a result of this unanimity on the part of the neutral representatives that the Turkish delegate, rather surprisingly, accepted the contention that, whatever interpretation was given on the point at issue for the future, the registrations which had already taken place under "other communities" should be maintained. It seemed to me that to call in question decisions already taken by the commission

would hopelessly undermine the commission's authority, and I expressed this view to the committee. This point having been conceded, it was considerably easier to reach agreement about the procedure to be adopted in the future, in regard to which there was general readiness to make some concession to the Turkish view. It was finally agreed that henceforth any elector expressing a wish to register under "other communities" shall be required to specify to which "other community" he belongs, such "other community" being necessarily one of the following: Latin, Maronite, Melchite, Israelite, Druse, Ismaili, Circassian. (These were taken from the list of communities recognised under local law, excluding those, such as Sunni Moslem and Armenian, which are already embraced by the special *ad hoc* communities specifically mentioned in article 17 of the regulations.) If an elector wishing to register under this group fails to indicate one of these minorities, his registration will be refused, and the fact mentioned in the register. The instructions to the commission on this point include a carefully-worded introduction explaining that the new interpretation is necessitated by a deficiency in the wording of the Fundamental Law, and not to any fault of the commission, and making it clear that registrations already recorded are to stand.

3. At one point during the discussions I suggested that, as the number of persons who had so far registered under "other communities" was extremely small, the practical importance of the question was out of all proportion to the difficulties in the way of introducing a new interpretation on the point, and that for that reason it would be better to leave things as they were. The Turkish representative, however, replied that what he considered to be the present abuse of "other communities" might become greater as the elections went on, and it was essential to put the matter right now. Short of leaving things as they were, I think that the settlement reached is the best that was possible in the circumstances. Its merit, from the juridical point of view, is that past registrations are maintained and the commission are given an interpretation of the regulations for the future which it is reasonable to suppose to be in accordance with the intentions (though unexpressed) of the framers of the Fundamental Law. From the psychological point of view, the settlement combines the minimum concession to Turkish susceptibilities with the maximum measure of consideration to the susceptibilities of the commission. It is on this latter ground that I considered the settlement to be one which the instructions I received before leaving for Geneva authorised me to accept.

*II.—The Commission's Plea for an Extension of the Period of the Elections.*

The committee were faced, on the one hand, with the fact that the French and Turkish Governments had both expressed themselves firmly opposed to any extension, and, on the other, by their own wish to treat the commission fairly and not to ask them to do what was impossible. The communication which it was finally agreed to send to the commission on the subject leaves the door still open for an eventual prolongation, but again urges the commission to do their utmost to finish the elections as soon as possible.

*III.—Publication of the Results of the Registration Operations.*

This provision owed its retention in the revised regulations largely to the insistence of the French representative. M. Lagarde was now quite prepared to let it lapse and, as no important question of principle was involved, the committee acceded to the commission's request. It was decided to inform the commission of this decision in the communication dealing with point II above and to treat it as a contribution towards the acceleration of the elections.

During the committee's deliberations the French delegate played his now familiar rôle of pleading the Turkish cause. In private he expressed anxiety about the situation in the sanjak; anxiety which it is easy to understand in view of the small likelihood of the elections now producing a result which the Turks will accept as satisfactory. The settlement reached on the question of "other communities" may to some extent soothe Turkish feelings, but it cannot have any effect on the outcome of the elections.

R. J. BOWKER

May 23, 1938.



## Annex 1.

*Decisions of the Committee of Five.*

## I.

LE Comité du Conseil a examiné attentivement la question de savoir quelle interprétation doit être donnée à l'article 9 de la Loi fondamentale et à l'article 17 du Règlement définitif des premières élections.

Il résulte de ces deux textes que tout électeur au premier degré a le droit de se faire inscrire dans l'un des sept groupes énumérés, l'un de ces groupes étant défini par l'appellation globale "autres communautés."

D'autre part, il faut reconnaître que, lors de l'élaboration de la Loi fondamentale et du Règlement électoral, cette question n'a pas fait l'objet d'un examen détaillé au sein des comités compétents.

C'est là une lacune qui n'est aucunement imputable à la Commission électorale.

Jusqu'à présent il n'a pas été exigé des électeurs demandant leur inscription sous la rubrique "autres communautés" qu'ils indiquent la communauté déterminée à laquelle ils prétendent appartenir. Les inscriptions ainsi effectuées restent acquises.

Cependant, cette pratique ayant donné lieu en fait à des inconvénients signalés au comité, ce dernier décide que les inscriptions futures sous ladite rubrique seront subordonnées à l'obligation pour l'intéressé d'indiquer également au Bureau électoral la communauté déterminée à laquelle il prétend appartenir, cette communauté devant être l'une de celles qui figurent dans la liste ci-après : latine, maronite, melchite, israélite, druse, ismaélite, tcherkesse.

Si le déclarant n'indique pas une communauté figurant dans la liste ci-dessus, l'inscription sera refusée et mention sera faite au registre du motif pour lequel elle n'a pas été admise.

La présente décision sera immédiatement notifiée à la Commission électorale par le Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

## II.

Le comité saisit parfaitement les préoccupations auxquelles la Commission électorale a obéi en demandant la prorogation de la date ultime des opérations électorales. Néanmoins, tenant compte des inquiétudes manifestées par les représentants des Gouvernements français et turc, le comité, en raison de la situation dans le sandjak, n'a pas jugé opportun de prendre une décision portant prorogation de ladite date.

Il est convaincu que la commission s'emploiera à accélérer par tous les moyens en son pouvoir les opérations afin qu'elles soient achevées le plus tôt possible.

Dans cet esprit, le comité, vu les circonstances signalées par la commission, a, conformément au vœu de cette dernière, décidé qu'en dérogation au Règlement électoral, il ne sera pas procédé à la publication prévue par l'article 30.

Cette dernière décision sera immédiatement notifiée par le Secrétaire général à la Puissance mandataire.

## Annex 2.

*Turkish Delegate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.*

M. le Secrétaire général,

Genève, le 16 mai 1938.

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer, ci-joint, le texte de la lettre que le consul général de Turquie à Antioche a adressée au nom de son Gouvernement à M. le Président de la Commission électorale du Sandjak en date du 13 mai.

L'incident qui a motivé la remise de cette lettre a été provoqué par la prétention qu'un certain nombre d'individus, encouragés par les autorités locales, ont élevé de se faire inscrire sur les registres *ad hoc* comme appartenant à la communauté musulmane sunnite.

La première réaction de la Commission électorale s'est manifestée par le refus d'inscrire ces individus comme appartenant à une communauté non prévue par la Loi fondamentale.

Mais les agents officiels et officieux du mandat ont montré, tant aux individus dont il s'agit qu'à la commission elle-même, le chemin à suivre pour partager la communauté turque du sandjak en deux tronçons et lui faire, ainsi, perdre la majorité qui lui revient de droit.

La commission vient, en effet, de décider que ceux qui se prétendent musulmans sunnites peuvent être inscrits à la liste des "autres communautés."

Or, cette prime au fanatisme va nettement à l'encontre des résolutions de Genève, qui n'ont envisagé une liste supplémentaire des "autres communautés" que pour permettre aux communautés existantes minoritaires dont les membres sont en nombre infime de se rassembler en vue d'élire, si possible, un Député destiné à les représenter toutes.

La communauté sunnite musulmane qui n'a aucune existence statutaire serait, si elle existait dans le sens de la Loi fondamentale, non pas une fraction infime de communauté mais bien une communauté éminemment majoritaire, puisqu'elle rassemblerait dans son sein, dans les proportions de 85 et de 15 pour cent, les deux communautés, turque et arabe, que le Conseil de la Société des Nations a dû ériger en communautés indépendantes. C'est sur cette séparation de la grande communauté musulmane sunnite que repose toute la Loi fondamentale, je dirai même, tout le compromis du sandjak. La Commission électorale qui doit connaître la genèse des résolutions du Conseil ne pouvait pas commettre une erreur aussi manifeste et si elle l'a commise, elle ne devrait pas persister dans cette manière de voir qui est la négation même du système électoral confié dans son exécution à sa haute autorité.

Sous la dénomination du musulman sunnite les électeurs inscrits sont des Turcs trompés sur le sens de leurs votes, car parmi les musulmans sunnites du sandjak l'élément ture forme, comme je viens de le dire plus haut, une majorité de plus de 85 pour cent.

La fausse application des décisions de Genève ne peut donc avoir d'autre but et d'autre conséquence que celle de briser la grande majorité turque et elle est par cela même d'une importance primordiale.

La lettre ci-incluse à M. le Président de la Commission vous montrera les arguments sur lesquels s'est basée la démarche courtoise entreprise par le consul général de Turquie à Antioche au nom du Gouvernement de la République.

Il ne vous échappera pas que l'importance de l'affaire est de nature à exiger l'adoption de mesures immédiates en vue de la cessation de cette pratique insolite.

Veillez, &c.

Le Délégué permanent de Turquie,  
N. SADAK.

Enclosure in Annex 2.

*Turkish Consul-General at Antioch to the President of the Electoral Commission.*

M. le Président,

LA décision adoptée par la Commission électorale en ce qui concerne le sens du terme "autres communautés" est nettement contraire à la Loi fondamentale du sandjak. Les délibérations du Comité technique de Genève se sont, en effet, déroulées dans un sens qui exclut l'interprétation adoptée par votre honorable commission. Une liste des autres communautés a été envisagée à Genève dans le but de permettre de voter aux communautés existantes, telles que les communautés tcherkes, juive, catholique, maronite, &c., mais toujours dont l'existence de fait est de notoriété publique. Lorsqu'une personne se présente devant le Bureau électoral celle-ci est "présumée faire partie de la communauté à laquelle elle déclare appartenir." Cette déclaration entraîne l'inscription d'office, mais encore faut-il qu'une communauté connue soit citée par l'intéressé.

Il ne peut être admis qu'un électeur puisse déclarer appartenir aux "autres communautés," ce terme ne signifiant pas une communauté dans le sens de la Loi fondamentale et du Règlement électoral mais bien une liste destinée à rassembler les membres des communautés existantes minoritaires. Le Bureau électoral ne peut, par exemple, inscrire dans la liste des "autres communautés." Si un Turc, un Arabe ou un Alaouite exprimait la volonté d'être inscrit à cette liste il lui faudrait déclarer appartenir à une des communautés minoritaires existantes en affirmant qu'il est Tcherkez, ou Maronite et que par cela même il est au bénéfice

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d'une inscription à la liste des autres communautés. C'est à la suite de cette déclaration, mais uniquement dans ce cas, que l'inscription peut être opérée. J'ai le ferme espoir que votre honorable commission voudra bien se ranger à cet avis, strictement conforme aux délibérations et actes de Genève, et faire à ce sujet les communications nécessaires au Bureau électoral. Dans le cas contraire le Gouvernement de la République turque fait toutes réserves sur l'application erronée qui serait donnée aux résolutions du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Veuillez, &c.

[E 3548/29/89]

No. 88.

*Further Meeting of the League Committee of Five which drew up the Revised Regulations for the Elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.*

(Confidential Record by Mr. Bowker.)

THE Committee of Five met on the 10th and again on the 11th June. The first meeting opened with the reading of the various communications which had been received from the Electoral Commission. These referred to the successive suspensions of the registration of voters, made at the request of the delegate of the French High Commissioner and with the assent of the Turkish consul-general at Antioch, the first from the 31st May to the 5th June, and the second from the 5th to the 9th June, and to the commission's inability to terminate the elections by the date fixed (the 15th July). The commission also called attention to information which had recently reached them, confirmed by the press, according to which France had already guaranteed to Turkey a small Turkish majority in the Sanjak Assembly; they affirmed that the mandatory authorities were exerting pressure on the non-Turkish communities to induce them to refrain from propaganda and from registering, and made full reservations regarding the commission's ability to continue their task. M. de Haller acquainted the committee semi-officially with a subsequent communication which the secretariat had received from the commission, stating that, since the resumption of registrations, pressure was being exercised on certain elements to induce them to refrain from registering. The president then explained that the occasion for calling the committee was the commission's request for a fresh examination of the question of postponing the ultimate date of the elections. He added that, in his opinion, however, it would be impossible for the committee to consider the question of the date without taking account of the present situation as described by the commission.

2. The French representative thereupon made a long statement regarding the policy of the mandatory Power in the sanjak. The latter, he explained, had the task of preparing the way for the future régime as defined in the texts adopted at Geneva. The Turkish Government had always affirmed that there was a Turkish majority in the sanjak, and this was "une affirmation de volonté." The mandatory Power was convinced that the only Government which could possibly exist in the sanjak when the new régime came into being was one in which Turkey would play the leading part. They therefore considered it their duty to open the eyes of the persons committed to their charge to the realities of the situation, and to make them aware that they would merely defeat their own purposes by working for a precarious majority composed of the combined non-Turkish elements. He distinguished between a "pression directe" on the population and a "tendance à la persuasion," which was the extent of the mandatory Power's action. He maintained that such action was justified by the fact that a proper settlement of the sanjak question was not only of local importance, but had a vital bearing on future relations between France and Turkey and between Turkey and Syria. Finally, he alluded to the negotiations at present in progress between France and Turkey, which already promised a settlement which would be in the best interests of the inhabitants of the sanjak. M. Lagarde reverted to this theme on more than one occasion during the discussions, and his remarks were obviously intended to be the official justification of the long series of French capitulations to Turkish demands regarding

the sanjak. Before the members of the committee finally dispersed, he asked me most earnestly to see that this exposition of his Government's position and their understanding of their rôle as mandatory Power was brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government.

3. The Turkish representative then read a communication from his Government, in which the latter refused to admit any justification for the commission's request for a prolongation of the electoral period, and levelled serious charges of partiality against the commission itself.

4. At this point the president said that he felt bound to ask the French and Turkish representatives for an explanation of the allusions which had been made in different quarters to a Franco-Turkish Agreement about the result of the elections. This evoked from the obviously embarrassed M. Lagarde a statement to the effect that the French and Turkish Governments had throughout worked on the understanding that there was a Turkish majority in the sanjak, and further allusions to the duty of the mandatory Power to open the eyes of the population to realities. The Turkish representative merely dismissed as newspaper reports the allusions to which the president had referred.

5. Knowing that His Majesty's Government had already expressed indignation at Angora and Paris at the so-called "gentleman's agreement," I thought that little was to be gained by the committee probing into the matter further. I therefore expressed the opinion that the committee should confine itself to an examination of the commission's request for a postponement of the ultimate date of the elections, and that this should be done in the light of two considerations, namely, the fact that registrations had recently been suspended for ten days, and the commission's assertion that difficulties were being put in the way of the proper execution of their task. The Belgian representative expressed the opinion that the committee's competence was strictly limited to a consideration of the question of the ultimate date. The Turkish representative said that his Government were now studying the last communication received from the commission, and would possibly wish to make a declaration on the whole question. He therefore asked that the commission should meet again on the following day.

6. The second meeting of the committee opened with a statement by the Turkish representative, on behalf of his Government, accusing the commission of interfering in matters which were outside their concern, of jeopardising the work of collaboration between the French and Turkish Governments, and in inciting the minority elements in the sanjak against the Turks. He added that his Government categorically refused to agree to any prolongation of the electoral period. This declaration made it impossible for the committee, whose decisions must be unanimous, to accord any postponement of the ultimate date of the elections, and therefore it remained only to decide on the text of the reply to this effect to be sent to the commission. The president was anxious that the reply should include some expression on behalf of all, or certain, members of the committee of their dissociation from the Turkish Government's criticism of the commission, and the French Government's conception of the rôle of the mandatory Power, as explained by M. Lagarde. The Belgian representative, however, insisted most strongly that the committee was competent only to deal with the question of the date, and called attention to the impropriety and the danger of expressing an opinion on matters which not only were outside its competence, but about which it was imperfectly informed. I suggested that, as the commission, in their communications to the committee, had appeared to ask for guidance, it would at least be desirable to explain to them the limits of the committee's competence. It was on this basis that the reply to the commission was finally drafted, and adopted by the committee. A copy is attached.

7. In private conversation with M. Westman, Mr. Walters, M. de Haller and myself, M. Lagarde spoke of the separate Franco-Turkish Agreement regarding the result of the elections. He said that, under this agreement, the French Government had guaranteed that, in the event of the number of Turkish Deputies resulting from the elections being less than twenty, the mandatory authorities would see that a sufficient number of non-Turkish Deputies were induced to vote with the Turkish Deputies and so, in practice, bring the number of the latter up to twenty-two. There is no doubt that this is not the interpretation of the agreement which the Turkish Government would now be prepared to accept. In fact, the agreement seems to have been left in some ambiguity, and



it seems to have been the case that, although the Turkish demands were communicated in writing to the French, the latter gave no written acceptance of them.

8. Pressed as they were for time before the recent suspension of registration, there is little chance that the commission will be able to finish the elections by the date fixed, and it is quite possible that, as the result of the committee's negative reply to their application for a postponement, they will resign. That the Turkish Government wish this to happen is the only inference to be drawn from their violent strictures on the commission's management of the elections and their categorical refusal to consider any prolongation of the electoral period. Probably they now look on the commission as an obstacle in the way of the fulfilment of their demands. It is, in fact, very doubtful whether at this stage the elections, if proceeded with, could by any possible means be made to produce the required Turkish majority. If the commission resign, and the French and Turkish Governments reach a direct settlement, the pity will be that such a settlement was not reached long ago and that all the work and expense of the Electoral Commission should have been done, and incurred, in vain.

9. The commission have been criticised for taking too strict an interpretation of the regulations and at the same time concerning themselves with matters outside their province. But their position has been extremely difficult. They have had no effective support from any quarter; they have had to work in an atmosphere of increasing tension and excitement and to face the ever-hostile criticism of the Turkish Government, and recently they have known that the local authorities were doing their utmost to restrict that freedom of choice in the matter of registration which was the underlying principle of the electoral regulations. It is not to be wondered at if they consider that they are being used to carry through a Franco-Turkish deal which is not in accordance with the task which was allotted to them.

R. J. BOWKER.

June 14, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 88.

*Decision of the Committee of Five.*

LE Comité du Conseil a pris connaissance des récentes communications de la Commission électorale qui lui ont été transmises par le Secrétaire général. Il a également entendu les éclaircissements donnés par le représentant de la France et les déclarations que le représentant de la Turquie a faites et qu'il a confirmées par lettre au Secrétaire général.

Le Comité du Conseil a été constitué pour remplir certaines tâches précises, définies dans la résolution du Conseil du 31 janvier 1938. Il ne peut dépasser les limites de son mandat. Parmi les questions soulevées par les diverses communications adressées au Secrétaire général par la Commission électorale, seule la question de la fixation de la date ultime des opérations électorales relève de la compétence du comité.

Plusieurs membres du comité ont été d'avis qu'étant donné les circonstances, et tout spécialement la suspension des opérations, il y avait lieu de modifier la décision prise antérieurement à ce sujet. L'unanimité, nécessaire aux termes de la résolution du Conseil, n'a pu toutefois être réalisée sur ce point, le représentant du Gouvernement turc ayant déclaré ne pouvoir accepter un tel changement.

[E 3717/29/89]

No. 89.

*Mr. Morgan to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 23.)*

(No. 307.)

My Lord,

Angora, June 18, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my telegram No. 147 of the 16th June regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta, that the stream of invective formerly directed against France by Turkish officials and newspapers is now mainly poured on the League of Nations and the League Commission at present in the sanjak.

2. This change seems due to the fact that the Turkish Government now hopes that, as a result of the intense pressure which it has consistently brought to bear on France, it will succeed in obtaining, as a result of the Franco-Turkish Staff talks now going on in Hatay, i.e., in the sanjak, a solution of the Hatay problem which will be favourable to Turkey. The solution envisaged is that Turkish troops should enter the sanjak to co-operate with French troops there. The French authorities would then arrange, in execution of the Turco-French "shady bargain" (here called the "gentlemen's agreement"), concluded at Geneva, that the elections should end in an assured Turkish majority. Alternatively, both parties would be responsible for ensuring the Turkish majority.

3. This solution, while satisfactorily disposing of the Hatay problem as far as France and Turkey are concerned, and removing a cause of quarrel between the two countries, takes little count of the rôle of the commission sent to Hatay by the League of Nations. Now that there is a possibility that Turkey may arrange matters directly with France, the Turkish view is that the commission should discreetly efface itself. Instead of this, it is now alleged to be doing all that the French have up to now been accused of doing—encouraging anti-Turkish elements, conducting the electoral proceedings with an anti-Turkish bias, and scheming to show the numbers of the Turkish body as less than they are. The commission, in its anti-Turkish activities, is said to be even "more Royalist than the King."

4. The commission does not seem willing to efface itself, and Turkish energies are now concentrated on neutralising the activities of this unwanted and inconvenient body. The French Ambassador told me a few days ago that Dr. Tefik Rüstü Aras had used most opprobrious language about the League of Nations, but had later telephoned to ask M. Ponsot to forget it. The Secretary-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs spoke to me strongly against the commission, and stated that he would telegraph to Geneva to protest against the anti-Turkish bias of the commission. Finally, the Turkish press, obviously inspired, is joining in a chorus of abuse of the commission and of the League of Nations. In this connexion, I may quote the following closing words of a leading article on the commission by Fahri Rifki Atay, in the *Ulus* of the 16th June:—

"We must now ask a question which has been in the minds of our people for some time. Has not the time come for Turkey to consider the question of her relations with the League of Nations and even the question of her membership of that body?"

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 3800/29/89]

No. 90.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 27.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, June 21, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to report that the apparent inability of France to defend Arab interests in the Sanjak of Alexandretta against Turkey has produced a feeling of consternation at Aleppo, where intelligent opinion is convinced that at some well-chosen moment in the future Turkey will revive pretensions to the whole North Syria region and will again find France equally unwilling or unable to afford protection.

2. The result of this consternation has been a noticeable weakening of the Syrian Nationalist cause on the one hand and an outburst of Turkish propaganda on the other. Twice during last week pamphlets calling upon the population to demand reunion with Turkey, the only Power in the Near East capable of keeping out the foreigner, have been widely distributed in Aleppo, and although two Turkish propagandists alleged to be responsible for these pamphlets have been arrested, it is not to be supposed that with them the pro-Turkish movement here is in any wise scotched. It can only be stopped if France can somehow convince people that she is in the last resort both able

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and willing to wage war if necessary to keep the Turks out of North Syria and will never again be prepared to sacrifice a section of Syrian territory to a foreign Power for the sake of avoiding possible international complications.

3. In this connexion it must be borne in mind that politically speaking, despite repeated Syrian Nationalist assertions to the contrary, there is much real divergence of interest and sentiment between Aleppo and Damascus, and that the Syrian Nationalist Government since its accession to power has consistently contrived to intensify rather than diminish that divergence; while economically it would suit Aleppo better to be included in a State comprising Turkey, the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the Jezireh, rather than in a shrunken Syria run by and for the Damascene.

4. New evidence of this deep-seated divergence has been painfully apparent during the visit last week to Aleppo of Sa'adullah-el-Jabri, Syrian Minister of the Interior and for Foreign Affairs, who on Friday last made a speech in the principal mosque counselling continued and even long-suffering confidence in the Nationalist Government despite all its apparent failures and declaring three times in succession that the Franco-Syrian Treaty will be ratified. This speech was very coolly received by the crowd and was immediately followed by chronic dissensions among the adherents of the Nationalist Bloc itself as the result of which the leader of the bloc at Aleppo, Dr. Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha, resigned his post. He has many sympathisers.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Angora and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 196/196/25]

No. 91.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 11, 1938.)*

(No. 181.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 18, 1937.*

I HAVE had the honour to report to you by telegram on various questions raised in an interview which I had with Ibn Saud on the 15th December, during a visit of forty-eight hours which he paid to Jedda. I now give a summary of the whole of the conversation.

2. His Majesty began, quite unexpectedly, with Iraq. He was worried at the instability and what might be called lack of continuity there. The Cabinet was divided and resignations were threatened, and some of the tribes were still hostile. I talked of the difficulties which naturally beset a country in the first stages of self-government, and said that in any case I should be surprised to hear that Saudi Arabia had any ground of complaint against the Iraq Government. Ibn Saud said that that was true. Even in the time of Hikmet Sulaiman (though he seemed relieved that that régime had come to an end) he could not say that the attitude of the Iraq Government had been anything but correct towards himself and Saudi Arabia, but he felt that he never knew what would happen there next. For instance, there were people there who were bringing forward schemes for Palestine, not from love of Palestine or of the Arabs, nor from friendship towards His Majesty's Government, but from personal ambition. I concluded that he was referring to the project of Nuri Pasha's, which is mentioned in Bagdad telegram No. 261 of the 13th December, and which formed the subject of Mr. Kelly's despatch, of which a copy was sent to me under cover of your despatch No. 369, dated the 30th September, 1937, and this impression was confirmed when the King mentioned a scheme which Nuri Pasha had explained to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba in Egypt some time ago; but, as will be seen later, Ibn Saud had also heard of another Palestine scheme affecting Iraq. I sent a telegram to the Foreign Office on this point, No. 97, dated the 16th December.

3. The King then spoke of the Italians, of whom he seemed to be no less suspicious than he was when he talked to Mr. Rendel and myself in March. They were always interfering, now in one country, now in another. Look at the Yemen! After the publication of the Italo-Yemeni Treaty not long ago, he wrote to the Imam and asked whether there was anything behind what was published. The Imam assured him that there was nothing, and he believed the Imam, who was a clever, wide-awake man; but he would not answer for the Imam's sons, nor for the Yemeni officials.

4. The next subject was arms. Ibn Saud said that, as His Majesty's Government knew, he had tried to treat the Italian offer of arms in such a way as not to place himself under an obligation by acceptance and yet not to offend the Italians. The offer of Italian rifles he had eventually refused, on the ground that his forces were equipped with Mausers, and that to introduce some weapons of a new type would complicate the rearmament question. The Italians then said that they would get him any kind of rifles he liked, *e.g.*, Mausers from Austria or Germany. The King then pleaded poverty, but the Italians said that that need not worry him, they would arrange easy terms. Keeping to his delaying tactics, the King said that if they would provide samples he would study the matter; and there the matter rested for the moment. Had he done right? What would His Majesty's Government say? I repeated more or less what Sheikh Hafiz Wahba had already heard at the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Government had provided all the arms which their own urgent needs enabled them to spare. If it had been within their power they would gladly have supplied more, but it was not. Ibn Saud was the sole judge of his own requirements in the matter of arms. It would evidently be better if he could have recourse to neutral supplies rather than to a Government like the Italian, which presumably, as His Majesty had himself said, was not offering cheap arms out of pure love for Saudi



Arabia, but if in the end he could not escape the Italian offer, he would at least be acting with his eyes open. Ibn Saud said that he would continue to delay as far as he could, but there usually came a time in such cases where a decision could no longer be postponed. However, he would see what he could do.

5. I mention here that, according to a statement which Fuad Hamza had made to me the day before, the Italians wanted to sell Italian guns and anti-aircraft guns, in fact, any war material Ibn Saud might want as well as Mauser rifles.

6. Passing then to aviation, Ibn Saud said that he much wanted to get rid of the Italians. He realised that to replace them by British or French might create an awkward situation, but replacement by Moslems would not be open to the same objection. Could His Majesty's Government suggest some suitable man from Egypt or Iraq for this purpose? I asked whether what His Majesty wanted was a trained air-force man to take charge of Saudi aviation, and after some talk His Majesty explained that he would like a sort of chief of staff to advise on all arms, and that, failing that, he would be glad to have an expert to take charge of aviation. I promised to report this desire to His Majesty's Government at once, and I have done so in my telegram No. 99, dated the 16th December. From the tenor of the conversation, I assume that Ibn Saud would apply to the Government concerned for the loan of a suitable expert if he could first have the advice of His Majesty's Government as to the character and capacity of some possible candidates. I could see objections to the proposal, and felt sceptical as to the advantage, other than the elimination of the Italians, which Ibn Saud might expect to obtain if it were carried out; but we have had to blow cold upon so many Saudi aviation schemes that I did not want to be discouraging about this one at the outset, the more so as there is nothing to prevent the King's applying to Egypt or Iraq without consulting us, in which case some quite unsuitable person might be sent here.

7. No reference was made by Ibn Saud to the alleged offer of a Soviet air mission (your despatch No. 413, dated the 1st November). This did not surprise me, for when I had mentioned the subject to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin the day before, he had expressed ignorance and surprise, and after making enquiry had told me that no such offer had been made and that Sheikh Hafiz must have misunderstood something much vaguer as to which he would get the papers from Mecca. I have no more information on this point at present, but it seems clear that there is no question of the acceptance of a Soviet air mission by Ibn Saud.

8. The King then talked at length about Palestine. The views he expressed were summarised in my telegram No. 98, dated the 16th December. He was not violent, or even reproachful, but very anxious about his own position as being dependent on that of His Majesty's Government. He said more than once, as he has said before, that while he objected to the partition scheme as an Arab and a Moslem, he objected to it also because he felt it would be ruinous to His Majesty's Government and therefore dangerous to himself. At one point he said he would rather that the British mandate should last for another century. I employed the familiar arguments in favour of partition, especially the one which has always appealed to me personally (provided that frontiers less unfavourable to the Arabs than those suggested in the report of the Royal Commission could be found), that a limitation by territory would be more stable and more likely to be final than a limitation by population, but the King said that, on the contrary, he believed that the creation of a separate Jewish State would be a perpetual irritant and source of danger. But, indeed, he seemed unable to believe that partition would ever be effected.

9. The King asked whether I had seen the reply which he had caused to be given to the accusation that out of deference to the feelings of His Majesty's Government he had refused to allow an Arab conference to be held in Mecca. I said that I had seen it in the *Umm-al-Qura* (see my despatch No. 177, dated the 7th December), and that it seemed, if I might say so, to have been drafted with His Majesty's usual wisdom. Ibn Saud said that in spite of the denial there was something in the report. It had been suggested that there should be a secret conference about Palestine in Mecca, but he had refused to allow it, alleging that Mecca was a place for religious worship, not for political conferences. That was, in fact, one of his reasons, but, of course, he had others; he never embarked upon any policy until he was sure it was reasonable, and he did not wish to embarrass His Majesty's Government. And besides, if the holding of a conference had been

the course to pursue, he would have proposed it himself and not followed the suggestions of others.

10. Here the King revealed again a secondary anxiety, viz., that His Majesty's Government would come to some arrangement about Palestine with someone else in the Arab world, or come to some fresh decision without his knowledge, and thus damage his prestige irretrievably. There was, he said, a story going about to which many were giving credence, that His Majesty's Government proposed to declare a cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine and to hand the country over to the Iraq Government, who would then, as part of the bargain, open Palestine to unrestricted immigration by Jews. He said that he had always been frank with His Majesty's Government, and he hoped they would always be frank with him. I described the scheme he had mentioned as fantastic in itself and incredible for two other reasons. In the first place partition was still the declared policy of His Majesty's Government, though, of course, no one could foresee what the recommendations of the forthcoming commission would be, and in the second, His Majesty's Government appreciated the complete frankness and sincerity with which His Majesty had always acted in the matter of Palestine, and I was sure they would never take any serious decision on the subject without giving him the earliest possible notice.

11. Ibn Saud said he wished that some policy could be found which would not place His Majesty's Government in opposition to the Arabs. The one question of Palestine apart, the interests of His Majesty's Government and the Arabs were identical, but the Arabs found themselves facing the Jews, whom they could easily deal with as Jews alone, and behind the Jews they found the British, and conflict was inevitable. The Arabs knew well and execrated the treatment of the Arabs in Libya by the Italians both before and after the war, and no one could have believed a year ago to what extent Mussolini would induce the Arabs to look upon him as their champion. His success was entirely due to the British policy in Palestine.

12. At the time of the interview I had not received the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 110, dated the 15th December, which arrived after Ibn Saud had left Jedda, but, as will be seen from what I have said, I anticipated your assurance that there was nothing fresh to say, and that, if there was, he would be told as soon as possible. I also anticipated your message about the necessity for mutual comprehension of each other's difficulties by the two Governments. I asked His Majesty whether he had not found, as he rose from being ruler of Riyadh to his present high position, that at every stage the points of contact with the world increased and political questions became more complicated, and when the King said that this was so, I asked whether he could not believe that the affairs of Great Britain, coming as she did into touch with many countries which did not concern Saudi Arabia seriously and having possessions all over the world, were even more complicated than His Majesty's. Ibn Saud pondered a moment as though the matter had not struck him in that light before and said that he agreed, and I hope that the argument helped to convince him of the truth of my assurance, that it was not from failure to give careful attention to his proposals that His Majesty's Government had not been able to decide upon a policy more satisfactory from his point of view.

13. The matters other than politics which were touched upon at the interview are dealt with in my despatch No. 182, dated the 18th December. Throughout the interview Ibn Saud showed the friendliness and desire to co-operate with His Majesty's Government which were shown during the talks in March last when Mr. Rendel was here.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, his Excellency the Governor of Aden and the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



[E 1114/1034/65]

No. 92.

*Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 169. Most Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, February 17, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Minister, in conversation with Mr. Hamilton, recently referred to a conversation which had taken place between the Aga Khan, who has just been staying in Cairo, and Sheikh El Maraghi. This conversation had been reported in the press. Shevki Pasha understood that the Caliphate question had been discussed at this meeting, and he presumed that the Aga Khan was acting on behalf of the British Government, who, he suggested, favoured the Caliphate of an Egyptian monarch who would be more or less under their wing. Mr. Hamilton pointed out to the Turkish Minister that it had always been the policy of His Majesty's Government to refrain from any interference in the Caliphate question.

2. Before his departure, the Aga Khan informed me on the 11th February of the gist of his conversations with Sheikh El Maraghi. He said that the sheikh had quoted historical precedents for local rulers assuming local Caliphate titles in the past. Sheikh El Maraghi had urged that the same thing could properly be done in Egypt to-day, and, if done by one Moslem ruler, it would doubtless be done by others, *e.g.*, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Imam of the Yemen, Ibn Saud, and so on. The Aga Khan suggested to me the parallel in England, where The King's title as Defender of the Faith was recorded on the coins in current use.

3. I observed that this was all new to me, and I was not sure of my ground. We had carefully kept out of the Caliphate question hitherto. My instinct was that any claim to the title, however limited, might well cause trouble, not only in the Arab world, but more especially with Turkey, where its limitations might not be understood.

4. The Aga once more emphasised that each ruler's Caliphate would be specifically confined to his own territorial limits. He did not think that Turkey had any reason to complain, she having been the first to set the example.

5. I mentioned that I happened to know that the Turkish Minister here was already uneasy about these conversations. The Aga Khan earnestly begged me to disabuse the Minister of any idea that a universal Caliph was in any sense under contemplation. Only territorial Caliphates were being contemplated.

6. The Aga Khan then continued that the more important part of his discussions with Sheikh El Maraghi had turned on the modernisation of Moslem teaching and tenets. Religion had to keep pace with modern developments, otherwise its fate was sealed. The claims of science had to be taken into account. There was also the question of the treatment of women. His own sect, the Aga Khan claimed, were already far advanced and had been so for the past thirty years. Other Moslems, however, were not so advanced. Cairo was the best centre for starting new Moslem developments. Indeed, Sheikh El Maraghi had already done so in many ways, *e.g.*, by the introduction of modern astronomy, physics, &c., into the programme of the Azhar.

7. The Aga Khan added that he would write to me more fully about these matters if they began to assume concrete shape.

8. I have since had these matters considered by my expert advisers, and would submit the following comment. The argument about territorial Caliphates is specious. For nearly 300 years after the overthrow of the Abbasid Empire by the Moguls, numerous independent Moslem princes, disregarding the puppet Abbasid Caliphs in refuge at Cairo, assumed Caliphate titles, until gradually the spread and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire and its predominating influence in the Islamic world put an end to this practice except in remoter or more heretical corners of Islam, *e.g.*, Morocco and the Yemen.

9. The Imam Yehia, a Zeidi, *i.e.*, an unorthodox Moslem, has long been styled "Amir-al-Muminin" (Commander of the Faithful) among his own Zeidi followers. This title was even used in his recent treaty with Italy, and its assumption on that occasion is understood to have caused offence to Ibn Saud, who is reported to have maintained that this was a breach of an understanding reached during the negotiations for the peace which concluded the recent war between Ibn Saud and the Imam.

10. Although in the Middle Ages the assumption of Caliphate titles by independent Moslem rulers was viewed with indulgence by enlightened lay thought in Islam, it is not at all certain that to-day other Moslem rulers would view with equanimity the assumption of Caliphate titles by King Farouk. Most of these independent sovereigns in the Middle Ages who assumed Caliphate titles were either in conflict with the other sovereigns assuming similar titles, or too remote from them to matter.

11. Sheikh El Maraghi probably has two objects in view: Firstly, to strengthen the position of King Farouk in Egypt by the assumption of the title of Caliph; and, secondly, to spread Egyptian influence thereby through Arab countries. The first objective is probably the one to which he attaches most importance. His idea seems to be that popular support can best be diverted from the Wafd to the King by religious attraction. The King of Egypt, as Caliph, would be religiously entitled to the devotion of his Moslem subjects. No doubt Sheikh El Maraghi thinks that this factor would act powerfully with the ignorant masses. He may also imagine that he himself, who in Egypt occupies morally a position similar to that of the Kheikh-al-Islam in pre-Kemalist Turkey, would be the power behind the throne of an Egyptian Caliph-King.

12. Incidentally, according to a report from an informant in touch with Ali Maher Pasha, the latter is rather apprehensive about Sheikh El Maraghi's Islamic campaign. According to this informant, there is actually a conflict between Ali Maher Pasha and Sheikh El Maraghi, each endeavouring to secure the predominating influence over the King. Ali Maher Pasha, according to this informant, is seriously disturbed by Sheikh El Maraghi's endeavour to influence the King in favour of Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha as against a combine of the Maher brothers.

13. I may mention that Shevki Pasha dined with me a few hours after my conversation with the Aga Khan. I took the opportunity to tell him what the Aga had said about the Caliphate. My impression was that he was rather relieved. I doubt, however, whether the Turkish Government would view with equanimity either the Caliphate pretensions of an Egyptian King or the whole Islamic campaign at present being conducted in Egypt by Sheikh El Maraghi and the Palace.

14. Unless the Aga Khan himself raises this matter on his return to England, I should prefer that the matter should not be raised with him at this stage; if he does so raise it, I should prefer that, in any case, the contents of this despatch should not be divulged to him save in the most general way, for I should regret it greatly if he came to think that I had been sowing trouble for him with His Majesty's Government.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Angora, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &amp;c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

[E 1099/10/31]

No. 93.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 2, 1938.

AS you are aware, it is extremely difficult to find out what people are thinking in this country. Contact with the local inhabitants, which has always been rare, has ceased altogether since the promulgation of the orders designed to circumscribe Italian propaganda on which I reported in my despatch No. 8, dated the 17th January, 1938, and in any case discipline is too strictly maintained by the King for Saudi subjects to speak freely to members of foreign Legations on lines which he might not approve. For these reasons I think it worth while to transmit to you the attached extract from a conversation which I had recently with M. Naidyonoff, the "White" Russian pilot employed by the Saudi Government.

2. The conversation arose out of a projected flight of three Saudi planes to



Wejh, which has been the subject of discussion for several weeks. One is to be piloted by the Italian, Major Ciccu, a second by M. Naidyonoff, and the third by a Saudi, and the rest of the Saudi pilots are to be carried as passengers. The party would stay some ten days in Wejh, I gather, before returning. The start has been postponed several times for lack of one thing or another, and it has now been put off again because Major Ciccu is ill. When speaking to me about this flight on the 1st February, M. Naidyonoff said that he was thinking of giving up his post here because he did not want to be involved in hostilities. A few days before he had spoken of this possibility and had said that, whatever happened, he himself, as an officer who served in the Denikin army, would never take part in hostilities against the British. On both occasions I deprecated any talk about hostilities involving Saudi Arabia and, indeed, all talk about the imminence of war, but last night M. Naidyonoff seemed greatly disturbed. As will be seen from the enclosed note, his feelings are based on nothing more solid than the attitude of the commandant of the Jedda forces, Said-al-Kurdi, who admits that his anti-British policy is not that of his master, Ibn Saud. But it is interesting to hear of the influence which the views of an unpopular man have here, because they are anti-British and pan-Arab, and thus coincide with those of the younger Saudis, and to learn of the belief that, if a serious revolt broke out in Transjordan, it would attract the spontaneous participation of the Saudi tribes on the border, and when once the movement had begun Ibn Saud would have to allow it to continue or perhaps even to take part in it.

3. There is no doubt that at present Ibn Saud does not want anything of the sort to happen. If he had not been really attached to the view which he has professed on several occasions during the last eighteen months, viz., that his interests and those of His Majesty's Government are identical, he would hardly have acted as he has done in regard to Palestine. The important question is how far he will continue to adhere to that view if there is no radical change in the Palestine policy of His Majesty's Government. I have recently recorded my opinion that he continues to support His Majesty's Government as far as he can because he cannot believe that in the long run they will carry out a policy grossly unjust (from his point of view) to the Arabs, and that his strong professions of friendship must not be regarded as a blank cheque. He has recently pointed out that his help in bringing about a restoration of order in Palestine so that the Royal Commission could carry out its work, and later in inducing the Palestine Arabs to give evidence, resulted in disappointment for the Arabs, and has said that while he is ready to assist in bringing about an atmosphere in which the technical commission can begin its labours he cannot this time take the initiative. In fact, he assisted His Majesty's Government and the Arabs got nothing out of it (again from their point of view, and his), and whereas last time he gave his assistance because of his general belief in the "justice" of His Majesty's Government, he cannot afford to do that again. Of course, it may be that His Majesty's Government have no further need of his good offices. I am not assuming that they are necessary to His Majesty's Government, but am merely using the history of Ibn Saud's attitude on the point to show that his position seems to have become more difficult.

4. If, as seems evident, the Palestine question has gradually forced Ibn Saud into a position where he cannot be as helpful as he would like to be to His Majesty's Government, can it be guaranteed that, if the situation does not soon turn more to the advantage of the Arabs, he will not be obliged to become less and less friendly? I would not give any such guarantee, and I think it would be a mistake to trade too far upon his wish to maintain the friendliest relations with His Majesty's Government. What will constitute in Arab eyes a favourable turn is a difficult problem, but I fear that no scheme which does not call a final halt to Jewish expansion in Palestine, in some way or other, will have a chance of acceptance by the Arabs. I must admit that I myself favoured partition as a solution even before the Royal Commission began its work, as placing a limit on Jewish expansion in the most definite way. Whether the suggested scheme of partition would have aroused less hostility among the Arabs if the reservations made in the despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, had appeared in the Statement of Policy in July is an academic question, but of the strength of the hostility now there is no doubt. The main difficulty is perhaps the complete disbelief which Arab spokesmen profess to have in the ability of His Majesty's Government to keep the Jews within any limits which may be fixed. Ibn Saud does not go so far as to say that

His Majesty's Government are under the thumb of the Jew, but he has expressed a vehement surprise at what he considers the unnatural and, indeed, irreligious combination of the Jews with His Majesty's Government. And the religious factor has great influence with him, both because of his personal convictions and of his vulnerability to criticism, both at home and abroad, on this score.

5. These remarks have grown out of what may well seem the foolish vapourings of a pan-Arab visionary of no influence. I do not share the view that the flight of six Saudi aeroplanes along the border would suffice to cause a revolt in Transjordan, but the suggestion that a revolt in Transjordan might attract Saudi tribes and eventually win the acquiescence if not the support of Ibn Saud, is not necessarily to be scouted for ever because we can scout it for the moment.

6. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

#### Enclosure in No. 93.

#### *Extract from a Note on a Conversation with M. Naidyonoff.*

THE pilot, Ciccu, is ignored by the Saudi pilots, who do not even say good-morning to him (? on orders from the King). When Naidyonoff asks them why this rudeness they indicate that they don't want any Italians. But one form of insult is no longer inflicted on Ciccu: he used to have to walk to the aerodrome, but Abdullah Sulaiman (Minister of Finance and Director of Defence) has now supplied him with a car. The only person who is friendly to Ciccu is Said-al-Kurdi, who is learning Italian from him, because, he says, it is bound to be useful in the next war, whichever side Saudi Arabia is on.

Said-al-Kurdi is the only person who has a glimmering of understanding of aviation, its uses, needs, limitations, &c. Abdullah Sulaiman is hopeless, but Kurdi listens, and also learns from experience.

Kurdi is always telling Naidyonoff that if only the Saudi aeroplanes could fly along the Transjordan frontier, so that the tribes there could see that the Saudis had an air force, there would be an immediate rising in Transjordan, which would spread to Palestine, and the Saudi tribes would take part. Naidyonoff asked Kurdi whether this was Ibn Saud's policy. Kurdi said no, but if the movement started he would not stop it, but would have to back it up.

Kurdi is very unpopular, but he is a single-minded fanatic on this subject and the young people listen to him. There is a tremendous amount of propaganda of this kind going on, designed to show that times are very difficult for His Majesty's Government and that the opportunity should not be lost. Naidyonoff said that we ought to watch "night and day" in Transjordan.

[E 1237/1237/25]

No. 94.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 5.)*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 5, 1938.

MY despatch No. 26 of 12th February.

Syrian Minister of Finance discussed Hejaz Railway with Saudi Arabian Government while here on pilgrimage, and, according to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, he promised, with confidence in result, to urge those concerned to authorise contribution of £30,000 sterling from Syrian revenues towards reconstruction of damaged portion, while Ibn Saud also promised £30,000.

2. Fuad says that, if Syrian portion of line has not paid hitherto, it is because it has been bled to increase profits on other railways in Syria, and that this practice is to cease.



3. See enclosure to your despatch No. 8 of 12th January, 1937. It cannot be said that, of pilgrims who came this year, even 7,000 would have travelled by railway had the line been working. Number is perhaps 4,000 or 5,000. But Saudi Arabian Government argue that many more would come if they could travel by rail. This seems reasonable.

5. If we could agree to reopen discussion it would make a good impression. Contribution by Ibn Saud, and perhaps Syria, make it more difficult for us to refuse to participate and at the same time reduces financial call on us.

5. I have not mentioned the subject to my French colleague, who is perhaps unaware of the promise attributed to Syrian Minister of Finance.

[E 1249/1237/25]

No. 95.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 26.)  
Sir,

*Jedda, February 12, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a French translation of an identic note which the Saudi Government have sent to the British and French Legations in Jedda. The translation has been accepted as correct by my French colleague and myself. It seemed to me that it might be convenient for His Majesty's Government to have an agreed French translation for use in case of discussions with the French Government on the subject, and I have therefore thought it unnecessary to send an English translation.

2. I gather from M. Maigret that he regards the matter as of no practical importance, and, indeed, in view of the attitude of the French and Syrian Governments and the declared lack of funds as revealed in various despatches from the Foreign Office, the last of which was No. 457, and dated the 30th November, his opinion is not surprising. Nor is the Saudi letter very convincing since it professes to see no difficulty in the question of raising the money required for the reconstruction of the line, but only in the way expenditure should be effected. The suggestion that the Hejaz Railway should be administered by an international company operating over all the parts as the International Sleeping Car Company runs its coaches through many different countries over railways belonging to different authorities is apparently designed to get round the question of ownership—at least, so I gather from Fuad Bey, who communicated a copy of the note to me confidentially in advance. The scheme also involves the conclusion, again confirmed by Fuad Bey, that the Saudi Government would have nothing to do either with the management of the line or with its finances.

3. In my despatch No. 20, dated the 10th February, 1937,<sup>(1)</sup> I reported against the suggestion that His Majesty's Government might perhaps be justified on political grounds in meeting the cost of restoring the damaged portions of the Hejaz Railway. The situation has, however, changed in two respects: (1) The Saudi Government do not now propose to have anything to do with the management of the line or with its finances; and (2) the political arguments call for reconsideration.

4. If it were possible for the railway to be managed in such a way that the Saudi Government had nothing to do with it, most of the arguments under the fourth of the five heads under which I set forth my objections would cease to be valid. An argument that still stands is that which refers to the dissatisfaction which Ibn Saud would feel if the railway, after beginning to run, had to cease again for lack of funds, but the line would be less likely to cease running if the Saudi authorities had nothing to do with the management.

5. It is, however, on political grounds that I have been reconsidering this question. A year has elapsed since my despatch was written, and during that time we have been unable to give Ibn Saud any satisfaction in regard to Palestine, and he has found himself, owing to his identification of his interests with those of His Majesty's Government, in a position of increasing difficulty. Moreover, on another question on which he feels very strongly, His Majesty's Government have been obliged to be discouraging, viz., the territorial ownership of Jabal

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 14, Part XL.

Nakhsh, Safaq and Khor-el-Odeid, on his eastern frontier. Nor does the help we have been able to give or to promise Ibn Saud in the matter of arms and aviation compare favourably with the assistance given or offered by the Italians, who have not ceased to make strenuous efforts to draw Ibn Saud over to their side. I suggest that His Majesty's Government should now consider whether it would not be worth while their contributing the whole or part of the cost of restoring the damaged part of the line as a political gesture to Ibn Saud alone, without reference to its reception in the Moslem world. The financial and administrative difficulties are obviously very great. It is for His Majesty's Government to assess them, and decide whether the scheme is feasible and whether the advantages offered would be worth the cost. My own view is that, while it is true, as he is the first to admit, that Ibn Saud's policy towards His Majesty's Government is based on self-interest, his attitude has been, and still is, of great value to us, and that the expenditure of money on a scheme which would please him and might at the same time help to distract the attention of the inhabitants of the northern portion of the Hejaz might conceivably be justified on political grounds.

I have, &c.

R. S. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 95.

*Identic Note to British and French Legations, Jedda.*

(Traduction de l'arabe.)

Excellence,

(Après les salutations.)

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'il y a déjà près de deux ans que mon Gouvernement a présenté aux Légations française et britannique son mémorandum No. 18/1/43 du 4 Doul Kaada 1354 (28 février 1936), relatif aux travaux de la conférence de Haïfa chargée d'examiner la question de la remise en état de la ligne du Hedjaz ainsi que la reprise du trafic sur cette ligne. Depuis l'envoi de ce mémorandum, plusieurs conversations ont eu lieu en diverses occasions à Djeddah, à Londres et à Paris. Des discussions préliminaires ont également eu lieu ces temps derniers à Beyrouth, à Damas et à Londres, touchant le désir d'entamer les négociations sur cette question. Dans sa conviction qu'il est de l'intérêt des pays que traverse cette voie ferrée, comme de l'intérêt des pèlerins musulmans, que l'examen de la remise en état ne soit plus différé, mon Gouvernement espère que les deux Gouvernements français et anglais se mettront d'accord sur un moyen pratique d'arriver à ce but.

Le point essentiel, qui a empêché d'aboutir à un résultat satisfaisant, ne réside pas dans la difficulté de trouver les fonds eux-mêmes, mais bien dans la façon de les employer. Pour surmonter cette difficulté d'ordre financier, mon Gouvernement avait proposé une solution pratique consistant à considérer cette ligne—en ce qui touche son administration et son exploitation—comme un tout, à l'instar des sociétés internationales (Compagnie des Wagons-lits, par exemple). Dans ces conditions, il serait facile de trouver les fonds nécessaires par emprunt, émission d'obligations, dons ou tous autres moyens sur lesquels il serait possible de se mettre d'accord.

Mon Gouvernement propose que des conversations préliminaires aient lieu entre les représentants des Gouvernements intéressés pour envisager la possibilité d'une solution de ce genre et il espère trouver auprès des deux Gouvernements français et britannique un appui pour l'adoption de cette suggestion et l'ouverture de nouvelles négociations.

Veuillez, &c.

FAYSSAL.



*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 189.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, February 24, 1938.*

WITH reference to Mr. Eden's despatch No. 79 of the 18th January, I have the honour to report that the local press recently published a statement to the effect that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his forthcoming visit to Egypt for the ratification of the Turco-Egyptian Treaty, would discuss with the Egyptian Government the question of the latter's adherence to the Middle East Non-Aggression Pact between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Iraq. The report added that the question "was being examined at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs." An unofficial enquiry at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirmed this report as far as its examination at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was concerned.

2. On my instructions, the oriental secretary called on the Prime Minister and asked him for his views on the subject. Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha replied that he knew nothing about the matter. He did not even know that Turkey had made any approaches to the Egyptian Government. He had been ill for several days and was out of touch with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He would send for Abdel Fattah Yehia Pasha, discuss the matter with him and subsequently call on me. The Prime Minister added that, anyhow, before entering into such negotiations he would regard it as a treaty obligation that the Egyptian Government should consult its British ally.

3. On the following day the Prime Minister called on me and said that he had been assured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention at present of Egypt joining the pact. Of course, it was possible that, during the forthcoming visit of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Cairo, the subject might be broached, and the Prime Minister understood that the Turkish Foreign Minister was, in fact, anxious that Egypt should adhere to the pact. Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha remarked that, as far as he could see, there was no advantage in Egypt's adherence, except, perhaps, in the way of a slight moral gain. He asked me what I thought about it. I replied that the matter was one which Egypt alone could judge. If she did decide to adhere, I felt sure that, in view of article 5 of our Treaty of Alliance, the Egyptian Government would be careful to see that no engagement was made which ran counter either to the letter or spirit of the alliance. Indeed, she would be well advised to make that point perfectly clear to the other signatories by some form of unilateral declaration. As the Prime Minister still pressed me as to what my views were regarding the advisability or otherwise of adhering to the pact, I observed that, speaking entirely personally, my normal approach to all such questions was to ask myself what advantage the proposal entailed from one's own point of view. Again speaking entirely personally, therefore, I might say that I could not see that Egypt would, in fact, gain anything from adhering to the pact. After all, none of the signatory Powers were contiguous to her as they were to one another. It would seem, therefore, rather curious that she should adhere; but the above, I must emphasise, was a personal expression of view, only given because he had pressed me to say what I really thought. I must repeat that the decision was obviously one that Egypt alone could take, subject always to the special reservation I had made in regard to avoiding any possible conflict with the terms of our Treaty of Alliance. The Prime Minister replied that what I had just said tallied very much with his own views. Anyhow, I could take it from him that there was no question at the present moment of Egypt adhering to the pact.

4. With reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Mr. Eden's despatch under reply, I presume that the conclusion of any international treaties by Egypt would, to a certain extent, encourage her to negotiate others. Once Egypt was engaged in the international treaty field she would become more familiar with foreign affairs, and this, in itself, would no doubt make her more politically minded in dealing with foreign States. I do not, however, consider that this possibility furnishes sufficient ground for discouraging Egypt, should she so desire, from signing the pact with four Eastern Powers who are on friendly terms with ourselves, subject always to the reservation indicated in paragraph 3 of Mr. Eden's despatch.

5. As a certain moral strengthening against Italy, presuming that Kemalist Turkey remains anti-Italian, the Four-Power Pact might have some Mediterranean significance for Egypt. Egypt's association with these independent Powers would also give her a certain international weight. Otherwise, the concrete advantages for Egypt are not very obvious. Turkey's keenness on Egypt's adherence is perhaps due to a desire to detach Egypt from any purely Arab combine. An association with the Arab countries might appeal more to an Egyptian Government dominated by the Palace, which, under Sheikh-el-Maraghi's guidance, is inclined to cherish ambitions in the direction of a Caliphate, or, at least, of an Islamic supremacy for Egypt. It would be possible for Egypt to conclude *ententes* with both the Powers of the Four-Power Pact and with the Arab countries. Iraq is in the Four-Power Pact, has made advances to Egypt for an *entente* and already has a pact of non-aggression and *bon voisinage* with Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. However, in practice, such a double association might become delicate for Egypt in view of Turkey's hostility to any Arab combine. In view of our friendly relations with Turkey, on the one hand, and with the Arab countries on the other, in spite of the Palestine obstacle, I do not think it would be advisable for us to endeavour to discourage Egypt actively from accession to the Four-Power Pact or even to an Arab *entente*, subject always to the same reservation that any such *ententes* must not conflict with the spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 276.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel (at Rome) dated the 15th March, 1938, respecting the Anglo-Italian conversations on the subject of Palestine, and recording a conversation with Signori Buti and Guarnaschelli at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*Rome, March 18, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 97.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

*First Meeting on the Evening of March 15.*

*Palestine.*

AT the outset of my conversation on the evening of the 15th March with Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli they asked me whether I had anything to say on the subject of Palestine.

2. I explained that, as they knew, the policy of His Majesty's Government was to try to set up three separate areas in Palestine, a Jewish State, an Arab State and an area under British mandate. It was still too soon to say what solution of the Palestine problem would eventually emerge; but it would be satisfactory to us if we could have some general assurance that the Italian Government would not cause us unnecessary difficulty when the time came. I quite understood that the Italians had very important interests in Palestine, but I did not think they need be unduly preoccupied over these, since many other countries had interests no less important, and any settlement we eventually devised would, of course, have to be approved by the Council of the League of Nations, who would watch with a very jealous eye the safeguarding of all the international and foreign interests concerned. It was certain, therefore, that in any settlement there might be, whether in the form of a revised mandate or of



treaties with new States, foreign interests and privileges would be fully safeguarded, and Italian interests and privileges would be safeguarded with the rest. Moreover, there would no doubt be adequate economic provisions for the maintenance of the open door and for the grant to the countries concerned of most-favoured-nation treatment, though this would of course have to be on a basis of reciprocity and not merely, as at present, a unilateral obligation on the part of Palestine. In these circumstances it seemed to me that the Italians hardly needed any special assurances, and presumably if Anglo-Italian relations were established on a friendly and cordial basis the Italians would hardly want to make unnecessary difficulties for us when the time came. Nevertheless, it would be convenient and satisfactory to have some assurance on the subject.

3. Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli appeared to appreciate the situation and agreed that the question was mainly a psychological one. They did not press for any explanations regarding our intentions, and the whole matter was left over for further discussion. They did not refer to the assurances given to Italy about Palestine in 1926.

4. We then passed to the question of Arabia, which is recorded separately (see enclosure in Lord Perth's despatch No. 277 of the 18th March).

G. W. RENDEL.

March 15, 1938.

[E 1563/880/91]

No. 98.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 277.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of a conversation with Signori Buti and Guarnaschelli at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the 15th March, respecting Arabia.

Rome, March 18, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 98.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

First Meeting on the Evening of March 15.

## PART II.

### Arabia.

I SAID that I understood that the Italian Government were anxious to bring the Rome understanding of 1927 up to date and had certain observations to make in regard to it. Certain provisions of the understanding—*e.g.*, about Asir—had, of course, become inapplicable, and it was perhaps inconvenient that the understanding had not been published. We were, however, ourselves prepared to carry on with it, if the Italians were.

2. Signor Guarnaschelli said that the Italians considered that we had not observed the understanding, since they regarded our forward policy in the Hadramaut as constituting a disturbance of the *status quo* in Southern Arabia.

3. I replied that, in our view, the negotiators of the understanding had been dealing solely with the Arabian coast of the Red Sea. This view was borne out by the terms of the understanding itself, which dealt almost exclusively with the position of the Arabian rulers on the Red Sea coast. Moreover, if there had been any intention of dealing with a larger area of Arabia, and of including the British spheres of influence, it would obviously have been necessary to mention at any rate the area then known as the Aden Protectorate, about our position in which there had never been any dispute. The fact that there was no mention of the Aden Protectorate showed that it had never been the intention of the

negotiators to touch on the question of the British spheres in Arabia, and the reason for this omission of any mention of Aden and the surrounding district equally accounted for the omission of any mention of the British zone as a whole. Incidentally, the Italians had never attempted to invoke the Rome understanding in the course of our subsequent conflict in 1928 with the Imam of the Yemen, when, in order to preserve the integrity of the Protectorate, we had even been obliged to take air action against the Imam.

4. It seemed to me, however, that nothing would be gained by a rather legalistic discussion about the precise meaning of the words "Southern Arabia" in the Rome understanding of 1927, and that it would be better now to explain the situation frankly as we saw it. The question of our spheres of influence in Arabia was a very old one. Our claims were very ancient and dated from the days over a century ago when it had been necessary to suppress the pirates, &c., who threatened the route to India. Long before the war we had found that British and Turkish claims in this area were in danger of conflicting. We had therefore reached an agreement with the Turks to establish a boundary between the Turkish and the British spheres in Arabia. This did not necessarily mean that either the Turks or ourselves exercised direct or effective authority over the whole area up to the line, but that we each reserved to ourselves complete freedom up to that line. The reason of this was that in those days the area was largely unexplored and of little practical importance, and that, while we had treaties and understandings with all the Arab rulers on our side of the line placing them under our protection, it was still uncertain how far inland the influence of some of these Arab rulers actually extended. But we, nevertheless, reserved complete freedom for ourselves up to the Anglo-Turkish line, the two main sections of which were known as the "blue" and "violet" lines respectively.

5. I showed Signor Buti a copy of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, of which he had already been made aware by Signor Crolla as a result of our conversations in London, and I emphasised that this instrument, in our view, still governed the situation. Had there been any question of this area coming under discussion at the time of the conclusion of the Rome understanding of 1927, we should, of course, have explained the situation on these lines. But I could find no trace in the Rome conversations of 1927 of this subject having come up at all.

6. Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli tried to argue that this did not mean that the Rome understanding did not cover the whole of Southern Arabia, but only that, at that time, nothing was happening in that area, while the danger-point happened to be the Red Sea coast, which naturally formed the main subject of discussion. But I think they realised that their case was weak, although they emphasised that the Rome understanding, both at the beginning and the end, specifically referred to Southern Arabia as distinct from the Red Sea coast, and without reference to the Arab rulers of that coast.

7. Signor Guarnaschelli and Signor Buti then took the line that, whatever the position might be about the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, we had, in fact, effected a complete change in the *status quo* and departed from the principle of "parallel action" established by the Rome understanding, by developing our control and authority over the Hadramaut, where we had previously exercised none, and that our action might thus easily be regarded as a threat to the independence or security of the Yemen, a matter to which the Italians attached the greatest importance. Signor Buti explained that, when all was said and done, our main concern was to ensure the complete independence both of the Yemen and of Saudi Arabia. To speak quite frankly, the Italians were uneasy about our attitude towards the Yemen. They attached very great importance to the continued independence of the Yemen and it was a mutual Anglo-Italian interest that neither Italy nor Great Britain should in any way imperil the independence and integrity of either the Yemen or Saudi Arabia. This was the main point with which the Italians were concerned.

8. I said that, as to this, it was easy to set their minds at rest. From our point of view, there was no change in the situation since the war. While we must reserve complete freedom of action within our own spheres of influence, we were prepared to give the most categorical assurances that we would in no circumstances go beyond our spheres. It would have been easy for us to have established a privileged position for ourselves in Saudi Arabia, and it might have been

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convenient for us to keep our hands free in regard to that country in future. But we would gladly reaffirm our undertaking in the Rome understanding to refrain from acquiring any privileged position for ourselves outside our own spheres of influence in Arabia, in return for a similar guarantee from Italy. I could assure Signor Buti that we had no intention whatever of going beyond our line and no aim of any kind against the Yemen. Our action in the eastern areas of the Aden Protectorate could not therefore possibly constitute a threat to the Yemen. Moreover, we had already come to terms with the Yemen by the treaty of 1934, and the Imam therefore had nothing whatever to fear from us.

9. Signor Guarnaschelli then tried to represent that, in spite of this, what we were doing in the Aden Protectorate involved complete alteration of the situation. We were now virtually colonising a large new area, and this could not leave the Italians indifferent. It would inevitably produce uneasiness and unsettlement in South-Western Arabia, and even on the coast it involved a modification of the existing situation, since, if we established close control, air bases, &c., along the southern coast of Arabia, Italian Somaliland on the south side of the Gulf of Aden was bound to be affected.

10. I said that I could not accept this argument. The whole point of our having reserved our complete freedom of action within our sphere, and, indeed, of having a sphere at all, was that we should be free to develop it. I thought that many British authorities would probably have been only too glad to leave matters as they had been. But this was no longer practical politics. Exploration and air developments, activities of prospectors for oil and minerals, and modern developments generally, had made it impossible for these areas to remain merely a kind of vacuum. If we were responsible for them internationally, we must take our responsibilities and assume an increasing measure of control.

11. Signor Buti professed to see this point completely, though Signor Guarnaschelli continued to maintain that it involved an alteration in the *status quo*. Eventually, Signor Buti asked whether we could not find some means of giving the Italians, and, I understand, the Yemen, some kind of reassurance about our future policy. I said I did not see how we could in any way limit our freedom. They continued to press me to try to devise some formula on this point.

12. Meanwhile, I had already asked them two or three times what their attitude was towards the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. It is clearly impossible for them effectively to challenge the validity or implications of this instrument, and I wanted, if possible, to bring them into the open. They refused to commit themselves definitely, but said that they would consider the matter urgently and let me know their views on the following day. I think this is probably the strongest ground on which to pursue the discussion for the present, and Signor Buti—at any rate at this opening meeting—showed a disposition to be quite reasonable about our spheres and seemed content to concentrate on a mutual self-denying arrangement limited to the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

13. At the end of the conversation Signor Buti raised the question of the Island of Kamaran. There, also, he contended that we had violated our obligations under the Rome understanding of 1927 not to develop our influence. I said that the position in regard to Kamaran was quite different from that in our sphere on the mainland. We fully admitted our obligation under the Rome understanding not to claim any kind of sovereignty over Kamaran. In point of fact, there had been no change whatever in our position in the island, where the Civil Administrator—who had always borne that title—merely exercised the minimum of authority to maintain order, &c., for the safety of the pilgrimage quarantine station.

14. Signor Buti said that the fact that the Civil Administrator had now been officially referred to as such in the *Aden Gazette* seemed to him to be definitely a forward step. Moreover, we had promised by the Rome understanding to consider eventually the appointment of an Italian doctor. He thought this might now be taken into consideration. We did not, however, pursue this point, and agreed to continue the discussion on the following day on the main issue.

March 15, 1938.

[E 1564/880/91]

No. 99.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 286.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome despatch No. 277 of the 18th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of the second meeting at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 16th March respecting Anglo-Italian Middle Eastern conversations on the subject of Arabia.

Rome, March 18, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 99.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

Second Meeting on the Evening of March 16.

Arabia.

THE discussion at this meeting has already been fairly fully summarised in Lord Perth's telegram No. 166 of the 17th March, but it may be convenient to supplement that telegram with a rather fuller account of what was said.

2. The meeting was at first with Signor Guarnaschelli, and his assistant, Count Zoppi, only, but Signor Buti came in once or twice, and took a fleeting and spasmodic share in the conversation.

3. Signor Guarnaschelli began by reminding me that I had at the previous meeting asked the Italian Government to define their attitude towards the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 establishing the boundary between the Turkish and British spheres in Arabia. He said that the Italian Government were not disposed to recognise this instrument as determining the present position, for the following reasons: In the first place, they regarded the Anglo-Turkish Convention as *res inter alios acta*, i.e., as an agreement of which they had no cognisance and which could not affect the understanding reached between the Italian and British Governments by the Rome understanding of 1927, more especially as it had not been brought to their notice at the time. Secondly, he wished to draw my attention to the fact that while the convention set a definite limit to Ottoman territory it did not in any place state that the territory on the other side of the line was British or under British influence. This omission was important. Thirdly, he recalled that neither the Imam of the Yemen nor Ibn Saud admitted the validity of the convention, or regarded themselves as having inherited its obligations. As they were the Powers that controlled the greater part of the territory concerned, this was a material fact.

4. I replied that, as regards the first argument, it seemed to me that international relations would become impossible if third Powers began questioning the validity of bilateral treaties made between other Powers on the ground that they were not official parties to the arrangements made in them. All over the world there were bilateral treaties which might or might not affect the interests of third Powers, but which were accepted without question by those third Powers. In the present case, the fact that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 had not been specifically mentioned at the time of the Rome conversations of 1927 seemed to me merely to strengthen the contention of His Majesty's Government that the negotiators in 1927 had not intended their understanding to apply in any way to the British sphere as established by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. As regards the second argument, it seemed to me that the mere fact that the 1914 Convention was an Anglo-Turkish one which we had found it necessary to negotiate bilaterally with the Turkish Government showed that the convention was designed to establish a boundary between the Turkish and British spheres. There would otherwise have been no point in our negotiating with the Turks at all or being parties to the convention. Moreover, a great part of the convention dealt with the delimitation of the boundary between Ottoman territory and the British-protected territory of what was then generally known as the Aden Protectorate.

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The remainder of the line was merely a prolongation of this boundary, and therefore merely a prolongation of the Anglo-Turkish frontier. Thirdly, the attitude of the Imam and of Ibn Saud was not really relevant. Apart from the fact that the Turks were actually rulers of the Yemen in 1914 and that Ibn Saud in the same year had accepted Turkish suzerainty, the Turks were, obviously, from the international point of view, the only authority competent to conclude any international agreement in respect of the territory in question at that date. Our contention had always been that juridically both the Yemen and Saudi Arabia were in fact Turkish succession States, whatever their rulers might say. But the point was really irrelevant since we had already in 1934 negotiated a frontier settlement with the Imam, in so far as the territory under his direct administration or control was concerned, and were in process of negotiating a frontier arrangement with Ibn Saud.

5. Signor Guarnaschelli appeared to realise that these arguments constituted effective replies to his contentions, as he did not press the matter further, and admitted that nothing could be gained by pursuing a discussion on the purely legal aspect of the matter. He instead reverted to the general question of our action in the Aden Protectorate. He took the line that it was one thing from the Italian point of view that there should be a number of small independent Arab States bound to His Majesty's Government by purely negative treaties by which they were prevented from ceding territory or entering into relations with other Powers. The Italian Government would have raised no objection to this kind of vague protectorate. But our present forward policy was a very different matter. We were now intensifying our control, despatching political agents and administrative officials to various areas, raising native levies and organising forces, even if only at present of a police character, issuing passports, and generally converting the whole area into a virtual British colony. The original loose conglomeration of independent and insignificant Arab sheikhdoms was thus in process of being converted into a compact and organised British area. The Rome understanding, which, Signor Guarnaschelli repeated, specifically referred, both in the preamble and in article 7, in an entirely general way to "Southern Arabia," as distinct from the Red Sea area, laid down that the "respective policies of the two Governments in Southern Arabia and the Red Sea should be pursued in a spirit of friendly co-operation and developed on parallel though independent lines." It seemed to the Italian Government that our forward policy in the protectorate was entirely incompatible with the principle of "parallelism" established by the Rome understanding, and involved a complete disturbance of the situation in our favour which the Italian Government could not regard with indifference. It had been precisely to avoid any such disturbance that the Rome understanding had been concluded eleven years ago.

6. I replied by repeating my conviction that the British negotiators of the Rome understanding had never for one moment intended to tie the hands of His Majesty's Government in respect of the territory on our side of the Anglo-Turkish line. The Italian Government had never challenged—and indeed there was no question of anyone challenging—our action in developing the area in the immediate neighbourhood of Aden. We had made roads, raised native levies, and even forcibly ejected Yemeni forces from this area, in which we had admittedly been perfectly free to take whatever action circumstances might in our view necessitate. The position in the eastern and northern areas of the Aden Protectorate, *i.e.*, in Shehr and Mokalla, and in the Hadramaut, was identical, since our relations with the local rulers rested on precisely similar treaties to those with the chiefs in the immediate neighbourhood of Aden. There was no more justification for protesting against anything we did in the Hadramaut than for doing so against our action in Aden. In both cases the territory concerned was within our exclusive sphere and we regarded ourselves as completely free.

7. It was, moreover, not practical politics to leave matters as they were. Signor Guarnaschelli had spoken of passports. This was a case in point. We clearly could not leave the issue of passports in a State for which we were internationally responsible in the hands of a local and practically uncivilised Arab chief. Similarly, it was essential to maintain police and secure public order. The development of travel—as instanced by Mr. Philby's recent journey—the activities of oil prospectors, and the general development of our communications, all made it quite impossible for us to adopt a purely static and passive policy. It was no longer possible to leave such regions as a kind of vacuum.

8. Signor Buti appeared to appreciate this point better than Signor Guarnaschelli, but they both maintained that we had nevertheless completely transformed the situation, which they insisted on regarding as crystallised by the Rome understanding. They reverted to the rather absurd contention that this alteration in the situation would react unfavourably on the Italian position in Italian Somaliland, and made a rather half-hearted effort to represent the Rome understanding as applying not only to the Red Sea but also to the Gulf of Aden. It was not difficult to dispose of this particular argument, but the Italian representatives continued to press at least for some gesture on our part to offset the alteration in the balance of the situation, which, they maintained, our action had produced. As I could give them no satisfaction on this point all I could do was to bring the discussion to a close and to say that I would report their views.

G. W. RENDEL.

Rome, March 18, 1938.

[E 1562/330/31]

No. 100.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 287.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome despatch No. 276 of the 18th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel (at Rome), dated the 18th March, 1938, respecting the Anglo-Italian Middle Eastern conversations, being a record of the third meeting at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 17th March on the subject of Palestine.

Rome, March 18, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 100.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

*Third Meeting on the Evening of March 17.  
Palestine.*

THE discussion at this meeting has been recorded in Lord Perth's telegram No. 57, Saving, of the 18th March, to which it is perhaps unnecessary to add very much. The main point which emerged from Signor Guarnaschelli's summary of the Italian attitude was that the Italians are not seriously worried about their own special interests in Palestine, such as schools, religious and charitable institutions, hospitals, &c. It is not that they do not attach importance to the retention of the privileges enjoyed by these institutions, but they seem to realise quite clearly that, as I explained in the course of our first interview on the 15th March (see enclosure in Lord Perth's despatch No. 276 of the 18th March), we should have to make adequate provision for the maintenance of existing rights and privileges for the sake of the League and of the other countries and religious interests concerned, so that, unless there were special discrimination against Italy, Italian institutions would benefit with the rest from any arrangements which might be made. It is true that Signor Guarnaschelli referred once or twice to the special assurances about Palestine given to Italy by His Majesty's Government in 1926, but he did not stress this point unduly.

2. The three aspects of the matter to which the Italians seem to attach most importance are (a) their claim to be consulted, and to have a say in the establishment of any new régime or régimes in Palestine to replace the existing mandate (which they entirely agree is quite unworkable); (b) their desire to have some guarantee that if a Jewish State is established under British military protection, it shall not serve merely as a cloak for the establishment of new British military, naval and air bases obviously designed for more than mere local defence, *i.e.*, on a



large and important scale; and (c) their fear of the reaction which might be produced against them in the Moslem world if they gave us a completely blank cheque about Palestine, and we were thereupon to enforce a strongly anti-Arab policy.

3. I did not at this meeting attempt to argue about these claims in any detail. It is no doubt true that the Italians, by leaving the League, have forfeited their strict legal right to be consulted about any alternative régime in Palestine, except in so far as that right may derive from the fact that they were one of the Powers possessing capitulatory rights in the Ottoman Empire, so that those capitulatory rights will presumably automatically revive in their favour on the termination of the mandate (under article 8) unless they have been previously abandoned. But I think it is at least arguable that if the positions were reversed and Italy had held the mandate for Palestine and had contemplated a change of régime which might have liberated her from some of the international obligations of the mandate (such as the non-construction of military bases), we should certainly have regarded the matter as of political concern to us, irrespective of whether we were members of the League or not. I did not, therefore, feel on sufficiently certain grounds at any rate at this stage to contest the Italian claim vigorously and effectively, and accordingly thought it best not to take up the point at all for the time being.

4. On the general question of our future policy in Palestine, Signor Guarnaschelli emphasised the unfortunate results which an anti-Arab or anti-Moslem policy might have, not only on Italian interests in Africa if Italy showed any inclination to support us, but also on British interests themselves. I replied that we fully appreciated these considerations, but that we also had important obligations towards the Jews, and that Italy herself had approved of the issue of the Balfour Declaration at the time when it was made. Signor Guarnaschelli at once replied that the Balfour Declaration referred to a national home, and that there was nothing in it to suggest that it was intended to provide for the establishment of a predominantly Jewish State at the expense of the Arabs. I said that however this might be, there was no escaping from our obligations to the Jews, and that our task had not been made easier by the action of Italy's German friends in brutally persecuting and expelling thousands of innocent Jews, who had become homeless wanderers, and for whom British public opinion rightly felt the strongest sympathy. In any case, quite apart from the question of immigration into Palestine, there were now nearly half a million Jews already in Palestine who had their own towns and areas, and who had sunk vast amounts of capital in the country. They had brought about a very remarkable phase of intensive development, and it was quite out of the question for us to abandon them. Whatever solution of the Palestine problem might ultimately be adopted, the interests of these Palestinian Jews, who were actually in Palestine, would have to be properly safeguarded, and it was difficult to see how this could be done without the creation at least of special Jewish areas.

5. Signor Guarnaschelli said that he fully appreciated this, and that all that the Italians really wanted was to be protected against the accusation that they had as it were sold the pass to the enemy. Provided some saving clause could be adopted to the effect that any solution which the Italians bound themselves not to oppose would be within the framework of the mandate or in harmony with the objects for which the mandate had been set up, he thought that there would be no difficulty in getting over this point.

6. I suggested that such phrases might be rather obscure, particularly if there were any reference to the objects of the mandate, about which there had been a good deal of controversy. Signor Guarnaschelli did not think that this would much matter, and I formed the impression that he was really trying to find some face-saving device, and that the Italians were not out to make trouble for us over this particular question.

7. On my pressing Signor Guarnaschelli strongly to make some positive suggestion, he sketched out the formula quoted in paragraph 10 of Lord Perth's telegram No. 57, Saving, of 18th March. He eventually agreed to my taking this down on the understanding that it was an entirely personal and unofficial suggestion of his own which had not yet been approved by his higher authorities. It may be convenient for purposes of record to quote here the Italian text as I took it down: "E convenuto che la sistemazione della Palestina avvenga conformemente ai principi del mandato ed agli scopi per i quali il mandato fu

istituito." It was eventually agreed that Signor Guarnaschelli and Signor Buti (who joined us at this point) should endeavour to work out a more detailed and more definite formula, which they promised to let me have if possible on Saturday, the 19th March.

8. At the end of the interview Signor Buti again reverted to the military aspect of the question. He explained that the mandate gave a kind of "guarantee of tranquillity" as regards military developments. But if we were now to set up an "independent" Jewish State, which would obviously be wholly dependent for its existence on British military assistance, and if this State were to assume, as had been suggested, an important part in British strategic arrangements, with the possibility of our using it for the establishment of major naval and air bases, Italy could not remain indifferent. What the Italian Government wanted was some sort of guarantee that no major military developments of this kind would take place. Signor Buti emphasised, however, that any agreement now reached would not be used for the purpose of embarrassing us.

9. It was agreed to postpone further discussion until the Italians had produced their formula.

G. W. RENDEL.

March 18, 1938.

[E 1609/880/91]

No. 101.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 289.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 286 of the 18th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of the Anglo-Italian conversations concerning the Middle East, fourth meeting held on the 19th March, Part II, on the subject of Arabia.

Rome, March 19, 1938.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

Fourth Meeting on evening of March 19.

PART II.

*Arabia.*

AFTER giving me the Italian draft formula on Palestine which I have dealt with in a separate note, Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli gave me on the evening of the 19th March a minute regarding the proposed formula about Arabia, a copy and a translation of which are attached.

I explained that we quite realised that the original brief formula would be insufficient and that we had as a matter of fact been working on an alternative formula designed to expand it. It was, indeed, largely for the purpose of discussing this draft formula with the other departments concerned that I was going back to England. I hoped that on my return I might be able to put forward a definite text. Meanwhile I was somewhat puzzled about part B of the Italian formula, since in the first place as I had already explained we could not admit that the Rome understanding of 1927 was intended to cover the British sphere in Arabia, and secondly, I did not see how, even if it were, the two positions could be reconciled. I agreed, however, to communicate Signor Buti's suggestions to the authorities concerned and see that they received full consideration.

G. W. RENDEL.

March 19, 1938.



Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

*Translation of a Minute written in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and communicated unofficially to Mr. Rendel by Signor Buti on the evening of March 19, regarding the Proposed Arabian Formula.*

THE British have proposed the following formula:—

"The two Governments agree in so far as they are concerned that they will do nothing to disturb the territorial *status quo* in Arabia, and that neither of them will seek to obtain for itself a privileged position on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea."

The British might be told that we should be disposed to accept in principle the proposed formula in so far as it deals with the territorial *status quo* in Arabia on condition, however, that:—

(a) In so far as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of the Yemen are concerned the obligations regarding their respective independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity should be better defined.

(b) That some means should be found—either in the formula or in some other document such as the conclusions of the 1927 conversations—to harmonise the position which the Italo-British conversations of 1927 give to Italy in regard to southern Arabia (paragraph 2 and points 1, 3 and 7 of the conclusions themselves) with the British request that Italy should recognise the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.

It will also be necessary to clear up various points touched on in the conversations of 1927 (Kamaran, &c.).

Suitable drafting will have to be devised for the second part of the proposed formula.

Should differences arise they should be regulated by friendly agreement between the two Governments.

[E 1610/330/31]

No. 102.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 290.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to despatch No. 287 of the 18th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel (at Rome), dated the 19th March, 1938, respecting the Middle Eastern Anglo-Italian conversations on Palestine and the formula communicated to Mr. Rendel by Signor Buti, of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*Rome, March 19, 1938.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 102.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

*Fourth Meeting on the Evening of March 19.  
Palestine.*

IT had been arranged that I should see Signor Guarnaschelli at 5.30 this evening, when he would give me an Italian draft of the proposed formula regarding Palestine. The formula was not, however, ready until 8.30, when I was eventually asked to go down to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to receive it.

Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli then gave me the two formulæ of which copies and translations are attached.

I said that I would take these to London with me and discuss them with the various authorities concerned. But two points occurred to me immediately.

In the first place, I thought the phrase about the agreement of the local populations might lead to great difficulty. Signor Buti explained that he had tried to follow the wording of our own declarations, since we had always made it clear that any new States would be set up by agreement and would be bound to us by freely negotiated treaties. Secondly, the reference in paragraph 4 of the confidential formula to what were described as the Italian rights over the Sanctuary of the Cenacle would, it seemed to me, cause very serious difficulty. Although I had not been dealing with the question at the time, I remembered that there had been a great deal of trouble over this in the past, and that His Majesty's Government had explained more than once that, in view of the recognised rights of a certain Moslem family or association over this building, it was not possible to meet the Italian claim. I thought that this paragraph might cause great difficulty.

I got the impression from Signor Buti that the second point had been put in mainly for purposes of bargaining, but I cannot, of course, be sure about this.

Signor Buti explained that the phrase about the Ethiopian Coptic Church in paragraph 5 might not be correctly worded, but that the draft was intended to serve as a basis of discussion.

G. W. RENDEL.

*Rome, March 19, 1938.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

*Formula regarding Palestine communicated to Mr. Rendel by Signor Buti on the Evening of March 19.*

(Translation.)

*Part I.—Main Formula.*

THE British Government declares that the policy and method of administration which it will adopt in Palestine will be in accordance with the principles of the mandate and with the objects for which the mandate was instituted, and that any future settlement will be reached in agreement with the local populations.

In view of the foregoing the Italian Government declares that it has no intention of creating difficulties for the British Government in regard to the policy and method of administration to be adopted in Palestine and Transjordan.

*Part II.—Confidential Agreement.*

1. With reference to the declaration contained in Item 7 (Palestine) of the Italo-British Protocol of . . . the British Government declares that, whether during the mandatory régime or after its termination, and whatever the future position of Palestine and Transjordan may be going to be, it does not intend to undertake, or cause to be undertaken, in the said territories preparations or works of a military nature which have not a defensive character.

2. The British Government declares, further, that, whatever the future policy, organisation and administration of Palestine and Transjordan may be going to be, it undertakes to ensure that Italian interests and institutions existing in the said territories (missions, schools, charitable institutions, &c.) shall be fully respected, and that their present juridical and administrative position shall be consolidated, most-favoured-nation treatment being in any case applied to them.

3. The British Government declares also that, whatever the future policy and administrative organisation of Palestine and Transjordan may be going to be, it undertakes to ensure that most-favoured-nation treatment shall be assured to Italy, particularly in economic, commercial and juridical matters and in matters connected with establishment and in the measures to be taken to ascertain, define and regulate all rights and claims regarding the Holy Places and also the various religious communities in Palestine.

4. The British Government recognises the validity of the firman issued by Sultan . . . and dated . . . by which the rights of His Majesty Victor Emmanuel III over the Sanctuary of the Cenacle were confirmed.



5. The British Government, in view of the separation which has taken place of the Ethiopian Coptic Church from the Egyptian Coptic Church, recognises for its part that the Abyssinian Holy Places in Palestine depend on the Ethiopian Coptic Church.

6. The Italian and British Governments will settle in a friendly way all differences which may arise between them in regard to the interpretation and application either of the declaration contained under item 7 of the Italo-British Protocol or of the various points dealt with in the present letter.

(N.B.—Article 5 is subject to the concurrence of the Royal Ministry for Italian Africa.)

[E 1687/1034/65]

No. 103.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 43. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, March 9, 1938.*

I HAD just drafted a despatch about Ibn Saud and the Caliphate when I received a copy of the despatch which was addressed to you (No. 169 of the 17th February), by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo, and I am recasting my own despatch in the light of Sir Miles Lampson's.

2. The rumour had reached me, as it had Sir Miles Lampson, that the use by the King of the Yemen of the title Amir Al Muminin (Commander of the Believers) in his recent treaty with Italy, was a breach of an understanding between him and Ibn Saud at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Taif. Fuad Bey, however, to whom I mentioned this rumour a little while ago, said that this was not so; what happened was that Ibn Saud refused to sign a treaty in which the King of the Yemen was referred to as Amir Al Muminin, and that as a compromise each of the parties used his title of Imam, i.e., religious leader of his own people. So far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, Fuad Bey added, the Imam Yahya might continue to call himself Commander of the Believers, as it had no effect outside his own territories. This indifference is perhaps slightly exaggerated, as Fuad Bey certainly gave a slight gasp when the Amir Husain of the Yemen, on the occasion of the inauguration of the London broadcast in Arabic to which we were listening together, referred to his father as Commander of the Believers, and he also asked with evident interest, before he had seen the text of the Italo-Yemeni Treaty, whether it was true that the Italians had recognised the Imam as Caliph in that document. But on the whole Ibn Saud can afford to ignore the policy of the King of the Yemen in this respect. It would be otherwise, however, if King Farouk were to take the title of Caliph, since Egypt, in virtue of her geographical situation, population and relative wealth, holds a position which must give importance to any act of her ruler; and even if the assumption of the title were accompanied by a declaration that it was merely co-terminous with the title of king, suspicion would not be completely allayed. It is true that personal rivalries and nationalism soon destroyed the early unity of the Caliphate, but, quite apart from the wide recognition which the Ottoman Caliphate enjoyed for so long, the title of Caliph carries with it memories of the early successors of Muhammad, who held religious sway over all Moslems, and its assumption by any ruler to-day could hardly fail to be interpreted in many quarters as a bid for spiritual influence outside the borders of his secular realm. Articles which had appeared in the press in England referring to King Farouk's alleged designs on the Caliphate, were mentioned in a recent conversation which I had with Fuad Bey, and I am sure that he was not speaking for himself alone when he said very firmly that King Farouk's ambitions were well known, but that the assumption by him of the title of Caliph would meet with determined opposition from many sides. Ibn Saud is prepared to co-operate with other Moslem countries on equal terms; he is too cautious to thrust himself forward as the leader of the Arab world, but he will not willingly allow any other ruler to assume the leadership either. The remedy proposed by his Highness the Agha Khan, that each of the Arab rulers should style himself Caliph for internal purposes, might not agree with Ibn Saud's religious principles, and in any case he would certainly dislike

to have the choice thrust upon him by the latest-arrived of the Arab rulers, whether to assume a local title of Caliph or to leave King Farouk's assumption of the title unchallenged.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Angora. The matter is also being mentioned in the Jedda report for February, for the information of other posts that may be interested.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1843/880/91]

No. 104.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 1, 1938.)*

[By Telephone.]

(No. 278.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome.*

(*En clair.*) MIDDLE Eastern conversation.

*Arabia.*

At seventh meeting with Mr. Rendel on morning of 31st March Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli began by explaining that Italian Government were now prepared to accept British formula in principle, and, in particular, to abandon their previous objections to recognition of British zone in Southern Arabia, subject, however, to agreement being reached on question of termination clause. But Italian Government also attached importance to certain other amendments.

2. On major question of termination, Italian representatives produced counter-draft of article 8 (originally 7) based on "revision formula" in covering protocol (see paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 133). This included no provision for denunciation, but contained new provision for general consultation in following terms:—

"The two parties will keep in contact and will consult together in all matters regarding their mutual interests in the zones of the Middle East to which the present agreement refers."

3. Mr. Rendel pointed out objections of principle to agreement being binding in perpetuity. With my prior approval, he suggested submitting to His Majesty's Government that agreement should be denunciable after five years, continuing automatically for further period of five years unless denounced. Signor Buti eventually agreed, but strongly pressed for ten years in each case, arguing that this was not long for an agreement of such importance. Eventually, Mr. Rendel agreed to submit proposal for initial validity of ten years continuing automatically unless denounced for periods of five years each. (*En clair ends.*)

4. I recommend that this be accepted. Rome Understanding of 1927, which is still valid, is of unlimited duration, and we stand to gain at least as much as Italians by replacing it by new agreement. In any case, it seems unwise to give Italians the opportunity of denouncing their recognition of our position in Southern Arabia in five years' time.

5. Consultation formula was not discussed in detail, but I should like to accept it unless you see serious objection.

(*En clair.*) 6. Next most important point was reference in article 6 to Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. Italians objected to mention of this instrument, which, they said, would cause them great embarrassment with Arabian States, who had not recognised its validity. They handed Mr. Rendel following alternative formula for first paragraph of article 6:—

"As regards zone of Arabia lying to east and south of the frontiers which are or shall be established between His Majesty's Government on the one part and the Saudi and Yemeni Governments on the other . . ."



7. They also suggested a consequential amendment with part of article 6 (a) (1) immediately following the reference in brackets to article 1, to run as follows:—

“In the territory which at present belonged to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or in those which either of those States may subsequently acquire as a result of frontiers agreements concluded or to be concluded between the Governments of the United Kingdom and either of the said States.”

8. Mr. Rendel pressed the objections to omitting our proposed reference to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Doubts might arise as to what was the *de facto* position in outlying areas. The reference to the 1914 line established a clear maximum limit for the British sphere, which would be to everyone's advantage, but without which there might be conflicting claims, so that His Majesty's Government might be exposed to accusations of “prejudicing the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen,” as a result of action which they might legitimately take in outlying areas within their sphere. (*En clair ends.*) Shabwa is a case in point, though Mr. Rendel, of course, did not mention it (*En clair begins.*) Italian representatives, in course of lengthy argument, maintained their objections to reference to 1914 convention and argued that article 6 (2), by which Italian Government renounce all political ambitions in the zone south and east of frontier of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, should give His Majesty's Government sufficient guarantee. (*En clair ends.*)

9. The whole of article 6 (1) refers, of course, to territories of Arab rulers under British protection and therefore depends upon our treaties with those rulers rather than on 1914 convention. Moreover, the new definition would correspond to that in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937. While, therefore, I appreciate risks to which Mr. Rendel drew attention, I am inclined to think that we might accept this omission. We shall still have gained vital point under article 6 (2).

(*En clair.*) 10. Italians then raised the question of commercial freedom in Aden Protectorate dealt with in article 7 (originally article 6 (a)), and contended that most-favoured-foreign-nation rights were quite illusory in absence of any obligations to other foreign Powers. Mr. Rendel could not say whether any such obligations existed in virtue of accession of Aden Protectorate to any British commercial treaties, and Italians said they could trace none. They therefore proposed insertion at the beginning of article 7 of the two following paragraphs:—

“The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate, &c., Italian subjects and companies, as regards their persons and their goods, shall be received and treated in accordance with ordinary international law and shall therefore have, subject to the laws and regulations in force, freedom of access and sojourn and the right to exercise any kind of commerce, profession or industry.

“Similarly, Italian merchant ships, subject to the laws and regulations in force, shall have freedom of access to, sojourn in and departure from the ports and anchorages of the Aden Protectorate, as also freedom to accomplish commercial operations in the said ports and anchorages.” (*En clair ends.*)

This may be based on wording of article 1 of Anglo-Italian Commercial Treaty of 1883.

(*En clair.*) 11. Mr. Rendel pointed out that it was impossible to give these guarantees in respect of territory over which His Majesty's Government exercised so light a control. The Italian Government had begun by objecting to what they described as the transformation of the protectorate into a colony. His Majesty's Government had now assured them that the present system of government would be maintained, but the Italians could not have it both ways. In view of the very loose control which His Majesty's Government would be exercising in the protectorate, it might prove impossible to allow foreigners freedom of movement in areas where we should not be able to guarantee their safety. Italian representatives replied by emphasising that the rights they desired would still be subject to the regulations in force, so that the Administration could always

impose general prohibitions or limitations on travel, &c. On Mr. Rendel again emphasising the difficulties, the Italians indicated that they attached particular importance to this point. (*En clair ends.*)

12. I fully appreciate the difficulties of giving suggested guarantee, but should welcome any alternative formula which might make it clear that our own offer is not illusory.

(*En clair.*) 13. Italians also revived their objections to words “non-Arabian” and “adjacent to the Red Sea” in article 3, and pressed strongly for their omission. After long discussion (record by bag), it was suggested that their point might be met by redrafting sentence to run somewhat as follows:—

“The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of both of them not only that neither of them (as provided in articles 1 and 2 above), but also that no other Power, should establish itself in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen,” &c.

Italians would accept this, and I think we might agree.

14. They also suggest insertion in article 4 (ii) (b) of Little Hanish, where they say establishments exist similar to those on other two islands mentioned. Mr. Rendel said he would refer this point to His Majesty's Government.

15. Following are only other amendments suggested:—

Article 1.—For “which might impair the complete independence and integrity” read “which might in any way impair the independence or integrity”;

In article 2 insert the word “any” before the word “territory” wherever it occurs; and

In article 6 (a) (i), on the analogy of article 1, amend to read “such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity,” &c. (*En clair ends.*)

16. I realise some of these amendments may lead to difficulty, but earnestly hope that it may be possible to reach early and favourable decision.

[E 1695/880/91]

No. 105.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Jedda, March 11, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note from the Saudi Government about the projected Anglo-Italian conversations, to which I referred in my telegram No. 55, dated the 6th March.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Saudi Government to Sir R. Bullard.

(Translation.)

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Muharram 3, 1357 (March 4, 1938).

I HAVE received your letter No. 36, dated the 2nd March, regarding the instructions issued to you by the British Government concerning the circumstances attending the resignation of Mr. Eden from the Foreign Office, to the effect that this does not mean any change in their policy, and that they always have in mind the particular interests of Saudi Arabia, and that my Government may rest assured that the British Government will take no action inconsistent with those interests or with the sincere friendship existing between the two parties.

I thank the British Government for their friendly feelings towards my Government and for their assurance that they will not agree to any action

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inconsistent with the interests of this country or with the firm friendship existing between the two parties. My Government could not, of course, contemplate any interference whatsoever in the policy to be adopted by the British Government in regard to a third State, but they think it their duty, first as a friend, and, secondly, as having important interests in this part of the world, to explain frankly to their friend the British Government exactly what their feelings are.

The comments of those who are unaware of the facts of this occurrence can be summarised thus:—

- (1) That the action of the British Government implies the defeat of their political principles, and of the principles of international law and of the League of Nations.
- (2) That it is a sign of weakness on the part of the British Government and an acknowledgement of the strength of their rivals.
- (3) That it sacrifices many of the nations which placed their trust in the British Government, and followed in their policy the path adopted by the British Government.
- (4) That it will encourage the ambitious to persist in their extravagances and ambitions and will lead to complications and probabilities the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

The Government of His Majesty would like to believe that no such thing has been or will be. Their confidence in the British Government and their adherence to their traditions lead them to take another view of the situation. This view can be summarised thus: the British Government felt that propaganda on a wide scale was being spread against them, and that it was they who by their obstinacy were tending to poison the international atmosphere, and that they therefore wished to destroy those rumours and to declare their desire to do everything possible to clear up the complicated political situation, and (! to show) that the responsibility is not theirs, and therefore they willingly agree to enter upon conversations in the desire to reach satisfactory conclusions to be approved within the limits of international obligations and agreements, so that if the conversations should not be successful, it would not be from lack of goodwill or from obstinacy on the part of the British Government but from the act of others. If this is the case (and my Government hope that it may be), then my Government wish the British Government success and hope with all their heart that the efforts which are being made will be crowned with success. They also sincerely hope that no action will be taken which might injure her special interests or lead to the persistence of other parties in their claims, and they trust that the British Government will keep them informed of all matters affecting this country which may arise in the course of the conversations.

In this connexion my Government would like to enquire whether the Rome Declarations of February 1927 relating to the Arab countries will come under discussion, and, if they do whether Great Britain will persist in respecting them or not.

FAISAL.

[E 1884/880/91]

No. 106.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 4.)*

(No. 327.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome telegram No. 241 of the 25th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of the Anglo-Italian conversations concerning the Middle East, fifth meeting, held on the 28th March, on the subject of Arabia.

Rome, April 1, 1938.

Enclosure 1 in No. 106.

ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

*Fifth Meeting on the Morning of March 28.*

*Arabia.*

HAVING returned to Rome the previous evening, I saw Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli on the morning of the 28th March, as recorded in Lord Perth's telegram No. 241 of that date, and gave them our new Arabian formula as in the attached copy. After consultation with Lord Perth I had decided to omit article 2A (freedom of commercial opportunity, &c., in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen)—since His Majesty's Government are not keen on it, and we felt that we could safely leave it to the Italians to raise this point—but to insert article 6A—now renumbered 7—most favoured foreign nation treatment for Italy in the Aden Protectorate, as defined by the Aden Protectorate Order in Council, 1937—which we felt would make the whole formula much more attractive to the Italians and might tip the scale in favour of its acceptance.

2. I explained that our formula was based on the terms of the Rome Understanding of 1927, many of the provisions of which it reproduced, but that it took full account of the conversations we had had during the first stage of our discussions, and also of the Italian desiderata as set out in the Italian Foreign Office minute, of which Signor Buti had given me a copy unofficially on the 19th March. I further explained that the formula had only been evolved with the greatest difficulty, and that it had been by no means easy to obtain so much in the way of concession to the Italian point of view. I added that both Lord Perth and I felt that the formula which we were now offering was eminently fair and went a very long way indeed to meet the Italian desiderata. I earnestly hoped, therefore, that the Italians would be able to accept it as it stood.

3. The Italian representatives explained that they could express no opinion on the formula pending its submission to their higher authorities, and that any comments they might make were, therefore, of a purely personal and unofficial kind.

4. They anticipated no great difficulty over the parts of the formula which dealt with Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, but the main preliminary observation which occurred to them was that the formula provided for the complete acceptance of the British point of view regarding "Southern Arabia" and the British zone. This was, of course, at variance with the Italian interpretation of the Rome understanding.

5. I replied that on this point I had always made it clear from the outset that we should not be able to give way. I had already explained our view of the legal position, and why it would be impossible for us to withdraw in any way from the areas under our protection. We had agreements with the tribal rulers concerned on which we could not possibly go back; nor could we leave the protectorate as a vacuum. We were internationally responsible for it, and must exercise our responsibilities by providing for whatever measure of control and development modern circumstances might render necessary. But, apart from this, it seemed to me that our formula gave the Italians all the reassurances they could desire. They had explained to me during the first part of our discussions that what caused them anxiety was our apparent intention to convert what had been a loose collection of minor Arab States, bound to us by purely negative ties, into a highly organised British colony, which might constitute a threat either to the independent Arab States or even to Italian Somaliland. It seemed to me that the assurances contained in article 6 of our formula should set all Italian misgivings on this score at rest. I got the impression that Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli were personally inclined to accept this view, but that they were very nervous of exceeding their instructions.

6. Before we got to article 7 (the old article 6A) Signor Guarnaschelli raised the question of Italian commercial opportunity in the Aden Protectorate. I drew his attention to the article, which he seemed to like, though he asked me whether there were, in fact, any foreign countries actually enjoying rights of commerce, &c., in the Aden Protectorate. I said that I did not think there were at present, as the country was still quite undeveloped, but that there certainly would be before long. Signor Guarnaschelli asked me whether this might not

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mean that the rights we were prepared to accord to Italy under article 7 might prove illusory, since we could presumably impose prohibitions on *all* foreign activities in the Aden Protectorate. The Italians would like to be sure of reasonable freedom in the protectorate for travel (*e.g.*, for exploration or archaeology) and trade, &c.

7. I said that, as far as I knew, there was no intention of imposing any general prohibition, but that, of course, the protectorate was still a very wild and uncivilised area, where we could not—as the responsible Power—allow foreigners to travel freely without being reasonably assured of their safety. At present we ran the whole protectorate with such a very small organisation that it might be difficult for us to guarantee the safety of foreigners in outlying parts of it. There might therefore be practical objections to the kind of freedom the Italians desired.

8. Signor Guarnaschelli then asked, as what he called a purely personal enquiry, whether it would be possible for the Italians, for example, to appoint a consular officer at Mokalla. I said that if other Powers appointed consuls there, there would, of course be no objection, and that I did not think there would be any objection in principle. I thought it well to say, however, speaking extremely frankly and quite personally and unofficially, that there were quarters where Italian consular officers in British colonies and mandated territories were regarded with some suspicion. No doubt if Anglo-Italian relations were re-established—as I trusted they would be—on a really friendly basis, these suspicions could easily be dissipated. But I had myself had reason to suspect before now that the Italian consul in Aden was inclined to give undue credence to bazaar rumours, while the activities of the Italian consuls and other Italians in Palestine had, I knew, often caused our colonial authorities considerable anxiety. These remarks were perhaps not immediately relevant to the subject in hand, and, indeed, they were made during an interval in the discussion while Signor Guarnaschelli and I were waiting for Signor Buti, who had been called away to see Count Ciano. But I thought it well to make them, as it would be useless for the Italians to think that we should welcome the early appointment of an Italian consular officer at Mokalla. My impression is that it will be very difficult for the Colonial Office to agree to such an appointment until we have some evidence that Italian consular officers can be trusted a great deal more than they can be at present not to intrigue against us. Signor Guarnaschelli took my remarks in very good part, merely saying that he thought that our suspicions against the activities of the Italian consul-general at Jerusalem were unfounded. He admitted that the Italian consul in Aden had been inclined to send home some inaccurate reports, but maintained that most of his material had been proved accurate and reliable. I did not pursue the point.

9. With regard to the rest of the formula, the Italian representatives only raised minor points. They were not altogether happy about the term “non-Arabian Power” in article 3, and asked whether it was intended to include Egypt and Iraq. I explained the origin of the term, but they said that at first sight they would prefer to leave out the word “non-Arabian” and to speak simply of “no other Power” in this article, as in article 5 (ii).

10. Signor Guarnaschelli also asked whether it was really necessary to refer in terms to the 1914 Anglo-Turkish Agreement. I said that we attached considerable importance to this, as it constituted the legal basis of our whole position. He asked whether it would not be sufficient to speak of a frontier “to be decided on by agreement.” I replied that we had thought of this, but that the phrase seemed to us too vague. There was a real advantage both from the point of view of the Italians and of the independent Arabian States as well as from our own in having a clearly defined legal line beyond which His Majesty’s Government would not in any case go. But this did not mean that we were necessarily trying to hold Saudi Arabia and the Yemen back behind that line. The Italian representatives would notice that we had in each case referred not only to the territory belonging to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen to the north and west of the line, but also to any territory which those States might acquire by agreement with us to the south and east of it. The Italian representatives seemed to appreciate the force of this argument and did not raise further difficulties over this point at the time, though they may, of course, revive it.

11. The Italian representatives seemed pleased at the reference to Italian officials at Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur, though they asked pointedly whether

we still insisted on having our Civil Administrator at Kamaran. I said that I was afraid we must do this, but drew their attention to the very categorical renunciation of any claims to sovereignty by us over the island. Signor Guarnaschelli showed me a report from an Italian sloop to the effect that a British flag—which he described as “very large”—flew over Kamaran. I said that, seeing that we had specifically renounced any claim to sovereignty, it seemed to me immaterial whether the British Administrator flew a flag over his house or not. No doubt, however, this difficulty could be got over, and, if necessary, the Administrator could fly a consular flag, or one with some other distinguishing mark. The Italians said that they did not wish to press this point, but presumed that there would be no objection to the Italian officials of Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur equally flying an Italian flag if they wished to do so. I said this seemed to be implied in the agreement, provided, of course, it was on the same condition that there was no claim to sovereignty.

12. The Italian representatives also seemed a little disturbed at the revision and termination clause (now article 8). I explained our objection to an agreement binding in perpetuity, and suggested some of the entirely hypothetical circumstances which might make it necessary to revise the agreement. The Italians asked whether it might not be possible, nevertheless, to provide that, even if circumstances rendered it necessary to revise or suspend the agreement—*e.g.*, in the event of a hostile Arab ruler taking action against us involving an expedition into his territory—it might not, nevertheless, be provided that in any such event we should not, after any necessary measures had been taken, annex any territory within the present limits of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. I said I did not think this need present any insuperable objection. We certainly had no intention whatever of annexing any further territory. The whole question, however, was extremely hypothetical and the article had only been inserted as a sort of insurance and safeguard, without any particular contingency in view.

13. On the whole the Italian representatives seemed to take the formula fairly well, though they gave me the impression of still being tied by their instructions to refuse to recognise our zone in Southern Arabia. They said that they would submit the matter at once to Count Ciano, and Signor Buti promised—for what it may be worth—to use his influence in favour of our draft.

G. W. RENDEL.

March 28, 1938.

Enclosure 2 in No. 106.

*Draft Arabian Formula (March 28, 1938).*

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Royal Italian Government;

Being equally desirous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present agreement;

Have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might impair the complete independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Neither party will acquire or seek to acquire a privileged position of a political character in territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or in territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of both of them that no non-Arabian Power shall establish itself in any territory adjacent to the Red Sea which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea

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belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

#### ARTICLE 4.

(i) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, neither party will, on or in regard to any such island:—

- (a) Establish its sovereignty; or
- (b) Erect fortifications or defences.

(ii) It is agreed that neither party will object to—

- (a) The presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, of the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, of the other part; it is understood that an Italian medical officer may also be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the said agreement.
- (b) The presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands.
- (c) the presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

#### ARTICLE 5.

(i) The two parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(ii) The two parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.

#### ARTICLE 6.

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the boundaries of the former Ottoman Empire as established in the convention concluded in London on the 9th March, 1914, between His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, on the other part:—

(a) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:—

(i) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in article 1 hereof) within the territories of those States to the west and north of the boundaries referred to above. This undertaking shall also apply to any territory to the east and south of the boundaries referred to above which is or shall be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as a result of frontier agreements concluded or to be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and either of them.

(ii) The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works, of a purely defensive character, for the defence of the said territories or of the communications of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United

Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence.

(iii) While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(b) The Royal Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

#### ARTICLE 7.

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian nationals (including Italian companies), Italian ships and goods produced or manufactured in Italy shall in matters of commerce, navigation and industry receive treatment not less favourable than the treatment which is or may be accorded to the nationals (including companies), ships, products and manufactures of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

#### ARTICLE 8.

(i) Should either party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present agreement such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

(ii) Should these negotiations have led to no agreement within three months of the date on which the notice is given, either party may then terminate the agreement by giving to the other a notification of its desire to do so, which shall take effect three months after the date on which it is given.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Rome, this       day of       , 1938, in duplicate in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

[E 1885/880/91]

No. 107.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 4.)*

(No. 328.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome despatch No. 327 of the 1st April, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of the Anglo-Italian Conversations, concerning the Middle East, sixth meeting, held on the 28th March, Part II, on the subject of Arabia.

*Rome, April 1, 1938.*

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## ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

*Sixth Meeting on the Evening of March 28.*

## PART II.

*Arabia.*

THE first part of my meeting on the evening of the 28th March with Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli (the second meeting since my return to Rome and the sixth meeting of the series) was taken up with the question of Palestine, which has been fully reported in Lord Perth's telegram No. 244 of the 28th March.

2. After the end of our discussion on Palestine, Signor Buti reverted to the question of our Arabian formula, which I had presented to him that morning (see separate record), and said that he wished to raise various points, though he was not yet in a position to discuss the formula officially.

3. The first and most serious point that occurred to him arose out of article 8 (ii), providing for the denunciation of the new agreement on three months' notice in the event of one of the parties having asked for its revision by negotiation, and these negotiations having, after three months, led to no result. The effect of this clause was to make it impossible to rely on the agreement being in force for more than six months, and this would practically destroy its value from the Italian point of view. Signor Buti noticed that in the revised draft of the general covering protocol which Lord Perth had communicated to the Italian Government on the 26th March, there was a clause providing for the revision by negotiation and mutual consent of any of the agreements forming part of the settlement. This clause was much the same as article 8 (i) of our Arabian formula, but without the objectionable feature contained in article 8 (ii). As it would apply to the Arabian Agreement with the rest, was there any reason for the insertion in the Arabian Agreement of article 8 at all?

4. I explained that it had never been our intention to suggest that the Arabian Agreement should be of short duration. We were all agreed as to the objections to agreements being binding in perpetuity, and these objections applied particularly in the case of an area like the Middle East, which was still in an undeveloped and necessarily somewhat fluid political condition. It was impossible to foretell what developments would occur in the Middle East, and it might be most inconvenient for both parties to find their hands tied in perpetuity. On Signor Buti pressing me to explain why we attached importance to the power of terminating the agreement, I said that it was conceivable that in certain eventualities negotiations for its revision might reach a deadlock, and that unless there was some power of denunciation the effect would be to give each Government a virtual right of veto against the revision of the agreement. Circumstances might arise where new States and rulers might spring up in Arabia with whom it might not be possible, with the best will in the world, to maintain such friendly relations as at present existed. Although it was always difficult and invidious to imagine hypothetical cases, it was conceivable—though in the highest degree improbable—that a new ruler might at some future date spring up who might encourage active hostilities against, say, Iraq or Palestine. In such an event it might conceivably be necessary for us to send an expedition into independent Arabia. Similarly, the Italians might conceivably find themselves involved in serious difficulties in the Yemen, and might equally wish to regain their freedom of action. The denunciation clause, therefore, though there was no reason to suppose that there was any likelihood of its being invoked, seemed a reasonable precaution if the agreement was not to bind both parties in perpetuity.

5. Signor Buti said that he quite understood that, if new and hostile rulers should spring up in Arabia, it might be necessary for us to be free in certain eventualities to take military action in their territory. But provided that this did not involve any question of annexation, he did not see why this should lead to any difficulty. If, however, the agreement contained a denunciation clause on the present lines, His Majesty's Government could at any moment, on giving six months' notice, regain their freedom to annex any part of Arabia or to adopt any kind of forward policy. He repeated that this would destroy the whole value of the agreement.

6. I said that as we had no intention whatever of annexing any part of Arabia, I wondered whether the point would not be met by the insertion of some phrase to the effect that there would in no case be any permanent annexation of territory. Alternatively, would it be possible to provide that there should be no denunciation of the agreement for, say, ten years? Signor Buti pressed strongly, however, for the complete omission of the denunciation clause. (It is, of course, true that if the denunciation clause is omitted it may prove difficult for us to secure the revision of the agreement if the Italians are determined to be obstructive. On the other hand, Lord Perth agrees that there is a good deal of force in Signor Buti's arguments, and we think it may be very difficult to insist on this point. It will be remembered that the Rome understanding of 1927 contained no provision for its termination.)

7. I promised Signor Buti to take up this point at once in advance of the official Italian reply.

8. Signor Buti then asked why in article 3 we had spoken of its being an essential interest of both Powers that no non-Arabian Power should establish itself in Saudi or Yemeni territory "adjacent to the Red Sea." He was not clear as to the object of this limitation. Surely it was an equally essential interest of both parties that no other Power should establish itself in *any* Saudi or Yemeni territory?

9. I replied that this phrase followed on the provisions of the Rome understanding of 1927, and on the subsequent discussions, in which the question had been looked at entirely from the point of view of maritime communications through the Red Sea. As Signor Buti knew, the 1927 understanding was intended to deal with the Red Sea only. Our present discussions were mainly concerned with the Red Sea route, and in this article we had been thinking of non-Arabian Powers, which could only establish themselves in Arabia by sea. It was natural, therefore, to speak of the Red Sea coast.

10. Signor Buti said that whatever the original intention might have been the agreement now covered the whole of Arabia. (I interposed that this had been mainly due to the action of the Italians in challenging our position in the British Zone.) Was there then any reason for this limitation? Moreover, as Signor Guarnaschelli had said at the previous meeting, there seemed no reason for the limitation of this provision to "non-Arabian Powers." If the words "non-Arabian" were omitted would it not be logical equally to omit the words "adjacent to the Red Sea"?

11. I gathered that the Italians intend to raise these points in their official reply, but I said that I would look into the matter meanwhile.

12. I ought to add that, at an earlier stage in the conversation and before Signor Buti joined us, Signor Guarnaschelli drew my attention to the fact that while the Rome understanding of 1927 referred to the principle of commercial equality (in article 5), our new draft Arabian formula did not deal with this subject at all. He asked what was the reason for this omission.

13. I replied that we had originally proposed to insert an article on this subject, but that we had found it very difficult to draft, since in modern conditions economic equality was very hard to define. For instance, we clearly could not exclude concessions, but concessions were often exclusive and difficult to reconcile with the principle of complete economic equality. Moreover, we were dealing with independent sovereign States, and it was really for them rather than for us to ensure commercial equality for foreign traders, &c., in their territories. We had therefore felt that such an article might be rather illusory, and on the whole were inclined to feel that little would be gained by its insertion. We were, however, quite willing to insert such an article, and I had, in fact, brought with me a draft which I should be glad to show to Signor Guarnaschelli if he wished to go any further in the matter.

14. Signor Guarnaschelli appeared to be inclined to agree that there would be nothing to be gained by inserting such an article, and did not press the matter further. He did not ask me to produce our draft article (article 2A of the draft of the 25th March), and in view of the general attitude of the various departments concerned on this subject, I decided to say no more about it myself.

March 29, 1938.

G. W. RENDEL.



[E 1886/330/31]

No. 108.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received April 4.)

(No. 329.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome telegram No. 244 of the 29th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a record by Mr. Rendel of Part I of the sixth meeting for Anglo-Italian conversations concerning the Middle East, held on the 28th March, the subject discussed being Palestine.

*Rome, April 1, 1938.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

Sixth Meeting, on the evening of March 28.

## PART I.

*Palestine.*

THE first part of this meeting, in which we discussed Palestine, has already been fully reported in Lord Perth's telegram No. 244 of the 29th March, to which there is not very much to add. The Italian representatives were obviously anxious to know what our intentions were in Palestine, and have clearly been made very nervous of future developments by recent talk in England of the desirability of setting up a Jewish State under British military protection or in close military alliance with His Majesty's Government, which would enable us to develop a strong British strategical position in the Middle East. I endeavoured to dissipate these fears as far as I could do so without committing us in any way to any particular line of policy. I explained that it was still too early to say what precise form any eventual settlement of the Palestine problem would take. As the Italian Government knew, His Majesty's Government had adopted the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and were now sending out a new commission to Palestine to see how they could be carried into effect. But it was clearly impossible to say at this stage exactly what the new commission would report.

2. The Italians repeated all their objections to giving any kind of blank cheque. They explained, however, that all they wanted was some kind of general guarantee that His Majesty's Government would continue to base their policy on the general principles which underlay the mandate itself. There had been no difficulty over this in the case of Iraq, where the emancipation of the country had followed naturally on the termination of the mandatory régime. Could we not say that the same principles would apply in the case of Palestine?

3. I explained that Palestine was in a totally different position from Iraq. The problem in Iraq had been a simple one, but that in Palestine presented peculiar difficulties. It was really impossible for His Majesty's Government to tie their hands by any further commitments at this stage. They already had quite enough obligations with regard to Palestine, and their policy had formed the subject of numerous public statements.

4. The Italians were clearly disappointed with this attitude, but seemed to understand and to appreciate the difficulties of the situation more clearly than I had expected. Their first inclination was obviously to leave the whole Palestine question over. I said that our main object had been to avoid unnecessary difficulties from the Italian side when the time came to try to bring any new settlement into effect. If, as we hoped, Anglo-Italian relations were by that time friendly, I presumed that Italy would not seek to make any unnecessary difficulties. Signor Buti assented. As regards any other difficulties that might arise, they would presumably have to be taken on their merits. I was careful not to imply that Italy had any special rights in the matter beyond those which she obviously will have under article 8 of the mandate. I merely left it that if Italy wished to put forward any suggestions it would be open to her to do so through the diplo-

matic channel when the time came. I carefully avoided implying that we should necessarily adopt a favourable attitude towards any claims the Italians might then make.

5. Signor Buti emphasised that the point about which the Italians were most anxious was the possibility of our creating an important new military, naval or air base in Palestine, and that what they were most anxious to have was some sort of guarantee that anything we did of this nature would be for purely defensive purposes. I repeated the objections of principle which we saw to tying our hands in any way even on this point.

6. After I had made the general position quite clear, I gave the Italian representatives the text of our revised draft formula, as in the attached copy. Signor Buti, having read it, said that it really amounted to nothing at all. I emphasised that it did give the Italians a guarantee that we would keep them informed and give them an opportunity of stating their views, but Signor Buti did not seem to attach much importance to this. He said, however, that he would study the formula carefully and let me have the official reply of the Italian Government about it, if possible, by Wednesday, the 30th March.

G. W. RENDEL.

*March 29, 1938.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 108.

*Draft Formula about Palestine, March 28.*

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will inform the Royal Italian Government of the proposals which they intend to adopt for the replacement of the existing mandate for Palestine, and will, so far as is practicable, give effect to suggestions from the Royal Italian Government for the safeguarding of Italian interests in Palestine.

2. The Royal Italian Government will adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the proposals of the Government of the United Kingdom with regard to the replacement of the existing mandate.

[E 1527/1034/65]

No. 109.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).*

(No. 416.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 4, 1938.*

I HAVE had under consideration your Excellency's despatch No. 169 of the 17th February<sup>(1)</sup> regarding the question of the Caliphate.

2. I feel certain that the Turkish Government would take strong exception to any suggestion for a revival of the Caliphate, even if an Egyptian Caliphate only, with a local title, were proposed. I also feel certain that Ibn Saud, whose views on the spiritual unity of Islam are pronounced, would strongly object to the institution of autocephalous Moslem churches. It is, moreover, difficult to see how the cause of the Mahometan religion or that of international peace will be assisted by the exploitation of that religion as a servant of nationalism.

3. Over and above these considerations it would be undesirable for His Majesty's Government to be implicated, as Egypt's ally, in any form of religious dissension among Arab and other Near Eastern Moslem States.

4. I am, therefore, of the opinion that no countenance should be given to the proposal to establish one or more Caliphates, and request that you will express the misgivings of His Majesty's Government to the Egyptian Government if the suggestion is carried any further. Provided the representations of His Majesty's Government were based on the international aspects of the proposal, it should be possible to show that they in no way constituted interference with internal Egyptian politics or with the religious affairs of Islam, although in regard to the latter point I am advised that it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Mahometan ruler alive to-day has the necessary qualification for the Caliphate.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 92.



5. I shall welcome any observations which your Excellency may wish to make on this proposal.

6. With regard to the Aga Khan, I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the India Office.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora and Bagdad, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 109.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1938.*

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 1st May, 1937, I am directed by Viscount Halifax to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquess of Zetland, the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo<sup>(1)</sup> regarding the possibility of the proclamation of the King of Egypt as Caliph, and the views of the Aga Khan thereon, together with a copy of his Lordship's reply. It appears that the Aga Khan, when consulted by Sheikh El Maraghi, gave the sheikh some reason to believe that he approved the idea of the institution of territorial Caliphates in Mahometan countries.

2. As you will see from paragraph 13 of Sir Miles Lampson's despatch, his Excellency is anxious that the matter shall not be raised with the Aga Khan unless his Highness should himself mention it. Subject, however, to Lord Zetland's observations, Lord Halifax hopes that, in the event of the Aga Khan doing this, every effort will be made to dissuade him from pursuing the idea further.

I am, &c.  
LACY BAGGALLAY.

[E 1920/880/91]

No. 110.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 5.)*

(No. 334.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 278 of the 31st March, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel, dated the 3rd April, respecting Anglo-Italian conversations concerning the Middle East, seventh meeting, on the subject of Arabia.

*Rome, April 3, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 110.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations concerning the Middle East.*

Seventh Meeting on the Morning of March 31.

#### ARABIA.

THE main points in this conversation have been fully dealt with in Lord Perth's telegram No. 278 of the 31st March, but it was naturally impossible in that telegram to give the whole text of the Italian counter-draft. A copy of this text in Italian<sup>(1)</sup> together with a translation, is now attached.

2. The Italian representatives did not begin by communicating this text to me, but took our own text, and went through it article by article, beginning with minor points and working up to the more important points at the end of the conversation. For purposes of convenience, this order was reversed in Lord Perth's telegram referred to above.

<sup>(1)</sup> Italian text not printed.

3. It was only at the very end of the conversation that the Italians produced a complete counter-text, which purported, indeed, to be no more than a translation of our text, except for the passages specifically quoted in Lord Perth's telegram under reference. But the Italian text is, in fact, a counter-draft, and had better, for convenience, be referred to in the future as the Italian counter-draft of the 31st March.

G. W. R.

*April 2, 1938.*

Annex to Enclosure in No. 110.

*Italian Counter-Draft of March 31.*

THE Italian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Being equally desirous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present agreement,

Have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Neither party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of both of them not only that neither of them (as provided in articles 1 and 2 above), but also that no other Power shall establish itself in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

#### ARTICLE 4.

(i) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, neither party will, in or in regard to any such islands—

- (a) Establish its sovereignty; or
- (b) Erect fortifications or defences.

(ii) It is agreed that neither party will object to—

- (a) The presence of British officials at Kamaran, for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, of the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, of the other part; it is understood that an Italian medical officer may also be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the said agreement.
- (b) The presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish and Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands.
- (c) The presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.



## ARTICLE 5.

(i) The two parties agree that it is in their common interest that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But, while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace, they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(ii) The two parties also recognise that it is in their common interest that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.

## ARTICLE 6.

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the frontiers which are or shall be established between His Majesty's Government on the one part, and the Saudi and Yemeni Governments on the other:

(i) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:—

(a) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in article 1 hereof) within the territories which at present belong to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or in those which either of those States may subsequently acquire as a result of frontier agreements concluded or to be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and either of the said States.

(b) The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of a purely defensive character, for the defence of the said territories or of the communications of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence.

(c) While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(ii) The Royal Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate, as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian subjects and Italian companies, as regards their persons and their goods, shall be received and treated in accordance with ordinary international law, and shall therefore have, subject to the laws and regulations in force, freedom of access and sojourn and the right to exercise any kind of commerce, profession or industry.

Similarly, Italian merchant ships, subject to the laws and regulations in force, shall have freedom of access to, sojourn in, and departure from the ports and anchorages of the Aden Protectorate, as also freedom to accomplish commercial operations in the said ports and anchorages.

The treatment which in the Protectorate of Aden shall be accorded to Italian subjects and to Italian companies, to Italian vessels and to goods produced or manufactured in Italy and in her possessions and colonies, as regards the establishment, commerce, navigation and industry, shall be not less favourable than the treatment which is or may be accorded to the subjects, companies, vessels, products and manufactures of any other country not being a territory under the sovereignty, protection or mandate of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

## ARTICLE 8.

The two parties will keep in contact, and will consult together in all matters regarding their mutual interests in the zones of the Middle East to which the present agreement refers.

Should either party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present agreement such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Rome this       day of       1938, in duplicate, in the Italian and English languages, both of which shall have equal force.

[E 2061/880/91]

No. 111.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)*

(No. 360.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report by Mr. Rendel dated the 8th April on the 8th, 9th and 10th meetings with the Italian experts on the subject of Arabia, and of the proposed Anglo-Italian Arabian agreement.

*Rome, April 8, 1938.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 111.

ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS: MIDDLE EAST.

*Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Meetings on April 7, 1938.*

## ARABIA.

NEW instructions having been received in Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 185 and 190, I arranged to see Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli on the morning of the 7th April. I had already sent to Signor Guarnaschelli on the 6th April a revised text of article 7 of the proposed Arabian agreement on the lines of the text given in paragraph 5 of Foreign Office telegram No. 185, and I had fully discussed with the Ambassador the line to be taken with the Italians on the various points raised in Foreign Office telegram No. 190, and particularly on the question of the initial duration of the proposed agreement.

2. Having explained to Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli that we had now received the necessary instructions from London, I suggested that we should go through the draft agreement article by article. Signor Buti agreed and began by asking whether it might not be better to amend or omit the preamble. I said that I had understood that the Italians had already accepted this, as it appeared unchanged in their redraft of the 31st March; I thought the preamble would be useful, particularly as making the object of the agreement clear to the Arab world; in any case, I deprecated reopening any points on which agreement had already been reached. Signor Buti agreed and the preamble was accepted.

3. Articles 1 and 2 had already been agreed and presented no difficulty.

4. I then presented Signor Buti with a redraft of article 3, based on paragraph 4 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190, as amended by subsequent telephonic conversations with the Foreign Office.

5. Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli appeared somewhat upset by our insistence on the maintenance of the words "adjacent to the Red Sea." I



explained our reasons for attaching importance to these words, developing once more the arguments brought out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190, although I had already used these arguments in the course of previous interviews. I also reminded the Italian representatives that the main origin of the whole present negotiation was the importance to both Italy and the British Empire of the Red Sea. The interior and the north-eastern areas of Arabia were in quite a different category, and the freedom of these areas from interference by a third Power could not be described as an *essential* interest of both parties in the same way as in the case of the Red Sea coast. The Italian representatives eventually agreed to refer the point to their higher authorities, though they indicated that this would be regarded as a very important concession, and that they were uncertain whether they could get it accepted. I got the impression at the time, however, that the difficulty might not be insuperable.

6. We then passed to article 4, and I told the Italian representatives that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree to the inclusion of Little Hanish in article 4 (ii) (b). I added that we thought it would make for clarity to insert the words "and purposes incidental thereto" in article 4 (ii) (a) (see paragraph 24 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190), but, in order if possible to forestall their suspicions, I said that it was not a point to which we attached great importance. The Italians seemed ready to accept this point.

7. Article 5 having already been agreed, we passed to article 6, on which I told the Italians that His Majesty's Government were prepared—although reluctantly—to agree to the omission of the reference to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, provided the agreement was accompanied by an exchange of confidential notes in which the boundary established in that convention should be specified as constituting the "present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen" for purposes of this and any other articles in which the boundaries were mentioned. This would not, of course, preclude us from conceding territory on our side of the line to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, as indicated in the body of the agreement, but it would avoid any risk of misunderstanding or confusion should there be any conflicting claims.

8. After some discussion Signor Buti agreed to accept this, and I left with him a redraft of the article on the lines of the text in paragraph 9 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190 and a draft of the confidential exchange of notes based on paragraphs 10 and 11 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190 (including, however, a reference to article 5 of the agreement, as arranged by telephone with Mr. Baggallay on the evening of the 6th April). Signor Buti anticipated no great difficulty over this.

9. I also drew his attention to the insertion of the phrase "between different parts of the British Empire" in article 6 (i) (b), which he accepted.

10. We then passed to article 7, of which I had already sent Signor Guarnaschelli a draft based on the text in paragraph 5 of Foreign Office telegram No. 185, on the morning of the 6th April. Signor Buti said that the legal advisers to the Italian Foreign Office had raised considerable objection to our draft. In their view it meant nothing at all, because it left the Aden authorities complete discretion to allow or prohibit any Italian activities in the Aden Protectorate. I replied that the Italian draft of the 31st March itself did this, as it contained a phrase providing that any Italian activities must be subject to the laws and regulations in force—a point to which Signor Buti himself had drawn my attention at the time. Signor Buti admitted this, but said that the Italian draft contained one positive provision in that it allowed Italian enterprise in the Protectorate *in accordance with the usual principles of international law*. I replied that this itself meant nothing, and was only likely to lead to confusion, since such vague and ambiguous phrases without any clear meaning would be open to any sort of interpretation (compare paragraph 7 of Foreign Office telegram No. 185). The Italian representatives eventually seemed ready to admit this, but implied that the Italian experts would wish to introduce several changes in our drafting. I urged them not to do this. The rights we were prepared to give to the Italians might prove valuable, and there was no reason to anticipate that the Aden authorities would be gratuitously obstructive. I had already explained the reasons why it was impossible for us to guarantee more than this, and I thought it would be very difficult to get any better terms. Eventually Signor Buti seemed prepared to agree, though he again insisted that he must refer the points to his higher authorities.

11. We then passed to article 8. I explained to Signor Buti, basing myself on the arguments developed in paragraph 21 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190, why His Majesty's Government could not accept the Italian formula regarding consultation which he had presented to me on the 31st March. I then gave him an alternative draft for this formula, based on that given in paragraph 22 of the Foreign Office telegram. Signor Buti said that it was clear from this, and from our attitude in regard to article 3, that we were trying to establish a distinction of principle between what might be described as the Red Sea region on the one hand and the region of the hinterland and of Eastern and Southern Arabia on the other. While he appreciated our objects, he thought that this distinction might lead to great difficulty. I repeated the familiar arguments about the predominant importance of the Red Sea route, and tried to show that the Red Sea area was in an entirely different category from that of the rest of Arabia; but it was clear that the Italians felt considerable suspicion of our motives in emphasising this distinction so strongly in an agreement the main object of which was ostensibly—or at any rate in their view—to set up a kind of "ring-fence" round the whole area at present comprised in the territories of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. It was clear that what was troubling them was our insistence on leaving something very like a gap in the northern and eastern portions of this fence. Signor Buti, however, did not at this interview raise immediate objection to our formula, but merely said that he would have to study it and would let me have his answer later.

12. We then came to the question of termination. I explained to Signor Buti that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the desirability of giving a long period of validity to certain provisions of the agreement, such, for example, as those contained in articles 3 and 4. On the other hand, the situation in Arabia was extremely fluid, and circumstances might conceivably arise—though I did not personally think it very probable that they would do so—in which the obligations involved in certain other provisions of the agreement might become extremely embarrassing. I therefore suggested to him that the termination provision should be on the lines of that suggested in paragraph 15 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190, and did my best to make a case in favour of this proposal. Signor Buti took the line that the only effect of this would be to make those provisions of the agreement which were of most value to Italy terminable at any time on six months' notice at our discretion. This would make the agreement itself of little practical or moral value, and, to speak frankly, he saw no point in our making any further effort to negotiate so elaborate and comprehensive an instrument if it was to be of so precarious a nature. It was clear that his suspicions as to our intentions were being thoroughly aroused, and that he was beginning to feel that our whole negotiation was likely to prove illusory.

13. I should explain at this point that I had already on the previous evening discussed this matter of the initial validity of the agreement very fully with the Ambassador, and that we had agreed that it would be extremely dangerous to press the Italians too hard on the point. Count Ciano had already made it clear to Lord Perth that, from the Italian point of view, the initial validity of the agreement was a matter of major importance, and that the Italian Government would be unlikely to accept any agreement with an initial validity of less than ten years. If this could be conceded, Count Ciano was likely to prove far more amenable on other points at issue. The alternative might well have been to find ourselves with no new Arabian agreement at all, in which case we should have had to fall back on the Rome understanding of 1927, which is, of course, of indefinite duration, so that we should lose both ways. Moreover, both Lord Perth and I felt strongly that the disadvantages of making the agreement terminable on short notice at any time might be even greater from the British than from the Italian point of view, since Italy would thus be able to regain her freedom of action in the Yemen and the Red Sea islands and withdraw her recognition of the British position in the Aden Protectorate at any time, thus possibly causing His Majesty's Government very considerable inconvenience. Much would clearly be gained from the British point of view if a reasonable measure of permanence could be given to the provisions of article 5 and to the final paragraph of article 6. Finally, both Lord Perth and I felt that an attempt to give permanent validity to certain provisions of the agreement while making all the others terminable on very short notice at any moment, would create the worst possible impression both on Ibn Saud and the Imam. Lord Perth had



therefore authorised me as soon as I felt it desirable to take advantage of the discretion left to us in paragraph 18 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190, and offer a ten-year initial validity.

14. In these circumstances, and in view of Signor Buti's obviously growing suspicions of our intentions, I said that I thought that if the Italians could see their way to accept our draft on every other point it might be possible to persuade His Majesty's Government to agree to the new agreement having a fixed initial validity of ten years. In such an event, however, it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to accept any fixed periods of continuing validity, and the agreement would merely continue indefinitely after ten years unless denounced at three months' notice. Signor Buti appeared much relieved at this suggestion, and the atmosphere thereupon considerably improved. I accordingly left him a draft, which had been previously prepared for use if required, on the lines of the text given in paragraph 20 of Foreign Office telegram No. 190. This became article 8 (iii), article 8 (ii) being the formula for revision which had appeared as article 8 (i) in our original draft of the 28th March, and which the Italians had subsequently accepted.

15. I then made a renewed appeal to Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli to accept the rest of our draft as it stood, and pointed out that we had gone to an extreme limit of concession in offering them a ten-year initial validity, and that I could only offer this concession on the understanding that all our other points were accepted. The Italian representatives said that they would study the new drafts which I had left with them as sympathetically as possible and let me hear from them again later in the day.

16. I had hardly been back at His Majesty's Embassy for more than an hour when Signor Guarnaschelli telephoned to me to ask whether I could call again at the Ministry as soon as possible to clear up a point which was causing Signor Buti some anxiety. I accordingly returned to the Ministry at about a quarter to 1 and found Signor Buti much exercised over our draft of article 3. He explained that the agreement was obviously intended to be as precise as possible, but that the phrase "adjacent to the Red Sea" in article 3 appeared extraordinarily vague. What precisely did we gain by it? Would, for example, Sana'a be regarded as adjacent to the Red Sea, and, if so, what would be the position as regards Riyadh?

17. In reply, I repeated all the familiar arguments in support of our draft. The Italian representatives agreed that, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate to use the phrase "an essential interest" of the two parties in connexion with the territories of Eastern Arabia. Signor Buti, however, clearly felt that there was some special motive behind our determination to leave our hands free in regard to any possible intervention by a third Power in Eastern or Northern Arabia. He asked whether we could not give some kind of guarantee that we would discourage any Power in alliance or special treaty relations with us or under our protection from attempting to acquire a privileged position of a political character in North or North-Eastern Arabia. He also asked whether we could not devise some definition of the words "adjacent to the Red Sea."

18. I told Signor Buti that, as far as I could see, there was no reason to anticipate any danger from any Power such as he had mentioned. If the Power was under our control, obviously we should not encourage it to establish itself in an area which we were trying to sterilise. But while conditions were still so fluid in Arabia and the Middle East, one could not foresee future developments, and it was obviously undesirable to enter into too many indefinite commitments in cases where vital interests were not affected. Nevertheless, we considered for some time the possibility of drafting an exchange of notes to reassure the Italian Government on this point, and also to define what was meant by "territories adjacent to the Red Sea." It was suggested that His Majesty's Government might explain with reference to articles 1 and 2 of the agreement that they would "equally discourage any State under their protection or in special treaty relations with them from obtaining or seeking to obtain a privileged position," &c., while, as regards the territory adjacent to the Red Sea, this might perhaps be defined for purposes of this article as "any territory from which any third Power could threaten British or Italian communications through the Red Sea, and, in any case, any territory within, say, 200 kilom. of the Red Sea coast." This draft, however, presented certain difficulties, and we eventually fell back on the two alternatives put forward in Lord Perth's telegram

No. 328 to the Foreign Office, which was drafted and sent shortly after this interview. As a result of further conversation with me, Lord Perth subsequently sent his telegram No. 331 supplementing the preliminary views expressed in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. 328.

19. It had already been agreed earlier in the day that I should meet Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli again at 6 o'clock to continue our discussions. I found at this meeting that reflection had only increased the Italians' suspicions. Signor Buti now appeared to be convinced that we had some definite object in view in limiting article 3 to the Red Sea area, and in attaching as much importance as we had done to retaining our freedom to terminate the agreement at any moment. He had already, I fear, had his suspicions aroused by our refusal to give any kind of undertaking whatever about the general principles on which we intended to base our future policy in Palestine, and by our consequent inability to reach any agreement with Italy on this subject. He apparently felt that our insistence on keeping our own hands free while trying to secure various engagements from Italy could only be due to some Machiavellian design for further extending and strengthening our political and military position in the Middle East. I did my best, while not going back on any of the arguments which I had previously been obliged to use, to dispel these suspicions, and to explain once more that it was only in view of the fluid and uncertain political situation in Arabia that we felt it was mere common sense not to tie our hands unduly. But I fear I did not succeed in dispelling the suspicions which were now uppermost in the minds of the Italian negotiators.

20. Signor Buti's attitude at this meeting seemed to be that, if we really insisted on our point, the agreement would be of so little value that it did not much matter what was done about it. But he said quite definitely that, if we were not prepared to amend article 3 on the lines suggested in alternative No. 1 in Lord Perth's telegram No. 328, the article would clearly have to be omitted from the agreement altogether, and in that case the Italian Government would be obliged themselves to press for our original provision enabling either party to denounce the agreement at six months' notice at any time.

21. Alternatively, if we were prepared to give Italy some undertaking, on the lines of alternative No. 1, that we would discourage any State from establishing itself in any part of the area round which we were by way of trying to set up a "ring fence," the Italians would be prepared to meet us as far as possible over other points. I asked whether, in that event, the Italians would be prepared to accept an initial validity of five years only. Signor Buti rather unexpectedly said they would. He also revived the question of the consultation formula in article 8 (i), where he said that the Italians could not accept the limitation of consultation to matters coming under articles 3 and 5. He eventually agreed, however, to the complete omission of article 8 (i) if we would agree on the main point arising out of article 3. He spoke a great deal about the spirit in which the agreement was to be concluded, but seemed more depressed about the whole position than on any previous occasion.

22. Various alternative possibilities were discussed in the course of this meeting, but, in view of the general deterioration in the situation, I returned as soon as possible to the Embassy, where I discussed the whole question again with the Ambassador, who, as a result, despatched his telegram No. 334.

23. On thinking matters over further later in the evening, it occurred to me that a new draft might still be devised such as to meet both the British and the Italian desiderata. I therefore prepared the new draft text given in Lord Perth's telegram No. 338. Lord Perth having agreed that this seemed to offer a new hope of a solution, the suggestion was immediately put to the Foreign Office in Rome telegrams Nos. 337 and 338.

24. For convenience of reference, a copy of a complete redraft of the proposed agreement as handed to the Italians at the end of the first of the three meetings recorded in this memorandum (see paragraph 14 above) is attached. This text has formed the basis of the subsequent discussions.

G. W. RENDEL.

April 8, 1938.



Enclosure 2 in No. 111.

*Proposed Anglo-Italian Agreement about Arabia.**(Draft of April 7, 1938.)**Preamble. (Agreed.)*

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Royal Italian Government,

Being equally desirous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present agreement,

Have agreed as follows:—

*Article 1. (Agreed.)*

Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

*Article 2. (Agreed.)*

Neither party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

*Article 3. (Redraft of the 7th April.)*

The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of each of them, not only (as provided in articles 1 and 2 above) that the other shall not, but also that no other Power shall, acquire sovereignty or any privileged position of a political character in any territory adjacent to the Red Sea which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

*Article 4. (Agreed.)*

(i) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, neither party will, in or in regard to any such island—

- (a) Establish its sovereignty, or
- (b) Erect fortifications or defences.

(ii) It is agreed that neither party will object to—

(a) The presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca (and purposes incidental thereto) in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, of the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, of the other part; it is understood that an Italian medical officer may also be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the said agreement.

(b) The presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish and Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands.

(c) The presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

*Article 5. (Agreed.)*

(i) The two parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace, they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(ii) The two parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.

*Article 6. (Redraft of the 7th April.)*

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen or of any future boundaries which

may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, on the other—

(i) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone—

(a) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in article 1 hereof) within any territory at present belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as a result of agreement which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of either of them.

(b) The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of a purely defensive character, for the defence of the said territories or of the communications (between different parts) of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence.

(c) While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(ii) The Royal Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

*Article 7. (Redraft of the 6th April.)*

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian nationals (including companies) shall have liberty to come, with their ships and cargoes, to all places and ports, and they shall have freedom of entry, travel and residence and the right to exercise there any description of business, profession, occupation or industry, so long as they satisfy and observe the conditions and regulations from time to time applicable in the protectorate to the nationals and ships of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

*Article 8. (Redraft of the 7th April.)*

(i) At all times while the present agreement is in force the two parties will keep in contact and consult together as regards all questions affecting their common interests as described in articles 3 and 5 of this agreement.

(ii) (Agreed.) Should either party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present agreement such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

(iii) (Redraft of the 7th April.) At any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the entry into force of this agreement either party may notify the other of its intention to determine the agreement. Any such modification shall take effect three months after the date on which it is made.

*Final Formula. (Agreed.)*

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Rome this                      day of                      , 1938, in duplicate in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.



[E 2072/880/91] No. 112.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1938.*

(R.) MY telegram No. 53 to Bagdad [of 11th April: Anglo-Italian conversations—Arabia].

Unless you have already done so, you should now explain confidentially to Saudi Arabian Government the form which the Anglo-Italian Agreement about Arabia is likely to take, and express the hope that they will agree that this agreement will be even more in accordance with their interests than Rome understanding.

2. In addition to changes indicated in my telegram to Bagdad under reference, article 6 of agreement as given in my telegram No. 49 [of 26th March] has been modified by omission of any reference to Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, and now reads:—

“As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen or of any future boundaries which may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen:

“(a) The Government of the United Kingdom declare, &c.:

“(i) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice, &c., within any territory at present belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of them as a result of agreements which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Governments of either of them.” (End of R.)

3. For your own information only (for the present at any rate). There will, however, be a *confidential* exchange of notes to the effect that, for the purposes of the agreement, the “present boundaries” of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are the boundaries laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention as modified by the Treaty of Sana’a, although as the result of future agreements further territory to the south and east of these boundaries may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to one or other of them.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 22, Saving.)

[E 2072/880/91]

No. 113.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1938.*

(R.) HIS Majesty's Government hope, as result of Anglo-Italian conversations, to conclude agreement providing, *inter alia*, that neither United Kingdom nor Italy will:—

- (i) Do anything to impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen; or
- (ii) Obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to those States, or which either of them may hereafter acquire; or
- (iii) Intervene in any conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen which may, despite their good offices, break out between those States.

2. Proposed agreement will probably also contain provisions to effect that:—

- (iv) It is common interest of United Kingdom and Italy that no other Power should obtain sovereignty or a privileged position in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of them may hereafter acquire; and

- (v) In particular, it is an essential interest of each of parties that no other Power should obtain such sovereignty or privileged position on any part of coast of Red Sea belonging to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen; and
- (vi) It is common interest of both parties that no other Power should intervene in any conflict arising under (iii) above. (End of R.)

3. His Majesty's Government did not include (iv) among their original proposals, but Italian Government are unwilling to accept (v) alone, on grounds, among others, that it is unprecise, and suggests that parties are indifferent to activities of other Powers in the northern and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia.

4. The effect of adding (iv) is to constitute a warning by the United Kingdom and Italy to all other Powers, including Iraq, not only that they must not establish themselves on Red Sea coasts of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, but also that they must not do so in *any* part of those two States.

5. In order to secure an agreement, His Majesty's Government have felt compelled to accept this addition, to which Italian Government attach capital importance, in spite of their reluctance to admit that Italy has any interest in parts of Arabia remote from Red Sea.

(R.) 6. Please communicate proposals summarised in paragraphs 1 and 2 confidentially to Iraqi Government, explaining that His Majesty's Government have wished to give them this information in regard to their intentions in spirit of Anglo-Iraqi Alliance, and express hope that they will agree with His Majesty's Government in regarding agreement on these lines as of considerable advantage both to United Kingdom and Iraq, and as being entirely in consonance with spirit of Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.

7. You may add that I feel sure that Iraqi Government will share desire of His Majesty's Government to exclude other foreign Powers from gaining a foothold in any part of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or interfering in their affairs, and that the only way in which there has been any prospect of achieving this has been by means of a self-denying ordinance, applying inevitably to all Powers without distinction, whether friendly neighbours or not of those two States.

8. I shall be glad to amplify any point on which Iraqi Government are not clear.

9. Agreement will probably be valid for ten years unless amended by common consent and thereafter continue in force until denounced by one of parties. (End of R.)

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 53. Repeated to Jedda, No. 56, and Rome, No. 21, Saving.)

[E 2076/880/91]

No. 114.

*Mr. Rendel to Mr. Baggallay.—(Received April 12.)*

My dear Lacy,

*Rome, April 4, 1938.*

MANY thanks for your letter about the draft of the Arabian Agreement.

2. You will have seen from the Ambassador's telegram No. 241 that, on the 28th March, I handed the Italians a draft (which I have called the draft of the 28th March) reproducing the draft of the 25th March to which you refer in your letter, but omitting article 2A; including (after consultation with the Ambassador) article 6A, thenceforth renumbered as article 7; and renumbering the old article 7 to be article 8.

3. A copy of this draft of the 28th March, exactly as handed to the Italians, was attached to my memorandum of that date recording my fifth meeting with Buti and Guarnaschelli (see enclosure in the embassy's printed despatch No. 327 of the 1st April). I hope this has been sufficient for your purposes.

4. Since then two verbal changes have been made. The word “obtain” has been substituted twice for the word “acquire” in the first line of article 2, and the sub-paragraphs of article 6 have been renumbered so as to bring the system of numbering into harmony with that adopted in articles 4, 5, &c., so that, instead of running 6 (a) (i), 6 (a) (ii), 6 (a) (iii), and 6 (b), the sub-paragraphs will now run, on the analogy of those of the other articles, 6 (i) (a), 6 (i) (b), 6 (i) (c), and 6 (ii).

[19825]

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5. On the 31st March I had a very long and difficult interview with the Italians, at which they took our draft of the 28th March as the basis of discussion, having beside them, apparently for their own domestic use, what they described as a translation of our draft of the 28th March. This translation, however, contained their counter-drafts of articles 6, 7 and 8, as summarised in the ambassador's telegram No. 278 of the 31st March.

6. In the course of our discussion some further modifications were suggested—e.g., that in the first sentence of article 3 dealt with in paragraph 13 of the ambassador's telegram No. 278. Incidentally, I succeeded after much argument in inducing the Italians to abandon certain other amendments which had apparently originally been included in their "translation," but which they agreed could be dropped. As a result, a new Italian text was prepared while we were still talking, and, about half-an-hour after our interview I got a copy of this, which I am now calling the Italian draft of the 31st March, though it was only drawn up after our meeting of that day.

7. This procedure was rather confusing, and I am afraid led to our adopting the same rather awkward method in the ambassador's telegram No. 278. It would really have been much simpler if the Italians had frankly produced a formal counter-draft at the outset. But the result, of course, is much the same in the end.

8. A further source of difficulty was the time factor. As you know, I was extremely anxious to get decisions on the outstanding points at the earliest possible moment. Owing to the approach of the week-end this meant getting the necessary telegrams sent off by Thursday evening at the latest. I am afraid this necessitated some very hurried drafting, and resulted in our telegram No. 278 being longer than it need have been.

9. I ought, I suppose, to have supplemented that telegram with a complete story by Friday's bag. But I still hoped that decisions might have been reached before the end of last week so that anything by bag would have reached you too late to be of any real value; while, as it happened, the mechanical difficulties at this end were particularly serious that day, the typing and registry staffs being even more hard pressed than usual.

10. We are now sending you under a separate P.L. a paper showing the position of the various drafts as on the 3rd April, and attach a spare copy. I hope this, together with the present letter, will make the position quite clear.

11. There are three other small points.

12. You will have seen from paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of my memorandum of the 29th March, recording the second part (at which Arabia was dealt with) of my sixth meeting with Buti and Guarnaschelli on the evening of the 28th March, that it was agreed *not* to include in the agreement any "equality of commercial opportunity" clause at all. I have, therefore, never put forward to the Italians our draft article 2A, and the question raised in Shackle's letter of the 28th March to Eric Beckett, of which you sent me a copy in your letter of the 28th March, did not therefore arise. If it had, I should personally have been inclined to adopt the course suggested in paragraph 6 of Shackle's letter. But the point is now immaterial.

13. Secondly, I have taken no action on the point raised in your letter of the 28th March about the Italian doctor at Kamaran. I saw no way round the difficulty, and can only hope that the words "an Italian doctor" will be generally accepted as meaning not more than one Italian, in spite of the dangerous analogy of the Dutch. I think we shall have to take this risk.

14. Thirdly, your telegram No. 163 of the 31st March, with a minor Dominions Office amendment about the words to be used in describing inter-Imperial communications, arrived too late to enable me to get it inserted in the Italian draft of the 31st March; but I anticipate no sort of difficulty in getting it adopted. I have inserted a note about it in the comparative paper referred to in paragraph 10 above.

Yours, &c.  
GEORGE RENDEL.

Enclosure in No. 114.

*Anglo-Italian Conversations Concerning the Middle East.*

*Proposed Anglo-Italian Agreement about Arabia.*

(Position on April 3, 1938.)

(PREAMBLE (text of the 28th March agreed, but order of Governments reversed in Italian text).)

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Royal Italian Government,

Being equally desirous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

(Article 1 (minor verbal alterations only, referred to Foreign Office in paragraph 15 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March).)

*British Text of March 28.*

Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might impair the complete independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

*Italian Text of March 31.*

Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

ARTICLE 2.

(Article 2 (minor verbal alterations only, referred to Foreign Office in paragraph 15 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March. In British text word "obtain" substituted for word "acquire" in first two lines in accordance with Mr. Baggallay's letter No. E. 1678 of the 28th March to Mr. Rendel).)

*British Text of March 28.*

Neither party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or in territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

*Italian Text of March 31.*

Neither party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

ARTICLE 3.

(Article 3 (alterations referred to Foreign Office in paragraph 13 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March).)

*British Text of March 28.*

The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of both of them that no non-Arabian Power shall establish itself in any territory adjacent to the Red Sea which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

*Italian Text of March 31.*

The two parties recognise that it is an essential interest of both of them not only that neither of them (as provided in articles 1 and 2 above) but also that no other Power shall establish itself in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.



## ARTICLE 4.

(Article 4 (text of the 28th March agreed, except that Italians wish to insert in paragraph (ii) (b) the words "and Little Hanish." These have been inserted in the following text, but the point was referred to the Foreign Office in paragraph 14 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March).)

NOTE.—The translation of this article will want checking in minor points, e.g., the reference to the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, in paragraph (ii) (a), where the Italians have put the word "Government" in the singular.

(i) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, neither party will, in or in regard to any such island:—

- (a) Establish its sovereignty, or
- (b) Erect fortifications or defences.

(ii) It is agreed that neither party will object to:—

(a) The presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India, of the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, of the other part; it is understood that an Italian medical officer may also be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the said agreement.

(b) The presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish and Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands.

(c) The presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

## ARTICLE 5.

(Article 5 (text of the 28th March agreed, except that in the Italian translation the words "of both of them" are left out in both paragraphs after the words "the common interest".))

(i) The two parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(ii) The two parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.

(Article 6 (preamble and sub-paragraph (i) (a)—formerly (a) (i)). The Italians have accepted the main provision of our article 6, i.e., paragraph (ii), but wish to omit from the preamble and from sub-paragraph (i) (a) all reference to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. The point was referred to the Foreign Office in paragraphs 6-9 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March, and a further suggestion for a supplementary exchange of explanatory notes was made in Rome telegram No. 281 of the 1st April.

(NOTE.—The numbering of the sub-paragraphs has now been changed to bring it into conformity with the numbering of the sub-paragraphs of the other articles.)

*British Text of March 28.*

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the East and South of the boundaries of the former Ottoman Empire as

*Italian Text of March 31.*

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the East and South of the frontiers which are or shall be established

established in the Convention concluded in London on the 9th March, 1914, between His Majesty The King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, on the other part:—

(i) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:—

(a) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in article 1 hereof) within the territories of those States to the West and North of the boundaries referred to above. This undertaking shall also apply to any territory to the East and South of the boundaries referred to above which is or shall be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as a result of frontier agreements concluded or to be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and either of them.

(Article 6 (sub-paragraph (i) (b) and (c), and sub-paragraph (ii). British text of the 28th March agreed, but the Dominions Office wish to make a small verbal alteration at the end of the first sentence of sub-paragraph (i) (b), where instead of the words "the communications of the British Empire" they wish to use the words "communications between different parts of the British Empire" (see Foreign Office telegram No. 163 of the 31st March). This amendment has been made in the following text, but has not yet been communicated to the Italians.)

*Amended British Text (agreed to by Italians).*

(i) (See p. 4 for preamble and sub-paragraphs (i) and (i) (a).)

(b) The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of a purely defensive character, for the defence of the said territories or of the communications between the different parts of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence.

(c) While the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(ii) The Royal Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

between His Majesty's Government on the one part and the Saudi and Yemeni Governments on the other:—

(i) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:—

(a) No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (which both parties have undertaken to respect in article 1 hereof) within the territories which at present belong to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or in those which either of those States may subsequently acquire as a result of frontier agreements concluded or to be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and either of the said States.



## ARTICLE 7.

(The Italians wish to insert two new paragraphs at the beginning of this article, as explained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Rome telegram No. 278.)

*British Text of March 28.*

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian nationals (including Italian companies), Italian ships and goods produced or manufactured in Italy shall in matters of commerce, navigation and industry receive treatment not less favourable than the treatment which is or may be accorded to the nationals (including companies), ships, products and manufactures of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

*Italian Text of March 31.*

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian subjects and Italian companies, as regards their persons and their goods, shall be received and treated in accordance with ordinary international law and shall therefore have, subject to the laws and regulations in force, freedom of access and sojourn and the right to exercise any kind of commerce, profession or industry.

Similarly, Italian merchant ships, subject to the laws and regulations in force, shall have freedom of access to, sojourn in and departure from the ports and anchorages of the Aden Protectorate as also freedom to accomplish commercial operations in the said ports and anchorages.

The treatment which in the Protectorate of Aden shall be accorded to Italian subjects and to Italian companies, to Italian vessels and to goods produced or manufactured in Italy and in her possessions and colonies, as regards the establishment, commerce, navigation and industry (shall be) not less favourable than the treatment which is or may be accorded to the subjects, companies, vessels and goods produced or manufactured under the sovereignty ("suzerainty" is omitted, but as there is a gap in the Italian text this may be mainly due to difficulty of translation), protection or mandate of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

## ARTICLE 8.

(The Italians wish to insert a clause providing for consultation. This is embodied in a new preliminary paragraph in their text of the 31st March.

They have accepted verbatim the text of paragraph (i) of the British draft, but they have strongly objected to paragraph (ii), providing for denunciation. This point was referred to the Foreign Office in paragraphs 2-5 of Rome telegram No. 278 of the 31st March.)

*British Text of March 28.**Italian Draft of March 31.*

The two parties will keep in contact and will consult together in all matters regarding their mutual interests in the zones of the Middle East to which the present agreement refers.

(Agreed paragraph. (i) in British text and (ii) in Italian counter-draft.)

Should either party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present agreement such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

Should these negotiations have led to no agreement within three months of the date on which the notice is given, either party may then terminate the agreement by giving to the other a notification of its desire to do so, which shall take effect three months after the date on which it is given.

(Final formula about signature, &c., British draft of the 28th March agreed, except that order of Italian and English languages is reversed.)

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Rome this                      day of                      1938 in duplicate in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

[E 2148/330/31]

No. 115.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 13.)*

(No. 364.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome despatch No. 290 of the 19th March, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel (at Rome), dated the 10th April, 1938, respecting the Anglo-Italian Middle Eastern negotiations, being a record of the 12th meeting, on the 9th April, on the subject of Palestine.

*Rome, April 11, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 115.

ANGLO-ITALIAN NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

*Twelfth Meeting, on the evening of April 9.*

Part I.—PALESTINE.

AT the beginning of this meeting Signor Buti reverted to the question of Palestine.

2. As a result of the Foreign Office unnumbered telegram of the 8th April, giving, with reference to Lord Perth's telegram No. 314 of the 5th April, the text of the statement on Palestine which His Majesty's Government suggested might be made in Parliament by a member of the Government, Lord Perth had pursued the matter with Count Ciano, with whom, as recorded in his telegram No. 346 of the 8th April, he had left a copy of the draft statement in question. Signor Buti explained that the Italian Government were not quite happy about this statement, which seemed to them unduly vague and ambiguous. What precisely was meant by the phrase "will not do anything to prejudice the position of His Majesty's Government in Palestine?" The Italian Government were quite prepared to undertake not to cause His Majesty's Government unnecessary difficulties. But, as he had explained before, they could not give a blank cheque about the future. Would it not be possible to find a more precise formula indicating that His



Majesty's Government for their part would be acting in accordance with the terms or spirit of the mandate and of the agreements in force?

3. I explained that this raised the old question of an undertaking by His Majesty's Government about their general policy in Palestine—an undertaking which, for reasons which I had already explained, it was out of the question for them to give. We realised the corresponding difficulty in which the Italians found themselves in giving us any undertaking about their attitude towards our future policy, whatever that might eventually be. But what we were asking for now was a guarantee about the present situation. There was much feeling in England about the encouragement which the Italians, during the period of acute Anglo-Italian tension, had given to those who were attacking all law and order in Palestine. What was wanted, particularly from the point of view of a parliamentary statement, was an undertaking that such encouragement or assistance would now stop. Signor Buti at one moment suggested a phrase referring to—and denying—these accusations of past assistance to terrorism. This was clearly inappropriate, and I was able to head him off from pursuing this sterile suggestion further.

4. Eventually, after a long discussion, in the course of which various formulæ were suggested and discarded, we finally devised that referred to in Lord Perth's telegram No. 358 of the 9th April (and of which a copy is attached for convenience of reference). I said that I should naturally have to refer this formula to Lord Perth, but that speaking purely personally I saw no obvious objection to it.

5. It will be noted that the new formula gives no guarantee about the attitude of the Italian Government towards any eventual proposals by His Majesty's Government for the termination or modification of the Palestine mandate.

G. W. RENDEL.

Rome, April 10, 1938.

#### Annex.

#### *Formula for Parliamentary Declaration about Palestine.*

THE question of Palestine has been discussed between the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome in the course of their recent conversations. As a result, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured His Majesty's Ambassador orally that the Italian Government will abstain from creating difficulties or embarrassments for His Majesty's Government in the administration of the mandate of Palestine. His Majesty's Ambassador has assured the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs orally that His Majesty's Government for their part intend to preserve and protect legitimate Italian interests in that country. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador have, moreover, agreed that these assurances may be made public.

[E 2233/880/91] No. 116.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 374.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 14, 1938.

IN my telegram No. 375 of the 10th April, I had the honour to report that, after considerable difficulty, agreement had been reached over Arabia with the Italian authorities, and added that the greatest credit was due to Mr. Rendel for his admirable handling of this difficult and complicated problem. I now enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Rendel summarising the general course of these negotiations, and giving a very clear account of the various issues at stake and the problems which arose.

I have, &c.  
PERTH.

Enclosure in No. 116.

#### *Anglo-Italian Conversations regarding Arabia.*

#### *General Summary up to April 9.*

NOW that a practically complete agreement has been reached with the Italians on the question of Arabia, it may be convenient to summarise briefly the general course of the negotiations. The various stages of the negotiations have, of course, already been reported in detail, but these reports are necessarily too voluminous and too much taken up with details to be of much value except for purposes of reference and record.

2. The negotiations with Italy about Arabia owe their origin mainly to the obscurities and uncertainties of the Rome understanding of 1927; this document, which was of great value at the time, was inevitably somewhat loosely drafted. It implied that there was to be what the Italians have described as a "close parallelism" of policy between Great Britain and Italy in Arabia, and—although this was not stated in terms—suggested that the territorial *status quo* as it existed in 1927 was to be maintained not only on the Red Sea coast, but also in the whole of "Southern Arabia." The negotiators of the Rome understanding of 1927 seem to have taken no steps to safeguard the British position in Southern, South-Western and South-Eastern Arabia, and, although "Southern Arabia" is twice referred to in that instrument, no mention is made of Aden or the Aden Protectorate, and no indication is given of the limits of the areas falling within the British zone. It even seems possible that the negotiators of the agreement completely overlooked the existence of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, establishing the boundary between the Turkish and British spheres in Southern and South-Eastern Arabia.

3. As a result partly of these uncertainties and partly of the extreme tension which developed between Great Britain and Italy during the Abyssinian war, the forward policy which His Majesty's Government were obliged to adopt in the Aden Protectorate as a result of recent developments in that area led to increasing friction with Italy. Moreover, His Majesty's Government had considerable cause to be suspicious of Italian activities in the Yemen, where the internal situation was precarious and the possibility of Italian intervention, and possibly of eventual Italian political penetration, could not be excluded. For these reasons it had in any case become desirable to try to reach some understanding with the Italians, offering some better guarantee than that provided under the Rome understanding of 1927, that Italy would not establish herself in the Yemen, where her presence might have been a cause of serious embarrassment to His Majesty's Government, and at the same time providing that she should formally recognise the British position in the British zones of Southern and South-Eastern Arabia, which she had hitherto refused to do.

4. The Italians themselves appeared no less nervous of British activities in the Aden Protectorate, and of possible British political ambitions in Saudi Arabia and certain Red Sea Islands, than His Majesty's Government were of Italian activities and designs in the Yemen. They fully realised that the Rome understanding of 1927 was obscurely worded and no longer entirely applicable; and as early as 1934 they pressed strongly that the whole question of Anglo-Italian relations in Arabia and the Middle East should form the subject of discussion in Rome. In 1937 they again pressed for such discussions in connexion with their complaints that British action in the Hadramaut was at variance with the terms of the Rome understanding of 1927; and it became clear in the course of that year that this question would have to be included in the agenda for any general Anglo-Italian conversations. The question was therefore included in the list of questions for discussion which His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome presented to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs when the agenda for the impending conversations was being discussed, and as the subject was extremely complicated and involved special knowledge of Eastern questions, it was arranged that I should go out to Rome to deal with the matter.

5. During the first stage of the conversations on the subject, between the 15th March and the 19th March, the main object on the British side was to secure Italian recognition of the British position and of British exclusive rights in the



zone of Arabia lying to the south and east of the frontiers established under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. This proved a matter of great difficulty and led to endless discussions, as a result of which, however, the Italians seemed to be somewhat shaken. Nevertheless, the Italians took the line that they could hardly be expected to recognise the exclusive claims of His Majesty's Government over this vast area—of the existence of which they had (so far as could be seen) been genuinely unaware at the time of the conclusion of the Rome understanding of 1927—without some kind of *quid pro quo*. In particular, they showed great nervousness at what they described as our apparent intention to convert what had been a loose collection of independent tribal States into purely negative treaty relations with His Majesty's Government—*e.g.*, bound not to cede territory—into what would amount to a highly-organised Crown Colony, which might seriously alter the strategical position in the Middle East.

6. The whole question was thoroughly examined in London between the 21st March and the 26th March at a series of meetings which I attended, and at which I was able to explain what seemed to underlie the Italian attitude. As a result of these meetings we were able to prepare a draft agreement—on the basis of a preliminary draft which I had myself suggested from Rome a week earlier—which seemed likely to meet the main Italian desiderata, while at the same time giving His Majesty's Government the security and recognition they required.

7. Discussions were resumed with the Italians on the 28th March, when the British draft of the proposed agreement was presented to them. The main Italian objections to this draft were, firstly, that it was virtually terminable at any time on six months' notice so that it gave no guarantee of stability; secondly, that it referred in terms to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, which the Italians were not disposed to recognise as a valid instrument, particularly as it was not accepted as such by either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen; thirdly, that the economic and commercial rights conceded to Italy in the Aden Protectorate were illusory, since they were dependent upon rights granted to other foreign countries, while in fact no such rights had yet been granted at all; and, fourthly, that owing to the differentiation between the provisions of the draft agreement regarding the Red Sea coast and those regarding the hinterland, the ostensible object of the agreement, which was—in the Italian view at any rate—to set up a kind of "ring-fence" round the territory at present occupied by Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, would be largely defeated, since there would be, so to speak, a gap in that fence in the north and east, where His Majesty's Government were not prepared to give any sort of guarantee against States under their protection or in alliance with them eventually acquiring any part of Saudi territory.

8. The discussions on these various points were at times extremely difficult, more especially as time was extremely short, and points that had to be referred to London affected so many departments of His Majesty's Government that it was often difficult to get replies sufficiently quickly to prevent the Italians from raising new points in the interval. Moreover, some of the Italian arguments had a good deal of foundation, and it is only necessary to visualise a situation where the positions might have been reversed to realise how easily we ourselves might have taken up the same position as the Italians, had we been in their place. A serious source of difficulty was the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to keep their hands as free as possible in the event of an entirely new situation developing, *e.g.*, as a result of events in Palestine, while endeavouring, at the same time, to commit the Italians to a number of obligations. These difficulties, indeed, became so serious that on the evening of the 7th April it looked as though a deadlock had been reached, and as though the whole agreement might break down.

9. Fortunately, however, it was possible to devise a draft on what was then the most serious point of difficulty (article 3) which was telephoned to the Foreign Office on the morning of the 8th April and which His Majesty's Government were able to approve at midday on the 9th April. This draft (article 3 in the new agreement) was accepted by the Italians on the evening of 9th April, and thus enabled complete agreement to be reached that evening.

10. The only difficulty remaining was due to the desire of the Italians to insert in article 3 an explanatory phrase about the vital importance of British and Italian communications through the Red Sea, which they took from the Suez Canal formula as originally drafted and approved. This formula had since been found open to objections from the Egyptian point of view and will have to be modified. This involved a consequential suppression of the formula in the

Arabian Agreement. But apart from this point no serious difficulty has been encountered, and the agreement may now be regarded as finally accepted by both sides. (This point has now been disposed of.)

11. The agreement may certainly be considered as eminently satisfactory. The Rome understanding of 1927, which has hitherto been the basis of Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea area and the Arabian Peninsula, had become an increasingly unsatisfactory document. It was open to a variety of interpretations and was likely to lead to increasing friction and misunderstanding. Moreover, it had been decided at the time that it should not be published, with the result that it could never be publicly referred to or openly invoked. The present agreement will, of course, be published as a White Paper with the rest of the settlement, and should form a far more satisfactory basis for Anglo-Italian relations in the Middle East in future.

G. RENDEL.

April 10, 1938.

[E 2205/330/31]

No. 117.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 380.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with reference to Rome despatch No. 364 of the 11th April, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum respecting the Anglo-Italian negotiations on the subject of Palestine, dated the 10th April.

Rome, April 14, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 117.

*Memorandum respecting Anglo-Italian Negotiations.*

PALESTINE.

IT may be convenient to summarise in a separate memorandum the course of the negotiations which have taken place with the Italian Government in regard to Palestine.

2. The Italian attitude about Palestine was of importance to His Majesty's Government from three distinct points of view. In the first place, there was the question of Italian propaganda in Palestine, and in regard to British policy in that country—a question which loomed very large in the public eye during the period of acute Anglo-Italian tension. Whatever rôle that propaganda may have played in influencing events in Palestine—and the view has been held in certain quarters at least, that Italian propaganda was a secondary rather than a primary factor in the development of the growing tension between the Arabs and the Jews—the Italians have always contended that this propaganda was a symptom rather than a cause, and that, with the re-establishment of Anglo-Italian relations on a friendly basis, there would be little difficulty in bringing it to an end. This aspect of the question is, moreover, bound up with the more general question of the Italian campaign against British policy and British ideas and institutions generally, which has been so unpleasant a feature of the period of tension. It was clearly more convenient to deal with it from this general aspect than from the purely Palestinian angle, more especially as the latter course might have encouraged the Italians to believe that their somewhat crude methods of propaganda had met with a greater measure of success in Palestine than was perhaps the case. The question of Italian propaganda in Palestine has, therefore, been dealt with under the general propaganda formula which forms an instrument of the general settlement.

3. Apart from propaganda, Italian activities against the British position and against British policy in Palestine have been somewhat difficult to expose, although there is good reason to know that such activities have in fact taken place

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on a considerable scale. From their very nature it was difficult to bring this aspect of the matter within the scope of any clear-cut written agreement. Moreover, here again it is perhaps reasonable to assume that if general Anglo-Italian relations are re-established on a satisfactory basis such more or less subterranean activities will hardly prove necessary or profitable to Italy; while, if Anglo-Italian relations are not improved, no written agreement on this point is likely to prove of much value. Nevertheless, on this point, as recorded in Lord Perth's telegram No. 254 of the 29th March, Count Ciano on the same day volunteered certain fairly comprehensive assurances which, as is recorded in Lord Perth's telegram No. 314 of the 5th April, he is willing to allow to be quoted in Parliament. Efforts might have been continued to persuade Count Ciano to agree to an exchange of letters on this point, as suggested in Lord Perth's telegram No. 296 of the 3rd April, but it was clear from Foreign Office telegram No. 173 of the 1st April that His Majesty's Government did not attach any capital importance to such an exchange of notes, and in the circumstances it was decided not to pursue this suggestion further.

4. The question of the precise form which a parliamentary declaration on this point should take was discussed in Lord Perth's telegram No. 358 of the 9th April and in Mr. Rendel's memorandum of the 10th April (of which a copy was sent to the Foreign Office under Rome despatch No. 364 of the 11th April).

5. The third aspect of Anglo-Italian relations in regard to Palestine is that of the future. It has been clear for some time, as a result of the report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, that the mandate for Palestine cannot continue in its present form. His Majesty's Government have made various announcements of policy in regard to Palestine, but the precise form which their policy will take and the precise proposals which they will eventually have to submit to the Council of the League and to Parliament for a new policy in Palestine are still somewhat uncertain. Much will depend on the report of the new commission which is about to make a closer investigation into the possibilities of partition; and it is clear that His Majesty's Government cannot commit themselves at this stage to any more detailed statement than those which they have already made.

6. On the other hand, the Italian Government is in a position to cause His Majesty's Government considerable embarrassment when the time for the adoption of a new policy in Palestine arrives. In the first place, under article 8 of the mandate Italy is entitled, on the termination of the mandate, to claim the re-establishment in her favour, unless she shall have previously renounced her rights, of all the capitulatory privileges and immunities which she enjoyed under the former Ottoman régime. As there are a considerable number of Italian nationals and Italian institutions in Palestine, this might, in certain eventualities, cause His Majesty's Government the same kind of embarrassment as was caused to them by the claims of the United States Government to similar capitulatory privileges and immunities prior to the conclusion of the Anglo-American Treaty about Palestine of 1924.

7. But the Italian claim to have a say in our future policy in Palestine, though it may be questionable from the strictly legal point of view, rests on a number of other arguments. In the first place, Italy claims that she was one of the original principal Allied Powers who at San Remo in 1920 allotted the mandate for Palestine to Great Britain, and that she should, therefore, have a say in its termination or modification. Again, she claims that she accepted the territorial settlement which included the allocation of the Palestine mandate to Great Britain only because she was thus assured that a certain situation—including, *e.g.*, the non-establishment of military and naval bases—would be maintained in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is true that Italy, by leaving the League of Nations, has probably forfeited most if not all her legal rights to be consulted about the future of Palestine. She is, however, in a position to develop a considerable nuisance value if she wishes to do so, and, as His Majesty's Government are likely to meet with considerable difficulties in carrying through whatever policy they may eventually decide on in regard to Palestine, and further opposition might in certain circumstances tip the scale against us if opposition to our policy were to assume serious proportions, it seemed clearly desirable to do everything possible to secure in advance Italy's acquiescence in our future Palestine policy.

8. The general settlement which has formed the subject of the recent Anglo-Italian negotiations seemed to offer a particularly favourable opportunity for

doing this, and a simple formula was accordingly devised in London early in March designed to secure an undertaking from the Italian Government that they would refrain from any attempt to create difficulties for us either in the framing of policy for, or in the administration of, Palestine, in return for an undertaking on our part to respect legitimate Italian interests in that country.

9. The matter was fully discussed between Mr. Rendel and the Italian experts on the 17th March. It then became apparent that while the Italians were ready to promise to adopt a generally sympathetic attitude in return for any clear indication that His Majesty's Government intended in their future policy to maintain certain principles laid down in the mandate, they were not prepared to give His Majesty's Government anything in the nature of a blank cheque.

10. On the 19th March the Italians presented Mr. Rendel with a draft formula regarding Palestine, which was sent to the Foreign Office in Lord Perth's despatch No. 290 of the same date. This formula, which was in any case open to certain serious objections on points of detail, was discussed at a meeting of the Middle Eastern Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in London on the 22nd March, when it became apparent that it would be quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to tie their hands in any way whatever as regards their future policy in Palestine. In view of this decision any hope of obtaining from the Italian Government an undertaking of any real value about their attitude towards the future policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine practically disappeared. A new and anodyne formula had indeed been devised mainly for window-dressing purposes; but when this was presented to the Italian representatives on the 28th March, it was clear that they were not prepared to go any further in the matter. It was, therefore, decided that the best plan would be merely to rely on the general improvement of Anglo-Italian relations to ensure that no unnecessary difficulties arose when the time came to leave the matter to be dealt with on its merits in due course through the ordinary diplomatic channels.

G. W. RENDEL.

Rome, April 10, 1938.

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No. 118.

*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 381.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Rome despatch No. 360 of the 8th April, 1938, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rendel (at Rome), dated the 9th April, 1938, respecting the 11th meeting and second part of the 12th meeting, on the 9th April, 1938, of the Anglo-Italian Middle East Conversations on the subject of Arabia.

Rome, April 14, 1938.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS: MIDDLE EAST.

*Eleventh Meeting and Second Part of the Twelfth Meeting, on April 9, 1938.*

ARABIA.

PENDING the reply from the Foreign Office to the new proposals put forward in Lord Perth's telegrams Nos. 337 and 338, I went to see Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli on the morning of the 9th April to discuss the remainder of the draft agreement, on the supposition that we should be able to reach an agreement on articles 3 and 8 later on.

2. Signor Buti again pressed for the insertion of a new paragraph in the preamble to give the agreement a positive as well as a negative character, and he gave me a short draft in Italian of what he had in mind. I said that I would consider this, and later discussed it with the Ambassador, who agreed that there

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would be no harm in accepting Signor Buti's suggested addition, and that we could do this on our own responsibility without further reference to London. Having occasion later, however, to telephone to Mr. Baggallay, I mentioned the addition to him, and, as will be seen from the record of my subsequent conversation with Signor Buti, I eventually agreed to accept this additional paragraph in order to facilitate the omission of the consultation formula in article 8 (i).

3. Signor Buti then suggested the addition of a passage in article 1, to the effect that it was a mutual interest of the two parties that the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen should be maintained. This formula was open to obvious objections, and if our proposed redraft of article 3 were eventually accepted the point would in any case be covered. I therefore told Signor Buti that I thought it would be most difficult, and cause a great deal of delay, to reopen the drafting of agreed articles such as article 1, and he did not press his point further.

4. We left article 3 over for subsequent discussion and went on to article 4, where the Italians, on thinking matters over further, raised various objections to our phrase "and purposes incidental thereto." As previously arranged, I agreed to abandon this phrase. They also asked for a small amendment in the phrase regarding the Italian doctor. This amendment was adopted.

5. We then had a long discussion regarding the exchange of notes on article 6, where the Italians were anxious for the insertion of some phrase to show that the reference to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 did not imply any recognition of its validity and was limited to a definition of the frontier. I eventually succeeded in heading the Italians off this request, which was not pressed further.

6. Next we had a long argument about article 7, where the Italians again pressed for the reinsertion of the phrase about the principles of international law. I eventually succeeded in getting them to abandon this also.

7. I then left with the Italians a draft (copy attached) to serve as a basis for the exchange of notes about the consent of the Netherlands Government to the appointment of an Italian doctor at Kamaran. I had already discussed this over the telephone with Mr. Baggallay. The Italians entirely agreed in principle, but at our next meeting suggested a revision of the draft, which was eventually adopted.

8. The atmosphere at this meeting was rather better, but everything clearly depended on the question of article 3.

9. In the early afternoon of the 9th April Foreign Office telegram No. 224 was received over the telephone. I immediately made an appointment with Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli and presented them with our revised draft of article 3. I explained how this was designed both to meet their point about the apparent gap in the "ring fence," which it was one of the objects of the agreement to set up round the territories at present occupied by Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and to meet the view of His Majesty's Government that it was only in the Red Sea area that we could properly speak of "essential" interests of the two parties. The Italian representatives read the draft through carefully and appeared very pleased with it. They said that it fully met their point and expressed considerable relief that a solution had been found. The only suggestion that they wished to make was that a reference should be made to the reason why the Arabian coast of the Red Sea was of such importance to the two contracting parties. They proposed, therefore, the insertion in the final sentence, after the words "in particular," of the words "and in view of the fact that they consider the Red Sea an essential means of communication between the United Kingdom and British territories overseas and between Italy and Italian territories overseas." These words were taken from the Suez Canal formula, which they showed me and said had already been agreed. As it has been one of our main arguments that the Red Sea area alone could be described as of essential importance owing to the fact that the Red Sea is an essential means of communication, and as the vital importance of safeguarding both British and Italian communications through the Red Sea has been one of the main reasons for all these Anglo-Italian discussions about the Red Sea area ever since the Rome understanding of 1927, it seemed to me that there would be no great harm in accepting this addition. It was only when I returned to the Embassy that I found that, as a result of later correspondence, and of possible complications in regard to Egypt, this sentence would have to be taken out of the Suez Canal formula, so that there was clearly no question of reinserting it in the Arabian

agreement. I therefore, after consultation with the Ambassador, subsequently telephoned to Signor Guarnaschelli to explain that, for reasons entirely unconnected with the Arabian agreement itself, we should have to reserve our position in regard to this phrase.

10. Signor Buti made an effort to secure the introduction of a variant of the consultation formula into article 8 (i), but I explained that it was impossible for us to accept this without some qualifying limitation to which the Italians had already said that they could not agree. If a complete Anglo-Italian agreement were reached and led to a *détente* in Anglo-Italian relations, I felt sure that there would be no difficulty about consultation in future about matters which could be described as essential common interests. In the meantime, it seemed to me extremely difficult to devise a formula which everyone would accept. Signor Buti finally agreed to omit the consultation formula altogether.

11. They then went through the text of the notes about the Italian doctor and, after a good deal of discussion, these were redrafted, at Signor Guarnaschelli's suggestion, in a somewhat simpler form. I said that I saw no objection to this redraft. Incidentally, owing to difficulties of translation, it was suggested that the final paragraph, both of these notes and of those about the frontiers, should be slightly recast.

12. The Italian representatives said that they were anxious to instruct the Italian Minister at The Hague to approach the Dutch Government as soon as possible. I said that I thought it would be as well that the British and Italian Ministers should act simultaneously, and it was agreed that any instructions sent to the Italian Minister should be to the effect that he should concert with his British colleague so that they might act on parallel lines. I pointed out that a new agreement would probably be necessary in order to cover the various points required. Signor Buti asked me to make sure that the British Minister at The Hague received the necessary instructions as soon as possible. I pointed out, however, that the matter was of no immediate urgency, and that, incidentally, there were various questions, such as arrangements for Italian ships and for ensuring that pilgrims did not evade our quarantine control by travelling independently in dhows, which would eventually have to be settled.

13. After a very long discussion in which we covered all the ground of the agreement again, it was finally settled that revised final drafts in English and Italian should be prepared as soon as possible in order that I might go through them finally before leaving for London on the 11th April.

14. Signor Buti and Signor Guarnaschelli expressed great satisfaction at the way in which the negotiations had terminated, particularly in view of the apparent imminence of a complete deadlock on the evening of the 7th April.

15. On my return to the Embassy I arranged to have a revised draft of the agreement and the relevant exchanges of notes prepared, and a copy of those revised drafts of the 9th April are now attached.<sup>(1)</sup>

G. W. RENDEL.

Rome, April 9, 1938.

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

*Suggested Draft for Exchange of Notes regarding Italian Doctor at Kamaran.  
Draft of April 9.*

M. le Ministre,

WITH reference to article 4 (ii) (a) of the agreement about Arabia signed between us this day, it is understood that, while His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will for their part raise no objection to the presence of an Italian medical officer at Kamaran on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under the agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, &c., and will gladly use their good offices with the Government of the Netherlands to secure the acceptance by that Government of such an arrangement, the consent of that Government will nevertheless be necessary before such an arrangement can come into force.

I shall be glad if you will confirm that this is also your understanding of the position.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



*The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 385.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 17, 1938.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 411 of yesterday, to transmit to you herewith one of the two original copies of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, signed by Count Ciano and myself yesterday at 6.30 p.m. in the Palazzo Chigi. The Agreement also contains the documents concerning Egypt, which were signed by Count Ciano, myself and Mostafa El Sadek Bey, the Egyptian Minister, at the same time.

2. I further transmit three copies of the text of the Agreement which I have obtained from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In these copies I have, for convenience of reference, included—

- (a) Translations of the various letters in Italian from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to myself and the Egyptian Minister.
- (b) Copies of the letters from myself and Mostafa El Sadek Bey to Count Ciano.
- (c) Copies of the letters from myself to Mostafa El Sadek Bey.

I have, &c.  
PERTH.

Enclosure in No. 119.

*Texts of the Agreement and Exchanges of Notes between the United Kingdom and Italy and of the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and Exchanges of Notes between the United Kingdom, Egypt and Italy, Signed at Rome, April 16, 1938.*

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#### I.—AGREEMENT AND EXCHANGES OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ITALY.

(1)

#### PROTOCOL.

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government, animated by the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a solid and lasting basis and to contribute to the general cause of peace and security, have decided to undertake conversations in order to reach agreement on questions of mutual concern;

and the said conversations having taken place;

His Excellency the Right Honourable the EARL OF PERTH, G.C.M.G., C.B., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, and

His Excellency COUNT GALEAZZO CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

duly authorised for that purpose by their respective Governments, have drawn up the present Protocol and have signed the Agreements and Declarations annexed hereto, each of which shall be regarded as a separate and self-contained instrument:—

- (1) Reaffirmation of the Declaration of the 2nd January, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and of the Notes exchanged on the 31st December, 1936.
- (2) Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information.
- (3) Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East.
- (4) Declaration regarding Propaganda.
- (5) Declaration regarding Lake Tsana.
- (6) Declaration regarding the Military Duties of Natives of Italian East Africa.
- (7) Declaration regarding the free Exercise of Religion and the Treatment of British Religious Bodies in Italian East Africa.
- (8) Declaration regarding the Suez Canal.

The said instruments shall take effect on such date as the two Governments shall together determine. Except in so far as any of them contain provisions with regard to their revision or duration, each of the said instruments shall remain in force indefinitely, but should either Government at any time consider that a change of circumstances renders the revision of any of these instruments necessary, the two Governments will consult together with a view to such a revision.

The two Governments agree that, immediately after the taking effect of the said instruments, negotiations will be opened, in which the Egyptian Government will be invited to participate so far as all questions affecting Egypt or the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are concerned, with a view to a definitive agreement on the boundaries between the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the one side and Italian East Africa on the other; and with regard to other questions affecting reciprocally (a) Italian interests on the one hand and British, Egyptian or Sudan interests on the other hand in the above-mentioned territories, and (b) the relations between those territories. These negotiations will also include the question of commercial relations between the Sudan and Italian East Africa.

It is also agreed that negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government will take place as soon as possible on the subject of commercial relations between Italian East Africa and the United Kingdom, India, and British colonies, overseas territories, protectorates and mandated territories administered by the Government of the United Kingdom, including the subject of the application, on conditions to be established, to the whole of Italian East Africa of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Rome on the 15th June, 1883. These negotiations will be inspired by the common desire to further commercial relations between these territories and to ensure adequate facilities for trade.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.



(2)

## Annex 1.

## REAFFIRMATION OF THE DECLARATION OF JANUARY 2, 1937, REGARDING THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND OF THE NOTES EXCHANGED ON DECEMBER 31, 1936.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm the Declaration signed in Rome on the 2nd January, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and the Notes exchanged between the two Governments on the 31st December, 1936, regarding the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

(3)

## Annex 2.

## AGREEMENT REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government agree that in the month of January each year a reciprocal exchange of information shall take place through the Naval, Military and Air Attaches in London and Rome regarding any major prospective administrative movements or redistribution of their respective naval, military and air forces. This exchange of information will take place in respect of such forces stationed in or based on:—

- (1) overseas possessions of either Party (which phrase shall for this purpose be deemed to include protectorates and mandated territories) in or with a seaboard on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden, and
- (2) territories in Africa other than those referred to in paragraph (1) above and lying in an area bounded on the west by longitude 20° east and on the south by latitude 7° south.

Such an exchange of information will not necessarily preclude the occasional communication of supplementary military information should either party consider that the political circumstances of the moment make it desirable.

The two Governments further agree to notify each other in advance of any decision to provide new naval or air bases in the Mediterranean east of longitude 19° east and in the Red Sea or approaches thereto.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

(4)

## Annex 3.

## ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT REGARDING CERTAIN AREAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government,

being desirous of ensuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to the areas in the Middle East referred to in the present agreement,

being desirous, moreover, that the same friendly spirit which has attended the signing of to-day's Protocol, and of the documents annexed thereto, should also animate their relations in regard to those areas, have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

Neither Party will conclude any agreement or take any action which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen.

## ARTICLE 2.

Neither Party will obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or in any territory which either of those States may hereafter acquire.

## ARTICLE 3.

The two Parties recognise that, in addition to the obligations incumbent on each of them in virtue of Articles 1 and 2 hereof, it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should acquire or seek to acquire sovereignty or any privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or which either of those States may hereafter acquire, including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of those States, or in any other islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923. In particular they regard it as an essential interest of each of them that no other Power should acquire sovereignty or any privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen or in any of the aforesaid islands.

## ARTICLE 4.

(1) As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey renounced her rights by Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, and which are not comprised in the territory of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, neither Party will, in or in regard to any such island:—

- (a) establish its sovereignty, or
- (b) erect fortifications or defences.

(2) It is agreed that neither Party will object to:—

- (a) the presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement concluded at Paris on the 19th June, 1926, between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India on the one part, and the Government of the Netherlands, on the other part; it is also understood that the Italian Government may appoint an Italian Medical Officer to be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands Medical Officer under the said Agreement;
- (b) the presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish, Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the purpose of protecting the fishermen who resort to those islands;
- (c) the presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

## ARTICLE 5.

(1) The two Parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and within the territories of those States. But, while they will at all times exert their good offices in the cause of peace, they will not intervene in any conflict which, despite their good offices, may break out between or within those States.

(2) The two Parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any such conflict.



## ARTICLE 6.

As regards the zone of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and of the Yemen or of any future boundaries which may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, on the other:—

(1) The Government of the United Kingdom declare that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone:—

- (a) no action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom, which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen (which both Parties have undertaken to respect in Article 1 hereof), within any territory at present belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to either of those States as a result of any agreement which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of either of them;
- (b) the Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake, or cause to be undertaken, any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of a purely defensive character for the defence of the said territories or of the communications between different parts of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not enrol the inhabitants of any of these territories, or cause them to be enrolled, in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defence;
- (c) while the Government of the United Kingdom reserve the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(2) The Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the Aden Protectorate as defined in the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, Italian citizens and subjects (including Italian companies) shall have liberty to come, with their ships and goods, to all places and ports, and they shall have freedom of entry, travel and residence and the right to exercise there any description of business, profession, occupation or industry, so long as they satisfy and observe the conditions and regulations from time to time applicable in the Protectorate to the citizens and subjects and ships of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

## ARTICLE 8.

(1) Should either Party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present Agreement, such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the Agreement, the two Parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the Agreement.

(2) At any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the entry into force of this Agreement either Party may notify the other of its intention to determine the Agreement. Any such notification shall take effect three months after the date on which it is made.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

(5)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN BOUNDARIES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE YEMEN.<sup>(1)</sup>

Lord Perth to Count Ciano.

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

British Embassy,

Rome, April 16, 1938.

With reference to Articles 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East, signed this day, it is understood between us that the present Eastern and Southern boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are, for the purposes of those Articles, to be taken to be the frontier of the former Ottoman Empire established in the Convention between His Majesty The King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, on the other part, signed in London on the 9th March, 1914, as modified by the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation between His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part, signed at Sana'a on the 11th February, 1934.

It is also understood that, as a result of future agreements between the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, further territory to the East or South of this frontier may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to one or other of those States.

I shall be glad if your Excellency will confirm that you agree with the foregoing.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

PERTH.

Count Ciano to Lord Perth.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

Rome, April 16, 1938.

I have received your Excellency's Note of to-day's date, the text of which is as follows:—

"With reference to Articles 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East, signed this day, it is understood between us that the present Eastern and Southern boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are, for the purposes of those Articles, to be taken to be the frontier of the former Ottoman Empire established in the Convention between His Majesty The King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, on the other part, signed in London on the 9th March, 1914, as modified by the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation between His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part, signed at Sana'a on the 11th February, 1934.

"It is also understood that, as a result of future agreements between the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Governments of Saudi Arabia or of the Yemen, further territory to the East or South of this frontier may be recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom as belonging to one or other of those States.

"I shall be glad if your Excellency will confirm that you agree with the foregoing."

I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency that I agree with the foregoing.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

CIANO.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not published as part of "Treaty Series No. 31 (1938)" (Cmd. 5726).



EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING THE ITALIAN MEDICAL OFFICER AT KAMARAN.<sup>(\*)</sup>*Lord Perth to Count Ciano.*

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

*British Embassy,**Rome, April 16, 1938.*

With reference to the provisions regarding the Italian medical officer at Kamaran contained in Article 4 (2) (a) of the Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East signed by us to-day, it is understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be glad to use their good offices with the Government of the Netherlands to secure the acceptance by that Government of these arrangements, and that the consent of that Government is necessary before these arrangements can be put into effect.

I shall be glad if your Excellency will confirm that you agree with the foregoing.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

PERTH.

*Count Ciano to Lord Perth.*

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have received your Excellency's Note of to-day's date, the text of which is as follows:—

"With reference to the provisions regarding the Italian medical officer at Kamaran contained in Article 4 (2) (a) of the Agreement regarding certain areas in the Middle East signed by us to-day, it is understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be glad to use their good offices with the Government of the Netherlands to secure the acceptance by that Government of these arrangements, and that the consent of that Government is necessary before these arrangements can be put into effect.

"I shall be glad if your Excellency will confirm that you agree with the foregoing."

I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency that I am in agreement with the foregoing.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

CIANO.

## Annex 4.

## DECLARATION REGARDING PROPAGANDA.

The two Governments welcome the opportunity afforded by the present occasion to place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which it is the object of the present Agreement to establish and maintain between the two Governments and the peoples of their respective countries.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

(\*) Not published as part of "Treaty Series No. 31 (1938)," (Cmd. 5726).

## Annex 5.

## DECLARATION REGARDING LAKE TSANA.

The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

## Annex 6.

## DECLARATION REGARDING THE MILITARY DUTIES OF NATIVES OF ITALIAN EAST AFRICA.

The Italian Government reaffirm the assurance which they gave in their Note to the League of Nations of the 29th June, 1936, that Italy on her side was willing to accept the principle that natives of Italian East Africa should not be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defence.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

## Annex 7.

## DECLARATION REGARDING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND THE TREATMENT OF BRITISH RELIGIOUS BODIES IN ITALIAN EAST AFRICA.

Without prejudice to any Treaty engagements which may be applicable, the Italian Government declare that they intend to assure to British nationals in Italian East Africa the free exercise of all cults compatible with public order and good morals; and in this spirit they will examine favourably any request which may reach them from the British side to assure in Italian East Africa religious assistance to British nationals; and that as regards other activities of British Religious Bodies in Italian East Africa in humanitarian and benevolent spheres, such requests as may reach the Italian Government will be examined, the general line of policy of the Italian Government in this matter and the principles of legislation in force in Italian East Africa being borne in mind.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.



(11)

## Annex 8.

## DECLARATION REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of the Convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

(12)

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING THE STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN FORCES IN LIBYA.

*Count Ciano to Lord Perth.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

During our recent conversations your Excellency has referred to the question of the strength of the Italian forces in Libya.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Head of the Government has given orders for a diminution of these forces. Withdrawals have already begun at the rate of 1,000 a week and will be continued at not less than this rate until the Italian Libyan effectives reach peace strength. This will constitute an ultimate diminution of these effectives by not less than half the numbers present in Libya when our conversations commenced.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

CIANO.

*Lord Perth to Count Ciano.*

Your Excellency,

*British Embassy, Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of to-day's date in which your Excellency informed me of the intentions of the Head of the Italian Government with regard to the progressive diminution of the Italian forces in Libya.

I shall have pleasure in communicating this information to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

PERTH.

(13)

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING ITALIAN POLICY IN SPAIN, &amp;C., AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SITUATION REGARDING ETHIOPIA.

*Count Ciano to Lord Perth.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency will remember that, in the course of our recent conversations, I gave your Excellency certain assurances regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connexion with Spain. I now wish to reaffirm those assurances and to place them on record.

First, the Italian Government have the honour to confirm their full adherence to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain, and pledge themselves to give practical and real application to such an evacuation at the moment and on the conditions which shall be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee on the basis of the above-mentioned formula.

I desire secondly to reaffirm that if this evacuation has not been completed at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war, all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war material will simultaneously be withdrawn.

I wish thirdly to repeat my previous assurance that the Italian Government have no territorial or political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, in or with regard to either Metropolitan Spain, the Balearic Islands, any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish Zone of Morocco, and that they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed forces in any of the said territories.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

CIANO.

*Lord Perth to Count Ciano.*

Your Excellency,

*British Embassy, Rome, April 16, 1938.*

In reply to your Excellency's Note of to-day's date, I have the honour to take note of the reaffirmation contained therein of the assurances which your Excellency has already given me, during the course of our recent conversations, regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connexion with Spain. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to whom I shall not fail to transmit this communication, will, I feel sure, be gratified at its contents. In this connexion I hardly need to remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government regard a settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the Agreement between our two Governments.

I have further the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, being desirous that such obstacles as may at present be held to impede the freedom of member States as regards recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the situation of member States in this regard.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

PERTH.

(14)

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL TO ACCEDE TO THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, MARCH 25, 1936.

*Count Ciano to Lord Perth.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government have decided to accede to the Naval Treaty signed in London on the 25th March, 1936, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 of that Treaty. This accession will take place so soon as the instruments annexed to the Protocol signed this day come into force.

In advising your Excellency of the foregoing, I desire to add that the Italian Government intend in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Treaty.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

CIANO.



*Lord Perth to Count Ciano.*

Your Excellency,

*British Embassy, Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of to-day's date, in which your Excellency informed me of the decision of the Italian Government to accede to the Naval Treaty signed in London on the 25th March, 1936, so soon as the instruments annexed to the Protocol signed this day come into force, and in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid Treaty.

I shall have pleasure in communicating this decision to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

PERTH.

(15)

PALESTINE (ORAL ASSURANCES).<sup>(\*)</sup>

[EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS.]

The question of Palestine has been discussed between the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome in the course of their recent conversations.

As a result the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured His Majesty's Ambassador orally that the Italian Government will abstain from creating difficulties or embarrassments for His Majesty's Government in the administration of Palestine.

His Majesty's Ambassador has assured the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs orally that His Majesty's Government for their part intend to preserve and protect legitimate Italian interests in that country.

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador have, moreover, agreed that these assurances may be made public.

*Rome, the 16th April, 1938.*

P.

C.

(16)

"BON VOISINAGE" AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

The Italian Government on the one hand and, on the other hand, in respect of Kenya and British Somaliland, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and, in respect of the Sudan, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government;

desiring to provide for friendly relations in East Africa;

undertake, in addition to proceeding in due course to the discussion of detailed questions connected with the frontiers between Italian East Africa and the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland as provided in the Protocol signed to-day by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, at all times to co-operate for the preservation of good neighbourly relations between the said territories and to endeavour by every means in their power to prevent raids or other unlawful acts of violence being carried out across the frontiers of any of the above-mentioned territories;

agree that in view of the fact that, by virtue of the Italian Decree of the 12th April, 1936, slavery was prohibited in Ethiopia, as it had already been abolished in the other above-mentioned territories, the good neighbourly relations

<sup>(\*)</sup> Not published as part of "Treaty Series No. 31 (1938)," (Cmd. 5726).

referred to above shall include co-operation to prevent the evasion of the anti-slavery laws of the respective territories;

agree that nationals of the other Party shall not be enrolled in the native troops, bands or formations of a military nature maintained in the above-mentioned territories, including in particular any such nationals who are deserters from the troops, bands or formations maintained in, or refugees from, the territories of the other Party.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Rome, in triplicate, the 16th April, 1938, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

PERTH.

CIANO.

MOSTAFA EL SADEK.

(17)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING LAKE TSANA.

*Lord Perth to Mostafa el Sadek Bey.*

*British Embassy,*

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding Lake Tsana was signed to-day by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, as Annex 5 to the Protocol which Count Ciano and I have also signed to-day:—

"The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them."

Further, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government for their part declare that they agree that the assurances given to them in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana shall apply equally to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

PERTH.

*Mostafa el Sadek Bey to Lord Perth.*

*Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egypte*

*à Rome, April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of to-day's date which reads as follows:—

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding Lake Tsana was signed to-day by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, as Annex 5 to the Protocol which Count Ciano and I have also signed to-day:—

"The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for

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Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them."

"Further, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government for their part declare that they agree that the assurances given to them in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana shall apply equally to the Egyptian Government."

I shall have pleasure in communicating this information to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

MOSTAFA EL SADEK.

*Count Ciano to Mostafa el Sadek Bey.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding Lake Tsana was signed to-day by Lord Perth and myself, as Annex 5 to the Protocol which Lord Perth and I have also signed to-day:—

"The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them."

Further, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government for their part declare that they agree that the assurances given to the Government of the United Kingdom in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana apply equally to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

CIANO.

*Mostafa el Sadek Bey to Count Ciano.*

*Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egypte à Rome.*

*April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of to-day's date which reads as follows:—

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding Lake Tsana was signed to-day by Lord Perth and myself as Annex 5 to the Protocol which Lord Perth and I have also signed to-day:—

"The Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them."

"Further, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government for their part declare that they agree that the assurances given to His Majesty's Government in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana apply equally to the Egyptian Government."

I shall have pleasure in communicating this information to the Egyptian Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

MOSTAFA EL SADEK.

(18)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL.

*Lord Perth to Mostafa el Sadek Bey.*

*British Embassy, Rome,*

*April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding the Suez Canal was signed to-day by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself as Annex 8 to the Protocol which we have also signed to-day:—

"The Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of the Convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal."

I have the honour to communicate the above Declaration to your Excellency as the Representative of the territorial Power concerned.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

PERTH.

*Mostafa el Sadek to Lord Perth.*

*Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egypte à Rome,*

*April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note of to-day's date in which your Excellency informed me of the Declaration regarding the Suez Canal signed to-day by your Excellency and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs as Annex 8 to the Protocol which your Excellency and Count Ciano have also signed to-day.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Egyptian Government, as the territorial Power concerned, take note of the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government and associate themselves therewith.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

MOSTAFA EL SADEK.

*Count Ciano to Mostafa el Sadek Bey.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Rome, April 16, 1938.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the following Declaration regarding the Suez Canal was signed to-day by Lord Perth and myself as Annex 8 to the Protocol which we have also signed to-day:—

"The Italian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom hereby reaffirm their intention always to respect and abide by the provisions of the Convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888, which guarantees at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal."

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I have the honour to communicate the above Declaration to your Excellency as the Representative of the territorial Power concerned.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

CIANO.

*Mostafa el Sadek Bey to Count Ciano.*

*Légation de S.M. le Roi d'Egypte à Rome,  
April 16, 1938.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Note of to-day's date in which your Excellency informed me of the Declaration regarding the Suez Canal signed to-day by your Excellency and His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome as Annex 8 to the Protocol which you and Lord Perth have also signed to-day.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Egyptian Government, as the territorial Power concerned, take note of the intention of the Italian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom and associate themselves therewith.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

MOSTAFA EL SADEK.

[E 2234/880/91]

No. 120.

*Report by Mr. Rendel on Anglo-Italian Conversations. Middle East-Arabia.—  
(Received in Foreign Office, April 19.)*

I HAD not time before leaving Rome to send in any record of my thirteenth and fourteenth meetings with the Italian representatives, which both took place on Sunday, the 10th April. No detailed record of these meetings is, however, necessary, as they were entirely occupied with checking up the English and Italian texts of the agreement and the two exchanges of notes attached thereto. Signor Guarnaschelli was assisted by Count Zoppi and by one of the Italian legal advisers, whose name I am afraid I did not memorise. We went through both the English and Italian texts with extreme meticulousness, and every comma formed the subject of discussion. The chief difficulty we encountered was that of translating some of the English phrases in the agreement into good Italian. Two cases in point were the phrase "from time to time" in article 7 of the agreement, which has no adequate Italian equivalent, but which we tried to meet by saying "are or may be" (*sono o saranno*), and the phrase "the boundaries . . . are to be taken to be" in the first exchange of notes, which we met by adopting a somewhat different Italian grammatical construction, which I am satisfied is a reasonably accurate rendering of the idea underlying the English text.

2. The only point we were not able immediately to settle was that concerning the use of the word "cargoes" in article 7, which has formed the subject of separate telegraphic correspondence.

3. Signor Guarnaschelli also read to me the text of the telegram which the Italian Government were sending to their minister at The Hague about the Italian doctor at Kamaran. This has also formed the subject of separate telegraphic correspondence.

4. In these circumstances, I think this note should constitute a sufficient record of the two meetings in question.

G. W. RENDEL.

*Rome, April 14, 1938.*

[E 3017/880/91]

No. 121.

*Memorandum respecting the Anglo-Italian Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East, signed on April 16, 1938.*

(A)—Analysis.

THIS agreement covers three separate areas:—

- (a) The territories of the independent States of Arabia, which are now Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.
- (b) The zone of Southern Arabia under British influence, which comprises—
  - (i) The Colony of Aden.
  - (ii) The Aden Protectorate.
  - (iii) The protected Arab States of the Trucial Coast, including Qatar.
  - (iv) The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, which is an independent sovereign State.
- (c) Certain islands in the Red Sea, the sovereignty of which was left open by article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923.

2. With regard to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the United Kingdom and Italy undertake that neither of them will—

- (i) Conclude any agreement or take any action which might impair in any way the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (article 1), or
- (ii) Obtain or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to those States, or which either of them may hereafter acquire (article 2), or
- (iii) Although it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between those States and within their territory, intervene in any conflict which may, despite their good offices, break out between them or in any conflict within their territories (article 5 (1)).

3. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Italy declare that—

- (iv) It is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should acquire or seek to acquire sovereignty or a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen (including their islands in the Red Sea) or which either of them may hereafter acquire (article 3), and
- (v) In particular, it is an essential interest of each of them that no other Power should obtain such sovereignty or privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea which at present belongs to those States (including their islands in the Red Sea) (article 3), and
- (vi) It is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should intervene in any conflict arising under (iii) above (article 5 (2)).

4. With regard to the zone of Arabia lying east and south of the present boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen or of any future boundaries which may be established by agreement between the United Kingdom and either of those States, the United Kingdom and Italy make the following declarations (article 6):—

(1) The United Kingdom declares that within the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection within this zone—

- (i) They will take no action which might prejudice the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen within their present territories or any additional territories which the United Kingdom may hereafter recognise as belonging to either of them.
- (ii) They will not undertake any military preparations or works except purely defensive preparations or works for the defence of those territories (*i.e.*, those under British protection) or of the communications between different parts of the British Empire.

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- (iii) They will not enrol the inhabitants of those territories in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and local defence.
- (iv) While reserving the liberty to take in the territories in question such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection.

(2) The Italian Government declare that they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

5. Furthermore, the United Kingdom agrees that within the Aden Protectorate Italian nationals and vessels shall have the right to trade, &c., provided they observe and satisfy the conditions and regulations from time to time applicable to the nationals and vessels of the most favoured foreign nation.

6. With regard to the islands in the Red Sea covered by article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne and not belonging to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, the United Kingdom and Italy declare that—

- (i) It is an essential interest of each of them that no other Power should acquire sovereignty or any privileged position in any such island (article 3).
- (ii) Neither party will establish its sovereignty in any such island (article 4 (1)).
- (iii) Neither party will erect fortifications or defences in any such islands (article 4 (1)).
- (iv) Neither party will object (article 4 (2)) to—
  - (a) The presence of British officials at Kamaran for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca in accordance with the Anglo-Netherlands Agreement of 1926, it being understood that the Italian Government may appoint an Italian medical officer to be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer under that agreement.
  - (b) The presence of Italian officials at Great Hanish, Little Hanish and Jebel Zukur for the protection of the fishermen who resort to these islands.
  - (c) The presence at Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir of such persons as are required for the maintenance of the lights on those islands.

7. The agreement comes into force at the same time as the rest of the Anglo-Italian settlement of the 16th April, 1938 (covering protocol). It remains in force for ten years from its entry into force and thereafter until three months after its denunciation by either side (article 8 (2)). Either side may at any time ask for negotiations to take place with a view to its revision or amendment (article 8 (1)).

#### (B)—Development from the Rome Understanding of 1927.

8. The agreement is to a great extent a reproduction in clearer language of the so-called Rome Understanding of 1927. The general intention of the understanding was that neither party should establish itself in any way on the coast of the Red Sea, or interfere in the internal conflicts of the States bordering that sea (of which there were then three, Asir having since been absorbed) and that no other Power should do these things.

9. On the whole, the understanding has worked well, in the sense that the Italian Government have at any rate refrained in practice from acquiring territory, or openly seeking a position of predominant influence, on the coast of the Red Sea or taking open sides in the quarrels of the States bordering that sea.

10. The understanding has remained a confidential document, but during the recent conversations the press have somehow become aware of its existence and have referred to a "secret treaty" of 1927. His Majesty's Government have

never regarded it as a treaty in the strict sense of the word at all, but simply as a record of diplomatic conversations, and the decision that it was unnecessary to publish it or register it with the League of Nations was taken deliberately at the time of its conclusion.

#### (C)—Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

11. The Red Sea is a vital sector in the communications both of the British Empire and of Italy. It is essential for His Majesty's Government that no non-Arabian Power, and especially Italy, should establish itself on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea. A promise by His Majesty's Government not to establish themselves on that coast more than they are established there already (*i.e.*, in Transjordan and the Aden Protectorate) is a small price to pay for a corresponding promise from the Italian Government; and as the Italian Government have shown themselves keenly anxious lest His Majesty's Government should, in fact, establish themselves still further on the Red Sea coast and are therefore unlikely to give them any excuse for doing so, there is every reason to hope that they will observe their promise.

12. In the Rome Understanding it was declared to be a "vital British Imperial interest" and an "Italian interest" that no European Power should establish itself on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea. Although no open warning has hitherto been given to other Powers, with the exception of a statement (which did not, however, attract much notice) made by Mr. Eden in a speech in the House of Commons on the 19th July, 1937, that—

"It has always been, and it is to-day, a major British interest that no Great Power should establish itself on the eastern shore of the Red Sea. I need hardly say that this applies to ourselves no less than to others."

it has been decided by the Committee of Imperial Defence that, to prevent the Yemen, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabian territory near the Red Sea, from falling under the domination of any other foreign Power is of vital importance for this country, *i.e.*, a factor for which it would probably have to fight in the same way as it would have to fight for the defence of Egypt. From this point of view, there was nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, by making public the degree of interest felt in this area.

13. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, although they have strong rulers, are both weak States, entirely lacking in financial and industrial resources, modern armaments and adequate administrative machinery. Neither could hope to oppose aggression from even a second-class Power unless assured of the material support of some other and stronger Power, or even to withstand intensive intrigue from without unless assured of the moral support of such a Power. Were it not for this country, one or both would sooner or later be absorbed, as Abyssinia has been absorbed, though not necessarily by Italy. There can, in fact, be few parts of the world where the policy of the "ring fence" is more necessary or more justified.

14. It is true that if either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen attacked the other without provocation and a third Power, *e.g.*, Iraq, came to the assistance of the State attacked, the rendering of this assistance would be contrary to the declared common interest of His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government under article 5 (2) of the agreement.<sup>(1)</sup> The article might thus have the effect of preventing the Yemen or Saudi Arabia from furnishing itself with allies in an emergency. Both are, as a matter of fact, co-signatories with Iraq of a so-called Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, but the treaty is, strictly speaking, only a consultation pact. This ban upon allies may seem unfair, but it is impossible to draw distinctions between Powers which may intervene in the affairs

<sup>(1)</sup> The effect upon the rights of the parties to the agreement of something happening which is declared to be contrary to their common interest is dealt with in greater detail in Foreign Office despatch No. 371 of June 29 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad: "Eastern (General)" print of June 29, 1938, section 1, and Foreign Office despatch No. 253 of June 29 to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda: "Eastern (General)" print of June 29, 1938, section 2. Briefly the result of an event which one of the parties conceives to be contrary to its interests is to restore to that party such liberty of action as it may have lost under the agreement. The position becomes, in fact, much as if the agreement did not exist.



of the Arabian Peninsula and those which may not, and it must be hoped that the influence of the United Kingdom and Italy would suffice in a case of unprovoked aggression to protect the interests of the State attacked.

15. The warning to other Powers does not mean, however, that either the United Kingdom or Italy have given any kind of guarantee to either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen to protect them should any other (non-Arabian) Power threaten them. Nor, strictly speaking, have either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen been warned that they must not give any other Power a privileged position of a political character, although this is no doubt implicit. All that the two parties have said is that it is in their common interest (essential interest in the case of the Red Sea coast) that no other Power should threaten the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or seek to acquire a privileged position in either State, and they have left their hands entirely free as to the measures which they would take in any such eventuality. His Majesty's Government are not, for instance, pledged to the Yemen to come to her aid should a number of United States citizens be murdered in Yemeni territory and the United States Government decide, in the absence of redress, to take punitive measures.

16. It should be noted, however, that, as each side has recognised that certain activities on the part of other Powers are contrary either to their common interests or the essential interests of the other, His Majesty's Government could not in such a case object if the Italian Government were to decide that the activities of the United States Government were such as to threaten the independence or integrity of the Yemen, and to desire, in order to protect that independence or integrity, to take measures in Yemeni territory which might otherwise seem incompatible with the agreement. Similarly, the Italian Government could not object if His Majesty's Government thought it necessary, in the absence, say, of a settled Government in what is now Saudi Arabian territory, to take measures otherwise incompatible with the agreement with the object of preventing some such Power as Germany from establishing itself in that territory.<sup>(\*)</sup>

17. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the terms of the agreement do not preclude them from defending territories under British sovereignty, protection or mandate from attack by Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or by the successors of either, or from carrying the war into the enemy's country if that were strategically necessary. But they would be precluded from acquiring territory as a result of the war or retaining a privileged position in what is now Saudi Arabian or Yemeni territory after it was over.

18. The two parties have agreed that they will refrain from intervening not only in conflicts between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (a provision which appears on more or less similar lines in the Rome Understanding), but also in internal conflicts within those States. For instance, neither His Majesty's Government nor the Italian Government may support a rebellious party in either country. From the point of view of His Majesty's Government, this is an advantage, since the possibility of Italian intrigue, especially in the Yemen, is one which has always been present. Similarly, the two parties have said that they regard it as their common interest that no other Power should intervene in conflicts within either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

19. Under the terms of the agreement, the warning to other Powers applies particularly to the coast of the Red Sea, but also to the whole of the territories of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. His Majesty's Government only agreed to this extension with great reluctance, because they have always been loath to admit a special interest on the part of any other European Power in the Persian Gulf and because they do not regard it as in any way an Italian interest that the territorial *status quo* in the northern and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia should continue. They do not in any case regard it as their own *essential* interest that Iraq or a future independent Transjordan should never acquire territory from Saudi Arabia, whereas the present agreement even precludes (to the extent indicated in paragraphs 15 and 16 above) a transfer of territory by agreement with Saudi Arabia.

20. The Italian Government were, however, exceedingly suspicious of the desire of His Majesty's Government to restrict the operation of the warning to the coast of the Red Sea, as they believed that His Majesty's Government wished to hold their hands free to pursue intrigues against Saudi Arabian territory,

(\*) See footnote (\*).

*e.g.*, in the event of its falling into anarchy, under the cover of their allies, like Iraq or a future independent Transjordan, or even of States under their protection, like Koweit, or under their mandate, like the existing Transjordan (although His Majesty's Government consider the restrictions which they have placed upon their own freedom of action as applying with equal force to all States under their protection or mandate).

21. In any case, His Majesty's Government found it necessary, in the face of these suspicions, to concede the point, and for the purposes of public explanation it is perhaps as well that the warning should apply to the whole of both territories, because there is now an Arabian Power with territory on both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and it would be difficult in practice to suggest in a public statement that either of the parties would resent an attack on Saudi Arabia from the Red Sea more than an attack from any other direction or, still more, to suggest that foreign support to a rebel would be more serious near the coast of the Red Sea than near the coast of the Persian Gulf.

22. Finally, it should be noted that, whereas the loosely-worded Rome Understanding said that it was in the interest of the two parties that no "European Power" should establish itself on the coast of the Red Sea, the present agreement simply says "no other Power." This embraces not only Powers like Japan and the United States of America (which the Rome Understanding undoubtedly meant to embrace, although it did not say so), but also Powers like Persia, Egypt, Iraq and any future independent State in Palestine or Transjordan. At the outset of the negotiations, His Majesty's Government proposed that the phrase should be no "non-Arabian Power," but the Italian Government objected to this, as leaving a possible loophole for Powers such as Iraq, which, though not "Arabian," in the English use of the word, are undoubtedly "Arab." It is just possible that the present phrase, *i.e.*, "no other Power," if taken by itself, might be read to mean that no Power but Saudi Arabia or the Yemen should possess territory on the coast of the Red Sea, in other words that the two parties were pledging themselves to uphold the existence of these two States as the sole territorial sovereigns on that coast. But it is clear from article 5 that the possibility of changes in the form of the two States is not ruled out, provided they settle matters between them without outside interference. For instance, they may coalesce, or they may split up into smaller States.

#### (D)—British Zone in Southern Arabia.

23. The Rome Understanding unfortunately said nothing about the British zone in Southern Arabia. On the contrary, it said that the two parties would maintain close touch in all questions affecting "the Red Sea and Southern Arabia," a phrase which was undoubtedly intended by the British negotiators to mean the independent Arabian territory adjoining the southern part of the coast of the Red Sea, but which has since been claimed by the Italian Government to mean the whole of the southern part of the Arabian peninsula. In fact, neither during the negotiations nor in the understanding itself was anything said to make it clear that His Majesty's Government reserved the right to take whatever steps might be necessary in regard to the administration of the territories under their influence.

24. Furthermore, the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, which laid down the limits of Ottoman territory in Arabia, and which at that time and since has been regarded by His Majesty's Government as also laying down the limits of the territory in which they were free to exercise exclusive influence, had not been published when the Rome Understanding was negotiated, and was not published till 1933. The Italian Government have since said that, whether that instrument is valid or not, they cannot regard its existence as excusing His Majesty's Government from failing to maintain the *status quo* in Southern Arabia, as it existed in 1927. They assert that, having regard to what was said about the area of the Aden Protectorate in official publications and maps, they were justified in supposing that the protectorate did not extend for more than 100 miles or so in any direction from the port of Aden. It had therefore come as a shock to them to find that His Majesty's Government not only included in the protectorate the region known as the Hadramaut, but also claimed the whole of Southern Arabia as a British sphere of influence. Finally, they expressed the belief that the forward policy which His Majesty's Government had adopted in the protectorate,



and which was undoubtedly new since 1927, meant that His Majesty's Government, as a result of, and in revenge for, the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, meant to turn Southern Arabia into a vast reservoir of native troops and a base of future operations against Italian East Africa.

25. These arguments cannot be accepted as entirely convincing, because the protectorate treaties between His Majesty's Government and the rulers of the whole of the territory from Aden itself to the confines of the Sultanate of Muscat have been in existence (and have been published) since 1890 at least. In addition, had the point been raised in 1927, the British negotiators could have given the Italian negotiators any explanations they asked for about the extent of the protectorate. It was clear from the records that in 1927 neither side was thinking about the British zone at all, either from the point of view of its extent or from any other point of view.

26. But, nevertheless, the Italian Government had a sufficiently arguable case to make it necessary for His Majesty's Government to agree that something should be done to enable the Italian Government to recognise the British position in Southern Arabia, notwithstanding the fact that, juridically speaking, His Majesty's Government had no need to secure recognition for this position from Italy or any other Power. The Italian Government took the line that, unless this were done, a source of possible friction would continue to exist on the Anglo-Italian horizon, which it was the object of the conversations to clear of all such sources of friction.

27. But, although willing to meet the Italian Government thus far, His Majesty's Government were unable to agree, as the Italians wished them to do, to limit their freedom of action in any essential respect in the Aden Protectorate, or in the other areas under their protection. All they could agree to do was to place on record their intention to refrain from doing certain things, which they have, in fact, never had any serious intention of doing in any case.

28. These obligations, which are summarised in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, call for no special comment. The undertaking not to do anything to prejudice the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen is merely a repetition of what is said earlier on in article 1 of the agreement. There is hardly any kind of military work or defence (including aerodromes) which His Majesty's Government are ever likely to wish to construct in the Aden Protectorate, or in the Persian Gulf States, which could not be included under the term "military works or defences designed for the defence of the communications between different parts of the British Empire," and the obligation does not in any case apply to the Colony of Aden. Nor have His Majesty's Government any desire to enrol the inhabitants for service outside their own country. Finally, His Majesty's Government do not now desire, and are unlikely to desire in the next ten years, to change the method of administration in the protectorate or in the Persian Gulf States, *i.e.*, to make what are at present protectorates into colonies, which is all that "maintaining the autonomy" of the rulers in question really means. The grant of commercial rights in the Aden Protectorate means very little, because the conditions and regulations applicable to all foreign nationals and, indeed, to British subjects, leave few opportunities for the carrying on of commerce by strangers.

29. The obligations which His Majesty's Government have undertaken extend only to the States under their protection within the zone of Arabia lying south and east of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen; in other words, the obligations do not extend to the Sultanate of Muscat. The Italian Government, on the other hand, have undertaken not to seek to acquire political influence in this zone, and this does embrace the Sultanate of Muscat, although the point is not apparent from a casual reading of the text—and is not meant to be, in view of the susceptibilities of the Sultan in all matters affecting his independence, which is theoretically as complete as that of France or Belgium, but is tempered in practice by the influence which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India exercise by custom over his affairs.

30. A most important feature of this part of the agreement is the confidential exchange of letters explaining what His Majesty's Government mean when they say that they will respect the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. By this exchange of letters it is made clear that His Majesty's Government are free to take any action they think necessary in any territory lying south and east of the line laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Conven-

tion of 1914, as modified by the Treaty of Sana'a (the only practical effect of which is to leave temporarily in Yemeni occupation two small areas to the south of the 1914 line). The letters also indicate that His Majesty's Government may later conclude agreements with either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, recognising as theirs further territory south and east of the 1914 line. As a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government are prepared to conclude an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government recognising as Saudi territory considerable areas south and east of that line, many of which are already in *de facto* Saudi occupation. It may also be necessary to make a new frontier agreement with the Yemen, surrendering the district of Shabwa, but this is still uncertain.

31. It was at one time hoped that the Italian Government would agree to embody the terms of this confidential exchange of letters in the agreement itself. They demurred to this, however, on the ground that neither Saudi Arabia nor the Yemen accepted the 1914 line as valid, and it was apparent that they had given promises to at least the Yemeni Government which precluded them from publicly recognising this line. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government were unwilling to describe the *de facto* frontier, because it is essential that, until their frontiers with Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are finally regulated, they should retain intact the legal basis of their claim that the 1914 line is, unless altered by common consent, the proper limit of the territories of the successor States of the Ottoman Empire, *i.e.*, of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

32. A confidential exchange of letters was accordingly agreed upon, but His Majesty's Government are satisfied that for their purpose, which is to prevent the Italian Government from objecting, should His Majesty's Government see fit at any time hereafter to insist upon their full territorial rights, a confidential exchange is as good as a public exchange. But, although the fact that the Italian Government have recognised the 1914 line must, unless the Italian Government attempt to repudiate it, be kept secret, for that is part of the bargain, there is no reason, so far as the present agreement is concerned, why His Majesty's Government should not publicly maintain their claim to the 1914 line; and although it is not desired to insist too much on this claim in the negotiations with either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, it must, if necessary, be publicly maintained sooner than be allowed to go by default.

33. No attempt was made to include in the exchange of letters any description of the "present boundaries" of Saudi Arabia in the north, partly because it was not desired to emphasise still further the degree of Italian interest in the northern parts of Saudi Arabia, partly because the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, Iraq and Koweit are all laid down either in agreements which are recognised by both sides (although they may in some cases be difficult to interpret on the ground), as in the case of the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Koweit, Saudi Arabia and Iraq and the Saudi Arabian district of Nejd and Transjordan, or in a unilateral declaration by His Majesty's Government (which can easily be traced upon the ground), as in the case of the Saudi Arabian district of the Hejaz and Transjordan.

#### (E)—The Red Sea Islands.

34. The islands of which the sovereignty was left in abeyance by article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne comprise the greater part of the islands in the Red Sea. The undefined "intéressés" mentioned in article 16 have never taken any steps to settle the future of these islands, and His Majesty's Government are well content that this indeterminate state of affairs should continue, their main concern being that no other Power should be in a position to fortify any of the islands. In the Rome Understanding it was declared to be a "vital British Imperial interest" and an "Italian interest" that no European Power and no unfriendly Arab ruler should take possession of Kamaran or the Farsan Islands. The declaration was probably meant to cover the other islands, and in the present agreement this is made clear. His Majesty's Government are themselves clearly one of the "intéressés," and so are the Italian Government. Both are therefore well within their rights in announcing that it is their essential interest that no other Power should acquire sovereignty or a privileged position in any of these islands, since no other Power could legally do so without the consent of both as "intéressés." They have, moreover, undertaken not to establish their sovereignty in the islands themselves.



35. The position is complicated, however, by the fact that the Saudi Arabian Government have established effective control over some of the islands, *e.g.*, the Farsan Islands. His Majesty's Government do not, for their part, object to this, and a British oil company has, in fact, obtained an option for the islands, but, in the absence of any consent on the part of the "intéressés," it cannot be said that their title is internationally unchallengeable.

36. The position is also complicated by the fact that His Majesty's Government are already themselves "established" (although not as the sovereign Power) in Kamaran, the site of a quarantine station for pilgrims to Mecca from India and the Netherlands East Indies, which has the best anchorage and landing ground for aircraft between Aden and the Gulf of Suez, and that the Italian Government are "established" (although not as the sovereign Power) in the Great Hanish group of islands, where the Italian Government maintain small police posts for the ostensible purpose of protecting fishermen who go there from the Eritrean coast, and which could, if adequately fortified, render the passage of the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb difficult, or even impossible, for an opposing squadron. One of the principal objects of His Majesty's Government in making this agreement has been to ensure that the Italians shall be precluded from fortifying the Great Hanish group. In order to attain this object, they have themselves gladly undertaken not to fortify any of the islands, including Kamaran, and, although for the reasons given below they would gladly acquire sovereignty over Kamaran, they would much sooner forgo this than leave the Italian Government free to acquire sovereignty over the Great Hanish group. The possibility of an arrangement on these lines was, in fact, considered, but rejected, because, even if there were mutual guarantees of demilitarisation, no such guarantees would be likely to prevent the Italian Government from sooner or later fortifying the Great Hanish group if once they become the recognised sovereign Power. The question of fortification in reality far transcends that of sovereignty, except in so far as the latter paves the way for the former, since Kamaran and the Great Hanish group are already under the effective administration of His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government respectively, and whether this is called sovereignty or not is of comparatively small importance from all other points of view.

37. The question of Kamaran is especially difficult. His Majesty's Government first occupied Kamaran in 1915, when it was Ottoman territory, but they took no steps to annex it before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1924, since when its future disposal has been in the hands of the "intéressés."

38. In the Rome Understanding, moreover, His Majesty's Government made some declarations regarding their presence on the island which have since proved most inconvenient. They declared that the presence there of British officials was solely for the purpose of securing the sanitary service of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and that, if the number of pilgrims from Italian territory using the quarantine station increased, they would reconsider the question of allowing an Italian doctor to participate in the quarantine service. In the present agreement the position has been improved, inasmuch as His Majesty's Government are now only precluded from establishing sovereignty over the island or fortifying it, the article by which the Italian Government declare that they will not raise any objection to the presence of British officials there being, strictly speaking, superfluous (although essential as a means of allaying Italian suspicion). In addition, the Italian Government have recognised the Anglo-Netherlands Agreement of 1926 (under which the Governments of India and the Netherlands East Indies share the expenses of the quarantine station). The advantage of this recognition is that in the agreement of 1926 the principal British official is described as "civil administrator" of the quarantine station, a title to which the Italian Government have taken exception in the past.

39. The admission of an Italian medical officer to the island (with the consent of the Netherlands Government) on the same conditions as the Netherlands medical officer appointed under the agreement of 1926 is a small price to pay for this improvement in the position, despite the possibilities of intrigue and despite the fact that the number of pilgrims from Italian territory does not really warrant the appointment. A number of details connected with the position of the Italian medical officer under the agreement of 1926 have still to be settled.

40. The position of His Majesty's Government is still weak, however, because it depends so largely on the quarantine station, the utility of which is

beginning to be doubted by the Government of India, whereas His Majesty's Government wish to remain in the island on purely strategic grounds, *i.e.*, because it is an essential link in the air route down the Red Sea and because in the event of hostilities they wish to be able to use it as a fleet anchorage.

41. Of the remaining islands, there are lighthouses on three of them, of which two are maintained by His Majesty's Government on behalf of a French company<sup>(\*)</sup> and one by the Italian Government. Otherwise, so far as is known, there is no foreign activity in any of the islands. It will be observed that the present agreement does not entirely rule out innocent activities in any of the islands, whether on the part of the United Kingdom or Italy or any other Power, although even the most innocent of activities on the part of any other Power would probably be regarded with the deepest suspicion by both the parties.

(F)—*Economic Equality Clause.*

42. The Rome Understanding contained an article to the effect that there should be economic and commercial freedom on the Arabian coast and the islands of the Red Sea for the nationals of the two parties, and that the protection which these nationals might reasonably expect from their respective Governments should not assume a political character or complexion.

43. An attempt was made to draft an article to the same effect for incorporation in the text of the draft agreement to be presented to the Italian Government. But on examination the question gave rise to so many difficulties that it was given up as hopeless.

44. Some of these difficulties were:—

- (a) A vague text would probably become subject of dispute almost at once, since
- (b) Nobody could expect Saudi Arabia or the Yemen not to develop their economic resources, and any such development might entail exclusive concessions (*e.g.*, Petroleum Concessions Limited's concession in Saudi Arabia) or even monopolies for certain specified lines of trade.
- (c) To distinguish legitimate concessions, &c., from concessions of so wide a monopolistic character that they should be ruled out might require a highly elaborate formula (if the dividing line could really be expressed in words at all).
- (d) Whatever wording were devised would be likely to prove in practice a hindrance to legitimate British commercial enterprise through constant Italian complaints that His Majesty's Government were breaking the agreement in regard to Saudi Arabia, without being an effective deterrent to Italian penetration, especially in the Yemen.
- (e) Neither party could in any case say they would do all in their power to secure economic equality in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, as this would be assuming a power which belonged to the Governments of those States and which the parties themselves did not possess.
- (f) Moreover, His Majesty's Government had no absolute power to prevent private British interests from seeking privileged commercial positions in either State.
- (g) The most carefully drawn self-denying ordinance about commercial opportunity was apt to look to other States, including the States whose territory was concerned, like an agreement to divide the spoils.
- (h) In the last resort it was impossible to define support "of a political character or complexion" (which the parties to the Rome Understanding undertook not to afford to their nationals in commercial matters), and anyhow His Majesty's Government could not promise never in any circumstances to send troops or ships to protect British lives. Without an elaborate text it would be difficult to distinguish between the proper armed protection of nationals and protection which would be infringement of the independence or integrity of the States.
- (i) The main concern of His Majesty's Government was that Italy should not secure a predominant position of political advantage under the guise of legitimate economic activity, and, in view of the difficulties

(\*) The claims of this company are extremely complicated, but irrelevant to the present question.



attendant on the drafting of an "economic freedom" clause, His Majesty's Government felt that they would have to rely upon this object being secured by the ban upon the securing of any "privileged position of a political character."

45. The Italian Government noted the omission, but raised no objection. They had previously indicated that they had important economic interests in the Yemen, but, as these were not affected by the omission, they were presumably content.

(G)—Consultation.

46. The Italian Government wished to reproduce a provision which appeared in the Rome Understanding for the maintenance of close touch between the two parties and to lay it down that the parties should "consult together in all matters affecting their mutual interests in the zones of the Middle East to which the present agreement refers."

47. This formula was obviously unacceptable, since it covered areas such as the Aden Protectorate as well as Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and the Red Sea islands. His Majesty's Government suggested instead a formula limiting the consultation to matters which were declared to be of common interest in the agreement, e.g., the exclusion of other Powers. This alternative formula, however, was unacceptable to the Italian Government.

48. Later in the negotiations it became apparent, as has already been explained, that the area of "common interest" would have to be extended to the whole of Saudi Arabia and not merely to the coast of the Red Sea. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government felt unable to accept any consultation clause at all and the clause was finally dropped.

(H)—Validity and Termination.

49. His Majesty's Government were anxious from the outset of the negotiations that the agreement should be valid indefinitely, provided that there were some provision by which they could be released from their obligations, or some of them, in the event of a total change in the circumstances prevailing at the time when it was concluded. No entirely satisfactory device for securing this object could, however, be evolved and in the end it was necessary to accept the Italian suggestion that the agreement should remain in force in the ordinary way for a fixed period of years, unless amended by mutual consent as the result of negotiations for which either side might ask at any time.

50. The Italian Government were most anxious that the minimum period should be ten years and this was finally adopted. In point of fact, there is unlikely to be any change in the circumstances in the next ten years which would render the agreement an inconvenient limitation upon the freedom of action of His Majesty's Government, without the change of circumstances being at the same time of such a kind as automatically to release His Majesty's Government from their obligations under the agreement, e.g., hostilities in which Italy was either an enemy or an ally. The only way in which the obligations of the agreement would be likely to be inconvenient would be if there were a total collapse of the central authority in Saudi Arabia and small States were to spring up on the Persian Gulf over which His Majesty's Government might wish to exert the same degree of influence as they exert over Muscat, or even over Koweit and Bahrein.

(I)—Conclusion.

51. The terms of the agreement are upon the whole exceedingly satisfactory from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, not least because its obligations are perfectly clear. It may prove to have eliminated the worst of the suspicions entertained, for the most part quite needlessly, by the Italian Government, and if so there is every reason to hope that they will observe it faithfully. If it comes into force it ought, in the absence of major changes in the situation, to serve its purpose for more than the ten years of its initial validity.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1938.

[E 2504/1034/65]

No. 122.

*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 2.)*

(No. 459.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, April 22, 1938.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 416 of the 4th April regarding the Caliphate question, and more particularly to paragraph 4 of that despatch, I feel that it would be advisable to avoid anything in the nature of "representations" from His Majesty's Government to the Egyptian Government. We have always held that it was not our business to interfere in the Caliphate question, and I submit that it is expedient to maintain that attitude as far as possible. There would, however, be less objection to my expressing, as and when opportunity offers, a personal feeling that an Egyptian Caliphate claim will stir up trouble between Egypt and other Moslem States, and that, as we are allied or exceedingly friendly with all the parties likely to be seriously concerned, such a conflict would naturally be unwelcome to us.

2. I suggest it would be unwise to cause annoyance in any quarter by precipitate action; the Egyptian Caliphate idea will certainly meet with so many difficulties before it reaches the stage of definite formulation that it may quite possibly lapse of itself. I suggest, therefore, that the expression of personal views indicated above would only arise if and when Egyptians raise the matter in conversation with us.

3. With reference to the end of paragraph 4 of your despatch, I am advised that it is correct that no Moslem ruler to-day possesses the orthodox qualifications for the Caliphate, but what is apparently in the mind of Sheikh El Maraghi is rather the revival of the unorthodox regional caliphates of the period following the overthrow of the Bagdad Caliphate by the Moghuls. Nevertheless, it is doubtless true, as indicated in the second paragraph of your despatch under reply, that other Moslem States would object to even such a local Egyptian Caliphate.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora and Bagdad, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
D. V. KELLY.

[E 2804/84/65]

No. 123.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 142.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, April 7, 1938.*

WITH reference to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch No. 496 of the 18th December, 1937, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that a law authorising the King of Iraq to ratify the Saadabad Pact between Iraq and the Government of Afghanistan, the Iranian Empire and the Turkish Republic, signed at Saadabad (Tehran) on the 8th July, 1937, was published in the *Official Gazette* on the 22nd March.

2. The text of the pact was published at the same time in Arabic, and I am enclosing a copy herein.<sup>(1)</sup>

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without its enclosure, to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
MAURICE PETERSON.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 204.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 4, 1938.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 53 of the 11th April dealing with the Anglo-Italian conversations on Arabia, I have the honour to report that on the 12th April, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I communicated confidentially to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the proposals contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the telegram under reference, and added orally the explanations in paragraphs 6 and 7. I also informed the Minister that you would be glad to amplify any point on which the Iraqi Government were not clear. His Excellency thanked me and said that he would study the proposals.

2. Yesterday he handed to me a *note verbale*, a copy of which is enclosed herein, in which the Iraqi Government raise a number of questions concerning the effect of the Anglo-Italian agreement on the special relations established between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen by the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance signed at Bagdad in April 1936, and the Yemeni adherence thereto signed by the Imam in April 1937.

3. In accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I had impressed on Taufiq Suwaidi the view of His Majesty's Government that the Arabian provisions of the Anglo-Italian agreement were entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Treaty of Arab Alliance. It will be seen that the Iraqi Government, though they agree that this is so, in so far as the agreement aims at securing the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, have doubts whether the agreement does not, in fact, conflict with the terms of the treaty in regard to the close co-operation between the three Arab States for which it provides.

4. In this connexion the *note verbale* asks for assurances on four specific points and, having regard to article 5 (2) of the agreement and article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, for a forecast of the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt in the event of Iraq becoming involved under article 4 of the Arab Alliance in a conflict between Yemen and Saudi Arabia (e.g., as the result of an act of aggression by the Yemen or Saudi Arabia).

5. The points of doubt discussed in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Iraqi note seem to be met in the main by the words "of a political character" which occur after "privileged position" in article 3 of the agreement and were presumably added after your telegram was despatched, but it does not appear altogether certain that these qualifying words will enable His Majesty's Government to give the first of the two assurances for which the Iraqi Government ask in paragraph 6 of their note.

6. This point may, in fact, be given a practical test in a short time. If the Iraqi Government send a military adviser to the Saudi Government, could Italy claim that there had been a breach of article 3 of the agreement, and if she were to do so, would His Majesty's Government have to use their influence to prevent the Iraqi Government from taking a course which they have a perfect right to follow under their treaty with Saudi Arabia?

7. I shall be glad, in due course, to be furnished with your Lordship's observations on the Iraqi note and with instructions as to the manner in which I should reply to it.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome and to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 124.

*Note verbale.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and in referring to the verbal communication of his Excellency the Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th April, 1938, concerning the then projected Anglo-Italian agreement which

has since been signed, have the honour to state that it was said in that communication that the British Government wished to give this information as to their intentions in the spirit of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and the hope was also expressed that the Iraqi Government would agree with the British Government in regarding an agreement on the lines indicated as being of considerable advantage to the United Kingdom and Iraq, and as being entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. It was also added that the Iraqi Government would share the desire of the British Government to exclude other foreign Powers from gaining a foothold in any part of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, or interfering in their affairs, and that the only way in which there had been any prospect of achieving this had been by means of a self-denying ordinance applying inevitably to all Powers without distinction, whether friendly neighbours or not, of those two States. It was thought probable that the agreement would be valid for ten years unless amended by common consent and thereafter would continue in force until denounced by one of the parties. The Ambassador also said he would be glad to amplify any point on which the Iraqi Government are not clear.

2. The Iraqi Government welcome the rapprochement between the United Kingdom and Italy as a major contribution to world peace, with consequential advantages not only to the United Kingdom but also to Iraq. While detailed comment must necessarily await the communication of the full terms of the agreement between the United Kingdom and Italy, which it is understood has now been signed, the Iraqi Government in the meantime cordially congratulate the British Government on achieving a rapprochement which they hope will have generally beneficial results.

3. The Iraqi Government thank the Embassy for the verbal communication in question and would have been glad if they had been given sufficient time to examine the subject and make their comments thereon in accordance with the second paragraph of article 1 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

4. The Iraqi Government are anxious to study in all its aspects an agreement which touches so closely the interests of Iraq's allies, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and of her ally Great Britain, and consequently, also, her own interests. Nevertheless they adhere to the legal principle: *Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*, and therefore consider that the Anglo-Italian agreement does not prejudice their rights and obligations.

5. The Iraqi Government are not at present satisfied that the Anglo-Italian agreement, so far as it is known to them, is entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, and still less that it is consonant with the express terms of that treaty, but they are disposed to agree with the British Government that the agreement in its primary aim is in consonance with the main object of the said treaty, in that it appears to aim at securing the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen from external aggression. Iraq can look forward to finding Great Britain and Italy ranged alongside her in accordance with the Anglo-Italian agreement when she fulfils her obligations to her allies under the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. Nevertheless it appears that the agreement, apart from the protection imposed by it, diminishes the freedom of the two Arab Kingdoms in a manner which leads to hampering the closer co-operation of the Arab States. If this is the intention, it cannot be agreeable to Iraq, and, moreover, it would be in conflict with a principal object of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. The Iraqi Government earnestly hope that the policies of Great Britain and Italy embodied in the agreement will not have that effect.

The Iraqi Government desire to be assured that there is nothing in the Anglo-Italian agreement which prevents:—

- (1) The exchange of territory with Saudi Arabia as a result of a mutual agreement.
- (2) A political union between Iraq and either or both of her Arab allies.
- (3) Any action Iraq might see fit to concert with Saudi Arabia to suppress revolts in Saudi territory under article 5 (3) of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.
- (4) The exercise and performance by Iraq of her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance in the unhappy event of a conflict arising between her two Arab allies.



In such an event the Iraqi Government would be glad to know the attitude of the British Government, having regard to the Anglo-Italian agreement, in carrying out their obligations to Iraq under article 4 of the Anglo-Italian Treaty of Alliance.

6. It is noted from the verbal communication that the agreement will probably provide that it is in the common interest of the United Kingdom and Italy, that no other State shall acquire sovereignty or a privileged position in any part of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. In this connexion the Iraqi Government desire to state that if the text finally agreed upon retains the phrase "privileged position" as indicated in points 4 and 5 of the verbal communication, then it must be observed that the Anglo-Italian agreement appears also to mark a retrogression in the status of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen in spheres other than the purely political, and to involve a limitation on the independent action of these two countries in the spheres of economic, administrative, military and cultural development, in which both countries will be looking for assistance from abroad in the future as in the past. The rendering of such assistance in some of these spheres is already a treaty right and obligation of Iraq, and the Iraqi Government desire further explanations of the way in which the British Government expect the agreement to work in this respect. In particular, the Iraqi Government desire to be assured that there is nothing in the Anglo-Italian agreement tending to prevent in fact:—

- (1) The enjoyment and execution of Iraqi's rights and obligations under article 7 of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance; and
- (2) Closer economic and financial co-operation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

In this connexion it is also to be observed that by the acceptance of Iraq's declaration to the League of May 1932, general recognition was accorded to her right to give special advantages to her neighbours for facilitating frontier traffic, and to other countries members of any customs union into which she might enter, as also to give special advantages in customs matters to any country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia. It is implicit in this declaration and its acceptance that Iraq, besides giving special advantages to such countries, would be free to accept special advantages in return. These countries can be restricted in their freedom to give special advantages to Iraq only by their own participation in a legally binding agreement to that effect. Conversely, Iraq can be restricted in her freedom to accept special advantages only by her participation in a legally binding agreement to that effect.

7. From the statement that in the view of the British Government the Anglo-Italian agreement is entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, it is inferred that the British Government will use its best endeavours at all times to see that this Alliance is not impaired or its execution impeded in fact. On the other hand, in view of the fact that there are some points on which doubts may arise as already indicated it seems very desirable to the Iraqi Government that, subject always to the express reserve in paragraph 4 of this note, further explanations and assurances should be given by the British Government which they accordingly invite.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs avail, &c.

Bagdad, May 3, 1938.

[E 2783/880/91] No. 125.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.—(Enclosure in Jedda Despatch No. 79 of April 24; Received in Foreign Office, May 16.)

Your Excellency, Mecca, April 20, 1938.

WITH reference to your note No. 73, dated the 12th April, 1938, enclosing a copy of the provisions concerning Arabia in the agreement which may result from the Anglo-Italian conversations now in progress, the Government of His Majesty the King express their thanks and gratitude to the British

Government for their friendly feelings towards them, and cordially hope that the efforts of the two parties may be crowned with success. They also hope that this agreement will prove to be the happy inauguration of an auspicious era of improvement in the friendly relations of the two parties.

With highest respects, &c.  
FAISAL.

[J 2014/2014/16]

No. 126.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 621.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 19, 1938.

I DULY received your despatch No. 459 of the 22nd April and your telegram No. 320 regarding the aspirations of King Farouk towards the Caliphate.

2. In view of the considerations advanced by your Excellency, I am of opinion that you should say nothing on the subject to the Egyptian Government at this stage. I request, however, that you will watch developments and report to me at once if more active steps are taken, either by King Farouk or the Egyptian Government, in this matter.

3. I enclose a copy of a saving telegram which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Bagdad and Jedda.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Viscount Halifax to Sir P. Loraine (Angora).

(No. 12. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 1 (Saving) [of 2nd May: King Farouk's aspirations towards the Caliphate].

In view of Sir M. Lampson's telegram No. 320 [of 10th May] I prefer that you should say nothing to Turkish Government for time being.

[E 3166/880/91]

No. 127.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Jedda, May 2, 1938.

IN my telegram No. 90, dated the 2nd May, I reported that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had inquired as to the meaning of certain clauses in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and sent a summary of my reply. The clauses in question are those which appear as No. 3 and No. 5 (2) in the agreement as published, but in the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, they are quoted from a note of mine which is based upon your telegram No. 56, dated the 11th April.

2. This enquiry brought into prominence the extraordinary conditions prevailing in this country. The King, who manages his own foreign affairs, is in Riyadh, or out shooting in that direction. Not only is he so remote from the legation that it is impossible for him to summon me for an interview, but, in the absence of Fuad Bey on leave and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in Iraq, he has no one with him who knows anything about foreign affairs. The Amir Faisal is nearer to Jedda, being only some ten hours away in Taif, but in spite of his title of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he has never been known to discuss any of the questions for which he is nominally responsible. In Jedda arrangements have been made for

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the summer which, while an improvement on the condition of almost complete neglect in which foreign affairs have at times been left for considerable periods, is still unsatisfactory. The Kaimakam, Ibrahim-bin-Muammar, is now the intermediary for foreign affairs, but he is little more: he brings messages from the Government and takes down the reply word for word. He admits that he goes in fear lest he should distort the messages for which he is a channel or, to use his own words, lest if I give him £9 5s. 3d. to transmit he should send less or more. However, I thought that it would be better to have a talk with him before replying to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, so I obtained the authority of the Amir Faisal to do so and, judging by the time it took to get a reply, I conclude that even for that sanction had to be obtained from the King.

3. The Kaimakam was not very helpful, but he was able to inform me of his own knowledge that some Syrian paper or papers had tried to read into the clauses in question an intention on the part of the British and Italian Governments to establish in fact, if not in law, some sort of protectorate over Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. He agreed that this could not be extracted from the wording, and accepted as reasonable my contention that the Saudi Government might have had real cause for anxiety if such clauses had been omitted from the treaty. Eventually he took down the message which is summarised in my above-mentioned telegram, and went off to telegraph it to the Amir Faisal. I thought it well, however, to reply in writing also to the enquiry which I had received. A copy of my reply is attached.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

*Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Mecca, April 27, 1938.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th April, 1938, I have the honour to express to your Excellency that the Government of His Majesty my Lord the King are confident of the wisdom and policy of their friend Britain *vis-à-vis* Arabia, and more specially towards the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, and that they wish to state frankly to the British Government that they would like to know in a clear manner the interpretation of the sentence mentioned in the note forwarded with your Excellency's letter referred to above, for their information and because rumours circulated by people and their plunging into the subject as well as the radio broadcasts therein are frequent, viz.:—

4. It is the common interest of the United Kingdom and Italy that no other Power should obtain sovereignty or a privileged position in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen or which either of them may hereafter acquire.

5. In particular, it is an essential interest of each of the parties that no other Power should obtain such sovereignty or privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea belonging to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

6. It is the common interest of both parties that no other Power should intervene in any conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen which, despite their good offices, may break out between those States.

As regards the confidence which the Government of His Majesty the King have in the British Government, they never doubt, and they are aware of their good intentions *vis-à-vis* Arabia, and specially towards the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

With highest respects,

FAISAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

*Sir R. Bullard to the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(No. 88.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, May 2, 1938.

(After compliments.)

IT gave me great pleasure to read the expression of confidence in the good intentions of His Majesty's Government which I had the honour to receive in your Royal Highness's letter dated the 27th April. I am sure that when the Anglo-Italian Agreement is rightly understood that confidence will be strengthened. I regretted, however, to learn that the clauses quoted by your Royal Highness were not clear to the Saudi Government, and, in order that I might have an opportunity to find out where the difficulty of interpretation lay, I suggested to your Royal Highness that I should talk over the matter with his Excellency the Kaimakam of Jedda. Having received your permission, his Excellency called on me this morning. I gathered from him that various Arabic newspapers in other countries had indulged in fantastic speculations about the agreement, and had tried to read into the clauses quoted by your Royal Highness things remote both from the plain meaning of the text and from anything which His Majesty's Government could ever have accepted. If the Saudi Government could inform me which particular rumour or wireless broadcast caused them to enquire as to the meaning of the clauses in question, I would endeavour to deal with it. In the absence of such information, I have given his Excellency the Kaimakam a general reply to this effect: The said clauses mean just what they say. The object of the agreement is to prevent interference or encroachment in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen by any country whatsoever. It confirms and strengthens the sense of the Rome Understanding of 1927, which in various respects was vague and incomplete. There are no hidden motives behind it.

I trust that my reply will have cleared up any obscurity in the clauses of which your Royal Highness asked for an interpretation, and that the Saudi Government will not allow themselves to be disturbed by interpretations placed upon the clear wording of the clauses by ignorant, irresponsible or interested parties.

With highest respects,

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3167/880/91]

No. 128.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 94.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a note from the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Anglo-Italian Agreement.

Jedda, May 10, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 128.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.*

Your Excellency,

Mecca, Rabi-al-Awwal 9, 1357 (May 8, 1938).

WITH reference to your Excellency's letter of the 2nd May, 1938, I have great pleasure in expressing to your Excellency the gratitude of the Government of His Majesty the King for the sincere assurances given in your above-mentioned letter. Your Excellency is doubtless well aware that the Government of His Majesty have never any doubt as to the good intentions of the British Government and their activity in what may be to the advantage of the mutual interests of both parties. Our enquiries as to the interpretation of some clauses of the



recent Anglo-Italian Agreement, which seemed to us obscure, have only been (made) in accordance with our custom, namely, always to consult them and obtain any necessary explanations from them (His Majesty's Government). It is impossible for us to pay attention to the fabricated lies and the false interpretation which the people of selfish aims circulate. You will receive from us another letter in which we will explain this matter thoroughly.

With best compliments and highest respects,

FAISAL, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 3487/1237/25]

No. 129.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord,

Damascus, June 1, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith translations of cuttings from the Damascus newspapers, *Alef Ba* and *Echos*, reporting the approval by the Syrian Parliament of the principle of sharing with King Abdel Aziz-bin-Saud the cost of the repairs of the Hejaz Railway, in accordance with a report submitted to Parliament by one of its members, Shukri Bey Al Quwatli, of his conversations with the Saudi Arabian ruler in Mecca last February.

2. As you are already aware, the proposals of Ibn Saud and Shukri-al-Quwatli (then Minister of Finance of the Syrian Government) were that the Syrian Government and the Saudi Arabian Treasury should share equally the cost, estimated at £T. 120,000 gold, of putting the whole of the line in continuous working order. It was suggested that each country should provide half the amount out of its resources and issue loans for the remaining half. Since then there has been a curious disinclination on each side to exhibit implicit faith in the other. Now, although the Syrian Parliament has approved the principle of the transactions, it was careful to add a rider "provided His Majesty King Ibn Saud do likewise." During the debate one Deputy raised the question that everyone else has so far burked: "What is the attitude of the French and British Governments to the arrangement?" I gather that a rather uncomfortable silence greeted the query, to which no answer was given. Some time ago, Shukri Bey Al Quwatli, in the course of a conversation I had with him when he touched on his negotiations with Ibn Saud, asked me how His Majesty's Government would be likely to view the matter. I answered truthfully that I had not the slightest idea, but I added that it occurred to me that the complacent attitude of Syria towards the peculiar difficulties of the British authorities in Palestine did not appear to me likely to engender any particular warmth in the hearts of Englishmen for Syrian projects.

3. Examined in its practical aspect it does not seem probable that the Syrian Government will find it possible to raise in the near future £T. 30,000 gold for railroad reconstruction of very doubtful economic value, which is to be carried out entirely in a foreign country, albeit an Arab State. Indeed, until some extraordinary revenue in the shape of oil royalties, still hypothetical, is forthcoming, it is hard to see how Syrian economy can provide for the defence forces required of the country under the terms of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, much less enjoy the luxury of bearing half the cost of an enterprise which to-day is little more than a mirage of religio-political gratification. There is, however, another thought at the back of the minds of Shukri-al-Quwatli and his supporters. They believe that the completion of the line will force the British and French authorities to relinquish, without compensation, what are thought to be highly profitable sections of the line (Damascus-Deraa and Deraa-Maan) and the improvements effected thereto since the war for the benefit of an "Arab Wakf," a first tangible sign of Pan-Arabian union.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Beirut, Jedda and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Translation of Extract from Damascus Alef Ba of June 1, 1938.

The Parliament Approves Necessary Credits: The Parliament Telegraphs to King Ibn Saud.

AMONGST the projects approved by the Syrian Parliament in its final session last night was the proposal for an extraordinary credit of £Syr. 270,000 for the repair of the Hejaz Railway and the resumption of its working. Agreement was reached after discussions and the clear statements made by Shukri Bey Quwatli. Then the Deputy Al Haraki proposed the despatch of a telegram to His Majesty King Ibn Saud informing him of this result and begging him to fulfil in his turn the agreements passed between His Majesty and Shukri Bey.

This is the text of the telegram sent:—

Al Riyadh: His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Aal Saud.

The Syrian Parliament takes the opportunity of a vote for the opening of credits in order to share in repairs to the Hejaz line and the resumption of its working, to submit to your Majesty its respect and thanks for your endeavours in his matter, asking God to strengthen your throne for the benefit of the Arabs and for unity amongst them.

The Speaker,

FARES-AL-KHOURI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

Extract from the Damascus Echos of June 1, 1938.

La Chambre a voté en toute hâte £270,000 pour la Reconstitution du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz. Quel serait le sort de cet emprunt?

Damas (Office arabe).—La Chambre a voté hier, après des débats sommaires, un emprunt de 30 mille livres sterling ou leur contre-valeur de 270 mille livres syriennes pour la participation à la reconstruction et le rétablissement de la ligne ferrée du Hedjaz entre Damas et les villes saintes du Hedjaz, le Gouvernement séoudite participant pour un crédit du même montant à cette entreprise. Commentant ce vote, on se demande, dans certains milieux, si les Gouvernements français et britannique intéressés dans cette entreprise ont été consultés en la circonstance et, dans la négative, si, ils ne constituent pas une grave entrave pour la réalisation de ce projet. Quel serait le sort de cet emprunt au cas où, pour ces raisons ou pour toutes autres, cette entreprise s'avère irréalisable? On se demande, par contre, pour le cas où l'entreprise serait entourée des garanties nécessaires, si une souscription publique nationale n'aurait pas été plus judicieuse qu'un emprunt conçu dans ces conditions et qui serait une préface à la politique des "emprunts" considérée si néfaste pour l'avenir national du pays.

[E 3549/10/31]

No. 130.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 13, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 81 of 10th June.

I sent to Ibn Saud immediately a message in the sense of paragraph 2 of your telegram. His reply suggests at least that he does not desire an open breach with His Majesty's Government. It denies allegations categorically and gives assurances that he is not interfering and that he will not allow anyone to come

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between him and His Majesty's Government. I replied that His Majesty's Government counted confidently on his non-intervention, but thought he ought to know what was being done in his name.

2. Yusuf Yasin is back in Riyadh, and message shows signs of having been pruned by him.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 22.)

[E 3790/10/31]

No. 131.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

Jedda, June 5, 1938.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 76, dated 2nd June, I sent to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a letter of which I enclose a copy, giving the exact words of the Prime Minister's announcement in the House of Commons on 2nd May about the oral assurances exchanged with Italy on the subject of Palestine. It had occurred to me that, in view of the assurance which I had conveyed to Ibn Saud on the strength of your telegram No. 47 of the 24th March, to the effect that under no circumstances could His Majesty's Government admit Italian intervention in regard to Palestine, Ibn Saud might think the exchange of assurances with Italy strange, and that to send him the exact words of the Prime Minister on this point would be the best way to dissipate any suspicion that he might have been feeling. Only, as you had not thought fit to instruct me to make any communication to the Saudi Government on this point I thought it well to ask for your approval before taking action.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 131.

*Sir R. Bullard to Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(No. 116.)

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

Jedda, June 5, 1938.

IN a secret note which I had the honour to address to your Royal Highness on the 27th March, I referred to the suggestion which had been made by His Majesty the King of the Yemen regarding a joint appeal to the British and Italian Governments concerning the Palestine question. I now have the honour to give your Royal Highness the statement, taken from the official report of affairs in Parliament, in which the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, informed the House of Commons on the 2nd May of the exchange of oral assurances with the Government of Italy in regard to this question. The words were as follows:—

"In case anybody should think that Palestine is purposely left out, I should like to mention that the subject of Palestine was also discussed between Lord Perth and Count Ciano, and that as a result the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has given our ambassador an oral assurance that the Italian Government will abstain from creating difficulties or embarrassment for His Majesty's Government in the administration of Palestine, and our ambassador has given a similar oral assurance that His Majesty's Government for their part intend to preserve and protect legitimate Italian interests in that country.

Your Royal Highness will have heard of this before, through the press and the wireless, but you will doubtless be glad to have the exact words used by the Prime Minister.

With highest respects,

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3793/10/31]

No. 132.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 119.)

My Lord,

Jedda, June 13, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in continuation of my telegram No. 109, dated the 13th June, that I sent to Ibn Saud on the 11th June a message in the sense of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 81 of the 10th June. His reply suggests that the return of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Riyadh has had at least one good result, in pruning the King's style and therefore speeding up correspondence.

2. The message expresses gratitude for the frankness of His Majesty's Government, which it describes as the deed of a friend, but says that such things as are now attributed to Ibn Saud have not been and will not be done. The King may be the object of many prayers and requests, but it is impossible that he should act in the manner attributed to him in the information received by His Majesty's Government. The news, he suggests, comes from one or two sources, either from Palestine leaders who hope to encourage their followers thereby, or from—here follows a vague circumlocution which, no doubt, means the Italians. If the matter is investigated thoroughly the truth will appear. His Majesty's Legation and His Majesty's Government and Saudi officials all know, the message concludes, that Ibn Saud is not interfering, and that he has no intention of allowing anyone to come between him and His Majesty's Government, and no one would act against his orders.

3. In reply, I thanked His Majesty and said that His Majesty's Government counted confidently on his non-intervention, but thought it right that he should know what was being done in his name.

4. The tenor of the King's reply suggests that at least he does not wish to have an open breach with His Majesty's Government. The message does not ask this time, even indirectly, what the sources of information were on which the representations of His Majesty's Government were based, but the Qaimmaqam of Jedda, who brought me the reply, asked about this, though in terms which it was not difficult to parry.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3794/1237/25]

No. 133.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

Jedda, June 14, 1938.

I HAVE received from His Majesty's consul at Damascus a copy of his despatch to the Foreign Office No. 27 of the 1st June, in which he reports the voting by the Syrian Parliament of (probably non-existent) funds towards the cost of repairing the damaged portion of the Hejaz Railway. This decision has moved the Saudi Government to send me a note, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation. My French colleague has received a note in similar terms. The notes ask whether the British and French Governments are prepared to contribute towards the cost of repair in consideration of the fact that the damage was effected by the Allies during the Great War in their military interests, and propose that a conference of British, French, Saudi and Syrian representatives should be held at Jedda with a view to an agreement as to the repair of the line "on the basis proposed." It is not clear whether "on the basis proposed" refers simply to the suggested method of raising money, or includes the scheme for working the line as a single unit which was mentioned in the Saudi note sent to the Foreign Office under cover of my despatch No. 26 dated the 12th February.

2. If, as I hope, the proposal contained in the letter which the Foreign Office sent to the Colonial Office on the 29th April is approved, it will provide a reply to the two main points in the latest Saudi note. If it is not, I hope that the Saudi proposal for a conference will not be rejected out of hand (though a more suitable place than Jedda could be selected for the meeting), and that His

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Majesty's Government will feel able to enter into discussions on the subject. A suitable basis of discussion would perhaps be the cost of repair and of working the line and the amount of revenue to be expected. It would not be unreasonable for His Majesty's Government to say that, before replying to the Saudi note, they felt it necessary to have more exact data. But in some ways this might be taken as involving His Majesty's Government more deeply than the proposal of the 29th April, under which they would get off with a fixed contribution and the responsibility for the rest would be thrown upon the Saudi Government and their Syrian friends.

3. I do not know whether the Saudi opinion as to the ownership of the line, viz., that it is a Waqf, has ever been dealt with fully in any document communicated to the Saudi Government. If it has not, this course might perhaps be taken at some convenient moment. It should not be difficult to show that, although Moslems in many parts of the world contributed to the cost of the railway as a means of facilitating the performance of the pilgrimage, the line was a State railway and must have been built largely out of State funds raised, by the issue of a Hejaz Railway stamp, not only from Moslems, but from non-Moslem subjects of the Porte, and even from foreigners; and that consequently ownership has passed to the succession States in which the respective sections are situated. But this has perhaps been communicated to the Saudi Government in some paper which I have not been able to trace.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 133.

(Translation.)

*Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Viscount Halifax.*

(No. 7/1/7.)

Your Excellency,

*Mecca, June 10, 1938.*

ON the 30th Dhul Hijja, 1356 (the 1st March, 1938), Fuad Hamza mentioned to his Excellency Sir Reader Bullard—and Yusuf Yasin confirmed (what Fuad said) in his talks with his Excellency—the conversation that took place with his Excellency Shukri-al-Quwatli, the Syrian ex-Minister of Finance, during his stay in the Hejaz, about the Hejaz Railway, namely, to the effect that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Syria should contribute a sum of money for the repair and operation of the line, and that a general contribution should be proposed in which Governments and individuals could participate. Our Government have been awaiting the Government of Syria's approval of the suggestion of their Minister of Finance in order to lay the proposal before the English and French Governments. His Majesty the King has now received a telegram from the President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, saying that the Chamber has unanimously decided to open the credit for the repair of the line which the ex-Minister of Finance had suggested. The Saudi Arabian Government therefore bring this to the notice of the Government of Great Britain, and await their reply and that of the French Government, to whom a similar note has been addressed, on the following points:—

1. It is hoped that the British and French Governments will have no objection to the repair of the line being effected with the contributions to be collected.

2. Are the British Government, on their side, prepared to pay any monetary compensation (as a contribution) for the repair of this line in consideration of the fact that the destruction thereof was effected by the Allies during the Great War and in their military interest?

3. Do the British Government agree to the holding of a conference at Jedda, to be attended by representatives of Great Britain, France, Syria and Saudi Arabia, with a view to an agreement as to the repair of the line (being reached) on the basis proposed, on the understanding that our Government maintain their former views as to the ownership of the line?

With highest respects,  
FEISAL,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

[E 2698/1573/25]

No. 134.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 371.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1938.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 204 of the 4th May enclosing a copy of a *note verbale* from the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which the Ministry make certain enquiries as to the effect of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938, regarding certain areas in the Middle East, upon the relations of Iraq with Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, more particularly in the light of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance of the 2nd April, 1936, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, to which the Yemen acceded, with certain modifications, on the 29th April, 1937.

2. The possibility that some of the provisions of the Middle Eastern Agreement might be thought to restrict unduly the liberty of action not only of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, but also of neighbouring States such as Iraq, was realised while the agreement was under negotiation. As you will be aware from my telegram No. 53 of the 11th April, an attempt was made to avoid some of the difficulties to which the Iraqi Government have now drawn attention by opposing the Italian demand that article 3 (in which the two parties define their attitude towards threats by other Powers to the welfare of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen and which was originally intended to apply only to those territories of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen adjacent to the Red Sea, following in this the provisions of the Rome Understanding of 1927) should apply to the whole of the territories of those States. Similarly, it was sought to qualify the words "no other Power" in articles 3 and 5 (2) and to limit these provisions to "no non-Arabian Power." In view, however, of the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Italian Government, which at one time threatened to cause a deadlock in the negotiations, it was necessary to concede this point in consideration of the wider advantages to be derived from conclusion of an agreement. There can be no doubt that the difficulties to which the Iraqi Government have drawn attention, and which, as will be seen from the later paragraphs of this despatch, are, in fact, more apparent than real, are far outweighed by the benefits accruing to Saudi Arabia, and indirectly to Iraq, under the agreement.

3. I note that in paragraph 3 of the Ministry's communication disappointment is expressed that the Iraqi Government were not given sufficient time to offer their observations on the provisions of the agreement before its final conclusion on the 16th April. As you are aware, the discussions in Rome were difficult and had to be concluded under great pressure, and it was impracticable to approach the Iraqi Government until the negotiations were well advanced and agreement had been reached on the main provisions of the draft instrument. In the circumstances, however, the delay was possibly open to misinterpretation, and it seems desirable to explain to the Iraqi Government, at least orally, that the negotiations in Rome were of a complex character and that it was not possible to consult them until the agreement had taken definite shape and His Majesty's Government were in a position to give them a clear idea of its terms, which was only the case during the closing days of the negotiations.

4. With regard to the main question, I have given careful consideration to the Iraqi note, and in view of the importance and complexity of some of the questions raised therein, I will now acquaint you in some detail with the position as it appears to me.

5. The Iraqi Government begin by asking in general terms whether the Middle Eastern Agreement is likely in any way to impede the close co-operation between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen for which the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance provides. One answer to this question is that the provisions of an agreement between Great Britain and Italy cannot in any way restrict the freedom of action of the three Arab States, or, for that matter, of any other State which is not a party to the agreement. This is not, however, a complete answer, since the real point of the question is whether, in the event of Iraq giving effect to certain of her obligations under the treaty, Great Britain may, as a result of the obligations which she for her part has assumed under the agreement, be precluded from supporting her, or even be obliged to oppose her.

[19825]

z 3



6. It is to be observed that the provisions of articles 3 and 5 (2) of the agreement do not in any way commit His Majesty's Government or the Italian Government to oppose action by other Powers inconsistent with those articles. All that the two parties have agreed to therein is that, as a matter of general principle, it is in their common interest that various kinds of intervention by other Powers shall not take place. His Majesty's Government are not therefore obliged under the agreement to oppose attempts by Iraq to intervene in or between Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. At the same time the question of the extent to which His Majesty's Government might be prevented from actively supporting Iraq in such attempts presents a more difficult problem. The general position appears to be as follows:—

7. His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government have, as has been said, agreed in articles 3 and 5 (2) that it is in their common interest that certain forms of intervention by other Powers shall not take place. The effect of this agreement is to enable one or both of the parties to take measures to prevent such intervention which they might not otherwise be entitled to take owing to the terms of other articles of the agreement. It does not follow, however, that once such intervention had actually occurred the interests of the two parties would continue to run parallel. A new situation would have arisen for which no provision is made in the agreement, and it is possible to maintain that in such an event both parties would be free to take whatever action was dictated by their own interests in the light of the altered circumstances. If, therefore, any of the things which are stated in the agreement to be contrary to the interests of the two parties actually takes place in a serious and important form, both parties will on this construction of the agreement be released automatically from their obligations and the position will be much as if the agreement had not been made.

8. The position would, however, be somewhat different if Iraq were contemplating an act of intervention in or between Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, but had not yet carried her intention into effect. If in such an event Italy took steps to prevent Iraq's proposed action, His Majesty's Government would unquestionably be tied to a certain extent by the provisions of the agreement in opposing Italian attempts to restrain Iraq and correspondingly restricted as to the degree of assistance which they might give to Iraq.

9. The practical importance of this difficulty would, no doubt, depend largely on the circumstances obtaining at the time. Nevertheless, a distinction can properly be made between those forms of intervention by other Powers which would violate, or threaten to violate, one of the fundamental principles recognised and safeguarded in the agreement, and other forms of intervention of a less far-reaching character. The fundamental principles recognised in the agreement may be considered to be those laid down in articles 1, 2 and 3 thereof, viz., the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and the principle that no other Power (including Great Britain and Italy) shall obtain a privileged position of a political character on the coast of the Red Sea or in the islands referred to in the last sentence of article 3. While it may be argued that His Majesty's Government could not, so long as the provisions of the agreement remain in force, support Iraq in any proposal likely to have the effect of impairing the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, &c., they would not, in my opinion, be precluded to the same extent from supporting Iraq in other forms of intervention, which might be undertaken in the interests of Saudi Arabia or the Yemen and with their consent. The fact that His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government have agreed that, as a matter of general principle, their interests will be best served if other Powers do not intervene in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen does not mean that such intervention may not, in particular instances, be unobjectionable and even beneficial.

10. With regard to the particular points raised in the Iraqi note, my views are as follows:—

11. *Point (1) of paragraph 5. Whether an exchange of territory between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as a result of a mutual agreement, would be contrary to the terms of the Agreement.* Clearly an agreement between Great Britain and Italy cannot deprive Iraq (or Saudi Arabia or the Yemen) of her liberty to exchange territory with her neighbour. If Iraq does, however, she will have acquired sovereignty in territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia, and therefore will have done something which is stated in article 3 of the agreement to be contrary to the common interest of the two parties. The effect of this,

however, is merely that Italy and the United Kingdom respectively can claim that this event releases them, if they wish to prevent this exchange, from their obligations under the agreement of non-intervention in Saudi Arabia. In other words, if such an exchange were made, and Italy herself intervened in or with Saudi Arabia to prevent it, His Majesty's Government could not claim that Italy was breaking the agreement in so doing. Italy would merely acquire her ordinary freedom of action in a sphere which is otherwise limited by the agreement. That is, however, all, and His Majesty's Government would be by no means committed to support Italy in her action. The position would, in fact, be very much as if the agreement had not been made.

12. At the same time it is clear that if Italian opposition took the form of an attack on Iraq His Majesty's Government would have to come to the assistance of Iraq under article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance of the 30th June, 1930, which is the major obligation and the existence of which was known when the agreement with Italy was concluded. But before the Iraqi Government made such an exchange of territory, they should consult with His Majesty's Government under the terms of the last paragraph of article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, and should also concert with them, under article 3 of that treaty, in an endeavour to settle any subsequent dispute which might in consequence arise. The question appears, however, to be largely academic, because, so far as can be foreseen at present, any exchange of territory which is likely to be made between Iraq and Saudi Arabia would mean an alteration of desert boundaries, which Italy would not have any interest in opposing under the provisions of article 3 of the agreement.

13. *Point (2) of paragraph 5. Whether there is anything in the Agreement to preclude a political union between Iraq and Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or both.* It is not clear what form of political union the Iraqi Government have in mind. If what is meant is a union by which Iraq and Saudi Arabia or the Yemen join and become one entity for international purposes (and it is not easy to imagine any other form of "political union" between States already united by treaties of Arab Brotherhood and mutual protection), the identity of Iraq as a State would presumably disappear, and consequently the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq would come to an end unless it were specifically reaffirmed or replaced in the new circumstances. Such an event would also clearly make a fundamental change in the situation to which the Anglo-Italian Agreement applies, and it would be possible for either party to contend that it was an event which was covered by the provisions of article 3 and, therefore, that either of them were free to intervene in order to oppose it. It might, indeed, be as much in the interest of His Majesty's Government to do so as in that of Italy. So far as the agreement is concerned, therefore, all that can be said is that such an event would restore to either party the liberty of action in Arabia which is otherwise restricted by the agreement.

14. *Point (3) of paragraph 5. Whether the agreement precludes any action which Iraq might see fit to concert with Saudi Arabia to suppress revolts in Saudi territory under article 5 (3) of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.* Iraq is free to take such action, if she wishes, so far as legal obligations are concerned. If she does so, however—as she may be bound to do under the treaty—she will be doing something which theoretically Great Britain and Italy have recognised as being contrary to their common interest under article 5 (2) of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. The theoretical result is merely that, this having happened, the two parties might claim to recover their freedom of action so far as it is restricted by the agreement, and the position becomes largely as if the agreement had not been made. But from the practical point of view it is more than doubtful if Italy would wish to make any such claim in a case of this kind.

15. *Point (4) of paragraph 5. Whether, under the terms of the agreement, Iraq would be free to give effect to her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood in the event of a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.* The position is complicated by the fact that the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance comprises two instruments, the first the bilateral treaty between Saudi Arabia and Iraq concluded on the 2nd April, 1936, and the second the instrument of accession, subsequently ratified by Saudi Arabia and Iraq, whereby the Yemen acceded to the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty in a modified form. It is by no means clear what exactly Iraq's rights and obligations under these treaties would be in the event of a conflict between the other two Arab States, since neither instrument appears to make any specific provision for such an eventuality. On the



assumption that the words "another State" in article 4 of the Yemeni instrument of accession do not apply to one of the high contracting parties themselves, the most that Iraq would be able to do under that instrument in the event of either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen attacking the other, would be to denounce the treaty under article 8, in which case she would cease to have any further rights or obligations. If, however, the words "another State" are to be taken as applying to the parties themselves, Iraq would be bound to consult with and assist the victim of aggression in accordance with the provisions of article 4.

16. As regards the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty of 1936, on the other hand, if the treaty is to be regarded as an entirely separate instrument and the Yemen is not considered to have become a party even to those provisions in it which are reproduced in the instrument of accession, then the Yemen remains a "third State" for the purposes of article 4 of that treaty. On this interpretation, if the Yemen attacked Saudi Arabia (but not if Saudi Arabia attacked the Yemen), Iraq would be under an obligation to consult with and assist Saudi Arabia in accordance with article 4. At the same time she could denounce the Yemeni instrument of accession without affecting the validity of the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty. In the event of Saudi Arabia attacking the Yemen, on the other hand, the only action which Iraq could take would be to denounce the whole treaty under article 10. If, however, the Yemen is considered to be a contracting party to the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty for the purpose of those of its provisions which are reproduced in the Yemeni instrument of accession—and this interpretation is supported by the fact that article 6 of the treaty specifically provides for subsequent accession of the Yemen—then it could be held that Iraq would be under no obligation to take any special action even in the event of a Yemeni attack on Saudi Arabia.

17. The position in regard to this question is thus far from clear, but in general it appears that the more likely case in which Iraq might consider herself to be under an obligation to intervene would be in the event of an attack by the Yemen on Saudi Arabia. The effect of such intervention with regard to the agreement would be that Iraq would have done something which is declared in article 5 (2) to be contrary to the common interest of both Italy and the United Kingdom, and consequently both Great Britain and Italy would be freed from their mutual obligation not to intervene between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. That would, I am advised, be the only result so far as the agreement is concerned. The position would, in fact, be much as if the agreement had never been made, and the two parties would be free to intervene on different sides if they chose to do so.

18. It is, however, desirable to note in this connexion that notwithstanding the use of the word "alliance" in the treaty, the only obligation falling upon Iraq even in the event of Yemeni aggression against Saudi Arabia is to "consult with Saudi Arabia regarding the measures which shall be taken with the object of concerting their efforts in a useful manner to repel the said aggression." How far this obligation would inevitably entail action on the part of Iraq may be open to doubt, but the obligation is clearly far weaker than the corresponding obligation in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance: "... immediately come to his (the other high contracting party's) aid in the capacity of an ally."

19. The general conclusion is, therefore, that, if any of the types of action referred to in points (1) to (4) of paragraph 5 of the Iraqi note takes place, something may happen which is declared in the agreement to be contrary to the interests of both Great Britain and Italy, and that consequently both parties are freed from their obligation not to intervene. The position is then very much as if the agreement had not been made.

20. *Additional point in paragraph 5. The attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt, having regard to the provisions of the agreement and to article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, in the event of Iraq becoming involved in a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.* As has been shown above, the more likely case in which Iraq might claim to be under an obligation to intervene in a conflict between the two other parties to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance would be in the event of an attack by the Yemen on Saudi Arabia. His Majesty's Government have undertaken, in article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, to support Iraq in the event of her becoming involved in a war, and this undertaking is qualified only by the condition that such action shall not be contrary to the rights and obligations of either Great Britain or Iraq under the League Covenant or the Kellogg Pact.

21. In the event of Iraq going to the assistance of Saudi Arabia to repel an unprovoked attack by the Yemen, she would not, in so doing, be breaking either the League Covenant or the Kellogg Pact. On a strict interpretation, therefore, of the relevant texts it seems, in fact, probable that Great Britain would be held to be under an obligation to assist Iraq. On the other hand, it may be argued that Iraq is under an obligation, before embarking on a war, to consult with Great Britain with a view to settling the dispute under article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance, and that, if she fails to do so, the obligation of Great Britain to render assistance under article 4 no longer applies.

22. But whatever the legal position may be, it is certain that His Majesty's Government would not have acquiesced in the conclusion of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance in 1936 had they supposed that its operation might have the effect of bringing them into a war of Iraq's choosing in circumstances over which they had no control. The precise obligations of Iraq under article 4 of that treaty, as discussed in paragraph 18 above, become from this point of view of primary importance; and His Majesty's Government might not feel obliged to come to the aid of Iraq in the capacity of an ally if the Iraqi Government had ignored any advice which His Majesty's Government might give them, as the result of consultation under article 3 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, as to the best manner of fulfilling their obligations under article 4 of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.

23. *Point (1) of paragraph 6. Whether there is anything in the agreement to prevent Iraq from giving effect to her rights and obligations under article 7 of the Saudi-Iraqi Treaty of 1936 (corresponding to article 9 of the Yemeni instrument of accession).* The question here is whether the words "privileged position of a political character" in article 3 of the agreement cover any action which Iraq might take under the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood. So far as cultural matters are concerned, it can safely be said that the answer is in the negative. As regards military co-operation, e.g., the appointment of an Iraqi subject as military adviser to the Saudi Arabian Government, the position is hardly more doubtful. The mere appointment of a military adviser of Iraqi nationality by the Saudi Arabian Government would not give Iraq a "privileged position of a political character" in Saudi Arabia, though assistance of this kind might be carried to a degree where such a position would arise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia are two States whose strength is not very different. The political influence of a military adviser in such circumstances would be much less than that of an adviser selected by a Great Power, and I am not prepared to say in the abstract that the appointment of a national of a Great Power would be covered by the agreement.

24. *Point (2) of paragraph 6. Where there is anything in the agreement to prevent closer economic and financial co-operation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (or the grant to and receipt from Saudi Arabia and the Yemen by Iraq of certain preferences and privileges in matters of frontier traffic and customs).* With regard to these two questions, it is only necessary to say that Iraq is in no way committed not to take any of the measures contemplated, and that none of these measures appears to be covered by the provisions of article 3 or 5 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement as being something which is contrary to the common interest of the two parties.

25. From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that the point over which a "conflict" between the Middle Eastern Agreement and the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance is most likely to arise in a serious form (although not the one which is likely to give rise to the greatest difficulties of interpretation) is an act of aggression by the Yemen against Saudi Arabia. The agreement declares that it is in the interests of Great Britain and Italy that Saudi Arabia and the Yemen shall in that event fight their own battle without outside interference or assistance, and although neither Great Britain nor Italy is obliged to take positive action in support of its declared interests, it must be assumed that neither would make such a declaration lightly. Iraq may consider in the same event that the treaty obliges her to support Saudi Arabia. Such support might not be unwelcome to His Majesty's Government, whatever might be the case were it offered from any other quarter. But it might be most unwelcome to the Italian Government and the ultimate result might be the termination of a valuable agreement, if nothing worse. The fact that this conflict of interests exists must be faced. At the same time, in the event of unprovoked aggression by either Saudi Arabia or the Yemen



against the other, a moral obligation would rest upon both Great Britain and Italy either to do their best to prevent or terminate the aggression and to protect whichever State was attacked, or else to leave that State free to look for support where it could find it.

26. In all other respects—and for that matter in this respect too—the agreement is far more likely to promote the true interests of Saudi Arabia and even of Iraq and the Yemen than the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. In the last resort it is the power and prestige of Great Britain which alone ensures to these States an independent existence, and in general His Majesty's Government must be free (though there should be consultation under article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance and a sympathetic response to representations made) to conduct their relations with the other Great Powers in whatever manner they think most likely to assist these aims. I do not wish to wound the self-esteem of any of the States concerned by insisting unduly upon this aspect of the question in reply to the present enquiries, but it is, nevertheless, the moral foundation of many of the provisions of the Middle Eastern Agreement, and unless it is understood that agreement cannot be understood.

27. The above explanation is mainly for your Excellency's information. Subject to your views, the reply to be sent to the Iraqi note should be on the following lines:—

28. You should inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have appreciated the frankness with which the Iraqi Government have consulted them in this matter, and welcome this opportunity of explaining the manner in which His Majesty's Government are likely to interpret their own interests under the Middle Eastern Agreement and of resolving any misapprehensions which may have arisen regarding their effect on Iraq. They can understand that certain of the provisions of the agreement may at first sight appear capable of impeding the close co-operation between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen which was established by the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance. They feel, however, that the difficulties to which the Iraqi Government have drawn attention are, in fact, more apparent than real. They would accordingly, in the first place, make the following general observations:—

- (a) Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are not bound by the provisions of the agreement, to which none of them is a party, and in consequence they are free, so far as the agreement is concerned, to take any action which they may think desirable in their own interests, as to which they are and must remain the sole judges, subject only to their treaty obligations, if any, to other Powers.
- (b) The object of articles 3 and 5 (2) of the agreement is to safeguard the true interests of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and to preserve them from falling under foreign domination by discouraging certain forms of intervention by other Powers which might endanger the independence and integrity of those States. His Majesty's Government are confident that this purpose is entirely consonant with the declared objects of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.
- (c) It was, however, impossible, as was explained to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th April, to frame provisions which would have the effect of excluding intervention by foreign Powers for purposes detrimental to the true interests of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen without also covering similar forms of intervention by friendly Arab States such as Iraq, even though in the latter case such intervention might be beneficial to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.
- (d) Nevertheless, the provisions of articles 3 and 5 (2) do not oblige His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government to taking any positive action to oppose intervention by other Powers; all that the two parties have done is to declare that, as a matter of general principle, it is in their common interest that intervention by other Powers shall not take place. If such intervention does take place, either party to the Middle Eastern Agreement may claim to be released in whole or in part from its obligations under the agreement not to intervene itself, and the position approaches that which would exist if the Middle Eastern Agreement had not been made. This would be regrettable, but naturally such a claim would not be made unless the infringement of the "common interest" was a serious one.

29. Articles 3 and 5 (2) are thus in the nature of enunciations of general principles in the light of which the parties will judge their own interests; they do not bind other States, and they do not even bind the parties concerned to definite courses of action; moreover, they make no attempt to envisage or define situations of detail. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to estimate their effect upon attempts by other Powers to carry out treaty obligations applicable to circumstances described in the relevant instruments in far greater detail. Subject to these general considerations and reservations, His Majesty's Government offer the following further observations on points of detail:—

30. With regard to the question whether there is anything in the Anglo-Italian Agreement to prevent Saudi Arabia and Iraq from effecting an exchange of territory as a result of mutual agreement, they have little to add to the explanations given under the headings (a), (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 28. The agreement clearly cannot deprive Iraq of her liberty to exchange territory with her neighbour, and neither His Majesty's Government nor the Italian Government are committed to opposing such an exchange. His Majesty's Government have no hesitation in assuring the Iraqi Government that, in the event of an arrangement being made whereby Saudi Arabia and Iraq mutually agree, in what was clearly the interests of both, to an exchange of territory, they would not seek to oppose it. They presume, however, that the Iraqi Government would consult them before concluding such an arrangement.

31. The Iraqi Government have, furthermore, enquired whether there is anything in the Middle Eastern Agreement to prevent a political union between Iraq and Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, or both. His Majesty's Government are unable to express an opinion on this point without knowing exactly what form of political union the Iraqi Government have in mind. They must mean something more than the existing Arab Brotherhood Alliance, and in principle a "political union" means the merging of two States into one. This in its turn would in this case mean (1) that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance would cease to operate unless it was amended by agreement—indeed, it would be contrary to the Treaty of Alliance; (2) that so great a change had taken place that the Middle Eastern Agreement no longer applied.

32. With regard to the question whether the agreement precludes any action which Iraq might see fit to take to concert with Saudi Arabia to suppress revolts in Saudi territory under article 5 (3) of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood, His Majesty's Government would again refer the Iraqi Government to the considerations set forth under headings (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. Although His Majesty's Government have agreed in article 5 (2) of the agreement, for the reasons explained above, that it is in their interest that no other Power shall intervene in any conflict which may arrive within Saudi Arabia or the Yemen they can assure the Iraqi Government that they would not seek to oppose any action which Iraq might wish to take under article 5 (3) of the treaty, with the agreement of the Saudi Arabian Government, for the purpose of suppressing disorders which were clearly of concern to both States.

33. The Iraqi Government enquire whether, under the terms of the agreement, Iraq would be free to give effect to her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance in the event of a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. His Majesty's Government are not aware that the treaty makes provision for a conflict between any of the parties who have, in fact, agreed under article 2 to settle all disputes by friendly negotiations, and they presume that in such an event Iraq would have no rights or obligations other than the right to terminate the whole treaty. In the event, however, of Iraq finding or feeling herself under an obligation to intervene in a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the position would be much the same as in the cases already discussed above, *i.e.*, an agreement between two other Powers cannot prevent Iraq from intervening, and His Majesty's Government are not committed to opposing such intervention, but the Iraqi Government are obliged under the Treaty of Alliance, articles 1 and 3, to consult with His Majesty's Government before taking any such action.

34. The Iraqi Government have also enquired what attitude His Majesty's Government would adopt, having regard to the provisions of the agreement and to article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, in the event of Iraq becoming involved in a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. His Majesty's Government cannot state specifically in advance what their attitude would be in a highly



hypothetical eventuality. They presume that, in the event of any conflict arising, Iraq would, in the first place, and before becoming involved, consult with His Majesty's Government under article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance and collaborate with them with a view to settling the dispute in accordance with article 3 of the treaty. For the rest, while His Majesty's Government cannot pledge themselves in the abstract to support Iraq in a war entered upon of her own free will, they can assure the Iraqi Government that they will at all times respect their obligations under article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which was in force at the time of the conclusion of the Middle Eastern Agreement and is in no way modified or diminished by that agreement.

35. With regard to the further questions set forth in paragraph 6 of the Iraqi note, His Majesty's Government would only say that Iraq is in no way committed not to take any of the measures suggested, and that in their opinion none of these measures fall within the classes of measure which the agreement declares to be contrary to the common interests of the two parties.

36. Finally, you may at your discretion add an oral and confidential communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following lines:—

"Throughout the Anglo-Italian negotiations His Majesty's Government were forced constantly to ask themselves: what is in the best interests of Saudi Arabia? They then felt sure and still feel sure that these interests are better served by the conclusion of the agreement even in its present categorical form, than by the absence of an agreement, and, to be quite frank, they were obliged, in order to secure an agreement, to accept certain provisions which they would have preferred to omit. This was largely because the Italian Government were suspicious lest His Majesty's Government, as the ally of Iraq, might through Iraq pursue an imperialistic policy towards Saudi Arabia. Having accepted these provisions, His Majesty's Government mean to keep them faithfully both in the letter and the spirit, but they can say with full responsibility that no activity on the part of the friends of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and especially on the part of Iraq, conceived in good faith for the welfare of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, will ever be found to be contrary to the interests of His Majesty's Government, as defined in the agreement. That is what they mean when they say that, in their opinion, the agreement is entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood."

37. I trust that these replies will satisfy the Iraqi Government. Should they fail to do so, it may be necessary to state both the theoretical defects of the agreement and its practical advantages (on the lines indicated in paragraph 26 above) in greater detail.

38. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

[E 3659/880/91]

No. 135.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 253.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 84 of the 29th June, respecting the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government towards the agreement regarding certain areas in the Middle East concluded by His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government on the 16th April, I transmit to you, herewith, a copy of my reply to Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 204 of the 4th May, (\*) of which you will already have received a copy direct, on the subject of the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the agreement.

2. The Saudi Arabian Government are not entirely in error when they surmise that His Majesty's Government only accepted some of these provisions

(\*) No. 134.

in order to ensure that the Italian Government should not interfere in Arabia. Nor can it be denied that a State which may not dispose of its territory, or accord exclusive political privileges to other States, or furnish itself with allies, has lost some of the qualities of independence. As explained in my despatch to Sir Maurice Peterson, the agreement does not in fact prevent Saudi Arabia from doing any of these things and still less obliges the parties to the agreement to oppose them. But, even so, the Saudi Arabian Government may reasonably feel that they have received a warning that certain actions on their part may prove contrary to the interests of two powerful neighbours.

3. But none of these considerations alters the fact that the agreement is not only in the true interests of Saudi Arabia, but also in strict accord with the realities of the situation. The continued existence of Saudi Arabia as an independent State depends in the last resort upon the continued existence of Great Britain as a great Power. A declaration by Great Britain that interference by any other Power in Saudi Arabia or in its affairs will be contrary to her interests, even though it does not constitute an obligation from Great Britain to Saudi Arabia, is in effect a far more valuable guarantee for Saudi Arabia than any steps (such as the conclusion of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance) which she can take on her own behalf.

4. Moreover, the agreement does not change in any material respect the position which existed under the Rome Understanding of 1927, with which the Saudi Arabian Government have been well content for many years. Except for the extension of the area covered by the "warning off notice" to the whole of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (instead of to the Red Sea Coast only), the Rome Understanding contained implicitly the same restrictions upon the freedom of the Arabian States as the agreement.

5. With regard to the motives which impelled His Majesty's Government to accept certain provisions of the agreement, I must make it clear at once that, whatever may have happened during the negotiations, nothing could be of less assistance to His Majesty's Government now than to be placed in a position in which they might have to agree with the Italian Government upon an interpretation of such phrases as "common interest" and "privileged position of a political character." As I have explained to Sir Maurice Peterson, the agreement, which was only concluded with considerable difficulty, is in essence an enunciation of general principles and no good can come of attempts to define in advance the extent to which it would affect, or be affected by, particular happenings. This is especially true of the present time, when the agreement is still waiting to come into force and any argument or discussion about its meaning might lead to a demand for modifications in its terms. In fact, His Majesty's Government might feel obliged, were they to be placed in the position which I have described, to suggest to the Italian Government that they should send an identic reply to the Saudi Arabian communication to the effect that the agreement means no more and no less than it says, and that the parties cannot undertake to supply glosses or commentaries upon its terms to third States who are not parties to the agreement and who need not regard themselves as affected by it in any way if they do not wish to do so.

6. You are in a better position than I am to judge how far the communication you have received from the Saudi Arabian Government is the outcome of genuine misunderstanding and how far of mischief-making advice from Iraq or Syria. In asking you, therefore, to do your utmost to dissuade the Saudi Arabian Government from sending an identic note, which would almost certainly entail consultation between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government, I leave you full discretion as to the methods to employ to achieve this aim. Subject to this, you might, I suggest, convey a hint, if you feel you can do so with discretion, to the effect that it is unwise to look a gift horse in the mouth, and then say that, while His Majesty's Government are themselves willing to furnish full information upon any points which the Saudi Arabian Government think obscure, they are unlikely to be able to supply such full information in reply to an identic communication addressed to both Governments. Moreover, His Majesty's Government think the Saudi Arabian Government are in error in supposing that any ambiguity exists in the text from which the Italian Government hope to derive advantage. His Majesty's Government assume and believe that the Italian Government have entered into this agreement in good faith with the object of securing the independence and integrity of Saudi



Arabia and the Yemen, and the Saudi Arabian Government would be well advised to proceed on a similar assumption. His Majesty's Government therefore urge the Saudi Arabian Government, as much in their own interests as in those of His Majesty's Government, to abandon the idea of identic notes, or, if they feel that they must make an identic communication, to make no enquiries and limit it to a brief statement to the general effect that the Saudi Arabian Government do not regard themselves as bound by an agreement to which they are not parties and make all reserves in regard thereto. This advice you may support by such arguments taken from this despatch and the despatch to Sir Maurice Peterson as you think prudent.

7. You may also, as you suggest, state that His Majesty's Government appreciate the spirit in which the questions in the draft note were put and will examine them attentively in the hope of being able to furnish a reply which will reassure the Saudi Arabian Government, who may meanwhile rest assured that nothing in the agreement was intended to place any time-limit on the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia. You may, furthermore, if you think it desirable, furnish the Saudi Arabian Government with the answers indicated below to the points made in the draft identic note, explaining that these replies have been framed as the result of a telegraphic summary only, and that it is possible, although not probable, that they may need amplification when the full text of the draft note is available to me:—

8. *The Saudi Arabian Government state that they are not affected by an agreement which they have not signed.* Although it might be more accurate to say that the Saudi Arabian Government are not bound by an agreement to which they are not parties, you may inform the Saudi Arabian Government that His Majesty's Government agree.

9. *The Saudi Arabian Government ask the meaning of "common interest."* His Majesty's Government consider that, where certain events happen which are recognised in the agreement to infringe a "common interest" of the two parties, either party may claim to be free from its obligations to the other of non-intervention arising from the agreement. But naturally it acquires no new right of intervention which it would not have had if this agreement had not been made.

10. *The Saudi Arabian Government ask the meaning of "a privileged position of a political character," particularly with reference to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.* While His Majesty's Government do not for their part consider that it is possible or desirable to define with precision a phrase which is meant to refer rather to the spirit which will inspire the policies of the two parties than to lay down a precise code of conduct for their guidance, they do not consider that the existing Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, whose terms were known before the Middle Eastern Agreement was concluded, gives any of the Arab parties such a position in the territories of the other. The main object of the agreement is that the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen shall be maintained and the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance do not deprive any of the Arab parties of their independence or integrity.

11. *The Saudi Arabian Government suggest that article 3 of the agreement is contrary to article 1 of the Treaty of Jeddah.* His Majesty's Government fail to understand how an article which declares that it is in the interest of Great Britain and Italy that all other Powers should refrain from doing certain things prejudicial to the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen can be regarded as incompatible with an article which states that His Britannic Majesty recognises the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies.

12. *The Saudi Arabian Government ask whether article 8 places a time-limit on the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the independence of Saudi Arabia.* The answer is that it certainly does nothing of the kind. The agreement is one between Great Britain and Italy in which each party promises the other not to do certain things, and recognises that certain other things may be regarded by the other party as contrary to that other's interest. Its conclusion, and equally its termination, does not or will not in any way affect the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government. Furthermore, the agreement deals with other questions besides the position of Saudi Arabia (for instance article 7). Many of these questions differ both from the

provisions of the agreement relating to Saudi Arabia and from the rest of the Anglo-Italian settlement inasmuch as they are not merely affirmations of general principles, but impose definite obligations on both sides in regard to matters which do not affect the rights or interests of any third Power. It is only natural that a term should be set to obligations of this kind and the Saudi Arabian Government can rest assured that, so far as they are concerned, the fact that the whole agreement is terminable after ten years is without significance.

13. As the Saudi Arabian Government are aware of the enquiries made by the Iraqi Government, it will no doubt be desirable to inform them in due course of the replies of His Majesty's Government. But you should wait until you receive from Sir Maurice Peterson a precise account of the communication which he makes to the Iraqi Government before attempting to convey this information otherwise than in the most general terms.

14. I enclose for your information a memorandum upon the scope and objects of the Middle Eastern Agreement.<sup>(\*)</sup> This document was originally prepared for use in connexion with the parliamentary debate upon the Anglo-Italian settlement. It must be regarded as a general guide only, and in the case of any seeming inconsistency between it and this despatch, or my despatch to Sir Maurice Peterson, the views expressed in the despatches must be taken as authoritative.

15. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome, Cairo and Bagdad, to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

(\*) No. 121.







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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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*Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.*

## CONFIDENTIAL.

### Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XLIII.—JULY TO DECEMBER 1938.

#### CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 2579/150/91]

No. 1.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1938.*

I AM directed by Viscount Halifax to request you to inform the Marquess of Zetland that he has carefully considered your letter of the 3rd May respecting the possibility of ceding to Ibn Saud, in order thereby to secure an agreed frontier between the Trucial Sheikdoms and Saudi Arabia, certain territory adjoining the Khor-el-Odeid, which at present belongs to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.

2. Lord Halifax fully realises that the grant to Ibn Saud of access to the Khor-el-Odeid could not be guaranteed to have a lasting good effect upon his relations with His Majesty's Government. It is, unhappily, only too likely that the necessity placed upon His Majesty's Government of following a certain policy in regard to Palestine may make it impossible for Ibn Saud not to work against them in certain circumstances, whether he receives satisfaction over his south-eastern frontiers or not. He has never made any attempt to conceal this possibility and the prospect of having it forced upon him has been one of the principal motives behind his constant appeals to His Majesty's Government to reconsider their policy.

3. But although it cannot be guaranteed that any concession which might be made over the Khor-el-Odeid would have a permanent effect in securing Ibn Saud's friendship, there are strong arguments, in Lord Halifax's opinion, for making every endeavour to reach a final settlement of this frontier question at the present time. His Lordship would, in fact, see great advantage in such a settlement, even from the point of view of relations with Saudi Arabia. In his Lordship's opinion, the position is different from what it was when Sir Reader Bullard expressed his doubts a year ago as to the advantages to be obtained from letting Ibn Saud have access to the Khor-el-Odeid, because His Majesty's Government have since then, and at a time when the general international outlook has become increasingly threatening, adopted the policy of setting up a Jewish State in a part of Palestine. The change which this has brought into the Middle Eastern situation is fundamental, and His Majesty's Government must clearly do everything within their power at this present juncture to retain the goodwill of Ibn Saud and—more important still—to strengthen his hand in dealing with his own people. A frontier settlement which would give him access to the sea at a new point on the Persian Gulf and could be represented as a success for his diplomacy would help in both these directions. In any case the dangers of the present time are so great that no course of action which may promote these objects can safely be overlooked.

4. It will be seen from what has been said above that, in Lord Halifax's opinion, a concession regarding Ibn Saud's claim to the Khor-el-Odeid might with advantage be made even at the risk of considerable inconvenience in other directions, as, for example, some diminution in the prestige of His Majesty's



Government in the Persian Gulf, although he is naturally desirous that no avoidable action should be taken which might have this result. But for the reasons given below he is not convinced that the action which has been proposed for the settlement of the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia need, in fact, have a serious adverse effect on British prestige locally.

5. The position, as his Lordship sees it, is as follows: The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi controls a territory extending inland from the coast for an indefinite distance. In theory, this territory may be regarded as having in the recent past extended, or at any rate as having been capable of extension, as far west as the blue line of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 and as far south as the boundary, wherever that may be, dividing the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (whose territory has likewise been theoretically capable of extension to the blue line) from the territories of the Trucial sheikhs. In practice, however, the sheikh has been unable to assert his authority over so wide an area, and His Majesty's Government have been obliged to recognise that at the utmost he has not asserted it further west or south than the so-called Riyadh line offered to Ibn Saud in 1935. The Power to whom the sheikh has lost what may be called his reversionary rights to the area between the blue line and the Riyadh line is unquestionably Ibn Saud, and he has lost them, not through any sudden act of conquest or intrusion, but as the result of a gradual forward movement which had probably begun long before the blue line came into being.

6. If it were possible to regard the Riyadh line as a natural frontier to the west and north of which the authority of the sheikh was firmly established, there might be no need to apprehend a further Saudi advance. But it is nothing of the kind. Apart from the probability that Ibn Saud is already the overlord of the inhabitants of the area lying between it and the Khor-el-Odeid, the recent enquiries into the possibility of providing landing-grounds in the hinterland of the Trucial Coast for use by aircraft engaged on survey work do not suggest that the control of any of the Trucial sheikhs over the interior is really effective, while it is known that Saudi officials have been able in recent years to penetrate as far east as Baraimi. Even, therefore, if there is no imminent menace of Saudi or Wahabi expansion upon the Trucial Coast itself, it equally does not appear that further expansion towards that coast would meet with any obstacle.

7. It is, in fact, the nature of this expansion which lies at the root of the problem. Ibn Saud's advance has proceeded quietly but inexorably, for no apparent reason except that there has been nothing to stop it. It is reasonable to suppose that, for a ruler of Ibn Saud's prestige, it is easy to persuade desert tribes who are not under the control of any recognised ruler to say that they owe allegiance to himself, and unless some effective check to this natural and even inevitable process can be devised, it is likely to continue through the years until Ibn Saud's authority extends to the very outskirts of the Trucial ports. There are only two ways, as far as Lord Halifax can see, of preventing this. The one is for His Majesty's Government to lay down a frontier unilaterally and declare their intention of maintaining it by force of arms. The other is to agree with Ibn Saud upon a frontier which he will formally and openly recognise, and which he and his successors will thereafter be unable to disregard without providing His Majesty's Government with grounds for opposing them with a degree of vigour which could not be justified in the present anomalous situation.

8. There can be no question but that the second of these alternatives is much to be preferred, if it can be achieved. It cannot, however, be achieved without the cession to Ibn Saud of either the Jebel Naksh, which is impossible, or the Khor-el-Odeid, which is only possible with the acquiescence of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. The position of the sheikh being what it is, he would have every reason to welcome the establishment of a settled frontier, more or less following the Riyadh line, in return for the surrender of a small area of empty desert adjacent to the Khor-el-Odeid, for which he can have little or no use, but which may have great value for Ibn Saud, both sentimentally and as a possible corridor for an oil pipe-line to the Persian Gulf.

9. Whether the sheikh can be persuaded to see his own interests in this light is, however, a separate problem, and on the assumption (which has yet to be proved) that he will refuse to do so, two main ways of compensating him still further for the loss of some of his territory have been considered. The first of these is a money payment and the second is an assurance of support in the event of a serious attack from the landward side.

10. Lord Halifax shares to the full the distaste which has been expressed for a money payment, because it clearly imports a questionable element into a settlement which can be justified on its own merits and which the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi ought to accept in his own interests. Nevertheless, if a money payment would regard as adequate compensation, but looking at the question from another Government ought not, in his Lordship's opinion, to hesitate to pay any reasonable sum which might be necessary. He notes that it is impossible for the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to hazard a guess as to the sum which the sheikh would secure the sheikh's acquiescence in a frontier settlement, His Majesty's angle—that is to say, from the point of view of the value of a settlement to His Majesty's Government—he considers that £25,000 or even a larger sum would not be too much.

11. The alternative, or additional, form of compensation is an undertaking to protect the sheikh in the event of a land attack from Saudi Arabia. Lord Halifax notes that in the opinion of the Political Resident the first question which the sheikh would be likely to ask, if approached regarding the Khor-el-Odeid, would be: "Will His Majesty's Government guarantee this frontier as against Saudi Arabia?" His Lordship considers that if it were necessary to secure the sheikh's concurrence, an endeavour should be made to meet to some extent his wishes on this point. The precise wording of any assurance given to the sheikh would need consideration. It would clearly be undesirable that His Majesty's Government should undertake any responsibility for intervening if some tribal elements on the Abu Dhabi side of the frontier chose to repudiate the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and to declare allegiance to Ibn Saud; nor could His Majesty's Government accept responsibility for the prevention of tribal raids from Saudi Arabian territory across the frontier. The undertakings to be assumed by His Majesty's Government should be so worded as to apply only in the event of major aggression against Abu Dhabi on the part of the territorial sovereign on the other side of the frontier.

12. Lord Halifax is aware that assurances of this kind may seem to constitute an extension of the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government. He realises that in particular strong objection is seen in many quarters to increasing the commitments of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf by adding to the existing obligations to defend the Trucial sheikhs from aggression by sea an obligation to defend any one of them from aggression by land, and that the view has been expressed that if His Majesty's Government were to undertake such an additional commitment it might necessitate an adjustment in the forces of His Majesty's Government in the neighbourhood of the Gulf. His Lordship cannot help feeling, however, that these responsibilities already exist and the additional obligation would be more apparent than real.

13. In the first place, the fact that the air route along the Trucial Coast is a vital sector in the communications of the Empire means that His Majesty's Government could not in practice allow any Power not under their influence to occupy any part of the coast or its immediate vicinity which was of importance for the air route. The only uncertainty is at what point His Majesty's Government are to consider that their position on the Trucial Coast would be threatened. At present they are free, so far as their formal obligations to the sheikhs are concerned, to allow the predominant Power in the adjacent parts of Arabia to extend its influence as far as the Trucial ports themselves. It is doubtful, however, whether His Majesty's Government could even now remain inactive while the authority of one of the Trucial sheikhs was irreparably undermined in this way, while in the event of a serious attack from Saudi Arabia His Majesty's Government would in practice find themselves obliged to intervene to prevent the sheikh from being overwhelmed.

14. In the second place, if any oil company hereafter wishes as the result of a survey to undertake active operations in the interior, it will not be able to do so unless it knows that the site of these operations lies to the north and east of a settled frontier, and once such operations had begun His Majesty's Government would inevitably be obliged to interest themselves in the maintenance of that frontier.

15. Nevertheless, Lord Halifax is prepared to agree that every effort should be made to avoid the additional commitment involved in a definite guarantee of any landward frontier which might eventually be fixed for the sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi as the outcome of the present discussion, and that the support of His



Majesty's Government should be limited to a promise to intervene energetically with Ibn Saud or his successors in the event of their disregarding the new frontier.

16. In the circumstances set forth above, Lord Halifax considers that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to grasp an opportunity which may not recur of settling this most difficult of frontier questions, and should to that end try to persuade the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi to part with the relatively small area necessary to give Ibn Saud access to the Khor-el-Odeid, if possible in return for a settled frontier, but if necessary with the added inducements of a promise of general good offices in matters relating to that frontier and a money payment. But the question still remains of what attitude His Majesty's Government should adopt if all these inducements fail in their object. Lord Halifax would not for a moment dispute the view that it would be wrong to bring pressure to bear upon any Trucial sheikh to act to his own disadvantage merely in order to further the interests of His Majesty's Government. But in this case the action proposed is manifestly not to the sheikh's disadvantage. Moreover, His Majesty's Government are surely entitled to take into account the fact that without their protection not one of the Trucial sheikhs could last for a day against Ibn Saud, and to expect from these sheikhs a greater degree of co-operation in matters affecting the interests of His Majesty's Government than many of them have seemed disposed to show in recent years.

17. This being so, Lord Halifax feels that in the event of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi proving obdurate, he should be informed that this is a case in which His Majesty's Government must insist, in the interests of his people and successors, on his following their advice, in return for which they will promise to take up on his behalf all matters affecting his landward frontiers and (at the discretion of the Political Resident) a money payment, which might be disguised as compensation for the loss of imaginary dues or revenues from the ceded territory.

18. The question of the effect which such an attitude might have upon the prestige of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf is one upon which Lord Halifax naturally expresses an opinion with diffidence. But he suggests that, provided no injustice is done, a show of firmness in such a situation ought not to diminish the prestige of His Majesty's Government, but rather to enhance it. It may be argued that this might be so, but for the fact that to the Trucial sheikhs it would appear that His Majesty's Government were being firm with one of themselves because they dared not be firm with Ibn Saud. Lord Halifax recognises the force of this argument, but he sees no reason why the advantages to the sheikhs of a settled frontier should not be understood locally. It might, indeed, be represented to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi that Ibn Saud is the friend of the British and has throughout his career (unlike certain lesser Arab rulers of no importance who are ignorant of world affairs) shown himself consistently well disposed to His Majesty's Government and anxious in all circumstances to consult their interests; so that His Majesty's Government, for their part, have no hesitation in asking the sheikh to contribute his share towards an agreement which is considered to be advantageous to all parties.

19. There remains to be considered the opinion expressed by the Government of India, that there are political objections to making a breach in the line of territory under British control at present stretching along the coast of the Persian Gulf from Qatar to Muscat or to admit further Saudi access to the Gulf. The Service Departments are understood to be satisfied that there are no strategical disadvantages to be apprehended from Saudi access to the Khor-el-Odeid, and it seems clear that such access will not give Ibn Saud any greater opportunities for expanding his influence upon the Trucial Coast than he already possesses at the present time. On the contrary, a settled frontier between his territories and those of the Trucial sheikhs would set definite limits to such expansion. Lord Halifax finds it difficult in these circumstances to form a clear idea of the nature of the political objections, and in any case these objections do not in his opinion outweigh the wider political advantages of securing a frontier settlement with Ibn Saud.

20. Copies of this letter are being sent to the departments represented on the Middle Eastern Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence and to the Petroleum Department.

I am, &c.  
L. BAGGALLAY.

[E 4047/29/89]

No. 2.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 127.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, June 21, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in continuation of my telegram No. 113, dated the 21st June, that on the 20th June the Kaimakam of Jedda, in his capacity of Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, brought and read out to me copies of telegrams exchanged between my Turkish colleague and Ibn Saud. M. Goren, who said that he was acting on instructions from Angora, telegraphed to the King urging him not to be misled by the rumours and slanders about Turkey that were being uttered; the trouble in the Sanjak of Alexandretta was mainly due to certain Catholics acting apparently under the protection of the French High Commissioner, with the Pope in the background. Turkey, said M. Goren, adhered firmly to her desire for the freedom and independence of the Arabs and for the establishment of a lasting friendship between Arabs and Turks, and His Majesty must therefore be on the watch for anything that interested parties might do to disturb that friendship. In his reply, Ibn Saud reciprocated the good wishes of the Turkish Government, said that he had advised Jamil Mardom last year to act with moderation, and had informed His Majesty's Government of that fact, and expressed the hope that a satisfactory settlement would be arrived at.

2. This correspondence was communicated to me, the kaimakam explained, in pursuance of the King's policy of taking His Majesty's Government into his confidence; what comment did I wish to make? As usual, the kaimakam sat with pencil poised to take down a message to be repeated word for word to Ibn Saud. I refrained from making the obvious comment that the Turkish Government appear, from their telegram, to think more highly of Ibn Saud's influence than of his intelligence, but merely said that some compromise seemed inevitable in the circumstances, and spoke with high appreciation of the counsel of moderation which His Majesty gave to Jamil Mardom; this advice had doubtless had a good effect and would help, I trusted, to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem.

3. Apart from letting me see this correspondence, the Saudi Government have made no communication to me about Alexandretta for a long time. They know, I assume, that the case is lost. In private conversation the kaimakam takes the ordinary Arab view that the sanjak has been sold to the Turks by the French in exchange for security for the rest of Syria and for recognition of the special position of France therein. This is no doubt the view of Ibn Saud also, and he is probably thinking of the warnings about Turkish ambitions which he has given us on more than one occasion. He used to believe, or affect to believe, that His Majesty's Government were strangely blind on this point, but it would not be surprising if he had by now concluded that His Majesty's Government had helped to sacrifice the Arabs in the sanjak to the Turks in return for Turkish friendship and support. From one point of view it was satisfactory to learn from despatch No. 183 which His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora addressed to the Foreign Office on the 22nd April that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had advised the Palestinian Arabs to accept the partition policy of His Majesty's Government; but when Ibn Saud heard of this advice, as he was bound to do very soon, he may well have connected it with the defeat of Arab hopes in the sanjak. I do not venture to criticise the Alexandretta settlement, and if Ibn Saud could see the minutes of the proceedings at which the matter was discussed, he might take a charitable view of our policy; but with the material at his disposal he will inevitably believe that from fear or self-interest we have allowed the Turks to attain in the sanjak a political predominance which is not justified by the strength of the Turkish element in the population.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.



[E 4185/193/25]

No. 3.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, June 26, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the activity in aviation which I reported in my despatch No. 107, dated the 30th May, has died down even sooner than I expected. Aeroplanes have been seen very rarely since then, and in the last fortnight I do not think more than one ascent has been made. I am informed that there is no petrol. As you are aware, in Saudi Arabia finance and defence are in the hands of the same official, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, and this arrangement, which might lead to extravagance in defence in a richer country, leads to parsimony here, where the Treasury is always short of funds. It is perhaps not unfair to connect the shortage of petrol with the fact that Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman has just despatched to India at the expense of the State a man whose business it is to buy stuffs for the Royal ladies. But it is confidently asserted that next year Saudi Arabia will have its own petrol.

2. According to M. Naidyonoff, the attempts of Major Cicchi to instruct the Saudi pilots in navigation have been abandoned, and the pilots, while able to make straight flights quite well, still show no interest whatever in the theoretical side of their work, or in the engines.

3. The repairs to the second Wapiti are now nearly complete, and M. Naidyonoff is besieging the Minister of Finance, who is at present in Jedda, for enough petrol to enable him to make a trial flight. M. Naidyonoff proposes, as soon as he has two Wapitis at his disposal, to fly to Taif to repair the Wapiti which is lying there. As to the fourth machine, he thinks it may have to be sent to the factory in England, as it was completely dismantled by one of his predecessors. M. Naidyonoff hears much gossip about the desire of the Italians to supply the Saudi Government with machines (? Ansaldo) to oust the Wapitis, but nothing definite.

4. There has been talk lately about sending some young Saudis "abroad" for training in connexion with aviation, and the most definite report is that ten are required for training as air mechanics and ten as motor-car mechanics. This suggested that the Saudi authorities were perhaps proposing to act upon the offer of the Air Ministry and had arranged the details, as was suggested in Foreign Office telegram No. 1 of the 3rd January, through their representative in Cairo. I therefore asked the Kaimakam casually whether the Saudi Government were carrying out the scheme which they had accepted in principle some six months ago. The Kaimakam professed to know nothing about the matter, but said he would ask. That was a fortnight ago, and I have not yet received a reply. Perhaps His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo have some information on this point.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4187/196/25]

No. 4.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 132.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, June 28, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a translation of an interesting announcement from the *Umm-al-Qura*, reporting that at a conference held in Riyadh in May it was agreed that a Higher Council of State should be set up and that the military system of the country should be reorganised on a more regular basis.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. Why the new council is to be called the Higher Council of State is not made clear. There is at present a Legislative Assembly, and a standing

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

committee of the Council of Ministers. The Legislative Council seems to deal only with administrative, never with political, questions. The other body apparently serves by standing, for, according to Fuad Bey, who is a member of it, it does nothing else. The High Council of State is apparently to be consulted on political matters, since it is to consider "public affairs touching the State and its preservation." While Ibn Saud makes his own decisions, he is quite right in claiming, as he has done on occasion, that he first listens to advice, and he listens to it openly in a manner which the European Dictators would consider ruinous to their reputations. It is, I think, legitimate to suppose that the council will be a safety-valve for its members, who can give their opinions on Palestine and the Arab world and European politics, and for the King a formal means by which he can make his opinions and decisions on questions of high policy known to the people.

3. In view of the forecast made in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 103 E, dated the 22nd May, it is interesting to see that a standing army trained on more or less modern lines is to be created with the aid of oil revenues—for that is evidently the "economic resources" Ibn Saud has in mind. We have never been told what reply Ibn Saud returned to the Iraq proposal for the introduction of some measure of unification in the training and equipment of the two armies, but it is probable that that proposal will be taken into account when the tens of thousands of Arabs are assembled, clad in unaccustomed trousers, in their barracks. It may be some little time before the collection of oil royalties allows of a serious beginning with this plan, and it is therefore early to speculate whether the proposed force will be more efficient than tribal levies, and, if so, whether it will conduce to the stability of the Saudi régime by providing the ruler for the time being with a sure protection against any attempt to overthrow him.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4403/150/91]

No. 5.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 137.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, July 4, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, a note from the Saudi Government, dated the 26th June, about the eastern frontier. It is a reply to the note, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office with my printed despatch No. 72, dated the 14th April, in which the right of His Majesty's Government to keep the American oil company concerned informed of the frontier situation was reiterated, and it deals also in principle with the question of prospecting for oil in the disputed zone. It will be seen that the Saudi Government do no more than repeat their offer to refrain from prospecting in the disputed zone until a frontier agreement is arrived at, provided that His Majesty's Government will ensure that a similar policy of abstention is observed from the Qatar side.

2. In my telegram No. 56 dated the 7th March, I reported Fuad Bey's "personal" opinion as to the sort of solution that might be acceptable to his Government. Fuad Bey went to Syria on leave soon after that, and had I been in a position to give him my views on his opinion, the reply was to be sent to him there. It is possible that the Saudi Arabian Government have been waiting for such a reply, but their reference to Fuad Bey may have resulted from their consciousness that he is the only person in their employ who thoroughly understands the bilingual correspondence on this subject and can be trusted to write a clear reply.

3. The deadlock is still complete. The only hopeful feature in the situation is that the Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company are more and more

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inclined to believe that the oil-field in Hasa is extremely rich. If this belief is well-founded, Ibn Saud's bitterness on the frontier question, in so far as it has an economic basis, should diminish with time, though an increase in his income will not make him less touchy on the point of prestige.

4. On looking through the file, I see that, owing to a regrettable oversight, the Saudi note which I summarised briefly in my telegram No. 40 of the 23rd February was never sent to you. A translation is enclosed. I expect to proceed to England on leave in a few days, and this question can perhaps be considered once more while I am at home, though I have no useful suggestions to make. All we can do, it seems, is to revert to our proposal for a preliminary examination of the area in dispute, which is little more than a device by which we hope to convince the Saudi authorities that Jabal Nakhsh is an integral part of the small Jabal Dukhan range. If the invitation which I have received holds good and I spend a few weeks at Ibn Saud's camp in Nejd next spring, it might perhaps be possible to organise a visit to the Qatar boundary for this purpose.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch, with copies of enclosures, to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire and the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department at Simla.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

*Saudi Government to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard,

*Taif, June 26, 1938.*

I REGRET the delay in replying to your note dated the 14th April, 1938, due to the necessity of enquiring from the Deputy Minister for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to certain information which he has concerning the matter in question, while he, as you are aware, is on sick leave.

Your Excellency's note under reference has been studied, and I am able to explain to your Excellency the opinion of the Government of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom thereon.

1. The Government of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom have already informed the British Government of their non-recognition of the Blue Line, and that they did not consider its existence as a proper reason for the surrender of territories and places which are under their control, and in their possession from ancient and in recent times.

2. Our Government do not recognise the validity of any orders which any Government may give to individuals or companies in their country. It is the right of our Government and no one else to give such information.

3. His Majesty the King always desires—it is his habit—not to create any difficulty for his neighbours, and particularly for the British Government. He therefore hopes that the frontier question may be settled at their earliest convenience.

4. With a view to the obviation of disputes at the present time until after the conclusion of a definite agreement with Qatar in respect of the delimitation of the frontiers, he is prepared to give special orders to the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company to the effect that they must not cross the maximum limit of the frontiers as proposed by the British Government, provided that Qatar undertakes to prevent the oil company in their territory from crossing the maximum limit, as requested by our Government, until after the conclusion of a definite agreement in respect of the frontiers. If the British Government agree to this (solution) our Government is prepared to accept it.

With highest respects,

FEYSAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

*Saudi Government to Sir R. Bullard.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Mecca, February 16, 1938.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter, dated the 3rd February, regarding the south-eastern frontiers.

The Government of His Majesty desire nothing better than to be in agreement with the British Government on every subject of common interest and to have a complete understanding on all matters. They have already exerted and are still exerting their endeavours, as the British Government are aware, to settle every question in a manner satisfactory to both parties and calculated to secure their common interests. One of the points on which they have spent their efforts in order to bring the two parties nearer to each other is the settlement of the question of the south-eastern frontiers between Saudi Arabia and the Arab amirates on the Persian Gulf in a manner satisfactory to all and calculated to secure the lawful interest of both parties. You state that your Government have shown a spirit of great conciliation in the matter of the frontier to which my Government hold, whereas the position to which my Government hold has remained unchanged. It is true that that is the apparent position, but if you will examine the spirit of conciliation actually shown by my Government, it will prove to you that they have gone very far indeed towards meeting the wishes of their friends the British Government. When the question of this frontier was first raised in London and Jedda, the position of my Government was clear, viz., that what they hold to is all the territories which belonged to the fathers and grandfathers of His Majesty the King; and these, of course, include much wider areas than the frontier to which their claims were subsequently limited. As you are aware, the agreement of 1915 plainly recognises as belonging to His Majesty the King what belonged to his fathers and grandfathers. A satisfactory adhesion to the text of that agreement would make a large part of the Hadhramaut, Dhufar, Oman, Abu Dhabi and Qatar fall within the territories of His Majesty the King, and an historical examination (of the facts) shows that the posts at Abr and Bairami and Dhifar and in the middle of Qatran were Saudi posts founded by the forefathers of His Majesty the King in the last century. Nevertheless, His Majesty the King, (was) desirous that there should be agreement and understanding with the British Government, and that his friends among the Arab rulers on the Persian Gulf should not be deprived, even though that should involve himself in material loss. All this caused him, after strong insistence, to limit his claims to the minimum, hoping (thereby) to put a decisive end to the difficulties. It never entered into His Majesty's thoughts that what he mentioned would be a subject of argument and dispute. The line to which my Government holds represents the minimum of their legitimate and reasonable claims; consequently, your Excellency's statement that the conciliation and concession have come from the British Government, while the position of my Government has not changed, indicates disdain for the Government of His Majesty and forgetfulness of the great sacrifices which they have made in renouncing in favour of the rulers of those neighbouring Arab territories wide areas whose ownership by His Majesty can be proved by every historical and actual right.

It never entered into the thoughts of my Government to bargain about the frontier which they put forward, for it was drawn after deep reflection and careful consideration; and it was on account of the insistence of the British Government that it was drawn so as to cover the very minimum of the just claims. Had my Government thought that it would be the subject of discussion and bargaining, they would have taken up a different position, whereas they limited their claims to the minimum, hoping that the British Government would not argue about it, but would accept it as a just and practical frontier in the interests of both parties. I do not conceal from your Excellency that my Government attaches the greatest importance to this frontier and regards it as a very vital matter. Nay, more: I can say that this question is a question of life and death in connexion with that part of His Majesty's dominions. They, therefore, regret exceedingly that the British Government do not appreciate their position at its true value; at the same time, however, they express their readiness to discuss any practical proposal which will secure the interests of both parties and obviate harm.



As to the abstention by employees of the companies on both sides from encroaching on the disputed areas, the Deputy Foreign Minister in his personal letter of 3/12/1356 (the 3rd February, 1938) explained the essence of the position to your Excellency as my Government understand it, and in it he explained exactly how the matter stood. I hope that there may be sufficient explanation therein to help to clear up the present misunderstanding and to bring about a fundamental solution of the difficulties.

As to the question of the appointment of a topographical commission, His Majesty's Government, before giving a definite reply to the request, would like to enquire from your Government as to the areas required to be surveyed in order that the matter may be sufficiently clear to both sides, and that the confusion which might result if the agreement were general and not precise may be avoided.

I await, therefore, the opinion of your Government on the three points set forth above.

FEYSAL.

[E 4545/233/91]

No. 6.

*Correspondence between the Governor of Aden and the King of the Yemen respecting the Shabwa and Ahl Sei'ar Tribes.—(Communicated to Foreign Office by the Middle Eastern Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, July 29, 1938; Received August 2.)*

I.—Governor of Aden to the King of the Yemen.

Your Majesty,

Aden, May 3, 1938.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with my letter dated the 4th September, 1937, and to your Majesty's letter dated the 7th Muharrum, 1357 (the 9th March, 1938), regarding Shabwa and the tribes in that region, I am directed by His Majesty's Government to assure your Majesty that it is not their desire to take any action in contravention of the San'a Treaty.

2. I am desired to point out that, under article 3 of the treaty, the high contracting parties agreed to maintain the position in regard to the southern frontier of the Yemen as it existed at the time of the signature of the treaty; that such an agreement could affect, and did affect, only the political dividing line between the areas administered by the Yemeni Government and those under the protection of the British Government; and that these areas were contiguous from the coast opposite Perim to the north-eastern boundary of the Beihan Province. Your Majesty will doubtless recollect that it was only this line that formed the subject of the discussions upon which the treaty was based. Beyond Beihan the areas administered by your Majesty in 1934 were not, in fact, immediately adjacent to the area claimed by His Majesty's Government as being under their protection.

3. I am further directed to say that His Majesty's Government would gladly defer, were it possible, to your Majesty's expressed wish that all reference to treaties concluded with the late Ottoman Government should be excluded from these discussions, but your Majesty will hardly fail to appreciate that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 was an internationally valid agreement concluded with the then recognised ruler or suzerain of the territories bordering upon the areas in Southern Arabia under British protection; and that, while British relations with the several tribes in the protectorate are based upon the several treaties concluded with them, the definition of the northern boundary of the whole area included in the Anglo-Turkish Convention is clearly authoritative. While, therefore, His Majesty's Government do not claim to derive their rights of suzerainty from the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the latter has always been regarded—and must continue to be regarded—as evidence of the geographical extent of the area under British influence. The boundary line, as defined in those treaties, passes considerably north of the areas occupied by the tribes of Shabwa,

and these areas are therefore indisputably within the territory which the British Government has always claimed in the past as lying within the sphere of its influence.

4. Since, therefore, the Shabwa area is geographically within the limits claimed to be under British suzerainty, and since the area under Yemeni administration in 1934 lay at some distance both from the Shabwa area and from the protectorate boundary to the north of it, as laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it is the view of His Majesty's Government that no administrative action taken therein can be construed as a breach of article 3 of the San'a Treaty.

5. Moreover, the tribes of Shabwa, though it is admitted that no very close contact has been maintained with them in the past, have always been regarded as being subsidiary to the Upper Aulaqi Sultan, with whom His Majesty's Government have been in treaty relations since 1903, and consequently as being covered by the provisions of the latter's treaty with His Majesty's Government. It is only because it has become apparent in recent years that the tribes of Shabwa are not in practice subordinate to the Upper Aulaqi Sultan at the present date, that the Aden authorities have recently considered the conclusion with them of a treaty similar in kind to the treaties with all other tribes and rulers within the area of British influence.

6. I am further authorised to suggest, for your Majesty's consideration, that, in view of your Majesty's attitude on the boundary question, and having regard to the probability that officers of the Yemeni Administration may in future come into closer contact with those of the Protectorate Government in the area north-east of Beihan, arrangements might suitably be made at some convenient date for an informal and friendly discussion between representatives of the two Governments with a view to arriving at an agreed settlement in regard to the Yemeni-Protectorate boundary in this area.

7. The foregoing deals with the question of Shabwa.

But with reference to your Majesty's letter of the 7th Muharrum, 1357 (the 9th March, 1938), in which your Majesty claims the Ahl Sei'ar as well as Shabwa to be in the Yemeni Kingdom, and complains of certain recent activities on the part of His Majesty's Government in connexion with this tribe and in their territory, it must be clear to your Majesty that the arguments and facts quoted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter apply equally to the Ahl Sei'ar as they do to Shabwa and its tribes.

Moreover, the Ahl Sei'ar are considered to be subordinate to the Qu'aiti Sultan of Mukalla. It is realised that certain nomads of the Ahl Sei'ar trade and graze in, and have constant contact with, your Majesty's kingdom, but this is only a limited number and does not affect the principles set forth in the preceding paragraphs. These nomadic Sei'ar may be compared to similar tribal movements of the Bal Harith in the Beihan area.

I take, &c.

B. R. REILLY,  
Governor.

II.—The King of the Yemen to the Governor of Aden.

San'a, 7th Rabi II, 1357

(June 5, 1938).

(After Compliments.)

WE have received your esteemed letter dated the 3rd Rabi' Awwal, 1357 (the 3rd May, 1938), through Captain Seager, and have gone through it with full respect, thoroughness and deep care and interest. As we personally in particular and our Government in general have sincerely and truthfully agreed and are determined in an absolute manner to maintain love, earnestness and good understanding and treatment with the Great British Government, we deem it suitable and necessary to make a frank and just declaration (viz., representation), and in reply to your letter under reference to explain the following articles:—

1. Your Excellency knows that there had been negotiations which lasted about fifteen years or more between the two Governments, part of which were lengthy official correspondence, and all of which refused in an absolute manner any contract (pact), or discussion or plan (viz., arrangement), made with the Ottomans



or others relating to Yemen, and an agreement has lastly and finally been arrived at on this basis between the two parties to confine the understanding and decision direct between the two Governments only, and on this basis the auspicious treaty was concluded between the two kingdoms, and we pray God that that treaty shall be observed (viz., maintained) and its terms executed under the goodwill and friendship of both parties. Such being the case, it is not conceivable that there should be any place for the repetition of claims relying on those (alleged) documents which were already refused. For this reason we can find no way or reasonable authority to repeat the mention or reference to those refused documents, and to make them as an authority or basis to rely on in justifying the execution of the desire for expansion of lands inside or within our pure (viz., real) territory. The attempt to approach or have connexion with such places as (those of) Al Karab, including Shabwa, where there exist up to date, some of our soldiers residing there, viz., the Qarmushiyyun, and (with places such as) Sei'ar, including Al 'Abr, in which a Husn (fort) known as the Husn of Al Hadi, our great-grandfather, is but a delusion and merely following the rule: "Rule is for the Conqueror" ("Right is might"). Your Excellency knows that the document which you claim and which you call as the British-Ottoman Agreement of 1914 cannot in any way be considered as binding either from an international point of view or from a special (viz., private) point of view, because it is simply a paper methodically incomplete and undecided (or unacceptable) by both Governments and unratified by the Royal sides of both parties. Over and above this, that paper mentioned was not placed for execution not even for a single day or an hour, either before or after, but subsequent to its conclusion the two contracting Governments entered into a state of war with one another which lasted four years in all parts (of the world) and in accordance with public law, every contract or decision, pact, understanding or plan (viz., arrangement) is abolished from its basis, root and branch between belligerents. The rise and desire for gain and the argument impressed on us now by means of such worthless implements is unbecoming of the dignity, honour and greatness of the great British Government.

2. The understanding and decision arrived at between the two Governments in all transactions and its branches have been confined, without any restriction to any part or item, to the articles of the treaty signed by both Governments honourably and truthfully by both sides. We did not believe or imagine that it will be followed by an unbecoming treatment such as this. It must not occur between loving and sincere contracting parties who undertook to be sincere and to maintain the firm undertaking and agreement signed by both of them. The honourable treaty referred to has confined the conflicting or points of disagreement between both sides and declared it in article 3 very clearly and plainly, and showed the way of its solution in a friendly way and by agreement. It is not reasonable that means shall be created and claims made outside the contents or text of the treaty and the idea constituting it.

3. As to the attempt for invention that there exists between Al Karab tribe, including Shabwa (on the one part) and the Aulaqi Sultan (on the other), any relation or connexion and to the cherishing of profit by this reference, this is justly speaking causing great surprise. Your Excellency knows that there exist between the Aulaqi Sultan and the said tribe no old bindings or administrative relations up to now, but if it is intended to base the claims on imaginary relations, it is refused from its origin. Take for granted that there exist any private relations of neighbourhood between the two tribes, do these relations make the Al Karab tribe, which is entirely independent of the Aulaqis in as far as territory, country and relationship are concerned, connected with it or subordinate to it? We do not hesitate in deciding that you will not answer this except negatively. If we allow ourselves freedom to make such claims, shall we be at right if we say that we have relations with Lahej, Dhala, the Fadhl country and the Hadhramaut? Will such things be not considered as violating the undertaking, if we make it as a means to get what rights we have in these localities, the taking of a final decision on them has been postponed and we desire to have them executed now? The subordination of As Sei'ar to the Queiti Sultan or the Sultan of Mukalla does not go beyond the meaning of that very thing understood and explained above.

4. It is certain, self-evident and an agreed fact which accepts no objection and free from doubt that the said places are part of our old and original country. It is a known clear fact that till recent days there had been no relation or connexion between the Government of Aden and the said places. The Government

of Aden did not claim till recently anything of the sort except in your letter dated Rabi' Awwal, 1356 (15th May, 1937). In it your Excellency requested and asked us, basing your point of view on the introduction that the desert tribes residing on the corner of the Empty Quarter for maintenance of security and peace between them by concluding a three years' truce, and requesting us to help in that, and in that your Excellency touched our feeling while mentioning the protected tribes by referring to Al Karab tribe, and we had answered your Excellency at once in our letter dated the 27th Rabbi' Al Awwal, 1356 (the 7th June, 1937), by explaining that the Al Karab tribe, as also the Sei'ar, are of the Yemeni original tribes which have had no relation up to now with any other side. We express with much regret that after this the attempts of Aden Government continued by sending aircraft and by endeavouring to obtain papers from some inhabitants of Al Karab. They have likewise sent their aircraft to fly over Al 'Abr in the direction of Sei'ar tribe, and landed in that place and took a group of men of Sei'ar tribe by force in their aircraft and led them to the interior of the Hadhramaut, and they continue to be under captivity up to now. They have established a military post over the Al 'Abr wells dug by our ancestors over 1,000 years ago, and it is attached to us till to-day without any claim or interference having been made for it previous to this by any direction (or Government). These manoeuvres and the like ought not to have been made with the Yemeni country, which is in treaty with the great British Government. Notwithstanding all these stubborn claims also, nothing can be profited except that there exists no relation or connexion between the Aden Government and the said places up to now. It is stated that in these recent days, in spite of the provisions of the treaty, the Government of Aden have passed a judgment in favour of themselves to expand the occupied territory and to add to them new territory of the Yemen Kingdom.

5. As we on our side have admitted and declared all that proves our rights and all that which necessitates the moderation of the Aden Government in this matter in our letter dated the 23rd Jamad I, 1356 (1st August, 1937), we repeat and assure and request the great British Government from an honour and justice point of view not to go so far as to violate the firm undertaking concluded between the Governments, the maintenance of which is based on honour, and to start executing the expansion as an ambition for the barren desert and poor villages, for they have never been one day fit or worthy of the ambition of any ambitious person whoever he may be. It is not conceivable that any profit or benefit would be gained by the Aden Government by such expansion unless they have an idea (intention) to occupy the Yemen. As to our side, it is actually considered to be one of our forts in order to keep the neutrality and continuance of the administration of the kingdom and its protection.

6. In addition to all that we have stated in this, we return, repeat and confirm and assure you in a sincere and eternal manner that we have not spread any action whatever which would cause any infringement to touch the honour, dignity and security of the British Government's administration at all and everywhere. For this we, with our complete sincerity and resolution, inform and assure your Excellency that we are prepared and ready to accept and enforce all that which the British Government wish to do for the peace and security of the roads and the continuance of the communications and the administration of the country which is under their authority till the date of the conclusion of the auspicious treaty between both sides, and we do not ask for anything other than requesting that no attention would be directed to expand or annex new territory from our poor country.

7. It is a known fact that great Powers pride in justice and uncovetousness in the rights (viz., countries) of others without justification. The most fit men to observe these noble qualities is the great British Government due to the precedence they possess in the line of or among Great Powers. It is also a known fact that the reversion to the way of justice and equity is nobler and more honourable and loftier than the persistence to digest (viz., to take away) the rights (countries) of others. Notwithstanding this it is expected of your Excellency if the order for expansion has been issued by the London Government to explain to them fully that it is not feasible to persist on these causes for the required expansion. You were the person who conducted the honourable treaty and who knows these territories which have no (previous) relations with the great British Government.



8. We request the high and great British Government kindly to direct their just and true attention towards us and to place reliance on our actions and moral and material hopes, that we shall always firmly be helpful and useful and shall have regard for the beloved great British Government at all times, viz., at the present and future times.

Greetings!

[E 4992/150/91]

No. 7.

*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India.—*  
(Communicated to Foreign Office in India Office letter P.Z. 5890/38 of August 24, 1938; Received August 25.)

(No. 474-S. Confidential.)

THE Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to (1) His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, (2) the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and, with reference to Residency letter of the 3rd July, 1938, to the India Office, has the honour to transmit a copy of a letter, of the 31st October, 1937, from the Political Agent, Muscat, to His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman respecting the Saudi-Muscat frontier.

*Bushire, July 27, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Political Agent, Muscat, to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.*

(No. C/126/157 of 1937.)

Your Highness,

WITH reference to your Highness's letter dated the 11th May, 1937, regarding the western boundary of your dominions, I am instructed to inform your Highness that His Majesty's Government have taken note of the fact that, while your Highness is unable to state precisely the limits of your claims, your Highness lays no claim to any territory beyond the points:—

D (Intersection of 54° 40' E. and 22° 40' N.)

E (Intersection of 55° 40' E. and 22° N.)

G (Intersection of 55° E. and 20° N.)

H (Intersection of 52° E. and 19° N.)

mentioned in your letter.

(Usual ending.)

R. P. WATTS, Major, I.A.

[E 5064/25/25]

No. 8.

*Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 165.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, August 16, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz for 1938.

2. I was again unable to report from personal knowledge of the actual pilgrimage at Jedda, as I was on leave when most of the important events of the pilgrimage took place. I have therefore again had to rely largely on reports and records left by the departmental officers concerned. Mr. Lal Shah Bokhari, the new Indian vice-consul, Dr. Ghulam Rasul and Haji Abdul Majid have supplied full and carefully compiled materials for the Indian pilgrimage details, the medical remarks and the Malay pilgrimage details respectively. Mr. Ousman has dealt with most of the other nationalities who make the pilgrimage in some numbers. I have again adhered strictly to the general lines of the previous report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the same authorities as last year, viz., to the Government of India (External Affairs Department), to the Government of India (Department of Education, Health and Lands) and the Government of the Straits Settlements.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 8.

PILGRIMAGE REPORT, 1938.

(1) *Introductory and General.*

THE Saudi Arabian Government have reason to be satisfied with the 1938 pilgrimage. Numbers were greater than last year; there were no disasters or epidemics; in fact, everything worked quite smoothly. The internal political situation during the year ending with the pilgrimage had been peaceful and satisfactory: King Abdul Aziz had consolidated his relations with his neighbours by means of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood with Iraq and the Yemen, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had visited Iraq and Syria, and the Iraqi Finance Minister came on pilgrimage. The Amir Saud visited Bahrein before the pilgrimage, and the Sheikh of Bahrein came on pilgrimage with his family. The stalemate which appears to exist with Koweit over the blockade did not prevent Koweitis from making the pilgrimage; in fact more than usual came this year. Rumours of troubles with Transjordan were denied by King Abdul Aziz, and a good many pilgrims came over the Transjordan frontier, including a number of Syrians.

2. The Egyptian pilgrimage passed off well. Talaat Pasha Harb carried out extensive propaganda through the Banque Misr, and, in spite of a general election in Egypt, nearly 10,000 Egyptians made the pilgrimage. The *mahmal* came only as far as Suez; the *kiswa*, or sacred covering for the Kaaba, was sent on to Mecca, though the Saudis seem to have thought it was not as good as *kiswas* used to be in the good old days. At any rate, the Egyptians appear to have deferred to Saudi views about the *mahmal*.

3. The usual propaganda in Moslem foreign countries in favour of the pilgrimage went on, except in Turkey and Iran, both of which countries appear as a rule to make it impossible for intending pilgrims to obtain foreign exchange for their journey. The vagaries of the Moslem calendar seem to make it impossible to forecast on what day of the week the Haj day will fall; full advantage was again taken of this convenient fact this year by the spread of



statements that this year the pilgrimage would be a "Haj-i-Akbar" with its tenfold blessing. In point of fact, however, Pilgrimage Day fell on a Wednesday and not on a Friday. Saudi propaganda was not confined to attracting pilgrims; when they arrived in the country they were again subjected to propaganda exalting the achievements of the present régime. Economic conditions in Java and Malaya appear to have been even better this year, and the number of pilgrims from those countries increased by about 50 per cent. A similar increase took place in pilgrims from India; this fact is probably due in large part to the intense rate war between the Mogul Line and their new rivals, the Scindia Navigation Company. The Italian "Protector of Islam" does not appear to have protected quite as passionately this year as last; however, it is reported that nearly 500 pilgrims came from Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland at Government expense. Eight hundred and fifty-nine pilgrims arrived from the Spanish Zone of Morocco in a vessel flying the Franco flag; 520 of them were said to be Rifians who had been subsidised to the extent of being allowed to purchase their exchange at a very cheap rate, and they arrived full of praise of the insurgent régime, with rumours that a consul-general was to be appointed; perhaps a rival "protector" is about to manifest himself.

4. Pilgrimage Day, which had been announced for Thursday, the 10th February, was finally, by an announcement made on the 7th February, fixed for Wednesday, the 9th of the month. The sudden change of date caused great discomfort and confusion in transport arrangements. There were some murmurings among the sufferers from this curious alteration of date; pilgrims were heard to remark that the date of the Haj was being fixed by Wahhabi mullas, not from the lunar calendar. But the pilgrims assembled at Arafat to the number of about 125,000. Precautions were taken to prevent attacks on the King, and a Bengali pilgrim who attempted to kiss the hands of the King in the mosque at Arafat was arrested on suspicion, but afterwards released. Climatic conditions were good, and the general health of the pilgrims at this favourable time of the year was excellent.

5. At the time of the visit of the Sheikh of Bahrein it was noticed that the same measures were taken in respect of the sheikh as had been taken to protect the King against attack: when the distinguished visitor made the circumambulation, the ordinary pilgrims were brushed aside and made to interrupt their devotions. This gave rise to some complaints from those who felt strongly about the Islamic conception of the equality of all believers before God. An Indian physician, named Hakim Seyyid Ahmed Sasawani, who had come on the pilgrimage bearing a special present of ingenious locks for the King, was arrested as the result of an anonymous letter declaring that he would attempt to murder the King; all was eventually explained and he was released and compensated. An equally respectable pilgrim from the Sudan was similarly arrested on suspicion that he was intending to murder the King with a dagger in the mosque.

6. No changes are to be recorded in the general economic condition of the country. The American Oil Company in Nejd and the Petroleum Development Company in the Hejaz employed some labour, and the former seem to have struck much more oil than they expected; the consequent royalties are beginning to be paid, and may, in the end, enable the Saudi authorities to reduce the present high rate of fees for pilgrims. Four Arab companies were operating in economic matters, according to the newspapers, but their precise functions were very obscure. The road project, from Jedda to Mecca and also from Jedda to Medina, was the subject of a good deal of talk, and is evidently to be financed partly out of the Egyptian waqf funds and partly by Saudi funds; but nothing has actually been done yet.

7. Sir Nizam Jung visited the Hejaz again after an interval of two years, but does not seem to have arranged to his satisfaction details of his schemes for repairs and improvements. He put a sum of 12,000 rupees at the disposal of the Minister of Finance for the construction of a rest-house at Rabigh; whether such a building will be useful is doubtful, as the pilgrims seem to prefer to frequent wayside coffee-shops than rest-houses.

8. No great fluctuations of currency were noticed.

9. The aviation fund is thought to possess vast funds, but it makes little use of them. The Italian air mission is still in Jedda and flights are made whenever there is petrol, which is not often. A flight to Yanbu was written up with much embellishment in the press, and if there had been enough fuel the intrepid flyers

might have gone on the Wejeh. A new French aeroplane, a Caudron-Renault, was brought by a French officer and is treated with great respect.

10. The Banque Misr again ran an air service for the pilgrimage, and among the first to fly were the Minister of Finance and the Kaïmakam of Jedda. Just before the pilgrimage one of the two machines met with an accident near Medina. The other was chartered by Princess Khadija Abbas, who arrived from Egypt, a day before the Pilgrimage Day, left by car for Jedda immediately after the pilgrimage, then flew to Medina and Tor, and then on to Egypt after doing the three days' quarantine. An Indian contractor named Majid made some enquiries about the prospects of starting an aeroplane service from the Persian Gulf for Indian pilgrims, but he seems to have come to the sensible conclusion that the practical difficulties were too great to make it worth while.

11. Indian propagandists were again prominent; Ismail Ghaznavi, Mohammed Khan Ghazi Khan and Mohammed Amin were again among the pilgrims. It is pleasant to be able to record that they were not at all obstructive to the new Indian vice-consul; in fact, they were helpful to him whenever he invoked their aid. One of their principal activities was applauding the administration of the local government. Ismail Ghaznavi, one of the promoters of the Scindia Line, devoted most of his energy to promoting that line and making difficulties for the rival Mogul Line. He left for India as soon as he had obtained a cheque for 10,000 rupees for himself and 2,000 rupees for his assistant, Abdul Aziz, editor of the newspaper *Khadim-i-Ka'ba*. The Finance Minister, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, did something for the Indian pilgrims after the Haj; the Indian vice-consul had brought to his notice the preferential treatment accorded to Egyptian pilgrims in the matter of transport last year; the Finance Minister promised not to repeat this discrimination this year, and was as good as his word. In fact, in some respects Indian pilgrims did better than others; owing to a shortage of transport, pilgrims were ordered to stay only three days in Medina instead of the usual eight; at the instance of the Indian vice-consul this rule was relaxed in favour of the Indian pilgrims.

12. The Banque Misr again made use of their barges in landing pilgrims. There is still no Banque Misr Hotel at Medina; the new hotel at Jedda (paragraph 15 of the 1937 report) was again used for pilgrims; and the Grand Hotel at Mecca was finished and opened for pilgrims' use ten days before the Haj and was very popular. The King is said to have been shown round it and to have been greatly interested, especially in the electric lift; brushing aside an objection by one of the Nejd staff that it must be an invention of Satan, he expressed an intention of building a palace at Mecca with similar fittings.

13. Two new taxes have been imposed and have given rise to the complaints which were to be expected. One is the registration tax on foreigners of 10 riyals per head; after the observations of this Legation were received, certain modifications were introduced in the application of this new tax. The other tax was one of a quarter riyal on each animal sacrificed at Muza.

14. No discrimination in the quarantine arrangements for pilgrims was noticed this year. Dr. Ibrahim Adham has been removed from the post of quarantine doctor, and his successor has kept things going smoothly.

15. The King has continued in his very correct attitude as regards Palestine; the pilgrimage has not been allowed to be used as propaganda against the British policy in Palestine. All that a group of pilgrims from Palestine were able to do was to distribute a certain amount of inflammatory literature amongst the pilgrims. False rumours of trouble at Aqaba alarmed those interested in the pilgrimage from that district, but they were soon contradicted by the King.

16. Converts to Islam from other races are still the object of great suspicion. When Lady Abdul Qadir visited Jedda to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina out of the usual season, she brought with her an Englishwoman who had professed Islam for ten years. Nevertheless, this convert had to be examined again by the local Qazi, whose report had to be considered by the Qazi of Mecca, who had to consult the King, and so on; what finally happened was that the lady waited in Jedda until Lady Abdul Qadir completed her pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina, and then went off to India with her.

17. Accommodation arrangements were similar to those of last year. The Hejaz Motor Service imported some thirty cars and 170 lorries, which were



driven recklessly in all directions over the places where the roads ought to have been. More cars are constantly arriving, as the depreciation rate is enormous.

18. The overland route between Najaf and Medina functioned well this year.

19. Haji Abdul Ghani Dada, who founded the orphanage at Medina, has died, but his orphanage continues to do good work there. Sir Nizam Jung's opinion was that it was time for the Saudis to take over its management.

20. The vexed but ever-present question of destitute and semi-destitute pilgrims is alluded to in detail below. Such persons are to be divided into two main categories: those who arrive here with their fares paid and with their return tickets, but without sufficient money to pay the local dues for mutawwifs, &c. These persons are subjected to various indignities, though all of them seem to be released at the last moment from duress at Jedda as so to be just in time to do their pilgrimage. Finally, they either borrow the money for the fees, or get some kind person to pay for them, or are let off—though this is difficult, because the mutawwif or wakil has to pay two-thirds of the dues in cash to the Saudi Government when the pilgrims arrive. The second category consists of persons who manage to cross from Baluchistan to the Arabian coast in a dhow with neither papers nor money, and then beg their way to Mecca. The Saudi Arabian Government tries its best to keep such persons out of the Holy Land by a cordon of guards on the Yemen frontier, but some of them manage to get through. Some return in a similar way, while others make false declarations to this Legation, saying that they have lost their passes, &c., and are repatriated at the expense of the Government of India. The goodwill of the Minister of Finance, the Kaimakam of Jedda, and the Sheikh Ul Mutawwifin or head mutawwif, has to be invoked for these destitutes, and, although in the end they manage to do their pilgrimage, they cause endless trouble.

21. There was no Turkish steamer this year. The resurrection of the old shipping rivalry for Indian pilgrims had a great effect on fares; the *El Medina* and the *Englestan*, which formed the fleet of the Scindia Line, competed with the Turner Morrison boats of the Mogul Line, the result being a fierce rate war; some pilgrims were actually taken for the return journey to India at an inclusive charge of 25 rupees, very much less than the net cost to the carriers.

22. Security was good. The full severity of the barbarous penalty for stealing was said to have been applied to three Bedouin, and no others risked losing their hands. Pickpockets were at work in the haram, however. Fewer complaints of lost baggage reached this Legation.

23. The King held three banquets this year for distinguished pilgrims. The first was for Indians. Invitation cards in three separate colours distinguished the sheep from the goats; the most favoured ones sat at the King's table, lesser lights at the Amir Saud's, and the least of all at the Amir Feisal's. Ismail Ghaznavi was not invited, though he was in Jedda and could have attended; nor was the Naqib of the Indian wakils honoured with an invitation. The Indian vice-consul at this Legation was invited but could not attend. The second banquet was for Javanese, and the third for pilgrims who spoke Arabic. The King made a speech at each ceremony, the burden of his remarks being the same as last year—i.e., that he was a Hanbali, and therefore as good as orthodox a Moslem as any adherent of the other three recognised sects. The speech at the first banquet was translated into Urdu by the chief representative from Hyderabad State, Seyid Qadir Muhiyuddin.

24. A good many notables made the pilgrimage this year. Among the most important were the following:—

The Sheikh of Bahrein and his family. Chaudhury Muhammad Ismail Khan, M.L.A., Pir Seyyid Jamayat Ali Shah (Punjab), Nawabzadeh Mir Saeed Alam Khan of the Indian Political Service, Masud Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Bengal), Nawab Sir Nizam Jung Bahadur (Hyderabad). Princess Khadija Abbas came from Egypt; and Seyyid Idris-el-Idrisi from the Sudan. The Sultan of Tajura and Sheikh Omar-el-Azhari came from French Somaliland. Two pro-Franco propagandists, named Hainan Muhammad-ben-Amer, and Saiyid Ahmad-bin-Sadiq-al-Ghamari came, but did not stay long.

Arrangements for the return of the Indian pilgrims worked much more smoothly this year than last. Within the first two weeks after the Haj nearly half of the

Indian pilgrims were got away; and during this period, when so many complaints used to be heard in the past, no pilgrim had to wait more than a day or two in Jedda.

25. H.M.S. *Londonderry* (Captain W. K. D. Dowding, D.S.O.), visited Jedda for the Haj week. Arrangements were made for a regatta on Haj day on the same lines as last year. The French ship won most of the prizes.

26. The Afghan Minister paid a flying visit to Mecca and Medina, attended a few parties, and rushed back to Cairo at the earliest opportunity. An Indian doctor was sent to look after Afghan pilgrims; he did not stay long.

27. Foreigners again had to pay the road tax known as "Koshan," from which Saudi subjects are exempt. So what with koshan and the new registration tax foreigners felt oppressed, but these things made no difference to the pilgrimage numbers.

28. The proposal mentioned in paragraph 38 of last year's report, that ships transporting Indian pilgrims should land the Karachi pilgrims at that port instead of taking them to Bombay even if the number of Karachi pilgrims did not quite reach 100, was not agreed to.

29. A few refugees from Sinkiang came on pilgrimage this year. General Mahmud Si Jang (Shih-chang), alias Mohiti, travelled from Karachi with three companions with Chinese passports, and left in April for Alexandria, with the intention of visiting Turkey and Syria. Twenty-five Tungen refugees from Sinkiang also visited Mecca and appeared to intend to settle down there.

30. The Iraqi Government reduced the amount of the deposit demanded for their pilgrims from 8 Iraqi dinars to 7 Iraqi dinars, and a similar reduction was authorised in the deposit extracted from Indian pilgrims from Iraq.

31. As a result of complaints from Palestinian pilgrims that they were made to give precedence to Egyptian pilgrims on Egyptian boats returning after the pilgrimage, it was ascertained from the Palestinian Government that Palestinian pilgrims are only permitted to travel on Egyptian pilgrimage ships as an act of grace, and that they have no claim to prior consideration over Egyptian pilgrims.

32. Three hundred and sixty Tunisians sailed from Tunis in January in a French ship with a representative of the Bey on board; they returned in March, all save one, who died at sea.

33. Seventeen Persians came on pilgrimage this year, having received special permission from the Shah, probably through the intercession of Hassan Esfandiary (Muhtashim-es-Saltaneh). A brother of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din (Prime Minister of Persia in 1920) also came via Palestine.

34. The Japanese Government, according to a published report dated the 30th January, 1938, are maintaining close contact with Japanese students of Islam. The motive for this interest was declared to be the hope that the geographical distribution of Mahometans would form a barrier against the spread of communism. Seven Japanese pilgrims were seen performing the pilgrimage this year. But the most important symptom of Japanese interest in the Islamic antidote is the opening of the new mosque in Tokyo. Invitations to the opening were sent to the Egyptian and the Yemen Governments, as well as to the Saudi Arabian Government, who sent Sheikh Hafez Wahba.

35. Reports from Aden say that one Muhsin Tehapan Oglu, a Turk, resident in Japan, visited Sana at the end of March; he was the president of the "Japanese Moslems Federation." His interviews with all the leading personalities of the Yemen were not confined to invitations to the opening of the mosque; he tried to do some business connected with the sale of arms.

36. Chinese Moslems were even more to the fore; a "Chinese Moslem Near East Goodwill Mission, under one Captain Naji Djelaleddin Wanzinshan, visited Jedda early in March with the object of enlisting sympathy in Moslem countries for the sufferings of China at the hands of the Japanese.

## (2) Statistics.

37. The following tables, compiled from information obtained unofficially, give the usual statistical information. They differ to some extent from figures compiled from other sources. They give the total number of pilgrims landed at

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Jedda, Yanbu, Lith and Qunfida during the period the 14th September, 1937, and the 9th February, 1938. A large increase will be noted in the number of Indian and Javanese pilgrims. The total number of pilgrims increased from 51,142 in 1937 to 67,224 in 1938; these figures include 1,185 overland pilgrims in 1937 and 3,436 in 1938. The remarkable increase in the Indians can be attributed mainly to the keen competition between the two rival shipping companies, while that of the Javanese reflects the rise in the price of rubber. The increase in the number of Persian Gulf pilgrims was due no doubt to the arrival of his Highness the Sultan of Bahrein to perform the Haj this year.

TABLE (A).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at different Ports of the Hejaz, arranged by Nationality.*

Nationality.	1937.	1938.	Landed at—	
			Jedda.	Yanbu, Lith and Qunfida. (*)
India and Far East—				
Indian ... ..	10,588	15,238	15,228	10
Javanese ... ..	9,381	16,089	16,089	...
Chinese and other ... ..	64	55	55	...
Japanese ... ..	3	4	3	1
Africa—				
North African ... ..	3,707	3,240	3,211	29
Egyptian ... ..	10,226	10,096	10,015	81
Sudanese ... ..	1,658	2,054	2,051	3
West African ... ..	4,787	6,046	6,046	...
Senegali ... ..	63	17	17	...
Somali ... ..	1,214	771	771	...
Zanzibari and East African ... ..	100	238	238	...
South African ... ..	105	76	76	...
Abyssinian ... ..	619	501	501	...
Arab countries—				
Syrian ... ..	1,414	1,552	1,103	449
Iraqi ... ..	22	13 <sup>(1)</sup>	5	8
Palestinian ... ..	428	736	660	76
Yemeni ... ..	964	557	483	74
Hadhrami and Adenese ... ..	661	607	576	31
Hejazi ... ..	672	706	674	32
Persian Gulf ... ..	66	280	146	134
Miscellaneous—				
Afghan ... ..	1,756	3,709	3,709	...
Bokharan ... ..	1,248	890	890	...
Persian ... ..	...	11	11	...
Turkish ... ..	151	171	101	70
Kurdish ... ..	...	72	...	72
European countries—				
Yugoslavian ... ..	60	59	56	3
Total ... ..	49,957	63,788 <sup>(*)</sup>	62,715	1,073

N.B.—<sup>(1)</sup> Indicates the number of Iraqis who came by sea; a greater number arrived by motor vehicles overland; the exact figure is unknown.

<sup>(2)</sup> In addition to the above number of overseas pilgrims, there were 1,898 pilgrims who travelled by overland route in motor vehicles via Iraq-Medina; and 1,538 in motor vehicles and on camels via Syria-Medina, almost all of whom returned by the same route. There were also about 250 destitute Indian pilgrims, who travelled overland or by dhow, &c., but were returned by ship. There was no report of any large number of pilgrims from Koweit.

<sup>(3)</sup> This year separate figures for Yanbu, Lith and Qunfida could not be obtained.

TABLE (B).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.*

Country of Embarkation.	1937.	1938.
India and Far East—		
India ... ..	13,186	20,238
Malaya ... ..	5,370	7,850
Dutch East Indies ... ..	4,141	8,414
Africa—		
North Africa ... ..	3,167	2,196
Egypt ... ..	13,085	11,527
Sudan ... ..	6,378	8,141
Eritrea ... ..	1,216	654
Somaliland ... ..	637	611
East Africa ... ..	26	128
South Africa ... ..	112	44
Arab countries—		
Syria ... ..	657	829
Aden and Hodeida ... ..	987	1,120
Hadhramaut ... ..	635	61
Palestine ... ..	...	41
Miscellaneous—		
Turkey ... ..	...	...
Europe ... ..	3	860
America ... ..	...	1
Pilgrims from different places but landed at at Yanbu, Lith and Qunfida ... ..	357	1,073
Total ... ..	49,957	63,788

TABLE (C).

*Number of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz, and Number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.*

Flag.	1937.		1938.	
	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
British ... ..	82	29,214	39	30,608
Dutch ... ..	8	4,752	17	7,767
French ... ..	3	3,123	1	1,676
Italian ... ..	26	1,199	24	1,595
Swedish ... ..	1	1	...	...
German ... ..	...	...	1	1
Spanish ... ..	1	463	1	859
American ... ..	...	...	1	1
Egyptian ... ..	11	10,844	48	20,208
Turkish ... ..	...	...	...	...
Arabian ... ..	1	4	...	...
By dhow, &c., at ports other than Jedda ... ..	...	357	...	1,073
Total ... ..	133	49,957	132	63,788

N.B.—The figures given relate to the actual pilgrimage season and not to the whole Arabic year.

38. The apparent decrease in the number of British voyages is explained by the fact that the Khedivial Mail (or rather the "Pharaonic Mail") boats were registered under the Egyptian flag this year for the first time. Consequently, the number of Egyptian voyages went up from eleven to forty-eight, and the number of pilgrims they brought went up to twice the previous figure. Nevertheless, the British boats must have been fuller, on an average, than last year, as the thirty-nine voyages brought more pilgrims than the eighty-two of 1937.



## (3) Quarantine.

39. Arrangements for the medical inspection of pilgrims from Iraq travelling by the desert route Najaf-Medina were similar to those of last year. The Iraq Government maintained a quarantine post at Rahbah, where all outgoing and incoming pilgrims were examined. On the Saudi side Dr. Izzat Faraoun was in charge of the examination of these pilgrims: he was assisted by an itinerating doctor and, on the whole, the arrangements they made worked satisfactorily.

*Kamran.*

40. As far as Kamran was concerned, the pilgrimage season opened with the arrival of mail steamship *Polyphemus* from the Netherlands Indies on the 14th September, 1937—almost a month earlier than the previous year—and closed with the departure of the steamship *Akbar* on the 3rd February, 1938. During that period 37,543 pilgrims were dealt with, again an increase of 50 per cent. as compared with the previous year. Twenty steamers came from British India, 13 from the Netherlands Indies, 9 from the Straits Settlements and 4 from Arabia and Africa. Great increases were recorded in the number of pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies and from the Straits Settlements. The health of the pilgrims was very good. The following cases of infectious diseases were reported: one case of measles and one case of modified smallpox from the Straits Settlements, and one case of modified smallpox and two cases of chicken-pox from British India. No "infected" or "suspected" steamers put in at Kamran during the season: all steamers were therefore dealt with according to the measures prescribed for "healthy" ships in article 20 of the Anglo-Dutch Agreement of 1926. All the steamers calling at Kamran were exempted from landing their pilgrims. The system of mustering pilgrims on deck for inspection proved easy and efficient. An Italian troopship named steamship *Sannio* brought 616 pilgrims from Mogadiscio. The hospital on this ship was very large and well equipped: shower baths and porcelain wash-basins were provided for the use of the pilgrims.

41. The Government of India have decided to reduce the quarantine fees in future from the present rate of 8 rupees per head to 3 rupees. They have approached the Netherlands East Indies Government with the suggestion that that Government should bear some of the resulting loss of revenue, but in the last resort they are prepared to bear it all themselves.

42. The Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938 agreed to the presence of an Italian doctor at Kamran; he has not arrived there yet, and there is a difficulty about accommodation.

43. His Majesty's Minister was able to dispense returning ships from calling at Kamran in the same way as was reported last year.

*Tor.*

44. This station functioned in the same way as last year, except that for the first time returning pilgrims landed from aeroplanes and did their five days' under observation in the lazaret before being allowed to proceed to Egypt; that the Permanent Commission of the Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the return pilgrimage clean on the 24th February, 1938: and that the health of the pilgrims this year was exceptionally good, there being no single case of infectious illness. The Tor station closed on the 30th March, and the Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage closed on the 15th April, 1938.

*Suakin.*

45. The Sudan Government maintained, and improved in various ways, their quarantine station at Suakin. All pilgrims coming from or through the Sudan were concentrated at Suakin where they were vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera. In addition, owing to the prevalence of relapsing fever amongst West Africans, delousing was carried out where necessary this year, in order to protect the Hejaz from infection with this disease. Certain modifications were also introduced in the arrangements for returning pilgrims: facilities were improved and certain unnecessary routine measures omitted. For instance, the preliminary medical inspection of pilgrims on board ship was discontinued, as there is a doctor on board ship. New sheds including a separate examination room for the women were built. Clean pilgrims were exempted from

bathing and delousing. The quarantine period was reduced, first from five days to three days, and then to a little over twenty-four hours. The examination of pilgrims for bil-harzia was discontinued. And finally the quarantine dues were reduced from 500 to 300 millîmes.

*Jedda.*

46. At Jedda Dr. Ibrahim Adham-al-Jazaerli acted as quarantine medical officer and port health officer in the absence on sick leave of Dr. Yahya Nasri. But after the pilgrimage both Dr. Adham and his assistant were removed from their posts by command of the King: it is reported that this was in consequence of complaints made against them by Egyptian pilgrims.

## (4) Health.

*General.*

47. The health of the pilgrims was very satisfactory. The diseases which were most prevalent were malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea: most of the deaths were due to these diseases, or to old age. Some of the Indian pilgrims had gangrenous ulcers on their arms arising from vaccination at Bombay. After the pilgrimage a great number of pilgrims were treated for influenzal catarrh, due to inhaling the dust of Muna and Muzdalifa.

*Saudi Medical Service.*

48. *Mecca.*—The staff at Mecca resembled that mentioned in last year's report. There were two hospitals there, and the staff, all Syrians except the Egyptian midwife, included a surgeon, a specialist in abdominal diseases, midwifery and women's diseases, and a chemist and bacteriologist. A veterinary surgeon is to be engaged and attached to one of the Mecca hospitals next year.

*Jedda.*—Dr. Akram Shooman was director and surgeon, assisted by Dr. Taufiq-al-Qiseibati as medical officer, a dispenser, and a midwife. The dismissal of the Acting Director of Quarantine has been mentioned above: he was succeeded by Dr. Adil Mahish from Medina.

*Medina.*—Dr. Adil Mahish as director, who was later on transferred to Jedda, Dr. Fuad-al-Mahroos as medical officer, Fauzi-al-Safaai as compounder and Mlle. Nabeehah-al-Safadi as midwife.

*Taif.*—One doctor.

*Yanbu.*—One doctor, and one dispenser.

*Wejh.*—One doctor and one assistant dispenser.

*Jauf.*—The same establishment as Wejh.

*Hail.*—One doctor.

*Riyadh.*—Dr. Midhat is the private doctor to the King. Dr. Rashid is a surgeon and X-ray specialist, and Dr. Ahmed Yasin is a medical officer in the Riyadh hospital: and there is a midwife. There is also one itinerating doctor, who has visited Rabigh, Medina, Hail, Bureida, Aneiza and Shaqra.

*Local Government Hospitals.*

49. *Jedda.*—A few poor patients and soldiers and policemen visit the local Government hospital for treatment. But the foreign dispensaries are much more popular: these include the Indian dispensary maintained by the Government of India, the Italian and the Russian dispensaries. A Syrian specialist trained in France in surgery is reported to have returned to Jedda and to be prepared to perform operations: if so, he will be able to supply an urgent local need.

*Mecca.*—Dr. Ghulam Rasul reports that the X-rays department of the main hospital is working well and is very popular. The Syrian doctor in charge appears to know what he is doing. The operating theatre is tidy, but the instruments are few, and operations rare. The hospital is equipped with a high pressure steam sterilizer. The outdoor dispensary was well attended. A disinfection plant exists and was working. The First Aid Society has done good work in rendering first aid to pilgrims who collapsed: their ambulance cars were prominent during the Haj.

*Medina and Taif.*—There is nothing to add to last year's report except that the X-ray machine for Taif is to be installed soon.



50. The Director-General of Health issued instructions to the public regarding measures to be taken for the limitation of malaria. This step in the right direction was supported by regulations allowing the importation of quinine and other anti-malarial medicines duty free.

51. The Indian medical officer's return of cases treated and deaths in Government hospitals during the year ended the 31st March, 1938, compiled from the weekly reports of the local health authorities, is as follows:—

Diseases.	Cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery ... ..	1,166	47
Consumption ... ..	78	26
Puerperal fever ... ..	60	40
Typhoid ... ..	39	8
Mumps ... ..	30	...
Chicken-pox ... ..	2	...
Dengue ... ..	24	...
Influenza ... ..	10	...
Diphtheria ... ..	3	1
Leprosy ... ..	4	1
Smallpox ... ..	1	...
Measles ... ..	79	14
Whooping cough ... ..	17	1
Erysipelas ... ..	4	...
Tetanus ... ..	1	1
Syphilis ... ..	1	...
Total ... ..	1,519	139

52. It looks from these figures as if dysentery and puerperal fever had been more, and consumption less, prevalent than last year. But these figures really give no real indication of the prevalence of diseases in this country, as a very large number of local inhabitants prefer to trust themselves to one of the Legation dispensaries than to make use of a Government hospital. The percentage of deaths to cases treated is 9.15, as compared to 10.6 last year. The inaccuracy of the figures is reflected in the inclusion of only one case of syphilis.

#### General Sanitary Conditions.

53. The Indian medical officer is more impressed with the defects than with the recent improvements in general sanitary conditions in this country. Little attempt is really made to cover vegetables and meat from flies, though the Director of Health seems to do his best to persuade shopkeepers to do so. Arrangements for the slaughtering of animals at Muna show some improvement. But apart from the main streets, most of the town of Mecca is soiled with human excreta, and at Muzdalifa and Muna almost every inch of the ground becomes covered with human dejecta: in fact, no attempts seem to have been made to solve the difficult problem of latrine accommodation for pilgrims performing the observances prescribed by the prophet.

#### Government of India Dispensaries.

54. The Jeddah dispensary worked as usual, and the annual supply of drugs was cleared through the customs without payment of duty.

55. The Mecca dispensary remained open from the 19th December, 1937, to the 26th March, 1938, being directed by Dr. Ghulam Hussein and served by Dispenser Mohammad Ali. Dr. Mirza Ghulam Rasul went to Mecca with the rest of his staff for the rush period. At Muna the dispensary and the staff were accommodated in half of the house hired jointly with the Indian vice-consul, the rent being paid by the Government of India.

#### Cases Treated in the Indian Dispensaries.

56. The total number of cases treated in the Jeddah dispensary during the year ending the 31st May, 1938, was 44,573, as compared with 54,021 the previous year and 41,886 the year before last. Of these 8,763 were Indians, as compared with 8,540 last year. At Mecca 18,444 cases were treated, of which 4,590 were

Indians. Three hundred and six cases were seen at Muna. In-patients numbered 14. Thirty-nine selected surgical operations were performed and 3,037 minor operations carried out.

57. The following table shows the percentage of various diseases treated during the year in the Indian dispensaries:—

(1) Malaria and its complications ... ..	16.00
(2) Diseases of digestive system ... ..	16.50
(3) Respiratory diseases ... ..	8.75
(4) Urinary diseases ... ..	1.75
(5) Circulatory diseases ... ..	1.75
(6) Nervous diseases ... ..	1.50
(7) Diseases of the locomotory system ... ..	1.50
(8) Diseases of the areolar tissue ... ..	5.00
(9) Skin diseases ... ..	7.75
(10) Eye diseases ... ..	5.50
(11) Ear diseases ... ..	4.00
(12) Nose diseases ... ..	0.60
(13) Disease of the lymphatic glands ... ..	0.03
(14) Diseases of the liver ... ..	0.25
(15) Injuries ... ..	3.65
(16) New growth ... ..	0.25
(17) Rheumatism ... ..	6.25
(18) Ulcers ... ..	9.20
(19) Gonorrhœa ... ..	5.00
(20) Syphilis ... ..	0.85
(21) Infectious diseases ... ..	0.26
(22) Diseases of generative system ... ..	1.00
(23) Diseases of blood ... ..	2.75
(24) Deficiency diseases ... ..	0.01

Total ... .. 100.00

About 110 visits were made to patients in their houses without charge.

#### Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

58. The Egyptian Legation continued to maintain one doctor without a dispensary. At Mecca the Egyptians kept two doctors permanently; and during the pilgrimage season they sent a medical mission in the same way as last year.

59. The Dutch maintained one doctor at Mecca, with one dispenser.

60. The Soviet Legation kept one doctor at Jeddah.

61. The Italian Legation kept one doctor.

62. The Afghan Government kept open a dispensary for one month at Mecca during the days of the pilgrimage; this was looked after last pilgrimage by Dr. Seyyid Rashiduddin, an Indian.

#### Legation Medical Staff.

63. Dr. Mirza Ghulam Rasul, M.B., B.S., D.P.H., D.T.M. and H., of the Punjab Civil Medical Service, took over charge from Dr. Abdul Hamid on the 26th October, 1937. He was assisted by two new dispensers. Dr. Ghulam Hussein with a dispenser worked at Mecca.

#### (5) Internal Transport.

64. Air transport for pilgrims was not a great success this year. As has already been reported, one aeroplane was damaged before the pilgrimage and the only other one was engaged by Princess Khadija for her journey to Mecca and back; it then took spare parts to its damaged sister-plane, and that was the end of air transport for pilgrims this year. The high fare of £18 gold for the journey Jeddah to Medina and return again applied.

65. The governmental monopoly of motor transport, which now has the name of "The Arab Motor Company," must have made huge profits from the pilgrimage.



Transport arrangements were no worse than in previous years, though there were the usual breakdowns and complaints of being stranded. The number of pilgrims who travelled by car exceeded last year's figure by 10,818, but less pilgrims used cars for the journey from Mecca to Arafat; for such short journeys it was more popular to take a camel. The Government endeavours to discourage pilgrims from taking camels, in the hope of getting more revenue from road taxes; but a large number of the faithful, having tried cars already, preferred entrusting themselves to camelmen than to chauffeurs.

66. During the year the Government had bought about 100 new Ford cars, and had made over about 250 cars to the Arab Motor Company, at a valuation of £g.23,870. The Government received in payment 2,387 £10 shares in the company and thus became the biggest shareholders. The company are reported to have had 644 cars in running condition during the year, and to have sold back some to the Government. The tendency is for Government officials to run the company; the Finance Minister and his friends hold a number of shares, and ordinary shareholders are being squeezed out by depressing the market price of shares to a good deal less than £10.

67. The following table showing the number of pilgrims who were conveyed by motor transport shows that the total number of pilgrims using this method of transport increased by more than 10,000, as compared with last year:—

	In 1937.	In 1938.
From Mecca to Medina and back ...	14,790	16,478
From Jedda to Medina and back ...	3,801½	5,069
From Mecca to Jedda (single) ...	6,817	8,700
From Jedda to Mecca (single) ...	25,197½	31,764
From Yanbu to Medina (single) ...	46	76
From Yanbu to Medina and then back to Mecca ...	380	195
From Medina to Mecca (single) ...	170	...
From Medina to Mecca and back to Medina and from Medina to Mecca only ...	...	1,706
From Mecca to Arafat and back to Mecca ...	6,191½	5,002
From Mecca to Taif and back to Mecca ...	4	...
From Medina to Mecca and back to Medina ...	774	...
	58,171½	68,990

68. The income of the company this year is given as 54,183,681 piastres miri, as compared with 39,848,765 last year. The bus service continued last year. The Saudi Government exempted all Saudi subjects from the payment of "koshan" tax this year, a discrimination which caused a good deal of complaint from foreign pilgrims. But perhaps it was inevitable that the motor company should reduce their fares after the Haj was over.

69. A good deal of trouble arose over the shortage of local drivers. Hejazi chauffeurs resented the Government's action in importing 100 Sudanese drivers, and when the latter lost their way or broke down, as they frequently did, the Hejazis refused to go to their assistance. There were also frequent vague complaints of extortion on the part of the chauffeurs, who would slow down and stay a long time at villages on the way on purpose, till stimulated by an appropriate tip to get to Jedda in time to catch a ship.

70. A new transport company called the "Nejd Company" was formed this year, ostensibly for the transport of passengers from Nejd to the Hejaz, with a capital of £15,000 gold, made up of 3,000 shares of £g.5 each. However, no shares were allotted to private hands: the Government took half and the Arab Car Company the other half; and its operations are shrouded in mystery.

71. A large garage is under construction in Mecca, to be paid for out of the profits of the car company. Its cost is estimated to be £12,000 gold.

72. The Jedda-Mecca and Jedda-Medina roads remain in their pristine state, and the car company's statement that repairs have been made is not confirmed by those who have tried to travel on them. Nothing has yet been done

about the construction of proper tar-sprayed roads, though the Egyptian Government is certainly in active negotiation with the Saudi Arabian Government on the subject. The waqf funds, together with the proceeds of the Saudi road tax, will provide the funds necessary to start.

#### Overland Routes.

73. About ninety Indian pilgrims, mostly Shias, came on pilgrimage via Najaf. Adequate transport arrangements were made by the Iraq Motor Company, but the journey was long and tiring. The total number of pilgrims coming overland from Iraq was 1,898. No pilgrims came overland direct from India in a through car. A contractor named Majid, from Calcutta, visited the Hejaz with a view to arranging an air service for pilgrims from India.

#### Camels and Cabs.

74. The same remarks as in last year's report apply. No cars were allowed inside Mecca during the pilgrimage this year, so the cab drivers of Mecca flourished as well as those of Jedda.

#### Dhows.

75. As the result of representations from this Legation the Government of India discontinued this year the arrangement whereby boat-hire from the ship to the shore was payable in advance when the pilgrim bought his ticket at the Indian port. Collection had therefore to be arranged at Jedda. The sheikh of the dhowmen first endeavoured to collect the fares from the pilgrims at the quay; this proved difficult as pilgrims never had the proper change. Eventually, the Naqib of the wakils was ordered by the Government (which is interested in collecting the dues, as it claims a part of them) to arrange collection through the wakils, together with the mutawwifs' dues. This pleased nobody, as wakils were unable to collect dues from some indigent pilgrims, and neither the dhowmen nor the Government received their full payment. The local authorities then issued instructions to the local agents of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Company to effect collection; but they replied that they had orders from their principals in Bombay not to do so. It is for the local authorities to think out some suitable scheme; the interest of the Government of India and of this Legation is confined to seeing that pilgrims are not overcharged, or charged twice, as they sometimes used to be. No representations have yet been made in the matter by the local authorities to this Legation. But Egyptian, Javanese and Italian pilgrims all pay their boat hire as part of an inclusive charge when they buy their ticket at the port of departure.

#### General.

76. Pilgrims who had paid the Government dues were not interfered with, but those who had not were prevented from leaving Jedda for a long time. It is believed, however, that all, or almost all, of these indigent persons were released to make the pilgrimage just in time to get there for the Haj ceremonies. A party of fifty Afghans who objected to paying dues caused a good deal of trouble to the police. Eventually they paid pilgrimage dues for Mecca. But at Medina they had a minor battle with the local police and "muzawwirs," and finally got away without paying.

77. A good many destitute pilgrims visited Mecca and Medina on foot. Some came over the Yemen border; Saudi guards were posted on the frontier to stop them, but some got through the cordon. A good many devotees were of weak physique and absolutely without resources; many must have died on the road.

#### (6) Customs.

78. There is nothing new to report about venality and smuggling. The examination of pilgrims' baggage by the customs authorities was often accelerated by a present of a rupee or two.



79. Indian pilgrims, especially those from Bengal, continued to arrive with large bags of rice. This was charged a heavy duty; the transport charges to Mecca were about 5 rupees per maund; and the result usually was that the pilgrim sold his rice in Jedda at a loss.

80. The new customs sheds were a great improvement and facilitated the examination of pilgrims' baggage. It meant, however, that the pilgrim was separated from his baggage for some time, and in consequence some baggage went astray. Compensation or recovery was always arranged.

81. There was no change in the customs schedule this year.

#### (7) Religious Policy.

82. There is little to be recorded this year under this head. Wahhabi tenets still apply. A rich Memon who applied for permission to build a mosque at the birthplace of Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet, received permission in the first place, but was afterwards told that it could not be sanctioned, as his mosque might some day be looked upon as a monument.

83. Similarly, Sir Nizam Jung's proposal to build a library at the birthplace of the Prophet was not acceptable to the Government, as they would not permit books other than those approved by Wahhabi ulema to be kept at such a library.

84. The rules against gramophones and drinking still apply, though there is a great deal of gramophone playing in both Jedda and Mecca.

85. The Grand Qazi was responsible for the strict enforcement, under penalty of a fine, of a rule prohibiting the shaving of the chin; but even this rule was more or less forgotten before the pilgrimage really started.

86. The treatment of indigent pilgrims who could not pay their mutawwifs' dues has been reported elsewhere; in effect the same thing happened as last year; after long detention such persons were released just in time to attend the Haj.

#### (8) Mutawwifs.

87. It is pleasant to be able to record an improvement this year in the general attitude not only of the mutawwifs but also of Indian agitators to this Legation in its efforts to look after the Indian pilgrim. Mohammad Khan Ghazi Khan, Chaudhury Mohammad Amin and Ismail Ghaznavi showed no hostility to the new Indian vice-consul, and even went out of their way to help him on occasion.

88. However, mutawwifs have been oppressing ignorant pilgrims for more than 1,300 years and it is too much to hope that they will stop. Rich pilgrims come before poor; the Indian who cannot make himself understood is always liable to exploitation. One complaint, against a certain Seyyid Jamil Abu Saud, was taken up, but could not be brought home to him; there was cause to suspect that he was guilty of speculation, however, and the matter was reported to the Government of India.

89. Only three cases of overcharge were made; though there were many complaints against the artificial rate of exchange which was fixed by a committee controlled by the Naqib on the arrival of each boat. Pilgrims coming from India could evade this difficulty if they changed their money into English sovereigns in India as advised in the *Manual of Instructions*.

90. The registration and the rotation systems for Indian pilgrims worked satisfactorily this year. On the request of the Indian vice-consul a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Seyyid Jamil Daud) directed the wakils to assist him in carrying out the details of these systems. The wakils were very willing to assist, once they were given permission to do so. It is true that a confidential circular letter was issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Saudi officials just before the Haj requiring them not to associate with or visit any foreign representative in the Hejaz during the pilgrimage. It looked as if the boycott of previous years would be repeated. But on the intervention of His Majesty's Minister an exception was made in the case of pilgrimage work, and the routine went on normally.

91. The mutawwifs who visited India seem to have behaved as they have usually done in the past. The Saudi Arabian Government are not likely to discourage them from visiting India, as they would expect that the number of pilgrims would decrease if these visits did not take place.

92. The rivalry between the Mogul Line and the Scindia Line caused undercutting of rates and enabled many poor persons to come on pilgrimage. The last two boats, in particular, brought a number of semi-destitute beggars, as anyone who could raise 25 or 30 rupees could buy a return ticket from Karachi during the latter half of January 1938. Such persons were unwilling and often unable to pay the Saudi dues, and were detained on arrival and on departure; it is believed that all of them managed to perform the pilgrimage. A separate report has been addressed to the Government of India on the question of destitutes. It may be noted here that the Indian vice-consul was able to take advantage of the low rates prevailing to save the Government of India a considerable sum in fares for returning destitutes; he was also successful in discovering that a considerable number of the so-called destitutes had a certain amount of money; and they were made to pay all or part of their fares.

93. The "taqrir" system, whereby one mutawwif has the monopoly of supervision over pilgrims from one district or belonging to one community, still persists in the case of the Memon community and one or two others. The Legation has received a spate of complaints from that community against the neglect which is shown to them by their mutawwif; and a report on the matter has been submitted to the Government of India. There are signs that certain interested persons are seeking similar monopolistic rights over pilgrims from other districts of India, such as Assam and Chittagong.

94. It is an unfortunate fact that the Saudi Arabian Government still look with jealousy and suspicion on the work of the Pilgrimage Office at Jedda. They also realise that without the active co-operation of the mutawwifs it is difficult for the Indian pilgrimage section to carry on their routine work. The situation calls for great tact and diplomacy on the part of the Indian vice-consul.

95. Although the matter is somewhat outside the scope of a report on the annual pilgrimage, it is of interest to record that five pilgrims arrived at Jedda from Karachi on the 23rd September, 1937, having obtained a reduced rate for their passages on the grounds of indigence. Their idea was to travel to the Hejaz in the off-season in order to avoid extra expense. On arrival at Jedda they were surprised to find that mutawwifs' fees had to be paid. They, therefore, applied to this Legation for assistance, stating that it was with the help of the Port Haj Committee that they obtained reduced rates for their steamer fare. Subsequent correspondence elicited the fact that when in Karachi these pilgrims possessed enough funds to pay their mutawwifs' dues, though not enough for their steamer fare. Meanwhile, the pilgrims had, after much argument, managed to obtain permission to go on to Mecca, and have since been lost sight of.

96. Such persons usually conceal their proper financial position in the hope of receiving charity. The Government of India in the course of the correspondence stated that they proposed to give wide publicity to paragraph 3 of the *Manual of Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hejaz*, which warns pilgrims failing to pay the taxes and dues that they may have to return to India without performing the Haj. It seems that the local authorities at Jedda are in the habit of asserting this right and of threatening to deport the indigent pilgrim; but that in practice they rarely do so.

#### (9) Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage.

97. The consolidated fee payable on arrival in Jedda remained at £2-81½ gold, as last year.

98. The extra charge for travelling in new or "mumtaz" vehicles was not maintained this year.

99. All bus fares were alike.

100. The additional charge on account of the "Road Development Scheme" was maintained, though nothing was done to the roads. Other charges remained unaltered, e.g., car charges between Jedda, Mecca, and Medina; charges for overland pilgrims from Iraq via Medina; charges to Arafat and back; and camel hire to Medina and Arafat.



101. A charge of 3 rupees per pilgrim was collected from almost everyone who entered the inner room of the Kaaba. But no special collection was made for an aerodrome at Jedda.

102. It will thus be seen that the tariff of charges was practically the same as that of last year. The tariff for next year, however, which has been issued much earlier than usual (in July 1938), shows that certain increases of importance are to be made next year: the Saudi Arabian Government will realise from them an increase of revenue amounting to some £30,000 gold, assuming that the numbers and itineraries of pilgrims are the same as they were in the 1938 pilgrimage.

#### (10) Indian Pilgrimage.

103. The Indian pilgrimage began with the arrival of steamship *Jehangir* on the 25th October, 1937, which also brought the new Indian vice-consul and the new Legation doctor. Arrivals ended with the steamship *Akbar* on the 5th February, 1938.

104. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and from Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

Province.	Total Number of Pilgrims in 1937.	In 1938.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam ...	1,776	2,737	123	956	3,816
Punjab ...	2,211	154	3,743	...	3,897
Bombay Presidency ...	1,770	1,404	105	...	1,509
United Provinces ...	1,126	943	541	...	1,484
Madras Presidency ...	245	376	12	...	388
Sind Province ...	913	...	2,340	...	2,340
Behar and Orissa ...	254	230	19	2	251
Central Provinces ...	521	78	...	...	78
Baluchistan ...	359	29	699	...	728
N.W. Frontier Province ...	256	51	456	...	507
Hyderabad (Deccan) ...	281	262	1	...	263
Delhi ...	158	31	180	...	211
Burma ...	131	74	2	41	117
Ceylon ...	40	32	1	...	33
French India ...	...	2	...	...	2
Portuguese India ...	...	2	...	...	2
Mauritius ...	...	...	...	...	...
Rajputana States ...	...	123	131	...	259
Central India Agency ...	...	127	16	...	143
Miscellaneous ...	...	4	6	...	10
	10,041	6,664	8,375	999	16,038

105. These figures were compiled from data supplied by the various Port Haj committees in India. It will be seen that the total number, 16,038, is 800 more than the total number of Indians shown as landing at Jedda in Table (A) of section (2). It is possible that the Jedda authorities have entered 800 Indians as Afghans or Javanese. At any rate, it is clear that the total number of Indian pilgrims rose rather more than 50 per cent. this year. The explanation is partly the extremely low fares which the rate war between the Mogul and the Scindia Lines caused. Ismail Ghaznavi and his friends carried out an intensive propaganda for the Haj, and took full advantage of low fares. Numbers from Bengal and Assam, from the Punjab from Sind, from Baluchistan and from the North-West Frontier Province went up considerably. Pilgrims from Bombay, however, were not quite so numerous as last year: the 1937 figure was abnormally swollen by the visit of the chief priest of the Bohra community.

106. The following figures show the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports for the 1938 pilgrimage:—

	1937.	1938.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan) ...	821	10	392	...	402
Chinese ...	...	...	28	...	28
Afghans ...	1,739	57	2,619	1	2,677
South Africans ...	4	44	...	...	44
East Africans ...	...	4	...	...	4
Nepalese ...	12	11	...	...	11
Russians ...	88	14	70	...	84
Persians ...	3	...	7	...	7
Hejaz-Nejd subjects ...	247	179	60	22	261
Far East ...	9	44	...	1	45
Arabs from Persian Gulf ...	54	74	56	...	130
Arabs from Hadhramaut ...	4	...	...	...	...
Miscellaneous ...	18	1	...	1	2
	2,999	438	3,232	25	3,695

107. These figures have also been supplied by the Port Haj Committees. It will be seen that the number of Afghans leaving Indian ports is given as 2,677; now most Afghans travel via India, so it appears that the figure given in the Saudi statistics (section (2), Table (A)) for Afghans, viz., 3,709, is probably too large and may contain some Indians; which accords with the supposition mentioned above. At any rate, it is clear that the number of Afghans and Arabs from the Persian Gulf increased considerably, probably owing to the cheaper fares. The visit of the Sheikh of Bahrein also affected the numbers from the Gulf. Chinese from Turkestan were much fewer this year, as the unsettled conditions in the Far East would lead one to expect. The number shown as Saudi (Hejazi-Nejd) subjects represents for the most part returning mutawwifs and similar propagandists; the number of such persons has been increasing steadily in the last three years.

108. The number of Indians who travelled overland is not known. It is thought that it exceeded 300. Pilgrims from Najaf overland via Medina are said to have numbered ninety.

109. Two lines of steamers dealt with the Indian pilgrim traffic this year: The Mogul Line, owned by Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co., and the Scindia Steam Navigation Company (also known as the Haj Line), a new venture, the capital of which is said to be held to some extent by Hindus.

110. The details of the return traffic to India can be seen from the following table:—

Dates.	Number of ships in port.	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation.	Pilgrims despatched.	Pilgrims remaining.	Ship or ships sailing.
1938—					
February 17 ...	8	6,994	1,612	5,382	Islami.
February 18 ...	7	6,561	1,388	5,173	Akbar.
February 19 ...	6	5,441	2,501	2,940	Rizwani and El-Medina.
February 20 ...	4	3,062	1,024	2,038	Alavi.
February 21 ...	3	2,193	1,646	547	Rahmani.
February 24 ...	4	842	695	147	Khosrou.
February 28 ...	3	1,607	1,026	581	Jehangir.
March 2 ...	2	798	633	165	Englestan.
March 8 ...	2	2,606	1,610	996	Islami.
March 12 ...	2	1,611	1,294	317	Akbar.
March 15 ...	2	751	751	...	El-Medina.
March 25 ...	2	1,787	1,631	156	Rizwani.
March 30 ...	2	1,436	1,012	424	Alavi.
April 1 ...	1	1,002	713	289	Englestan.
April 20 ...	1	708	658	50	Rizwani.
May 5 ...	2	341	341	...	El-Medina and Alavi.



111. It will be seen that the Mogul Line had a steamer sailing from Jedda on almost every one of the first ten days of the departure of pilgrims. The first boat of the Scindia Line, however (steamship *Englestan*), did not leave till the 2nd March. A good many pilgrims were obliged to wait for a boat in Jedda for as long as twelve days. However, such congestion is very difficult to avoid, and more than half of the pilgrims were got away within the first two weeks after the Haj. No difficulties were encountered this year in booking passages: this duty was carried out under the supervision of the Indian vice-consul.

112. The following table gives the number of ships run, voyages made and pilgrims carried by the two lines outward and homeward:—

Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
Number of Ships.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of ships.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
9	20	19,733	9	18	18,535

113. The figure of arrivals from India, 19,733, is less than that given in Table (B) of section (2), because the latter figure includes infants, while the shipping company's figures, given above, include only those for whom quarantine dues were payable. The homeward figures include about 250 destitute Indians, who came overland but returned by steamer at reduced rates. Some of those who returned had arrived in the Hejaz some time before the pilgrimage. Eight hundred and forty-six tickets remained on deposit with the Legation. Of the 19,733 arrivals, the Mogul Line brought 16,560 and the Scindia 3,173. About 12,000 of the pilgrims brought by the Mogul Line were on full rates: in the case of the Scindia Line more than 50 per cent. travelled at reduced rates. The Mogul Line employed seven ships, the Scindia two. The former line made sixteen voyages out and thirteen voyages back to India; the rival company made four out and five back. Of the 18,535 returning pilgrims, the Mogul Line took 15,787 and the rival line 2,748. A certain number of pilgrims brought by the Scindia Line at prices similar to 25 or 30 rupees per head for a return ticket were sent back by a Mogul Line boat at full rates, paid by the rival company; it is clear that the Scindia Line has taken a number of passengers at a loss: in fact, to accept pilgrims at 25 rupees per head means really to take them free, as the company has to pay the Kameran fee of 8 rupees as well as the Saudi quarantine and sanitary charges, amounting to 23 rupees, out of the passage money.

114. The following table shows the ports of embarkation and destination of the Indian pilgrims mentioned above:—

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.			Pilgrims returning.	
Bombay	...	...	...	7,102	7,608
Karachi	...	...	...	11,607	10,927
Calcutta	...	...	...	1,024	...
				19,733	18,535

115. The following is a statement of the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India or deposited the amount of the return passage:—

Port.	Deposit.	Single.	Return.	Total.
Bombay	85	286	6,731	7,102
Karachi	269	18	11,320	11,607
Calcutta	46	22	956	1,024
	400	326	19,007	19,733

This statement was compiled from returns supplied by the Port Haj Committees in India.

#### Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

116. The Indian vice-consul was able to arrange passages without a hitch this year, as he had the full co-operation of the rival shipping agents. Nevertheless, the Scindia Line, having only two ships and dealing with only about 3,000 pilgrims, has perforce to wait longer in port to get their ships full than the Mogul boats had. The latter boats began to sail on the 17th February, while the first Scindia boat did not leave till the 2nd March, just within the fifteen days' limit imposed by the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, section 209 A. It was no doubt galling for Scindia passengers to watch the Mogul boats leaving: the remedy is for them to purchase deposit-paid tickets which will enable them to select the line they fancy for the return voyage.

117. It again proved impossible to run returning boats to a schedule announced in advance. As much notice as possible was given of the departure of each steamer, but the cars of the transport company are always liable to break down, and several unfortunate pilgrims missed their boats in this way.

#### Food, Accommodation, &c.

118. Few complaints about food were received this year on outward voyages from India. Complaints on the return journeys, however, were numerous. It is no doubt extremely difficult for the ship's caterers to cope with the many different tastes of the various classes of pilgrim. Moreover, a number of pilgrims are of some age and unused to travel. With the help of the Amir-ul-Haj and with goodwill from the cooks most of the complaints were dealt with satisfactorily. The problem of the storage of heavy luggage in the hold was dealt with by the despatch of a sub-inspector of Bombay police on one of the ships in order to persuade the pilgrims to let their luggage be stored below. But as this Legation had not been warned of his arrival, the Saudis charged him pilgrim dues, and the Indian vice-consul only obtained exemption for him.

119. As for the collection of baggage of departing pilgrims, M. Sayyid Lal Shah Bukhari was able this year to make a more convenient arrangement than the haphazard system hitherto in force. Instead of all luggage, whether for Egypt, Syria, India or Java being heaped up in the same place and sent out in the same lighters, Sayyid Lal Shah arranged that the luggage for each destination should be stacked and despatched separately.

120. The director of the Kameran Quarantine Station has drawn attention in his report to several instances of overcrowding in certain ships of the Mogul Line. He gives the following instances of excess numbers: steamship *Khosrou* carried 1,402 pilgrims when sanctioned for only 1,396; steamship *Rahmani* took 1,664 when licensed for 1,651; steamships *Akbar*, *Rizwani* and *Islami* carried 10, 23 and 49 extra pilgrims respectively on certain voyages. He considers that children take up a great deal more room than might be expected. The director also noticed that the amount of baggage brought by pilgrims is increasing: he saw camp beds, bicycles, sacks of rice and flour, rolls of carpets, &c., stored between decks; it is evidently advisable that such luggage should be stored in the hold and should not be allowed to take up space allotted for the pilgrims to breathe.

121. In the year 1937 the Government of India investigated the advisability of issuing return tickets with food to pilgrims proceeding to the Hejaz during the non-pilgrimage season; but the number of pilgrims from whom it was impossible to recover food charges was found to be very small, and the proposal was abandoned.

122. The usual complaints of lack of space on board pilgrim ships were made by various Indian pilgrims, and proposals for the revision of section S 193 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, with the object of providing more room for each pilgrim were reported to have been brought before the Central Assembly.

123. There would be more room for pilgrims if they could be persuaded to let their heavy luggage be stowed away in the hold. It would be better to endeavour to change the mentality of the average pilgrim in that respect than to increase the space allowed on deck: for the latter would presumably increase the cost of a passage.

124. The usual arrangements about persons acting as "Amir-ul-Haj" on each boat were made. Of course, they did not please everybody, but the



system seems a useful one, and provided a useful channel for the ventilation of grievances and for their adjustment by the ships' officers.

#### *Pilgrim Passes.*

125. The Government of India, for reasons of religious susceptibilities, have decided once more not to agree to a proposal to affix photographs for each pilgrim on his pass. One result has been that it is in practice impossible to check fraud. Anyone who can steal a pass manages to make use of it. As long as local wakils co-operate with this Legation such fraud can be kept within limits: but such co-operation is always liable to break down, as it did in the 1937 pilgrimage. The Indian Section issued 200 duplicate passes this year to pilgrims who had lost their documents, and 191 emergency passes were issued to pilgrims who had travelled overland on foot and had no documents with them. The increase in the number of duplicate passes this year is explained by the greater number of indigent pilgrims: the mutawwifs confiscated their passes on arrival, and when they were released from a long confinement, their passes, having no photographs, could not be identified or were in some way missing.

#### *Refunds on Deposit-paid Passes and Return Tickets.*

126. The established system worked satisfactorily. Certain pilgrims having come on one line desired to return via another line, and claimed refunds on their tickets booked by the first line. In accordance with article S 208 C of the regulations such refunds had to be refused.

#### *Registration.*

127. The established arrangements continued to work well this year, owing to the co-operation of the local wakils. Out of 16,038 Indian pilgrims who arrived by sea, 15,367 registered themselves at this Legation, i.e., only 671 failed to deposit their return tickets in the Indian Section. Allowing for a certain number of these who had only single tickets, it will be seen that there were only very few who did not register. Fifty-nine unclaimed return tickets or deposit-paid passes remain in the Legation and will be forwarded to India in due course.

128. Ten Indian and seventeen foreign pilgrims reported the loss of their return tickets. Passes were made out for them as usual.

#### *Rotation System.*

129. His Majesty's Minister discussed this system with Fuad Bey Hamza before the pilgrimage, and as a result the Jedda wakils gave their full support to the Indian vice-consul in carrying out the details of the rotation system, whereby the principle of "first come, first away" was rigidly applied. It meant that the booking arrangements had to be made under the strict supervision of the Indian vice-consul, and the two shipping agents lent their aid in working out the details.

#### *Hyderabad State Caravan.*

130. Moulana Abdul Qader Mohi-ud-Din was again the "Kafila-Salar" or commander of the State pilgrimage. He made excellent arrangements for his pilgrims. But he expressed his dissatisfaction with the mutawwifs.

#### *Destitutes.*

131. About the same number of destitutes as last year applied for repatriation. The Indian vice-consul was, however, able to deal with them at a much lower cost than last year. He had noticed from certain indications, and also by inference from the statements of Indians he met on the road to Medina and who talked to him not knowing what his position was, that some of these so-called destitutes really possessed a certain amount of money. On his offering to send off these persons without delay as soon as they arrived, provided they would pay something towards the cost of their ticket, he was able to send off the first batch of eighty without cost to the Government of India. Some pilgrims were sent off after having paid 10/- per head; and, finally, the last batch of eighty-three, who had no money at all for their fares, was sent off by steamship *Jehangir* on the 15th May, the Mogul Line having very generously agreed to take them at 20 rupees per head.

132. Details of the persons repatriated in this way are given below:—

#### (a) Provinces of origin—

Bengal	...	...	...	...	64
Sind	...	...	...	...	39
Punjab	...	...	...	...	18
Assam	...	...	...	...	19
United Provinces	...	...	...	...	7
North-West Frontier Province	...	...	...	...	7
Baluchistan	...	...	...	...	5
Madras	...	...	...	...	8
Bombay	...	...	...	...	1
Behar	...	...	...	...	1
Central India	...	...	...	...	2
Hyderabad State	...	...	...	...	3
Rajputana State	...	...	...	...	1
Burma	...	...	...	...	2
					— 177

#### (b) Route—

##### (1) Overland—

Via Gwadar-Muscat-Mukalla-Yemen	...	...	...	38
Via Gwadar-Nejd	...	...	...	10
Via Bombay-Mukalla-Yemen	...	...	...	83
Via Karachi-Mukalla-Yemen	...	...	...	26
Via Iraq-Nejd	...	...	...	5
Via Iraq-Aman	...	...	...	2
Via Mandvi-Mukalla-Yemen	...	...	...	2
				— 166

##### (2) By sea—

Bombay (steamer)	...	...	...	7
Karachi (steamer)	...	...	...	1
Suez (steamer)	...	...	...	1
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	2
				— 11
				177

133. These 177 persons do not include the eighty who were sent off first at no cost to Government. The total cost borne by the Government of India in respect of repatriation of destitutes this year was 1,836 rupees 4½ O.

134. A full report has been rendered to the Government of India this year on the subject of destitutes. It has been shown that there are two main sorts of destitutes: (1) those who take their ticket at the Indian port but who, when they land at Jedda, have no money to pay the local dues, and (2) those who travel somehow by dhow to the southern shores of the Arabian peninsula, usually without passes or money, and who beg their way, walking, to the Yemen frontier and thence (if they succeed in avoiding the Saudi guards who lie in wait for them) to Mecca. Category (1) might be eliminated by requiring such pilgrims to deposit a sum equal to the Saudi dues at the Indian port when they purchase their ticket at the Indian port of embarkation. Category (2) might be controlled or reduced by a stricter supervision over dhows leaving the shores of Baluchistan for Arabia.

#### *Publicity.*

135. The usual *Manual of Instruction* was brought up to date this year: the Saudi tariff was announced in August, so that it was in time to be incorporated in the *Manual*.

#### *Banking Facilities.*

136. These remained the same. The amount of money deposited by Indian pilgrims with the Legation amounted to 13,491 rupees this year.



*Indian Staff.*

137. Sayyid Lal Shah Bukhari, M.A., of the Punjab Civil Service, took charge of the pilgrimage section on his arrival in October 1937. He has had a very successful first season, and has handled the various problems with much energy and resource. The two clerks, Mr. Shah Jehan Kabir and Mr. Iqbal Din, again did excellent work, their past experience being of great value, and Munshi F. A. Qazi was employed during the rush period.

*(11) Afghan Pilgrimage.*

138. More than twice the number of Afghans came on pilgrimage this year than last. The number this year was 3,709, and last year 1,756. The cheap fares prevailing in Karachi and Bombay owing to the rate war had a good deal to do with the increase.

139. The Afghan Legation here took little interest in its destitutes, who were numerous this year. Those who could not pay their dues were not financed by their Legation.

140. The Afghan Minister continued to reside in Egypt, although he is accredited to Saudi Arabia and not (it is believed) to Egypt as well. He paid a hurried visit to Medina after the Haj and rushed back to Cairo, leaving his first secretary in charge.

141. An Indian doctor named Dr. Rashid-ud-Din, M.B., B.S., from the Punjab came to the Hejaz a few weeks before the Haj as medical officer for Afghan pilgrims; he returned to Kabul shortly after the pilgrimage.

*(12) Malay Pilgrimage.*

142. The pilgrimage season from the Malay point of view started with the departure of the first ship from Singapore on the 8th September, 1937, and ended with the departure of the last ship to leave Jedda for Singapore on the 18th March, 1938. The Blue Funnel Line took all the traffic, there being nine journeys outward and six homeward.

143. The total number of pilgrims of the usual mixed nationalities (Malays, Javanese, Philipinos and Saudi Arabs) who arrived at Jedda from Malayan ports was 7,868. Out of this, according to the register, 4,589 were Malays (excluding infants), made up as follows:—

Straits Settlements—					
Singapore	...	...	...	...	71
Penang and Province Wellesley	...	...	...	...	170
Malacca	...	...	...	...	98
Labuan	...	...	...	...	...
Federated Malay States—					
Perak	...	...	...	...	652
Selangor	...	...	...	...	498
Negri Sembilan	...	...	...	...	240
Pahang	...	...	...	...	248
Unfederated Malay States—					
Johore	...	...	...	...	938
Kedah	...	...	...	...	498
Perlis	...	...	...	...	32
Kelantan	...	...	...	...	938
Trengganu	...	...	...	...	156
Brunei	...	...	...	...	50
Total	...	...	...	...	4,589
To this may be added—					
(a) The number of infants	...	...	...	...	118
(b) The number who arrived via India	...	...	...	...	9
(c) The number who arrived via Egypt	...	...	...	...	9
Grand total	...	...	...	...	4,725

This figure showed an increase of 87 per cent. over that of the previous season. It may be noticed that the figures given in the Saudi returns quoted in Table (B) of section (2) do not agree: they say that 7,850 pilgrims arrived from Malaya. It is probable that some of these should have been classified as coming from the Dutch East Indies.

*Notable Malay Pilgrims.**144. From Johore—*

- (1) The Hon. Engku Mohamed-bin-Khalid.
- (2) The Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Dato Yahya.
- (3) Captain Seyyid Isa-bin-Alwi.

*From Kedah—*

- (4) The Hon. Inche Mohamed Sheriff, C.B.E.
- (5) Tuan Seyyid Mohamed 'Idid.

*From Perlis—*

- (6) Sitti Eshah, wife of His Highness the Raja of Perlis.

*From Trengganu—*

- (7) Inche Abdul Rahim-bin-Dato Bijaya Sura.

*From Penang—*

- (8) Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar, M.C.S. (Retired).

*Assistance to Pilgrims.*

145. No financial assistance was granted through the Legation to pilgrims this year, as none was asked for; but grants from the Government of Perak amounting to 1,118 dollars were distributed among their nominees. Quite a number of Government officers and Government servants, together with their respective families, were recommended to the Saudi Arab authorities for permission to leave the Hejaz by an earlier ship than the ones by which they were entitled to leave, according to the local "rule of rotation," that is, the rule whereby pilgrims were released from Mecca according to the order in which they arrived in this country. This was done in order to enable the applicants to resume duty before the expiry of their leave; but in some cases where certificates of leave were not available, the statement had to be accepted on the applicant's word. Refunds on 109 tickets of deceased pilgrims were received from the shipping agents at Jedda and paid to their respective next-of-kin in Mecca during the season. Medical assistance to Malay pilgrims remained as in the previous years under the control of the Dutch Medical Mission in Mecca, whose Javanese doctor would appear to be fully taxed by attending to both the Javanese and the Malay patients.

*Cost of the Pilgrimage.*

146. The only shipping company dealing with Malay pilgrim traffic raised their rates this year for a return deck passage, including food, from 181 dollars to 215 dollars. The rate for a first-class passage was not changed. The rates for all inclusive services to the pilgrims, as authorised by the Saudi Government, were as follows:—

Means of Transport.	Including visit to Medina.	Without visit to Medina.
	Dollars.	Dollars.
(a) By camel	206.50	142.80
(b) By bus	278.25	167.60
(c) By car	364.75	200.45

Rates were quoted locally in Saudi currency; the foregoing rates have been calculated at the rate of £1 gold = 14.75 dollars.

147. First-class passengers generally made private arrangements for accommodation through their sheikhs. Rates for a flat ranged between £15 gold to £30 gold per month according to locality, &c.

148. In assessing rates for children, the Saudi Arabian Government followed a new plan this year: children under 5 years of age were charged nothing; those between 5 and 10 were charged half-rates, and those over 10 full rates.



### Deceased Pilgrims.

149. The total number of deaths among Malay pilgrims this year was 223, including ten who died on the voyage out. This works out at 4.7 per cent. of the total number. The effects of twenty-five pilgrims who died last year without having any friend who could take charge of their effects were handed over by the Saudi authorities to the Malay vice-consul during this season. Among those who died was the Hon. Engku Mohamed-bin-Khalid of Johore, a cousin of his Highness the Sultan of Johore. He died at Mecca.

### Pilgrim Passes.

150. This year, for the first time, a pass was issued to each pilgrim above the age of 1 year.

### Miscellaneous.

151. The revised Merchant Shipping Ordinance of the Straits Settlements Government affecting changes in the amounts of refunds on unused and on deceased pilgrims' tickets proved to be an important factor, among others, in bringing about the removal (as an experiment) of the control on the issue of return tickets to the pilgrims this year; otherwise, owing to the large number, an extra assistant to the Malay pilgrimage officer might have had to be engaged to cope with the work. For the first time, gratis tickets were issued by the shipping company to babies under 1 year of age accompanying their parents on pilgrimage.

152. The Malays residing in the Hejaz exhibited a good deal of indignation at the imposition of a registration charge on foreigners residing in this country. A deputation which waited on the Malay pilgrimage officer whilst at Mecca was informed that the Saudi authorities were entitled to impose such a registration fee, which is similar to those levied on foreigners by many other countries.

153. The secretary to the Government of Kedah, Haji Muhammad Sheriff, C.B.E., in an interview with His Majesty's Minister, raised the point that the Hejaz custom of classing together the inhabitants of Malaya and of the Netherlands East Indies as "people of Java" is not always agreeable to Malaysians. It happened that the local newspaper, in reporting the departure of Mr. Sheriff, referred to him as belonging to Kedah, "one of the parts of Java." His Majesty's Minister took advantage of this sad ignorance of geography to write to the Amir Feisal on the matter. The Amir replied that no superiority or inferiority was implied by this long-established terminology. However, he said that all Hejaz newspapers had been informed that they should call everyone by the name of his own nation.

### Staff.

154. Staff arrangements were exactly the same as last year; Haji Abdul Majid and Haji Mohammed Jamil again applied their long experience to the problems of the pilgrimage with pronounced success.

### (13) Sudanese Pilgrimage.

155. According to Saudi quarantine returns, which this year tend to err on the side of generosity, 2,054 Sudanese pilgrims disembarked at Jedda, as compared with the total of 1,851 computed by the Sudan Government as having embarked at Suakin. The latter figure shows an increase of 193 on last year's total of 1,658. The relatively small number of fourteen emergency certificates were issued during the return season to Sudanese pilgrims who claimed to have lost their travel documents, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. were, as usual, good enough to provide them with free passages to Suakin.

156. Mutawwifs' dues remained on the reduced scale which was standardised in 1936, and the sum fixed for collection purposes this year was £E. 2 170 mm. Again this year the mutawwifs experienced great difficulty in collecting their dues, which all pilgrims, irrespective of nationality, are required to pay immediately on landing at Jedda. A large number of Sudanese pilgrims

applied to the Legation for monetary assistance on landing, to enable them to pay their mutawwifs' dues; not one of them had more than 75 Egyptian piastres in his pocket, and many of them possessed only 40 to 50 piastres. Their applications were refused, but to enable them to perform the pilgrimage, their mutawwifs were promised that a loan of £E. 1,500 mm. would be advanced to their indigent charges after the pilgrimage (see paragraphs 167 and 168 of last year's report).

157. It has been suggested that the adoption of a suitable form of paid-up pilgrim pass scheme, whereby an intending pilgrim would be required to deposit a fixed sum of money with the authorities in the Sudan, which would be refunded to the pilgrims at Jedda after the pilgrimage, would help to eliminate the possibility of indigent pilgrims embarking at Suakin. This question is now the subject of correspondence between this Legation and the Sudan Government.

158. During the return season the large number of 212 pilgrims were each advanced the sum £E. 1,500 mm., which, in the large majority of cases, was immediately handed over to their mutawwifs.

159. This year's pilgrimage was unique in that no serious complaints were received by the Legation from returning pilgrims regarding the inadequacy of shipping facilities. The enlargement of the quarantine accommodation at Suakin, and the reduced period of quarantine from five to three days, which was still further reduced towards the end of the pilgrimage to about twenty-four hours, were mainly responsible for this highly satisfactory state of affairs. The Khedivial Mail Line were also more accommodating in their allotment of steamers, thanks largely to the untiring efforts of the commissioner at Port Sudan.

160. Prominent among Sudanese pilgrims were: Hussein Abdel Aseem Khalifa, a native District Commissioner, Sheikh Ahmad Rabi Abu Ku', a section sheikh of the Kenana tribe, and Sheikh Saboonabi, a religious notable of the Fung tribe, who was accompanied by a large number of followers.

### 161. Repatriation of Sudanese:—

(a) Applications considered	...	...	...	1
(b) Applicants repatriated	...	...	...	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	...	...	...	3
(d) Applications still under reference	...	...	...	Nil

162. The Sudan Government proposed during the year that a medical mission from the Sudan might with advantage accompany the Sudanese pilgrims to the Hejaz. His Majesty's Minister did not welcome this suggestion: he pointed out that the delegate of the International Quarantine Board at Alexandria was already charged with the duty of collecting and transmitting to the Board information of medical interest concerning the pilgrimage, from his arrival some weeks before the Haj to the moment when his board declares the pilgrimage clean. Sir Reader William Bullard considered that a Sudan mission would not be able to glean much more information than this delegate, and that as the Saudi Arabian Government did not welcome such missions, it was doubtful whether in present circumstances the proposal was worth following up. The Sudan Government agreed.

### (14) West African Pilgrimage.

163. According to Saudi quarantine returns, 6,046 West African pilgrims arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year via Suakin, an increase of 1,460 on last year's total of 4,586. The large majority of these pilgrims were natives of British West Africa. They were, as usual, carried to and from the Sudan in ships of the Khedivial Mail Line. No West Africans are shown in the Saudi returns as having disembarked this year at the southern ports of Lith and Qunfida. Some fifty-six emergency certificates were issued to pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their pilgrim passes, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. were again good to provide most of them with free passages to Suakin.

164. Only ninety West Africans travelled under the auspices of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme this year, compared with seventy-nine last year. At the time of writing this report sixty-two of them have collected their return tickets and the balance of their deposits. The scheme worked smoothly this year, and nominal lists together with return tickets and duplicate pilgrim passes were received from the Sudan by the same ship on which the pilgrims travelled.



## 165. Repatriation of West Africans:—

(a) Applications considered	...	...	5
(b) Applicants repatriated	...	...	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	...	...	4
(d) Applications still under reference	...	...	Nil

## (15) Somali Pilgrimage.

166. According to Saudi quarantine returns, 771 Somali pilgrims disembarked at Jedda this year, a decrease of 443 on last year's total of 1,214. This decrease is mainly in respect of pilgrims from Italian Somaliland.

167. The Somali ratings of H.M.S. *Londonderry*, which was visiting Jedda during the Haj, were unable to perform the pilgrimage this year owing to the early departure of the vessel from Jedda.

168. During the return season thirty-one Somali pilgrims were refunded the total sum of £120.

## 169. Repatriation of Somalis:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	...	3
(b) Applicants repatriated	...	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	...	2
(d) Applications still under reference	...	1

## (16) Palestinian and Transjordan Pilgrimage.

170. According to Saudi quarantine returns 736 Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims entered the country this year; 600 through the port of Jedda, and 76 via Yanbu. This figure closely corresponds with the total of 725 given by the Government of Palestine as having registered with the Palestine Department of Health as intending pilgrims, and shows an increase of 308 on last year's figure of 428. The large majority of Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims travelled to and from the Hejaz in ships of the Misr Steamship Line.

171. As usual, no figures are available regarding those who travelled overland. Only four persons in this category came to the notice of the Legation, when they applied for repatriation on the grounds of destitution.

172. The Government of Palestine were again good enough to sanction the local engagement of a clerical assistant. Hassan Effendi Kamel, a Sudani (see paragraph 179 of last year's report), was again employed in this capacity, and although the clerical work involved was considerably heavier this year he discharged his onerous duties to the complete satisfaction of the officer who deals with this section of the pilgrimage.

173. Applications for refunds of deposits during the return season were proportionately high. A total of £590 10s. was advanced to 142 Palestinian, and four Transjordan pilgrims.

174. The preferential treatment accorded to Egyptian pilgrims by the Egyptian Legation, and the officials of the Misr Steamship Line in the matter of the allotment of accommodation during the return season has already been alluded to in paragraph 31 above. To obviate possible misunderstanding in the future, pilgrims will be informed before their departure from Palestine and Transjordan that if they are permitted to travel on steamers chartered by the Egyptian Government, prior consideration will be accorded to Egyptian pilgrims during the return season.

175. A comparatively unsuccessful attempt was made by the Palestine Islamic Committee to use the pilgrimage as a vehicle for the circulation of anti-British propaganda. Large quantities of pamphlets, illustrated to show the alleged desecration of religious literature and other similar acts by the British in Palestine, and said to have been printed in Syria, were brought to the Hejaz from Beirut by Taha Abu Saud, of Jaffa, a member of the Islamic Committee, and others. A few pamphlets were discreetly distributed in Jedda, and some in Mecca, but most of them were confiscated by the King, who forbade their distribution in this country.

## 176. Repatriation of Palestinians and Transjordanians:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	...	4
(b) Applicants repatriated	...	Nil
(c) Applications still under reference	...	Nil

177. A number of Transjordanians made the pilgrimage overland, instead of making use of the recognised route via Palestine or via Maan and Aqaba. The Transjordan Government is in process of organising facilities for pilgrims via Mudawara: 267 outgoing and 652 returning pilgrims used that route this year. Some were inoculated at Muaqqar, a few miles east of Amman; and adequate arrangements were made by a medical officer at Mudawara on return for control and quarantine measures, and for the feeding of destitute pilgrims. This route, not being recognised at the pilgrimage conference at Beirut in 1929, was not open to Syrians. Nevertheless, certain parties of Syrians attempted, some successfully, to cross Transjordan territory via Kaf on their way to the pilgrimage.

## (17) Muscati, Bahreini, and Koweiti Pilgrimages.

178. Saudi quarantine returns show that 146 Muscati pilgrims arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year, and 134 are shown as having disembarked at Lith and Qunfida. No figures are available regarding those who came overland.

179. According to the "Koweit Intelligence Summary" No. 17 of December 1937, some 380 pilgrims had left Koweit for the collecting point at Jahara village. A not altogether successful attempt was made this year by the newly formed Nejd Car Company (a quasi-Government concern) to carry pilgrims from Koweit via Riyadh to Medina and Mecca, and from Ujair via Hofuf and Riyadh to Mecca, but no figures are available regarding the number of passengers carried.

180. The Ruler of Bahrein, His Highness Sir Hamad-ibn-Isa-al-Khalifa, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., &c., accompanied by eighteen followers disembarked at Jedda from H.M.S. *Londonderry* on the 22nd January. He was met on board by His Majesty's Minister and the Amir Feisal, Viceroy of Hejaz, and on shore by His Royal Highness the Amir Saud. His Highness left the same afternoon for Mecca. After the pilgrimage His Highness accompanied by some ninety followers embarked at Jedda on the steamship *Islami* on the 17th February for Karachi.

181. No Muscati, Bahreini or Koweiti pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

## (18) Pilgrimages of Inhabitants of the Colony and Protectorate of Aden.

182. According to Saudi quarantine returns 559 natives of the Colony and the Protectorate of Aden arrived in Jedda on pilgrimage this year, and thirty-one pilgrims are shown as having disembarked at the southern port of Lith. As usual, no figures are available regarding those who travelled overland.

183. During the return season 203 emergency certificates were issued to natives of the Aden Protectorate, as compared with 140 over a similar period last year. There has been a greater exodus of Hadhramis of the semi-settled class this year, owing to the tax imposed on foreign residents under the recently promulgated "Residence Regulations."

184. Shipping arrangements during the return season worked relatively smoothly, and the few complaints received by the Legation were satisfactorily dealt with.

## 185. Repatriation of natives of Aden Colony and Protectorate:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration	...	39
(b) Applicants repatriated	...	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	...	29

## (19) South African Pilgrimage.

186. According to Saudi quarantine returns seventy-six South African pilgrims entered the country via the port of Jedda this year. They were, as usual, people of some means, who entered and left the country unostentatiously.

187. No South African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

## (20) Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimages.

188. Saudi quarantine returns show that 247 Zanzibari and East African pilgrims disembarked at Jedda this year, an increase of 147 on last year's total of 100.

189. No Zanzibari or East African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.



(21) *Sarawak Pilgrimage.*

190. No less than 111 Sarawakis came on pilgrimage this year: a record figure for the last ten years. Ninety-two of them returned to Sarawak after the pilgrimage; sixteen elected to stay in the Holy Land for a year or so, and at least one of the remaining three has had the privilege of dying at Mecca.

(22) *Abyssinian and French Somali Pilgrimage.*

191. A magnificently equipped Italian troop-ship, steamship *Sannio*, carrying a regular naval officer, brought 616 pilgrims from Mogadiscio. She had a very large hospital, shower-baths, and porcelain wash-basins: her pilgrims were very happy, though two of them died. A few further details gathered from reports from Harar may be added here. The Italian authorities organised the pilgrimage throughout. Each pilgrim paid 3,000 lire to the Government before his departure, and incurred no further expenses. It is evident that that sum was not enough to cover all the services rendered, so that Italian Government funds must have made up the difference. Generous rations of tea, sugar, rice, butter and other food were distributed daily; one cook was allotted to every ten persons; in the Hejaz one sheep or goat was issued to every six persons, and each pilgrim received a dollar a day for personal expenses. A few boys under 12 years of age were taken free of charge.

192. The total number of pilgrims brought by the *Sannio* was reported to be 660 from Mogadiscio and 560 from Massawa.

193. The retort of the French authorities at Jibuti was the despatch of an organised party under the Sultan of Tajura, accompanied by Sheikh Omar-al-Ashari, an Italophobe notable, but according to local reports only twenty-eight French Somalis came in this party.

[E 3066/1036/91]

No. 9.

*Agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Standard Oil Company of California, May 27-29, 1933.*

ON the 27th May, 1933, an agreement was signed between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Standard Oil Company of California granting the company a concession for a defined area in Eastern Saudi Arabia corresponding roughly with the district of Hasa. An abridged text of this agreement was published at the time in the Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura*. What was believed to be a full text, consisting of thirty-four articles, was obtained in 1935 by the political agent at Kuwait (E 3823/173/25 (1935)).<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The Saudi Arabian decree announcing the grant of the concession contained, however, a reference to a "special agreement," which was not published. It was believed at the time that the "special agreement" gave the California Arabian Standard Oil Company an option on territory in Eastern Saudi Arabia not already included in the Hasa concession, but details were lacking.

3. In April 1938 the Saudi Arabian Legation in London communicated unofficially to the Foreign Office the text of three articles of an agreement relating to the Standard Oil Company's concession, together with a copy of a letter dated the 29th May, 1933, from the company's representative to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance. This letter refers *inter alia* to "the contract signed to-day." The three articles and the letter deal with the particular question of the company's option rights outside the original concession area.

4. The three articles were numbered 3, 7 and 35. The Saudi Arabian Legation had no knowledge of the remainder of the agreement from which the articles are supposed to be taken, and it is, in any case, unlikely that there would be two complete, but entirely separate, agreements signed at about the same time and relating to the same subject.

5. The most probable explanation is that on the 29th May, 1933, a modified version of the original agreement of the 27th May was signed, and that this

<sup>(1)</sup> Part XXXVI, Enclosure in No. 68.

modified version consisted of the original agreement with the three extra articles and the interpretative letter. This is borne out by the fact that if the three additional articles are inserted in their proper places in the original agreement, the whole agreement reads consecutively.

6. The agreement has accordingly been reproduced below with the three articles inserted. The numbering of the other articles has been altered accordingly, *i.e.*, article 3 in the original becomes article 4, article 5 becomes article 6, article 6 becomes article 8, and so on as far as article 32, which becomes article 34, after which the new article 35 supersedes the original article 33. Finally, article 34 becomes article 36. References to other articles have been altered to correspond with the new numbering. The letter has been placed at the end of the agreement.

7. The whole document is confidential, as no part of it has been communicated officially to His Majesty's Government by the Saudi Arabian Government.

*Foreign Office, September 22, 1938.*

*Text of the Oil Agreement between the Standard Oil Company of California and His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud.*

THIS agreement made between his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman-al-Hamdan, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of Saudi Arab Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Government"), of the one part and L. N. Hamilton, acting on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the Company in manner following:—

## ARTICLE 1.

The Government hereby grants to the Company on the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, and with respect to the area defined below, the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years from the effective date hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, ozocerite, and other hydrocarbons, and the derivatives of all such products. It is understood, however, that such right does not include the exclusive right to sell crude or refined products within the area described below or within Saudi Arabia.

## ARTICLE 2.

The area covered by the exclusive right referred to in article 1 hereof is all of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters), westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north, 30 degrees west, to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana, such boundary shall continue in a straight line south, 30 degrees east, to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia.

For convenience this area may be referred to as the "exclusive area."

## ARTICLE 3.

In addition to the grant of the exclusive area referred to in article 2 of this agreement, the Government also hereby grants to the Company a preference right to acquire an oil concession covering the balance of eastern Saudi Arabia extending as far west of the westerly boundary of the exclusive area as the contact between the sedimentary and igneous formations. This preference right includes such rights as the Government may now have, or may hereafter acquire, in the so-called Neutral Zone bordering on the Persian Gulf to the south of Kuwait. The nature of this preference right is to be hereafter agreed upon. The term "oil concession" as used in this article means an exclusive concession covering the same products which are covered by the present agreement. Furthermore,



the Company's geologists shall have the right to examine the region covered by the preference right just referred to (excepting the Neutral Zone referred to above), in so far as such examination may be necessary or advisable for a better understanding of the geological character of the exclusive area.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Within the time agreed in article 18 of this agreement, the Company shall make a payment to the Government of £30,000 gold, or its equivalent.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The Company shall pay the Government annually the sum of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent. For convenience this payment is termed an "annual rental" and it is payable in advance. The first annual rental shall be paid within the time agreed in article 18 of this agreement; thereafter so long as the contract is not terminated, the annual rental shall be due upon each anniversary of the effective date hereof, and shall be payable within thirty days after such anniversary, provided that upon the commercial discovery of oil no further annual rental shall be due or payable.

#### ARTICLE 6.

If this contract has not been terminated within eighteen months from the effective date hereof, the Company shall make a second payment to the Government, amounting to £20,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due date of such payment shall be eighteen months from the effective date hereof, but the Company shall have fifteen days from the due date within which to make the payment.

#### ARTICLE 7.

During the life of this agreement, the Government shall be under no obligation to repay the initial loan of £30,000 gold (or its equivalent), or the second loan of £20,000 gold (or its equivalent). The Company shall have the right to recover the amount of these two loans by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government. If the amount of the two loans, in whole or in part, shall not have been so recovered by the Company upon the termination of this contract, the Government shall repay the unrecovered amount in four equal and consecutive annual instalments, the first instalment to be paid within one year from the date of the termination of this agreement. Furthermore, until such unrecovered amount has been repaid by the Government, the Company's preference right referred to in article 3 hereof shall continue in force.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Upon the effective date of this agreement the Company shall commence plans and preparations for geological work, so planning the work as to take advantage of the cooler season for more efficient work in the field, and of the hotter season for the necessary office work of compiling data and reports. In the event the actual field work shall commence not later than the end of September 1933, and it shall be continued diligently until operations connected with drilling are commenced, or until the contract is terminated.

#### ARTICLE 9.

Within ninety days after the commencement of drilling, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such portions of the exclusive area as the Company at that time may decide not to explore further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. Similarly, from time to time, during the life of this contract, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such further portions of the exclusive area as the Company may then decide not to explore or prospect further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. The portions so relinquished shall thereupon be released from the terms and conditions of this contract, excepting only that during the life of this contract the Company shall continue to enjoy the right to use the portions so relinquished for transportation and communication facilities, which, however, shall interfere as little as practicable with any other use to which the relinquished portions may be put.

#### ARTICLE 10.

The Company shall commence operations connected with drilling as soon as a suitable structure has been found, and in any event if the Company does not commence such operations within three years from the end of September 1933 (subject to the provisions of article 27 hereof), the Government may terminate this contract. Once commenced, these operations shall be continued diligently until oil in commercial quantities has been discovered or until this agreement is terminated. If the Company should fail to declare so sooner, the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date upon which the Company has completed and tested a well or wells capable of producing in accordance with first-class oil practice at least 2,000 tons of oil per day for a period of thirty consecutive days.

Operations connected with drilling include the ordering and shipping of materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia, the construction of roads, camps, buildings, structures, communication facilities, &c., and the installation and operation of the machinery, equipment and facilities for drilling wells.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Upon the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall advance to the Government the sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent, and one year later the further sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due date of the first advance shall be the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, as provided in article 10 hereof, and the due date of the second advance shall be one year later. In each case the Company shall have sixty days following the due date within which to make the advance. Both of these advances are in account of royalties, which may be due to the Government, and, consequently, the Company shall have the right to recover the amount of these advances by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Since it has been agreed that the annual rental of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent, is payable to the date of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and since it has been agreed also that the annual rental is to be payable in advance, it may happen that the last annual rental paid prior to the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities will cover a period beyond the date of such discovery. In case that this period should be equal to or greater than one-fifth of a year, the proportionate amount of the £5,000 gold, or its equivalent corresponding to such period, shall be treated as an advance on account of royalties due the Government, and consequently it should be recoverable by the Company by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

#### ARTICLE 13.

As soon as practicable (*i.e.*, allowing a reasonable time for ordering and shipping further materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia and commencing further work), after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall continue operations connected with drilling by using at least two strings of tools. These operations shall continue diligently until the proven area has been drilled up in accordance with first-class oil-field practice, or until the contract is terminated.

#### ARTICLE 14.

The Company shall pay the Government a royalty on all net crude oil produced and saved and run from field storage, after first deducting—

- (1) Water and foreign substance; and
- (2) Oil required for the customary operations of the Company's installation within Saudi Arabia; and
- (3) The oil required for the manufacturing the amounts of gasoline and kerosene to be provided free each year to the Government in accordance with article 19 hereof.

The rate of royalty per ton of such net crude oil shall be 4s. gold, or its equivalent.



## ARTICLE 15.

If the Company should produce, save and sell any natural gas, it will pay to the Government a royalty equal to one-eighth of the proceeds of the sale of such natural gas, it being understood, however, that the Company shall be under no obligation to produce, save, sell, or otherwise dispose of any natural gas. It is also understood that the Company is under no obligation to pay any royalty on such natural gas as it may use for the customary operation of its installation within Saudi Arabia.

## ARTICLE 16.

The Government, through duly authorised representatives, may, during the usual hours of operations, inspect and examine the operations of the Company under this contract and may verify the amount of production. The Company shall measure, in accordance with first-class oil-field practice, the amount of oil produced and saved and run from field storage, and shall keep true and correct accounts thereof, and of the natural gas it may produce and save and sell, and duly authorised representatives of the Government shall also have access at all reasonable times to such accounts. The Company shall within three months, after the end of each semester, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, deliver to the Government an abstract of such accounts for the semester, and a statement of the amount of royalties due the Government for the semester. These accounts and statements should be treated as confidential by the Government, with the exception of such items therein as the Government may require to publish for fiscal purposes.

The royalties due the Government at the end of each semester commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, shall be paid within three months after the end of the semester, such portion of the amount as may be unquestioned shall be tendered the Government within the period hereinabove, and thereupon the question shall be settled by agreement between the parties or failing that by arbitration as provided in this contract. Any further sum which may be payable to the Government as a result of this settlement shall be paid within sixty days after the date of such settlement.

## ARTICLE 17.

It is agreed that all gold payments provided in this contract, whether pounds gold or shillings gold, are to be based on the gold pound standard according to its weight and fineness at the time the payment may be due. It is also agreed that wherever it is stipulated in this contract the equivalent of any sum or amount in pounds gold or in shillings gold may be paid, such equivalent may be in dollars in United States currency, or pounds sterling.

It is agreed, furthermore, that the equivalent of pounds gold or shillings gold, for any payment which may be made hereunder in dollars, United States currency or in pounds sterling (with the exception of the first payment provided for in article 18 hereof), shall be based on the average of the rate of exchange as computed over a period of three months immediately preceding the due date of the payment.

## ARTICLE 18.

All payments provided in this contract to be made to the Government may be made by tendering such payment directly to the Government, or by depositing the amount due to the credit of the Government in some bank which the Government designates in writing, and which the Government may change from time to time by giving written notice to the Company long enough in advance, so that Company will have sufficient time to make future payments to the new bank. It is agreed that Government will designate such bank in Saudi Arabia, or in the United States of America, or in England, or in Holland, but that no bank in Saudi Arabia will be so designated unless such bank has a correspondent in United States of America, England or Holland, through which bank transfers of money to Saudi Arabia may be made. Once the Company has made the proper payment to the Government or has deposited the proper sum to such correspondent for transfer to a bank in Saudi Arabia, the Company shall be free of all further responsibility in connexion with payment.

It is agreed, however, that the first payment of £35,000 gold, or its equivalent (comprising the first payment and the first annual rental), shall be made, within fifteen days after the effective date of this agreement, to a correspondent in New York or in London, of Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) at Jedda, Saudi Arabia, to be transmitted without delay, and at the expense of the Company, to said society and to be delivered to the Government upon obtaining a proper receipt from the Government for such payment. If this first payment is not made in gold, it will be made in pounds sterling at the current rate of exchange at the time the Company makes the payment to such correspondent.

## ARTICLE 19.

As soon as practicable after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall select some point within Saudi Arabia for the erection of a plant for manufacturing sufficient gasoline and kerosene to meet the ordinary requirements of the Government, providing, of course, that the character of the crude oil found will permit of the manufacture of such products on a commercial basis by the use of ordinary refining methods, and provided further that the amount of oil developed is sufficient for the purpose. It is understood that the ordinary requirements of the Government shall not include resale inside or outside of the country. Upon the completion of the necessary preliminary arrangements, and as soon as the Company has obtained the Government's consent to the proposed location, the Company shall proceed with the erection of such plant. During each year following the date of completion of this plant, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 200,000 American gallons of gasoline, and 100,000 gallons of kerosene, it being understood that the facilities provided by the Government for accepting these deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company's operations.

## ARTICLE 20.

The Company, at its own expense, will employ the necessary number of guards and guides to protect its representatives, its camps and installations. The Government promise to co-operate fully in supplying the best soldiers and men available for this responsibility, and in furnishing every reasonable protection, at rates not exceeding those customarily paid by the Government or others for similar services, it being understood that the expense for such services shall be paid by the Company through the Government.

## ARTICLE 21.

In return for the obligations assumed by the Company under this contract, and for the payments required from the Company hereunder, the Company and enterprise shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes, imposts, charges, fees and duties (including, of course, import and export duties), it being understood that this privilege shall not extend to the sale of products within the country, nor shall it extend to the personal requirements of the individual employees of the Company. Any material imported free of duty may not be sold within the country without first paying the corresponding import duty.

## ARTICLE 22.

It is understood, of course, that the Company has the right to use all means and facilities it may deem necessary or advisable in order to exercise the rights granted under this contract, so as to carry out the purposes of this enterprise, including among other things the right to construct and use roads, camps, buildings, structures and all systems of communication, to install and operate machinery, equipment and facilities in connexion with the drilling of wells, or in connexion with the transportation, storage, treatment, manufacture, dealing with, or exportation of petroleum and its derivatives, or in connexion with the camps, buildings and quarters of the personnel of the company; to construct and use storage reservoirs, tanks and receptacles; to construct and operate wharves, piers, seaload lines and all other terminal and port facilities; and to use all forms of transportation of personnel, or equipment, and of petroleum and its derivatives. It is understood, however, that the use of aeroplanes within the country shall be subject to a separate agreement.



The Company shall also have the right to develop, carry away and use water. It likewise shall have the right to carry away and use any water belonging to the Government, for the operations of the enterprise, but so as not to prejudice irrigation or to deprive any lands, houses or watering places for cattle, of a reasonable supply of water from time to time. The Company may also take for use, but only to the extent necessary for the purpose of the enterprise, other natural products belonging to the Government, such as surface soil, timber, stone, lime, gypsum stone and similar substances.

Government officials and agents, in pursuance of official business, shall have the right to use such communications and transportation facilities as the Company may establish, provided that such use shall not obstruct or interfere with the Company's operations hereunder, and shall not impose upon the Company any substantial burden of expense.

In times of national emergency the use of the Company's transportation and communication facilities by the Government shall entitle the Company to fair compensation for any loss it may sustain thereby, whether through damage to the Company's facilities, equipment or installation or through the obstruction or interference with the Company's operations.

#### ARTICLE 23.

The enterprise under this contract shall be directed and supervised by Americans, who shall employ Saudi Arab nationals as far as practicable, and in so far as the Company can find suitable Saudi Arab employees it will not employ other nationals.

In respect of the treatment of the Saudi Arab nationals as employees, the Company shall abide by the existing laws of the country applicable generally to employees of any other industrial enterprise.

#### ARTICLE 24.

The Government reserves the right to search for and obtain any substance or products, other than those exclusively granted under this contract, within the area covered by this agreement, except land occupied by wells or other installations of the Company, provided always that the right thus reserved by the Government shall be exercised so as not to endanger the operations of the Company or interfere with its rights hereunder, and provided also that a fair compensation shall be paid to the Company by the Government for all damage the Company may sustain through the exercise of the right so reserved by the Government. In any grant of such right so reserved by the Government, the concessionnaire shall be bound by the provisions of this article.

#### ARTICLE 25.

The Company is hereby empowered by the Government to acquire from any occupant the surface rights of any land which the Company may find necessary to use in connexion with the enterprise, provided that the Company shall pay the occupant for depriving him of the use of the land. The payment shall be a fair one with respect to the customary use made of the land by the occupant. The Government will lend every reasonable assistance to the Company in case of any difficulties with respect to acquiring the rights of a surface occupant.

The Company, of course, shall have no right to acquire or to occupy Holy Places.

#### ARTICLE 26.

The Company shall supply the Government with copies of all topographical maps and geological reports (as finally made and approved by the Company) relating to the exploration and exploitation of the area covered by this contract. The Company shall also furnish the Government, within four months after the end of each year, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, a report of the operations under this contract during the year. These maps and reports shall be treated as confidential by the Government.

#### ARTICLE 27.

No failure or omission on the part of the Company to carry out or to perform any of the terms or conditions of the contract shall give the Government any

claim against the Company, or be deemed a breach of this contract, in so far as such failure or omission may arise from *force majeure*. If through *force majeure* the fulfilment of any term or condition of this contract should be delayed, the period of the delay, together with such period as may be required for the restoration of any damage done during such delay, shall be added to the terms or periods fixed in this contract.

#### ARTICLE 28.

The Company may terminate the contract at any time by giving the Government thirty days' advance notice in writing, whether by letter or by telegraph, provided that the telegraphic notice is promptly confirmed by letter. Upon the termination of this contract through such notice or through any other cause, the Government and the Company shall thereafter be free of all further obligations under this contract, except as follows:—

- (1) The Company's immovable property, such as roads, water or oil wells with their casings, permanent buildings and structures, &c., shall become the property of the Government free of charge.
- (2) The Company shall afford the Government an opportunity to purchase the movable property of the enterprise in Saudi Arabia at a fair price equal to the replacement value of such property at the time, less depreciation. Any controversy about this fair price shall be settled by arbitration in the same manner as provided in article 31 of this contract. If the Government declines or fails, within two months following the date of the termination of this contract, to purchase such movable property, or if the Government fails to tender the purchase price within thirty days after it has been decided upon, by agreement or arbitration, the Company shall then have six months within which to remove such property.

#### ARTICLE 29.

In case of the breach by the Company of its obligation to make the second payment of £20,000 gold, or its equivalent as provided in article 6 hereof, or of its obligation to commence operations connected with drilling as set forth in article 10 hereof, or of its obligation to make two advances of £50,000 gold, each, or its equivalent under the terms and conditions provided in article 11 hereof, or of its obligation under article 30 hereof to pay the amount of any damages which may be assessed upon the Company, the Government's remedy shall be the right to give the Company notice at once for such breach, and thereupon if the Company does not take immediate steps to comply with the obligation so breached, the Government may terminate this contract.

#### ARTICLE 30.

Except as otherwise provided in article 29 hereof, the penalty for the breach by the Company of any of its obligations under this contract shall be damages which shall be payable to the Government under the following conditions:—

The Government shall at once notify the Company of any alleged breach on the part of the Company, setting forth the nature of such breach. Any controversy which may arise as to whether or not the Company has committed the alleged breach shall be settled by arbitration in the manner provided in this agreement. Once that the fact of the commission of the breach has been established, the failure of the Company to take immediate steps to remedy the breach shall subject the Company to the payment of damages to the Government, and if such damages cannot be agreed upon they shall be determined by arbitration in the manner provided in this contract. The amount of any damages which may be determined shall be paid to the Government by the Company within sixty days after such determination.

#### ARTICLE 31.

If any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and the Company concerning the interpretation or execution of this contract, or



anything herein contained or in connexion herewith, or the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder, it shall, failing any agreement to settle it in another way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party, and a referee who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of arbitrators failing to agree upon a referee, the Government and the Company shall, in agreement, appoint a referee, and in the event of their failing to agree they shall request the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of the difference of opinion between them the decision of the referee, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed upon by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be The Hague, Holland.

#### ARTICLE 32.

The Company may not, without the consent of the Government, assign its rights and obligations under this contract to anyone, but it is understood that the Company, upon notifying the Government, shall have the right to assign its rights and obligations hereunder to a corporation it may organise exclusively for the purpose of this enterprise. Any such corporation or organisation, upon being invested with any or all of rights and obligations under this contract, and upon notification thereof to the Government, shall thereupon be subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement.

In the event that stock issued by any such corporation or organisation should be offered for sale to the general public, the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia shall be allowed a reasonable time to subscribe (upon similar terms and conditions offered to others), for at least 20 per cent. of such shares of stock so issued and offered for sale to the general public.

#### ARTICLE 33.

It is understood that the periods of time referred to in this agreement shall be reckoned on the basis of the solar calendar.

#### ARTICLE 34.

The effective date of this contract shall be the date of its publication in Saudi Arabia, following the notification of this contract by the Company.

#### ARTICLE 35.

This contract has been drawn up in English and in Arabic. Inasmuch as most of the obligations hereunder are imposed upon the Company and inasmuch as the interpretation of the English text, especially as regards technical obligations and requirements relating to the oil industry, has been fairly well established through long practice and experience in contracts such as the present one, it is agreed that while both texts shall have equal validity, nevertheless, in case of any divergence of interpretation as to the Company's obligations hereunder, the English text shall prevail.

#### ARTICLE 36.

It is understood that the contract, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be subject to ratification by the Company at its offices in San Francisco, California, before it shall become effective. After both texts of this contract have been signed in duplicate in Saudi Arabia, the signed copies shall be sent by registered mail in the next out-going mail to the Company in San Francisco, California, and within fifteen days after receipt in San Francisco the Company shall transmit to the Government by telegraph whether or not it ratifies this contract. If the contract is not ratified by the Company within fifteen days after that period, it shall be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Likewise, if the amount of the first payment and the first annual rental is not made within the time agreed upon in article 18 hereof, the Government may declare this contract to be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Upon ratification of this contract by the Company, one signed copy of each text, together with the necessary evidence as to ratification by the Company, shall be returned to the Government. Also upon ratification of this contract by the Company, the contract shall be published in Saudi Arabia in the usual manner. Signed this 29th day of the month of May 1933.

*Letter to his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman-al-Hamdan.*

Dear Sheikh Abdulla,

Jedda, May 29, 1933.

REFERRING to the contract which has been signed to-day by you, on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government, and by the undersigned, on behalf of Standard Oil Company of California, relative to an oil concession covering a portion of Eastern Saudi Arabia, I am setting forth below the agreement we have also reached on behalf of the two parties to the same contract, which agreement shall be considered as a part of the said contract. For convenience, the two parties in question shall be referred to below in the same manner as designated in the said contract, namely, the "Government" and the "Company," and the said contract shall be referred to as the "Saudi Arab Concession."

1. The Company is granted a preference right to an oil concession covering a certain area described in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession. The preference right so granted the Company shall be a right to acquire an oil concession covering such area, exclusive of the so-called Neutral Zone also referred to in the same article 3, by equalling the terms of any offer for such concession that may be made the Government by others in good faith and that the Government may be willing and ready to accept. Within thirty days after receiving from the Government written notice, setting forth in full the terms of such offer, the Company shall notify the Government whether or not the Company wishes to acquire the oil concession by equalling the terms so offered. If the Company does not wish to do so, the Government is free to accept the offer made, but if an oil concession should not be granted to others on the same terms as those so offered and so presented to the Company, the preference right of the Company shall continue, at least so long as the provisions of article 7 of the Saudi Arab Concession remain in force.

2. The Company's preference right to acquire an oil concession covering the so-called Neutral Zone referred to in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession, shall be a right to equal, with respect to the rights of the Government in the Neutral Zone, the terms and conditions which may be obtained by the Sheikh of Koweit for a concession covering his rights in the Neutral Zone. In the absence of any grant of an oil concession covering such rights of the Sheikh of Koweit, the Government will endeavour to reach an agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit whereby the Company will be permitted to acquire an oil concession covering the rights of the Government and of the Sheikh of Koweit in the Neutral Zone. In either of these two events, the Company shall have a period of thirty days from the date it receives written notice setting forth in full the terms and conditions of the oil concession covering the rights of the Sheikh of Koweit in the Neutral Zone, or covering the terms of the proposed concession embracing the rights of the Government and of the Sheikh of Koweit in the Neutral Zone, as the case may be, within which to decide and to notify the Government whether or not the Company wishes to acquire the oil concession on such terms. If the Company does not wish to do so, the Government is free to negotiate with others, but if the oil concession should not be granted to others on the same terms as those offered to the Company, the preference right of the Company shall continue, at least so long as the provisions of article 7 of the Saudi Arab Concession remain in force.

3. The consent of the Government must be obtained before the Company shall have any right to examine the so-called Neutral Zone referred to in article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

4. The provisions of article 35 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall also apply to this agreement.



[E 5842/1237/25]

No. 10.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).*

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 7, 1938.*

MY despatch No. 334 [of 18th August: Hejaz Railway].

French Government have agreed to action proposed.

2. Saudi Arabian Government may now be informed at suitable opportunity that His Majesty's Government agree to conference at Jedda of representatives of four countries concerned with object of reaching agreement as to repair of damaged portion of Hejaz Railway, on understanding that His Majesty's Government, like Saudi Arabian Government, maintain their former views as to ownership of line.

3. Saudi Arabian Government may also be informed, in confidence, that His Majesty's Government intend to authorise their representative at conference to announce that they are prepared to contribute £30,000 towards reconstruction of the Saudi Arabian section of the railway and to repair at their own expense the Mudawara-Maan section (which may cost as much as £100,000), provided that Saudi Arabian Government can raise from other sources remainder of estimated cost of restoring their own section.

4. This information should, however, be accompanied by a warning on general lines of paragraph 6 of Foreign Office letter of 29th April to Colonial Office.

5. Any further suggestion which His Majesty's Government may have to make, e.g., about the running of line once it is built, can be reserved for the conference.

6. While above communication should be made at an early date, it is desirable, if possible, to avoid impression that it is only made because of present international situation. Sir Reader Bullard arrives in Jedda shortly, and his return would be a natural occasion for making it, as he could say it was result of discussion while at home.

[E 5878/150/91]

No. 11.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 10.)*

Sir,

*India Office, October 7, 1938.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to Mr. Baggallay's letter of the 1st July, regarding the possibility of arranging the cession to Ibn Saud of territory adjoining the Khor-el-Odeid, and to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter dated the 30th August from the Government of India, and of a letter dated the 10th September from the Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, containing their latest views upon this matter.

Lord Zetland, having carefully reconsidered the proposal in the light of the arguments advanced in the letter quoted above, finds himself in general agreement with the criticisms of the Government of India and especially with what is stated in paragraph 3 (c) of this letter. He is impressed by the difficulty that the proposal could not be carried out without serious risk of damage, now and hereafter, to the strength of the position of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf. There is, for example, the danger that such a transaction might seriously injure their prestige by inviting doubts as to their ability to protect the interests of the sheikhs or by impairing their reputation for scrupulous observance of their declarations. Moreover, even if His Majesty's Government were willing to incur these risks, the probability that the proposed cession of territory would materially influence Ibn Saud's attitude in the matter of Palestine is acknowledged to be remote and it is not even certain that it would secure a settled frontier with the Trucial Sheikhdoms. The chance that such a cession would have any weight in determining Ibn Saud's policy in the event of a major emergency seems also to be very small, while on the other hand the damaging effect of the cession on His Majesty's Government's prestige in the Persian Gulf would be felt all the more severely in the event of such an emergency. Lord Zetland

hopes, therefore, that on further consideration Lord Halifax will agree that the proposal need not be pursued.

Copies of this letter and enclosures are being sent to the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Colonial Office and Petroleum Department.

I am, &amp;c.

R. PEEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

*Government of India to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Simla, August 30, 1938.*

SOUTH-EASTERN boundaries of Saudi Arabia.

I am directed to acknowledge your letter of the 22nd July, 1938, on the above-mentioned subject, in which you ask to be furnished with the observations of the Government of India upon Foreign Office letter of the 1st July, 1938, addressed to the India Office.

2. The Government of India fully appreciate the importance of securing, if possible, Ibn Saud's benevolent neutrality towards His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine and of removing any other grievance which he may have against His Majesty's Government. They have accordingly re-examined the matter in the light of the arguments put forward by the Foreign Office, and have given those arguments all possible weight in considering whether they are justified in modifying the views expressed in their telegram No. 440 of the 8th March, 1938. As the result of that re-examination they have regretfully concluded that they must adhere to the position which they then adopted and must again express their uncompromising opposition to the proposal made by the Foreign Office.

3. The reasons for this conclusion may be summarised as follows:—

(a) The Foreign Office themselves admit that, even if Ibn Saud were induced by the cession of Khor-el-Odeid to agree to a settled frontier *vis-à-vis* the Trucial States, the effect would hardly be permanent so far as Ibn Saud's attitude towards the Palestine question is concerned. The Government of India would go further and state that, in their opinion, no gesture of friendship on the part of His Majesty's Government will avail to prevent Ibn Saud and his subjects from actively assisting their coreligionists in Palestine, unless some appeasement of the situation there can be secured before long by His Majesty's Government. Ibn Saud's present disposition is, so far as the Government of India understand it, to avoid any friction with Great Britain, and, if he does eventually decide to add to His Majesty's Government's difficulties in Palestine, it will not be on account of chagrin at failure to obtain the eastern and southern frontiers, which he desires, but because he is compelled to this course by pressure from the Moslem World in general, which he is not able to resist. The cession of Khor-el-Odeid will not, therefore, in the opinion of the Government of India, have any material effect upon Ibn Saud's behaviour with regard to Palestine, either in the immediate or the remote future. They hold this opinion the more strongly because they do not consider that Ibn Saud would be grateful or would regard himself as under any obligation to His Majesty's Government by reason of their allowing him to take territory which he regards as his by right and not by favour.

(b) The Government of India are by no means satisfied that the cession of Khor-el-Odeid would, in fact, result in the establishment of a fixed and agreed frontier between Saudi Arabia and the territories of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Even if Ibn Saud were prepared to agree to a bargain on these lines, it is most improbable that he would keep his side of it. His experience hitherto has been that, by declining to agree to anything and always demanding more in reply to any concession, he has been able to advance his influence and his rule gradually and almost imperceptibly towards the coast in spite of the protests of His Majesty's Government. It would not be obvious to Ibn Saud why a frontier, to which he had agreed in theory, should in practice be defended with more vigour than a line which His Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion declared to be their last and final offer. It, moreover, appears to the Government of India that, if international complications in Palestine and elsewhere supervene, which would render Ibn Saud's friendship even more desirable than it is at



present, His Majesty's Government would feel compelled to acquiesce in further encroachment against the territories of the Trucial Sheikhs rather than risk an open breach with Ibn Saud by forcibly resisting it.

(c) If, however, it be assumed that the advantages expected by the Foreign Office could, in fact, be obtained as regards both Palestine, and the fixation of a definite limit to Ibn Saud's encroachment against the Trucial Sheikhs by the cession of Khor-el-Odeid, it remains to consider the means by which such cession could be arranged and the effect which it would be likely to produce upon the general position of His Majesty's Government in the gulf. It would be necessary to secure the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's acquiescence in the transfer of this territory and there can be no doubt that this could only be obtained either by the exercise of pressure, amounting almost to force, or by giving him pecuniary inducements of the order suggested in the Foreign Office letter. The use of the first method would have a most deplorable effect upon British prestige in the gulf and in the Middle East, since it would be regarded by all our dependents there as a surrender to Ibn Saud's aggression at the expense of one for whose interests we are responsible. The second method would in the opinion of the Government of India create a most unfortunate precedent, since it would be known to everyone in the gulf that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi had been paid a large sum for his complaisance, and it would be impossible in future for His Majesty's Government to obtain anything from the sheikhs without paying an exorbitant sum for it.

4. To sum up, the Government of India consider that it would be impossible to arrange the bargain, which the Foreign Office propose, without causing grave damage to the general position of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf, and that the bargain if concluded would not secure either a settled frontier for the Trucial Sheikhs against Ibn Saud's encroachment or any alteration in Ibn Saud's attitude towards events in Palestine. They therefore feel bound to recommend that the proposal should be dropped.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, from whom no comments on your letter, dated the 22nd July, 1938, have been received.

I have, &c.

H. A. F. METCALFE.

Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

*The Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Karachi, September 10, 1938.

SOUTH-EASTERN boundaries of Saudi Arabia.

Reference correspondence resting with Government of India letter, dated the 30th August, 1938, on the above subject.

2. I have not hitherto submitted my views, since Sir Trenchard Fowle intended to state his opinion verbally in London. In view of the last paragraph of the Government of India letter, however, I should perhaps submit that my views coincide in all respects with those expressed by the Government of India.

3. I need only add two remarks: quite apart from the objections stated by the Government of India to the purchase of Khor-el-Odeid (and these are, I believe, sufficient to exclude the proposal for further consideration), I do not hesitate to say that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi would not, and—if he wished to survive—could not, sell for £25,000 or any comparable sum. The further inducement of a settled frontier is so qualified as to render it totally valueless to any Trucial Coast Sheikh; the nature of the guarantee suggested in the Foreign Office letter dated the 1st July, 1938, allows in so many words for Saudi expansion beyond any selected frontier by precisely those tactics of "peaceful penetration" which Ibn Saud has adopted in the past and would continue to use in the future.

H. WEIGHTMAN,

Officiating Political Resident  
in the Persian Gulf.

Attested:

J. CRONING,

For Secretary to the Political  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 6069/738/25]

No. 12.

*Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 191.)

My Lord,

Jedda, October 3, 1938.

WITH reference to your circular telegram of the 28th September quoting the statement issued early that morning by the Prime Minister, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the reply which the Saudi Arabian Government sent to the note by which I transmitted that statement to them.

2. Every indication points to the fact that the appreciation and gratitude which this note expresses were genuinely felt, not only by the Saudi Arabian Government, but by the populace of the Hejaz in general, many of whom have wireless sets and most of whom heard the news of the Munich settlement without delay. The Hejazis well remember the effect which a war has on their main source of revenue, the pilgrimage. I am informed that popular joy at the avoidance of war found expression in the sacrifice of sheep at Mecca, and in shouts of acclamation such as "Yahya Jemberlin!" ("Long live Chamberlain!") in the bazaars of Jedda.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 12.

*Note from Saudi Arabian Government.*

(Translation.)

Honourable Chargé d'Affaires

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

(After Compliments),

Mecca, October 1, 1938.

WITH reference to your letter No. 214 of the 28th September, 1938, with which you kindly sent, for the information of the Saudi Arabian Government, the text of the statement broadcast by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, I have the honour to inform you that I have been directed by the Government of His Majesty the King to express their many thanks for their happiness at, and their appreciation of, the humane efforts made by Mr. Chamberlain, for which the whole world thanks him and which will go down to history. I request you to be good enough to transmit their congratulations to Mr. Chamberlain on his great success in preserving that peace which is the desire of all human beings.

With highest respects,

Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Jedda,

IBRAHIM IBN MU'AMMAR.

[E 6098/1237/25]

No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 19.)*

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 19, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 106 of 7th October: Hejaz Railway.

2. Saudi-Arabian Government have sent a note expressing gratitude for reply of His Majesty's Government. They have heard nothing from the French and my French colleague has received no instructions, but they would like conference to meet on 11th January. Object of Ibn Saud is doubtless to reach agreement before pilgrimage, which is at the end of January.

3. Note remarks that economic obstacles can be discussed at the conference and supports suggestion made by Syrian Government that estimate of cost of repair should be made by British and French engineers.

(R.) Saudi Arabian Government ask whether His Majesty's Government approve this suggestion and whether they think estimate should be made

[19309]

E 4



before or after the conference. Suggestion seems sensible, but estimate ought clearly to be made before the conference. Date proposed is early, but conference before rather than after pilgrimage would mean so much more to Ibn Saud that I think we should do our best to fall in with Saudi proposal. (End of R.)

(Repeated, Saving, to Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus.)

[R 8639/23/22]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, October 31, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 114 of 26th October.

Ibn Saud thanks His Majesty's Government for notice of their intentions and asks what they would advise him to do regarding recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia. As it is desirable for him not to appear to be dependent upon policy of His Majesty's Government, I suggest reply should be to the following effect:—

While the question is one for decision of Saudi Arabian Government, if they should think fit to recognise Italian conquest of Ethiopia immediately, His Majesty's Government see no objection to that course from the Saudi point of view. The action could be explained, if necessary, by a desire to reinforce the spirit of conciliation, of which signs are now visible in international affairs.

[R 8709/23/22]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 2.)*

(No. 152.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 2, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 150 of 31st October.

Announcement from Italian sources that His Majesty's Government propose recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia has upset Ibn Saud's calculations, and he again asks for advice both as to recognition and as to the form it should take. I understand that Italian Minister has not pressed for recognition as yet.

2. I have given it as my personal opinion that Saudi Arabian Government would now do better to wait until Italians raise the subject again, and that the natural method of recognition will be to receive fresh letters of credence from the Italian Minister.

[E 6518/1237/25]

No. 16.

*Sir R. Bullard to Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.—(Enclosure in Jedda Despatch No. 196 of October 12; Received in Foreign Office, November 7.)*

(Confidential.)

Your Royal Highness,

*Jedda, October 12, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Royal Highness, with reference to the note which was addressed to this Legation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 12th January last, that the question of the repair of the damaged portions of the Hejaz Railway has been most carefully considered by my Government, who have been in communication with the French Government on the subject. While I was in London I had the opportunity to take part in various discussions of this problem, and I am now authorised to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to the proposal of the Saudi Arabian Government that representatives of the four countries concerned should meet in conference

at Jedda with the object of reaching an agreement as to the repair of the Hejaz Railway, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government, like the Saudi Arabian Government, maintain their former views as to the ownership of the line.

I have pleasure in adding, in strict confidence, that His Majesty's Government intend to authorise their representatives to the conference to announce that they are prepared to repair at their own expense the Mudawwara-Maan section of the railway and to contribute £30,000 sterling towards the reconstruction of the Saudi Arabian section, provided that the Saudi Arabian Government can raise from other sources the remainder of the estimated cost of restoring the section lying within their territory. I am to state that, according to the estimates which have been made, the repair of the Mudawwara-Maan section will involve His Majesty's Government in expenditure which may extend to £100,000.

In making this offer His Majesty's Government feel bound to record that they feel considerable doubt whether the reconstruction of the Saudi Arabian section of the railway can be regarded as sound from the economic and commercial points of view, and they feel obliged to make the reservation that, while they are prepared to offer the above-mentioned sums towards the reconstruction of those sections of the railway which are not at present in working order, they would be unable to make any further contributions even if the working of the Saudi Arabian section of the railway should result in a financial loss for the Saudi Government. The doubt which His Majesty's Government feel as to whether the railway when rebuilt would be self-supporting, results from their belief that the cost of reconstructing the Saudi Arabian section would be greater than the Saudi Arabian Government have suggested and might be as much as £300,000, and from their hesitation to believe that the number of pilgrims and other passengers who would use the line, and the freight likely to be carried, would even cover the cost of current working of the line, let alone the amortisation of the capital sunk in the reconstruction. If, however, notwithstanding these difficulties, the Saudi Arabian Government still consider it necessary or desirable to proceed with the reconstruction of the portion of the line which lies within their territory, His Majesty's Government will, subject to the conditions laid down above, assist to the extent of the above-mentioned sums in the initial work of reconstruction.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 6520/1237/25]

No. 17.

*Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Bullard.—(Enclosure in Jedda despatch No. 202 of October 19, received November 7.)*

Your Excellency,

*Mecca, October 17, 1938.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's confidential note of the 12th October, 1938, concerning the question of repairing the Hejaz Railway, I inform you that the Government of His Majesty the King present their thanks to the British Government for their above-mentioned note regarding the repairing of the Hejaz Railway and their consent to take part in a conference to be held at Jedda to discuss the repair of that line. They also thank them for the statement that they intend to declare at the conference their readiness to repair the line from Maan to Mudawwara and to contribute £30,000 towards the repair of the line within the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

The Saudi Arab Government fully appreciate the observations of the British Government as to the economic difficulties which beset the project, and thank the friendly Government for their useful advice. My Government think it better to study such difficulties at the conference. But in order that the facts of the matter may be clear, my Government think it better that there should be a technical committee to estimate the exact cost of the repairs. The Syrian Government have suggested that English and French engineers should be selected to make an estimate, and my Government would like to know the views of the British Government in this respect: are they of the opinion that such a technical commission should be selected and that it should be sent to make its report before or after the



conference! My Government think it desirable that the conference should be held in Jedda on 20th Dhu'l Qa'da 1357 (11th January, 1939). The reply of the French Government has not yet been received, but we wish to know the views of the British Government as to the selection of a technical commission before sending the invitation for the conference to meet at the above-mentioned date.

With, &c.

(For the Ministry for Foreign Affairs),  
HAMAD-AS-SULEYMAN.

[E 6689/233/91]

No. 18.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 136.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 17, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 497 to Rome [of 17th November: Yemeni occupation of Shabwa].

You may at your discretion inform Ibn Saud.

[E 6903/33/91]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 169.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 20, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 135.

I thought it essential to tell Ibn Saud. He admits that the Imam is a nuisance, but fears that forcible action by His Majesty's Government might prejudice our discussions; for example, it would be represented as part of our alleged forward policy in Arabia generally.

He asks whether His Majesty's Government wish him to intervene and whether he could do anything pending their reply. I expressed gratitude and said that I would convey suggestion to His Majesty's Government, and that I saw no objection to his telegraphing immediately to Imam, referring to our communication and asking for news.

I know how patient His Majesty's Government have been and Ibn Saud was unwilling to help in the spring, but I strongly urge acceptance of his offer and support his suggestion that, if the Imam does not send satisfactory reply by appointed date, His Majesty's Government should, nevertheless, delay action to allow time for mediation.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 28, and Bagdad, Saving.)

[E 6903/233/91]

No. 20.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 169 [of 21st November: Ibn Saud's offer to mediate in Shabwa dispute].

His Majesty's Government would welcome action by Ibn Saud if he were to feel able to urge the King of the Yemen to accept proposal that Shabwa shall be neutralised pending final frontier settlement, and Yemeni forces at once withdrawn. You may remind Ibn Saud of his statement to you last May (see your telegram No. 98 [of 14th May]) that, in his view, people of Shabwa wanted neither the Imam nor the British, but only to be free. It was partly the fact that Ibn Saud had expressed this view that inspired His Majesty's Government to put forward their proposal that the Shabwa district should be neutralised, and that neither the Yemen nor Aden should send forces to occupy it. The views of His Majesty's Government seem, therefore, to be entirely in accord with

Ibn Saud's on this point. They have no desire to maintain a force in occupation of Shabwa. It is only the occupation of Shabwa by Yemeni forces that has led to the present crisis. If Yemeni Government will agree to withdraw their forces and not to reoccupy district, His Majesty's Government, for their part, will also agree not to send forces to occupy the district.

2. It is regretted, however, that action against Yemeni forces now in Shabwa cannot be delayed. Such delay might well allow Yemenis to send reinforcements, whose later expulsion would involve major military operation. It is, moreover, hoped that Ibn Saud, who would have small patience with a Yemeni attempt to jump a claim to his own territory, may appreciate bad effect which would be caused locally by impression that His Majesty's Government were hesitating to implement their announced action.

3. If Ibn Saud can extract definite undertaking from the King of the Yemen to withdraw his forces from Shabwa, instructions will at once be sent to Aden to hold up action. Otherwise present programme must stand, but, even after expulsion of intruding Yemeni forces, offer of neutralisation will still hold good, and British forces will be withdrawn if the King of the Yemen undertakes not to attempt to reoccupy district.

(Confidential.)

4. You will appreciate that, in accepting Ibn Saud's offer of help, it is important not to give the impression that we are accepting him as an arbitrator to settle the whole frontier dispute. It would, for example, be impossible to agree in advance to accept his ruling on the validity of the 1914 frontier settlement, especially as he is an interested party. His assistance is required, not to settle the validity of existing claims to Shabwa, but merely to persuade the King of the Yemen to agree to neutralisation of district pending further frontier discussions.

[E 7037/233/91]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 24.)*

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 24, 1938.*

YOUR fears are, I am sure, unfounded. Ibn Saud will try to persuade the Imam to agree to neutralisation of Shabwa, that is all.

He realises our difficulty, but still hopes that it may be possible to go slow. French and Yemen wireless not working, and Ibn Saud has had to send his telegram of enquiry to the Imam by hand from Jizan to [two groups undecypherable].

Ibn Saud believes Yemen forces in Shabwa recently reduced from 2,000 to 600.

[E 7054/880/91]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 177 (Riyadh No. 15).)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 25, 1938.*

SAUDI authorities have again raised orally [group undecypherable] of Anglo-Italian Agreement and want to approach Italian Government. They have agreed to wait until I reach Jedda, and can study the correspondence, but I send this warning that the least that will satisfy them will be to make declaration such as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently made before League of Nations. I think the most we can do is to keep them to general principles and avoid details.



[E 7317/233/91]

Copy No.

*Sir R. Bullard (No. 9) to the Resident, Aden.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 6.)*

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 6, 1938.

YOUR telegram unnumbered of 3rd December.

In informing Ibn Saud of peaceful reoccupation of Shabwa, I have thought it best to confine myself to thanks for his efforts and pious wishes for friendly negotiations between the two parties. It is difficult to ask him to keep the Imam quiet unless we also give reasoned reply about Abr, and subject to Foreign Office instructions I had better perhaps take no further action.

[E 7427/880/91]

No. 24.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 10.)*

(No. 195.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 10, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 153 of 3rd December.

Saudi Arabian Government have agreed to take no action about the Anglo-Italian Agreement until I have seen Fuad, who is coming to Jedda soon.

[E 7387/233/91]

No. 25.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 194 [of 8th December: Frontier difficulties between Aden and Yemen].

Governor of Aden has been authorised to address communication to the King of the Yemen offering neutralisation of Shabwa and explaining purposes of post at Abr. Governor has been told that no offer for neutralisation of Abr and withdrawal therefrom should be made at present, and that His Majesty's Government contemplate that an offer with regard to neutralisation of Abr should be made only in the last resort if satisfactory settlement cannot otherwise be reached.

2. In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether anything further can be said to Ibn Saud for the present, since it is impossible to tell him our ultimate intentions regarding Abr.

3. It would, of course, be helpful if he were ready to advise the King of the Yemen to give a written undertaking not to attempt to occupy Shabwa and to treat Shabwa area as a neutral zone. If you have an opportunity, you may tell him this.

[E 7636/196/25]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 219.)

My Lord,

Jedda, November 28, 1938.

IN my telegram No. 160 of the 11th November, which I had the honour to address to you from Riyadh, I reported Mr. Philby's pessimistic opinion about Ibn Saud's health and energy. It is well known that no statement made by Mr. Philby should be accepted without caution, but in view of his long championship of Ibn Saud, and the terms of almost sycophantic admiration which he has used about the King in some of his books, attention must be paid to his remarks when he says that he has begun to wonder whether the period of chaos which it has always been thought might follow the King's death might not perhaps come even in his lifetime.

2. Mr. Philby's pessimism is based partly on what he calls the refusal of Ibn Saud to take his place as the leader of the Arab world and on the King's complete indifference to administrative affairs outside the management of the Bedouin. We may dismiss the first ground of pessimism, since it merely means that Ibn Saud has refused to adopt an attitude of open and violent opposition to His Majesty's Government in the matter of Palestine. The second ground of complaint has more in it. The abandonment of the finances of the country to Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman is both discreditable to Ibn Saud and bad for the country. To discuss this adequately, however, is impossible in this despatch.

3. As to Ibn Saud's health, Mr. Philby made definite statements. According to him, the King is for ever taking remedies, even in public, and almost every day falls into a doze at the *majlis*—the reception which he holds three times a day. Formerly, said Mr. Philby, the King always took an active part in the discussions which arose at these meetings, so that to attend was both interesting and profitable, but the King's growing indifference, and his tendency to fall asleep, had so changed the *majlis* that he himself reduced his attendance to once a day.

4. There is no doubt that failing sexual vigour is a cause of worry to the King. He does not scruple to refer to it in public, according to Mr. Philby, and I heard on good authority that he was taking injections regularly for this disability. Except when a doctor comes from the American Mission at Bahrein, he is in the hands of young Syrian doctors, who are probably both ignorant and venal, and what quackeries they perform one can imagine. The only time I saw the King move about much was when he took me all over his new palace to show me its glories. He moved rather heavily, and once, when we came to a very high step, he let himself down with his hands pressed against the walls, and the movements did not suggest rheumatism. I am prepared to believe Mr. Philby's statement that the King has lately begun to complain that the single flight of stairs in his new palace is almost too much for him, and has asked whether he could not have a lift installed.

5. I thought when I first met him this time in Riyadh that the King was perhaps rather softer and less vigorous in conversation than he was when I saw him last March, but at later interviews he seemed as keenly interested as ever. Mr. Philby says that the fact that he had been brought into consultation by His Majesty's Government on the Palestine question had given an extraordinary fillip to his energies, and induced him, for the first time this summer, to give attention to something outside the Bedouin, the Royal family, and the building of the new palace. But perhaps the King had been feeling that, what with the troubles in Palestine and the acute crisis in Europe, world affairs were getting beyond him, and his apparent indifference was due to a feeling of helplessness rather than to mental lassitude.

6. I am prepared to believe that Ibn Saud devotes far more time to personal affairs than any busy statesman can afford to do. He boasted to me that the huge palace he showed me (Murabba', or the Square Palace) had been designed by him and built under his personal supervision in five months. This was confirmed from other sources, and it is known that the work has taken up a great deal of the King's time. That the affairs of a family of twenty-six or more sons and a large number of women-folk must absorb an ever-increasing amount of attention is also clear. The death of the favourite, Umm Mansur, was a great blow, and her successor is dying of tuberculosis—a disease which is rife among women servants and slaves, owing mainly to their seclusion in ground-floor rooms which admit no light or air except from the central courtyard, and such anxieties may well try the King more severely now that he is growing older. It seems that he took a long time to decide to follow his usual practice in the autumn and to go out into camp, and that, having gone out, he stayed only two or three days instead of, perhaps, as many weeks, and then hurried back to his family in Rivadh.

7. We have hitherto taken the date of Ibn Saud's birth as probably 1880, but if I am to believe the King himself, the date must be placed about two years later. On the day of my departure from Riyadh the King said that it was the anniversary of his capture of Riyadh, and that therefore the Amir Saud, who was born on that famous day, was exactly 37 years of age. The King was, of course, calculating according to the Moslem date: in our reckoning the Crown Prince must be a little over 36. The King then gave his own age, after some thought, as 58, which in our reckoning is something over 56, and, if this calculation is correct, the King's birth must have occurred in 1882. This agrees with the usual



belief that Ibn Saud was only 20 when he captured Riyadh. Fifty-six is no great age, but Ibn Saud has led a hard life, and it is not surprising that his face is that of an older man.

8. Taking all the—rather slender—evidence into account, I conclude that, while Mr. Philby's pessimism is not fully justified, Ibn Saud is taking less interest in public affairs as a whole than he used to do. But he has always tried to do the work of half a dozen men, and if he would delegate some of the tribal affairs to the Amir Saud it is probable that he could still deal adequately with other matters. On the first day of the post-Ramadan feast, which occurred while I was in Riyadh, the Amir Saud held a huge reception, which Ibn Saud told me he had hitherto always held in person. He pleaded old age as excuse for this delegation of work, so perhaps he has at last begun to see the obvious method of conserving his time and energy.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7698/233/91]

No. 27.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 21.)*

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 21, 1938.

(Code begins.) YOUR telegram No. 163 of 14th December.

I thought it well to await arrival of Fuad. He asked to-day whether His Majesty's Government wished him to continue his attempt to (code ends) mediate or not. His remark confirmed my impression that Ibn Saud considers it would be worth our while at this critical time to include Abr in neutralised zone as proof of spirit of conciliation. I did speak as in paragraph 3 of your above-mentioned telegram, but I am sure that Ibn Saud will not act on this suggestion by itself. On the other hand, I trust he will, at my instance, disabuse the Imam of fantastic supposition that the latter professes to hold that our occupation of Shabwa and Abr was the work of irresponsible young officials instead of being, as I said, the considered policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

2. If His Majesty's Government eventually decide to give way about Abr, it might be well to give some of the credit to Ibn Saud. It would please him, and I suggest it would help to maintain our dignity if we attribute withdrawal in part to friendly representations of Ibn Saud. And it might induce the Imam to consult Ibn Saud in future about his foreign affairs, which I suggest would be very useful. According to Ibn Saud, the Imam is urging him to continue his efforts to bring about solution of present crisis.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 11.)

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 4196/45/93]

No. 28.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 288. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, June 28, 1938.

THE tarnished personal reputation of King Ghazi has, I regret to say, been besmirched further in the course of the last few days.

2. On or about the 18th June a negro youth, employed as personal servant to His Majesty, was found shot within the palace precincts. According to the official story, death was due to the accidental discharge of the young man's revolver, which he carried in his hip-pocket, and which he forgot to remove before settling down for the afternoon siesta. Taufiq Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister, to whom I mentioned the matter this morning, assures me that the bullet-mark on the couch bears out this supposition; but his manifest reluctance to discuss the incident suggested that he was himself far from convinced of the accuracy of the official version. Although nothing more than conjecture is possible, it seems far more likely that the young man was murdered, either because he had become a source of embarrassment to the King or by some adherent of the Queen, who, as Taufiq Suwaidi admitted, regarded the youth with deep aversion as the King's boon companion in debauchery.

3. This latter supposition is perhaps to some extent borne out by the panic-stricken condition to which the King was reduced (as I learn from sources other than the Foreign Minister) for several days after the occurrence. His Majesty is said to have been in fear of imminent assassination; he himself carried a revolver, the Crown Prince's nurse was forbidden to take her charge even into the palace grounds, and there were other signs of panic.

4. Perhaps unfortunately, when I paid my fortnightly visit to the King on the 22nd June, I had not heard of the affair; but both I and Mr. Houston-Boswall, whom I took the opportunity of presenting to His Majesty, were struck by the King's persistence in wishing me a happy leave in England, although I had made it plain that I was not starting for at least a month. I have little doubt that the King's childish mind was seeking to make it as difficult as possible for me to return to take him to task when I should have learned of the affair.

5. It is possible that His Majesty's contemplated visit to the north may be accelerated in consequence of this happening, and that I shall, in fact, have no normal opportunity to see him again before I go on leave.

6. It is unfortunately only too possible that the lower strata of the Palace entourage may represent a more important factor in the King's life than do the upper. It is impracticable for me to assess the former, but the latter are not very reassuring. Rashid-al-Khoja, the private secretary (Personalities, No. 68), is, so far as I know, personally honest and well-intentioned; but I doubt whether his influence approaches that of the Chamberlain, Abdullah-al-Damluji (No. 11), who strikes me as sinister and unreliable. Of the third of the trio, Colonel Rashid Ali, the military secretary, I know only that he was a Bekr Sidqi man, and that he is anathema to the present Government, who, however, appear quite unable to secure his removal.

7. Somewhere within this little circle lie influences which I find it difficult to combat. As a slight example of their working, I may mention that, five or six weeks ago, after His Majesty had told me that he was very fond of tennis but had no one to play with, I succeeded in getting him round for a game on the Embassy courts. His Majesty played four sets of "doubles" and showed every sign of enjoying himself thoroughly. But I have never been able to induce him to come again, although I have tried repeatedly. Someone has warned him that it is dangerous to consort with foreigners in general, or with His Majesty's representative in particular.

8. In the circumstances described above, and under normal conditions, I should be strongly tempted to press the Iraqi Government to proceed to a thorough overhaul of the Palace personnel, backed up by the institution of a Council of



State or some similar organ for the control of the King. I am restrained from following this course by two considerations which are in themselves connected:—

- (a) I should not wish to urge any Iraqi Government to carry out a purge of the Palace unless I could satisfy myself that that Government would thereafter stand firm and refuse to be jockeyed out of office by the revengeful spite of the King, intensified as it would be by the flattery of all and sundry in opposition.

If no assurance on this point could be secured, the net result of any action against the Palace would be a change of Government within a few weeks, accompanied by a return to former conditions in the palace itself, leaving the position of His Majesty's representative heavily compromised *vis-à-vis* of His Majesty (which I am beginning to regard as of little importance), and also of the new Government (to which I attach more importance).

- (b) I do not feel that I can command this degree of mutual confidence as between myself and the present Government of Iraq (or any Government which may replace it) until not only has the Palestinian question been settled, but a certain period of time has elapsed thereafter—the length of time being dependent on the nature of the settlement.

9. I am, therefore, forced to the conclusion that Iraq must continue, for the time being, to derive such benefits as accrue to her from the maintenance of the monarchy, less the heavy discount to which they are subjected through the inadequately controlled and unpleasing personality of the Monarch. The risk, whatever it may be, that the King may fall a victim to some Palace plot originating in an incident, such as that described in this despatch, must also continue to be run.

I have, &c.  
MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 4502/45/93]

No. 29.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 313.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, July 9, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Iraqi Government are making preparations to re-establish administrative control over the Pizhder tribal area in Kurdistan.

2. This area lies mainly on the right bank of the Lesser Zab, between Rania and the Persian frontier, and also embraces a large part of the Migra district to the south of the Lesser Zab. It has been outside the administrative control of the Central Government since it was evacuated in September 1922, after Turkish irregulars had raised the Pizhder and neighbouring tribes against the local administration.

3. The plan is to collect a strong force of police to accompany a kaimakam to Qala Diza and to build there a defensible serai (Government headquarters) in which the necessary officials and police garrisons will be established. Troops are to be concentrated at convenient posts in the background, ready to intervene if the advance of the police force or the construction of the serai should be opposed by tribal action.

4. The main body of these troops is already located at Mirza Rustam, where the road from Sulaimani to Qala Diza crosses the Lesser Zab, but there has been considerable delay in putting the civil side of the plan into effect. The chief preparatory measures have now, however, been completed and it seems likely that the advance to Qala Diza will be undertaken before the end of the month. Unfortunately, even if there is no tribal opposition, there will now be hardly enough time to finish building the serai before the autumn rains begin.

5. The mutessarif of the Sulaimania liwa, in which the Pizhder area is to be included, has warned the leading Pizhder chiefs of the Government's intention and they seem ready to acquiesce, though their attitude is not altogether certain.

6. A number of the chiefs of the smaller septs have already come in to the Government centres to signify their obedience, but the important aghas are evidently watching developments.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.  
MAURICE PETERSON.

E 4504/1982/93]

No. 30.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 315. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, July 12, 1938.*

IN your telegram No. 85 of the 18th June you instructed me to make representations to the Iraqi Government regarding the misuse of funds collected ostensibly for charitable purposes in Palestine, while in your telegrams Nos. 91 and 95 of the 28th June and the 4th July you have likewise instructed me to let the Iraqi Government know that they are not expected to offer the Mufti asylum in this country.

2. In the difficult and dangerous circumstances created in all Arab countries by the long-continued troubles and uncertainty in Palestine, these instructions place, to my way of thinking, a very heavy strain on the alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq.

3. I am thereby led to consider whether, in fact, everything possible is being done by His Majesty's Government, on the other side of the picture, to lead the Iraqis to realise the value of the alliance with Great Britain and thus to ease the strain. I regret to say I feel no hesitation at all in answering this question in the negative or in reaching the conclusion, to which I venture to draw your Lordship's earnest attention, that a certain lack of imagination leads us to put the Iraqi alliance, as it were, into cold storage, in the fond, but probably quite mistaken, belief that when the time comes it will be possible to take it out in a condition fit for use.

4. I am aware that every possible opportunity is taken in Parliament to include the Iraqi alliance amongst the commitments of His Majesty's Government and to proffer full assurance that this particular commitment will be observed, if and when the time comes. But what I am now referring to is not the question of the assistance which we shall offer Iraq in the event of war, but the peace-time measures and *ménagements* by which the vitality of the alliance is, or ought to be, maintained. Such measures are needed, not only to strengthen the alliance to withstand the strain imposed by events in Palestine, but also to enable it to contend with the competitive struggle for influence which is now an outstanding feature of international policy in the Middle East.

5. From this point of view it is unfortunate that the healthy growth and development of a real friendship between the two countries on the basis of the alliance has been retarded by the experiences which, in recent years, have often led Iraq to believe that His Majesty's Government, though zealous in safeguarding the rights acquired under the treaty of 1930, are not always equally mindful of their own obligations under that instrument.

6. I need hardly say that the most damaging of these experiences has been the difficulties encountered in obtaining for the army the military stores (particularly artillery) which the Iraqi General Staff have felt to be so urgently needed to give the Government the strength to maintain internal order and to defend their frontiers. These difficulties with the concurrent—but I admit quite necessary—insistence of His Majesty's Government on the proper observance of the last paragraph of article 6 of the annexure to the treaty of 1930, continue to be a cause of telling criticism of the alliance. Added strength has, moreover, been given to these criticisms by the popular misconceptions which are current about the large credits recently arranged by His Majesty's Government for Turkey. Even in the highest political quarters damaging contrasts have been drawn between the grant to Turkey of credits amounting to £6 million for war material and the cash-down terms which rule the purchases of munitions made

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in Great Britain by the Iraqi Government. The emphasis which I have placed upon the consideration advanced in your Lordship's telegram No. 88 of the 27th June, viz., that Turkey is not being assisted to buy arms which are withheld from Iraq, cannot be expected wholly to remove this feeling.

7. The Turkish credits have also revived some of the bitterness of the disappointment which was felt in Iraq at the unsatisfactory outcome of the loan negotiations which took place last year. The seemingly immense difference in the results achieved by Turkey compared with those obtained by Iraq has inevitably suggested that Iraq did not receive the same good offices from His Majesty's Government as did Turkey.

8. Another treaty arrangement which has not worked well is that which concerns foreign officials. The Iraqi Government have more than once been reminded of the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to securing that all foreign officials engaged on Government service are British subjects. But at the same time, as in the instance of the nomination of an adviser to the Ministry of Economics and Communications, it is often revealed that His Majesty's Government have the greatest difficulty in finding suitable candidates for posts which are vacant. That this difficulty arises, not from lack of goodwill but from lack of organisation, does nothing to lessen the irritation which is caused by the long delays which so often follow a request for a British official and the feeling that, in this regard, the treaty is irksome rather than helpful is strengthened by the easy assurances (spurious though they may be) given by my diplomatic colleagues that other countries could at once provide eminent specialists at much lower salaries than any British subject of a similar standing would ever accept.

9. I am not unmindful of the fact that, both in the manner in which they seek to engage British officials and in their treatment of those who enter their service, the Iraqi Government are frequently at fault. But it is only to be expected that they should see the mote in our eye more clearly than the beam in their own. Or, as an Iraqi would put it, it is only natural that they should judge His Majesty's Government by a higher standard than they would apply to themselves.

10. Other matters which have fostered criticism of Iraq's special relations with Great Britain are the difficulties which stand in the way of arranging full staff training for Iraqi officers in British staff colleges and the cold reception which is given to Iraqi efforts to enter into staff discussions of defence plans for their own country. The first is not perhaps a serious grievance, but the second has, I fear, often exacerbated feeling here. The Iraqi General Staff officers feel that, under article 4 of the treaty, Great Britain has positive advantages of the greatest value, whereas what Iraq is to receive in return, by way of aid from Great Britain in the capacity of an ally, is unsatisfactorily vague and ill-defined. I believe that much could be done to dispel this feeling if more sympathy were shown toward Iraqi overtures for discussions on this point, and it seems to me that it should be possible to do this without incurring undesirable commitments.

11. In the field of foreign policy, too, the Iraqis have found reason for disappointment with the fruits of the alliance. For example, in connexion with the recent conclusion by His Majesty's Government of their tentative agreement with Italy, the stipulation in the Iraqi treaty that "there shall be full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests" was interpreted by His Majesty's Government as being covered by notification to the Iraqi Government only five days in advance of what they intended to do (please see your Lordship's telegram No. 53 of the 11th April). The agreements themselves were afterwards found to contain a number of matters which are of very considerable importance to Iraq and which in effect drew from her a formidable *questionnaire* (please see my despatch No. 204 of the 4th May).

12. Then there is Palestine. Although His Majesty's Government have accepted and given careful consideration to communications sent through the diplomatic channel, there has been little or no visible response to the Iraqi Government's representations on this subject. In consequence, the impression has been given that the spirit of the alliance has not received all the consideration that it should. Developments in Palestine cannot be said to be of no concern to the Iraqi Government, and, though it is true that in consultation there is a risk of raising false hopes, the seemingly unapproachable aloofness of His Majesty's

Government's attitude towards friendly Arab opinion in this country where Palestine is concerned has inflamed feeling in this country.

13. The only way to strengthen our position so that it may bear the strains to which I have referred at the beginning of this despatch lies, I submit, in a studied endeavour to ensure that in the future the alliance shall produce benefits which shall be a constant reminder of its advantages to the Iraqi Government and people.

14. I therefore venture to offer some general suggestions as to the manner in which this object might be achieved:—

- (a) Firstly, it is, above all, essential that everything possible should be done to make a favourable, sympathetic and early response to the Iraqi request for munitions which I communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 215 of the 13th May. I gladly recognise the promising beginning which has been made in dealing with rifles and 3.7-inch howitzers.
- (b) Secondly, I feel that His Majesty's Government should volunteer to consider ways and means to help Iraq carry out her five-year plan. I am satisfied that it will soon be found that this cannot be done without credit facilities of some kind, and I am convinced that a happy impression would be made if His Majesty's Government were to offer their help. Perhaps the best plan would be for an invitation to be extended to the Iraqi Government to send a small mission to London to discuss ways and means.
- (c) Thirdly, I recommend that we should try to make a greater show of close consultation with the Iraqi Government on matters of foreign policy of common interest to both countries. Occasions for doing this should not be difficult to find and, in general, a little confidence will go a long way. The annual autumn meetings of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations, which are often attended by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, afford an opportunity for easy contacts, and I am informed that, on all occasions in the past on which your Lordship's predecessors have got into touch at Geneva with an Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, the results have well repaid the trouble taken. Other opportunities would have to be sought through the diplomatic channel and I am sure that even a small increase in the intimacy and confidence shown by His Majesty's Government towards Iraq, through this medium, would have a gratifying influence on mutual relations.
- (d) Fourthly, there is the question of advice on matters other than those connected with foreign affairs. I have stressed the need for improvement in the arrangements made for furnishing Iraq with British technical officials, and I should like now to go a step further and to suggest that our position as guide and mentor to Iraq would be greatly strengthened if, from time to time, His Majesty's Government were to volunteer to furnish authoritative advice on current internal, economic and technical problems without cost to the Iraqi Government. The success of the work of the British Council is an example of the big return obtained for a comparatively small expenditure. But it is not only in the realm of culture that it is desirable to consolidate British influence, and methods similar to those employed by the British Council could be well applied with even greater material gain to the economic field.

15. It is appropriate here to refer to the great success of the arrangements made earlier in the year for the visit to the United Kingdom of the Director-General of Training and Instruction in the Ministry of Education. It is not too much to say that that visit and its satisfactory results have profoundly changed the attitude of the Ministry of Education. Trust has largely replaced suspicion, and an appreciation of an eagerness for British education has grown up where American theories once held the field. I think the moral is that the same methods could with much advantage be applied to other departments. I should like, for example, to be able to arrange for a selected Iraqi irrigation engineer to visit India to see some of the major irrigation works which have been



constructed there and the immense areas which through them have been brought under cultivation and colonised. More frequent visits to the United Kingdom by the Iraqi army chiefs might also do much to improve the temper of the Ministry of Defence.

16. In conclusion, I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to your despatch No. 258 of the 16th May, in which you expressed your inability to endorse the recommendation which had been made by my predecessor and myself for a decoration to be conferred on an important official of the Iraqi Government, who has for many years shown the greatest friendliness towards this Embassy and who occupies what is, in this country, a position of very real importance. I am fully aware of the importance of avoiding anything like a promiscuous distribution of British decorations, but I feel that the special relations which exist between Great Britain and Iraq could not be more fittingly recognised and fostered than by the observance of a certain preference towards our allies in the matter of the award of honours.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 4638/45/93]

No. 31.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 327. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, July 15, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 288 of the 28th June, concerning the death of a negro servant in the Royal Palace at Bagdad, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report<sup>(1)</sup> (without sketches) by the British technical police expert which I have obtained in confidence.

2. Surprising as it may seem, it will be seen that the report bears out the official explanation of the affair, viz., that the young man was killed, while resting on a row of chairs, by the accidental discharge of his revolver.

3. I hasten to supply this corrective to the more ominous suppositions advanced in my despatch under reference. But I fear that the report will not catch up with the rumours to which the affair has given rise: and several ambiguities remain which prevent me from modifying, to any substantial degree, my estimate of the Palace entourage. Why, it may be asked, should a personal attendant upon the King, who was neither policeman nor soldier, carry a revolver at all; and why should the Palace react, as it undoubtedly did, to an accidental death if no equivocal significance attached to the victim of the accident?

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4642/45/93]

No. 32.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 336.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, July 20, 1938.*

BEFORE going on leave, I paid a visit this morning to the Prime Minister, Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai.

2. I found his Excellency fully satisfied with the new oil agreement which, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 110 of the 19th July, is on the point of being concluded with the Iraq Petroleum Company. At the same time his Excellency was not above making a little capital out of the preference which, he claimed, his Government were anxious to accord to British interests

in the spirit of the alliance and in the face of what the Prime Minister claimed were repeated protests from the diplomatic representatives of other Powers.

3. I told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government would, I was convinced, afford a sympathetic hearing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on all matters interesting Iraq when, as had now been arranged, Taufiq Suwaidi visited London early in October. Jamil-al-Madfai expressed gratification at the prospect of this visit and added the hope that I would arrange to be in London myself when the visit took place.

4. His Excellency went on to make what was for him an eloquent appeal that the Palestine difficulty, which at present constituted the great stumbling-block in the path of Anglo-Arab relations, might be settled promptly and in a sense acceptable to Arab opinion. He went on to refer to Colonel Newcombe's visit to Bagdad and to the new plan which the latter and his friends were sponsoring and upon which I am reporting in a separate despatch. Jamil-al-Madfai freely admitted that these proposals had no official character; but he was anxious that His Majesty's Government should know how warmly they commended themselves to Arab opinion.

5. In reply to my enquiries as to the internal situation, the Prime Minister contended that the country was much quieter than it had been a year ago. The Government were pursuing their policy of appeasement and would lend no countenance, either on the one side or the other, to those who wished to pursue vendettas arising out of past events. The vacant Ministry of Economics and Communications would be filled before long: the difficulty was that one post in the Government was traditionally reserved for a Kurd, and it was hard to find a Kurd of sufficient standing. The Prime Minister mentioned Taha-al-Hashimi and Rustum Haidar as personages who might be introduced into the Government before long: the difficulty was that the former was a somewhat controversial personality to be introduced into the Ministry of Defence—political faction in the army had not entirely disappeared though it had greatly diminished—while the latter had no following in the country.

6. I may mention, in closing this despatch, that a leading British business man visiting Iraq came to me a month or so ago to explain that he was acting as a go-between to secure the introduction of Nuri into the present Government. Matters were, he said, so far advanced that he hoped shortly to be able to telegraph to me, through His Majesty's consul at Damascus, the names of the revised Cabinet. While gratefully accepting this offer I remained sceptical and all the available evidence continues to indicate that no coalition of the kind is in any immediate offing, though if Taha-al-Tashimi were to be admitted into the Government, a bridge with Nuri would undoubtedly be established.

7. The present Prime Minister undoubtedly deserves well of Iraq, and by implication of Great Britain, for his firm discouragement of the blood-feuds arising from the murders of Jafar and of Dakr Sidqi. It is for this reason, and unless and until a Palestinian settlement makes some change necessary or desirable, that I am myself anxious to secure the continuance of the present Government in office.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 5197/5197/93]

No. 33.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 387.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, August 15, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a translation of Iraqi Law No. 49 of 1938 concerning the Iraqi Royal family. This law supersedes the ordinance forwarded in Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 312 of the 25th June, 1936.

2. The provisions of the law are not very different to those of the ordinance. The main point is the omission of article 8 of the latter which permitted the

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Privy Council to redistribute, or withhold, the allowances granted to members of the Royal family under the Iraqi budget.

3. In general, the new law seems to be designed to check excessively drastic action by the Privy Council against the Royal family.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 33.

*Extract from Iraq Government Gazette, No. 24, dated June 12, 1938.*

*Law concerning the Royal Family.*

WE, King of Iraq,

With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, do hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1. Ordinance concerning the Royal family No. 75 of 1936 is hereby repealed.

Art. 2. The Royal family shall include the descendants of King Faisal the First and the wife of the King. The King shall be the head of the family.

Art. 3. The members of the Royal family must be born in lawful wedlock. They shall be Moslems and of Iraqi nationality.

Art. 4. (1) The title of Amir or Amira is borne by every member of the Royal family but not by the children of an Amira whose husband is not an Amir.

(2) The title of Amira shall be borne by the wives of Amirs and by their widows until they remarry.

(3) The heir apparent and the other sons and daughters of the King shall be addressed as "Royal Highness," but other members of the family shall be addressed as "Highness" only.

Art. 5. If an Amir or Amira desire to marry, or if the guardian of an Amir or Amira desire to give his ward in marriage, such Amir or Amira or guardian shall obtain the King's written permission, after taking the advice of the Privy Council.

Art. 6. The Privy Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice. The Privy Council will meet under the presidency of the King or the Prime Minister, when deputed by the King, with the attendance by at least three of its members.

Art. 7. (1) The Privy Council shall deal with matters of discipline relating to the Royal family.

(2) The courts shall not take cognisance of any case within the jurisdiction of the Privy Council.

(3) The Privy Council shall have all the powers of the courts in suits appertaining to it under this law.

(4) The Privy Council shall issue instructions determining the procedure to be followed in cases brought before it.

Art. 8. Decisions of the Privy Council shall be taken unanimously or by majority. If opinion is evenly divided, the opinion supported by the President shall prevail, provided that the total of votes in any decision shall not be less than three. The King may, within fifteen days after the date of the decision, order the rehearing of any case and in that event the further decision of the council shall be final.

Art. 9. If an Amir or Amira marry or be given in marriage without the permission of the King, in contravention to article 5, the Privy Council may order that he or she be deprived of the title of Amir or Amira or may deprive the wife of the use of the title normally acquired on marriage. If an Amir is so deprived of his title, his wife is deprived thereof, if she obtained it in his right, and his children by such wife are also deprived thereof.

Art. 10. (1) If an Amir or Amira commit any act detrimental to the honour of the Royal family, the Privy Council may direct that he or she be expelled therefrom. In this case an Amir or Amira shall be debarred from the title of Amir or Amira and an Amir shall be debarred from his right of succession to

the throne and the descendants of such Amir may also be debarred from the title of Amir or Amira.

(2) The Privy Council may further direct—

(a) That the Amir or Amira be debarred from any rights which may be due to him or her as a member of the Royal family.

(b) That he be deprived of Iraqi nationality, and in that event he may be debarred from entering Iraq or residing therein.

(c) That he be debarred from possessing immovable property in Iraq. Any property of which an Amir or Amira is deprived shall be dealt with in such manner as the Privy Council considers suitable.

(3) The Privy Council may reconsider its decisions and may, on finding that the necessitating reasons no longer exist, determine their revision or cancellation.

Art. 11. All members of the Royal family, and all relatives of the King in the second, third or fourth degrees, are debarred from being elected or appointed Members of Parliament, in accordance with paragraph 10 of article 30 of the Organic Law.

Art. 12. The senior official in the office of the head of the Royal Diwan shall act as a secretary to the Privy Council, and the registers and documents relating thereto shall be kept in the said Diwan. A copy of the decisions shall be kept in the office of the Council of Ministers.

Art. 13. This law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 14. All Ministers of the State are charged with the execution of this law.

Made at Bagdad this 25th day of Safar, 1357, and the 26th day of April, 1938.

GHAZI

JAMIL AL MADFA'I,  
Prime Minister and Ag. Minister  
of Defence.

MUSTAPHA AL 'UMARI,  
Minister of Interior.

ABBAS MAHDI,  
Minister of Justice.

TAWFIQ AS SUWAIDI,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

IBRAHIM KAMAL,  
Minister of Finance.

JALAL BABAN,  
Minister of Economics and  
Communications.

MUHAMMAD RIDHA AL SHABIBI,  
Minister of Education.

(Published in the *Waqayi' al 'Iraqiya*, No. 1632 of May 4, 1938.)

[E 5345/1982/93]

No. 34.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).*

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 14, 1938.*

ALTHOUGH article 3 of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, as interpreted by High Commissioner's letter of 7th November, 1930, does not require His Majesty's Government to "concert together" with Iraqi Government concerning the present situation in Central Europe, it is nevertheless desirable that the Iraqi Government should be kept informed of the policy and activities of His Majesty's Government in a situation which may conceivably lead to article 4 of the treaty coming into effect, and shown that His Majesty's Government are mindful of their legitimate interest in such a situation. Quite apart from possibility that Iraqi Government might seek to evade full implementation of terms of alliance on grounds that they had not been consulted before His Majesty's Government became involved in hostilities, it is only right and in accordance with article 1 (2) and with spirit of alliance that they should have all possible information.

2. Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires was accordingly asked to call yesterday [13th September], and told that, in accordance with the spirit of alliance, His Majesty's Government wished, at a moment when matters were more serious than

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ever before, to assist Iraqi Government to as full understanding as possible of present situation. In course of general discussion, stress was laid upon fact that, as Prime Minister had stated on 24th March (and had since been reaffirmed), it was quite impossible, even in the absence of any definite obligation upon Great Britain to assist France apart from Treaty of Locarno, to assume that in event of France becoming involved in a war with Germany after Czechoslovakia had gone to limit of all reasonable concession, Great Britain would not also be involved.

3. It had been decided beforehand that no specific reference should be made to obligations of Iraq under Treaty of Alliance unless Chargé d'Affaires himself raised this question, which he did not do. Subject to your observations, it seems best to affect to treat fulfilment of alliance as a matter of course, and not to betray undue anxiety by attempts to give warnings or obtain assurances at this stage.

4. In response to an enquiry by Chargé d'Affaires, he was told that no specific instructions had been sent you to inform Iraqi Government of what was happening, but that you were at all times ready to furnish them with information. Similarly, Foreign Office would always be glad to inform Iraqi Legation of latest developments.

5. I am arranging for a series of special telegrams to be sent to you somewhat on the lines of those sent to the Dominions (but omitting the more confidential passages), which I hope will assist you.

6. A communication has also been made to Egyptian Minister, and similar action is being taken with the object of keeping Egyptian Government informed.

[E 5393/45/93]

No 35.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 410.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, August 29, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note which I have received from the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior concerning the topics which it is probable that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will seek an opportunity to discuss during his forthcoming visits to Geneva and London.

2. Mr. Edmonds's note reveals some interesting details of the current ideas of Iraqi politicians on the international situation of this country, and it may therefore be useful to those who come into contact with Tewfiq Suwaidi.

3. The Minister of the Interior's suggestion that Iraq should be made the spearhead of a drive to civilise Arabia is a typical instance of the inordinate vanity which I have noticed to be so common here among those who have found themselves promoted suddenly to high office.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 35.

*Note on the Present Orientation of Pan-Arab Policy in Iraq.*

AMONG the items on the agenda of Saiyid Tewfiq-al-Suwaidi during his forthcoming journey to Geneva and London appear the following:—

- (a) To discuss the Alexandretta question and cognate subjects;
- (b) To deal with the position of the Shatt-el-Arab, the Navigation Agreement and the Koweit question (the emphasis is doubtless on Koweit); and
- (c) To discuss the political situation as it affects the Arab case in the Near East.

The following record of conversations which I had at the beginning of August with my Minister, Saiyid Mustafa-al-Umari, and a day or two later with the Prime Minister, may be useful as throwing some light on the policy underlying these items.

2. I had started my talk with Saiyid Mustafa by saying that I was a little disturbed by a change I had noticed in the Iraqi attitude towards Turkey. Iraq had land frontiers with no fewer than six different States, and it behoved her to remain on friendly terms with as many of them as possible. It was not easy. Relations with Persia were never likely to be cordial; the Persians never forgot and never learned; they had transferred to Iraq (in spite of recent anti-clerical tendencies) the resentment they used to feel at the Sunni-Turkish ownership of the Shia shrines of Kerbela, Najaf and Kadhimain; every man of them in his heart considered the very existence of Iraq as an insult to the memory of Anushirawan and of Cyrus before him. Relations, of course, were much easier with Saudi Arabia, ruled as it was by a great Arab statesman; but even King Abdul Aziz did not always conceal his belief that he was the natural leader of all the Bedouin, whether inside or outside his State, and that the Euphrates would have made a much more suitable boundary than the present one. It would be idle to pretend that the French in Syria had any love for Iraq, whom they found, to put it mildly, embarrassingly precocious. The ties binding Iraq to Great Britain were fortunately proof against any strain, but there was friction on the Koweit border over smuggling and friction in the Transjordan direction over Zionism. The one neighbour whom Iraq had hitherto seemed able to understand and get on with had been Turkey; he had only to glance at the files in the Frontier Section of the Ministry to contrast the almost complete absence of incidents on the Turkish border and the smoothness with which any rare incident was settled, with the mutual vituperation exchanged daily with the Persians, and the constant complaints against the airy violations of the boundary by Saudi tax collectors.

3. I recalled the curious situation that had arisen some years ago when the Dardanelles film "Tell England" had been shown in Bagdad; the scenes representing British troops being mown down on the beach had been greeted with loud applause, while those depicting the Turks in misfortune had provoked violent demonstrations of indignation and grief; I remembered the incident vividly, because the atmosphere in the cinema had been reported to me as being unpleasantly tense, and, fearing the possibility of a brawl between Royal Air Force ranks and the local public, I had myself intervened to have the film prohibited before the run was completed.

4. I said that all this evidence had seemed to show that a common religion and old associations (after all, many of the leading men in the two countries had been class mates in their youth) had combined to give Turkey, the ex-tyrant, a strong initial advantage over Great Britain, the liberator, in any conflict of emotions that might arise in the Iraqi mind. The Anglo-Turkish rapprochement might almost have been designed by a benevolent Providence to solve the dilemma. Except for the calamity of Palestine all seemed well with the Near East. It was therefore a great disappointment that at that very moment Iraqi relations with Turkey should have taken a less cordial turn.

5. Saiyid Mustafa said that in their hearts they trusted Turkey as little as Persia. The cinema incident which I had recalled had reflected not any particular love of Turkey, but rather the accumulated passions generated by years of anti-mandate propaganda. Turkey must dislike an Arab revival on her southern frontiers, and would always do what she could to compromise any such development. Pan-Arab feeling permeated the educated classes (who alone counted) to an extent which no Cabinet could afford to ignore; even Saiyid Hikmat Sulaiman had had to do public, and indeed emphatic, lip-service to it; they were obliged to intervene to combat the dismemberment of Syria, even if the hope were a forlorn one. The leading men of Iraq had made up their minds that in this modern world of force-politics a small State of under 4 million inhabitants had no prospect of survival, and that their only hope lay in pushing a vigorous policy aiming at a pan-Arab League (that is, not a centralised Arab State). In a world conflict Great Britain would be unwilling to detach forces from the, for her, major theatre of war for the defence of Iraq, or, indeed, for any of her Arab protectorates. (This conviction that if ever Iraq has occasion to invoke the treaty Great Britain will not play is deep-rooted and persistent; it is constantly coming to the surface, for instance, in connexion with the Shatt-el-Arab and with the munitions grievance, and now as a justification for pan-Arab activities.) Turkey or Persia, he continued, would hardly fail to seize an opportunity of swallowing Iraq with her miserable little army of two or three divisions. But the prospect



for the aggressors would be far less attractive if they knew that at the first sign of encroachment twenty divisions of Arabs, trained and equipped for modern warfare, would march from Syria, Palestine, Saudiya, Yaman, Bahrein and the other Gulf Amirates. (I gave the obvious answer that that was a very nice dream which might come true one day; but in the meantime, during the two-division stage, it seemed unwise to go out of their way unnecessarily to irritate one of these powerful and *ex hypothesi* greedy neighbours.)

6. To explain his last reference, I must here insert a summary of a conversation which I had with the Minister in June of this year, at the time when the coincidence of the agreements between France and Turkey over Alexandretta, and Great Britain and Turkey for trade credits (including credits for munitions), had caused some mystification. After saying that the French had no far-sighted Arabian policy, and that we should not deceive ourselves into believing that the Turks would ever be our loyal friends, Saiyid Mustafa went on to ask what had happened to the old traditional British policy of friendship and support for the Arabs. Leaving aside for the moment our inexplicable doings in Palestine, why did we not adopt a more realistic policy in the rest of Arabia? Yaman in particular was full of possibilities, yet we seemed content to leave it, and Saudiya and the Gulf Amirates, as savage anachronisms, so many Abyssinians, fragile pots ready to be smashed by any hostile European contact. Why did we not set out to organise them into modern States as we had Iraq? I reminded the Minister that, though we had come to Iraq as liberators, we had nevertheless come rifle in hand and held the country down by force while we laid the foundation of modern administration; they themselves had disliked and resented the experience; in any case, similar procedure was obviously out of the question in the countries he had mentioned and in time of peace. His answer was, of course: "Then use Iraq." Iraq could be made the spearhead of a vigorous, realistic, Arabian policy which would secure many vital imperial interests. In the past prominent personages in England had been especially associated with the traditional policy of supporting the Arabs to which he had referred; but the giants seemed to have disappeared; was there nobody able to come forward to revive and champion it now?

7. A day or two after the conversation recorded in paragraphs 2 to 5 above Saiyid Mustafa asked me to repeat my views to the Prime Minister. This I did, emphasising my doubts as to the wisdom of pushing Iraq intervention in the Alexandretta question too far, since I understood that Turkey regarded the matter as having been finally settled with the other party to the dispute. Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai, after repeating much of what his colleague had said regarding the absence of real goodwill on the part of Turkey and the reasons which had led the Cabinet to espouse an active pan-Arab policy, said that actually the Turkish Government had not taken amiss their first attempt at mediation on the basis of partition; he blamed the French, who had no desire to serve an Arab cause and would have resented an Iraqi diplomatic success; the Turks, he felt sure, must realise that not they but Arabian Iraq had the right to feel aggrieved; he would, however, instruct Saiyid Tewfiq not to overdo it.

C. J. EDMONDS.

Bagdad, August 23, 1938.

[E 5394/4895/93]

No. 36.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 411.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 29, 1938.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 69, Saving, of the 15th August, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior on the subject of the present position of the Jews in Iraq, with especial reference to the bitter feelings which have been aroused against them by the recent Jewish reprisals on the Arabs in Palestine.

2. These feelings had showed signs of abating, but I fear that the news received recently of the heavy casualties which resulted from the explosion of a bomb in the Arab bazaar in Jaffa may again incense the Arab public, and it will not be surprising if there are further instances of the victimising of Jews in spite of the preventive measures taken by the Government.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall.

My dear Houstoun-Boswall,

Bagdad, August 22, 1938.

IN my letter of the 15th November, 1937, to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, I mentioned that for us here one serious aspect of the Palestine problem was that any exacerbation of the situation there reacted on the tranquillity of the large Jewish community domiciled in Iraq.

2. A few days ago, after the issue of the jihad fatwas of Kashif-al-Ghita and the two cases of bomb-throwing in the Jewish clubs, I was emphasising to my Minister in conversation that, from the purely internal point of view and quite apart from the Jewish question, any licence to the mujtahids to renew their interference in politics, or failure to trace those responsible for the bomb incidents, was bound to react unfavourably on the authority and prestige of the Government. Actually he had already sent strong messages of disapproval and warning to the divines concerned, and prohibited the press from enlarging on the fatwas; only a few minutes before he had been impressing on the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department that he must follow up the bomb cases with vigour. But before admitting this he argued vigorously against me for some time.

3. The Cabinet, he said, had had a most unpleasant year. Ministers felt as strongly as any members of the public about what was happening in Palestine (I need not repeat his detailed strictures on British policy). Even the sober Saiyid Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab, who had been Minister of the Interior in several Cabinets, had only a day or two before come dancing into his room, his eyes ablaze with anger at the prohibition of the demonstrations of popular indignation and tribute to the martyrs planned for the Friday. If responsible elder statesmen like the Qassab felt like that I could imagine the state of mind of younger and more excitable men. There was limit to what a Government could do in suppressing popular ferment.

4. The Minister went on to say that he feared that before long a demand might arise for the expulsion of all the Jews of Iraq. Every day he read in the press of some new drive against the Jews in Europe. Nobody had been able to prevent Hitler from carrying out his drastic anti-Jewish measures in Germany. The Arab countries as victims of Jewish territorial ambitions would have far stronger justification than the European. It was not entirely fantastic to visualise the 90,000 Jews of Iraq being escorted across the Euphrates and told to run the gauntlet of the desert to this Palestine of theirs. No one could tell when such a demand might arise; it might develop overnight, it might not be made for three, four or even five years; but sooner or later it was bound to happen unless there was a radical change.

5. There is no doubt that the recent campaign of Jewish reprisals in Palestine has roused public feeling here to an unusual pitch of intensity. It produces no effect to argue that, quite apart from the merits of the political issue, the Arabs started the outrages and that terrorism is a game that two can play. For the Arab spokesman, the injustice of the policy of His Majesty's Government is so patent that resistance in any form is legitimate, and counter-measures or retaliation by the other side constitute merely intensification of the persecution.

6. I am far from suggesting that any action so sweeping as that imagined by the Minister is imminent, or ultimately probable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the idea has been going the round and has been canvassed; I remember that Dr. Saib Shawkat, President of the Muthanna Club, entertained



me with similar ideas, one night after dinner, some months ago. In any case we had a pale indication of some of the possibilities in 1936, when several Jews were murdered in Bagdad in quick succession. It is true that in most cases the murders were attributed to personal motives; they were none the less symptomatic of a diminution of respect for the sanctity of Jewish life at a time of popular agitation.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

[E 5400/2000/93]

No. 37.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 419 E.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, August 31, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to Sir Maurice Peterson's telegram No. 80 of the 9th May, 1938, that the arrangement then made by the Iraqi Government by which they drew bills for £100,000 each, up to a maximum of £500,000, on the Iraq Petroleum Company in London, provided only temporary alleviation of the Government's financial embarrassment. They are again hard-pressed for ready money.

2. As anticipated in your Lordship's telegram No. 72 of the 17th May last, the bills accepted by the Iraq Petroleum Company proved an excellent marketable security. They were discounted, in some if not all cases, by the brokers of the Crown Agents at, I believe, a rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Being in the nature of accommodation bills, they are not rediscountable with the banks. Some confusion has been caused, owing to the Iraqi Government's ignorance of the sensitiveness of this particular section of the discount market, by their issue of bills in excess of the figure of £500,000 fixed as a maximum in May last. This has provoked a protest from the Crown Agents. I understand that extra bills for £150,000 have been taken up by the banks, at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and that the Iraqi Ministry of Finance have written to the Crown Agents offering to remunerate those who may be considered to have lost by the difference in discount rates due to the Government's excess drawings.

3. The Iraqi Government have once more turned to the Iraq Petroleum Company for relief, and they recently authorised Sir John Ward, who is at present in London, to approach the company and to ask that a sum of £500,000, in advance of the oil royalties due in January 1939, should be made available on the 1st September. The managing director of the Iraq Petroleum Company has, I am informed, agreed to advance this sum in four monthly instalments of £125,000 each, but he would prefer that payment of the first instalment should be deferred until after the 15th September, when the board of his company meets and can formally approve this transaction. The company are now waiting for an expression of the Iraqi Government's wishes to be conveyed to them through official channels.

4. This accommodation will go far to relieve the Iraqi Government's immediate embarrassment, but its necessity reveals a disquieting and somewhat unhealthy situation. The Iraqi budget estimates for revenue for the current year are approximately I.D. 500,000 a month. The totality of the oil royalties is earmarked for the Five Years' Capital Works Plan. The Government's need to draw over I.D. 1 million, by way of advance on oil royalties, in the first six months of the current financial year, seems to call for some explanation.

5. According to the financial adviser, whose observations I recently invited, the main complication in Iraqi Government finance derives from the Five-Year Plan. The Cabinet, having set themselves to plan constructively, produced a possibly too ambitious programme, requiring five years for its fulfilment. Oil royalties, &c., are duly earmarked for the purpose of financing this plan, but obvious difficulties arise from the fact that over 80 per cent. of the cost must be met during the first three years of the plan's course. A long-term loan would ease the situation, but this Government are opposed to borrowing. What seems to be required is some arrangement for the issue of bonds by which the Government, having assigned revenue for five years, might (*e.g.*) draw now on the third year and repay during the third year. Mr. Hogg has written privately to Messrs. Barings, and awaits their opinion as to the practicability of such a scheme. It is

my impression, however, that any Iraqi Government would think twice before making any approach to Baring Brothers after their last experience.

6. It seems surprising that the effects of the Five-Year Plan should embarrass the Government so early in its course, before any new project, supplementary to those already in course of execution when the plan was elaborated last April, has been initiated. Mr. Hogg informs me that present embarrassments are mainly due to defence expenditure inherited from the Bakr Sidqi régime, to Kut barrage and Tigris bridges costs, and to railway works.

7. To this explanation I would add that revenue is almost certainly not coming up to expectations. Agricultural produce is fetching poor prices, and these are reflected in diminished proceeds of the *istihlak* tax (on sales of produce). The date market is stagnant. Wheat-growers are facing a slump, owing to their folly in holding up stocks after a record harvest, while Canada and Russia supplied the market. Imports into Iraq during the June quarter of 1938 were valued at I.D. 2,121,000, as against I.D. 2,324,000 for the corresponding period of 1937. Exports from Iraq during the same two periods were of the value of I.D. 561,000 (1938) and I.D. 1,304,000 (1937) respectively. This falling off in trade, taxation and customs receipts must be reckoned, no less than the exigent avidities of the army and the railways, as a factor in the Iraqi Government's financial embarrassment.

8. Negotiations are to be resumed in the autumn with the Iraq Petroleum Company regarding the unification of production-obligations due from that company and its subsidiaries (see Sir Maurice Peterson's letter to Mr. Baggallay of the 28th March, 1938). One demand likely to be made by the Iraqi Government is that the oil royalties should be paid quarterly, and not annually as at present. With approximately £500,000 coming in quarterly from this source, the Government should be able to plan expenditure more realistically than is now the case. The loan of from £2 to £3 million which the company are prepared to make on the satisfactory conclusion of these negotiations would remove the last of the Government's worries. But it would also increase Government dependence on the oil companies, which, I believe, many Iraqis are beginning to resent.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 5477/2094/93]

No. 38.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 438.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, September 7, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that when I saw the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 6th September he said that he had been anxious to speak to me about Koweit, with special reference to the desire of the Iraqi Government to establish a port there, and he proceeded to elaborate the familiar arguments about the vulnerability of Iraqi interests in the Shatt-el-Arab. It was thus fortunate that I had received your Lordship's despatch No. 462 of the 15th August, which enabled me to inform the Minister that His Majesty's Government had given very close study to the proposal as presented to Mr. Morgan, and on another occasion to His Majesty's Ambassador, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs last March, but that the scheme on the lines suggested did not commend itself to them because it was felt that the rights of the sheikh might be infringed thereby. I also added that the Iraqi Government could rest assured that free communications in the Shatt would be maintained, as the interests of Iraq and of her allies were there identical. The Minister was clearly disappointed. He said that the Cabinet had considered the question several times lately, and that, indeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed to take up the question with your Lordship this month in London, as stated in my confidential letter to Mr. Baxter of the 23rd August, and in the enclosure to my despatch No. 410 of the 28th August. He went on to say that there had been some suggestion of linking this question with that of the sheikh's properties in



Iraq, but I think I was successful in persuading him that any such move would, to say the least of it, be very bad tactics (the Director-General for Foreign Affairs also mentioned this to me last week and showed that he entirely shared my view). Saiyid Abbas Mahdi also said that his Government would proceed to elaborate some other scheme to secure an outlet to the sea through Koweit, for they were genuinely perturbed at the possibility of Persian interference with Iraqi trade on the Shatt-al-Arab and felt very strongly that it was their duty to do everything possible to obviate any such risk. He would write to me on the subject after consulting his colleagues, who would no doubt send further instructions to Saiyid Taufiq-al-Suwaiti.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to his Excellency the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 5666/3/93]

No. 39.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.341.M.207.1938.VII.

Geneva, September 26, 1938.

*Communication from the Government of Iraq.—Action taken by the Iraqi Government in consequence of the Report on the Economic Conditions of the Assyrians in the Northern Provinces of Iraq.*

To the Secretary-General,

Geneva, September 21, 1938.

IN continuation of my letter of the 22nd August, 1938,<sup>(1)</sup> transmitting copy of a report on the economic condition of the Assyrians in Northern Iraq, I have the honour to furnish, for the information of the members of the Council, the following particulars of action taken by the Iraqi Government in consequence of the report, which, as will have been observed, deals with the question under four main headings, namely: (1) general economic conditions as revealed by the standard of living, actual pastoral wealth, and actual and potential agricultural production; (2) land tenure; (3) settlement on the land of the nomadic sections; and (4) the eventual transfer of the inhabitants of the malarious Nahla Valley.

The general economic condition of the Assyrians is shown to be for the most part superior to that of their neighbours and on the whole satisfactory. The report makes no specific proposals in this connexion, but, as has been stated on previous occasions, the Assyrians will automatically enjoy their full share of the benefits resulting from the productive schemes in various parts of the country, to which a large proportion of the annual budget is devoted with a view to raising the standard of living of the whole population.

As regards land tenure, the report shows that the autochthonous Assyrians (about 525 families) own 27 villages by ancient prescriptive right, while some 385 families of post-war arrival are settled in Government-owned villages. These villagers are absolutely secure in the possession of their lands as long as they continue to exploit them. But the psychological value of documents of title cannot be neglected. The Government therefore decided to retransfer the author of the report himself forthwith to the Land Settlement Department, and has already posted him to the Mosul Liwa with the particular mission of pushing forward the settlement of the northern areas in accordance with existing land-settlement legislation. Much preliminary work, such as survey, has, of course, still to be done, but it is hoped that the issue of the first documents of title to some of these 900 odd families will not be unduly delayed. The remaining 800 families of agricultural Assyrians are now settled in privately-owned villages; experience has shown that there is little or no danger of eviction (there is no case on record) and the customary conditions of lease are not onerous; indeed, as the report points out, there has been no tendency on the part of these tenants to apply for transfer to vacant Government-owned lands in their neighbourhood. There

<sup>(1)</sup> Document C.296.M.172.1938.VII.

is, of course, nothing to prevent the purchase by the Assyrians themselves of any villages and lands that may come on the market, and the facilities offered by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank for advances are available for them equally with others.

The recommendations made in respect of the third heading are already in course of implementation. Twenty-one villages, formerly occupied by Assyrians now in Syria, have been allotted for the establishment of the nomadic Ashuti tribe, estimated at about 400 families, and the local authorities are at the present time engaged in distributing them among the various sub-sections. The land being Government-owned, the recipients will in due course also qualify to receive documents of occupancy title.

The question of the transfer of the inhabitants of the Nahla Valley has solved itself. In reply to official enquiries the villagers have definitely stated that they are unwilling to leave their rich rice lands for more salubrious but less remunerative villages elsewhere. Their decision is not surprising. Everything possible will be done by sanitary instruction and medical treatment to reduce the incidence of the fever.

I have, &c.

T. SWAIDY,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 5688/1982/93]

No. 40.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 106.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to Mr. R. A. Butler, dated the 28th September, 1938, respecting the Iraqi Foreign Minister's visit to London.

Geneva, September 28, 1938.

Enclosure 1 in No. 40.

*Iraqi Foreign Minister to Mr. Butler.*

Hôtel d'Angleterre,

Geneva, September 28, 1938.

Dear Mr. Butler,

WHEN I spoke to you and to Lord De La Warr the other day about the various matters which I wish to discuss in London, we agreed that it would be convenient if I could prepare a short aide-mémoire regarding each item, to facilitate preliminary consideration of them in London, and to enable the representative of His Majesty's Government to give me, as far as possible, concrete replies regarding each.

I now enclose six short personal aide-mémoires regarding: (1) Aerodrome guards; (2) the ownership of the lands occupied by the port of Basra; (3) Koweit; (4) Palestine; (5) Alexandretta; and (6) Syria. You will observe that these notes have been made as short as possible and restricted to essential principles, to facilitate discussion. Each question has, of course, formed the subject of long and detailed correspondence, with which the competent Departments are familiar.

I suggest that these six aide-mémoires might be suitably considered as the agenda of my conversations in London.

Yours sincerely,

T. SWAIDY.



Enclosure 2 in No. 40.

*Aide-mémoires.*

(1) *Aerodrome Guards.*

ALTHOUGH the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq came into force in October 1932, effect has not yet been given to article 4 of the annexure.

2. The Iraqi Government has never accepted as binding the secret and unpublished letter from Nuri Pasha to Sir Francis Humphrys, dated the 30th April, 1930, on account of its unconstitutional character, and because its terms are inconsistent with both the text and the intention of article 4 itself.

3. The Iraqi Government considers it essential that the guards for the protection of the British air bases should be drawn from *bona fide* Iraqi forces. It has therefore been unable to accept various proposals which have been put forward in the past for a special "Air Defence Force" which would, except in name, be indistinguishable from the present levies, the existence of which it was the intention to terminate.

4. I therefore request His Majesty's Government to agree that the guards shall be detached from one or other of the following Iraqi forces:—

- (a) The regular Iraqi army (in which case the Iraqi Government agree that the commanding officer shall be a British officer attached to the British military mission); or
- (b) The Iraqi police who, through the Directorate-General, are under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.

(2) *Ownership of the Lands Occupied by the Port of Basra.*

The continued registration of the lands occupied by the port of Basra in the name of His Majesty's Government as owner is an anachronistic survival from the days of the mandate. It is considered that registration in the name of the Iraqi Government should no longer be delayed.

2. I therefore request His Majesty's Government to agree unconditionally to the change of registration. If the fact that the port loan has not yet been completely repaid is considered to be an obstacle, the Iraqi Government is prepared to make arrangements to repay the balance of the loan without delay.

(3) *Koweit.*

Koweit presents a twofold problem for Iraq:—

- (a) It has become an entrepôt for extensive arms traffic and smuggling.
- (b) It bars Iraq's access to the open sea.

2. His Majesty's Foreign Office is already familiar with problem (a). The activities centred in Koweit have for many years caused grave financial loss to Iraq in the shape of loss of customs revenue and extraordinary expenditure on preventive measures. The arms traffic also gravely complicates the task of maintaining law and order, particularly in the tribal areas of the Euphrates.

3. As regards (b), Iraq's only channel of access to the sea is at present the Shatt-el-Arab. The Iraqi Government feels that it is of vital importance to secure an alternative for the following reasons:—

- (a) The recent dispute with Iran has emphasised the unreliability of the Shatt line: Iran is in a position to interrupt it at any time.
- (b) The Shatt tends to become more and more congested with the development of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. If oil is discovered in the Basra Vilayet, developments of equal magnitude may be expected, and these must not be restricted by the Shatt-el-Arab bottle-neck.
- (c) After completion of the Tell-Kochik-Bagdad section of the railway, the Government proposes to extend the line as far south as possible with a view to inaugurating a fast passenger service to India, and shares the view of the original promoters of the Bagdad Railway, that the terminus should be on the sea, and not on the Shatt-el-Arab.

4. Just before the war of 1914-18 Koweit was an autonomous qadha of the Vilayet of Basra. The Iraqi Government, as the successor of the Ottoman Government in the Vilayets of Mosul, Bagdad and Basra, considers that Koweit should properly be incorporated in Iraq. If incorporation should take place, Iraq would agree to maintain the local autonomy of Koweit with a guarantee in the form of a special statute, but, of course, without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty.

5. If His Majesty's Government will agree to the incorporation of Koweit in Iraq, the two problems referred to in paragraph 1 will be automatically solved. If not, the solution of each must be found separately.

6. Solution of the smuggling and arms traffic problem can be sought by one of the three following methods, arranged in order of effectiveness:—

- (a) A customs union between Iraq and Koweit, Koweit to receive a fixed annual sum in lieu of its present customs revenue.
- (b) The northern frontier line of Koweit to run from west to east at about latitude 29° 35', instead of about 30° N. as at present, so as to give the Iraqi preventive services more space in which to operate south of Zubair, Shaiba and other villages south of the Hammar Lake.
- (c) Combined preventive operations.

7. As regards direct access to the sea, two alternative positions for a port and railway terminus suggest themselves for investigation:—

- (a) A suitable site to be selected on Koweit Bay;
- (b) The inland extension of the Khor Abdullah, named on the map Khor Zubair.

If the first alternative is found preferable, it would be necessary for Iraq to lease from Koweit a site for a port on the bay, and a corridor for the railway line. The second would involve a slight rectification of the frontier—that proposed under paragraph 6 (b) above would be more than ample—at the eastern end—so as to give sufficient room at Umm Qasr (a probable site) and leave the whole of the Khor Abdullah in Iraq. Pending further investigation the Iraqi Government would be glad to be assured that His Majesty's Government, in principle, would be disposed to consider favourably either alternative.

(4) *Palestine.*

The Iraqi Government believes that the real interests of the British Empire and of the Arab world coincide so closely that co-operation in the Near East is both possible and desirable. As the ally of Great Britain, Iraq in particular would wish that in a time of world crisis, His Majesty's Government should be able to count on the loyal and active assistance of all the Arabs, and not have to divert any part of their forces to that region of repress disorder or to counter a threat from any Arab element. The Palestine affair is poisoning what might be a most healthy political condition of the Near East. The Arabs, the Sa'adabad Governments and the whole of the Islamic world look upon the policy hitherto followed with feelings of dismay.

2. Even the Royal Commission, which, for the first time, suggested partition and the formation of an independent political Jewish State in Palestine, did not claim that this was an ideal solution. They clinched their argument in favour of it as against, for instance, cantonisation, by expressing the opinion that partition offered "one supreme advantage—the possibility it offers of eventual peace." The event, however, has shown beyond all argument that the premise on which the Royal Commission based its conclusions was false. The very suggestion of partition has fanned the flames of race-hatred to a degree of heat never before reached.

3. The Iraqi Government has on numerous occasions made representations to His Majesty's Government in this connexion, both on behalf of the original Arab inhabitants of Palestine on whom it believes the policy hitherto followed to be inflicting the gravest injustice (representations which it is not proposed to repeat in the present aide-mémoire) and also on the general political grounds summarised in paragraph 1 above. His Majesty's Government have been good enough to assure the Iraqi Government in reply, that these representations would be considered with the greatest attention.

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4. The Iraqi Government is therefore genuinely perplexed and disturbed—(a) to note that, in spite of the considerations set forth in the three preceding paragraphs, on every occasion that a spokesman of the United Kingdom has occasion to make a declaration on Palestine, the uncompromising statement is repeated that His Majesty's Government adhere to the view that partition offers the best solution; and (b) to learn, on what it believes to be respectable authority, that the Woodhouse Technical Commission styled itself "Partition Commission" and refused to hear any evidence intended to show that no scheme of partition could be practicable or equitable.

5. There thus appears to be a grave danger that after the Woodhouse Commission has reported, the only solution in the field will be one for partition, i.e., a solution that could only be forced through at great cost in blood and treasure, and with unfortunate political consequences.

6. I ask to be enlightened as to why His Majesty's Government (in spite of the reactions to the proposal for partition, which, of course, they could not foresee in July 1937 when they issued their statement of policy, but which have since become manifest) have continued to concentrate on the study of partition to the exclusion of any other proposal which might offer possibilities of an agreed solution. Two such schemes can be mentioned: (a) the scheme sponsored by Colonel Newcombe, and already agreed to by many influential Arabs and Jews of moderate views (details have already been communicated to His Majesty's Government); and (b) a scheme for the division of Palestine into a number—perhaps between twelve to twenty—of small federated cantons (rather on the lines of a scheme understood to have been propounded at one stage by Lord Runciman for Czechoslovakia).

7. I earnestly beg His Majesty's Government to have detailed schemes worked out on these two bases in addition to any scheme for partition which may have been worked out by the Woodhouse Commission, in order that all possible alternatives may be simultaneously studied by a conference of representatives of all interests involved, in the hope that an agreed and durable solution may emerge.

#### (5) Alexandretta.

The Iraqi Government maintains its opinion that the best solution of the Alexandretta question, both for practical reasons and also in the best interests of Arab-Turkish relations, would be division between Syria and Turkey.

2. During the course of my visit to Paris early in September 1938 I ascertained from M. Georges Bonnet that the French Government, though unwilling to take any initiative in this direction, would have no objection to the Iraqi Government's doing so at an opportune moment, and also that it had no objection in principle to division.

3. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this month at Geneva that, while Turkey considered the reopening of the question at the present moment inopportune, they would not attempt to bind the Syrian Government and would continue to consider the Iraqi Government as eventual mediators in the matter. M. Aras further promised to use his influence with the French Government to ratify the Franco-Syrian Treaty not later than November 1938.

4. In view of these assurances and the declaration of M. Paul Boncour in the Sixth Committee on the 20th September, 1938, that France intended to ratify the treaty shortly, and that the delay was due to only trivial points of detail, I refrained from raising the embarrassing question of the irregularity of the arrangement regarding Alexandretta, made direct between France and Turkey, an arrangement entirely inconsistent with the previous decisions of the Council of the League.

5. The Iraqi Government trusts that His Majesty's Government will use its good offices, whenever a suitable opportunity offers, to secure the reopening of this question with a view to settling it finally on the basis of division.

#### (6) Syria.

The Iraqi Government is seriously perturbed by the delay in the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. It understands that this delay is due, not to minor matters of detail as M. Paul-Boncour gave it to be understood in the Sixth Committee of the Assembly, but to fundamental additions and alterations which

the French Government wishes to impose, and to which the Syrian Government can never agree. The date for the complete emancipation has been fixed for January 1940, the preparations for the taking over of complete responsibility by the Syrian Government are in certain essential particulars, notably the formation of a regular national army, far less advanced than they were in Iraq at the corresponding date, viz., June 1930, sixteen months before our entry into the League.

2. Of the new proposals which are delaying ratification, the one which causes the Iraqi Government the gravest preoccupation on its own account is one for a special régime for the Upper Jazira. Experience has conclusively shown that special régimes set up in opposition to the permanent and unalterable conditions can have no permanence and frequently lead to disaster. To set up a special régime in the Upper Jazira would, furthermore, expose it to the same political fate as Alexandretta, or, in view of the heterogeneous nature of the inhabitants, worse.

3. Reference is invited to paragraph 3 of aide-mémoire (5) on Alexandretta, recording the promise of M. Aras to use his influence with the French Government to ratify the Franco-Syrian Treaty this November. I request His Majesty's Government similarly to use their influence for early rectification, and against any suggestion for the setting up of special régimes in Syria (especially the Upper Jazira) which can only promote discord.

[E 5731/1982/93]

No. 41.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, September 29, 1938.*

PRIME Minister asked me on evening of 28th September to go to his house, where were also the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Director-General for Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister said first of all that he wished to tell me that German Minister had that morning asked what would be the attitude of the Iraqi Government in the event of war. Prime Minister had reminded him of Anglo-Iraqi Alliance obligation which Iraqi Government had naturally no intention of evading. German Minister had then suggested that if the procedure under the Covenant of the League of Nations had not been complied with, it might not be necessary for the Iraqi Government to participate in war if it came. The Prime Minister briefly dismissed this objection, and proceeded to tell the German Minister that, in the event of war, he could not have German nationals at liberty in Iraqi territory. The German Minister asked how much warning his Legation would be given in order to enable them to evacuate the colony. The Prime Minister had replied that if the German Minister was as certain of war as he seemed to be, he had better take warning as from that moment to be on the safe side.

2. The Prime Minister continued that he wished to confirm to me in the most formal manner assurance of Iraqi co-operation with His Majesty's Government, which had been communicated to me orally by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram No. 137, and the latter handed me a note to that effect drafted in form of reply to a letter from me of 15th September giving effect to instructions in your telegrams Nos. 121 and 122. After I had expressed appreciation in suitable terms, we discussed certain points of detail with which I need not trouble you. But the Prime Minister did express his earnest hope that should financial position of Iraq suffer from war through, for example, closure of Mediterranean to merchant vessels (which would mean that no oil would go from Kirkuk, with consequent loss of royalties), or if economic position of the population should become such that Government assistance should be necessary, they could look to their allies for aid.

3. I do not think that an official conversation on a subject of vital importance could conceivably have been conducted in a more pleasant atmosphere. I have been very much struck—indeed, those with longer experience of this country than I have are frankly astonished—by the complete spontaneity with which the Iraqi Government have offered to honour their treaty obligations. In all my conversations on the international situation with the Iraqi Government it has been assumed as a matter of course that they would be on our side, and there has not been

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the slightest tendency to bargain about anything nor has Palestine even been mentioned. I trust, therefore, that it may be found possible to instruct me to convey to the Prime Minister of Iraq from your Lordship or Mr. Chamberlain himself a personal message of appreciation and thanks and on their assurance that His Majesty's Government will give their most sympathetic consideration to any request for financial assistance which Iraqi Government may feel obliged to make in the event of difficulties mentioned in paragraph 2 above materialising.

4. Although no attempt has been made to bargain about Palestine, I have no doubt that in their hearts Iraqi Government hope that the unreserved solidarity with His Majesty's Government, which they have shown in present crisis, will not be without its effect on the general attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Arabs, and that, as a consequence, a settlement of the Palestinian problem more favourable to Arabic ideas than that hitherto contemplated by His Majesty's Government may result.

5. Text of Iraqi Government's note by bag.

#### No. 42.

*Exchange of Telegrams between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Iraq.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 4.)*

##### (1)

*Jemil Madfai (Prime Minister of Iraq) to Mr. Neville Chamberlain.*

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

October 1, 1938.

THE Iraqi Government and people have watched with constant faith and hope and ever-increasing admiration your efforts for peace during these last weeks. I congratulate you with all my heart on your success and assure you of our profound gratitude for this great service to mankind.

##### (2)

*Mr. Neville Chamberlain to Jemil Madfai.*

(Telegraphic.)

October 3, 1938.

CORDIAL thanks for your message with its generous reference to my efforts for peace. I warmly appreciate the sympathy and goodwill manifested by the Iraqi Government and people during these critical weeks.

[E 5777/3/93]

#### No. 43.

*Memorandum on the Session of the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations between September 15 and 27, 1938 (Meetings Nos. 103 and 104).*

I ARRIVED in Geneva on the 14th September and that morning saw Mr. Hill and Mr. Walters. I wished to ascertain at once whether the League Secretariat, which, in its letter of the 5th September, had asked for £9,500, of which £5,500 to be remitted at once, was, or would be at an early date, in a position to substitute for this request a reasoned one asking for the total United Kingdom share, stated in its letter of the 28th February, 1938, to be £13,805, in the near future. It was clear that, even if this could be done, there would be considerable delay. I therefore telegraphed to Mr. Crosthwaite asking that £5,500 should be remitted as soon as possible. I was given to understand by the British delegation on the 28th September that the money was being remitted.

I also discussed (a) the question of the winding-up of the Trustee Board by a fixed date, and (b) the position as regards the naturalisation of the Assyrians. I found, as I expected, that we were in agreement that, as regards (a), no date could at present be fixed, and, as regards (b), early naturalisation would help to solve several difficulties and expedite the winding-up of the Trustee Board.

I then saw Mr. Edmonds, who was to act as representative for Iraq on the committee. I found him very insistent on the necessity of fixing an early date for terminating the existence of the Trustee Board. I made it quite clear to him that, in our opinion, it was neither possible nor advisable to attempt to fix a date at this stage. The reorganisation of the settlement was now in process and had, indeed, only regularly begun as from early in 1938, when the reorganisation budget had been passed. We were as anxious as anyone to close down the Trustee Board, but no member of the committee could yet properly take the responsibility of fixing a date. It might be awkward for the Iraqi Government to have to ask Parliament for further funds, but it would be, from our point of view, even more unpleasant to be accused in Parliament of shuffling out of the task of reorganisation before it was completed, and the committee could not honestly inform the Council, under whose directions it was working, that all was finished when this was not the case. Mr. Edmonds's view was that the difficulties in Iraq would be less if some date could be fixed. As it was obvious that we in Geneva were in this matter working largely in the dark, I came to the conclusion that, despite the inevitable delay, it would be best to send for M. Cuénod, the president of the Trustee Board, and take his views at first hand. He alone could give an estimate of when the material work of reorganisation (purchase of animals, equipment and land and construction of new houses, villages and water-wheels) was likely to be finished. He alone, too, could tell us whether, as Mr. Edmonds seemed to expect, there would, on the completion of the reorganisation work, be a surplus which, in the case of Iraq, might be used for continuing administrative expenditure. I had doubts as to whether the surplus would suffice to carry on the administration long enough, and I would have liked a guarantee that, while the Iraq Government would agree to the use of the surplus as suggested, it would also provide any further necessary sum. It seemed, however, unlikely that this would be forthcoming, and I decided, therefore, without prejudice to this aspect of the question, to support any proposal made at the committee meeting next day to call M. Cuénod to Geneva.

#### *Meeting of September 15 (No. 103).*

At this were present MM. Feldman (*president*), Celinski (*secretary*), de Panafieu (France), Satow (United Kingdom), Gastelu (Ecuador), a Roumanian secretary representing M. Crutzesco, who was ill, Edmonds (Iraq), Hill (League Secretariat), and Bieler (League Treasury).

Document C/Min. Ass/274, which shows the present position as regards reorganisation, was read. It appeared to the members of the committee to be clear. Mr. Bieler then made a statement as to finance and informed the committee that the League Treasury had from balances in hand of £4,706 (reorganisation) and £600 (administration) been able to remit to Beirut £5,306, so that there was some money available at once, although the sums of £5,500 each asked for from the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments were required as soon as possible. I stated that the United Kingdom contribution might be shortly expected.

Mr. Edmonds then recalled the statement made by the Iraqi representative at the 101st meeting in January 1938 and asked whether any decision as to the winding-up of the Trustee Board had been reached. A general discussion ensued, in the course of which Mr. Bieler warned the committee that, as things were, the League contribution of 14.78 per cent. had only been sanctioned up to the end of 1939. I should record here that, from what Mr. Walters said privately later, I gathered that League funds, if required, would be available after that date. Mr. Edmonds was insistent on the need of fixing a time-limit for the board, even if a provisional one. The general feeling of the committee was that, while the board should not exist for one day more than was necessary, it was doubtful if any time-limit could be fixed now, and impossible even to consider the matter without learning the views of M. Cuénod. It was therefore unanimously decided to call him to Geneva and a telegram was sent that evening. The expense of the journey is justifiable on two grounds: firstly, M. Cuénod's presence was essential in connexion with the suggested time-limit, and, secondly, it would enable the 1939 budget to be examined. He would, in any case, have had to come for the budget, so that one journey was inevitable.

Before the meeting adjourned I raised the question of the liquidation of the Ghab scheme. As soon as the accounts have been examined and passed by the



League Treasury, a report has to be submitted to the Council. Mr. Bieler explained that the considerable delay which had occurred was due to the fact that the work of verification had been in the hands of an Italian who had resigned. A promise was given that the work would be expedited, and the secretary of the committee has undertaken to press the matter with the Treasury.

An interlude of inactivity on the part of the committee had in the circumstances become inevitable. This was perhaps just as well. It was most difficult to get the committee together and keep it together. M. Feldman was very busy as *rapporteur* of the Second Committee, the secretary was attached to the president of the Assembly and Mr. Bieler was secretary of the Fourth Committee. While no doubt it is unavoidable that the Syrian Committee should meet during the Assembly, the fact that it has to do so does not help to expedite its business.

The period of inactivity was less than had originally been expected as M. Cuénod travelled by air, thus saving both time and money. It was therefore possible to begin with him on the 23rd September unofficial discussion of the questions on which the committee desired his opinion. To form an idea as to when it might, in the absence of some radical change in the situation, be possible to close down the Trustee Board, it was necessary to ascertain as closely as possible (a) the position as to expenditure incurred and expected to be incurred under the various headings of the reorganisation budget, (b) the savings, if any, to be expected on expenditure sanctioned in that budget, (c) the savings, if any, to be expected on the administration budget for 1938, and (d) the amounts likely to be required for administrative expenditure in the years 1939, 1940 and possibly 1941. If (b) plus (c) would provide the amounts required under (d), and if the Iraqi Government would allow balances of credits (£16,000) already voted for administrative expenses and reorganisation to be used for administrative expenses only, as Mr. Edmonds believed could be arranged, then the Iraqi Government would not have to go to Parliament for new money for the Assyrians, a prospect which they greatly dislike, believing that it will be impossible to obtain new credits. As already suggested by Mr. Edmonds, the League Secretariat would have to ask for the whole of the money already voted in Iraq and keep in a special account the unexpended balance. I took every opportunity of explaining that this course could not be followed in the case of credits voted by the United Kingdom Parliament, but I expressed the opinion, I trust correctly, that if the Iraqi Government allowed a balance to remain in the League Treasury at the end of the financial year 1938-39, this would be regarded as an Iraqi payment in advance for the year 1939-40 so that we could provide under the *pari passu* arrangement a similar amount.

The position under (a), (b), (c) and (d) estimated as closely as possible is as follows:—

(a) *Expenditure actually incurred or expected to be incurred on items sanctioned in the Reorganisation Budget of £50,000 under Seven Items.*

I (a). A reduction is probable. The prices are those asked by the would-be sellers. Offers are being daily received. No bargaining has taken place. Some plots may after all not be needed.

I (b). Amount is probably what will have to be paid.

I (c). Purchase finally concluded with a saving of £11.

I (d). This is an unknown quantity, but there should be a considerable saving. The trouble is that, owing to the political situation in Syria, it cannot be known how much will have to be paid to convert the occupation rights at present enjoyed into rights of definite ownership.

II (a) and II (b). There should be saving here. Preparations (brick-making and purchase of timber) have begun. There are to be twelve new villages on the Zeidi-el-Farhan estate. Of these, one-third to be finished this autumn, the remainder in the spring. 1,136 houses to be built, 788 for replacing the four villages in the north and 348 to take the surplus population of Tel Magas and Tel Tamer. Domes can only be built in dry weather.

III. Uncertain whether any saving likely.

IV (a). Two pumps ordered, six more to be acquired.

IV (b). Wood ordered.

IV (c). Will be done when new villages ready.

V (a). 453 pairs already distributed by groups in villages. This may suffice. If not, in December, when position will be clear, balance will be acquired. Strict

minimum only will be provided. Otherwise Assyrians might slaughter for food or sell. Enough ploughs provided, but carts not yet given. So far 606 sheep bought and 4,000 to be delivered from the 15th October onwards. Original number estimated at 6,268. Real requirements will be known before end of 1938. Actual prices are 150 fils per sheep lower than estimated prices. A saving here is certain.

V (c). This expenditure now considered to be inadvisable. It would be better to sell the shed even cheaply, say, for £200 or so. In this case the budget would benefit to the tune of some £600.

VI. No economy likely. The villages must be built under supervision.

VII. A saving is expected.

(b) *Savings under Reorganisation Budget.*

A conservative estimate of the money likely to be saved on this budget is £5,000.

(c) *Savings on the Administrative Budget for 1938.*

Taking into account balances at Geneva and Beirut and the expenditure already incurred during the first six months of 1938, it seemed reasonable to expect that on the 31st December, 1938, there would be in hand a balance of approximately £1,000.

(d) *Administrative Expenses during the years 1939, 1940 and possibly 1941.*

All that is reasonably certain under this heading is the expenditure for 1939. The date 1941 has to be taken into account because it is only in that year that the list of the Assyrians on the Khabur will, under normal procedure, *i.e.*, on the completion of five years' residence, be entitled to be naturalised. There is, however, reason to hope that the Syrian Government, which has agreed to take over the Assyrians, will finally consent to accelerate procedure. The figure for 1939 is about £7,200, and may be slightly less. The total for the two years 1940-41 may reasonably be expected to be and, indeed, must be made to be less than that for 1939, and should be in the neighbourhood of £7,000 for the two years. M. Cuénod was of the opinion that this amount should suffice for winding up the work of the Trustee Board in 1940 or at the latest in 1941.

The figures given below are, as will be understood, an estimate, and a conservative one at that. They are based on the hope and, indeed, what seems to be the justifiable assumption that both the Iraqi and the United Kingdom Governments will make available by different methods the total amounts voted by them for the financial year 1938-39, and that the League contribution will continue.

Funds available—		£
Cash in hand, Geneva and Beirut (approximate) ...	...	1,000
Credit voted by Iraq for 1938-39 and still intact (£4,000 for administration and £12,000 for reorganisation) ...	...	16,000
Equivalent contribution by United Kingdom Government ...	...	16,000
League contribution (approximate) ...	...	5,550
Approximate total ...	...	38,550
Estimated expenditure—		
To complete reorganisation (£50,000 less £23,000 already spent and £5,000 saved) ...	...	22,000
Current expenditure—		
September-December 1938 ...	...	2,400
September-December 1939 ...	...	7,200
Balance available for 1940 and possibly 1941 ...	...	6,950
Approximate total ...	...	38,550

*Meeting of September 27 (No. 104).*

The matter came up for discussion at this meeting. At it were present MM. Feldman (*president*), Celinski (*secretary*), de Panafieu (France), Satow [19309]



(United Kingdom), Edmonds (Iraq), and Hill (League Secretariat). The mandates of the Roumanian and Ecuadorean representatives on the committee have, under League procedure, expired and they are to be replaced by representatives of Yugoslavia and Peru. The matter is, however, of little practical importance.

The proceedings began with a request made by the president to M. Cuénod that he would frankly state his views as to the continuance of the Trustee Board. He assured him that he enjoyed the confidence of the committee and that its members knew that if he urged the continuance of the board he would do so in the interests of the Assyrians and not for personal reasons. M. Cuénod then gave his views and the reasons why the board could not cease to exist at the end of 1938, must continue its work in 1939, and probably also, although on an increasingly smaller scale, in 1940 and even during part of 1941. The general opinion, apart from that of the representative of Iraq, who evidently was strictly bound by his instructions, was that the work of the Trustee Board must continue for a further unspecified period. Mr. Hill made known to the committee the scheme devised by Mr. Edmonds for using Iraqi money without the voting of further credits. Mr. Edmonds was asked whether his scheme was approved by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tawfiq Bey Suwaidi, who was in Geneva for the Assembly. It appeared from his reply that the latter had knowledge of the scheme in a general way and did not disapprove. Obviously, however, a successful issue depends on Mr. Edmonds' ability on his return to Bagdad to work the oracle. He appears to think he can. In any case, he agreed to discuss the 1939 administrative budget *without prejudice* and, indeed, took a very active part in the discussion.

At this point the president withdrew, and was followed by the Yugoslav representative, whose presence may or may not have been regular, a matter of no special consequence. M. de Panafieu, who had a few moments earlier been elected as vice-president, a happy choice, as he really does know a good deal of the whole question, then took charge and the discussion of the 1939 draft budget ensued. A copy of it is attached (Annex I). As there shown, the total amount is £7,166. The object was to reduce the budget to £7,000, a sum likely to make things easier from the Iraqi point of view. This object will be entirely achieved if a reduction under chapter A, article 3, can be obtained. The item aroused general criticism, all the more so as during the first six months of 1938 nothing had been spent under the heading, but to obtain satisfaction the presence of the League assistant treasurer was necessary, and Mr. Bieler was unavoidably elsewhere.

The figures seem to require but little comment. Under chapter A the main items are the salaries of M. Cuénod and Captain Vuilloud. I am certain that we are getting good value for our money. The subordinate staff is small and cannot be reduced. There is considerable clerical and accountancy work. Under chapter B expenditure on the health service is left unchanged. It would be unwise to reduce it at present. Bad health conditions are a favourite criticism on the part of the well-wishers of the Assyrians. Article 6 as originally presented stood under its four components at £2,113. It was, on examination and in the light of M. Cuénod's explanation, felt it could not be reduced below a total of £1,789. The article covers the main services necessary to keep the settlement going and its improvement in various ways, so that on the disappearance of the Trustee Board the Assyrians shall be in possession of a really "going concern." The board possess a number of rather elderly tractors and lorries which will not be replaced, but are of the greatest use. They must be kept in reasonably efficient condition. The item VI (d) covers various items of an agricultural or horticultural nature which will increase the chances of success for the Assyrians when left to themselves. Tree cuttings can be obtained free, but various new crops, &c., are being tried, e.g., ground-nuts. Under article 9, of the two items (a) and (d) the former covers mainly repairs to tools and implements, and the latter permits of the execution of minor works of irrigation and water distribution which are of great importance. In the East a sufficient water supply and its proper distribution are matters of vital importance.

The discussion of the budget, with M. Cuénod to give explanations and M. de Panafieu, who has personal knowledge of the settlement, to guide the debate, was a matter of relative ease. As already stated, it was adopted at a total of £7,166, with one reservation which may result in a further small decrease. The corresponding figure for the 1938 budget was, it will be remembered, £12,113 and that in the Ward-Panafieu report £14,000.

After the budget discussion was ended a draft letter to be sent by the Secretariat to the Iraqi and United Kingdom Governments, submitting to them, as contributors, the draft budget, was read. The main object of this letter is to make things easier at the Iraqi end, and it was indeed drafted by Mr. Edmonds. To placate the Iraqis the letter, while suggesting that reduction of the board's expenses or even its liquidation *may* be possible in 1939, also suggests that the Board may quite well have to continue its operations for some time longer. At the same time economies are likely to be made, out of which the continuance of the board's activities can be financed. Therefore it asks that funds already voted may be used for that purpose. This letter will be sent to both the Iraqi and United Kingdom Governments. Mr. Edmonds seems fairly confident that he can get the Iraqis to agree. As for ourselves, we shall presumably not be able to agree, but there will, I trust, be no difficulty in arranging that a credit equal to the amount left over by the Iraqis in the charge of the League be provided in the 1939-40 estimates. If this is so, it will be important to know at how late a date this can be done. A copy of the letter is attached (Annex II).

Reference should also be made to certain other matters. Of these the most important is the question of naturalisation. This was constantly in the minds of all concerned. I first mentioned it to the French representative on the day of my arrival. He said then, as he said more than once later, that the letter of M. Meyrier, acting French High Commissioner at Beirut, was as disagreeable a surprise to him as it was to the other members of the committee and all others concerned. He is doing his utmost to obtain a favourable solution and believes that he will succeed. The position when I left was as outlined in Mr. Loxley's letter of the 26th September to Mr. Baggallay. M. de Panafieu has promised to inform me of developments as soon as he can by personal letter.

The visit of M. Cuénod proved to have been well worth the cost. His methods and his obvious intention to make practical economies greatly impressed the Iraqi representative, who several times expressed his satisfaction and approval.

As regards the December meeting of the committee which has usually been necessary to pass the budget for the ensuing year, it was unanimously agreed that in principle it was unnecessary. Of course, if there were unexpected developments of a serious nature it would have to meet, but as things are it is unlikely that it will.

In conclusion, I should add that the Iraqi representative left with the League Secretariat a time-table under which its requests for funds could be made. The dates were so adjusted that no request should reach Bagdad before Mr. Edmonds's return. From the Iraqi point of view it would be better that the request for £4,000 should not be made early in 1939 as suggested in the League Secretariat letter of the 5th September, but in December 1938. Mr. Edmonds, though he maintained most firmly the Iraqi point of view as to the Trustee Board, was, in general, very helpful.

H. SATOW.

October 4, 1938.

#### Annex I.

#### *Draft Budget for Assyrian Settlement on the Khabur for 1939.*

#### Chapter A.—*Expenditure for Central Administration.*

Item I—Trustee Board—		£ Sterling.
(a) Salaries and allowances	...	1,755
(b) Miscellaneous expenditure (telegrams, insurance, special missions, &c.)	...	350
Total	...	2,105



Item II—Beirut office of Trustee Board—						£ Sterling.
(a) Control	...	...	...	...	...	...
Treasury Department	...	...	...	...	...	...
(b) Office staff—						
Secretary-accountant	...	...	...	...	...	166
Shorthand-typist	...	...	...	...	...	96
Chauffeur-orderly	...	...	...	...	...	94
(c) Office expenses—						
Office	...	...	...	...	...	130
Travelling	...	...	...	...	...	34
Miscellaneous and unforeseen	...	...	...	...	...	28
Total	...	...	...	...	...	548
Item III—Expenditure of Council Committee and of League Secretariat						236
Total of Chapter A—						
Item I	...	...	...	...	...	2,105
Item II	...	...	...	...	...	548
Item III	...	...	...	...	...	236
Total	...	...	...	...	...	2,889

## Chapter B.—Khabur Settlement.

## Part I.—Current Expenditure.

Item I—Administration—						£ Sterling.
(a) Control	...	...	...	...	...	...
(b) Office staff	...	...	...	...	...	228
(c) Supervision	...	...	...	...	...	540
(d) Office expenses, travelling, &c.	...	...	...	...	...	74
Item II—Land	...	...	...	...	...	...
Item III—Transport	...	...	...	...	...	...
Item IV—Supplies	...	...	...	...	...	...
Item V—Health service—						
(a) Staff	...	...	...	...	...	344
(b) Supplies	...	...	...	...	...	284
Item VI—Upkeep of material—						
(a) Staff and labour	...	...	...	...	...	320
(b) Travelling	...	...	...	...	...	...
(c) Supplies, spare parts, motor fuel	...	...	...	...	...	1,239
(d) Seed and horticultural supplies	...	...	...	...	...	230
Item VII—Education	...	...	...	...	...	94

## Part II.—Capital Expenditure.

Item VIII—Buildings (upkeep of existing)	...	...	...	...	...	75
Item IX—Plant, live-stock, &c.—						
(a) Agricultural implements (upkeep and replacements)	...	...	...	...	...	50
(b) Motor lorries	...	...	...	...	...	...
(c) Live-stock	...	...	...	...	...	...
(d) Hydraulic installations ( <i>sic</i> )	...	...	...	...	...	420

## Part III.—Unforeseen Expenditure.

Miscellaneous and unforeseen	...	...	...	...	...	379
Total	...	...	...	...	...	4,277
Total expenditure for 1939—						
Chapter A	...	...	...	...	...	2,889
Chapter B	...	...	...	...	...	4,277
Grand total	...	...	...	...	...	7,166

## Annex II.

## Draft Letter to be addressed to the Governments.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians decided in principle that the Trustee Board should be wound up as soon after the completion of the reorganisation as possible, but did not see its way to fix a definite date at this stage.

The committee therefore drew up, for submission to the contributors, the attached draft budget for the expenses of administration for the calendar year 1939, without prejudice to the possibility of considerable reductions towards the end of the year, or even liquidation of the board before the end of the year should that be found possible; you will observe that the total amount provided is £ , a considerable reduction on the £14,000 provided for in 1937 and referred to in paragraph 87 of the Ward-Panafieu report.

On the other hand, the committee felt bound to take into consideration the possibility that it might be found essential to continue some kind of supervision for a further period. But since there seems to be good reason to expect that any necessary expenditure on the administration after the end of 1939 could be met out of savings on the reorganisation budget, all that is required at the present stage is the agreement in principle of the contributors to the reappropriation of funds from the reorganisation budget to the administration budget if need should arise.

[E 5805/1982/93]

No. 44.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).

(No. 546.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 5, 1938.

THE Iraqi Foreign Minister called on me on the 4th October at the outset of his official visit to this country.

2. I expressed to him, after he had made a cordial reference to the policy of His Majesty's Government during the recent international crisis, my warm appreciation of the helpful and friendly attitude of the Iraqi Government throughout the emergency. It had been of great assistance to His Majesty's Government to realise that they were able to count on the full co-operation of the Iraqi Government and people. I thought that, if the position were ever to be reversed, the Iraqi Government would find that we should adopt a no less helpful attitude.

3. Taufiq Suwaidi then explained at some length the great advantages to the United Kingdom of a strong Iraq. This enabled me to mention to his Excellency that proposals were being made to the Iraqi Government for a combined defence plan for Iraq to be drawn up by the British and Iraqi military authorities in consultation. It was evident from his reply, in the course of which he referred to the recently agreed programme for supplying arms and munitions from the United Kingdom to the Iraqi forces, that he was satisfied with the progress recently made in connexion with these arrangements for the defence of Iraq.

4. I proceeded to refer to the five-year development plan recently introduced by the Iraqi Government, and I suggested that it might be possible for the Iraqi Government to come to some arrangement with the Export Credits Guarantee Department which might, I hoped, enable some of the contracts for capital goods of a non-military nature to be placed in this country. Taufiq Suwaidi explained that the development plan envisaged an expenditure of roughly £8 million, of which £3 million were for army requirements and the remainder for such works as the Habbaniyah Barrage. It would, he suggested, be most helpful if military credits could be granted, but I explained to him that this would involve special difficulties, and suggested that, if the Iraqi Government could obtain assistance in connexion with non-military credits, this would no doubt render it correspondingly easier for them to finance their military requirements.



5. I added that the memorandum handed by his Excellency to Mr. Butler at Geneva had been read with interest. Some of the points which he wished to discuss during his visit to London would be discussed in greater detail with the competent department of the Foreign Office, and I hoped it might be possible for him to discuss the question of Palestine with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In the meantime, there was one point to which I thought it necessary to draw attention: I had observed that, in his notes regarding Koweit, he had raised several points which would be discussed with him in detail, and I had every hope that it might be possible to reach a satisfactory understanding. But His Majesty's Government would find it very difficult to admit any Iraqi claim based on legal or historical grounds, if the Iraqi Government were ever to put forward such a claim, to sovereignty over Koweit. His Excellency replied that he did not wish to insist on this point, and thought that the legal aspect of the case might be entirely set aside in the discussions on the practical points, *i.e.*, the problems of smuggling and the establishment of a new Iraqi port, which he wished to raise.

6. As regards the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, the only point which I wished to make was that His Majesty's Government had never brought pressure to bear on the French Government in this matter, nor had they even discussed it with the French Government, since it was, in fact, a matter with which His Majesty's Government did not regard themselves as directly concerned. His Excellency then explained in some detail his anxiety at the dangerous policy which he felt that the French Government were pursuing in this matter. He hoped that the French Government could be persuaded to proceed at an early date with the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, and that they would not insist on setting up a special régime in the Upper Jezireh which would have no permanence and would be a danger to Iraq.

7. As regards Alexandretta, his Excellency hoped that His Majesty's Government would be able to support, at some suitable moment in the future, a proposal for a new settlement on the basis of the partition of the sanjak between Turkey and Syria.

8. I concluded by expressing the hope that I should have a further conversation with his Excellency before his departure.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 5841/1982/93]

No. 45.

*Record of Conversation with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs held at the Foreign Office at 6 P.M. on October 4, 1938.*

Present:

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Major Edmonds (British adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior).

Mr. Baxter, Foreign Office.

Mr. Crosthwaite, Foreign Office.

Mr. Baxter enquired whether the Iraqi Foreign Minister wished to begin by discussing in detail the matters which formed the subject of the *aide-mémoire* handed by his Excellency to Mr. Butler at Geneva, or whether there were any other matters arising out of that morning's conversation with the Secretary of State which his Excellency wished to discuss.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that he would like to discuss in detail the subjects dealt with in his *aide-mémoire*.

*Aerodrome Guards.*

As regards the question of aerodrome guards, *Taufiq Suwaidi* referred to the delay which had taken place in giving effect to article 4 of the annexure to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. It was true that various proposals had been made since the entry into force of that treaty in 1932, but some of these proposals were not in accordance with the provisions or the intention of the treaty. Discussions had taken place at Bagdad in 1935, and a certain measure of agreement

had been reached, but there were still two outstanding points on which the views of His Majesty's Government had never been received. It was with a view to providing a solution of the whole problem that he had now suggested that the aerodrome guards should be detached either from the regular Iraqi army (in which case the commanding officer would be a British officer attached to the British military mission) or from the Iraqi police. In either case, the Iraqi military or police forces would be placed under the control of the British Air Officer Commanding, and in addition, if the forces were to be provided by the Iraqi army, there would be a British commanding officer. He thought that a solution on these lines would be entirely in accordance with the treaty.

Mr. Baxter drew attention to the provisions of the treaty article, stating that the special guards should be provided "upon such conditions as may be agreed upon between the high contracting parties," and that the Iraqi Government would "secure the enactment of such legislation as might be necessary for the fulfilment of the conditions referred to above." Various efforts had been made to reach agreement as to the nature of this legislation to be introduced by the Iraqi Government. The last proposals, it would be recalled, had been handed to the Iraqi Government by Sir M. Peterson in May last. It did not appear that the Iraqi Government had yet replied to that communication, and it was therefore only now that His Majesty's Government learnt that these proposals were unacceptable to the Iraqi Government.

As regards the proposals now put forward by *Taufiq Suwaidi*, it was regretted that neither was entirely welcome to the British authorities concerned. The main difficulty was, to speak perfectly frankly, the problem of the control of these aerodrome guards. His Excellency had stated that they would be under the control of the Air Officer Commanding, but in certain respects these guards, being part of the Iraqi military or police forces, would also be under the direct control of the Iraqi Government. It seemed to the British authorities concerned that this divided control might lead to difficulties and disputes between the British and Iraqi authorities, which it would be in the best interests of both the British and Iraqi Governments if possible to avoid.

His Majesty's Government, however, realised the difficulties in the way of reaching an agreed settlement on the lines hitherto followed, and had therefore been giving active consideration to an entirely different solution of the problem, which, if it proved practicable, would no doubt be welcome to the Iraqi Government; that was that His Majesty's Government should waive their right to ask the Iraqi Government to provide special guards, and that the Royal Air Force should themselves provide for their own ground defence without maintaining the present levies or any other force composed of Iraqi subjects. Before definite proposals to this effect could be made, however, various practical difficulties would have to be examined. During a recent tour of the Middle East undertaken by the Under-Secretary of State for Air, a senior officer of the Air Ministry accompanied him to discuss this problem with the authorities in Iraq, but unfortunately, owing to the international crisis, they had to be recalled when they had got as far as Palestine. But the British authorities would continue to consider the question as rapidly as possible.

*Taufiq Suwaidi* said that this was an entirely new suggestion, and he could not say how the Iraqi Government would regard it. He would at once telegraph to Bagdad and might possibly receive some indication of the Iraqi Government's views in the course of a day or two.

*Registration of Land Occupied by the Port of Basra.*

The Foreign Office representatives regretted that they were not yet in a position to discuss this problem, and that if it proved impossible to give his Excellency a reply before he left London a reply would, in any case, be sent to him at Bagdad at an early date.

*Taufiq Suwaidi* said he was sure that, if the Iraqi Government repaid the outstanding instalment of the port loan, there could be no objection to registering the land in the name of the Iraqi Government. He hoped that it might even be possible for His Majesty's Government to agree to his proposal without insisting upon the immediate repayment of the loan. Such a gesture on their part would be much appreciated in Iraq.



## Koweit.

(The Secretary of State, in the course of his meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister in the morning of the 4th October, had told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government would find it difficult to admit any Iraqi claim, if the Iraqi Government were ever to put forward such a claim, to sovereignty over Koweit; and the Iraqi Foreign Minister had agreed not to insist on discussing this point, to which a reference had been made in the aide-mémoire which he had communicated as a basis for discussion.)

Mr. Baxter referred to the reference in Taufiq Suwaidi's aide-mémoire to Koweit as a centre for extensive arms traffic and smuggling. He would like to consider, in the first place, the statement that there was an important illegal traffic in arms into Iraq. Hitherto, he believed, His Majesty's Government had not received any evidence to show that any such smuggling of arms was, in fact, taking place. In fact, the British authorities in the Persian Gulf seemed to be fairly sure that no arms were now entering Koweit, at all events by sea. He asked whether the Iraqi Government were able to produce any evidence to show that smuggling of arms did, in fact, take place through Koweit.

Taufiq Suwaidi replied that the Iraqi Government were convinced that arms smuggling from Koweit into Iraq had, in fact, assumed serious proportions, and he thought that the Iraqi Government could produce evidence of this. He was, in any case, quite certain that arms were on sale in Koweit in large quantities and at very cheap prices, and that there was nothing to prevent anyone who liked from buying arms freely in the open market and trying to smuggle them across the Iraqi frontier.

Major Edmonds added that, to his personal knowledge, as a result of his conversations with Iraqi tribesmen, it was quite a frequent occurrence for an Arab to buy a rifle in Koweit for £5 or £6 and to travel with it to Iraq, where he would sell it for about twice that amount. The fact was that Koweit had become a recognised market where Arabs, whether would-be smugglers or not, went to purchase arms. He was quite prepared to believe that the British authorities in the Persian Gulf were right when they said that no arms entered Koweit by sea, but it was absolutely certain that somehow or other these arms were available for sale in Koweit.

Mr. Baxter said that His Majesty's Government would certainly be prepared to give the whole question their earnest attention if the Iraqi Government would, in fact, be good enough to produce all the evidence in their possession.

At a later stage in the discussion, Major Edmonds suggested that His Majesty's Government might be prepared to consider a solution whereby substantial restrictions would be placed on the sale of arms in the Koweit market. He thought that in Muscat, before the war, His Majesty's Government had insisted that all the arms available for sale in that territory should be collected and stored in one special warehouse under Government supervision, and that the sale of these arms should be subjected to some form of Government control. He suggested that some such system in Koweit might be the most effective method of dealing with the situation which had arisen.

Mr. Baxter said that this suggestion would receive further consideration.

As regards other forms of smuggling, Mr. Baxter wished to point out in the first place that it was really entirely for the Government of a country to see that smuggling into its territory did not take place. The Iraqi Foreign Minister had put forward three suggestions. The first was for a customs union between Iraq and Koweit. This did not seem to His Majesty's Government to be an acceptable solution, since such an arrangement between a large State like Iraq and a small State like Koweit might be expected to undermine the independence of the smaller State.

Taufiq Suwaidi said that he did not think that there was much foundation for this fear. He said that for many years now the Iraqi authorities had run the Koweit postal administration. This had not, he thought, made any difference to the political position of the sheikhdom, and he did not see why it should make any difference if the Iraqi authorities also took over the Koweit customs

administration. Koweit would, of course, be offered a fixed annual sum in lieu of its present customs revenue. He thought that the Koweitis themselves would be very ready to accept such a suggestion.

Mr. Baxter said that the Iraqi Foreign Minister's second suggestion, that the northern frontier line of Koweit should be fixed further south so as to give the Iraqi preventive services more space in which to operate, seemed also to be unacceptable. This suggestion would apparently involve the cession to Iraq of about one-third of Koweit, and it was difficult to see what compensation could be given to the sheikh elsewhere.

Taufiq Suwaidi said that, if the suggestion of a customs union between Iraq and Koweit were found to be possible, it would not be necessary further to consider this alternative.

Mr. Baxter proceeded that, as regards the Iraqi Foreign Minister's third solution, he understood that the proposal of combined preventive operations had already been put forward some months ago. The Sheikh of Koweit had stated on that occasion that he was willing to negotiate with the Iraqi Government when he had reached an agreement with the Saudi Government regarding the raising of their blockade. These negotiations had been proceeding fairly satisfactorily of late.

Taufiq Suwaidi interjected that he did not see what these negotiations between Koweit and Saudi Arabia had to do with Iraq. In reply to the question whether the Iraqi Government had any special measures in mind in connexion with the proposed anti-smuggling agreement with Koweit, Taufiq Suwaidi seemed to think that it might be possible to induce the sheikh, who had no armoured cars, &c., to contribute to the proposed joint preventive operations, to share the cost of these operations. It was pointed out to him that the sheikh would not be likely to agree to any such proposal.

Mr. Baxter informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government had, in fact, received an expert report, from which it appeared that the Iraqi authorities might be able to give smuggling from Koweit a decisive blow if they were to take certain additional measures, e.g., control by aeroplanes and armoured cars, together with drastic measures against those organisations or individuals in Iraq who must be assisting in smuggling on such a large scale as had been suggested by his Excellency.

Taufiq Suwaidi thought that the Iraqi Government had already taken all such measures as were in their power. There were numbers of armoured cars, troops and police engaged in anti-smuggling measures, and all this was involving the Iraqi Government in serious expenditure. The position apparently was that the Sheikh of Koweit would take no action whatever, because, of course, he had nothing to gain from doing so; on the contrary, he was, if anything, making a large profit, for a large part of the customs levied on goods entering Koweit (which might subsequently be smuggled into Iraq) went into his own pocket. From the Iraqi point of view it was an unbearable situation.

Major Edmonds suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the Koweit customs tariff were increased to the level of the Iraqi tariff. The main cause of the smuggling was that the Koweit tariff was so low. He thought that possibly the Sheikh of Koweit was precluded from raising it by his treaties with His Majesty's Government. If it was impossible to agree to a customs union between the Sheikh of Koweit and the Iraqi Government, could it not at least be arranged that the two Administrations, even though remaining entirely independent, should impose the same tariff, i.e., the Iraqi tariff?

Taufiq Suwaidi added that in that case the Iraqi Government would no doubt wish to assure themselves that the higher tariff was being applied in Koweit in fact as well as in theory, and also that smuggling into Koweit was not taking place on a large scale. He thought that this difficulty might be overcome if an Iraqi customs official, perhaps one of the British officials attached to the Iraqi customs administration, could be attached to the Koweit customs administration.

Mr. Baxter undertook that this suggestion would be examined further.



*Iraqi Government's Wish for a new Port on the Persian Gulf.*

Mr. Baxter drew attention to the fear expressed by the Iraqi Foreign Minister lest there should be serious interference by Persia with navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. He enquired the nature of the Iraqi Government's fears on this point. Surely they did not expect some hostile act on the part of Persia, at all events in peace-time?

Taufiq Suwaidi replied with references to the violent tendencies of Persian policy as directed by the present Shah. He referred to the difficulties that had already arisen with Persia regarding the Shatt-el-Arab, and to the use of that waterway by Persian warships.

Mr. Baxter suggested that in time of peace it was improbable that Persian warships would commit hostile acts against Iraqi shipping using the waterway between Basra and the sea. Such an act of aggression seemed very unlikely, at least so long as the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance was maintained. In time of war, also, the Persian Government seemed to be unlikely to adopt a violently hostile attitude towards the British and Iraqi Governments, since they would be anxious to maintain the revenues resulting from their sales to us of Persian oil.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the desire of the Iraqi Government to secure an additional commercial outlet on the sea. They had no desire at all to stand in the way of such a project, and they had carefully gone into the Iraqi Government's wishes. The information at the disposal of the British authorities concerned showed that Koweit itself was not suitable for development as a modern port, and such development would be very expensive; it would involve dredging on a large scale, and the construction of a long breakwater, in addition to the provision of ordinary harbour works. Any other place in Koweit Bay would be even less suitable, since at present ships could not anchor nearer than 3 miles from the shore, and when the south-east wind blew lighterage would be impossible. On the other hand, Khor Abdullah appeared from the charts (which would, however, require confirmation, since they were based on a survey made so long ago as 1911), to be very well suited to development as a modern port. There seemed to be a deep water approach of at least 21 feet the whole way, and a deep water anchorage next the shore. Khor Abdullah thus seemed to be much the best site from the point of view of the Iraqi Government. Its development would almost certainly be less expensive, and it would be nearer the Iraqi railway system. The Iraqi Government would, therefore, do well, in the first place, to examine the possibility of meeting their requirements by the construction of a port at Khor Abdullah.

Taufiq Suwaidi replied that the Iraqi Government would certainly examine the possibilities of Khor Abdullah, but if they decided to develop a port on that inlet they might require certain concessions from the Sheikh of Koweit, and they would like to be assured in advance, before embarking upon any expenditure, &c., that the Sheikh of Koweit would be prepared to agree to an alteration in the existing frontier, in so far as this might be necessary.

Mr. Baxter suggested that first it would be necessary for the Iraqi Government to decide exactly what they would have to ask from the Sheikh of Koweit. If they wished the sheikh to cede to them a part of his territory, e.g., the small island of Warbah and the navigable channel between that island and the open sea, they would have to make an offer to compensate him elsewhere. For this purpose it would be desirable that the Iraqi Government's offer should be made as attractive as possible to the sheikh; it would be well that the compensation offered should quite evidently exceed in value the territory which they were asking the sheikh to cede.

Taufiq Suwaidi asked if he might get into direct touch with the Sheikh of Koweit on this question.

Mr. Baxter replied that His Majesty's Government would prefer that any official approach should be made through them.

Taufiq Suwaidi urged, nevertheless, that he might be allowed in the first place to approach the Sheikh of Koweit, whom he knew personally, and discuss the matter privately with him. He was sure that this would be the best procedure for reaching agreement. He, as a fellow Arab, would know how best to put the

matter to the sheikh, and induce him to accept some reasonable arrangement. But he would like to be able to tell the sheikh that this private approach was being made with the knowledge and approval of His Majesty's Government. The official proposals would be made later, and through us if we wished.

Mr. Baxter replied that he must maintain the view that any official approach should be made through His Majesty's Government, and added that further consideration would be given to the proposal that a preliminary private discussion should take place between Taufiq Suwaidi and the sheikh, with the knowledge and approval of His Majesty's Government.

*Foreign Office, October 5, 1938.*

[E 5944/1982/93]

No. 46.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 568.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 11, 1938.*

THE Iraqi Foreign Minister called on me again on the 10th October at the end of his official visit to this country.

2. His Excellency first mentioned the problem of smuggling from Koweit into Iraq. He had, since his previous conversation with me on the 4th October, discussed this difficulty with the competent Department in the Foreign Office, and he wished to press for the adoption of a solution, one of several that had been discussed, whereby the tariff in Koweit should be increased to the level of the Iraqi tariff. He reminded me that I had at our previous interview expressed the hope that, if legal issues concerning the status of Koweit could be set aside, it might be found possible to reach some agreement on other points affecting relations between Iraq and Koweit, including this question of smuggling. I assured his Excellency in reply that his suggestion would be carefully examined.

3. Taufiq Suwaidi then referred to British policy in Palestine, and said that he had been a little disappointed with the result of his recent conversation with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He appreciated that the Woodhead Commission had not yet completed their report, and that it was therefore impossible for His Majesty's Government now to reach a final decision as regards their future policy. At the same time, he thought that His Majesty's Government ought now to decide on the policy which they would adopt if the commission were to report that partition was impracticable. He had put forward his own suggestions to Mr. MacDonald, but had received no indication that they were likely to be acceptable. Alternatively, the Woodhead Commission might report in favour of partition, and he wished to enquire whether, if His Majesty's Government decided to proceed on that basis, it would be possible for Arab Palestine to join with some neighbouring Arab State. He thought it was clear that a small Arab State in Palestine would not be able to stand alone.

4. I replied that I had read with interest the record which the Secretary of State for the Colonies had made of his conversation with his Excellency regarding Palestine. It was true that His Majesty's Government were not able to take a new decision regarding their Palestine policy at this moment, before they had received or considered Sir John Woodhead's report. The whole situation, however, would manifestly have to be considered in the near future, and I thought, if I might say so, that his Excellency's recent conversation at the Colonial Office had been most helpful. The suggestions which he had put forward would certainly receive full consideration in due course, and I personally had every hope that a solution of this difficult problem might be found, which would be reasonable and fair to all concerned. As regards his Excellency's further question, respecting the position of Arab Palestine after partition, I thought it would be premature to consider this aspect of the problem at the present stage.

5. I proceeded to refer to the remarks which his Excellency had made at our previous conversation regarding Alexandretta. I explained that His Majesty's Government would not feel able to take the initiative in endeavouring to secure a final settlement of the Alexandretta problem on the basis of partition between Turkey and Syria; but I added that, if it were at any time found that partition was acceptable to Turkey and France, as the parties chiefly concerned,

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His Majesty's Government for their part would not see any objection to such a proposal.

6. I added that there was another point which his Excellency had raised at our previous conversation; he had asked that His Majesty's Government would use their influence with the French Government in favour of the early ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, and against any suggestion for the establishment of special régimes in Syria. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to bring to the notice of the French Government the anxiety which his Excellency had expressed, more especially as regards the position in the Jezireh, and to ask for any information which the French Government could give them as to the progress of negotiations. Taufiq Suwaidi observed that he had hoped that His Majesty's Government would have felt able, not merely to pass on the Iraqi Government's views and misgivings, but also actively to endorse them. I replied that an enquiry on the lines suggested would no doubt suffice to induce the French Government to examine carefully the Iraqi Government's point of view, and that I thought that he would regard this as satisfactory.

7. I then raised the question of the Iraqi Government's participation in the Empire Air Mail Scheme. I said that I did not intend to go into details, but only to say that this question had now been under consideration for a very long time, that the original British proposals had been modified on several occasions to meet what were believed to be the Iraqi Government's wishes, and that I understood that the latest British offer represented the limit to which the British authorities were prepared to go. We therefore hoped to hear soon that the present proposals, which were thought likely to benefit the interests both of Iraq and of this country, were acceptable to the Iraqi Government. Taufiq Suwaidi replied that he would certainly look into the matter on his return to Bagdad.

8. Finally, Taufiq Suwaidi expressed his thanks for everything that had been done for him during his week's visit, which he had greatly appreciated.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 5988/1982/93]

No. 47.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 14.)*

(No. 475. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 143 of the 27th September, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of secret letter No. 516, dated the 28th September, 1938, to the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, respecting the implementation of article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 in the event of war.

*Bagdad, September 28, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 47.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(No. 516. Secret.)

My dear Minister,

*Bagdad, September 28, 1938.*

I HAVE been directed by my Government to bring to your Excellency's knowledge that instructions have been sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government that the first stage of the Defence Plan for Egypt is to be put into force for an eventual war with Germany, and to warn them that in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom there is an "apprehended international emergency" within the meaning of article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936.

This article of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty contains, as your Excellency is aware, provisions similar to those of article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of

Iraq, signed on the 30th June, 1930. Under article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, should either of the high contracting parties become engaged in war, the other high contracting party will, subject to the provisions of article 9 of the treaty, immediately come to its aid in the capacity of an ally; and it is laid down that the aid of His Majesty the King of Iraq in the event of war or imminent menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on Iraq territory all facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

I have now received instructions, with reference to the second sentence of article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, to confirm what I told your Excellency yesterday, namely, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are likely at any time to need the facilities specified in the last sentence of article 4 of the treaty for the movement of reinforcements.

At the same time I am to express the keen appreciation by my Government of the statement which you made to me to the effect that His Majesty's Government could rely on the full co-operation of the Iraqi Government in the event of war, and that to this end they would take certain preliminary precautions.

I am, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 6060/1982/93]

No. 48.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 479.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, and, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 143 dated the 29th September, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a note dated the 28th September, 1938, from the Iraqi Government, Bagdad, respecting articles 1 and 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

*Bagdad, September 29, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 48.

*Note from Iraqi Government.*

WITH reference to the chargé d'affaires' letter dated the 15th September, 1938, in which it was stated that, in accordance with the second paragraph of article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930, His Majesty's Government considered it proper and expedient that the Iraqi Government should be in possession of all possible information regarding the present situation in Central Europe, and of the activities and policy of His Majesty's Government in the face of a situation which might conceivably lead to the application of article 4 of the treaty, the Iraqi Government are keenly sensible of the high motives which have actuated His Majesty's Government in this matter and warmly appreciate the manner in which His Majesty's Government consulted with them in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The Iraqi Government further desire to thank His Majesty's Embassy for the information which it has from time to time communicated to them concerning the present international crisis.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs are happy to inform the embassy that the Iraqi Government greatly appreciate the valuable endeavours which have been so unstintingly exerted by His Majesty's Government to prevent war and to strengthen the foundations upon which the peace of the world has been built up.

The Iraqi Government accordingly whole-heartedly support the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter, and the Ministry desire to add that, in the event of the British efforts for peace proving unavailing, the Iraqi Government will be ready to do all that is required by the existing undertakings between them and His Majesty's Government.

*Bagdad, September 28, 1938.*



[E 6068/6068/93]

No. 49.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 486.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, October 4, 1938.*

IT may be of interest to your Lordship to be informed briefly of public reactions in this country to the critical events which preceded the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on the 30th September.

2. Throughout the latter stages of the crisis public interest was keen, and groups of eager listeners gathered in the streets and coffee-shops to hear the Arabic news bulletins broadcast from the Bagdad station. Between Monday, the 26th September, and Wednesday, the 29th September, anxiety became acute. Many nervous householders began to hoard food, and the market prices for imported food-stuffs rose rapidly to as much as 30 per cent. above the normal. The press reflected the public mind by giving front-page positions to the day-to-day news from Europe, but were chary of offering criticism or attempting to appreciate the potentialities of the situation. Such comment as was offered was, however, unanimous in its appreciation of Mr. Chamberlain's efforts for peace. *Al Uqab* on the 29th September said: "The whole world appreciates the wise endeavours and foresight of the British Prime Minister . . . Mr. Chamberlain has carried out wonderful work. He will draw anew the map of Europe and will guarantee it, together with Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier."

3. Iraqis, with whom I and members of my staff have discussed recent events, have paid similar tributes to Mr. Chamberlain's untiring efforts for peace, but there are naturally many who, taking their note perhaps from British press comments, are openly wondering what may happen next. Not a few have said: "We shall now soon see what Great Britain will do about Germany's colonial claims."

4. Though the affairs of Europe were, I think, uppermost in the minds of most people for several days, events in Palestine were not excluded, and since the Munich Agreement they have reoccupied public attention. Articles are appearing in the newspapers contrasting the success which has attended Germany's firm stand for the rights of the Germans in Czechoslovakia with the failure of the efforts made by the Arab countries to help the Arabs of Palestine, and the moral is drawn that only those people who are strong enough to command respect can expect just treatment from others in this wicked world.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 6183/1982/93]

No. 50.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 488.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, October 5, 1938.*

THE recent crisis in Central Europe having provided the first occasion of its kind for consultation with the Iraqi Government in view of possible action under article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, it may be useful for me to give your Lordship a more connected account of this consultation and its results than that contained in the various telegrams which have passed between your Department and this embassy on the subject.

2. Before the crisis became acute, I had already received, semi-officially, the views of your Department with regard to certain matters affecting the question of mutual consultation under the treaty; and I had been asked for the views of myself and of the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, as to how far His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would require the assistance of Iraq in case they were involved in war, either with Germany alone or with Germany and Italy together. I accordingly consulted the air officer commanding and, as I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 134 of the 25th September, our conclusions were that the minimum of co-operation which the Iraqi Government should provide in accordance with the treaty to enable the

air officer commanding to carry out the movements for which he would probably become responsible in the contingencies envisaged were as follows. The Iraqi Government should—

- (a) Take forthwith certain preliminary precautions, such as reinforcement of existing police guards on bridges and the locating and keeping track of potential enemy nationals in Iraq, and
- (b) On the outbreak of war in Europe, remove the enemy diplomatic and consular officers from Iraq and intern or deport all enemy nationals; provide military guards for all essential communications; and strictly supervise the frontiers in order to prevent the entry into the country of enemy agents.

I informed your Lordship that, unless I was instructed to the contrary, I proposed to request the Iraqi Government to take the preliminary precautions forthwith; and you were good enough, in your telegram No. 140 of the 26th September, to signify your concurrence in this course. You pointed out, however, that any new system for controlling the movements of foreigners in Iraq would have, for the moment at least, to be nominally applicable to all foreign nationals, and that it would not do to discriminate against the nationals of certain countries in peace time on the grounds that they were potential enemies.

3. Your Lordship had already been good enough to send me, in your telegram of the 13th September (No. 404 to Cairo) and certain later telegrams, summaries of the development of events in Central Europe and the part played by His Majesty's Government therein, for the confidential information of the Iraqi Prime Minister. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was therefore not unprepared when, on the 27th September, I approached him in the agreed manner with regard to the preliminary precautions which it was desirable that the Iraqi Government should take. As reported in my telegram No. 137 of that date, Saiyid Abbas Mahdi undertook to take the precautions suggested, and promised orally the full co-operation of the Iraqi Government in the event of war. I expressed to him my appreciation; and I added an expression of the keen appreciation of his statement by His Majesty's Government also when, on the following day, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 143 of the 27th September, I apprised him formally that, with reference to the second sentence of article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, His Majesty's Government were likely at any time to need the facilities specified in the last sentence of that article for the movement of reinforcements.

4. On the same evening—the 28th September—the Prime Minister, as I reported in my telegram No. 143 of the 29th September, asked me to go to his house. On arrival there I found that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were also present. Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai said that, in the first place, he wished to tell me that the German Minister had that morning asked what would be the attitude of the Iraqi Government in the event of war. The Prime Minister had reminded him of the obligations of Iraq under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, which the Iraqi Government had naturally no intention of evading. Dr. Grobba had then suggested that, if the procedure under the Covenant of the League of Nations had not been complied with, it might not be necessary for the Iraqi Government to participate in any war if it came. Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai briefly dismissed this objection and told Dr. Grobba that, in the event of war, he could not have German nationals at liberty on Iraqi territory.

5. The Prime Minister continued that he wished to confirm to me in the most formal manner the assurance of Iraqi co-operation with His Majesty's Government; and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me a note (the text of which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 479 of the 28th September) to that effect. I expressed appreciation. Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai then expressed the earnest hope that, should the financial position of Iraq suffer from war through, for example, the closure of the Mediterranean to merchant vessels (which would mean that no oil would go from Kirkuk, with the consequent loss of oil royalties to the Iraqi Government), or if the economic position of the population should become such that Government assistance should be necessary, the Iraqi Government could look to their allies for aid.

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6. As stated in my telegram No. 143, I was much struck by the complete spontaneity with which the Iraqi Government had offered to meet their treaty obligations. In all my conversations with them on this subject it was mutually assumed, as a matter of course, that they would be on our side. They evinced no tendency whatever to bargain about anything, and in this respect the subject of Palestine was conspicuous by its absence. I therefore felt it well to suggest to your Lordship the desirability of a personal message of appreciation being sent to Saiyid Jamal-al-Madfai, either by yourself or by Mr. Chamberlain, together with an assurance that His Majesty's Government would give their most sympathetic consideration to any request for financial assistance which the Iraqi Government might feel obliged to make in the event of the difficulties to which they had referred materialising.

7. The passing of the crisis was greeted in this country with very great relief, and it was not long before the Iraqi Government, as I reported in my telegram No. 147 of the 2nd October, asked me how long the preliminary precautions which they had taken were likely to be necessary since they entailed expense. I replied that I thought they would be necessary for at least ten days longer; in view, however, of the fact that the air officer commanding, on the 4th October, had informed me that he had that day received orders authorising him to revert to normal conditions, I thought it well, as reported in my telegram No. 150 of the 4th October, to pass this information on to the Iraqi Government, in order that they should not be put to trouble and expense for longer than was necessary in connexion with the special precautions which they had taken.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 6187/1982/93]

No. 51.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 495. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 153 dated the 10th October, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of his note to the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 10th October, respecting the implementation of article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

*Bagdad, October 10, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 51.

*Sir M. Peterson to Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(No. 542. Very Secret.)

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, October 10, 1938.*

IN his letter of the 7th March last to Mr. Morgan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made certain enquiries with regard to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the matter of the assistance to be extended by them to the Iraqi Government in the event of war, and the concerting of the necessary measures of defence in the event of the imminent menace of war, in accordance with article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. I have the honour to inform you that this matter has formed the subject of the most careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, who have now instructed me to make to your Excellency the following communication:—

2. In the first place, I have to convey to your Excellency a formal assurance that His Majesty's Government will provide the Iraqi Government with the assistance promised to them under the Treaty of Alliance, in each and all of the circumstances contemplated by that treaty. Your Excellency will realise that

the exact form of such assistance will depend very largely upon the circumstances prevailing at the time, and; although part of it may take the form of employing British land and air forces for local defence purposes in Iraq, it would be quite wrong to judge the value of an alliance with Great Britain solely on the basis of the latter's contribution to that local defence. Friendship with Great Britain implies ultimate support from the whole resources of the Empire and the enjoyment of the privileges which the control of sea communications inevitably confers. So long as Great Britain remains the predominant Power in the Middle East the independence of Iraq is assured, and the direct assistance which His Majesty's Government would be able to render to Iraq would be limited only by the extent to which their resources might be engaged in providing for the security of Great Britain itself if it was simultaneously attacked by a major Power. If any foreign Power were to challenge the position of Great Britain in the Middle East, an indirect threat to the independence of Iraq would at once arise, and it would be in the interests of both countries to combine in resisting any such attempt.

3. The maintenance of the integrity of Iraq is at all times important to Great Britain because of the geographical position which Iraq occupies in the Middle East, including as it does the strategic air and land communications leading to India and the Far East, and the valuable oil-fields at Kirkuk. Any threat to Southern Iraq would, moreover, affect British interests in the oil-fields at Maidan-i-Naftun in Iran. British dispositions in a major war, therefore, while being made to the best advantage for the defeat of Great Britain's main enemies, must essentially take into account the security of Iraq.

4. In virtue of the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance, however, Iraq is unlikely to be attacked except when the British Empire is involved in a war of the first magnitude. In this event Great Britain's sea power and her strong financial and economic position would do much to ensure the integrity of Iraq, but the direct assistance which Great Britain could afford to Iraq, other than that of a financial nature, might be limited. His Majesty's Government would have to withdraw some of the Royal Air Force squadrons normally stationed in Iraq in peace-time, although these could return at short notice if the threat to Iraq were to assume major importance. For this reason His Majesty's Government would welcome the development of the Iraqi forces on lines which would enable them, acting in conjunction even with the reduced strength of the British air forces, to meet with confidence all the initial requirements of any attack upon Iraq by her neighbours.

5. An important factor affecting the power of the Iraqi army to resist will be the reserves of munitions which are available. In a general war, British reserves which exist at the outbreak must be utilised to the best advantage for the conduct of the war as a whole. It is more than likely that a war in which Great Britain finds itself allied with Iraq will involve other allies who require assistance, operations in several theatres, and first-class Powers as our enemies; and it is only as the situation develops that British reserves can be allocated. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, therefore, Iraq should hold reserves of stores of all kinds, about fourteen months' stocks being necessary to allow for the time-lag for supplies to arrive from the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Government suggest that these reserves should be held east of Suez and, if arrangements for their inspection and reconditioning in Iraq cannot be made, it might be possible to arrange for their storage in India.

6. The conclusions which His Majesty's Government have reached in regard to the co-operation of British and Iraqi armed forces in the circumstances envisaged by the Treaty of Alliance are as follows:—

- (1) The fact that Iraq is allied to Great Britain is in itself sufficient to render any external attack upon Iraq by its neighbours unlikely; but, even if such an attack should materialise, the scale of assistance which Iraq would require would not be large, and in a local war all the British air forces in Iraq should be available. Any additional requirements could easily be met from British reserves in India and the Middle East. These reinforcements could arrive quickly, but their effective use would depend on efficient communications in Iraq.
- (2) If hostilities, in which Iraq became involved, were part of a war of the first magnitude, the direct assistance which Great Britain could provide would be limited, but Iraq would have the benefit of Britain's sea power.

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- (3) Reserves of munitions, specially earmarked for Iraq, can only be built up if paid for by Iraq in peace-time, since British reserves must be used to the best advantage for the prosecution of the war as a whole. It is desirable that such reserves should be located east of Suez.
- (4) Owing to the fact that His Majesty's Government cannot decide until the situation arises the strength of reinforcements which could be despatched to the assistance of Iraq, any defence plan must be drawn up with a view to the employment of the forces that are available in Iraq on the outbreak of war.

7. In view of the foregoing, His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that it would be desirable for a regular Anglo-Iraqi defence plan to be drawn up. In this connexion I am to explain that all British overseas defence plans are drawn up on the basis, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, of the employment of the forces existing in the country at the outbreak of hostilities; the urgency and strength of reinforcements must inevitably depend upon how the operations develop, and their arrival is always liable to be dependent upon unforeseen circumstances. These considerations do not, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, make the existence of a combined Anglo-Iraqi defence plan any less necessary; and I am accordingly to suggest to the Iraqi Government that such a plan should now be drawn up, on lines similar to those which have already been approved for Egypt. In the event of this suggestion commending itself to the Iraqi Government, His Majesty's Government suggest that the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, and the Iraqi General Staff, assisted by the British military mission, should meet in conference and draw up a draft plan.

I avail, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 6189/1982/93]

No. 52.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 498.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, October 10, 1938.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 151 of the 4th October, I have the honour to report that I called on the Prime Minister this morning and communicated to him your message of appreciation and thanks for the helpful attitude of the Iraqi Government throughout the recent international crisis. I explained that this message had already been conveyed to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs in London.

2. His Excellency asked me to tell your Lordship how greatly he valued this message and to explain that his Government's policy had been based on two considerations. Firstly, their desire honourably to fulfil their treaty obligations and, secondly, their conviction that it was in the best interests of Iraq always to stand shoulder to shoulder with His Majesty's Government in times of stress and danger. He added that it was his belief that the peace of the world depended, in the main, on the strength and firmness of Great Britain. He therefore hoped that she would always be strong enough to take an effective lead in international affairs.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 6368/1982/93]

No. 53.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 519.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, October 13, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, on my return from leave, I had my first audience of King Ghazi to-day.

2. His Majesty, for the first time since my arrival in Iraq, received me in the presence of the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am inclined to resent this innovation (though I understand it is only a reversion to a previous

practice) and I propose, as soon as Taufiq Suwaidi returns, to inform His Excellency accordingly, making it plain that I cannot be expected, *e.g.*, to speak to His Majesty in the sense which Taufiq Suwaidi himself recently desired (please see my despatch No. 213 of the 11th May) in the presence of any of His Majesty's Ministers. Should this argument prove insufficient, I propose, unless your Lordship thinks it inexpedient, to reserve my right to ask for a *private* audience of His Majesty whenever I may deem it necessary.

3. At this morning's audience and after I had arranged for the King to receive the new Air Officer Commanding and for the Queen to receive my wife, I saw no reason to refrain from raising the chief topic which I wished to discuss—viz., the abuse of the King's private wireless transmitting station for the broadcasting of provocative news from Damascus. This abuse was recently brought to my notice by an anonymous letter and last night the oriental secretary and I ourselves listened in to a tendentious and objectionable broadcast which accused the Palestinian administration of arming the Jews against the Arabs and which cited with satisfaction the day's list of casualties inflicted on the Jews. I told the King what I had heard and expressed my surprise that news of this kind should be broadcast from His Majesty's private station. I hoped, I said, that His Majesty would immediately impose some kind of censorship on the messages which were broadcast. The King said that Damascus news was always more or less of a provocative type, to which I retorted that that made it all the more desirable that it should not be relayed from His Majesty's private station. I mentioned that there had been two cases of kidnapping of Jews in Bagdad recently (the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs intervened to assert that these had been due to personal feuds and not to political or racial motives) and pointed out that outrages of this kind might well derive encouragement from the news sent out from the King's station. The King agreed that it was most necessary that Iraq should be spared the development of racial feuds and undertook to look into the matter.

4. Doubtless spurred on by my attack and perhaps emboldened by the presence of the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty took me to task on what he termed the delay in supplying Iraq with shells and small-arms ammunition. Alarmed by what he termed the Turkish incursion in the north, the King said that he had recently asked his Chief of the General Staff to what extent Iraq was able to protect herself and was told that there was only a week's supply of ammunition in the country. I said that I thought complete agreement, save for some minor details of expenditure, had been reached between our two Governments on the question of the supply of munitions and that, if there was any delay in carrying out what we had agreed in regard to any particular item, I should be only too glad to do what I could to remove it. As regards the Turks, I reminded His Majesty that my Government had expressed their confidence that the Turks entertained no territorial ambitions south of the Sandjak; and I added that His Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey, whom I had recently seen while passing through Istanbul, had re-affirmed to me that this was indeed the case.

5. The King seemed to accept these assurances but murmured *sotto voce* to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs: "The German stuff that we asked for has actually been sent off."

6. His Majesty then raised the question of the presence of Italian air force officers (he stressed the fact that they were officers since Iraq herself employs certain Italian non-commissioned officers) with the Saudi-Arabian forces. He regarded this infiltration across the Red Sea as fraught with danger for Iraq and he invoked the assistance of Abbas Mahdi to maintain that they looked to Great Britain to stop it. I suggested that Iraq had her own treaty with Saudi-Arabia and could very well speak for herself; but I reminded His Majesty that there were indications that the time may be approaching when the Anglo-Italian Agreement of this spring, which the Iraqi Government had at first professed to regard with some apprehension, might be put into effect and that this would constitute an additional guarantee against the loan of an officer or two being converted into a political foothold. I had, I said, heard rumours that the Saudi-Arabian Government were asking Iraq to supply a military adviser of some kind. Had any such request been received? The King replied with some heat: "That was all lies."



7. I find that His Majesty has spent the entire summer in Bagdad, his projected trip to the north having been abandoned. While I have every reason to know that his Government are unanimous in deprecating any visits to foreign countries on His Majesty's part, I had heard that they were trying to persuade him to allow them to create a summer residence in the north of Iraq. I thought the opportunity a suitable one, seeing that His Majesty had confronted me with his Minister, to suggest to them both that it was high time that the Government provided their King with a residence outside the capital. I may mention that the Prime Minister told me recently that His Majesty had had serious heart trouble during the summer and had been warned by his doctors of the absolute necessity for a carefully regulated mode of life.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 6526/45/93]

No. 54.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 86. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Bagdad, November 1, 1938.*

FOLLOWING Cabinet changes made yesterday:—

Sabih Najib, Director-General for Foreign Affairs (Personalities, No. 73) to be Minister of Defence.

Mustafa-al-Umari from Interior to Justice.

Abbas Mahdi from Justice to Economics and Communications.

Prime Minister to take over Interior provisionally.

[E 6676/28/93]

No. 55.

*Correspondence between Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.—(Communicated to Foreign Office in Bagdad Despatch No. 543 of November 3, 1938; Received November 12.)*

(1)

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, October 30, 1938.*

THE proposals concerning the properties in Iraq claimed by the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah which were contained in Mr. C. H. Bateman's note of the 8th July, 1936, addressed to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Al Saiyid Nuri-al-Said, have now received the careful consideration of the Iraqi Government.

2. The Iraqi Government are disposed to accept these proposals, subject to the following:—

3. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 6 of Mr. Bateman's note, legislation must be passed before the undertaking can be given. The Iraqi Government are prepared to propose such legislation and, on its coming into force, to give the undertaking requested.

4. With regard to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 6, the British Government may rest assured that the Iraqi Government have no intention of imposing discriminatory taxation on the property of any person in Iraq. Furthermore, the British Government must be aware that such taxation would be in conflict with the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. The Iraqi Government do not, therefore, consider it proper or necessary for any further assurance to be given by them in this connexion.

5. With regard to paragraph 8, the Iraqi Government confirm that the nationality of the two sheikhs shall constitute no impediment or delay to the

completion of the registration of the properties which may be awarded to them in accordance with the provisions of the Land Settlement Law.

6. The Iraqi Government are prepared to give the assurance mentioned in paragraph 9 on the basis of the Land Settlement Law or the regulations issued thereunder.

7. With regard to paragraph 10, it is necessary to point out that article 25 (b) of the Land Settlement Law provides that all judgments of the special court are subject to appeal to the court of cassation on points of law. The Iraqi Government cannot therefore confine litigation against the Sheikh of Koweit to appeals, against the decisions of the Land Settlement Officer, to the special court set up by virtue of article 4 of the law.

8. With regard to paragraph 12, it follows from paragraph 7 above that the British Government should recognise the decision of the court of cassation as well as the decisions of the Land Settlement Officer and the special court, and that the British Government's undertaking not to object to any changes which may result to the present boundaries of the sheikh's lands in consequence of the land settlement procedure must extend to changes which may result from any decisions of the court of cassation.

9. The Iraqi Government consider it necessary as part of the settlement of the present question to put an end finally to all disputes as to the competence of the Iraqi courts and the application of Iraqi law in all matters relating to immovable property in Iraq owned or possessed by either sheikh or in which either sheikh has or claims an interest, and for this purpose the Iraqi Government declare that for the future they will exercise the Iraqi jurisdiction over such property and all matters relating thereto without any distinction being made between it and other immovable property in Iraq or between the sheikhs and other persons interested in immovable property in Iraq.

10. On receiving the British Government's acceptance of the conditions above mentioned, the Iraqi Government are prepared to carry out with a minimum of delay the course of action proposed in Mr. Bateman's note and this note.

TAUFIQ-AL-SUWAIDI.

(2)

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, November 1, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 30th October, regarding the properties in Iraq owned by the heirs of the late Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and the late Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah.

2. I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have accepted the terms of your reply to the proposals communicated by Mr. Bateman in his note of the 8th July, 1936, to his Excellency Al Saiyid Nuri Said, and hope that the appropriate Iraqi authorities will now take early action to apply land settlement procedure to the area in which the properties in question are situated.

I avail, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 7060/45/93]

No. 56.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 563.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, November 16, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 546 of the 4th November, I have the honour to report the following recent political developments:—

2. Nuri Pasha, on his return to Iraq on the 22nd October, soon became the focus of the usual political rumours, and it must be assumed that he began once



more to take stock of his chances of returning to active public life. He met the counsellor at a small dinner-party a week after his return, and spoke to him about the situation in this country in the same gloomy terms as he used in conversation with Lord Cranborne last January (please see Mr. Eden's despatch No. 65 of the 2nd February). Nuri Pasha even went so far as to indicate that discontent with the present state of affairs had reached a point at which another violent upheaval was likely to take place, and that, if it did, his sympathies would be given to the movement, for which, however, he disclaimed responsibility. The counsellor reserved fuller comment, but pointed out at once the mistake of resorting to violence as a remedy for the ills of which Nuri had been speaking, and said that it was evident that what was needed was steady administrative improvement and not political revolution. Some days later, Mr. Houstoun-Boswall, on my instructions, told Nuri Pasha how disturbed I had been to hear that he thought another *coup d'Etat* was possible, and again laid emphasis on the folly of attempting by such means to improve the administration of the country. About the same time it was learnt from outside sources that Nuri had a few days earlier been received by King Ghazi, but had been kept standing and dismissed after only a few minutes' talk about the weather; the Pasha was much annoyed by this ungracious reception, and had been talking freely and disparagingly about His Majesty.

3. Although more is now seen of Nuri in Cairo and London than in Bagdad, I may here record my regretful conviction that this former comrade-in-arms of Lawrence, who, at his best, was in a different category from the ordinary run of Iraqi politicians, has greatly deteriorated, both in character and judgment, with the passage of years. I have heard this deterioration ascribed to various causes which I forbear to mention since there is no evidence available. But, whatever the cause, my feeling is that Nuri is now entirely dominated by a restless longing for a return to power and influence; and I believe that his reputation has declined considerably in this country, where it is asked: "Who is this man who will not live in Iraq unless he is a minister?"

4. Soon after the opening of Parliament three of the Deputies for Diwaniyah resigned their seats. All were important tribal sheikhs, and the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior informed me that their resignation was intended to be a gesture of dissatisfaction with the general corruption and incompetence of the provincial officials and with the conscription of tribesmen under the National Defence Law. Mr. Edmonds said that it seemed that the movement was to some extent infectious, and that a number of tribal Deputies were trying to form a combination strong enough to bring pressure to bear on the Government to redress their grievances. Politicians in Bagdad were not, he thought, behind the tribal sheikhs, but some of them were watching to see how they could exploit the movement to their advantage. From other sources, however, it is reported that Rashid Ali-al-Gilani has been corresponding with some of his old allies in Diwaniyah, and the possibility that he has encouraged the tribal Deputies cannot be excluded. Moreover, during his three weeks' visit Nuri Said may have given at least his blessing to the idea of a concerted action by the tribal Deputies to embarrass the Government in Parliament. But, I understand, the three Deputies have now been induced to withdraw their resignations.

5. The Arab extremists have also been complaining against the Government for their failure to support more actively and openly the cause of the Arabs in Palestine. Indeed, the demonstration of students which quickly degenerated into a riot, as reported in my telegram No. 171 of the 10th November, may have been directed as much against the present Cabinet as against Zionism. The Prime Minister, who, as Minister of the Interior, was responsible for dealing with the demonstration, showed lamentable weakness in consenting to the holding of the demonstration on the strength of guarantees which were obviously unlikely to be implemented. This lack of leadership quickly infected the police, who did nothing to prevent the mob from wantonly destroying some of the best shop-fronts in the main thoroughfare of Bagdad. The pointless stupidity of the rioting is shown by the fact that several motor cars belonging to Arab teachers in the secondary school were destroyed, and that Mahometan shopkeepers suffered extensively at the hands of the mob. I spoke strongly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about these riots, and I shall have the honour to address your Lordship again on the subject so soon as the estimate of damage done to British-owned shops has been completed.

6. The statement of policy made by His Majesty's Government concerning Palestine on the 9th November has for the moment quietened agitation concerning the future of that country and thereby strengthened the hand of the Government, which appears at present to be maintaining its position. The new oil concession for the south of Iraq recently concluded with the Iraq Petroleum Company was passed in the Chamber on the 12th November by 67 votes to 8, in spite of heavy attacks by Rustam Haidar and Taha-al-Hashimi. Nevertheless, the Cabinet, who have survived now for over a year, will have to show considerable skill and courage if they are to last through the present session.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 7630/7/93]

No. 57.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 598.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, December 8, 1938.*

DURING the course of a recent visit which I paid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency informed me that the new Minister for Defence, Saiyid Sabih Najib, was anxious to hasten the completion of the equipment of the three divisions and ancillary troops into which the Iraqi army was now being organised, and also to obtain speedily the material required for a mobile force similar to, but somewhat larger than, that planned in 1938 by the late Major-General H. Watson (details of that plan are contained in the enclosures to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 57 of the 14th February, 1938).

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he expected that an official communication on this subject would be sent to me very soon, and he hoped that I would do all I could to help the Minister of Defence to obtain what he wanted. Taufiq-al-Suwaidi went on to explain that the equipment required would, it was estimated, cost in all about £6 million. Iraq could not find enough money to order it at once on the existing terms of a 10 per cent. payment with order and further advances monthly according to the rate of production. On the other hand, if orders were delayed until enough money was available to meet the existing conditions, they would have to wait many years before their three divisions and mobile force were equipped. The problem was, therefore, one of finance as well as of manufacture and supply, and the Iraqi Government very much hoped that His Majesty's Government would be able, not only to supply them rapidly with the war material needed, but also to devise a helpful plan for spreading over a period of from ten to fifteen years the payments involved.

3. I have not yet received the promised official communication, but General Waterhouse (who has written fully to the War Office on this subject) has given me the following facts about the ideas of the new Minister of Defence.

4. As regards the material enumerated in the enclosure to my despatch No. 215 of the 13th May, he is anxious for deliveries of guns, howitzers and artillery ammunition to be fixed for much earlier dates than those originally proposed. He is also eager to obtain at once four of the new 25-pdr. guns, two fitted for mechanised draught and two for horse draught, so that he can form a mixed battery to test the capabilities of this gun under local conditions.

5. For the mobile force he will probably ask for eighteen or possibly twenty-one light tanks of the latest British type, complete with armament and wireless.

6. I am aware of the difficulties which these proposals will present, and I do not intend to comment upon them until they are communicated to me officially. But I think it desirable to give the longest possible notice of the Iraqi Government's intentions since it is undoubtedly of the first importance that, at least in some directions, their wishes should be met.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.



[E 7632/45/93]

No. 58.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 606.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, December 14, 1938.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that the Cabinet had yesterday considered reports prepared by the Director-General of Police concerning the political activities of a number of people in Bagdad, and had decided to issue orders under article 4 of the Law Prohibiting Malicious Propaganda, No. 20 of 1938, compelling six individuals to reside in provincial towns well removed from Bagdad. These orders had been carried out immediately. The Minister gave me the following names of the banished men:—

1. Colonel (retired) Ismail Haqqi Ibrahim.
2. Colonel (retired) Shakir-al-Wadi.
3. Captain Ali Ghalib.
4. Daud-al-Sa'di.
5. Ali Mahmud-al-Shaikh Ali.
6. Jamil Abdul Wahab.

No. 1 was one of Bakr Sidqi's favourites, and was appointed military attaché in London in October 1937. About the middle of 1938 he was recalled to Iraq and placed on pension.

No. 2 ("Personality," No. 80) was also one of Bakr Sidqi's right-hand men, and after a very brief tenure of the post of Iraqi Military Attaché in London in September 1937 he, too, was retired from the army.

No. 3 was one of the officers suspected of the murder of Jafar Pasha-al-Askari in October 1936.

No. 4 ("Personality," No. 25) is a well-known Bagdad lawyer, who for many years has been mixed up in every sort of political trouble. He is a Deputy in the present Parliament and has a special spite against the Government for having suspended him last December for the whole session as the result of an insulting attack which he made on the Ministers during a debate on the very law under which he is now banished from the capital.

No. 5 ("Personality," No. 13), like No. 4, is a lawyer who is seldom out of political trouble, though his general reputation is less disagreeable.

No. 6 is a minor lawyer who, at one time, was one of Nuri Said's political tools.

2. Taufiq Suwaidi said that the police reports had satisfied the Cabinet that these men were actively engaged in intrigues against the Government and that they were, moreover, implicated in the several bomb-throwing incidents which had recently occurred in Bagdad. One of these incidents happened on the 18th November when a bomb was thrown into a crowded coffee-shop (please see my Saving telegram No. 96). Another took place early in December about 10 o'clock at night in the street outside the Ministry of Defence. Other attempts to throw bombs are also reported to have been made but thwarted by the police and several men have been arrested for being in possession of material for making primitive bombs.

3. Taufiq Suwaidi did not give me details of the political intrigues in which the men now banished from Bagdad had been engaged, but from other sources I learn that they have been giving their help to any dissatisfied elements with which they could establish contact with a view to bringing about the fall of the Government. In particular, they have been collaborating with the moving spirits in the Palestine Defence League so that they may give to their intrigues the appearance of an agitation in support of the cause of the Palestinian Arabs. There are also indications, though nothing amounting to proof, that these people have been in close touch with the German Legation. The German Minister, Dr. Grobba, is well known to dislike the present Government for their declaration of solidarity with His Majesty's Government during the recent crisis in Europe and he is quite capable of fostering any activities likely to embarrass them.

4. The Minister appeared confident that the Government's action would be salutary in its effect, but he explained that if subversive activities continued the Cabinet intended to take further measures to maintain order. They had thought

it well to begin by dealing with the leading persons concerned; if that was not enough, they would take action against a number of smaller men whom they had under observation.

5. This morning the Bagdad lawyers endeavoured to organise a demonstration of law students to protest against the banishments ordered yesterday. Several of the ringleaders were arrested and the attempt failed. Rashid Ali-al-Gilani seems to have encouraged the movement and I am told that the mutessarif sent for him and warned him that he too would be ordered out of Bagdad unless he mended his ways.

6. The most satisfactory feature in the situation is that the Government now appear to be convinced that the extremist Palestine agitation in Iraq is directed at the Government themselves even more than at the Jews or at His Majesty's Government. The Minister assured me that adequate steps were now being taken to suppress the special evening news-sheets reporting Palestinian "atrocities" (please see my despatch No. 604 of the 13th December) and that the Government were also determined to close down King Ghazi's private transmitting station (please see my telegram No. 201 of the 7th December). This does not mean that Iraq's essential sympathy with the Arab cause in Palestine has been modified; but it does, I hope, mean that the Government will henceforward deal with breaches of public order, and incitements thereto, with a clearer realisation of the issues at stake and of the extent to which their own interests are involved.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.  
M. PETERSON.

[E 7755/45/93]

No. 59.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 26.)*

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, December 25, 1938.*

GOVERNMENT have resigned, following upon a demonstration by troops at Hinaidi yesterday which is said to have included the presentation of a petition from officers to the King complaining of Government treatment of army officers and politicians; presumably this refers to recent banishments.

Nuri Pasha, who only returned to Bagdad two days ago, has to-day formed a Cabinet with himself as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Taha Hashima is Minister of Defence.

My immediately following telegram gives the other names.

It is reported that the King sent for Hikmat before Nuri Pasha and that the former is now preparing to leave the country. Bagdad is quiet.

(Repeated to Government of India, Tehran, Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 7756/45/93]

No. 60.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 26.)*

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, December 26, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 215.

Education: Salih Jabrs; Finance: Rustam Haidar; Economics: Umar Nazmi; Interior: Naji Shaukat (has been invited but has not yet accepted); Justice: Mahmud Subhi Daftari.

Umar Nazmi is an experienced and efficient official whose last post was Director of Revenue.

(Repeated to Government of India, Tehran, Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.)



[E 7905/45/93]

No. 61.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 28.)*

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, December 27, 1938.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I paid my first call on Nuri Pasha this morning.

I told him that, glad as I was to see him in office, I could not but regret the method by which he had arrived there. It seemed a great pity that the army had again been brought into politics.

Nuri Pasha said that there were only two instruments by which the army could be controlled: Parliament and the King. The previous Government had neglected both of these instruments. Pressed to define his meaning, he could only, as regards Parliament, promise a general election (which his English advisers have told him to be unnecessary); but as regards the Palace, he intended to place Amir Zeid in close attendance on King Ghazi, with the position of [? actual] Comptroller of the Household and with a large measure of authority. The Amir would serve as a channel of communication between the King and the Government and the King and myself. Since Nuri Pasha explained that he regarded it as essential for the future of Iraq that His Majesty's representative should be able to bring influence to bear upon the King, I told him that I entirely shared this view, but I was already in close touch with His Majesty, and that if I was not conscious of having offered advice within the last few weeks it was because things had seemed to me to be going pretty well. The last Government had, indeed, in my view, been making satisfactory progress, which I was sorry to see interrupted.

The only accusations which Nuri Pasha could bring against the last Government were that they had not been sufficiently constructive, and that they had gone too far in banishing an ex-Prime Minister (Rashid Ali [group omitted]). He later made a vague reference to tribal discontent, which is understood to be one of his main planks, although both the disease and the remedy are extremely hard to define.

Maji Shaukat has accepted the Ministry of the Interior, which makes the Government already stronger in personnel than its predecessor.

I warned Nuri Pasha that it would be intolerable if his Minister of Defence were to continue as president of Palestine Defence Society, the issue of pamphlets defaming British forces in Palestine.

Nuri Pasha's proposed arrangement for Amir Zeid, while it may effect a very necessary purge of the Palace entourage (please see my despatch No. [? 288] of 28th June) suggests that he means to go even further at a later date. It will certainly drive the King to bitter intrigues.

(Copies by bag to Tehran and Government of India.)

## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 3902/10/31]

No. 62.

*Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 825.)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 2, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of the official and unofficial communications that I have addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to carrying out the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1399 of the 28th June last regarding the desire of His Majesty's Government that the Mufti of Jerusalem should leave Syria for France.

2. In handing these communications this afternoon to M. Bonnet, I laid great stress on the particular importance that His Majesty's Government attached to the early departure of the Mufti.

3. M. Bonnet enquired somewhat quizzically why we had allowed the Mufti to escape, so I assured his Excellency that his escape had been by no means welcome to the Palestine authorities, who had meant to effect his arrest on his leaving sanctuary. M. Bonnet's question would seem to show that the High Commissioner for Palestine was right in the surmise made in paragraph 10 of his despatch of the 12th May, of which you were so good as to forward a copy to me in your despatch under reply, to the effect that the French High Commission think that we deliberately allowed Haj Amin to escape to Syria in order not to incur the odium of the Mahometan world by deporting him.

4. Some months ago, when discussing at the Quai d'Orsay possible residences for the Mufti, I suggested that some sunny spot in Madagascar might be suitable, in case he should fear that even the south of France might be too cold in the winter. This suggestion I to-day repeated to M. Bonnet.

5. His Excellency promised to study my two communications with sympathy and the closest attention, and to reply thereto as soon as possible. I trust, therefore, that the action foreshadowed in your despatch No. 1400 of the 28th June regarding a possible closing of the frontier between Palestine and Syria may not be necessary.

I have, &amp;c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

*His Majesty's Embassy, Paris, to French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

HIS Majesty's Embassy presents his compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note (Levant) of the 5th November last concerning the sojourn in Syria of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. This communication expressed the view that the selection of Djounieh for the Mufti's residence would, for the reasons stated therein, particularly facilitate surveillance over him, and went on to explain, in some detail, the instructions which had been sent to the High Commissioner at Beirut. These instructions envisaged a strict control over the Mufti's actions, a formal undertaking from him to refrain from political activities (which in effect he was stated to have given in writing), and a clear warning that any failure in this respect would lead eventually to measures of constraint. To the warning implied in this last instruction His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at the time attached, and continue to attach, considerable importance. Finally, the communication states that the High Commissioner had received instructions that measures should be taken to prevent the regrouping around Haj Amin of dissident elements from Palestine and the re-entry into Syria of such of these as were not then in the French mandated territories. Confident in the assumption that these instructions would be faithfully observed, and that the mandatory authorities would see to it that the formal undertaking of Haj Amin was strictly carried out, His Majesty's Government tacitly accepted the situation. They are now compelled to observe

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with regret that the Mufti has failed to observe his undertakings to refrain from political activities, and thus has rendered himself liable to those further measures of constraint which the Government of the Republic envisaged in their note of the 5th November.

2. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs will recall that on several occasions their attention has been drawn to the freedom with which Haj Amin has been able to participate in plots against public security in Palestine. On each such occasion the Ministry, while explaining the difficulties of the situation—difficulties which His Majesty's Government are able to some extent to appreciate—have returned assurances that fresh instructions would be or had been sent to the French authorities in Syria to exercise a closer surveillance over the Mufti and his adherents; and at the same time they have indicated that what was required—so as to strengthen the hands of the French authorities—was tangible proof of the complicity of these persons in conspiracies in Palestine. As the Government of the Republic are aware, tangible proof, such as can be produced as evidence in a court of law, is in such cases hard to secure, and in the present case is, frankly, not available. It is impossible to produce documentary proof of instructions conveyed orally from a rebel leader to his trusted supporters. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge all over the Middle East that, so far from abstaining from politics, Haj Amin, with the help of his intimate adherents, has, since his arrival in Syria, organised and continues to organise, an unceasing campaign of terrorism and murder in Palestine in the hope of securing thereby his political ends.

3. It will be as well known to the French authorities as it is to the British authorities in Palestine that Haj Amin keeps in close and continuous touch with visitors from Palestine and with Palestinian *émigrés* in Syria and the Lebanon and with Syrians themselves. His proximity to the port of Beirut enables Palestinians from Egypt to visit him in safety by ship, without running the risk of travelling through Palestine. While the above contacts do not in themselves constitute crimes, they are nevertheless in the circumstances contacts which provide the ways and means for the conduct, from the shelter of a friendly territory, of as bitter a terroristic campaign against established authority as any Government can experience. From a mass of information (derived from diverse sources) in the possession of the authorities in Palestine and of His Majesty's Government, it is established that Haj Amin regularly and frequently sends messages and directions by personal messengers to his adherents in Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries, and that these messages are of an undeniably subversive character, directed to one end, namely, the continuance of active rebellion by a variety of means. It is equally clear that he receives from many quarters of the Arab world considerable sums of money which are devoted to the same object, and that it is he who directs the expenditure of these contributions. These facts cannot be unknown to the French authorities in Syria. That they are known to his Excellency Jamil Mardam, the Prime Minister for Syria, is borne out by the fact that on more than one occasion in conversation with His Majesty's consul at Damascus he has expressed surprise at the freedom with which the Iraqi Government have permitted the collection of funds in Iraq and their transmission to the Palestine Defence Committee of Damascus (whose activities are known to the Syrian Government, to the French authorities in Syria and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus), to be organised by the Mufti and to be devoted to the purchase of arms, the hiring of terrorists and the compensation of casualties among the Palestine rebels. There is therefore less reason for the French authorities to require the Palestine authorities to produce documentary evidence of these subversive activities and the more reason to recognise the overwhelming weight of the circumstantial evidence outlined above.

4. His Majesty's Embassy is instructed further to remind the Government of the Republic that Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon are all territories administered under "A" mandates of the League of Nations. Without desiring to over-emphasise this point, it is felt that it is totally incompatible with League principles that territory under one League mandate should be permitted to serve as a base for an effective campaign of organised terrorism against and resistance to the Government of a neighbouring territory also administered under mandate from the League.

5. His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to suggest that there is another and most important reason why the Government of the Republic should take drastic action in this matter. The Mufti's campaign of terrorism and murder in

Palestine, and the severity of the consequent measures which have unfortunately had to be introduced to suppress gang warfare, have had a serious effect on opinion in neighbouring Arab countries. It is as much in the interests of the Government of the Republic as of His Majesty's Government to check the activities of unscrupulous agitators who are attempting to excite Arab opinion in the Middle East against the Western European Powers. It is certainly also in the interests of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to see order restored in Palestine and the continuance of normal trading conditions with that country. Every effort is being made in Palestine to check the present disorders, and to calm Arab opinion, and the Government of the Republic will no doubt wish to co-operate in these efforts by taking effective steps to put an end to the Mufti's political activities in their mandated territories.

6. His Majesty's Embassy has the honour to request the Government of the Republic, in the light of the facts and observations set out above, to put a term to Haj Amin-el-Husseini's residence in the Lebanon. His Majesty's Embassy is to suggest, for the consideration of the Ministry, that the Mufti should be informed that his continued presence in the Lebanon or in Syria is likely to be the cause of international complications and that he should therefore make his arrangements to reside elsewhere. This communication might, it is suggested, be accompanied by a warning that, failing compliance with this requirement by a given date, he will be arrested and deported to his country of origin. At the same time a cordial invitation, if the Government of the Republic were willing, might be conveyed to him to reside in France or in some French territory outside the Middle East.

7. His Majesty's Embassy is also to request that, if the above course asked for be adopted, the earliest possible information may be given to the Government of Palestine of Haj Amin's movements if he should leave the Lebanon voluntarily and go to some other country.

8. His Majesty's Embassy finally has the honour to enclose, herein, a list<sup>(1)</sup> of Haj Amin's known chief supporters and to urge that instructions may be sent to the French authorities in Syria to withhold from these individuals the privilege of further residence in or entry into the French mandated territories.

July 2, 1938.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

Sir E. Phipps to M. Bonnet.

Mon cher Ministre et Ami,

Le 2 juillet 1938.

DANS la note officielle que je viens de vous remettre, vous trouverez exposées les raisons qui ont amené mon Gouvernement à formuler le désir que le Grand Mufti de Jérusalem, Haj Amin-al-Husseini, soit invité de quitter le plus tôt possible le territoire de la Syrie. Comme vous vous souviendrez, Lord Halifax a soulevé cette question avec votre Excellence lors de votre dernière visite à Londres.

Je me permets en même temps, et à titre purement personnel, d'attirer votre attention sur la très grave situation actuelle en Palestine. En dépit des efforts énergiques des forces militaires et policières déployés depuis plusieurs mois, l'activité terroriste continue à sévir en Palestine. La gravité de la situation ressort clairement du fait que, pendant la semaine du 9-16 mai, on ait constaté pas moins de 6 meurtres, 2 kidnappings, 3 combats avec gangs armés, 5 inflexions de blessures, 9 attentats par lancement de pétards, 52 attentats de la part de francs-tireurs, 21 cas de sabotage et 9 vols à main armée. Il ne peut exister de doute que l'un des éléments les plus importants du maintien et de l'encouragement de cette campagne terroriste soit la présence et l'action de Haj Amin et de ses affidés en Syrie. Tandis qu'il n'est sans doute pas aisé de présenter des preuves définitives de sa responsabilité personnelle, il existe d'abondantes raisons d'y croire. Selon l'opinion du Haut Commissaire britannique, que partage le Général commandant les troupes britanniques en Palestine, il n'y a pas de problème qui soit aussi angoissant pour ce pays que celui d'éloigner autant que possible Haj

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



Amin et son entourage. Je crois savoir que les autorités françaises se rendent bien compte de cet état de choses.

Je tiens à vous signaler, tout à fait confidentiellement, que la fuite de Haj Amin de Jérusalem en Syrie n'a point été pour plaire aux autorités de Palestine, qui s'étaient, en effet, proposé de l'arrêter au moment où il quitterait le sanctuaire du Haram-es-Sharif.

La situation actuelle où le Mufti se trouve à même de gérer une action guerrière contre la Palestine à l'abri sûr d'un territoire soumis au mandat français est, du point de vue de mon Gouvernement, tout à fait indéfendable. Il est de toute évidence de l'intérêt de la France de venir en aide au Gouvernement britannique dans cette affaire. Les autorités françaises sont certainement aux prises avec les difficultés qui leur sont propres dans le Levant, par exemple à Alexandrette, et seront sans doute d'autant plus prêtes à donner une suite favorable à notre requête de nous aider dans la lutte contre nos difficultés à nous en Palestine. Comme vous vous rendez compte, certainement, une détérioration nettement accentuée de la situation palestinienne ne pourrait aboutir qu'à la concentration dans le Levant d'un nombre considérable de troupes impériales, ce qui ne manquerait point d'avoir des répercussions importantes sur la situation stratégique ailleurs de par le monde. Le Gouvernement français, j'en suis convaincu, doit désirer qu'un terme soit mis aux désordres de Palestine, puisqu'il se rend bien compte de l'urgence et de l'importance qu'a pour nos deux pays la conservation des bonnes grâces des États arabes du Levant.

Je me permets de souligner que, dans ma note officielle, il n'est pas question d'une demande de l'arrestation immédiate du Mufti et de sa remise aux autorités de Palestine. Mon Gouvernement apprécie les difficultés qu'une telle requête présenterait pour le Gouvernement français. Si, toutefois, ce Gouvernement se trouvait à même d'agir de la sorte, mon Gouvernement, tout naturellement, s'en féliciterait hautement, mais tout ce que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté demande, en effet, c'est que le Mufti soit obligé de quitter le Liban le plus tôt possible et invité à résider à l'avenir en France, ou ailleurs en territoire français où son action politique, à supposer qu'il ne soit pas possible d'y mettre un terme définitif, sera moins dangereuse, et, de la sorte, moins en opposition aux intérêts communs de nos deux pays.

Croyez-moi, &c.  
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 3841/10/31]

No. 63.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).*

(No. 1465. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1138 of the 27th May regarding the instructions sent by the French Government in May to the French High Commissioner in Syria with a view to check the activities of the ex-Mufti in the Lebanon, I have to inform your Excellency that the counsellor of the French Embassy called again on the afternoon of the 27th June to communicate the substance of certain reports received from Comte de Martel, and to discuss the relations between Palestine and the French Mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon.

2 M. Cambon began by reading certain extracts from recent despatches from the French High Commissioner. M. de Martel had pointed out that, in the Lebanon at least, where the French authorities were in a position to exercise more direct control than in Syria, very exceptional police measures had been taken to assist the Palestine authorities. These measures are set forth in the annexed note, which is the summary of a memorandum left by M. Cambon for perusal and return, with the request that its text should not be quoted in subsequent communications to the French authorities, since, in fact, he had had no specific instructions to communicate the full text of this document to His Majesty's Government.

3. As regards the ex-Mufti, the French High Commissioner's despatches showed that he had already on repeated occasions caused Haj Amin to be reminded of his promises to refrain from political activities. M. de Martel had now, evidently on receipt of the instructions from Paris referred to in my

despatch under reference, caused a further and most emphatic warning to be conveyed to him by the police, and in reply Haj Amin had renewed his promises not to engage in objectionable activities.

4. Finally, M. Cambon said that the local French authorities were in very close contact with His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Damascus; and this collaboration had already produced valuable results from the point of view of the Palestine administration. M. Cambon mentioned several instances of this collaboration: the French authorities had, for example, been in close touch with Colonel MacKereth at Damascus regarding the consignment of smuggled ammunition recently seized in Iraq.

5. M. Cambon went on to mention a recent leading article in *The Times* which had criticised the alleged failure of the French authorities in Syria to co-operate with Palestine, and a similar article in the *Temps*, which, he said, had evidently been inspired by the same source. The information which he had given regarding the measures taken by the French authorities to assist His Majesty's Government with regard to Palestine was evidently intended to show that there was no foundation for the criticisms contained in these articles, and to reassure His Majesty's Government as regards the desire of the local French officials to adopt a helpful attitude.

6. M. Cambon was informed that fresh instructions were on the point of being sent to your Excellency to approach the French Government on the subject of the ex-Mufti's activities; these instructions, as subsequently approved, were contained in my despatch No. 1399 of the 28th June. M. Cambon said that, in that case, he hoped that these instructions would take account of the helpful measures already taken, as recorded above, by the French authorities in Syria. He wished also to express the hope that any approach to the French Government should not be based on generalities, but should include definite statements of fact which would enable the French authorities to take positive action. It was pointed out that in such a case it was not usually possible to provide evidence such as would be accepted in a court of law. M. Cambon accepted this, but said that the French authorities would at least wish to be provided with precise facts. Otherwise, he did not think that they could do more than they had already done. He suggested that he might call again and discuss the position further when the instructions to you had been despatched.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 63.

(Confidential.)

*Measures taken by the Lebanese Police to assist the Authorities in Palestine.*

Since the beginning of 1938 special police measures have been taken in the Lebanon with a view to preventing:—

- (a) The smuggling of arms and ammunition into Palestine.
- (b) The movements of Lebanese and Syrians across the frontier in order to join the Palestine rebels.
- (c) The entry of parties of insurgents from Palestine seeking refuge in the villages adjacent to the frontier in French Mandated Territory.

The Lebanese authorities have further endeavoured to obtain and communicate to the Palestine authorities as much information as possible likely to be of use to them. Information concerning frontier incidents has been communicated direct to the Palestine Frontier Police for immediate action.

The special measures referred to above have been the following:—

(A) *Measures to control the frontier:—*

- (i) The five existing fixed police posts have been reinforced.
- (ii) Four new posts were established in March in the most strategically situated frontier villages.

These posts are in contact with each other and maintain a continuous and active system of patrols by day and by night, with ambushes in the more dangerous spots.

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(B) *Measures to check the smuggling of arms:—*

(i) All the posts on the route from Tripoli to Syr and from Merjayun to Syr are under instructions to make a careful search of all vehicles that appear suspect.

(ii) Special arrangements have been made with regard to the road between Saida and Nakoura, including patrols by bicycles, cars and lorries.

(iii) Barricades are set up after nightfall at unexpected places on all the principal roads.

(C) *Measures to control movements of suspected persons:—*

(i) The timetables of persons using the less frequented routes and proceeding from villages which are suspect to the authorities are subjected to a careful scrutiny by the local police posts. Several searches have been carried out, in particular at Ain Ebel and Remeiche.

In addition, arrangements have been made for special action whenever information received from the British or French authorities is to be followed up. Thus, on information received from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut on the evening of the 28th May, a special patrol was set up on the nights of the 28th and 29th May and the 29th-30th May along the Lebanese coast in the neighbourhood of Syr, with a view to preventing the possible landing of arms.

Since the 1st January, 226 persons (including eight engaged in smuggling) have been arrested by the police while trying to cross the frontier.

On the other hand, the smuggling of arms would not appear to be very prevalent in this district, the figures for arms and ammunition seized during the months of April and May being as follows:—

*April:—*Two rifles, twenty-eight cartridges, a number of pistols.

*May:—*Four rifles, 493 cartridges, a number of pistols.

The following two encounters between the patrols and smugglers have occurred:—

*In March*, on the Saida-Syr road, when a Lebanese policeman was seriously wounded.

*In May*, in the neighbourhood of Alma Chaab, when a smuggler is believed to have been wounded.

[E 4008/10/31]

No. 64.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 95.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

He assured me that rumours of Mufti coming to Iraq were without foundation, but he hoped that His Majesty's Government would leave him in Beirut.

I said that Mufti's position in Beirut must be precarious, since I understood that he continued to be the centre of subversive activities in Palestine. But whatever might happen, I advised Iraqi Government not to have him here.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 7, and figures by post to Jedda, No. 3, Saving.)

Bagdad, July 5, 1938.

[E 4075/10/31]

No. 65.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. R. I. Campbell (Paris).*

(No. 1558. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 13, 1938

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1465 of the 5th July, I have to inform you that the counsellor of the French Embassy was handed, on the 8th July, a copy of the official memorandum which had been communicated by Sir Eric Phipps to the French Government on the 2nd July regarding the desire of His

Majesty's Government that the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem should be required to leave Syria and the Lebanon.

2. M. Cambon was shown the passage in which it was frankly stated that His Majesty's Government had no evidence against Haj Amin such as could be produced in a court of law. At the same time, it was pointed out, all the available information showed that Haj Amin was, in fact, engaging in political activities of the most objectionable kind against the Government of Palestine, and no doubt he purposely sent his instructions by oral messages, so that it should be impossible to produce documentary proof against him. The British authorities concerned were convinced that these political activities were, in fact, taking place. This conviction was founded on numerous reports, and such reports were continually being received. For example, since the communication of the 2nd July had been addressed to the French Government, His Majesty's Government had received a report from the British Legation at Athens, who had been asked to enquire into the origin of a consignment of smuggled arms which had been seized in Iraq. The Legation had been informed by a Greek manufacturer that enquiries for arms had in fact been received from the Arabs, who had promised that payment would be made by the ex-Mufti.

3. The attention of M. Cambon was drawn to the fresh outbreak of disturbances in Palestine, which had resulted in over 100 casualties in Haifa on the 6th July. He was informed that the British authorities in Palestine attached great importance, as one of the steps necessary for the restoration of law and order in Palestine, to effective measures being taken to put an end to Haj Amin's activities in Syria and the Lebanon.

4. M. Cambon said that the memorandum of the 2nd July was no doubt already under consideration in Paris, but that he himself thought that there might be some difficulties in the way of meeting His Majesty's Government's requests. For example, he did not think that the French Government would wish Haj Amin to establish himself in French North Africa, where the presence of Arab politicians might be embarrassing to them; nor did he believe that they would exactly welcome the idea of inviting him to reside in France itself.

I am, &amp;c.

HALIFAX.

[E 4054/10/31]

No. 66.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).*

(No. 286.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1938.

I HAVE received Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 76 of the 21st April, enclosing the translation of a further memorandum from King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in regard to Palestine.

2. As no reply has as yet been given to Ibn Saud's earlier memorandum, which was enclosed in Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 16 of the 25th January, I propose in the present despatch to consider both documents and to furnish you with the necessary material with which to acquaint him with the considered views of His Majesty's Government on his representations.

3. You will have realised from my despatch No. 191 of the 16th May that the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards the Palestine problem remains unchanged, and that they have not receded from their acceptance of the policy of partition as the best and most hopeful solution of the present deadlock.

4. I feel that in these circumstances it will be necessary, in replying to Ibn Saud's representations, to modify to some extent the terms of the reply suggested in paragraph 7 of Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 16, which would have given an assurance that the welcome which His Majesty's Government have extended to the partition proposal was only tentative, and might thus have conveyed the impression that the policy of His Majesty's Government is less definite than is in fact the case.

5. It is inevitable that the inability of His Majesty's Government to agree to any statement based on the likelihood that they may eventually modify their

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present declared policy, will render it difficult to answer Ibn Saud's representations in a sense which he will regard as satisfactory. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to allow his representations, expressed as they are in a sincere and friendly manner, and reflecting as they do the increasing uneasiness felt by the King with regard to his own position over the Palestine issue, to remain without some reply. You may therefore, provided you see no objection, reply to Ibn Saud in the sense of the following paragraphs.

6. You may inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government have greatly appreciated the frankness and friendliness with which he has communicated to them his views. But while his representations have received and will continue to receive their most earnest consideration, His Majesty's Government have expressed their sincere opinion that a scheme of partition on the lines recommended by the Royal Commission of 1937 represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock arising under the present mandate for Palestine. In accordance with this view, they have announced their intention of examining the possibilities of a scheme of partition and have appointed a Technical Commission to make recommendations for such a scheme on the lines indicated in my despatch No. 191.

7. When the findings of the Technical Commission are available, it will be for His Majesty's Government to decide whether any scheme of partition which the commission may have been able to devise is both equitable and practicable, and Ibn Saud will no doubt realise that the Technical Commission is not bound to adhere to the scheme of partition which is outlined in the Royal Commission's Report. Much as His Majesty's Government appreciate Ibn Saud's attitude, it is impossible for them to say more than this at present, especially as any scheme which may ultimately be worked out will have to be submitted to Parliament in this country and the Council of the League of Nations before any steps can be taken to put it into execution.

8. In paragraph 6 of Ibn Saud's memorandum of January 1935, there appears to be a suggestion that there is some connexion between the Royal Commission's Report and the steps which have subsequently been taken by the mandatory Government to suppress disorder and lawlessness in Palestine. The report was, however, published in July 1937 and the stern measures in question were only sanctioned with the greatest reluctance by His Majesty's Government for the purpose of dealing with the campaign of murder, terrorism and sabotage, which culminated in the murder of Mr. Andrews in Palestine last September. In this connexion, and with reference to the proposal contained in paragraph 11 (c) of the memorandum referred to above, His Majesty's Government feel that they cannot be expected to sanction any relaxation of the emergency regulations so long as murder, intimidation and sabotage continue. His Majesty's Government are at all times desirous of acting leniently towards those who are prepared to abandon unlawful methods of opposition, provided they are satisfied that their leniency will not be abused. Those responsible for the recent disorders have, however, by their repeated acts of lawlessness and terrorism, rejected all efforts at an improvement in the situation made by the mandatory Power, and until their attitude changes His Majesty's Government can hold out no hope of a relaxation of the emergency measures which they have been obliged to take for the protection of lives and property. This does not mean that His Majesty's Government resent the activities of those who regard it as their duty to express by all lawful methods their opposition to the policy which His Majesty's Government are pursuing. Nor have His Majesty's Government any desire to restrain such persons from doing what they regard as their duty. It does mean, however, that His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the murder of innocent persons or inciting others to commit such murders and the spreading of malicious and slanderous reports about the conduct of British officials or soldiers engaged in preventing such crimes can ever be regarded as lawful methods of opposition.

9. With regard to the proposals which were contained in paragraph 11 (a) and (b) of the memorandum of last January for the suspension of land sales and immigration into Palestine for a period of at least two years, it will be appreciated that His Majesty's Government administer Palestine under a mandate derived from the League of Nations. The suggested prohibition of Jewish immigration and of the sale of lands to Jews would, in their opinion, be incompatible with the express terms of the mandate; and unless the major question of the modification of the mandate were first settled in a manner which would make these prohibitions

possible, the secondary question of the prohibitions themselves could not properly be dealt with in the manner suggested.

10. With regard to paragraph 5 of the same memorandum in which Ibn Saud expressed anxiety lest the Sacred Places of Islam should come under Jewish domination, His Majesty's Government desire to emphasise once more that the partition proposal involves no such danger. They contemplate that the Moslem, as well as the other, Sacred Places in the City of Jerusalem shall remain in perpetuity under the direct mandatory protection of His Majesty's Government, and the terms of reference of the Technical Commission require them to make proposals for "the provision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection of religious rights and properties."

11. When replying to Ibn Saud on the lines of the foregoing paragraphs, you should, if you see no objection, repeat the arguments in the last chapter of the report of the Royal Commission showing the advantages to the Arabs of partition. If Ibn Saud should raise the question whether the Jews will ever be content with the small State allotted to them, you might say that it will be within the power of the neighbouring Arab States to determine their own relations with the Jewish State and the extent to which Jews were to be admitted for trade or settlement and that this power will for the first time be placed in the hands of the Arabs of Palestine within the area of the independent Arab State. I am aware that this reply does not cover the dangers of Jewish expansion which thoughtful Arabs foresee for the more distant, rather than the nearer, future. But, so far as it goes, it is an incontestably accurate statement of what the immediate position would be.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 4497/4087/31]

No. 67.

*Sir S. Waterlow to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 273. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Athens, July 25, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 134 of the 21st July on the subject of clandestine immigration into Palestine through Greek territory, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a *note verbale* in which the assurances given orally by the Permanent Under-Secretary, M. Mavroudis, are confirmed in writing.

2. It is to be hoped that this document will bring to a close an unsavoury incident which throws further light on the corruption prevalent in Greek official circles, for it is not to be believed that the connivance of the Greek authorities was due to any humanitarian motives. Illegal immigration into Palestine through Greece has been commercialised by a certain Russian Jew named Mosse Krivoshein, a Palestinian citizen, who has been in this trade for several years. This individual is said to have made a large fortune by exploiting the misery of his fellow Jews, and it is his open boast that he has bribed all the necessary Greek officials, high and low, in order to carry out his work with impunity. Krivoshein's character may be judged from the fact that he is now, as I am informed, living with an Austrian Jewess of barely seventeen years of age, who was clandestinely on her way to Palestine through Greece.

3. It will be impossible to regard the organisation for smuggling Jews into Palestine through Greece as having been finally broken up so long as Krivoshein remains in the country, and I have accordingly unofficially suggested to M. Mavroudis that he should be deported and, if possible, repatriated to Palestine. His passport (Palestine No. 164) will be impounded, should occasion arise.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister),

E. R. WARNER.



Enclosure in No. 67.

Note verbale from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A LA suite de la note No. 185 que la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu lui adresser, relative à l'immigration clandestine en Palestine d'Israélites provenant du territoire autrichien incorporé dans le Reich allemand, le Ministère royal des Affaires étrangères s'est empressé d'ordonner une enquête circonstanciée sur les faits exposés dans cette note.

Le résultat de l'enquête menée à cet effet semble confirmer que les autorités consulaires helléniques à Vienne ont effectivement apposé des visas de transit sur les passeports de nombre d'Israélites ci-devant autrichiens devant se rendre dans les îles du Dodécannèse.

Suivant les renseignements puisés auprès des autorités de police, le nombre de ces émigrants arrivés par groupes en Grèce après l'*Anschluss* et embarqués sous la surveillance de ces autorités sur des bateaux grecs à destination des îles du Dodécannèse s'élèverait à 700-800 environ.

De toute façon, le Gouvernement royal ne saurait rester insensible devant le préjudice causé par cette infraction aux dispositions réglementant l'immigration juive en Palestine et l'intérêt manifesté par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement de Palestine sur la cessation de cette entrée illicite dans ce pays.

Aussi s'empresse-t-il de donner des ordres à ses agents diplomatiques et consulaires de refuser absolument l'octroi sur les passeports des personnes de cette catégorie même de visas de transit et sans distinction si ceux-ci voyagent individuellement ou par groupes.

Parallèlement, il n'a pas manqué de donner des ordres urgents pour que tout départ de cette nature soit immédiatement suspendu et désormais strictement défendu.

Le Gouvernement hellénique aime à espérer que ces mesures seront d'une aide efficace dans les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement de Palestine pour mettre un terme à cette anomalie et que son concours sera d'une utilité appréciable aux intérêts légitimes du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique dans ce territoire.

Le Ministère royal des Affaires étrangères saisit, &c.

Athènes, le 22 juillet 1938.

[F 4536/10/31]

No. 68.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 114.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, August 1, 1938.

INCREASE of disorders in Palestine is strengthening pro-Arab agitation here.

Preparations are being made for Friday next to be observed as Palestine Day throughout this country. Arrangements will be similar to those made for 12th May (see Bagdad despatch No. 217).

Palestine Defence League have addressed letters to the King of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen recalling their previous intervention and appealing to King to take vigorous action to save Palestine.

League have also sent letter to Nahas Pasha thanking him for what he has already done to defend Palestine, and asking him to advise what action Arab world should now take in face of disasters which are overwhelming their brothers in Palestine.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 12; Cairo, No. 10; and Jedda, No. 9.)

[E 4550/10/31]

No. 69.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, August 2, 1938.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that activities of Palestine Defence League had taken Government by surprise. He had at once objected strongly to Minister of the Interior about Palestine Day, and he was confident that steps would be taken to curtail to minimum proposals for 5th August.

I expressed appreciation of Minister's action and raised question of money sent to Syria for relief of victims of troubles in Palestine.

Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that position was as stated in Sir M. Peterson's telegram No. 59, Saving, but said that he had urged that in future larger proportion of collections should be sent to Arab Women's Committee in Jerusalem.

I said that this seemed to be better than sending it to Damascus, but it was responsibility of collectors to ensure that money was devoted to purpose for which it was subscribed.

Despatch follows.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 13; Cairo, No. 11; and Jedda, No. 10.)

[E 4664/10/31]

No. 70.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 367.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 2, 1938.

WITH reference to Sir Maurice Peterson's telegram No. 59, Saving, of the 19th July, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs replying to the Ambassador's memorandum dated the 20th June on the subject of the money collected in Iraq for the victims of the present disturbances in Palestine.

2. Your Lordship will observe that this note confirms the information given in Sir Maurice Peterson's telegram under reference to the effect that, apart from £70 remitted to the Arab Women's Committee at Jerusalem, the bulk of the money collected in Iraq has been sent to Damascus. No reply is returned, however, to the enquiry contained in the last paragraph of the memorandum, neither is any attempt made to meet the allegation contained in paragraph 4 (a).

3. During the course of a visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, I drew his Excellency's attention to these evasions. I said that, according to the information of His Majesty's Government, there was, properly speaking, no such organisation in Damascus as the Central Committee for the Relief of the Sufferers in Palestine, and that they were satisfied that all the money sent from Bagdad to Damascus went to the Palestine Defence League, by whom it was distributed to people actively engaged in committing acts of violence in Palestine. I asked the Minister to tell me the name of the responsible official of the so-called Relief Committee to whom the money had been remitted. He told me that it was Izzat Daruzah. I said that this fact confirmed the contention of my Government: he was well known to be an active supporter of the terrorism now going on in Palestine, and there could be little doubt about the manner in which he spent any money sent to him from Iraq. I asked the Minister to realise that His Majesty's Government regarded activities of this kind with the gravest concern, and impressed on him the urgent need for measures to check the irresponsible recklessness of the Palestine Defence League and its leaders in Iraq.

4. At this point the Minister anticipated me by referring to the announcements in the press the day before to the effect that the 5th August was to be observed throughout the country as Palestine Day, and that collections were to be made everywhere for the relief of the Arab sufferers in Palestine, as reported in my telegram No. 114 of the 1st August. The League's declarations had, his Excellency said, taken the Government by surprise, and they had had no part in



the despatch of the League's letter to the three Arab Kings or to Nahas Pasha. When he had seen yesterday's papers, he had at once protested to the Minister of the Interior, and had urged that immediate action should be taken to place the public observance of Palestine Day under strict control. He had also spoken strongly on this subject to the Prime Minister. The whole matter was under examination, but he felt able to assure me that the advertised programme would be drastically curtailed.

5. Taufiq Suwaidi said that he fully appreciated the obligation of the Iraqi Government in this matter and begged me to believe that, since they had come into office, the present Cabinet had done their utmost to keep within proper limits popular agitation concerning Palestine. As regards the money collected for the Arab sufferers of the disturbances in Palestine, he had already asked that the organisers of these collections should be given an unmistakable hint that in future a greater proportion of the money subscribed should be sent to the Arab Women's Committee in Jerusalem. He hoped that this would ensure that it was properly spent. I said that this certainly seemed a step in the right direction, but it was clearly the responsibility of the collectors to see that the money was devoted to the purpose for which it was subscribed.

6. Taufiq Suwaidi then said that he wanted to speak to me as man to man. Surely, he said, His Majesty's Government must see the difficulty of the Iraqi Government's position. Popular feeling was high and the Government could not suppress all expressions of sympathy with the Arabs in Palestine. His Majesty's Government desired that nothing should occur which might render a solution of the Palestine question more difficult, but even His Majesty's Government were not always able to prevent such things from taking place. What did I think of Colonel Wedgwood's letter calling on the Jews to fight and slay the Arabs? (he here shook at me excitedly a bundle of newspaper cuttings of Colonel Wedgwood's now famous letter of the 30th May to the Jewish ex-Officers' Association at Tel Aviv). He said too how shocked he had been to hear that the Jews had actually on certain occasions recently had the audacity to disturb good order in Palestine by attacking Arabs, and seemed quite surprised when I observed that however deplorable violence was the Jews seemed to me to have shown great restraint in the face of prolonged Arab provocation. Nevertheless, his Excellency continued, the Iraqi Government must allow some measure of freedom to the Arabs of Iraq to show their fellow-feeling for their kindred Arabs in Palestine and their common hatred of Zionism. How much money after all had been collected for Palestine? A mere £2,000, and what real influence could that have on the situation however it had been spent?

7. Could I not, he said, explain these difficulties to His Majesty's Government and convince them that the Iraqi Government were really trying to deal with the situation in the spirit of the alliance. They had to consider not only their own people but Arabs everywhere. All Arabs were looking to Iraq to show the way to help the Arabs in Palestine, and no Iraqi Government could ignore their responsibilities as the Government of one of the leading Arab States. He was looking forward to the opportunity of discussing the question with your Lordship in Geneva and London next month.

8. I said that I was quite sure that His Majesty's Government did not overlook the difficulties which confronted the Iraqi Government and asked the Minister to believe that such representations as they made from time to time concerning Palestine were inspired only by a desire to further the real interests of the Arabs themselves. I was sure that the action which his Excellency had taken to check the efforts of the Palestine Defence League to stir up quite useless popular excitement by organising the observance of the 5th August as Palestine Day would be appreciated by His Majesty's Government and I undertook to communicate to your Lordship his Excellency's renewed assurances of the determination of the Iraqi Government to continue to deal in the spirit of the alliance with all repercussions in the country of the situation in Palestine.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Note from Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and, with reference to the esteemed Embassy's note dated the 20th June, 1938, regarding the sums collected in Iraq and remitted to Palestine and Syria by the Palestine Defence Society, the Ministry state that the enquiries carried out by the Iraqi authorities concerned reveal that most of the sums collected in Iraq by permission of the Iraqi Government were remitted to the Secretary-General to the Central Committee for the Relief of Palestinian Sufferers, Damascus, and that 70 dinars were remitted to the Arab Women Committee, Jerusalem, to be spent on purely charitable purposes.

The Ministry avail, &c.

Bagdad, July 30, 1938.

[E 4786/10/31]

No. 71.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 376.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 10, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 3rd August, the day after the conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs recorded in my despatch No. 367 of 2nd August, there appeared in one of the Bagdad daily newspapers, *Al Zaman*, a statement to the effect that the Prime Minister had written a letter to his Cabinet colleagues stressing the pitiable plight of the Arab sufferers from the disturbances in Palestine and urging the Ministers to appeal to all officials in the departments under their control to subscribe generously to the Palestine Relief Fund organised by the Palestine Defence League. I instructed the oriental secretary at once to ask the Director-General of Foreign Affairs whether there was any truth in this report, and the following day the Director-General was able to send me an assurance that it was entirely devoid of foundation and that the Prime Minister had had the editor taken severely to task. I replied saying that I was glad to know that the story was false, but I thought it important that *Al Zaman* should be required to publish a *démenti*. The Director-General of the Ministry, who discussed the matter at length with the oriental secretary, maintained that it would be most difficult to insist on this being done. The report had been published in one newspaper only and he was quite sure that this circumstance, coupled with the fact that it was well known that no appeal had been circulated to Government officials, would make it clear to everybody that the Prime Minister had not taken the action attributed to him by *Al Zaman*. Moreover, if the Prime Minister were to insist on the publication of a denial, it would be considered that he wished it to be known that he was opposed to collections for the Palestine sufferers and he would thereby expose himself to attacks from his enemies.

2. In view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' promise to me to take action to keep severely in check the manifestations planned for Palestine Day on the 5th August, and of the Prime Minister's preoccupation over the health of his son, who is ill with typhoid fever, I did not at that time press my point further, but reserved for my next meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I shall describe later, some frank comments on the tergiversations of the Iraqi Government in the matter of agitation about Palestine in this country.

3. My decision to speak frankly on this point was strengthened by the events of the 5th August which, as I have already reported, was chosen by the Palestine Defence League to be observed throughout Iraq as Palestine Day. Up to a point the Government kept their promise. In spite of the protests of the president, Taha-al-Hashimi, the League were forced to publish an announcement that the Government had refused permission for the meeting in the Great Mosque and the procession through the streets, which had been planned to follow it, and that, in consequence, these two items of the day's programme had been cancelled. A similar bann was placed on the mass meeting and processions which it had been intended should take place in the chief provincial



centres. Public celebration of the day was therefore limited to street collections and special prayers in the mosques. So far as I can judge from my information, little money was in fact collected, and the mosques were not noticeably fuller than is usual at midday on Fridays. On the other hand, the press was apparently allowed full licence and used its liberty to the utmost, as will be seen from the enclosed brief summary of certain typical articles.

4. On the 8th August there appeared in the press a public appeal signed by Kashif-al-Ghita, one of the leading divines of the Holy Cities, which declared that honour should impel all Arabs to join their brothers in Palestine in their struggle and that *jihad* for the sake of Palestine had become a duty for everyone, not only by the laws of religion, but by the rulings of conscience and right thinking.

5. When I opened the question of Palestine with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I went to see on the 9th August, he hastened to have his say first. He explained that he had expected me to talk about Palestine and before I began there were some facts that he wished to make known to me. He wanted to assure me that the Government had known nothing of the appeal made by Kashif-al-Ghita before it was published in the press. As soon as it appeared he had consulted his colleagues and he had been asked by the Prime Minister to reassure me. I should appreciate in the first place that the influence of the *Ulema* was no longer what it had been twenty years ago. The appeal sounded formidable and menacing, but I should soon see that it would have little effect. Secondly, he was authorised to give me a categorical undertaking that the Iraqi Government would take all possible measures to prevent people leaving Iraq to join the insurgents in Palestine and to ensure that money was not sent from Iraq to help the armed bands. More than this it would be difficult to promise. They could not prevent the *Ulema* from issuing appeals, but they were conscious of their obligations as Great Britain's ally and, much as they deplored the policy followed by His Majesty's Government in Palestine, they would fulfil their obligations.

6. I said that I was glad to have his Excellency's promises that the Government would prevent men and money from being sent to Palestine and I sincerely hoped that the appeal made by Kashif-al-Ghita, in spite of its inflammatory tone, would turn out to be as ineffectual as his Excellency had forecast. Nevertheless, the general recrudescence of agitation concerning Palestine, especially this call for action instead of words, must necessarily cause some misgiving in London. I went on to say that, at my last visit, he had dropped official reticence and had spoken to me as man to man: I would now for a few minutes do the same myself. After my last talk with him, I had addressed to your Lordship a despatch in which I had done my best to put before my Government the difficulties of the Iraqi Government in the same vivid words that he himself had used. I had also referred with appreciation to the spontaneous action which he had told me the Iraqi Government had taken to put a stop to the mischievous plans of the Palestine Defence League. Since then there had been several notable developments in the situation. The very day after I had sent off my despatch, a report had been published that the Prime Minister was giving full official encouragement to the collections for the Palestine sufferers, which, as I had already told him, were according to His Majesty's Government's information almost entirely devoted to the support of the insurgent bands. I was glad to know the report was untrue but, since it had been given no official denial, it would no doubt be widely copied in the Arabic press outside Iraq and would create a false impression of the attitude of the Iraqi Government. Further, although I did not overlook the fact that the action taken by the Iraqi Government had effectively prevented public demonstrations on the 5th August, the unrestrained outbursts in the press would have to be reported to my Government and would, I feared, contrast significantly with the general tenor of what I had written a week earlier. Finally, there had come this *Fatwa* from the leading Shiah *Alim*, the consequences of which could not yet be calculated. I said that, to be quite frank, I felt that perhaps I had made a mistake in being too ready to believe that his Excellency would be able to do all he had said he would do and that it would have been wiser to have awaited events before reporting to your Lordship. As regards the *jihad Fatwa* issued by Kashif-al-Ghita, I could only say that the words had unpleasant historical associations and that the news of the publication of this appeal would inevitably create a bad impression in London.

7. I may mention that since this conversation an official warning has been issued by the Press Bureau that any newspapers publishing unverified statements concerning the Government or Cabinet Ministers will render themselves liable to legal proceedings.

8. The Minister then spoke about the work of the Partition Commission and said that he hoped that this time His Majesty's Government would find some means to give the interested parties some opportunity to express their views on the commission's recommendations before declaring their policy. I said that this was a suggestion which the Minister should, if he thought fit, put to your Lordship himself.

9. I shall not fail to continue to watch the situation carefully and to report on the results of the *Fatwa* of the Shiah *Alim*.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, the High Commissioner for Palestine, and to the acting British consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 71.

*Summary of Articles appearing in the Local Press.*

The *Alam-al-Arabi* declared that Palestine had become a human slaughter-house and the scene of atrocious crimes. Zionists and their supporters were savagely oppressing the Arabs, while the Archbishop of Canterbury remained silent and unprotesting.

The *Mustaqbal* called on God to be a witness to Iraq's failure to carry out her obligations to her stricken brethren in Palestine. The people of Iraq were merely looking on at the most awful atrocities, yet they indulged only in words not deeds. Great Britain aimed at the extermination of the Arabs in Palestine and Iraq's help of her Palestinian brothers would be of no avail until deeds were joined to words. New measures should be adopted to ensure victory.

The *Youn* took the well-worn line of Britain's broken promises. The Arabs had suffered for Britain in Britain's hour of need and now they were thrown aside in favour of a people despised and outcast by the entire world.

The *Zaman* looked in vain for men ready to sacrifice themselves for the deliverance of Palestine, but found instead only speeches and protests. The imperialists had shown that they cared nothing for such pacific methods: petitions and prayers even left them unmoved. Might was the only argument which they understood and the world could be sure that the Arabs would not much longer remain patient in the face of imperialist oppression.

[E 4787/10/31]

No. 72.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 377.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, August 10, 1938.*

I HAD the honour to-day to be received in audience by the King of Iraq, with whom I found the Minister for Foreign Affairs. After some preliminary conversation on a variety of topics, King Ghazi said that he wished to speak to me about Palestine. Here Taufiq Suwaidi interjected that he had reported to His Majesty our conversation on this subject, an account of which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship in my despatch No. 376 of the 10th August.

2. King Ghazi told me that he was very worried indeed about the *Fatwa* which had been issued by a Shiah *alim* and which had been succeeded to-day by a similar pronouncement on the part of a Sunni *alim*. A call to *jihad* meant a holy war. It was all very well for his Ministers to say that there must be some safety-valve for public feeling and that this sort of thing could have no real effect. But His Majesty felt that it was very dangerous to allow religious fanaticism to be inflamed in this manner. Moreover, how could the Government



in any event take effective measures to prevent those who wanted to from responding to the *Fatwa* by going to Palestine with their arms to join the insurgents?

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that he had assured the King that the Government were fully alive to the risks inherent in the intervention of the religious leaders in this vexed question. He also said that steps would be taken to induce them to adopt a more moderate attitude and not to render more difficult than it was the delicate situation of the Iraqi Government, torn as they were between sympathy for their Arab brethren and a sincere desire not to embarrass His Majesty's Government, but rather to co-operate in finding a fair solution of the Palestinian question.

4. The King at this point observed that he was particularly anxious, too, lest this priestly agitation should increase anti-Jewish feeling and lead to acts of violence or to persecution of a community which, in his opinion, had always been harmless and unobtrusive.

5. Before I left I asked King Ghazi what reply he proposed to return to the appeal addressed to the Arab kings, of which a translation accompanied my despatch No. 366 of the 4th August, and if he had yet heard the reactions of the other rulers. His Majesty said that he was trying to avoid having to answer the Palestine Defence League at all, and that meantime he was anxiously awaiting news of the effect of the *Fatwa* on the other sovereigns. Thanking the King of Iraq for his active interest, I assured His Majesty that I was confident that his action, which I trusted would be effective, would be appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

6. I propose to ask the oriental secretary, who will be visiting the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connexion with other matters to-morrow, to suggest to the Director-General that much could be done to allay public opinion if the press were instructed neither to publish *Fatwas* of this nature nor to write inflammatory leading articles improving upon them.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, the High Commissioner for Palestine and to the acting British consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 4506/10/31]

No. 73.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).*

(No. 489.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1938.*

WITH reference to Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 166 of the 20th April, and to your telegram No. 112 of the 27th July, I have had under consideration the question whether it is necessary to return a further reply to the representations contained in the memorandum about Palestine handed to his Excellency on the 20th April by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. You will remember that a copy of this memorandum was also communicated to me by the Iraqi Minister in London, and that, at his request, a formal acknowledgment was sent to the Minister (see my despatch No. 223 of the 28th April) containing an assurance that the observations of the Iraqi Government would be considered with the greatest attention. In these circumstances, it is not clear that the Iraqi Government expect any further reply to their communication. Nevertheless, now that a full and detailed reply, on the lines indicated in my despatch No. 286 of the 14th July to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, is being returned to the similar representations received from the Saudi Arabian Government, and since the Saudi Arabian Government and the Iraqi Government are known to be in close communication on the subject, I agree that it may be well, in order to forestall any complaint from the Iraqi Government that their representations are accorded less consideration by His Majesty's Government than are those of Ibn Saud, to send some further communication to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. You may therefore, provided you see no objection, reply to his Excellency in the sense of the following paragraphs.

3. You may assure the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, with reference

to my note of the 27th April to the Iraqi Minister in London, that full attention has been given to the observations contained in the Iraqi Government's memorandum on the subject of Palestine. His Majesty's Government are always glad to receive any views on this and similar problems which the Iraqi Government, as the allies of His Majesty's Government, may desire to communicate to them.

4. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government entirely share the wish expressed by the Iraqi Government for the friendliest relations between Great Britain and the Arab countries of the Middle East. The Iraqi Government point out in their memorandum that they are constantly receiving communications from prominent Arabs requesting them to use their good offices for the solution of the Palestine problem, and the Iraqi Government have in fact conveyed to His Majesty's Government the substance of the views received by them from the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere. It is hoped that the Iraqi Government will not confine their good offices to action on these lines, but that they will in return find it possible, as the allies of His Majesty's Government, to explain to others the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to Palestine, and in general to use their influence to discourage the use of violence by the extremists.

5. In order properly to understand the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Palestine problem, it is necessary to consider in some detail the report of the Royal Commission of 1937. The Iraqi Government, who have evidently studied that document closely, will remember that the Royal Commission was set up on account of the difficulties and disturbances which had already arisen in Palestine. Its members were men of undoubted impartiality and outstanding ability; they considered with scrupulous care every aspect of the questions which they had been instructed to examine, and every proposal which had been suggested for a reasonable and just solution of conflicting claims and demands. The Iraqi Government will not fail to have been impressed by the able manner in which the commission set forth its views of the underlying causes of the disturbed situation in Palestine and their recommendations for the future. His Majesty's Government, for their part, were convinced, after a careful study of that report, that the policy recommended by the commission was indeed the plan which presented the best and most hopeful solution of the existing deadlock.

6. His Majesty's Government are in complete agreement with the Iraqi Government in desiring to put an end to the present disturbed situation in Palestine and to see the restoration of order and tranquillity in the country. They agree that the prevailing unrest is harmful to the interests of all parties and cannot assist the friendly relations existing between Great Britain and the Arab world, which it is the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to see progressively strengthened and developed. They have been led to the conclusion, however, both as a result of their experience as the Mandatory Power during the past fifteen years and of the findings of the Royal Commission, that a lasting solution of the Palestine problem is not possible under the present system. They accordingly set themselves to devise a new solution which should be both practicable and fair to all the parties concerned, and in doing so it was necessary for them to consider not only the unquestionable rights of the Arab population in Palestine, but also the rights of other interests in the country. For it must be remarked that His Majesty's Government find themselves unable to accept the contention of the Iraqi Government that the case of Palestine is precisely similar to that of other Arab territories detached from the former Ottoman Empire and that the question of the Jewish National Home is not part of the Palestine problem. They are, on the contrary, of the opinion that the case of Palestine is different from that of those other territories, in that it is not only the centre of three world religions, but is also inhabited by two important communities each of which has a long established connexion with the country. The question of the respective rights of the different communities in Palestine is, again, a subject which was considered with special care by the Royal Commission and its report suggested various measures whereby those rights may be safeguarded. As a result of the findings of the commission, and of their own consideration of the problem, His Majesty's Government formed the considered opinion that, in principle, a scheme of partition on the lines recommended by the commission represented not only the best and most hopeful solution of the present deadlock, but also the solution which was most just to all the parties concerned and gave the largest measure of satisfaction to their respective rights and claims.

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7. The above explanation will, it is hoped, suffice to show that His Majesty's Government have used, and will continue to use, their utmost endeavours to find a solution which shall be fair to all parties and shall not benefit one side at the expense of the other. With regard to particular points raised in the Iraqi Government's memorandum, His Majesty's Government have the following additional observations to offer.

8. In paragraph 6 of the memorandum it is stated that His Majesty's Government's obligations towards Zionism, as set forth in the Balfour Declaration and in the provisions of the mandate, do not include the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine or the allocation of a part of that country to the Jews. It is no doubt true to say that neither the Balfour Declaration nor the mandate specifically provides for the establishment of a Jewish State, although they in no way preclude it. His Majesty's Government have, however, come to the conclusion, in the light of recent events, that the establishment of such a State in a part of Palestine is the means whereby their obligations to the Jews under the Balfour Declaration and the mandate can be most properly and adequately fulfilled, without ultimate prejudice to the position of the Arabs in the whole of Palestine.

9. The meaning of the statements made by Mr. Winston Churchill in 1922, to which the Iraqi Government refer in paragraph 6, was explained in chapter 2, paragraphs 38 and 39, of the Royal Commission's report, and it is not necessary to add anything to these explanations. Again, the assertion which has frequently been made, and which forms the basis of paragraph 7 of the Iraqi Government's memorandum, that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine has been accomplished at the expense of the Arab inhabitants of that country, is also fully examined in the Royal Commission's report. For example, chapter 5, paragraph 23, shows that the Arab population of Palestine has risen since 1920 from about 600,000 to about 950,000, and it is legitimate to infer that this remarkable increase, when compared with the fact that the population of Palestine under the Ottoman régime was believed to be more or less stationary, gives some indication of the measure of prosperity which has been enjoyed by this point, contained in chapter 5, paragraph 34, of its report, is one which repays the Arabs under the British mandate. The Royal Commission's conclusion on attention.

His Majesty's Government feel that the activities of the Jewish State would not apprehensions of the Arabs in regard to the future activities of the Jewish State

10. In paragraphs 10 and 11 the Iraqi Government draw attention to the and the prospect of the growth of anti-Semitism in neighbouring Arab countries. need to affect the Arabs as seriously as they suppose. The relations between the Jewish State and the surrounding Arab States would lie in the hands of those States and any attempt by the Jewish State to conduct these relations in an aggressive fashion would find His Majesty's Government ranged upon the side of the Arab States so long as their treaties of alliance with those States subsisted. His Majesty's Government realise that it would be idle to hope that suspicion and ill-feeling could be quickly eradicated, but they trust that in the course of years the resentments of to-day would be forgotten and mutual goodwill engendered. Similarly they trust that those leaders in the various Arab States who understand that the Jewish communities are in no way responsible for or connected with what is happening in Palestine will use their utmost endeavours to allay the anti-Jewish sentiments which, as His Majesty's Government recognise, the disorders provoked by certain sections of the Arabs of Palestine are unfortunately likely to engender among the more ignorant of their compatriots in neighbouring countries.

11. In paragraph 12 of their memorandum the Iraqi Government state that a great number of prominent Jews are opposed to partition and demand that the solution of the Palestine problem should be based on an understanding with the Arabs. No doubt there is a certain diversity of opinion among Jews as well as among Arabs regarding the best way of dealing with the Palestine problem, but it should be remarked in the first place that the official representatives of Zionism have declared themselves in favour of examining the possibilities of partition, and in the second place that many of the Jews who criticise partition base their opposition on the fact that partition will place definite limits to the expansion of the Jewish National Home. At the same time His Majesty's Government would for their part certainly welcome any direct agreement which

might be reached between Arabs and Jews. They would point out, however, that all efforts which have hitherto been made to bring about such an agreement have proved unavailing.

12. With regard to the practical objections which have been advanced against a scheme of partition, His Majesty's Government, no less than the Iraqi Government, are fully alive to the difficulties which must inevitably beset any solution of the Palestine problem. It was precisely with a view to investigating these difficulties that the present commission was sent to Palestine to examine the situation on the spot and in the light of its conclusions to consider the practicability of a scheme of partition. When its report has been received, it will be possible for His Majesty's Government to judge how far the alleged difficulties are real and how far they may be circumvented. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government will continue to give careful consideration in this connexion to the observations made in paragraph 9 of the Iraqi Government's memorandum.

13. It will be seen that His Majesty's Government adhere to their opinion that a scheme of partition on the lines recommended by the Royal Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock arising under the present mandate for Palestine. In accordance with this view they appointed the present commission to investigate the practical possibilities of partition and to draw up a just and practicable scheme. Unless and until the findings of the commission give grounds for believing a plan of partition to be either impracticable or inequitable, His Majesty's Government must continue to adhere to their considered view as expressed above. When the report of the commission is available, it will be for His Majesty's Government to decide whether any scheme of partition which the commission may have been able to devise is both equitable and practicable, and the Iraqi Government will no doubt realise that the present commission is not bound to adhere to the scheme of partition which is outlined in the Royal Commission's report. Much as His Majesty's Government appreciate the attitude of the Iraqi Government, it is impossible for them to go more than this at present, especially as any scheme which may ultimately be worked out will have to be submitted to Parliament in this country and the Council of the League of Nations before any steps can be taken to put it into execution. Meanwhile the Iraqi Government may, however, rest assured that the views which they have expressed will continue to receive the consideration which they merit and will be taken into account before any final decision is reached with regard to the future of Palestine.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda. A copy will also be sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 5015/10/31]

No. 74.

*Mr. Bateman to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 986.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, August 23, 1938.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1009 of the 4th August, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the "Decisions" taken by the body of the Grand Ulema of Egypt on the Palestine question during a meeting held at the Azhar on the 18th August.

2. On the 20th August Sheikh-el-Maraghi, in the course of conversation with the oriental secretary, said that the Ulema had at the meeting expressed very violent opinions. He had thought it best to allow them to let off steam, but had finally secured their approval of the enclosed text, which he had prepared beforehand and which he seemed to consider moderate.

3. It is true that these decisions are moderately worded, but they, nevertheless, commit the Egyptian Ulema to a definite policy of an unpartitioned Arab Palestine and of co-operation between Islamic countries for the protection of Palestine. Moreover, Decision No. 3 is so worded as to provide ammunition

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for those Moslems who have been proclaiming that the Moslem Holy Places are in danger.

4. Sheikh-el-Maraghi told Mr. Smart that the feeling in Egypt regarding Palestine was genuine and widespread, and that the Egyptians viewed with alarm the establishment of a Jewish State on their frontier. The Jews were an intelligent and capable people, backed by vast financial resources and international connexions. Egypt and the Arab States feared that such a Jewish State would eventually overflow its borders and imperil the independence of the surrounding Moslem States. To illustrate the growing apprehension of the Moslems the sheikh cited a conversation he had held with an Egyptian lay professor who had expressed the view that the loss of Palestine to Islam would be a disaster similar to that suffered by the loss of "Andalous" (Spain) at the end of the Middle Ages—a loss which for centuries formed a recurring motif of lamentation in the Islamic world, where it was felt to be the beginning of the decline of Islam before the Christian West.

5. The sheikh went on to emphasise the danger which Zionism was preparing for all the Jewish communities in the Moslem East. Islam, he said, had hitherto treated the Jews far better than they had been treated in Europe in the past or were being treated in the present; but the seizure of a Moslem land by the Jews with British support was arousing much vindictive feeling. He quoted a passage from the Koran to the effect that the Jews were the worst enemies of Islam, and added that the Moslems to-day, in the face of what was happening in Palestine, might be all too ready to act on the Prophet's warning. It was quite possible, for example, that the Jews in Iraq and Egypt, who had hitherto been well treated by the Moslems, might shortly find themselves involved in the general anti-Jewish hostility of the Moslem world.

6. The resolutions of the Grand Ulema of Egypt may possibly have received some of their inspiration and impetus from those recently passed by the Ulema of Iraq (see Bagdad despatch No. 381 of the 18th August, 1938). If this is indeed the case, it is one more sign that Egypt, given the political rôle which she desires to play in the Near East of the future, is finding it difficult to hold aloof from the general pan-Islamic movement which, at the moment, has found a definite *point d'appui* in Palestine. Hitherto, Egyptians have not been active in finding solutions for the problem of their Moslem neighbours. This may not be true of the future; nor may it be possible for well-disposed and reasonable Egyptians to stem the tide of pro-Islamic sentiment if no settlement of the Palestine question, acceptable to the Arabs, is reached. In that event, Egypt might find it difficult to dissociate herself entirely from any anti-British *bloc* evolving among the Arabs over the Palestine question. This should, I think, be taken into account in reviewing our strategic position in the Near East so long as the present Palestinian imbroglio persists. It is fraught with grave possibilities.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad and Jedda.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 74.

*Extract from the Ahrām of August 19, 1938.*

*Decisions of the Body of the Grand Ulema on the Palestine Question.*

(Translation.)

THE body of the Grand Ulema held a meeting on Thursday, the 18th August at the Azhar, at which they reviewed the situation in Palestine and the clash taking place there. The body expressed deep regret at this state of affairs which, no doubt, was the result of the policy adopted by the British Imperial Government towards that country, especially the policy of partition, the imposition of which on an Arab Islamic country is desired. The memories of that country have not yet disappeared among Moslems. That policy aims at giving an Arab Moslem country another colour, in an unjustifiable manner, which is bound to have a

very bad effect on the relations between Moslem nations and the British Imperial Government. The body of the Grand Ulema have therefore decided—

- (1) To protest against the continuation of this policy and the partition project in whatever manner the partitioning is effected. To demand that the Arab Islamic nature of the country should remain and that its national existence should be safeguarded.
- (2) The body of the Grand Ulema appeal to leaders of Islamic countries to co-operate in taking such measures as they deem useful for the protection of Palestine and for finding a solution to put an end to this evil state of affairs so that peace may prevail among nations.
- (3) The body of the Grand Ulema appeal to Moslems to remember the Palestine cause in "Leilat Al Mi'raag" (The night of the Prophet's miraculous journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and back) and to pray God to protect that country against what is designed against it and preserve the Holy Places from far and imminent dangers. The body have decided to communicate these resolutions through the Acting Prime Minister.

The office of the Rector of the Azhar then forwarded these resolutions to the Acting Prime Minister yesterday afternoon.

[E 5008/38/31]

No. 75.

*Papers Communicated by the Colonial Office.*

(1)

*Mr. Hyamson to Sir C. Parkinson, Colonial Office.*

Dear Sir Cosmo,

London, August 8, 1938.

IN view of the approaching report of the Fact-Finding Commission on Palestine and the consequent review of the problem which the Secretary of State will presumably make, I am writing to make you acquainted with the course of events since my letters of the 6th June and the 21st November, 1937, and the brief reference to the subject in our most recent conversation.

2. As you know, Newcombe and I got together about a year ago and drew up a scheme for the future of Palestine which seemed to us to be fair to both parties in existing circumstances and to safeguard essential British interests, moral as well as material. It, of course, gave neither party all that it demanded, but in our opinion it granted both Arabs and Jews the essentials that were necessary to them if their future existence and freedom in Palestine were to be secured. I append a copy of this scheme, the details of which we hoped at the time would be filled in by representative Jews and Arabs sitting together.

3. The scheme was drawn up by Newcombe and myself alone, but we were in touch with Arabs of Palestine and elsewhere of standing and also with certain Palestinian and English Jews, and although they were not committed to the scheme we know that they viewed it in general favourably. The next step was to put it formally to the executive of the Jewish Agency and to Haj Amin and his friends, in the hope that it would be accepted by them as a basis of discussion. The response in both cases was not unfavourable, but Haj Amin made the following objections or reservations: (a) He was not authorised to discuss or take any steps in regard to the future of Transjordan; (b) pending authority from an Arab Congress, or, alternatively, unless pressed by the Arab rulers, he could not then agree to any increase of the present number of Jews in Palestine.

4. In the meanwhile, the Palestinian and other Arabs with whom there had been previous discussions had left England and as the executive of the Jewish Agency to whom I had written formally last November had referred the matter to their Jerusalem members, the conversations were continued in Jerusalem between Dr. J. L. Magnes, who was in close touch with myself and also with the members of the Jewish Agency executive, Zionist and non-Zionist, Dr. Izzet

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Tannous, who was the representative in Jerusalem of Haj Amin and his friends, the Bishop of Jerusalem, who is very anxious for an agreement, and Nuri Pasha Es Said, who may be said to represent the non-Palestinian Arabs. (It may be mentioned here that the suggestion has been made in Arab quarters that if a satisfactory settlement can be found in Palestine, a limited immigration of Jews into other Arab countries would be welcomed. The other Arab States are also interested for other reasons.) I, for my part, secured the support, but only in their personal capacities, of most of the prominent "non-Zionist" Jews in England and the United States and also of a few leading Zionists. None of these, however, had received or had sought authority to act in any representative capacity.

5. At this stage Haj Amin's alternative scheme was drafted. A copy is attached. This was unacceptable to the Jewish side and despite the offer by Nuri Pasha of a compromise scheme, also attached, the Jewish Agency in effect withdrew from the conversations. To my mind there is no appreciable difference of any consequence between the original scheme and that of Nuri Pasha. His alternative immigration clause (No. 6) is, however, to my mind not defined with sufficient clarity, and I should prefer as an alternative "The Jewish population of Palestine shall reach a percentage of by the 1st January, 19 , when a further agreement shall be made, but failing that agreement this percentage shall not be reduced."

6. Haj Amin and his friends, I have been assured, would accept Nuri Pasha's draft if pressed by the Arab rulers, and I am further assured that this pressure would be available. With the executive of the Jewish Agency I am no longer in touch, but I have the definite assurance of Mr. Neville Laski, the president of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the most prominent non-Zionist member of the council of the Jewish Agency, not speaking in the name of either of those organisations, but, on the other hand, representing, as he says, most, if not all, of the prominent non-Zionists of England, America and Western Europe, that the Nuri Pasha scheme is generally acceptable. Two or three western Zionist leaders have spoken to me to the same effect. Mr. Laski is prepared to repeat to you or to the Secretary of State what I have said regarding his views.

7. Personally, I seem now to have reached a dead end. There is undoubtedly a considerable body of both Jewish and Arab opinion, if not in agreement, very close to agreement, but they are running on parallel lines and unless some new element appears will never meet. Two alternative next steps have occurred to me, but in either the Government, assuming that a settlement on the lines suggested appeals to them, must act. The one is for the two parties to be invited to meet and discuss the possibility of an agreement either with these schemes or one of them as a basis, or without an agenda. The non-Zionist half of the Jewish Agency would, I believe, accept such an invitation; the Arabs, under pressure from the Arab rulers, would, I understand, also accept such an invitation. Certain English public men who enjoy the confidence of the Arab leaders would also, I believe, advise them to accept. There have already been conferences in America and Switzerland between the Arabs and the non-Zionists with, I believe, a mutually advantageous elucidation of points of view. The other course, which Mr. Laski favours, and has the advantage, of great value in my opinion, of reducing the interval between now and a settlement, is for the Government, if it considers the kernel of these schemes acceptable, to examine them and then to announce a policy, which it can be assumed will have a large volume of support in and out of Palestine. Consultation of Arabs and Jews might be considered necessary, but I do not think there should be anything of the nature of a three-party committee, which would lead to talks of an oriental prolixity.

8. Before I conclude, and I must apologise for the length of this communication, but I am anxious that you should be fully informed, I should like to explain a few points in the original draft. The kernel is, of course, the wide and full autonomy in all matters that concern one community alone. Such an autonomy would to my mind fulfil the pledge of a Jewish National Home, certainly in the sense in which Abad Ha'Am, the philosopher of Zionism and Weizmann's mentor, understood it, and would not run counter to the definition given in the white paper of 1922. It would be an extension to the furthest possible limit of the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, under which the Jews and Christians of Palestine lived for centuries and would also to some extent be a reversion to the system of self-government under which the Jews of Eastern Europe

flourished in their happiest period. The scheme would not create a Jewish State, which, again, the 1922 white paper pointed out was not essential to the attainment of a Jewish National Home, nor an Arab State, but a Palestinian State, a bi-national State, once Weizmann's political ideal. The immigration clause does not lay down that there must never be a Jewish majority, nor does it threaten the Arabs with such a majority, at any rate in the present generation, and no one, in view of recent experiences, will want to legislate in matters of international affairs for more than a generation. Personally, I don't believe the question of a Jewish majority to be one of practical politics. Unless Palestine became a mining or industrial (exporting) country, I can't see how there can ever be room for a population appreciably larger than the present one. The land question has not been touched on, by tacit general agreement. It may be necessary to deal with it in a final document, but the Arabs seem to hold the view that the land and population questions are one. To my mind much could be done if cultivators were secured the minima necessary to their maintenance, as laid down in present and prospective legislation, and that all holdings exceeding these minima and also land at present uncultivable be available in a free market. An alternative, with regard to uncultivable land, is a Government scheme of development.

9. I have been careful, in view of susceptibilities, not to use the word "minority," but always to substitute "community." Jews have less objection to that term. "Nationality" might be a preferable one, provided that it is clearly understood that it is not a synonym for "nation." I should also like to see included in any final draft something to the effect that the Jews of Palestine are in the country by right and not on sufferance. Finally, the Arabs, I am told, would accept Hebrew as an official language. They say this is implied in the communal autonomy clause, but it would be best if it were specifically mentioned.

10. Under this scheme, and I believe any other, Palestine would play a very minor part in relieving the pressure on the Jews in Europe. The attempt to turn the country from a Jewish National Home to a land of refuge has, to my mind, been one of the major misfortunes that have beset the land. There are many other regions in the Colonial Empire, some of which I believe are underdeveloped. I know that Jewish settlement in Northern Rhodesia and in Kenya is in contemplation, but if the whole of the Colonial Empire were surveyed, as I suggested on a previous occasion, opportunities might be found advantage of which could be taken to the benefit both of the colonies and of the refugees, and further links in the chain of the development of the British Empire with Jewish assistance—already a not inconsiderable one—forged. If any scheme of Jewish settlement—with the assistance of Jewish funds—in one or more British colonies were found practicable, the disappointment of the Jewish masses over Palestine, inevitable in any circumstances, would, to some extent, be diminished.

I am, &c.

A. M. HYAMSON.

Enclosure 1 in (1).

#### *The Original Draft.*

A SOVEREIGN independent Palestinian State to be created on the 1st January, , provided that the League of Nations certifies that the population of Palestine is then fit for self-government.

2. Every Palestinian, independent of race, religion and nationality, shall have equal and complete political and civil rights.

3. In the meanwhile, Great Britain shall continue to be responsible for the government of the country, the Palestine Government giving members of the population, Arabs and Jews, an ever-increasing share in the Administration.

4. Complete autonomy shall be granted to all communities in communal matters, in the widest sense, as soon as possible, provided that no community has jurisdiction over members of another community in those matters. A Jewish National Home, but not a Jewish State, would thereby be provided.

5. Complete municipal autonomy should be granted as soon as possible to all-Jewish and all-Arab towns, villages and districts.



6. The maximum Jewish population of Palestine, and later of Transjordan, shall not exceed an agreed figure, which shall be less than 50 per cent. of the population.

7. The interests of the different communities of Palestine, after the creation of the independent State, shall be watched over by the British Government.

8. Great Britain shall retain special rights at Haifa.

9. This agreement shall hold for a term of \_\_\_\_\_ years from \_\_\_\_\_ and shall be renewable.

October 9, 1937.

Enclosure 2 in (1).

*Haj Amin's Draft.*

A SOVEREIGN independent Palestinian State to be created on the 1st January, 19\_\_\_\_\_

2. Every Palestinian, independent of race and religion, shall have equal and complete political and civil rights.

3. In the meanwhile, Great Britain shall continue to be responsible for the government of the country, the Palestine Government giving members of the population, Arabs and Jews, an ever-increasing share in the Administration.

4. Complete autonomy shall be granted to all communities in communal matters, in the widest sense, as soon as possible, provided that no community has jurisdiction over members of another community in those matters.

5. Complete municipal autonomy should be granted as soon as possible to all-Jewish and all-Arab towns and villages.

6. The maximum Jewish population of Palestine should be the present population. All Jews in Palestine on the 1st \_\_\_\_\_ shall be entitled to apply for, and receive, Palestinian citizenship. During the interim period envisaged, the Arab leaders have not been authorised by Congress or by the Arab Kings to agree either to further Jewish immigration or to further land sales.

7. The interests of the different communities of Palestine, after the creation of the independent State, shall be guaranteed by the British Government.

8. The legitimate interests of Great Britain shall be safeguarded.

January 12, 1938.

Enclosure 3 in (1).

*Nuri-es-Said's Draft.*

A SOVEREIGN independent Palestinian State to be created on the 1st January, \_\_\_\_\_, in accordance with the procedure adopted by the League for other mandated territories, such as Iraq and Syria.

2. Every Palestinian, independent of race, religion and nationality, shall have equal and complete political and civil rights.

3. In the meanwhile, Great Britain shall continue to be responsible for the government of the country, the Palestine Government giving members of the population, Arabs and Jews, an ever-increasing share in the Administration.

4. Complete autonomy shall be granted to all communities in communal matters, in the widest sense, as soon as possible, provided that no community has jurisdiction over members of another community in those matters.

5. Complete municipal autonomy should be granted as soon as possible to all-Jewish and all-Arab towns, villages and districts.

6. The maximum Jewish population of Palestine shall be  $x$  per cent., until there be a further agreement between the two peoples.

7. The interests of the different communities of Palestine, after the creation of the independent State, shall be watched over and guaranteed by the British Government.

8. The legitimate interests of Great Britain shall be safeguarded.

February 6, 1938.

(2)

*Sir C. Parkinson to Mr. Hyamson.*

Dear Hyamson,

*Downing Street, August 19, 1938.*

MANY thanks for your letter of the 8th August giving me a résumé of your recent negotiations with Arabs and Jews with reference to an alternative solution of the Palestine problem.

We are glad to have this full account and the drafts of the alternative schemes mentioned in your letter, but you will not, I am sure, expect me to comment on the subject in detail at this stage. In any discussions which may take place after the report of the Partition Commission is received, it may be that these and other alternatives will come under consideration and, in that event, the material which you have furnished should then be very useful.

Yours sincerely,

A. C. C. PARKINSON.

[E 5067/10/31]

No. 76.

*Acting Consul-General, Beirut, to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, August 27, 1938.*

ACTING Secretary-General, in course of [group omitted] 26th August, said that High Commissioner has been asked by Quai d'Orsay for observations on proposal, apparently emanating from His Majesty's Government, that the Mufti should be requested to remove to Aleppo, and were intending to reply objecting to the proposal and pointing out that his transfer to such a Moslem centre would render control over his activities almost impossible and raises all sorts of future difficulties for the French in Syria. He gave impression that High Commission resented the suggestion implied in proposal, and openly stated in recent *Times* article, that they were not co-operating with the Palestinian Government, pointing out that they were frequently being thanked by the latter for their energetic action on Palestinian frontier, and asked what more they could be expected to do.

I said that Aleppo proposal was new to me (latest communication I have received on the subject is your despatch No. 17 of 2nd July), and that I was unaware of present views of His Majesty's Government on the question. If, however, the Mufti was to remain inside mandated territories and French were not in favour of his transfer to Aleppo, I asked, as from myself, if it would not be possible for them to take additional measures to control his contacts in Lebanon. Present position seemed to be that anybody who wished could visit him without hindrance. The Secretary-General assented, stating that Arab notables of all kinds (such as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs who recently passed through Beirut) visited Mufti, and that French could hardly be expected to decide what visitors the Palestinian Government would prefer him not to receive. I asked whether, in that case, French would be prepared to withhold visas of persons on exhaustive list to be presented to them by the Palestinian Government and to take the necessary steps to limit the possibility of his meeting such persons elsewhere. Secretary-General gave me to understand that the French would agree to co-operate on these lines, indicating to the Mufti that they were compelled to adopt additional measures of control over him in order to ensure that he carried out his understanding not to engage in political activities.

Personally, I agree with the French view of the [group undecipherable] proposal. I am unaware what has passed between His Majesty's Government and the French Government since 2nd July, and should be glad of information. If, however, Mufti is to remain here, above-mentioned suggestions, though doubtless inadequate, seem to me the only means, I fear, of hampering his activities. Failure of French control over them up to the present strikes me as due more to unwillingness to give themselves trouble and to cause difficulties with local population than to the lack of desire to co-operate with us.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)



[E 4664/10/31]

No. 77.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).*

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1938.*

YOUR despatches Nos. 367, 376 and 377 [of 2nd August, 10th August and 10th August: Money collected by Palestine Defence Society in Iraq].

I entirely approve your efforts to secure restrictions upon encouragement to terrorism.

2. Notwithstanding developments reported in two latest despatches, you may inform Iraqi Government that His Majesty's Government understand their difficulties and appreciate what they have already done. You may add that it is (as you have already said to them) in best interests of Arabs as a whole that their efforts should be continued and should succeed, for anything which encourages continuance of violence in Palestine is not merely assistance to those in armed rebellion against the ally of Iraq—it is assistance to a campaign which is doing more harm to the Arab cause than even responsible Arabs, whether in Palestine or elsewhere, can possibly realise.

3. I leave it to your discretion whether, and if so how, to express appreciation of the reasonable and helpful attitude adopted by King Ghazi.

[E 5161/10/31]

No. 78.

*Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 1006.)

My Lord,

*Paris, September 1, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to your despatch No. 1856 of the 19th August, 1938, that, in the course of an interview I had with the head of the African Section on other matters on the 31st August, M. Lagarde raised the question of the Mufti of Jerusalem.

2. M. Lagarde began by saying that they had received information that an Arab had arrived in Beirut saying that he had had a conversation with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and was an emissary from him with a message to the Mufti, whom he had seen. M. Lagarde mentioned this in order to ascertain whether the story was true, and whether, if it were, there was any change in the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Haj Amin which might involve any modification of their desire regarding the place and conditions of his residence and the degree of surveillance exercised over him.

3. M. Lagarde went on to say that the French Government had considered the requests of His Majesty's Government, and had sounded the Prime Minister of Syria, who is at present in Paris, with regard to the state of local opinion, and, on the assumption that the wishes of His Majesty's Government remained the same, the following conclusions had been reached with regard to the treatment of the Mufti. It was undesirable to settle Haj Amin in Aleppo. The French Government were ready, however, to consider his settlement in Latakia, under the necessary surveillance. On the other hand, they would prefer that he should remain in a Christian area, and therefore in the Lebanon, where they could, in case of absolute necessity, institute measures of surveillance which would amount in effect to internment. Such internment would, however, cause difficulties for them in Syria owing to the ill-feeling it would arouse, and they would much prefer, if possible, that the Mufti should remain in the Lebanon under the degree of surveillance at present exercised, surveillance which they considered was in fact effective. M. Lagarde asked that His Majesty's Government should consider what action in the light of the above they would like to ask the French Government to take.

4. As regards the control of the frontier, an extensive service of posts and patrols was already in existence, and, as an example of its efficacy, M. Lagarde stated that it had been possible recently to apprehend a number of British deserters at the request of the British military authorities. From the information in the hands of the French Government, the French control of the frontier

was, in fact, considerably more efficacious than that on the British side, both in respect of the numbers of troops, &c., assigned to this duty and in respect of the methods employed, and, if frontier control was to be as successful as was possible under the difficult circumstances, more would need to be done on the British side. Incidentally, however, it was the opinion of the French authorities (and the Prime Minister of Syria shared this view) that the terrorist campaign in Palestine received comparatively little assistance from outside sources. A number of allegations that arms, &c., had been sent across the Palestinian frontier had been examined and found groundless.

5. M. Lagarde's attitude was friendly throughout, but he held out little hope that the French Government could do more than either to secure the settlement of the Mufti in Latakia or to let him remain in the Lebanon, but under conditions amounting to internment.

I have, &amp;c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 5141/10/31]

No. 79.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).*

(No. 353.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 5, 1938.*

AT a luncheon which I gave for their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and the Amir Muhammad at the Foreign Office on the 31st August, the Crown Prince asked me whether he might afterwards say a few words about Palestine. I accordingly invited their Royal Highnesses to my room after lunch. The Saudi Arabian Minister, Sir Reader Bullard and M. Zada, who interpreted, were also present.

2. The Crown Prince said he was not speaking officially, but as a friend. The state of affairs in Palestine was causing the greatest distress and anxiety among Moslems everywhere. What was particularly distressing to King Abdul Aziz and other Arabs was to see the traditional friendship between Great Britain and the Arabs prejudiced by the Palestine question. There was no quarrel between the Arabs and Great Britain, only between the Arabs and the Jews. The King, in accordance with his policy of friendship with His Majesty's Government, had throughout done his best to prevent feeling in Palestine from going too far, and above all from doing irreparable damage to Anglo-Arab friendship. He had assured the Arabs in Palestine that their cause was safe in the hands of His Majesty's Government, who would in the end see justice done. But for his control over his own people and his influence in other Moslem countries, the situation would have been much worse. But his position was very difficult and he trusted that everything possible would be done to satisfy the Arabs' legitimate aspirations.

3. I thanked His Royal Highness for his frank statement and assured him that I would not fail to communicate what he had said to my colleagues. These views were not new to them, since Sir Reader Bullard had kept His Majesty's Government informed of the conversations and correspondence on the subject which he had had with the Saudi Arabian Government from time to time; but to have them direct from His Royal Highness gave them additional force. His Royal Highness could rest assured that the anxiety of His Majesty's Government was not less than his own and that of the Arabs in general.

4. I added that His Royal Highness would not expect me to make a statement of policy at the present stage, but I could say that my colleagues and I, in dealing with the Palestine question, always kept two objects in mind—the adoption of a just solution and the maintenance of close friendship between Great Britain and the Arabs.

I am, &amp;c.

HALIFAX.



No. 80.

*Sir S. Waterlow to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 308. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Athens, September 6, 1938.*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 273 of the 25th July regarding the clandestine immigration of Jews into Palestine through Greek territory, I have the honour to report that Krivoshein, who left for Vienna shortly after my representation to M. Mavroudis, returned to Greece on the 24th August. He was travelling in an Italian ship bound for Alexandria and, when subsequently questioned by the Greek police, announced that he had disembarked temporarily at Athens and that he had missed the boat on its departure. He took up his residence at the Acropole Palace Hotel, with the young Austrian Jewess previously referred to, whom he had now married, and at once became involved in negotiations with sundry Greek officials involving the disbursement of a good deal of money.

2. On my instructions, the First Secretary to this Legation called on the Director of the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 1st instant and informed him of Krivoshein's return and of our belief that he was spending money freely in connexion with his illegal activities. Mr. Hopkinson expressed the hope that the Greek authorities would take steps to expel him, and if they saw fit, to deport him to Palestine. M. Melas expressed astonishment that Krivoshein should have been permitted to land in view of the fact that definite instructions had been given to the immigration authorities to refuse him admission to Greece. After making enquiries into the matter he stated that Krivoshein was under technical arrest for his illegal entry and that he was to be expelled in the course of the next day or so. As regards the question of his deportation to Palestine, however, the police authorities were unwilling to agree to this in the absence of an application for extradition. M. Melas said that the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Mavroudis, was inclined to share this view, but that further pressure on the part of the legation might shake him.

3. I accordingly telephoned M. Mavroudis the following day and suggested that the Greek authorities might be willing to detain Krivoshein in Athens, until I could ascertain from the Palestine Government whether they wished to apply for his extradition. M. Mavroudis thought that Krivoshein might have already gone, and on making enquiries found that such was in fact the case. He had left by aeroplane for Italy early that morning.

4. It seems safe to assume that as a result of our intervention Krivoshein himself will not return to Greece. Unfortunately, however, although we have certainly delivered a shock to his organisation it is still in existence and a number of Greek police and other officials are in his pay. The pressure of Jewish refugees from Austria to enter Greece in transit to Palestine is still considerable, and M. Melas informed Mr. Hopkinson that only on the 31st August, the Greek authorities on the Yugoslav frontier had turned back 700 Jews who were in possession of Greek visas alleged to have been granted in Vienna. M. Melas said that the Greek Consul-General at Vienna, in whom he had the utmost confidence, denied that his office had issued any such visas. Be this as it may, everything points to the existence of a powerful organisation in Vienna, with ramifications in Greece and elsewhere and in possession of considerable funds, who are actively engaged in trying to smuggle Jews through Greece, Roumania and elsewhere into Palestine, acting with the connivance, if not with the full approval of the German authorities. There is also reason to believe that this same organisation is occupying itself with schemes for supplying arms to Jews in Palestine.

5. I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Berlin and Rome and to the Government of Palestine.

I have, &amp;c.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

[E 5161/10/31]

No. 81.

*Viscount Halifax to Acting Consul-General Furlonge (Beirut).*

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1938.*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 13 [of 5th September: Position of the Mufti].

You should shortly receive Foreign Office despatch No. 192 of 24th August showing action taken by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Paris on instructions copied to you in Foreign Office despatch No. 189 [of 19th August]. No other suggestions have been made to French Government; nor has Aleppo or any other particular place been mentioned.

2. French Government have now, however, indicated that most they are prepared to do is to consider Mufti's resettlement in Latakia, under necessary surveillance. They would much prefer, however, that he should remain in a Christian area and, therefore, in Lebanon, where they would, in case of necessity, institute measures of surveillance which would amount in effect to internment. But as this would cause ill-feeling and difficulty in Syria, they would also much prefer he should remain under present degree of surveillance, which they consider effective. They ask what action His Majesty's Government would, in light of these considerations, like them to take. (End of R.)

3. Reply to French Government is still under consideration. But even with measures reported in your telegram under reference, present surveillance is clearly inadequate, and on psychological as much as on practical grounds proper control is important. His Majesty's Government may therefore feel obliged at least to ask that—

- (1) Mufti should be placed not necessarily out of Lebanon but where he can be better guarded than at Beirut.
- (2) Surveillance should be improved by—
  - (a) Forbidding him to see Palestinians, whether residents or not, unless approved by High Commissioner.
  - (b) Forbidding all other visitors except in presence of a French official.
  - (c) Censoring his correspondence.

4. To judge from your telegram No. 12 [of 27th August], local authorities might be willing to go some of the way to meet these demands, even without pressure from Paris. I should welcome expression of such views as you can (without indicating to local authorities that His Majesty's Government are contemplating such demands) form as to their feasibility generally.

[E 5427/10/31]

No. 82.

*Acting Consul-General Furlonge to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Beirut, September 12, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 12.

Following are my views on demands suggested in paragraph 3:—

- (a) I assume French High Commissioner and not High Commissioner, Palestine, is referred to. If latter, suggestion seems to imply that local authorities should submit to Jerusalem each application for permission to visit the Mufti which I do not think they would agree to do. If, however, reference is to French High Commissioner I consider it would be essential to ensure that permission for visits was not granted too liberally, perhaps by means of measures such as that suggested in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 12 to which local authorities would apparently agree.
- (b) Clearly Arabic-speaking French official must be specified. Administration contains so few of these that one could probably not be spared. In any case, I doubt whether the French would agree for fear of local reaction.
- (c) I consider this useless because Mufti's important contacts are maintained either verbally or by messages brought by hand, which could easily be smuggled in and out of his house by servants, &c.



2. Kornayil, where the Mufti now resides, is near Beirut and contains majority of Druses, which people, according to my information, are taking increasingly active part in Palestine revolt. Connivance of villagers may therefore largely defeat such surveillance as the French would be likely to provide.

3. Local authorities (on whose opinion the French Government seem entirely to base their attitude) maintain that the Mufti takes little active part in the revolt, and that his function is chiefly that of figure-head. While this view of his probable rôle [group undecypherable] to move it may contain some truth. Certainly the prestige he enjoys by reason of frequent visits from notables and Beirut press publicity are assets to the revolt.

4. In view of above, such satisfaction as the French are likely to give on your suggested demands would not seem to make for effective control, at least so long as the Mufti remains near Beirut. His transfer either to Lattakia or to remoter and purely Christian Lebanese village, such as Faraya, seems, therefore, most desirable. Former possesses following advantages:—

- (1) It is a backwater, and once there the Mufti would be less in the public eye.
- (2) It is five hours further than Beirut by car from Palestine frontier.
- (3) So far as I am aware, Alawites, who have little sympathy with Sunnis of Damascus, have not taken and are unlikely to take much interest in Palestine.
- (4) Furthermore, I doubt whether French surveillance would in practice be much less effective in Lattakia than anywhere else.

[E 5473/10/31]

No. 83.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 434.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, September 6, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that this morning, on the occasion of my normal weekly visit, I delivered to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the message contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 116 of the 31st August, to the effect that His Majesty's Government understood the difficulties of the Iraqi Government and appreciated the action which they had taken to restrict encouragement of terrorism in Palestine. His Excellency was evidently gratified to receive this expression of sympathetic understanding from His Majesty's Government and appeared to be impressed when I communicated to him the advice contained in the second sentence of your telegram.

2. I also took the opportunity to give to him a memorandum based on your Lordship's despatch No. 489 (E 4506/10/31) of the 24th August and explained that that memorandum, which his Excellency said that he would carefully study at his leisure, embodied the observations of His Majesty's Government on the document handed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador on the 20th April last, and communicated at the same time to your Lordship's department by the Iraqi Minister in London.

3. Saiyid Abbas Mahdi again repeated the assurances given me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Government were determined to restrain any outward manifestations of feeling in this country on the subject of Palestine, but he warned me against being led to infer from the absence of demonstrations that public interest in the question had subsided. I said that I knew it would be idle to run away with any such impression, but I felt that the effect of conversations in houses and coffee-shops must be far less dangerous than the atmosphere which the extremists could easily have created here had not the Government wisely decided to control public agitation.

4. It would, of course, be a mistake to attribute the Government's policy to any fundamental difference between the views of ministers and those of the man in the street. The ministers hate Zionism as much as the most forceful members of the Palestine Defence League and the nationalist clubs, and they share with the rest of Iraq a fervent desire to save Palestine from Jewish domination. But ministers, and other men with experience of the responsibilities of government, realise that if popular feelings are not controlled, the stability of the Administration will be endangered and the public interest will

suffer. They are alive to the possibility that, if to-day people obey the fetva of the divines about Palestine, to-morrow they may similarly obey fetva aimed directly at the authority of the secular government.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 5479/10/31]

No. 84.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 450.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, September 14, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that when I saw him on the 13th September, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to ask me to convey to your Lordship an expression of the thanks of the Iraqi Government for the sympathetic message on the subject of Palestine, which I had communicated to his Excellency last week, as reported in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 434 of the 6th September. The Government would not relax their efforts to control the activities of the extremists here, but the repressive measures which the Government of Palestine had recently found it necessary to take had not tended to make their task any easier. He had in mind the destruction of certain Arab villages by British troops. This had greatly incensed local opinion—especially as no Jewish settlements ever seemed to have met a similar fate—and divines, religious leaders and others were continually asking the Prime Minister to remove the present ban on public agitation. The Government were, therefore, very anxious lest events should get beyond their control, when "something unexpected" might happen to the Jews, with whom the Iraqis had lived on good terms for years.

2. I said that the unfortunate situation of Palestine did, no doubt, furnish a good excuse for anti-Jewish agitation by ill-disposed or jealous Iraqis, who naturally did not find it difficult to misrepresent to the ignorant among their co-religionists any action which might be taken by the Palestinian authorities against the almost professional Arab terrorists. The Iraqi Government had lived up to their promises so far, and I was glad to hear that they proposed to continue to keep the extreme elements in check. I then gave his Excellency an Arabic version of a circular, of which I enclose a translation, addressed, according to my information, to about 150 Jewish business men in Bagdad, among them a British firm. I felt that in case this manifestation of anti-Jewish sentiment, even though it might only be an attempt by irresponsible youths to extract money from others for their own private gain, had not been reported to the police, the knowledge of it might be of assistance to the Government in their determination to maintain public order. Protection of Jews, as such, was no part of my duties, but this circular had reached at least one British firm, and I was no less anxious than the Government not to witness a popular outbreak against the Jews or any other community. Incidentally, I had noticed that some of the local Jews, including the Director-General of Finance, Ibrahim-el-Kabir, and the Ford agent and contractor to the Iraqi Government, I. Ades, had felt it necessary to propitiate "their brothers the Arabs" by publishing their telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the League of Nations on the subject of Palestine, a copy of which, extracted from the *Iraq Times*, I enclose. Saiyid Abbas Mahdi did not attempt to conceal his amusement at my reference to this telegram, but said that he had not heard before of the circular demand for money, which I had told him about, and would mention the matter in the proper quarter with a view to appropriate action being taken.

3. Meantime, his Excellency continued, would I convey to my Government an appeal from the Prime Minister for a "period of peace" in Palestine pending a declaration of the eventual policy of His Majesty's Government? I replied that no such appeal need be addressed to His Majesty's Government, as its terms coincided precisely with their own views as expressed lately in broadcasts by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and His Majesty's High Commissioner for



Palestine. Saiyid Jamil-al-Madfai should rather address this appeal to the Arabs. The Government of Palestine could not be expected to remain inactive in the face of persistent breaches of the peace. That, however, did not suit the Minister, who pleaded for equality of treatment for Jews and Arabs. For example, about fifty Arabs had been executed, but only one Jew; Jews had bombed the bazaars at Haifa and Jaffa, killing many Arabs on both occasions, yet the authorities had not retaliated by destroying the Jewish quarters. I said that I was not acquainted with all the facts and had no idea of the figures, but that he must remember that the Arabs had been indulging in a murder campaign long before the Jews had had recourse to violence, and that, therefore, quite naturally, more Arabs than Jews may have been executed. I refused to take seriously his reference to the bombing outrages.

4. I regret having to trouble your Lordship yet again with this ever-recurring subject, but in view of the Acting Minister's specific request, I have felt obliged to do so.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 84.

*Translation of a Circular addressed to Jewish Business Men in Bagdad.*

To the well-known merchant,

WE are collecting contributions for the Iraqi mujahids (warriors) who will proceed for the assistance of their brethren the Arab rebels in Palestine. As the Iraqi mujahids require supplies and equipments, &c., it is necessary that you should assist them by the payment of a suitable sum from your private money in order to prove your Arab character and your sincerity to your Iraqi brethren who are called up for sacred duty. If you decline to pay this sum, which should not be less than 15 dinars, and which you should always carry on you from the date on which you receive this letter, we will consider you to be one of the supporters of Zionism who are playing at will with the country, and take necessary action against you and against any one who entertains your ideas.

This letter, together with the demand of the society, should be kept secret.

[*The Iraqi Secret Society for the Assistance  
of the Palestinian Arab Rebels.*]

Enclosure 2 in No. 84.

*Extract from the Iraq Times of August 25, 1938.*

A BAGDAD DIARY.

THE following telegram, signed by representative members of the Jewish community in Bagdad, has been sent to the Secretary for the Colonies, London, and to the Secretary of the League of Nations at Geneva:—

"The Jews of Iraq protest against the Zionist policy and support their brothers the Arabs of Palestine. We implore you to do them justice and restore peace and tranquillity to the Arab States."

The telegram is signed by Rabbi Sassoun Kadoori, Rabbi Benjamin Moshi, Rabbi Salman Hoogi, I-el-Kabir, Eliaho Any, Ezekial Murad, K. M. Levy, K. Chouker, Dr. D. Nessi, D. M. Saleh, S. M. Sassoon, Salim Izaac, Dr. S. Koobi, S. Shelomo, Dr. G. Rabby, M. Mahlab, M. Gourgi, Dr. Nourallah, N. Mukamal, H. Smouha, Yamen Murad, Yehouda Zelouf, Dr. J. Rosenfeld, Ibrahim Haim Isaac, I. Ades, R. Semekh, S. Aboudi, Jacob Any, E. Mettana, E. H. Tawfiq, E. Joury, M. Sofair and K. Tweg.

[E 5551/10/31]

No. 85.

*Viscount Halifax to Acting Consul-General Furlonge (Beirut).*

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 21, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 299 to Paris [of 21st September: Reported intention of Mufti to attend Arab Congress in Cairo].

You should approach local authorities in sense of paragraph 2 and, if you think it necessary, of paragraph 4. But I realise in latter connexion that local authorities may never have had any intention of letting Mufti leave.

(Addressed to Beirut, No. 14. Repeated to Paris, No. 300, and Cairo, No. 423.)

[E 5655/10/31]

No. 86.

*Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, September 26, 1938.*

FOLLOWING is the substance of urgent message from King:—

A parliamentary conference on Palestine is shortly taking place in Egypt. If the King does not send a representative, he will be exposed to criticism and propaganda. The Ulema and notables of this country greatly desire to be represented. King has given them an answer and will deal with them. But he asks whether His Majesty's Government attach importance to conference, and whether he will stand to lose by his not being represented.

If he sends a representative, he will have to say the same declaration, if not something stronger: but King does not wish to embarrass His Majesty's Government. Merchants' reply is: "Do as you like." He will have to do as his people wish. He has not referred to Saudi Arabian Minister, as he wishes matters kept quite secret and desires an urgent reply.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 19, and Jerusalem, No. 31.)

[E 5694/2957/31]

No. 87.

*Captain Euan Wallace to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 104.)

My Lord,

*Geneva, September 28, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the question of mandates was referred by the Assembly to the Sixth Committee. In previous years this reference was made on the proposal of the Norwegian delegation. This year, however, it took place as a result of a decision by the General Committee of the Assembly, it being understood that the effect of the decision taken would be limited to this year's Assembly, and that its adoption would in no way prejudice the procedure to be followed by future Assemblies in the matter.

2. In the debate in the Sixth Committee the first speaker was the Danish delegate (M. Andersen), who referred first of all to Palestine, and, after summarising the recent reports and discussions of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council, said that it was highly desirable that nothing should be left undone that might in any way expedite a solution of the serious problems in that country. It was most earnestly to be desired that the mandatory Power, in which everyone felt the fullest confidence, might shortly find an equitable solution. M. Andersen then made a detailed survey of the recommendations of the Mandates Commission in respect of other mandated territories, and paid a tribute to the work both of the commission and of the mandates section of the secretariat.

3. The Iraqi representative (Sayid Tawfik-al-Suwaydi) appealed to members of the League, and in particular to the mandatory Power, to apply to the question of Palestine the principles of article 19 of the Covenant. The Government of Iraq was of opinion that the Balfour Declaration was automatically abrogated by article 20 of the Covenant, read with article 22. The Sixth Committee had resolutely refused to give its benediction to a search for a solution of

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the problem along the lines of partition. There was an alternative to partition, the basis of which was the formation of an independent sovereign State, a guarantee to every Palestinian, including all Jews who had immigrated up to date, of civil and political rights, and the grant to the various elements of the population of extensive local municipal, cultural and religious autonomy. Provision would be made for a guarantee by the present mandatory Power for a fixed period. Sayid Tawfik-al-Suwaidy appealed to the Sixth Committee to turn its back once for all on the solution that was no solution, partition imposed by force. Sayid Tawfik-al-Suwaidy's speech had been drafted in even more vigorous language, which he was persuaded to modify.

4. The Roumanian delegate (M. Cretziano) said he wished to give expression once more to the interest that his Government attached to the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Roumanian Government felt bound to emphasise the necessity of resuming normal immigration as soon as circumstances permitted.

5. The representative of Eire (Mr. Hearne) referred to the views expressed by Mr. De Valera in the Sixth Committee at the last Assembly, and said that these still represented the standpoint of his Government.

6. The French representative (M. Paul-Boncour), after a reference to Syria, in which he stated that the treaty designed to bring about the admission of Syria and Lebanon to the League had neither lapsed nor been forgotten, paid a sincere tribute to the way in which the United Kingdom had coped with the situation in Palestine. He said that it was clear that no settlement of the Palestine question could in itself provide a solution for the vast problem of Jewish immigration.

7. The United Kingdom delegate (Mr. R. A. Butler, M.P.) said that he would not fail to inform His Majesty's Government of the opinions expressed. If he did not reply in detail it was because the future status of Palestine was *sub judice*. It must not, however, be assumed that he was in agreement with some of the statements made. The committee would have observed the divergence of opinion among the different speakers and would realise how that very diversity increased the difficulties which confronted the mandatory Power. As regards the substance of the question, he had little to add to his statement in the Council on the 17th September. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were awaiting the report of the commission appointed to examine the possibilities of partition. While they favoured partition as being in principle the best solution of the problem, it was not until that report had been received that they would be in a position to take a final decision on future policy. They realised that uncertainty as regards the future had brought with it serious disadvantages. The Administration of the territory was doing all it could to suppress terrorism. But conditions were such that success might have to await a final decision on future policy. That decision must in its turn await the receipt of the Woodhead Commission's report, and it was impossible to foreshadow what it would be.

8. M. Andersen was appointed *rapporteur*. He presented in due course a report and resolution. The report summarised the discussion in the Sixth Committee, and said that the proposal for partition, the study of which the mandatory Power had been authorised to continue, gave rise to divergent comments, sometimes amounting to fundamental objections. The resolution expressed the hope that the problems relating to Palestine might be solved in the near future, account being taken of all the legitimate interests at stake. The report and the resolution were in due course adopted by the Sixth Committee and by the Assembly.

I have, &c.

EUAN WALLACE.

[E 5924/10/31]

No. 88.

*Note of Interview given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and Nuri Pasha at the Colonial Office on October 6, 1938.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, October 11.)*

THE Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs began by expressing his thanks for all that had been done for him during his visit to this country. He then went on to say that the Iraqi Government had done their best to prevent in Iraq any trouble for His Majesty's Government in connexion with the Palestine question.

Mr. MacDonald replied that while, if he might say so, we had sometimes felt that there was ground for complaint, he did appreciate very much what the Iraqi Government had done: he had already had a conversation with the British Ambassador in Bagdad, who had spoken to him of his satisfaction (which he himself shared) at the action taken by the Iraqi Government in this matter.

The Minister went on to say that, in his opinion, it was not difficult to find a solution of the Palestine question: on the contrary, it was quite easy. The Jews should not be given more than they had been promised or more than they expected. His own solution was that Palestine should be made into an independent State (Transjordan might possibly be included) which would be in treaty relation with Great Britain like Iraq, with full guarantees for minorities, including Jews, who would have a very large measure of local autonomy, *e.g.*, in the management of schools, and there would, of course, be no interference with their religion or language. He suggested that the precedent of Iraq was a good one, seeing that things had gone well since Iraq was established as an independent State in treaty relations with Great Britain. He realised, however, that no immediate decision could be taken until His Majesty's Government received the report of the Woodhead Commission.

Mr. MacDonald said that obviously we must wait for the report of the Woodhead Commission; it was not yet known to him what the commission would say, they might produce a scheme of partition which they regarded as practicable or it was open to them to say that partition was not practicable. Meanwhile, it was right to be considering possible alternatives to partition in case it might be found that that solution was impracticable, and for that reason he was very glad to know what the Minister had to suggest. As regards partition, he himself had thought that it should appeal to the Arabs seeing that it would set a definite limit to the Jewish national home, and would free the Arabs from any fear of Jewish domination. The difficulty which he saw in the suggestion made by the Minister was that such a proposal involved (1) stoppage of Jewish immigration; (2) putting the Jews as a permanent minority in Palestine. He had never supposed that Palestine could hold all the Jews in the world, or even anything like all the refugee Jews from Central Europe; that, indeed, had been made plain by the British representative at the Evian Conference. But he was quite sure that the House of Commons would not accept any scheme, even if the British Government were themselves prepared to put it forward, which involved stopping Jewish immigration and committing us here and now to the Jews being in the position of permanent minority. He himself agreed with the attitude which the House of Commons was likely to adopt, but he wanted to make it clear that he was quite prepared to stand for whatever he thought right despite objections raised by either party to the dispute: Jewish objections would not weigh with him more than Arab objections if he felt that proposals were in themselves fair and reasonable.

The Minister said that of course the scheme which he had outlined could be improved in this direction or in that. Would it meet Mr. MacDonald's point if "symbolic" immigration were permitted?

Mr. MacDonald said that in his view symbolic immigration would not suffice.

The Minister then suggested that some arrangement might be arrived at on the basis of allowing the Jews to reach in numbers a fixed proportion of the total population: the figures which he mentioned was 35 per cent.

Mr. MacDonald pointed out that that arrangement would mean that the Jews were to be a permanent minority. The House of Commons would, as he had already said, resist such a proposal, not because they were "pro-Jewish" but because they felt that such an arrangement would run counter to the promise made in 1917. By resisting the idea that it should now be settled that the Jews should always be a minority in Palestine, he did not mean that he was in favour of the Jews ultimately becoming a majority. He did not prejudice that issue. But it would not be reasonable to make a permanent arrangement on such arbitrary lines as a 35 per cent. proportion of Jews to total population; the House of Commons would be sure to say that the British Government should not commit itself now for all time; we must wait to see how things would develop, and not attempt



here and now to fix permanent limits. He would be prepared to consider some agreement which laid down limits for a period of years, leaving the matter open after that. Most treaties were made for a limited number of years, since it was impossible to foresee what conditions might exist further ahead. He agreed that there should be some assurance that the Jews should never be allowed to dominate the Arabs in Palestine, and *vice versa*.

*Nuri Pasha* enquired how long Jewish immigration into Palestine was to continue.

*Mr. MacDonald* said that it was this point of setting some limit to Jewish immigration which he had in mind when speaking of the benefits of partition from the Arab point of view. At present, there was no limit at all to the Jewish national home. The Government had hitherto determined Jewish immigration on the basis of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. If there were partition, Jewish immigration would be limited to the Jewish State, and the British Government would be willing to ensure that the boundaries were not overstepped by the Jews except so far as the Arab State might be willing to admit Jews.

*The Minister* said that, speaking solely for himself and not for the Iraqi Government, he felt that the Peel scheme of partition, if there were partition, would be quite unfair to the Arabs. If Palestine had to be divided between Jews and Arabs, it was reasonable to give each race a share of all parts of the country, *i.e.*, seaboard, plain, mountains. A line might be drawn across Palestine from west to east, starting at Tel Aviv on the coast, and giving to the Jews the part south of that line. The principle upon which the Peel Commission had proceeded of trying to give to the Jews an area covering existing Jewish settlements, was inequitable; under that scheme, all the good land would go to the Jews and the inferior land to the Arabs.

*The Minister* further said that from enquiries he had made he was convinced that Arabs were afraid of a Jewish State. The Jews were so powerful a people with much money behind them: and they were aggressive.

*Nuri Pasha* said that Jews and Arabs ought to reach a reasonable agreement between themselves with a view to living together in Palestine, and he had tried to reach such an agreement with Dr. Weizmann; but there was great difficulty in coming to any such agreement with the Zionists.

*Mr. MacDonald* said that he was very grateful to the Minister and *Nuri Pasha* for coming and telling him their views. These views would certainly be taken into account when the Government were considering policy on receipt of the Woodhead Report. He made it clear that he was very anxious for the earliest possible settlement.

*The Minister*, in thanking *Mr. MacDonald* for the interview, said that he would be returning to Iraq in two or three days' time, but that *Nuri Pasha* would be remaining here, and would be able to keep in touch.

*Mr. MacDonald* thanked the Minister and said that we should also keep the Iraqi Government informed through our ambassador in Bagdad.

A. C. C. P.

October 8, 1938.

[E 5427/10/31]

No. 89.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).*

(No. 2365.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 14, 1938.

IN the conversation with *Mr. Campbell* on the subject of the Mufti of Jerusalem which your Excellency reported in your despatch No. 1006 of the 1st September, the head of the African Section at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that he had received information that an emissary had been sent

to the mufti with a message from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and enquired whether this, if true, portended a change in the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the mufti. *M. Lagarde's* information that some special message has been sent to the mufti is not, however, entirely correct. The facts are that a certain Dr. Tannous, a Palestinian Arab who has recently spent much time in London, has seen the Secretary of State for the Colonies on several occasions and discussed with him the situation in Palestine. In the course of these conversations, *Mr. MacDonald* asked him to impress on his Arab friends the great harm that was being done to the Arab cause by the terrorist campaign. Dr. Tannous is known to have visited the Lebanon in the course of the last few weeks and no doubt he has communicated with the mufti, so that his visit may well have given rise to the rumour mentioned by *M. Lagarde*.

2. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the mufti has not changed. Your Excellency will observe from the enclosed copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine that in his opinion it is becoming increasingly important that the mufti should be removed from the vicinity of the frontier.<sup>(1)</sup>

3. It is clear from your despatch under reference that the French Government have finally decided that they cannot require the mufti to leave French mandated territory. They are apparently prepared to consider his transfer to Latakia, though I understand that they would prefer that he should remain in a Christian area, where they would be able, if necessary, to keep him under a strict surveillance that would amount almost to internment.

4. Of these alternatives I am inclined to favour the proposal that the mufti should, if possible, be settled in Latakia, more especially as this town is five hours by car further than Beirut from the Palestinian border. His Majesty's Government will accordingly be very grateful if the French Government will now arrange for this to be done, although if, on further consideration, the French authorities should find some unexpected difficulties in the way of this course, there would be no objection to his internment in some remote Christian village in the northern Lebanon. The main thing is that he should be removed from Beirut to some more remote district where he can be better guarded than at Beirut and where his intrigues are likely to be less harmful to public security in Palestine.

5. If, as I hope, the French Government prove willing to take this action as soon as possible, I shall be glad if I may be informed a few days beforehand of the date on which they propose to make it known to the mufti himself and to the public generally that his removal to a more remote place of internment is to be effected.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Bagdad and to the acting British Consul-General at Beirut.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6092/10/31]

No. 90.

*Mr. Mack to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 19.)*

(No. 1198.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 18, 1938.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 2365 of the 14th October on the subject of the Mufti of Jerusalem, I have the honour to report that I to-day handed to the head of the African Section at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs a memorandum in the sense of your Lordship's instructions.

2. *M. Lagarde* said that His Majesty's Government might be assured that the French Government fully understood their anxieties in this matter and that their only desire was to be helpful. He himself thought that it would be possible to move the Mufti either to Latakia or to some Christian village in the mountains in the neighbourhood of Sir—not to Sir itself, which was Mahometan. He would telegraph at once to the High Commissioner in Syria, and would

[19309]

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communicate the French Government's decision at a very early date. He seemed fully to realise the need for an early decision. M. Lagarde expected that the Mufti would strongly protest against being moved, and he added that he had more than once threatened to commit suicide. I remarked that people who threatened to commit suicide were often those who were least inclined to do so. I have, &c.

W. H. B. MACK.

[E 6102/10/31]

No. 91.

*Viscount Halifax to Consul MacKereth (Damascus).*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 19, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 43 to Jerusalem [of 18th October: Position of the Mufti].

If you have not already done so, please issue immediate statement denying categorically that His Majesty's Government have issued any invitation to the Mufti to come to London, or had any communication with him whatsoever. Terms should be telegraphed to me.

(Addressed to Damascus, No. 18. Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 490.)

[E 6151/10/31]

No. 92.

*Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Damascus, October 20, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 19th October.

Following is text of *démenti* published to-day in the local French and vernacular press:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Consulate in Damascus wishes to make it known that information published in the press to the effect that the Mufti of Jerusalem, Alhaj Amin Hussein, has refused an invitation to proceed to London to undertake negotiations with the British Government is entirely without foundation.

"His Majesty's Government has had no communication directly or indirectly with Alhaj Amin Hussein."

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 44.)

[E 6223/10/31]

No. 93.

*Sir R. Lindsay to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 25.)*

(No. 923.)

My Lord,

*Washington, October 18, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 377 and 378 of the 14th October, I have the honour to report that the situation in Palestine, and the rumour that His Majesty's Government were contemplating the stoppage of Jewish immigration, have formed the subjects of a number of recent leading articles in the American press.

2. There is little variety in the comments. The difficulty of the mandatory Government's position is generally recognised, but the degree of sympathy for His Majesty's Government in their thankless task is conditioned by reflections that the position has been made worse by irresolution and incompetence in the past, by conflicting promises made to Jews and Arabs during the Great War and by failure to use force when force was plainly necessary. To some, the crisis in Palestine is but a part of a general crisis through which the British Empire is thought to be going. It is generally held that a solution of the Palestine problem must somehow be found before long, but it is universally

agreed that no solution will be just or acceptable to American opinion which is made at the expense of the Jews.

3. The New York press, as might be expected, appears to be solidly pro-Jewish. It gives much prominence to the many protests which have recently been made to the President and the Secretary of State, and both the *New York Times* and the *New York Tribune* print in full the State Department's communiqué reported in my telegram No. 378, the text of which is enclosed herein. The former, which a few days earlier had announced that under the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 no change could be made in the terms of the mandate without the consent of the United States, passes over in silence the careful correction made in the communiqué and heads the article: "Hull Pledges Talk to Britain on Zion." The latter announces: "Hull Pledges United States Will Help Jews All It Can In Palestine," and carries an article by Walter Lippman (a Jew) headed "Britain at Bay," which points out that Palestine, with the Mediterranean, is one of the three vital strategic areas (the others being Western Europe and the Far East) in which redoubled threats to British security are likely results of the Munich settlement. This writer, and one or two others, mention German and Italian intrigues as contributory causes of the crisis in Palestine.

4. The *Washington Herald* prints an article by "a Gentile reader" who reminds Americans that Scripture has promised Palestine to the Jews and that Americans must therefore take care "lest perchance she be found fighting against the angels." The *Washington Star*, while admitting that the right of immigration is not one of those which may not be altered without consent of the United States, asserts that America, "as a supporter of the national home and as an indirect adherent to the terms of the mandate, desires to see immigration into Palestine continued." It takes care to explain that this interest "arises not only from America's population of more than 6 million Jews, but from humanitarian considerations as well, which are particularly pressing at this moment." The *Washington Post* (Jewish owned) says: "This humanitarian appeal cannot be ignored by London." The *Philadelphia Inquirer* says that it would be "unthinkable" that the Jews should be betrayed "were it not for the British Government's recent about-face in the case of other oppressed minorities." It urges the United States Government to insist that no decision affecting the welfare of the Jews in Palestine be taken without full consultation with Washington. The article is headed: "Britain Must Keep Her Pledge." The *Baltimore Sun* considers that British interests as well as British honour require that the Jewish case should prevail: "The British mandate in Palestine, the friendship and loyalty of the 400,000 Jews there, and the continued building of a strong and modern State appear better guarantees of British interests than some understanding with an uncertain Arab federation, brought about by submission to terror."

5. Further west, opinion appears to be less downright. The *Chicago Daily News* gave the case for both sides in a series of despatches from Jerusalem at the end of August and tended to put the blame for terrorism on the young Revisionists. The *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* sees the problem as rooted in conflicting Jewish and Arab claims to Palestine as a traditional homeland and thinks that partition will not solve it. At the same time, if His Majesty's Government were to abandon Palestine to its fate, not only would British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and further afield be seriously impaired, but the promises made to both Jews and Arabs would be broken. A miracle is what Great Britain needs. The *Indianapolis Star* says that anything short of maintaining in Palestine the national Jewish homeland would be a breach of trust. To the *Louisville Courier-Journal* a judgment of Solomon seems required in order to effect an equitable settlement, but, as this is probably impossible, a compromise may be expected when order has been restored.

6. I have not yet received from His Majesty's consular representatives a selection of editorials from the Pacific Coast; but there is no reason to suppose that they will differ essentially from the rest.

7. The Scripps-Howard *New York World-Telegram*, in a leading article headed: "Eretz Israel," cites the conflicting British wartime promises to Jews and Arabs and says that "between the two, the British have muddled and blundered. They have moved from one untenable stand to another," but, while dwelling on the tragic situation of Jewry in general, it recognises that Palestine



alone is too small to house all those Jews who desire to settle there, and it ends without making any definite recommendation. The Hearst policy is to say in capital letters that a pledge has been given to the Jews and must be fulfilled. Mr. Hearst is also among those who appear to believe that no change can be made in the mandate without American approval.

8. Prominence is given by eastern papers to a personal appeal to the President made by Senator Robert F. Wagner, who states that he told Mr. Roosevelt that "the contemplated action of the British Government was a complete reversal of its traditional policy for the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine," and that the stoppage of Jewish immigration "would be nothing short of calamitous." The President, he said, assured him of his deep concern and interest in the question.

9. The city council of New York has also made representations to the White House; and some speculation has been aroused by a visit which Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the Supreme Court, paid to the President. Mr. Brandeis is a Jew who has long been interested in the Zionist movement, and although he has never taken part in politics, it has now been rumoured that despite his age he would be willing to resign his seat in the Supreme Court to become head of a special committee in connexion with the present crisis in world Jewry. Mr. Brandeis, however, refused to make any comment when asked if he had offered to resign.

I have, &c.  
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 93.

*Communiqué issued by the Department of State, October 14, 1938.*

WITHIN the past few days this Government has received a large number of telegrams and letters from individuals and organisations in the United States concerning the Palestine situation, with particular reference to the reported possibility of the application by the British Government of a new policy with respect to that country. It is obviously impracticable to reply separately to the many communications which have been received and this statement is therefore being issued in lieu of individual answers.

As is well known, the American people have for many years taken a close interest in the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine. Beginning with President Wilson, each succeeding President has on one or more occasions expressed his own interest in the idea of a national home and his pleasure at the progress made in its establishment. American sympathy in a Jewish homeland in Palestine was further manifested by the joint resolution of Congress signed by the President on the 21st September, 1922, recording the favourable attitude of the United States towards such a homeland. In submitting the resolution the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that it:—

"Expresses our moral interest in and our favourable attitude towards the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. It commits us to no foreign obligation or entanglement."

It is in the light of this interest that the American Government and people have watched with the keenest sympathy the development in Palestine of the national home, a project in which American intellect and capital have played a leading rôle.

On several occasions this Government has brought its views regarding the rights of the United States and its nationals in Palestine to the attention of the British Government. As recently as 1937 a formal exchange of correspondence took place, and the following self-explanatory paragraph is quoted from the concluding note dated the 4th August, 1937, communicated by the American Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office:—

"In expressing satisfaction and appreciation for the assurances furnished that His Majesty's Government intends to keep the United States Government fully informed of any proposals which may be made to the

Council of the League of Nations for the modification of the Palestine mandate, I am instructed to request that these proposals may be communicated to my Government in ample time to enable it to determine what, if any, observations it may desire to make with a view to the preservation of American rights in Palestine."

It is expected, therefore, that this Government will have an opportunity to submit its views to the British Government with respect to any changes affecting American rights which may be proposed in the Palestine mandate. These rights, which are defined by the American-British Mandate Convention or Treaty of the 3rd December, 1924, comprise non-discriminatory treatment in matters of commerce, non-impairment of vested American property rights, permission for American nationals to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in Palestine, safeguards with respect to the judiciary, and, in general, equality of treatment with all other foreign nationals.

The rights of the United States in connexion with any changes in the terms of the Palestine mandate are set forth in article 7 of the above-mentioned treaty, which reads as follows:—

"Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States."

This article is substantially identical with corresponding articles included in eight other existing agreements concluded by this Government with respect to the mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon, former German islands in the North Pacific, French Cameroons, French Togoland, Belgian East Africa, British Cameroons, British East Africa and British Togoland. None of these articles empower the Government of the United States to prevent the modification of the terms of any of the mandates. Under their provisions, however, this Government can decline to recognise the validity of the application to American interests of any modification of the mandates unless such modification has been assented to by the Government of the United States.

It is the Department's understanding that the Palestine Partition Commission, which was appointed some months ago to make recommendations with respect to partition, will make its report to the British Government at the end of this month and that no decision will be reached by that Government on the subject until after an opportunity has been had to give consideration to that report. In reply to a question in the House of Commons on the 6th October, 1938, Mr. MacDonald, British Colonial Secretary, is reported to have stated that the House of Commons would not be in the position of having to confirm or reject a decision already taken and put into operation, but would have an opportunity of considering the policy before it was adopted and put into operation by the British Government.

The Department will, of course, continue to follow the situation closely and will take all necessary measures for the protection of American rights and interests in Palestine.

[E 6209/10/31]

No. 94.

*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 25.)*

(No. 1131.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, October 20, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 545 of the 20th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter presented to me to-day by a deputation of the Arab Parliamentary Congress and enclosing the resolutions of this congress as regards Palestine.

2. The document begins by an argument regarding the alleged invalidity of the Balfour Declaration in view of the previous promises made by Great Britain to the Arabs of subsequent declarations by President Wilson and the Allies and of article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.



3. The statement then deals with Jewish immigration. The writers, while maintaining that this immigration was a violation of Arab rights, state that the congress, in its desire to co-operate with Great Britain, is prepared to accept the Jews already in Palestine on condition that further immigration is definitely prohibited. This statement is followed by an argument to the effect that the Balfour Declaration has been fulfilled by the Jewish immigration which Great Britain has already facilitated into Palestine.

4. The partition of Palestine is then condemned because it would create two neighbouring hostile States between which exchanges of population and property, &c., would be impossible. Partition, moreover, would deprive the Arabs of the bulk of their wealth and of an outlet to the sea.

5. The document closes with the resolutions which were already reported to you in my telegram No. 538 of the 12th October, 1938.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

*Letter from Arab Parliamentary Congress to His Majesty's Ambassador.*

Excellency,

Cairo, October 19, 1938.

WE have the honour, on behalf of "The World Parliamentary Congress for the Defence of Palestine," to submit to your Excellency a copy—with its English translation—of the resolutions of the said congress, which held its meetings in Cairo from the 7th to the 12th of this month. We beg your Excellency to send the same to the British Government and hope that you may advise them to carry out these decisions, in the interest of all parties interested.

We beg, &c.

Mohamed Ali Pasha, Senator, President of the Execution Committee of the Congress:

MOH. A. ALLOUBA.

Fares Bey El Khouri, President of the Parliament of Syria:

F. KHOURI.

Tewfik Doss Pasha, Deputy of the Egyptian Parliament:

TEWFIK DOSS.

Hamad Pasha El Bassel, Deputy of the Egyptian Parliament:

HAMAD-AL-BASSEL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

*Resolutions of Arab Parliamentary Congress.*

THE World Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem Countries for the Defence of Palestine met in Cairo from the 13th Shaban to the 17th Shaban, 1357, A.H. (7th to the 11th October, 1938, A.D.), composed of representatives from India, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Yemen, Yugoslavia, the Maghrib (Riff and Morocco), China, and of the Arab emigrants in America, and after hearing the statements made by the spokesmen of these delegations, and after perusal of the reports presented by Arab and Moslem groups resident in Europe, Asia, Africa, the United States of America, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, has unanimously decided as follows:—

#### I.—Re the Balfour Declaration.

During the course of the Great World War, the late Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, speaking in the name of the Arabs, sent to Sir Arthur McMahon, the then British High Commissioner in Egypt, in his capacity as the representative of the

British Government, a letter on the 14th July, 1915, in which he laid down his conditions for revolting against the Ottoman Empire and entering the war on the side of the Allies. The following is an extract from his letter:—

"England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to 37 of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island (Jezireh), up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina."

Sir Henry McMahon, in his reply to the above, dated the 30th August, 1915, stated as follows:—

"I have the honour to thank your Highness for the expression of your friendly sentiments towards England, and it gives me pleasure to note that in the opinion of your Highness and that of your advisers Arab interests are identical with those of Great Britain. In this connexion I refer to the contents of the letter sent to you by Lord Kitchener, in which our desire for the independence of Arabs and the Arab countries has been placed on record, but in regard to the question of frontiers it appears that in view of the present war conditions it would be inopportune to discuss the details. . . ."

Sherif Hussein, against this failure to settle the question of the frontiers, protested in a letter dated the 9th September, 1915, addressed to Sir Henry McMahon, in which he said:—

"Your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coldness and hesitation displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries . . . might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of that sort."

Sir Henry McMahon answered the above on the 24th October, 1915, as follows:—

"I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me the moment had not arrived when they could be profitably discussed. I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter; and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which, I am confident, you will receive with satisfaction:—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurance and make the following reply to your letter: Subject to the above modification, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Great Britain will guarantee the holy places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories."

Other communications were also exchanged between the two parties, confirming the above letters, showing that Sherif Hussein, in view of the then existing state of war, agreed to postpone the discussion concerning the territories in which France claimed to have an interest, reserving to himself the right to resume discussion of the question after the termination of the war.



Whereas all this correspondence, and particularly Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, as representative of Great Britain, categorically recognised Arab independence within the boundaries laid down by Sherif Hussein, on behalf of the Arabs, and which boundaries included Palestine and to which the sole exception was the territory then excluded from that discussion and of which no part lay within Palestine.

As a result of the recognition and pledge given by the British Government to defend their independence, the Arabs revolted against the Government of their Sultan and Khalifa of the Moslems to attain that end. The Arabs, including Palestinians, entered the war on the side of the British and their allies, which resulted in the final victory of all, and thus the independence of the Arabs as a whole was *ipso facto* a natural result of the victory of the Allies.

The British Government, however, through its Minister, Mr. Balfour, addressed the following declaration on the 2nd November, 1917, to Lord Rothschild:—

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or their rights and political status of enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."

The congress does hereby announce that the Balfour Declaration is null and void for the following reasons:—

(1) That it is a transgression on the rights of the Arabs, who won their independence as a result of their alliance with Great Britain and their joint victory in the war, and because of the fact that the said declaration was made by one who had no right to make it. Further, if Great Britain had not pledged itself to support and guarantee Arab independence, the Arabs would have never waged war against their Sultan and Khalifa, nor would they have shed their blood in overthrowing the Ottoman Empire to be ultimately placed under the domination of the Jews.

(2) That the nullity of the declaration has further been established by the principles enunciated by President Wilson in December 1917, and endorsed by the Allies, one of which was:—

"The complete sovereignty of the Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire should be guaranteed, but the other peoples (the non-Turkish elements) who are under Turkish rule should be allowed to live in peace and tranquillity and should be afforded the chance of developing self-governing institutions without any interference or molestation."

(3) That the nullity of the declaration has also been confirmed by the joint proclamation made by England and France on the 7th November, 1918, to all Arab peoples, which reads as follows:—

"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations. In order to carry out these intentions, France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations. In Syria (which then included Palestine) and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and in recognising these as soon as they are established. Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to secure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and Administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves."

(4) That article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was signed by the Allies on the 28th June, 1919, being inconsistent with the spirit of the Covenant, also establishes the nullity of this declaration. Paragraph 4 of article 22 says:—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory."

As a necessary result of the aforementioned established facts and pledges, which confirmed the natural rights of the Arabs in their independence, the embodiment of the Balfour Declaration in the text of the mandate for Palestine, dated the 24th June, 1922, is totally illegal and null and void *ab initio*.

## II.—Re Jewish Immigration.

The congress declares that Jewish immigration which followed into the country as a result of the Balfour Declaration was one of the worst calamities that befell Palestine. And whereas this declaration, as has already been shown, is null and void, it constitutes a clear violation of the rights of the Arabs and therefore justice demands that the *status quo* before the Balfour Declaration should be re-established and Jewish immigration declared illegal *ab initio*.

Nevertheless, this congress, actuated by a genuine desire to co-operate with the British Government for the solution of the problem and for the maintenance of good relations between Great Britain, on the one hand, and Arab and Moslem countries, on the other, recommends that the people of Palestine should make a sacrifice by agreeing to the existing *status quo*, namely, to accept the Jews who are already in Palestine on the condition that further Zionist immigration is definitely prohibited, so that the difficulties resulting from such immigration, which has caused great harm to the country, may not be aggravated.

This solution, so favourable to the Jews, should be acceptable to the British Government because, even if the Balfour Declaration were to be considered to have a legal foundation (a fact which the congress in no way admits), it does not promise to the Jews a Jewish State in Palestine, but all that it states is that "Great Britain views with favour the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine." There is a great difference between these two statements and the solution proposed justifies the assumption that Great Britain has fulfilled its promise to the Jews by having facilitated their immigration into Palestine which has resulted in the fact that there is at present in Palestine a population of over 400,000 Jews, a fact which realises "viewing with favour" the creation of a national home for them.

Any other interpretation of the Balfour Declaration would mean that it was desired to make Palestine Jewish, which is contradictory to the text of the declaration itself. This attitude on the part of Great Britain would offend Christians and Moslems throughout the world and would be resisted by the Arabs and the Moslems with all the power at their command. The congress does not deem it necessary to lay further stress on the danger to Palestine of Jewish immigration as this danger has been acknowledged in the reports of the commissions of enquiry, particularly in that of the Shaw Parliamentary Commission.

## III.—Re Partition of Palestine.

The partition of Palestine is not less dangerous than the Jewish immigration nor is it compatible with the British declaration that Great Britain "entered the war in the East for the purpose of emancipating its peoples and the establishment of national Governments in accordance with the wishes of the people." It is also inconsistent with the declaration that "the welfare of the people and their development are a trust of civilisation."

Partition would create in Palestine two neighbouring hostile States between which it is impossible to imagine the possibility of an exchange of inhabitants, property and holy places, such as mosques and cemeteries, &c.



Furthermore, partition would deprive the Arabs of their property which represents the bulk of their wealth in the territory proposed to be ceded to the Jewish State and would also deprive them of an outlet to the sea, while the Jews possess hardly any property of any value, and have no population, in the barren mountainous regions intended to form the Arab State.

In addition to what has been stated above the Arabs do not recognise the legality of the Balfour Declaration, even if it only aimed at the establishment of a spiritual home for the Jews. How then would they acquiesce in the attachment of the best and the most fertile region of their country while it is proposed to place them in the barren rocky regions where they would be starved and annihilated.

The congress, therefore, resolves:—

- (1) That the Balfour Declaration is null and void *ab initio* and that it has no value whatsoever in the eyes of the Arabs and Moslems.
- (2) That it is essential that henceforth Jewish immigration into Palestine be definitely prohibited.
- (3) That the congress refuses to recognise the partition of Palestine in any form or manner whatsoever, and insists that Palestine be maintained in its entirety as an Arab country.
- (4) That it is essential to establish a national constitutional Government with a representative Assembly elected by Arabs and Jews on the basis of representation in proportion to their numbers in the population, and that a treaty of friendship and alliance between Palestine and Great Britain be signed which would *ipso facto* terminate the mandate.
- (5) That a general amnesty be declared for all persons accused of, or sentenced for, taking part in the Palestine revolution; all internees and prisoners released and all deportees and political exiles be repatriated.
- (6) That the congress considers the acceptance of the above demands as the only solution of the problem of Palestine and the only means for the re-establishment of peace and tranquillity in the country and for the creation of goodwill between Great Britain and Moslems.  
In the event of their non-acceptance, the Arab and Moslem peoples throughout the world will be compelled to regard the attitude of the British and Jews as inimical to them, forcing the Arabs and the Moslems to adopt a similar attitude with its natural consequences on the political, economic and social relations.
- (7) The congress appeals to the rulers and Governments of Arab and Moslem countries and their peoples to proceed with the execution of these decisions by all the means at their disposal and to communicate them to the British Government and to the League of Nations.
- (8) The congress elects a permanent committee with power to act on its behalf, with headquarters at Cairo, to carry out the decisions of the congress by adopting whatever means it may deem fit and with power to nominate any delegates and to co-opt members and add to their numbers by a majority of votes. The said committee is composed of the following:—

- (1) Mohamed Ali Allouba Pasha, *Chairman*.
- (2) Mawloud Mokhless Pasha.
- (3) Faris Bey El Khouri.
- (4) Hamad Pasha El Bassel.
- (5) Jubran Bey El Tuwaini.
- (6) Tewfik Doss Pasha.
- (7) Dr. Abdul Hamid Bey Saied.
- (8) Abdul Rahman Bey El Siddiqi.
- (9) Jamal Bey El Hussein.
- (10) Aouni Bey Abdul Habi.
- (11) Alfred Bey Rock.

[E 6355/1/31]

No. 95.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 30.)*

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 30, 1938.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 116 and 117 of 28th and 29th October.

Ibn Saud will be delighted at the abandonment of partition proposal, and will, I think, be gratified at the invitation to participate in conference. He has, of course, already given his views on the policy to be adopted, and they are probably unacceptable to His Majesty's Government as a whole, but as they were confidential he can, perhaps, retreat from them. He may object to participation of Jewish Agency in the conference on equal terms with Arab delegates as implying recognition of Balfour Declaration, but I am hopeful that he could be induced to withdraw this objection. In any case, Ibn Saud could not be expected to give definite reply until he had consulted other recipients of the invitation from His Majesty's Government, as he will never take up a position from which he might have to retreat, but I believe he would use his influence in favour of acceptance of the invitation.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 22; Bagdad, No. 26; and Jerusalem, No. 34.)

[E 6381/1/31]

No. 96.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 162.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 31, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 540 to Cairo.

I have not yet been able to study first draft statement of policy, which is being decyphered now. But the following is my appreciation of effect in Iraq of action indicated:—

2. Abandonment of partition should produce a large measure of satisfaction, though this will be tempered by disappointment (a) that emergence of an independent Palestine State is not brought appreciably nearer, (b) that the key question of Jewish immigration is left unsettled also. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been freely anticipating an independent Palestine since his return.

3. There will be little enthusiasm for proposed conference, especially if the mufti is to be excluded and representatives of moderate Jewish opinion are not to be included in addition to nominees of Jewish agency.

4. Nevertheless, I anticipate that Iraqi Government will be ready to use their influence (whatever it may be) with Palestine leaders to bring insurrection to an end, as also to make conference a success. Strong plea for admission of the mufti [two groups undecypherable].

(Repeated to Cairo and Jedda.)

[E 6506/1/31]

No. 97.

*Palestine: Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 7, 1938.)*

THE Royal Commission, presided over by the late Earl Peel, published its report in July 1937, and proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of a scheme of partition under which independent Arab and Jewish States would be established, while other areas would be retained under mandatory administration. In their statement of policy following upon the publication of the report, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom announced their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Royal Commission, and expressed the view that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the commission represented the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.



2. The proposal of the commission was framed in the light of the information available at the time, and it was generally recognised that further detailed examination would be necessary before it could be decided whether such a solution would prove practicable. This proposal was subsequently discussed in Parliament and at meetings of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations, when His Majesty's Government received authority to explore the practical application of the principle of partition. A despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine,<sup>(1)</sup> announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to undertake the further investigations required for the drawing up of a more precise and detailed scheme. It was pointed out that the final decision could not be taken in merely general terms, and that the further enquiry would provide the necessary material on which to judge, when the best possible partition scheme had been formulated, its equity and practicability. The despatch also defined the functions and terms of reference of the technical commission, who were appointed to visit Palestine for the purpose of submitting in due course to His Majesty's Government proposals for such a detailed scheme.

3. His Majesty's Government have now received the report of the Palestine Partition Commission, who have carried out their investigations with great thoroughness and efficiency, and have collected material which will be very valuable in the further consideration of policy. Their report is now published, together with a summary of their conclusions. It will be noted that the four members of the commission advise unanimously against the adoption of the scheme of partition outlined by the Royal Commission. In addition to the Royal Commission's scheme, two other schemes, described as plans B and C, are examined in the report. One member prefers plan B. Two other members, including the chairman, consider that plan C is the best scheme of partition which, under the terms of reference, can be devised. A fourth member, while agreeing that plan C is the best that can be devised under the terms of reference, regards both plans as impracticable. The report points out that under either plan, while the budget of the Jewish State is likely to show a substantial surplus, the budgets of the Arab State (including Transjordan) and of the mandated territories are likely to show substantial deficits. The commission reject as impracticable the Royal Commission's recommendation for a direct subvention from the Jewish State to the Arab State. They think that on economic grounds a customs union between the States and the mandated territories is essential, and they examine the possibility of finding the solution for the financial and economic problems of partition by means of a scheme based upon such a union. They consider that any such scheme would be inconsistent with the grant of fiscal independence to the Arab and Jewish States. Their conclusion is that, on a strict interpretation of their terms of reference, they have no alternative but to report that they are unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States.

4. His Majesty's Government, after careful study of the Partition Commission's report, have reached the conclusion that this further examination has shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable.

5. His Majesty's Government will therefore continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine. They are now faced with the problem of finding alternative means of meeting the needs of the difficult situation described by the Royal Commission, which will be consistent with their obligations to the Arabs and the Jews. His Majesty's Government believe that it is possible to find these alternative means. They have already given much thought to the problem in the light of the reports of the Royal Commission and of the Partition Commission. It is clear that the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews, and His Majesty's Government are prepared in the first instance to make a determined effort to promote such an understanding. With this end in view, they propose immediately to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of neighbouring States on the one hand, and of the Jewish Agency on the other, to

<sup>(1)</sup> Cmd. 5634.

confer with them as soon as possible in London regarding future policy, including the question of immigration into Palestine. As regards the representation of the Palestinian Arabs, His Majesty's Government must reserve the right to refuse to receive those leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence.

6. His Majesty's Government hope that these discussions in London may help to promote agreement as to future policy regarding Palestine. They attach great importance, however, to a decision being reached at an early date. Therefore, if the London discussions should not produce agreement within a reasonable period of time, they will take their own decision in the light of their examination of the problem and of the discussions in London, and announce the policy which they propose to pursue.

7. In considering and settling their policy His Majesty's Government will keep constantly in mind the international character of the mandates with which they have been entrusted and their obligations in that respect.

[E 6604/1/31]

No. 98.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)*

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 9, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 563 [sic].

Owing to my indisposition, the counsellor communicated yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs copies of the Partition Commission's report, summary of report and His Majesty's Government's statement of policy on Palestine. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was warned that these documents were strictly confidential until 7 p.m. to-night.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs' first personal reactions were good. He said that the statement seemed to him to be excellent, and that plan for discussions in London was just what he had recommended when he was there last month. When he read the last sentence of paragraph 5 he at once ejaculated: "I know this means that you do not want the Mufti." The counsellor said that this was so, whereupon the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in his opinion, there was no need for the Mufti to take part in the proposed discussions.

He thought that discussions should have every chance of success, but it seemed to him to be essential first to bring about a cessation of the present hostilities which were deplorable from every point of view. He felt sure that it would be possible for the Iraqi Government to use their influence effectively to this end if they were in a position to give reassuring information to the Palestinian Arabs as to the basis on which the London discussion would proceed.

He said that he would discuss the whole question with his colleagues and communicate considered observations to me as soon as possible.

As regards London discussions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that the essential condition of success was that there should be a basic understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government on the main issues before the discussions opened. Iraq could then use her influence to bring other Arabs into line; His Majesty's Government should, he suggested, do the same with the Jews. The counsellor offered no comment on this suggestion, but took the opportunity of speaking on the lines indicated in your paragraph 4.

I foresee that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is likely soon to revert to the suggestion mentioned in paragraph 3 above, that reassuring information should be given to the Palestinian Arabs about bases of the London discussion. If he does, I propose pointing out that statement of policy shows intention of His Majesty's Government to do everything possible to bring about an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews, and to say clearly that no undertaking can possibly be given which would tend to prejudice questions which will have to be discussed.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 15; Cairo, No. 17; and Jerusalem, No. 24.)



[E 6699/10/31]

No. 99.

*Consul-General Havard (No. 16) to High Commissioner, Jerusalem.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 12.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, November 11, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 285.

Reactions to statement of policy on Palestine have been slow to take definite shape, but following are main lines as indicated by press comments and personal contacts here:—

2. Natural satisfaction at abandonment of partition is overshadowed by disappointment at failure to grant outright at least some of Arab demands, particularly as regards suspension of Jewish immigration for a long period, and, in a lesser degree, prohibition of land sales.

3. Conference proposal, coupled with wireless report of decision to exclude the Mufti therefrom, is widely criticised. General view is that only the Mufti's party have any claim to represent Palestine Arabs and that no other Palestinian will dare to pose as a representative of Palestine Arabs at the conference for fear of subsequent vengeance of the Mufti; and that any decisions of the conference on which the Mufti is not represented will automatically be rejected by him and by Palestine Arabs as a whole. Extremist circles add that, in any case, Arabs would not sit down at a conference with Jews.

4. It is generally considered that disorders will continue until some further satisfaction is given to Arabs.

5. Feeling in short is that the statement of policy does very little to bring about a solution of Palestine problem.

(Repeated to Damascus, Saving.)

[E 6805/10/31]

No. 100.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 12.)*

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 11, 1938.

IBN SAUD regards statement of policy on Palestine with relief and satisfaction. He accepts invitation to appoint representatives for London discussions and seems pleased to be asked. He does not question exclusion of organisers of terrorism, and refers to the Mufti with amused condescension.

He has not yet raised any of the expected objections or tried to impose conditions. I suspect that he hopes for a solution more favourable to the Arabs than seems possible, but he realises that immigration must be discussed. He is awaiting news of effect produced by statement in Palestine and proposes to make soundings there about suitable representatives, but his refusal to make public stand against His Majesty's Government has been severely attacked in other Arab countries, especially since the recent Cairo Conference and his influence abroad may be weaker than he thinks.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 23, and Bagdad, No. 28.)

[E 6702/10/31]

No. 101.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 12.)*

(No. 162.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 12, 1938.

IBN SAUD asks whether his Government would [*sic*] mediate with any or all Arab rulers with a view to suspension of hostilities, but says it would be useless unless accompanied by some such concession as amnesty or release of prisoners.

I held out no hope that any such concession could be considered pending conclusion of London discussions, but said that I would transmit the offer, for which I knew you would be grateful.

[E 6726/10/31]

No. 102.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 13.)*

(No. 176.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, November 12, 1938.

NURI PASHA called this morning to take leave on departure for Egypt and United Kingdom, where he hopes to arrive about 20th November.

He made a special plea for admission to London discussions of Auni Abdul Hadi and Jamal Hussaini, who, he assured me, could be relied upon to work for a reasonable agreement. His comment on message in your telegram No. 170 was that Dr. Saleh, on third application, had received a visa, although he, too, had been excluded from Palestine. He also urged that some means should be found to enable Arabs of Syria and Le[banon] to be represented, and said that in his opinion [Farisal] Khouri (who is now in London with Alubha) would, if selected, make a good representative. He pointed out that Transjordan, although under a mandate, was to be invited.

Counsellor suggested to Nuri Pasha that he could take up these two points in London.

[E 6729/10/31]

No. 103.

*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 14.)*

(No. 1177.)

My Lord,

Cairo, November 2, 1938.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 559 of the 27th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a confidential letter from the commandant of the Cairo City Police to the Under-Secretary of State of the Interior regarding the anti-British and anti-Jewish agitation in Egypt over the Palestine question. Before addressing this letter to Rifaat Pasha, Russell Pasha had spoken to the Minister of the Interior himself on this subject.

2. With regard to the third paragraph of Russell Pasha's letter, no illustrations of British "atrocities" have, to the knowledge of the Oriental Secretariat, appeared in the local newspapers, but many illustrations of this nature have been given publicity in incendiary pamphlets about which frequent representations have been made to the Director-General of Public Security. Although in one or two instances he has been able to secure the suppression of such pamphlets, he has, as a rule, failed to do so. He has confidentially hinted that his difficulty is with the parquet, whose co-operation is lukewarm.

3. Italian propaganda is, as Russell Pasha points out, taking full advantage of the present situation. Although the ratification of the Anglo-Italian Agreement may put an end to these open activities, I fear that they will be pursued secretly to more or less the same extent. It will be remembered that anti-British propaganda was covertly carried on for several years before it became open in connexion with the Abyssinian affair.

4. German propaganda is probably more to be feared than Italian. As indicated in the last paragraph of my telegram under reference, I have no proof of specific German action to promote this anti-British movement, but there are general indications (in the bulletin of the Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro and in secret reports) that the Germans are conducting anti-British propaganda not only in Egypt but in the Near East generally. Their propaganda is much more skilfully conducted than the Italian, and its direction, according to secret information, is in the hands of very few individuals who, unlike the Italians, keep their mouths shut. It is, however, almost certain that anti-British German propaganda is at work in the Arab and Egyptian world, which is becoming, like pre-war Turkey, a favourable field for the spread of German influence. As in pre-war Turkey, Germany, owing to British and French policy, in some at least of these Arab countries, can easily represent the influence of England and France as inimical to the native interests. Germany, having, as yet, no territorial or political hold on these countries, is in the position of *tertius gaudens*, ever ready to exploit differences between the native populations and the great

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Western democracies. Palestine provides the most fertile field for this propaganda.

5. The Wafd, as indicated in my telegram under reference, and in Russell Pasha's letter, are seizing on the Palestine issue to conduct an anti-British campaign with a view to embarrass the Government and frighten His Majesty's Government into helping the Wafd back to power.

6. It will be noticed that Russell Pasha's information is that reliance cannot be placed on Egyptian officers in the police in the event of anti-Jewish riots. He even suggests that the Egyptian army, if called in to help the police, might be untrustworthy also. I am asking the head of the military mission for his opinion on this point.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 103.

*Commandant, Cairo City Police, to Egyptian Under-Secretary of State for the Interior.*

(Confidential.)

Excellency,

October 31, 1938.

AS you have no doubt noticed, the question of anti-British, anti-Jewish and pro-Palestinian propaganda and sentiment in Egypt is gradually gaining the sympathies of the Egyptian people as a whole, and before long it is likely to flare up in the way of demonstrations in Egypt, unless some practical solution is found covering the whole Palestinian question very soon.

Apart from the activities of the various Moslem religious associations formed in Egypt, and the members of the Moslem Congress, both male and female, the man in the street is openly antagonistic towards Great Britain's policy in Palestine.

All the Egyptian newspapers are openly defending the Palestine cause and many articles are now being written daily in the press, many of which are definitely anti-British; illustrations are likewise given of the supposed atrocities committed in Palestine by the British.

Open propaganda is likewise being shown in the Azhar, and the various mosques.

The Italian Propaganda Service is taking full advantage of the present situation by instituting anti-Jewish and anti-British propaganda amongst the students of the Italian colonies studying in Al Azhar. This has not been felt to any extent up to the present owing to the students of Al Azhar still being on holiday, but it is likely to break out on their return.

The Wafd, by vote recently taken, have the sympathy of the majority of the Egyptian University students, and are going to start the same propaganda; i.e., anti-British and pro-Palestinian propaganda as a means, principally, to embarrass the Government and to gain the sympathy of the Azharites.

In talking to Egyptian police officers the sympathies are definitely with the Arabs in Palestine and against British policy there.

This has been reported to me by the Assistant Commandants of divisions; also, in the case of pro-Palestinian or anti-Jew riots it is, therefore, very doubtful if much reliance can be placed on Egyptian officers in the police force or those under their commands.

Violent anti-Jewish pamphlets were distributed in Cairo after the Arab Congress; when the police asked whether these pamphlets should be confiscated they were told that the parquet would give instructions concerning them; no further instructions have been received.

If this feeling becomes general it might likewise affect the Egyptian army, who might be called in in case of severe riots, to help the Egyptian police.

I have, &c.

LEWA, Commandant, C.C.P.

[E 6702/10/31]

No. 104.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 14, 1938.*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 162 [of 12th November.]

You may inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government are grateful for his offer. They share his desire to see an early cessation of strife and bloodshed in Palestine, and are disposed to welcome any steps which he and other Arab rulers feel able to take to that end.

2. They notice that he uses the term "suspension of hostilities," and would be grateful if he could let them know rather more precisely what he has in mind. For example, rebel activities at the moment mean that Government authority is not complete in certain areas, e.g., Beersheba. If "hostilities" were to continue, it would only be a matter of a short time before our troops reoccupied those areas and the authority of the Government there was completely restored. Clearly a "suspension of hostilities" which postponed that process would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and they assume that Ibn Saud does not mean this. His Majesty's Government would regard it as an essential part of any arrangement that the authority of Government should be re-established in those areas, and that organised lawless activities throughout the country should cease.

3. If that is what he contemplated, His Majesty's Government would certainly give careful consideration to the possibility of a release of at any rate some political prisoners. (End of R.)

4. For your own information. We are now consulting High Commissioner in Jerusalem on the matter.

[E 6784/1/31]

No. 105.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 15.)*

(No. 177.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 15, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 175.

Yes.

Iraqis are expecting an invitation and I do not think various suggestions which they continue to put forward (please see my immediately following telegram) would prevent them from accepting it promptly.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 19.)

[E 6802/10/31]

No. 106.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 16.)*

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 16, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 170.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me this morning begging that following points might be given urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government:—

- (1) That Jewish immigrants might be stopped altogether pending final decision, whether reached as a result of deliberations of conference or unilaterally by His Majesty's Government.
- (2) That possibility should again be considered of utilisation of plan which he had presented in London as basis of conference. He urged that this plan did not entail total cessation of Jewish immigration, but that on the contrary allowed of very large immigration for two or three years after it came into force in order to bring Jews up to one-third of the population.

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- (3) That if his plan were not adopted, His Majesty's Government should themselves have a plan ready to serve as a basis for discussions.
- (4) That Syrians should be invited through French Government to send representatives.
- (5) After entering a long plea in favour of an invitation being extended to the Mufti, Minister for Foreign Affairs urged that, if this were really impossible, following should be invited to represent Palestine Arabs: Auni Abdul Hadi, Jamal Hussaini, Hilmi Pasha.

While undertaking to forward his Excellency's suggestions, I said that I saw no possibility of His Majesty's Government agreeing to (1), the effect of which would be to prejudge one of the most important decisions in advance of the conference.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 20; Jerusalem, No. 26; and Jedda, No. 16.)

[E 6818/10/31]

No. 107.

*Consul-General, Beirut, to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 16.)*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Beirut, November 16, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 26.

Following is gist of communication in the name of "Higher Arab Committee" which appears in the press to-day:—

2. While regretting long time taken to recognise the impracticability of partition, the committee welcome its abandonment.

3. They appreciate the invitation to other Arab countries to the conference on the future of Palestine, though expressing surprise that Syria and Lebanon should not be invited to send representatives while Transjordan, also a mandated country, is being invited, and regret that basis on which the conference will be held is not more clearly defined.

4. They refute the statement that problem is to reconcile Arab and Jewish rights in Palestine, denying the existence of the latter and declining to confer with the Jews.

5. With reference to His Majesty's Government's reservation regarding the reception of leaders they consider responsible for terrorism, committee points out that His Majesty's Government's policy, and not the Arabs, is responsible for disorders.

6. The committee claim to be the only body truly representative of Palestine Arabs.

7. They reject the possibility of imposed solution in the event of failure of the conference.

8. Finally, the committee restate their demands as follows:—

- (1) Recognition of Arab right to independence in Palestine.
- (2) Abandonment of Jewish national home.
- (3) Replacement of mandate by Anglo-Palestine Treaty on the lines of treaties with Iraq, &c.
- (4) Stoppage of Jewish immigration and land sales. They declare that the Arabs are prepared to give guarantees for the protection of British interests, of Holy Places and minorities.

Text follows by air mail.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Paris, Cairo and Bagdad; copy by bag to Damascus.)

[E 6860/1/31]

No. 108.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 17.)*

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 16, 1938.*

THE King said on 14th November categorically that he had sent advice to Iraq and Palestine not to insist on presence of Mufti or make conditions beforehand, but he had not yet received reply.

He spoke very strongly about Palestine. Following paragraph gives principal points:—

If London discussions fruitless and His Majesty's Government decide to continue present policy, they may have to impose it by force and Palestine Arabs will maintain their resistance to the death. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not allow themselves to get into position where they would be treating Arabs in Palestine as Jews are being treated in Germany. With the world in its present state it was futile to discuss whether Balfour Declaration justifiable or not. Point was what was possible now (implication of his remarks was that further Jewish immigration would be fatal to His Majesty's Government). As with Czechoslovakia, some sacrifice must be made to avoid greater evil. It would be tragic if, in case of general conflict, Arabs should be forced to join enemies of Great Britain. Arabs did not trust Italy and Germany, but desperate men would accept help from any quarter.

Ibn Saud gave very obscure hint that, if His Majesty's Government adopted a new policy requiring assistance and called in someone else (i.e., Abdullah) rather than their loyal friend and supporter Ibn Saud, he would be aggrieved. Fortunately, the remark was so vague assurance that His Majesty's Government gave their confidence to no one in Arab world more than to him met the case for the moment.

Helpful attitude of Ibn Saud towards suggested discussion is shown in first paragraph, but it is, I fear, [? group omitted] to expect his delegate will acquiesce in creation of scheme involving further Jewish immigration. He has said to me more than once, "if His Majesty's Government want to help the Jews, let them do so at their own expense, not at ours." That is his strong personal view, but he has to face criticism from other Arabs.

To-day Ibn Saud quoted the phrases from attack on Palestine policy by German Chancellor which he had heard on the wireless. That he said was the beginning.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 25, and Bagdad, No. 30.)

[E 6831/1/31]

No. 109.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 17.)*

(No. 165.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 17, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 131.

I can get no opinion out of Ibn Saud on this point. It is evident that he does not want to be [group undecipherable], [? as] he is finding the Iraqi Government and Palestine Arabs inclined to be stiff in their terms, while he is not in touch with Egyptian Government on the subject. Finally, he suggested, as the best way to avoid delay, ensure co-operation and utilise his influence, that London representatives of Egypt and Iraq and Ibn Saud should confer secretly in communication with His Majesty's Government as to terms on which representatives could attend London discussions and, meanwhile, campaign of violence in Palestine could perhaps be stopped.

If you approve this suggestion, he will instruct his minister in London and approach Iraq and Egyptian Governments.

(Repeated to Cairo and Bagdad.)



[E 6872/1/31]

No. 110.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 19.)*

(No. 166.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 19, 1938.*

IBN SAUD is in telegraphic correspondence with the Imam, who proposes, before deciding whether to send a delegate to London, to await decision of Palestine leaders, as they have repeatedly declined to discuss with Jews.

Meanwhile, Ibn Saud continues, he says, to urge moderation on Palestine Arabs.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 31, and Cairo, No. 26.)

[E 6875/1/31]

No. 111.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 19.)*

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 19, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 180.

I handed invitation in these terms to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, with verbal explanations based on your telegram No. 179.

His Excellency made it plain that there would be only one Iraqi delegate, with perhaps a private secretary. Nuri will be entirely unofficial and I see no reason why the Government's hospitality should be extended to him.

Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly wants to go to London himself. It is, I think, from this point of view, and not because there is any doubt of Iraq's acceptance of invitation, that he is anxious for reply to some of the points he has raised before Iraqi acceptance is conveyed to us.

It may be as well to summarise these points, since he has raised certain new ones in writing (despatch by next bag) since my telegram No. 178:—

(a) *Complete stoppage of Jewish immigration pending close of conference.*

I have prepared him for negative reply.

(b) *Invitation to Syrians (he does not care about the Lebanon).*

I told him that I did not think that His Majesty's Government could agree to this, and he now suggests that Iraqis should keep in touch with the Syrians and that Iraqi delegate should informally voice their views. While undertaking to forward this suggestion, I warned him that His Majesty's Government were bound to consider French susceptibilities.

(c) *Admissibility of three suggested representatives of Palestinian Arabs referred to in my telegram No. 178.*

(d) *Amnesty pending conclusion of the conference.*

I spoke in the sense of your telegram No. 131 to Jedda without mentioning Ibn Saud. I asked whether he meant if the Arabs not merely ceased to commit acts of terrorism and rebellion but *dispersed*, His Majesty's Government undertaking not to pursue and harry them. He said that this was what he did mean. He did not mention release of prisoners.

I disposed of the fifth point about which he is anxious, namely, that Iraqi delegate should have the opportunity to discuss the basis of the conference with His Majesty's Government and representatives of the other Arab States by pointing out that this was secured by His Majesty's Government's statement that the Arab States were being invited in the first instance to a discussion with His Majesty's Government.

He referred to German and Italian intrigues to prevent the success of the conference. I thought it well to tell him that in my view the German Government were at present doing all they could to impede the Arab Covenant, since result of their attitude towards the Jews was inevitably to heighten the sympathy felt for the latter in Great Britain and United States of America. In addition, the urgency of the Jewish settlement *somewhere* was being increased.

In conclusion and speaking personally, I told his Excellency that I was somewhat disturbed by the extent to which the field was at the moment being left to the extremists. This was dangerous for all concerned, and it would be a good thing if Iraqi Government could announce promptly their acceptance of the invitation to London Conference, indicating that, while they were aware of the difficulties, they regarded it as affording hope of a final and equitable solution of the Palestine question. He promised to consider this.

I hope some satisfaction can be given Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible, at least on the points (b) and (d).

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 22; Jedda, No. 17; and Jerusalem, No. 28.)

[E 6907/1/31]

No. 112.

*Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, November 16, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 29 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith in translation the text of the statement which appears in the Beirut press to-day in the name of the "Higher Arab Committee for Palestine." The statement is generally considered here to be the work of the Grand Mufti and to represent his official views, which he cannot express publicly without contravening his undertaking to the French High Commissioner not to engage in politics while in the Lebanon.

2. In the course of a private conversation with a member of my staff on the 14th November, a Palestinian Arab, who is generally considered to be in close touch with the Mufti, made the following statements, which may serve as some indication of the Mufti's line of thought:—

3. The Mufti had been much annoyed by the violent declaration of Nabih-el-Azmi, which was referred to in paragraph 2 of Damascus despatch No. 57 of the 12th November to the Foreign Office, and which he regarded as most uncalled for and likely to prejudice the Arab cause in general and his own position in particular. He also objected to a statement published in the Lebanese press by Sami-el-Fakhoury, president of the High Moslem Council of Beirut and a near relative of his, to the effect that the Arab delegation now in London was in possession of his instructions on the line to pursue.

4. The Mufti much regretted the absence of any announcement in His Majesty's Government's statement of policy of a suspension of Jewish immigration, which would have had a most beneficial effect.

5. He maintained that Arabs could not confer with Jews, but were prepared to confer with His Majesty's Government provided that the Higher Arab Committee were accepted as the sole representatives of the Palestinian Arabs. In that event the Mufti, not wishing himself to take part in the negotiations, would delegate certain members of the Higher Arab Committee to represent him.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Jerusalem, His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Bagdad and Cairo, and without enclosure to His Majesty's Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

P. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 112.

*Statement by the Higher Arab Committee, published by the Beirut Press on November 16, 1938.*

THE Partition Commission's report constitutes the worst possible end to the unsuccessful policy of sending commissions. It is regrettable and incomprehensible that a report of this nature should consider Palestine, which is already a Holy Place, and the heart of the Arab homeland, and which, moreover, is but a small country, as a fit object to be divided, torn, cut up, and parcelled out. The British Commission came with this theory in mind, but was brought to a stand-



still when attempting to fix boundaries; we consider, therefore, its new partition scheme still-born, the more so that the British Government, after careful perusal of the report have concluded that the establishment of two nations in one country was impracticable.

The Arab Committee deeply regrets that so long a time was required for His Majesty's Government to realise this truth, which was obvious from the very first day; and we ask ourselves with pain who is responsible for the misfortunes which have fallen on the country on account of the Government's policy—a policy which has ended in the failure of the partition scheme—and who is responsible for the destruction which has been inflicted on the country in pursuance of this policy. Will Palestine continue to be threatened by similar dangerous programmes evoked by the dreams of Zionists and colonisers, which the British Government will set out to fulfil? The idea of granting to the Jews a right in Arab Palestine, and of instituting a National Home for them in the heart of the Arab homeland, gave rise to the policy of partition which has had so unfortunate an ending. All things based on wrong are wrong; and any future scheme to benefit the Jews at the expense of the Arabs will meet with the same fate.

As regards the British Government's statement (of policy), the Arab people note with pleasure that Great Britain has abandoned the partition scheme and has realised that partition was impracticable; and they hope that the British Government realise also that the scheme was not equitable, and have definitely abandoned the idea of partition in any form or of any of those schemes similar to partition which were at one time under discussion.

The Arab people also note with pleasure that the British Government have adopted a method of negotiation and have realised that the Palestine question should be solved by political, as opposed to military, means; they note also with pleasure the envisaged collaboration of the Arab nations towards a settlement of this question which has dragged on so long. They consider this as an admission that the Palestine question is a general Arab question. The Higher Arab Committee is, however, astonished at and disapproves of Syria and the Lebanon being excluded from the negotiations, despite their close relations with Palestine, on a pretext that they are under mandate, while the Government of Transjordan, which is also under mandate, has been asked to take part.

The Higher Arab Committee disagrees with the statement of the British Government that "they are faced with a problem of finding alternative means of meeting the difficult situation which will be consistent with their obligations towards Arabs and Jews," because they do not admit the legality of British obligations to the Jews, those obligations being based on force and hostility and being at the expense of others. The Royal Commission stated in its report, and the British Government and the British delegates to the League of Nations have confirmed, that British obligations to Jews and Arabs were contradictory and irreconcilable; the attempt now once again to reconcile these contradictory obligations can lead to no result, and to base the solution of the question on such a reconciliation is impracticable, and can only lead to new difficulties. The Arab people cannot consider British obligations to the Jews, which are based on force and evil, as a fundamental either of the Palestine question or of the proposed negotiations.

The British Government state that the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between Arabs and Jews. The Higher Arab Committee consider that such an understanding is irrealisable so long as the Jews persist in their wrongful ambitions in Palestine. If, by an understanding, the British mean that the Jews may live in peace amongst the Arabs, this is practicable for the Jews, and forms a part of the national programme of the Arab people, who alone are the owners of their country. But the claims of the Jews in Palestine are false, based only on dreams and unsupported except by British bayonets. The question should be determined by considerations of right and equity only.

The British Government announce their intention of inviting representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of the Arabs from neighbouring countries to London to discuss future policy in Palestine, without defining the basis of these discussions. The Higher Arab Committee state in this connexion that they have a programme which may be summarised as the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and the replacement of the mandatory system by a treaty giving the country an independent national Government. This programme has been

approved by the Arab delegations, commissions, and Governments, and the Arabs cannot renounce it for it is the sole guarantee of their existence and of their legal right to their country. It is inspired by this legal right and contains the maximum concessions to the Jews.

When negotiations are to take place to settle a question, it is customary to define the basis of negotiation, especially in cases like that of Palestine, where the Jews are inspired by their dreams and rely on blind force and false propaganda. The Higher Arab Committee much regrets that the British statement contains no grounds for hope or optimism, and feels that this lack of definition may result in the failure of the conference, and that this may be their intention, so that the British Government may propose a policy of their own which would cause the present state of affairs in Palestine to continue. But as regards the British Government's invitation to discuss future policy the Arab people cannot regard the Jews as a party to the affair and will not enter into discussion with them as regards a solution.

His Majesty's Government reserve the right to refuse to receive those Arab leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence. The committee repeats, as it has many times done before, that the responsibility for the disorders from first to last belongs to the British Government and their representatives in Palestine. The Arab people only ask for their rights in their own country, and it is the British authorities who have at every stage attacked in an endeavour to crush the Arabs, and have closed their ears to their demands. It is, therefore, inequitable to hold the Arabs or their representatives responsible for the disorders which were forced on them, because the British Government had left no other means open to them of protesting against their wrongful policy—a policy which consists in imposing the Jews on them so that the Arabs were bound in the end to find themselves turned out of their own country.

The committee wonders, on the other hand, which Palestinian Arabs the British Government means if they do not refer to the members of the committee. The British Government are fully aware that the Higher Arab Committee enjoys the complete confidence of the Arab people, and entrusts them with the task of defending Arab rights and of carrying out their programme, and that there are no others in Palestine who can pose as representatives of the Arabs in this matter. The British Government know also that any other Palestinians, who accepted their invitation, would not enjoy the confidence of the Arab people, nor would they truly represent them; and the committee considers that this statement will add further difficulties to the question. The committee considers that the British Government, in making this statement, have proved that they do not wish Palestine to be properly represented in these talks, on which its very existence depends. Events in Palestine have proved that this method is already wrong.

If the British seriously wish to settle the question, let them face realities and declare their acceptance of the Arab programme as a basis for the proposed settlement, stop Jewish immigration during the negotiations, withdraw their accusations, and allow the Arabs the right to choose the representatives they trust.

The British Government declare that if the London discussions fail, they will take their own decision. The committee points out these reservations increase the existing difficulties. If the negotiations fail, the responsibility would be that of the British and of the Jews. The committee proclaims to the world, from now, that in case this occurs the Arab people will be unable to accept a solution imposed on them by blind force, and which would not give them their rights, and will in any case go on enjoying the sympathy and approval of both Arab and Moslem worlds, until they will get their full rights.

The Higher Arab Committee thinks it wise to take this opportunity to repeat their national programme, which is as follows:—

1. Recognition to the Arabs of their right to full independence in their country.
2. Abandonment of the attempt to institute for the Jews a national home.
3. Termination of the British mandate and its replacement by a treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi, the Anglo-Egyptian, and the Franco-Syrian, treaties, under which Palestine would become an independent country.
4. Complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and of sale of land to the Jews.



The Arabs are prepared to institute negotiations with the British on a legitimate basis, with the object of reaching an agreement which would safeguard reasonable British interests, and would guarantee the Holy Places and access to them, and the protection of all legitimate rights of Jews and other minorities in Palestine.

[E 6831/1/31]

No. 113.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 165 [of 17th November: Ibn Saud's offer to mediate regarding suspension of hostilities in Palestine].

You should cordially thank Ibn Saud for this characteristic example of his helpfulness, but explain confidentially that, on reflection, His Majesty's Government propose to adopt a somewhat different procedure from that which he had proposed as outlined in your telegram No. 162 [of 12th November].

2. His Majesty's Government appreciate and share his desire that atmosphere should be made as favourable as possible for London discussions. It has always seemed to them that this would be helped if it could be made clear that arrangements would be made for full representation of Palestinian Arabs in proposed discussions. Though they have excluded Mufti of Jerusalem from discussions, they have not necessarily excluded any of his adherents, and they are proposing to make statement in answer to question in Parliament on 23rd November, which indicates their readiness to accept these among others, and to give them facilities to come to London for purposes of discussions. This information should remain confidential until announcement on 23rd November.

3. His Majesty's Government had never contemplated a bargain whereby a suspension of hostilities should be effected in return for a release of prisoners. If, especially after public announcement referred to above, Ibn Saud does feel able to use his influence to stop violent acts and the shedding of blood by the Palestine rebels, so much the better. His Majesty's Government themselves will also continue to work for the restoration of peace and order in Palestine. If these efforts are successful, it is hoped that Palestine authorities may find it practicable to arrange for release of certain number of persons who have not been convicted of any crime, but who have been interned or deported.

4. We would regard it as impracticable and undesirable to start preliminary negotiations regarding policy with representatives of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia before arrival of delegates and commencement of actual discussions.

[E 6961/1/31]

No. 114.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 22.)*

(No. 171.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 21, 1938.*

IBN SAUD inclined to nominate Minister for Foreign Affairs Amir Faisal as delegate [two groups undecypherable], but is consulting Iraq and Egypt before deciding. I think he is determined not to be out-shone by other delegations, and I have not discouraged this, as it seems advantageous to us. Faisal preferable to Fuad or Yusuf Yasin, who would be impervious to any influence Foreign Office could exercise through Saudi Arabian Minister in London.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 28, and Bagdad, No. 33.)

[E 6875/1/31]

No. 115.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 23, 1938.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 178 and 181 [of the 16th and 19th November: Iraqi Government's suggestions regarding Palestine discussions].

I trust that Iraqi Government will not attempt to make their acceptance of His Majesty's Government's invitation conditional on receiving assurances regarding London discussions. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to enter into preliminary discussions on the points at issue before the real discussions begin in London. The Iraqi Government perhaps do not realise that the Jewish Agency may also approach His Majesty's Government with a request for assurances before London discussions begin. Such suggestions would, of course, be rejected at once.

2. In these circumstances, I fear it will be impossible to give the Iraqi Government very much satisfaction on the points they have raised.

3. His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot agree to the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration pending the result of the London discussions, as effect of this would be to prejudge one of the most important matters for discussion in London.

4. It will be open to Iraqi delegate to put forward during discussions any plan favoured by Iraqi Government. His Majesty's Government would not, however, find it possible to accept any scheme put forward in advance, whether by Jewish Agency, by Palestinian Arabs or by a neighbouring State, as a basis of discussions.

5. His Majesty's Government have also decided not to put forward any plan of their own in advance as a basis for discussions; but they will have done a good deal of preparatory work before the discussions take place, so that it is hoped that rapid progress may be made.

6. His Majesty's Government have already been in communication with French Government regarding question of Syrian representation at discussions, and it is evident that it will not be practicable to carry out Iraqi Government's suggestion that Syrians should be invited through the French Government to send representatives. The only appropriate procedure is to act through the French Government, and His Majesty's Government intend to keep closely in touch with them. It is unlikely that French Government would agree that Iraqi Government should represent Syrian interests in London discussions, even informally, but Iraqi Government can sound French Government on this point if they wish.

7. The three names suggested by Iraqi Government as suitable representatives of the Palestinian Arabs have been noted. It is difficult at present stage to state definitely that these individuals will or will not be admitted to participate in London discussions. In general, His Majesty's Government wish that Palestine Arab delegation shall fairly represent the opinion of leading groups in that country, including the Mufti's group, and the fact that they have felt obliged to refuse the Mufti himself does not necessarily mean that they will refuse to receive other individuals. You may inform Iraqi Government of statement to be made in Parliament on 23rd November (see my telegram No. 139 [of 21st November] to Jedda).

8. His Majesty's Government are glad to know that the Iraqi Government are prepared to use their influence to stop violent acts and the shedding of blood by the Palestine rebels. His Majesty's Government think it best not to attempt to negotiate any kind of truce, but perhaps after announcement on 23rd November local tension may be relaxed, and the Iraqi Government may be able to do much to bring this about.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 606; Jedda, No. 141; and Jerusalem, No. 504.)



[E 7036/1/31]

No. 116.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 24.)*

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 24, 1938.*

IBN SAUD is shocked at what he considers partisan attitude of President of United States on Palestine question, and would like to send him confidential message saying in moderate language that there is a case for the Arabs. He suggests that this might even assist His Majesty's Government, whom he supposes to be subjected to American pressure on the subject, and he requests advice of His Majesty's Government.

I suggest answer to it is that decision rests with him, but he should leave Anglo-American relations out of account in deciding. We ought not, I think, to try to dissuade him.

[E 7050/1/31]

No. 117.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 24.)*

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 24, 1938.*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 185.

At the Prime Minister's reception this morning on the first day of Id I urged both him and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to accelerate the Iraqi Government's acceptance in principle. The Prime Minister replied that he approved the points raised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that they were anxious to make sure that the conference had a reasonable chance of success.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his house after lunch and communicated the substance of your telegram. He was somewhat disappointed, particularly over His Majesty's Government's refusal (end of R)—

- (a) To stop Jewish immigration.
- (b) To offer amnesty.

As regards (a), he professed to understand His Majesty's Government's point of view, but said that some of his colleagues were more difficult to convince. I urged him to make it clear under existing arrangements that not more than about 1,000 Jews were likely to be admitted into Palestine between now and the end of the conference.

As to an amnesty, I ventured to point out that Iraqi Government have never suggested a "negotiated truce." Minister for Foreign Affairs is much disappointed that His Majesty's Government will not issue unilateral declaration guaranteeing either that if rebels refrain from hostile acts, they will not be attacked pending the conclusion of the conference, or, if preferred, that if they actually disperse, they will not be hunted down individually.

I do not myself see how Iraqi Government can bring any influence to bear upon Palestine Arabs without some declaration of this kind.

Since the Minister for Foreign Affairs was obviously in considerable doubt and hesitation, I told him that while no one could guarantee that the conference would be fully successful, I was convinced that, whatever happened, the meeting would mark a big step towards the settlement of Palestine question. With this step I was most anxious that Iraqi Government should be associated.

He promised to do his best to secure acceptance of the invitation in principle without further delay.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

No. 118.

*Speech by His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on November 24, 1938, on the subject of Palestine.*

I SHOULD like to preface my statement to-day by thanking hon. members in every part of the House for the patience and restraint with which they have watched in recent months the unhappy situation in Palestine. I know how easy it would have been for them to badger the Colonial Secretary at question time or to have drawn angry attention to this or that aspect of the matter on motions for the adjournment. But hon. members have refrained from doing these things. It is not because they are indifferent to what is going on in Palestine. The House is as conscious of its responsibilities in Palestine as it is of its responsibilities in any other part of the world. I think hon. members have, perhaps, refrained from doing these things because they appreciate the special difficulty and delicacy of the situation with which we are faced in that country. I hope that I may appeal to hon. members this afternoon, when we are about to enter into discussions with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews in London, to conduct this debate with such a wise judgment that no word which is spoken here shall prejudice the chance of these discussions bearing at last the fruit of an Arab-Jewish agreement.

During the last few months a constructive political effort to ease the situation in Palestine has not been possible. It was unfortunate, but it was inevitable. We had to await the presentation of the Woodhead Commission's Report, and so our attention has been concentrated on the mere physical effort to restore law and order in that country. During the idle summer days, when there was little work for labourers to do in the fields, a campaign of assassination and violence, waged by terrorists, grew into something like an organised and widespread Arab revolt against British authority. The powerful military and police forces which are now at the disposal of the Government are steadily and surely re-establishing the authority of the Government throughout the land. A few weeks ago they cleared the old city of Jerusalem of the rebels. The authority of the Administration has been re-established in Jaffa. Without any blowing of trumpets the walls of Jericho have been reoccupied by our troops. Gaza is once more a place where the writ of the Government runs, and this week hostile elements have been driven out of Beersheba. Steadily and painfully the process of restoration is going on throughout the country.

We all know that certain interested propagandists have been levelling many foul charges against the conduct of our troops. I see a good many things in the Colonial Office, but I have never seen any evidence in support of these charges. On the contrary, the whole world knows that the reoccupation of the old city of Jerusalem a few weeks ago was an example of the way in which British troops can with perfect humanity, as well as perfect success, conduct a delicate military operation in the midst of a civilian population. But the real problem in Palestine is not a military problem; it is a political problem. Our troops can restore order; they cannot restore peace. The Government have to do that; this House has to do that. There is nothing so easy as to state the problem in Palestine. It was done brilliantly in the pages of the report of the Peel Commission. There is no need to alter a word or a comma in the analysis of the problem as it is made in that remarkable State document.

Palestine is a tiny country. Spiritually it is great. In spiritual quality it has no peer among the countries of the earth; it guards some of the Holy Places of three of the world's great religions. But physically it is tiny. Some of its soil is very fertile and bears rich fruit, but much of the land is rocky or hilly, and much of it is desert. That is the nature of the small stage on which a grim tragedy is being played to-day. There are two protagonists in the piece: First of all, there are the Jews. Nearly 2,000 years ago their home was Palestine, but since then they have been dispersed, scattered over the face of the earth. They are a countryless people. But during the last twenty years many of them have been hastening back to Palestine under the terms of a mandate, which was endorsed by more than fifty nations, under which the administration of the country was entrusted to Great Britain. I do not think that anyone can justly say that during these years Great Britain has not been fulfilling her obligation to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine.



Since 1922 more than 250,000 Jews have entered Palestine and settled there. Their achievement has been remarkable. They have turned sand dunes into orange groves. They have pushed ever further into waste land the frontiers of cultivation and settlement. They have created a new city, housing to-day 140,000 souls, where before there was only bare seashore. There is no knowing where their achievement might end if Palestine were empty of all other population and could be handed over to them in full ownership. The Jews are in Palestine not on sufferance but by right, and to-day, under the lash of persecution in Central Europe, their eagerness to return to their old home land is multiplied a hundredfold. The tragedy of a people who have no country has never been so deep as it is this week. The sympathy of our own countrymen, their anxiety to do everything they can to help the persecuted Jews has never been so firm as it is to-day. But I hope that we are not going to allow our horror at the plight into which these people have been thrown to warp our cool and just judgment on the difficult problem of Palestine.

I must utter this word of warning. When we promised to facilitate the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine, we never anticipated this fierce persecution in Europe. We have made no promise that that country should be the home for everyone who is seeking to escape from such an immense calamity, and even if there were no other population in Palestine, its rather meagre soil could not, in fact, support more than a fraction of those Jews who may wish to escape from Europe. The problem of the refugees in Central Europe cannot be settled in Palestine. It has to be settled over a far wider field than that. Palestine, of course, can make its contribution; it is making a contribution to-day. At the present time, despite the disturbances, Jewish emigrants are going to Palestine week after week at the rate of about 1,000 a month. The Jewish Agency naturally, in the light of recent events, are now anxious that the rate of immigration shall be greatly increased. I saw two representatives of the Agency on Monday and they spoke to me about it. I asked them to let me have their proposals complete in every detail. Those proposals reached me this morning, and they will, of course, receive at once my most careful consideration, and I shall consult about them with the High Commissioner in Jerusalem. But I must in all honesty say this: the Government have often been charged with having no policy in Palestine, or else they have been charged with having a policy and then wobbling on it, changing their mind. The Government announced a short time ago what the next definite stage in its policy would be. That is a policy of discussions with Arabs and Jews in London, and we are going to abide by that policy. We cannot do anything now which might prejudice the chance of those discussions ending successfully. It is in the best interests of the Jews themselves that future policy in Palestine should as far as possible be based on a wide agreement.

The second people who are involved in this bitter controversy in Palestine are the Arabs. They have lived in the country for many centuries. They were not consulted when the Balfour Declaration was made, nor when the mandate was framed, and during the post-war years they have watched with occasional angry protests this peaceful invasion by an alien people. They have watched the buying up of their lands, they have watched Jewish settlements spreading ever further over the countryside. They have been compelled to recognise the superior energy and skill and wealth of that wonderful people. The Arabs are afraid. In 1933, 30,000 Jews came into Palestine; in 1934, 42,000 Jews came into Palestine; and in 1935 the number was 61,000. The Arabs wonder when a halt is going to be called to this great migration. They wonder whether a halt is ever going to be called to it, and they fear that it is going to be their fate in the land of their birth to be dominated by this energetic, new-coming people, dominated economically, politically, and completely. If I were an Arab I would be alarmed. If we are ever to have an understanding of this problem, if we are ever to play our part in finding a happy solution for it, we must be able to put ourselves in the shoes not only of the Jews but of the Arabs.

I know that a great many people regard this Arab agitation as the mere protest of a gang of bandits. Of course it is true that many of the Arabs who have taken part most eagerly in the troubles are cut-throats of the worst type. Their massacres of the innocents at Tiberias, and on a score of other miserable battlefields, have disgraced their cause. It is true also that many of those who are associated with them have been terrorised into that association. But there is

much more than that in the Arab movement. I think that this House, which is so capable of a generous understanding of other peoples, ought to recognise that many in the Palestinian Arab movement are moved by a genuine patriotism. However wrong they may be, however misguided they may be, however disastrous their policy may be, many of them have felt compelled to take the risk of laying down their lives for their country.

I know that that is not the whole story. There is a great deal else that has to be said if the description of the situation is to be complete and just. There is one set of facts especially, of great importance, that I must mention. Those who conceived twenty years ago the possibility of facilitating the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine were moved by a great idea, and already in these first twenty years that idea has been translated into a wonderful act of creation. But I do sometimes wonder whether all of the authors of this great creative act were fully informed of the situation even at that time, in 1917, 1918 and 1919. I sometimes wonder whether they knew then that there were already living between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea more than 600,000 Arabs. Certainly I do not think they could know that as a result of the coming of the British administration, with the coming of the Jews and because of the coming of the Jews, that Arab population would increase rapidly. The Jews brought with them money; development works provided extra livelihoods; modern health services, which were extended not only to Jews but to Arabs, gave the individual a further lease and security of life. Since 1922 the Arab population in Palestine has, scarcely at all by migration from outside and almost entirely by natural increase, gone up from something over 600,000 to 990,000 persons. Perhaps I should add that it is calculated that the total of 990,000 Arabs in Palestine to-day will have become 1,500,000 Arabs within twenty years from now.

That remarkable and significant set of facts leads to two reflections. In the first place, I think it must upset at any rate some of the calculations about how many Jews could be settled in Palestine without prejudicing the rights and position of the Arab population. But, as I say, there are two sides to that state of things. The other side is this: the Arabs cannot say that the Jews are driving them out of their country. If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe the Arab population of Palestine to-day would still have been round about the 600,000 figure at which it had been stable under Turkish rule. It is because the Jews who have come to Palestine bring modern health services and other advantages that Arab men and women who would have been dead are alive to-day, that Arab children who would never have drawn breath have been born and grown strong. It is not only the Jews who have benefited from the Balfour Declaration. They can deny it as much as they like, but materially the Arabs in Palestine have gained very greatly from the Balfour Declaration.

I know that it is useless to press that argument on the Arabs. They are deaf to the argument, they are blind to the spectacle of a gradually improving standard of life for their people, because they are thinking of something else. They are thinking of their freedom. They are afraid that, if this process goes on, then at last they will have to surrender to the political over-lordship of the enterprising, hardworking, ever-increasing citizens of the Jewish National Home. I say that we British people ought to be the last people in the world not to understand the feelings of the Arabs in this matter, because we too would sacrifice material advantages if we thought our freedom was at stake. We cannot put the Jews under the domination of the Arabs in Palestine, but also, unless we can remove that Arab fear that they are going to be put under the domination of the Jews, we shall have to face a suspicious and hostile people over a great area of the Near East, and we shall find that we have to lock up a great part of our army in Palestine indefinitely.

We have most solemn obligations to both peoples in Palestine. On the one hand, we are pledged to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine under suitable conditions and to encourage close settlement of Jews on the land; and on the other hand, we are pledged to see that the rights and position of the Arab population are not prejudiced. How can we reconcile justly and peacefully those two obligations? That is the problem that we have to solve. That is the riddle for which we have to find an answer. What is the answer? The Peel Commission, with irresistible logic, recommended that the country should be partitioned, that the Jews and the Arabs should be, to a certain extent, kept apart, that the



ambition of each of them to enjoy self-government should be satisfied in different areas of Palestine, whilst the Holy Places were kept in an enclave still under mandatory control. This House never committed itself to that policy. The Government accepted it in principle as the most hopeful solution to the deadlock which had arisen, but admittedly the practicability of the principle had to be further investigated, and the Woodhead Commission went out to Palestine for that purpose.

For three months they lived dangerously in the city of Jerusalem. They toured the whole country, always with their escort of armed men. They went about their business with great courage, and they went about it also with great thoroughness. A short while ago they presented their report. That report makes it clear that partition, as proposed by the Peel Commission, is impracticable. That report makes it clear that if we were to divide Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State and a Mandated area, then the Jewish State would have a great surplus in its budget every year, but year after year the budgets of the Arab State and the Mandated Territory would show great deficits. The Commission therefore reported that under their terms of reference they were unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which would afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. I think that is itself a remarkable tribute to the achievement of the Jews. It is impossible, without the continuous aid of the Jews, for the people living in Palestine beyond the Jewish settlements to maintain the standard of government and the social services to which they have become accustomed.

But that state of affairs also kills the proposal for the dividing up of Palestine into two sovereign States, and His Majesty's Government lost no time in accepting the position. A part of Palestine is not to be handed over to control by the Jews, another part is not to be handed over to control by the Arabs; the Government have declared that they will continue their responsibility for the government of the whole country. We have adopted, if I may say so, a motto, a policy, which my right hon. friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) said that he would make a present of to me when I met him in the Lobby shortly after I had assumed my office as Colonial Secretary. He muttered to me, as he passed one afternoon, "Not partition, but perseverance." We have got to find alternative means of meeting the needs of the unhappy situation in Palestine. I receive a great deal of help in my study of the problem from numerous correspondents. Scores of letters pour in, many of them containing solutions to this problem. I do not remember any two letters which suggested exactly the same solution. Many of the letters offer no solution at all; their writers merely cry in desperation: "Is there any solution to this appalling problem?"

Of course, there is a solution, but I do not think that it ought to rest on the Government alone to find that solution. It ought to rest also on the two other parties who are concerned in this matter, the Arabs and the Jews. They have both got a contribution to make; they have both got to make concessions to the other. If they would only be willing to do that, then peace and prosperity would return to both peoples in Palestine. I know that it is going to be exceedingly difficult to break down the hard bitterness which has naturally grown up on each side during months of violence and bloodshed. It may be that one's idealism is running away with one in supposing that any agreement is possible at the present time. But the Government attach so much importance to an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs that they are prepared to make a supreme effort to achieve that understanding. It is not impossible for ordinary Jewish and Arab people to live contentedly side by side in Palestine. Many of them have been doing so in numerous communities in Palestine right through these distressing times. Nor is it impossible for Jewish and Arab leaders to reach agreement together. There was a moment, twenty years ago, when that not only seemed possible, but seemed to have been actually accomplished. Dr. Weizmann, on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, crossed the River Jordan and met the Emir Feisal in his camp in the desert, surrounded by his Arab hosts, and in due course, after some months, those two men signed an agreement about Palestine. It is to that sort of relationship between Arab and Jew that we want to go back.

So the Government have proposed that discussions should take place in London. They will probably be, in the first instance, discussions between the Government and the Arab representatives and discussions between the Government and the Jewish representatives, but we hope that they will develop before

long into a discussion between all three parties meeting round a common table. The Government will, of course, enter those discussions bound by its obligations under the mandate to Jews and to Arabs, bound by its duty to Parliament, and to the other members of the League of Nations, and to the United States of America. But we shall not seek to prevent either the Arab representatives or the Jewish representatives from offering arguments as to why the mandate should be changed. The discussions will be full, frank and free; and, therefore, I am sure the House will not expect me to say more at this stage about the policy which the Government itself will pursue in the course of those discussions. I hope that it will be possible for the discussions to start in London within the next few weeks. If they cannot start before Christmas, I hope they will start at the very latest at the beginning of January, for it is imperative that the present uncertainty should be brought to an end as soon as possible. It is of the highest importance that policy should be formulated and clearly declared. For that reason, if the discussions in London do not yield some kind of understanding between the three parties within a reasonable period of time, the Government will itself take full responsibility, in the light of its examination of the question following the Peel and Woodhead Reports, and in the light of the discussions themselves, for formulating and declaring future policy.

Hon. members in the House in these days have to deal with a great variety of political problems. Each day they crowd upon us. But I always feel conscious that there is something about Palestine which distinguishes its problem from any of the others. The others are essays in the art of government—the most difficult of all the arts. When I attempt to deal with them I, naturally, like the other hon. members, feel a lively human interest and even fascination in them. In the possession of those qualities this Palestine problem yields nothing to any other. Its complexities make it a supreme test of our capacity to govern man. But there is more to it than that. When I turn to the Palestine problem I feel a certain awe and reverence. I cannot remember a time when I did not hear about Palestine. I cannot remember a time when I was not told stories about Nazareth and Galilee, about Jerusalem and Bethlehem, where was born the Prince of Peace. This House, in its long history, has had placed in its keeping many noble trusts, but it has never had a trust so sacred as that of restoring peace and goodwill in the Holy Land.

[E 7067/1/31]

No. 119.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 568.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, November 19, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 178 of the 15th November, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an aide-mémoire (undated), which I received on the 17th November from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in which his Excellency recapitulates and develops the main points which he made in his conversation with me about Palestine in the 15th November.

2. The aide-mémoire differs slightly from the summary of this conversation which was contained in my telegram under reference, and it will be noticed that a truce in Palestine (although not mentioned in the conversation) is now included among the preliminary measures which the Minister for Foreign Affairs recommends should be taken before the discussions in London are opened. I observe from your telegrams Nos. 174 and 176 that King Abdul Aziz has already raised this point and that it is receiving the attention of His Majesty's Government: I have not, therefore, reported the Iraqi suggestion by telegram.

3. In the sixth of the preliminary measures set out in his aide-mémoire the Minister for Foreign Affairs reverts to the suggestion which he made in his earlier talk with Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (see my telegram No. 170, paragraph 5) that the main bases of the ultimate settlement should be determined before the Arab and Jewish delegates meet in London, but he now recommends a prior understanding between His Majesty's Government and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and



Egypt, and not only between His Majesty's Government and Iraq. On reflection, his Excellency has perhaps become less confident in Iraq's ability to persuade the others to follow her lead.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and to the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 119.

*Aide-mémoire.*

WE have received the British Government's latest statement of policy regarding Palestine with feelings of relief and satisfaction that the delays involved in the original formulation and subsequent elaboration of a plan of partition have at last been ended, and that the British Government have now come to share the frequently expressed conviction of the Iraqi Government that partition is not a practicable solution of the problem. The formal abandonment of this plan is a first and fundamental step in the right direction. It must now be followed by a constructive plan for the future, and we fully share the view of the British Government that it is most important for a decision to be reached at an early date.

2. We believe that it should be possible for the various parties interested in the Arab case in Palestine to meet the British Government with some hope of reaching agreement on the future of that country, and we welcome the second step contemplated in the statement of policy, namely, the proposed invitation to representatives of the Palestine Arabs and of the neighbouring States on the one hand, and of the Jewish Agency on the other hand, to confer with the British Government as soon as possible in London regarding future policy, including the question of immigration into Palestine. The recognition of political realities implicit in this proposal gives us great hope that a solution by agreement may at last be found. We are firmly convinced that such a solution is the only one which can endure. The proposal offers an opportunity, perhaps a last opportunity, for a generally acceptable arrangement in the immediate future, and it involves a grave responsibility for all the interested parties to see that it is not lost. Every effort of statesmanship is called for to prevent the tragedy of another failure, and the first aim of all the interested parties must be to create the conditions in which success can be achieved. Those conditions do not, we believe, exist at present, but by the exercise of statesmanlike forbearance on all sides and mutual concession they can be created. We ourselves, and, we believe, the other Arab and neighbouring Governments and the Arabs of Palestine, are ready to do their part. We hope and believe that the British Government and others will also be ready to do theirs.

3. We hold the view that if the method of conference is to offer real hope of success, the following preliminary measures should be taken before formal discussions in London are opened:—

- (1) A truce must be called in Palestine. Effective discussion cannot take place in the atmosphere created by the military conflict now going on. We are prepared, if our other proposals are accepted, to use our influence with other interested Governments and with the Arabs of Palestine to secure such a truce.
- (2) On the other hand, the distribution of Jewish immigration certificates must be suspended for the time being until the final settlement of the problem as proposed in the statement of policy.
- (3) Effective representation of the Arabs of Palestine and their recognised leaders must be assured. The Arabs must be satisfied that their leaders, whether in Palestine or abroad, whether under restraint or at liberty, have had a real opportunity of exchanging views and agreeing upon their representatives. If there is a real desire to put an end to the troubles in Palestine by agreement, the logical and effective way to seek agreement is to negotiate with the leaders of the Arabs of Palestine or their freely appointed representatives. To propose a

conference and refuse this principle would be to prejudice hopelessly the prospects of its success, and we earnestly trust that the hopes raised by the proposal of discussions will not be dashed by any formal qualification of this principle. We are prepared to advise the Arabs of Palestine to choose, in their own interests, representatives who will, from every point of view (taking into account the known attitude of the British Government), contribute to effective discussion of the problem, but we feel at the same time that it would be a mistake to maintain opposition to receiving as representatives of the Arabs of Palestine any specified person or persons. To withdraw this opposition would show not weakness but strength and a determination to promote agreement on the basis of those political realities which are recognised in the proposal to confer. The prescribed Palestinian leaders have never been in essence enemies of Great Britain, however much and by whatever means at their disposal they have opposed in the past a policy which has now been abandoned as inequitable and impracticable. In any case, we are convinced that difficulties or objections as to particular persons, when others are available, will not be allowed to stand in the way of achieving the great and beneficent object of a solution by agreement.

- (4) Representatives of Syria and the Lebanon should be invited to attend the discussions with the British Government. If a conference is to succeed, its first object must be to learn the views of those closely concerned with Palestine's future. Her two northern neighbours are obviously among them. If it is necessary that an invitation be sent through the French Government, it seems to us impossible that that Government should fail to co-operate in facilitating this widely based, and for that reason hopeful, discussion of the future.
- (5) A careful preliminary study must be made and agreement in principle must be reached as to the proportion which the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine should bear to one another in the future. And it must be agreed that so far as the control of immigration can secure it that proportion should be maintained. A proportion of Arabs to Jews of two to one has been mentioned in the past, and some proportion near that actually existing should be agreed upon. The varying rates of natural increase of the existing populations will give an opportunity for a steady flow of Jewish immigration even after the Jewish population reaches whatever proportion is agreed upon.
- (6) It is necessary that a previous understanding should be reached between the British Government and the Governments of the leading Arab countries, notably Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the main bases of settlement before the meeting in London.
- (7) The basis of discussion should be the plan already submitted by us in London, which is believed to be satisfactory to Arabs generally, with any acceptable improvements in detail which the British Government may propose.

4. It will be observed from what has been stated above that we believe that the method of discussion can be made to succeed, that it is supremely important to all concerned that it should be made to succeed, that a statesmanlike attitude on the part of all is essential for it to succeed, that consequently the recognition of political realities already evidenced by the statement of policy must be extended to the utmost and shared by all parties, and that, therefore, the preliminary measures which are judged necessary for success should be taken in spite of the temporary concessions which they involve. As has been already stated, we agree that it is important for a decision to be reached at an early date, and we feel that the danger of the parties drifting into irreconcilable positions should be avoided at all costs. We therefore suggest that a provisional time-table might usefully be worked out.

5. We hope to have the views of the British Government on these questions at the earliest possible moment.



[E 6802/10/31]

No. 120.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received November 25.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 24, 1938.*

I HAVE just had final interview with Ibn Saud before leaving Jedda. Iraqi Government informed him of conditions they are attaching to participation in discussions, and that Egyptian Government are inclined to similar policy. He would be glad to know reply of His Majesty's Government to Iraqi Government as soon as possible. He had telegraphed Cairo and Bagdad urging unconditional acceptance.

It must, however, be realised that he supposes intentions of His Majesty's Government to be honourable from his point of view. If he thought they were not only proposed to continue immigration, but apparently expected Arabs, including himself, to acquiesce, he would be both astonished and disgusted.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 29, and Bagdad, No. 34.)

[E 7105/1/31]

No. 121.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received November 27.)

(No. 188.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, November 26, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 186.

Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me this afternoon to raise the following points:—

1. Mufti has no intention of going to London, even if he were invited. Could not His Majesty's Government, on the above understanding, say something to the effect that he was not excluded, although there was no prospect of his coming? Categorical announcement of his exclusion was felt to be humiliating by friends of the Mufti, who might find it difficult to nominate representatives unless the Mufti were appeased.

I said that I saw no chance of His Majesty's Government doing anything of the kind. Most they could perhaps do would be to avoid any necessity for again having to refer publicly to his exclusion.

2. Selection of representatives of Palestine Arabs. Iraqi Government were most anxious for further information as to the method by which this was being arranged.

I said that I did not see that I could tell him more than I had already. I would ask you to keep Iraqi Government informed how the matter progressed.

I told his Excellency that the Iraqi Government and possibly other Arab Governments were taxing the patience of His Majesty's Government rather high. He said that they had decided to accept in principle and that he thought he would himself inevitably be Iraqi delegate. As he was still vague about the possibility of further delay in communicating the acceptance, I suggested he should write me a note at once stating Iraqi Government's acceptance of invitation "having taken note of His Majesty's Government's intention to ensure adequate representation of Palestine Arabs."

He appeared struck by this suggestion and hopes to send me note in this sense to-morrow.

If he does, I should be grateful for any satisfaction which can be given him on the two points mentioned above.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 34; Cairo, No. 25; and Jedda, No. 19.)

[E 7126/1/31]

No. 122.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received November 28.)

(Nos. 179 and 180.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, November 27, 1938.*

IN talks about Palestine in Riyadh, Ibn Saud said that he still held friendship with His Majesty's Government to be essential for him and all Arabs, in spite of the advances from "certain other Powers." If he thought that His Majesty's Government were hostile to the Arabs or Islam, he would be the first to take arms against them in person, but he did not think so. He believed that they were now going to give the Arabs their rights—not perhaps everything the Arabs demanded, but very nearly. It is clear that he did not mean that Arabs might give way about immigration, for he asked anxiously whether, if discussions in London broke down, immigration could not be stopped until His Majesty's Government had decided upon their own policy, though he eventually accepted my argument that it would be best to see what emerged from the discussions. Prospects for discussions were brighter since statement in Parliament about Palestine delegates and explanation I had given him that discussions were with His Majesty's Government (I do not think he will allow his delegate to discuss with Jewish Agency on any terms). It would not be difficult to safeguard rights of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. If Palestine Arabs made difficulties on this point, he would see about it. He was the leader of the Arab world, not certain people who put themselves forward (he referred in particular to Iraqi Minister for External Affairs).

2. So far as Ibn Saud goes, I put forward that this is our last chance. The two commissions have kept him in play for nearly two years, and he has refused to take part openly against us on the ground that we would do justice to the Arabs in the long run. Justice to him means above all things stopping Jewish immigration. If after London discussions immigration is continued against the desire of Palestinian Arabs, I fear that it will not only convince him that His Majesty's Government are hostile to Arabs, but it will be a great personal humiliation for him and a triumph for Arab extremists, who laughed at him for putting his trust in His Majesty's Government.

3. The main inducement to the partition scheme offered the Arabs was that it put a limit to Jewish encroachment. Partition being ruled out, it seems to me that the line ought to be drawn by stopping immigration at the very high mark it has now reached. If this is not done, I do not see what can keep Arabs favourable or even neutral to us if, for example, in a general conflict Germany should offer, if successful, not only to cancel the Balfour Declaration, but to eject from Palestine the whole of the Jews who have gone there since 1918. German propaganda about Palestine is bound to damage us severely in Arab quarters, where our sympathy with German Jews will generally be regarded either as hypocritical or as proof that as between the Arabs and the Jews we are grossly partial. And now is the easiest moment to give way on immigration question, with reports of two commissions as material. Otherwise armed struggle will, I fear, continue, and if Ibn Saud shows his sympathy openly with the "rebels," we can hardly blame him.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

[E 7164/1/31]

No. 123.

*Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received November 29.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Damascus, November 28, 1938.*

THE speech of Secretary of State for the Colonies during House of Commons debate on Palestine has made an excellent impression in Syrian Arab circles.

It has been reliably reported to me that during Bairam feast members of Arab Higher Committee, including the Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestinian Defence Committee, have been debating their future policy. It appears that discouraging reports have been coming to them from Palestine stating that position of rebels is becoming precarious owing to restrictions placed on their movements by military road control and inconvenience to them of identity-card



system. There is also dispute in respect of distribution of money collected by Palestine Committees in Syria. In view of this feared collapse of rebellion in Palestine, propaganda measures have been organised to try to force on His Majesty's Government acceptance of the Mufti as Palestinian delegate before his prestige evaporates with suppression of revolt in Palestine. It is also suggested that present lull in rebel activities in Palestine is due not so much to British action as to suppositious moderating counsels of the Mufti.

Up to the moment that His Majesty's Government made public their categorical refusal to consider negotiations with the Mufti, I personally favoured, as you are aware, parley with him. To-day I believe it would react unfavourably on outside Arab opinion if His Majesty's Government were now to retract their refusal to treat with him.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 62, and Beirut, unnumbered, Saving.)

[E 7158/1/31]

No. 124.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received November 29.)

(No. 190.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, November 28, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 188, last paragraph.

I have received this afternoon letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs, which, after referring to invitation contained in [? my telegram No. 20] to Cairo, continues:—

"Iraqi Government, after taking note of statements made by His Majesty's Government and of your Excellency's repeated assurances to me that necessary arrangements have been made to afford to Arabs of Palestine an opportunity to choose their representatives in a manner which will satisfy their wishes, and being desirous of solving problems of Arabia in collaboration with neighbouring Arab countries, have pleasure in accepting invitation addressed to them and will send a representative as soon as possible.

"Iraqi Government very much appreciate this invitation and explanations concerning its objects which have been made by responsible persons; they consider that invitation constitutes a good omen for solution of problem, and they hope this omen will be fulfilled in a manner satisfactory to Arabs."

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 35; Cairo, No. 26; and Jedda, No. 20.)

[E 7158/1/31]

No. 125.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 30, 1938.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 186, 188 and 190 [of 24th, 27th and 28th November. Palestine discussions].

I am glad that Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has acted on your suggestion, that he should at once write a note stating his Government's acceptance of invitation, "having taken note of His Majesty's Government's intention to ensure adequate representation of Palestine Arabs." Please thank Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs for this communication.

2. I certainly intend to keep Iraqi Government fully informed of arrangements to be made for selecting a Palestine Arab delegation. You can assure Iraqi Government that His Majesty's Government attach importance to fact that Palestinian Arab delegation should be really representative of Palestinian opinion, and that active consideration is now being given to the means by which Palestinian Arabs may choose their own delegation. Suggestions made by Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs are being borne in mind. As regards the Mufti, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to make a public statement to the effect that he is not excluded from the London discussions. Much as I should have liked to meet the wishes of the Iraqi Government, I regret that this is not possible in the present case. The grounds for the exclusion of the Mufti were stated at the time, and nothing has since occurred to justify the reversal of a policy which was decided upon so recently.

3. As regards an amnesty, you may assure Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have constantly in mind the question of the procedure which will be most likely to restore peace in Palestine. They will keep especially in mind Iraqi Foreign Minister's proposal for a proclamation guaranteeing that, if the rebel bands disperse and go to their homes, they will not be hunted down individually. His Majesty's Government have, however, reluctantly decided that such a proclamation would be premature at the present moment. Perhaps some such step may be possible when the Palestinian Arab delegation has been formed and is ready to come to London, and His Majesty's Government will be prepared then to reconsider the position.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 618; Jedda, No. 148; and Jerusalem, No. 601.)

[E 7314/1/31]

No. 126.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 5.)

(Nos. 189 and 190.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, December 5, 1938.*

I THOUGHT it better to await Ibn Saud's list and not to communicate to him your two points. This policy seemed justified by a long memorandum received from him 4th December, setting forth his negotiations with Iraqi Government and Arab Higher Committee, and showing that he urged latter not to insist on being regarded as sole representatives of Palestine Arabs. To-day, however, I received a telegram which suggests that he is weakening. Following paragraph gives a summary:—

2. People of Palestine declared to our representative desire to elect delegates, but hesitate because they fear His Majesty's Government may object to some or all of those elected, because instructions said to have been given to High Commissioner to select other persons to accompany those chosen by Nationalists and because they want to be sure that their known claims will be the basis of discussion. This hesitation is perhaps justified. If we nominate four or five persons, will His Majesty's Government accept them as representing people of Palestine or desire to add to them? Selection of persons not trusted by people of Palestine might cause difficulty, and presence of two mutually hostile parties might prevent solution from being generally acceptable. We suggest five—the majority trusty—will suffice. Would His Majesty's Government accept following: Jamil-al-Husseini, Izzat Darwaza, Amin Tamimi and Alfred Rock? (Only four names are given and third is perhaps corrupt.) We shall be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government accept these persons and whether they desire to add any others, in which case may we know their names?

3. I am sure that Ibn Saud will back us strongly in insisting that His Majesty's Government cannot accept Arab demands as basis for discussion. Representation question is more difficult, because Ibn Saud himself describes as traitors all Palestine Arabs who do not follow the Mufti. With diffidence, and subject to views of the High Commissioner of Jerusalem, I suggest procedure:—

- Tell Ibn Saud which of the names His Majesty's Government accept—the more the [group omitted].
- Offer to receive up to seven or eight extremists by way of making representation of moderates seem more reasonable to him. Perhaps suggest names of two or three extremists.
- Quote his own arguments from the above-mentioned memorandum in support of representation of other parties, stating those members you think should be chosen to represent each party, and perhaps mention the names of two or three moderates and ask what he thinks of them. I do not think that he meant us to suggest names of moderates, but counter-attack would do no harm.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Nos. 37 and 38; Cairo, Nos. 32 and 33; and Bagdad, Nos. 38 and 39.)



[E 7315/1/31] No. 127.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 6.)

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 6, 1938.

MY telegram No. 189 of 5th December.

For third name read Amin Tamimi and Hilmi Pasha, total five persons.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 34; Bagdad, No. 40; and Jerusalem, No. 39.)

[E 7321/1/31] No. 128.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 6.)

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, December 6, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 191.

Minister for Foreign Affairs authorises me to inform you that he will be the Iraqi delegate.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 28; Jedda, No. 22; and Jerusalem, No. 38.)

[E 7314/1/31] No. 129.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 9, 1938.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 189, 190 and 193 [of 5th and 6th December: Representations of Palestine Arabs at London discussions].

You may inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to receive as representatives of the Palestine Arabs such persons as he may name after careful consideration and consultation of Arab opinion. His Majesty's Government would not desire to add to the list of names unless some unforeseen development in connexion with the Palestine delegation (such as serious criticism in Palestine itself of the names finally selected) should appear to require this, in which case His Majesty's Government would only wish to add names which might be suggested by Ibn Saud after further consultation. His Majesty's Government would therefore be ready to accept any or all of the five names which he has tentatively put forward, but, before he puts forward formally a complete list, His Majesty's Government would ask him to consider that a delegation which is not representative of all important sections of political opinion in Palestine may meet with criticism in Palestine itself. His Majesty's Government have noted that, of the four political parties which were formerly prominent in Palestine, the list tentatively put forward by Ibn Saud contains representatives of the Palestine Arab and the Istiqlal parties only; for example, it has been suggested in various quarters (by Palestinian Arabs as well as by other people) that the Palestine Defence party should be represented in the delegation. Ibn Saud will appreciate that this would not disturb the harmony of the Palestine delegation, for on the political issues to be discussed the Defence party is believed to be in entire agreement with the other parties; but it would broaden the base of Palestinian representation, and avoid otherwise inevitable criticism. Whilst not insisting on this suggestion, His Majesty's Government would ask Ibn Saud to consider it very carefully from point of view of securing delegation which will command wide measure of confidence.

2. You should also make the following points unless you think it preferable to mention them in the informal communication suggested below:—

- (a) That the Palestine delegation should attend the discussions, not as representatives of the Mufti or of the Arab Higher Committee, but as representatives of the Palestine Arabs.

- (b) That when questioned as to the manner in which the Palestine Arab delegation have been selected, His Majesty's Government will wish to be free to say that they themselves have not selected the delegation, but that they understand that Ibn Saud, on his own initiative, has been in consultation with neighbouring Arab Governments and with leaders of the Palestine Arabs, and that, as a result of these consultations, Ibn Saud has furnished a list of delegates who can be regarded as representative of the Palestine Arabs and whom His Majesty's Government are prepared to receive. His Majesty's Government attach importance to this, for any idea that His Majesty's Government had nominated the Palestinian Arab representatives would undermine authority with which they can speak on behalf of their countrymen.

3. You should also raise with Ibn Saud the question of consultation with the Government of Egypt, which does not appear yet to have taken place. It would seem desirable to us that Egyptian Government should not feel that they have been entirely left out in the cold in this matter.

4. Foregoing official reply to Ibn Saud should be supplemented, unless your see strong objection, by a separate informal communication on the following lines:—

5. While His Majesty's Government are prepared, as stated above, to accept final list which may be produced by Ibn Saud as the most suitable representatives of Palestine Arab opinion, they think it best to inform him quite frankly that they have reason to believe that the five names hitherto mentioned might not be regarded by all Arabs as a fully representative delegation. It might be felt in Palestine that such a delegation did not represent even the whole of the Arab Higher Committee, much less the people of Palestine. Whilst we attach great importance to an adequate representation of the Mufti's party, we are sure that Ibn Saud will agree, for the reasons he himself has given, that the delegation should not be composed exclusively of the Mufti's personal friends and followers. It may facilitate Ibn Saud's task of proposing the names of a really representative Palestine Arab delegation if the list were not limited to five individuals, though His Majesty's Government think that it should not exceed seven delegates or eight at the most.

6. In these circumstances, we think it may be helpful to Ibn Saud to have certain additional names (to be considered in conjunction with the five names already mentioned) which have been suggested from various sources, including Arab sources, to the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem, as being those of persons commanding the necessary degree of respect in Palestine. Such names are:—

- (1) Dr. Hussein Khalidi.
- (2) Raghab Bey Nashashibi.
- (3) Auni Bey Abdul Hadi.
- (4) Shibli Jemal.
- (5) Suleiman Bey Tukan.
- (6) Musa-el-Alami.
- (7) Yakub Faraj.

If Ibn Saud should wish to make enquiries regarding any of these people, it would be well that he should avoid letting it be understood that these suggestions have been passed on, even informally, to him by His Majesty's Government. These names are suggested merely as men who are believed to be more influential and capable, and more trusted in Palestine than some others who have been suggested. But His Majesty's Government are anxious to give Ibn Saud and his collaborators a free hand, though indicating privately a certain additional field of choice for his consideration.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 627; Cairo, No. 640; and Bagdad, No. 200.)



[E 7432/1/31] No. 130.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 11.)

(No. 198.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 11, 1938.

MY telegram No. 189 of 5th December, first paragraph.

Memorandum contains many points which have been disposed of by later and even by previous correspondence, but it concludes with two questions which I ought to have sent to you before, though I have sent a personal reply expressing my conviction that Ibn Saud will find reply of His Majesty's Government satisfactory. The questions are:—

- (a) If the Mufti persists, will His Majesty's Government change their attitude towards him and his demands?
- (b) Are His Majesty's Government likely to make greater concessions in this respect to any other Arab authority than Ibn Saud? (He hopes that any concessions will only be made through him.)

2. Memorandum suggests as possible causes of Mufti's obstinacy:—

- (a) Fears for his own political future.
- (b) Influence of extremists.
- (c) Influence of persons who are jealous of the influence of Ibn Saud with the Mufti.

3. Two of the Mufti's original demands have been settled by his agreement not to insist on his inclusion in delegation (my telegram No. 183 of 1st December) and by statement of His Majesty's Government that it is with His Majesty's Government that Arabs are to discuss. There remain two demands:—

- (a) That Arab Higher Committee should be accepted as sole representatives of the people of Palestine.
- (b) That the discussions should be on the basis of Arab demands, which are summed up in the Mufti's latest communication as final cessation of Jewish immigration and replacement of the mandate by a treaty.

4. Memorandum gives convincing arguments which Ibn Saud says he has used with Mufti and with Iraqi Government regarding the two outstanding demands.

5. I suggest our reply after thanks for advice and help should be on the following lines:—

Messages of 11th December from His Majesty's Government (based on your telegram No. 159 of 9th December) indicated their attitude on the question of representation. His Majesty's Government cannot recede from their refusal to accept in principle demands of Arab Higher Committee as basis for discussions. They are glad to know Ibn Saud has been using weighty arguments in support of the point of view of His Majesty's Government and hope that his efforts will be successful. While His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no intention whatsoever of changing their views on these two points, they can assure His Majesty that, should any modification in their attitude seem desirable, they would inform him at once and act in co-operation with him.

6. I should be grateful for early reply as soon as possible.

[E 7442/1/31]

No. 131.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 12.)

(No. 101. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, December 3, 1938.

SIR R. BULLARD'S telegram No. 180.

Iraq opinion also will regard question of Jewish immigration as the test of the forthcoming conference.

It would, I think, accept as a decision of the conference a continuance of Jewish immigration (a) as a means of reaching an agreed minority limit not exceeding 35 per cent., or (b) if fixing of a minority limit is impossible, in the form of casual immigration (*i.e.*, uncontrolled by the Jewish Agency referred to

in the mandate), provided it was restricted to something less than present figure, possibly confined to predominantly Jewish areas, and that guarantees offered against Jewish "domination" were in other respects satisfactory. If proceedings of conference were to include a declaration by His Majesty's Government that, taking in consideration the equally valid guarantee of the rights of the existing population, they now regarded their obligation towards Jews on this point of immigration under Balfour Declaration as discharged up to the limit of the practical, Arab attitude towards any arrangement of this kind would be much less critical.

But if conference breaks down, Iraqi opinion will expect His Majesty's Government either to fix a maximum minority limit or to discontinue Jewish immigration altogether.

In neither event should I anticipate that proposals, subject to revision (except on points of detail) after a term of years, will be regarded with any favour.

If Iraqi opinion is not satisfied on this question of immigration, we may look for a progressive deterioration in our relations with Iraq. Rapidity of process and extent to which it may be carried will very largely depend upon course of events in Palestine itself.

In attempting this appreciation of probable Iraqi attitude, I ought to make it plain that I have no knowledge of any recent correspondence between His Majesty's Government and Government of Palestine on this or any kindred subject.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem, by bag.)

[E 7432/1/31]

No. 132.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 12, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 198 [of 11th December: Palestine discussions].

I agree to action proposed in paragraph 5, but would prefer two following amendments, if you see no objection:—

1. Insert third sentence, after "basis for discussions," as follows:—

"They have steadfastly refused to accept any proposals, whether put forward by Palestine Arabs, by neighbouring States, or by Jewish Agency, as a basis for discussions."

2. Replace last sentence, beginning: "While His Majesty's Government," by the following:—

"His Majesty's Government can assure Ibn Saud that there is no question of their intending to make greater concessions to other Arab authorities than they make to him; indeed, they attach the greatest importance to close co-operation with Ibn Saud at every stage."

[E 7505/1/31]

No. 133.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 13.)

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 13, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 160 of 12th December.

I believe that such a decision would result in refusal of Palestine Arabs to send representatives to the London Conference. It would give the extremists opportunity they want and embarrass such friends as His Majesty's Government still have, in particular Ibn Saud, who would consider decision irresponsible as well as unjust.

2. I have reported more than once Ibn Saud's objection to what he considers our tendency to indulge in our humanitarian feelings at the expense of Palestine Arabs.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 36, and Bagdad, No. 42.)



[E 7511/1/31]

No. 134.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 13.)*

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, December 13, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 202.

I fear the admission of 5,000 German Jew children into Palestine would arouse strong feeling here unless quota for other categories was proportionately reduced. It is very hard to say whether feeling aroused would be so strong as to lead to refusal to send Iraqi representative to London discussions. I do not think it would, but increase of immigration figure already announced would be regarded as evidence of the strength of Jewish influence in this key-question, and hopes of ultimate settlement acceptable to Arab opinion would be diminished, and conference's chances of success would be prejudiced.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 29, and Jedda, No. 24.)

[E 7530/1/31]

No. 135.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 14.)*

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, December 14, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 199 of 13th December.

Second paragraph should have continued:—

"I will not, says Ibn Saud, reconsider withdrawal of acceptance of invitation, but he would lose confidence in His Majesty's Government, and would, I am sure, cease to act as a moderating influence with Palestinian Arabs."

Omission much regretted.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 37; Bagdad, No. 43; and Jerusalem, No. 41.)

[E 7643/1/31]

No. 136.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 18.)*

(No. 203.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, December 18, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 166 of 17th December.

The active interest shown by Egyptian Prime Minister is highly satisfactory from my point of view, as there would be obvious danger if Ibn Saud could claim that success was due to his unaided efforts, and I appreciate apprehension of Sir M. Lampson lest anything said by us should divide rather than unite them. I am sending Ibn Saud a message referring to your enquiry about his consulting with the Egyptian [group omitted] (paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 159 of 9th December) and to respond to communications from him (1) about uniting all efforts; (2) showing that Mufti is negotiating with Mohammed Mahmoud as well as with Ibn Saud, and am expressing the hope for agreement as to the list of delegates. This message which falls within the wide discretion allowed by your above-mentioned telegram should suffice for the present.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 39.)

[E 7624/1/31]

No. 137.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 218.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, November 28, 1938.*

ON my return from Riyadh, I have the honour to report rather more fully than I have been able to do by telegram on the conversations about Palestine which I have had with Ibn Saud.

2. The King naturally welcomed the abandonment of the partitions scheme, which I think he had always regarded as impossible, and received the statement of policy with great satisfaction. Throughout my stay in Riyadh he claimed to be doing his best, both with the Iraqi Government and with the Syrian and Palestinian Arabs, to support the proposal of His Majesty's Government that discussions should take place in London as soon as possible without conditions being laid down on either side. The course of the negotiations about the proposed meeting for discussion in London has been, I hope, adequately dealt with in my telegrams, and it will suffice here to say that Ibn Saud made no objection to the exclusion of the Mufti, but was nevertheless glad when the statement in the House of Commons on the 23rd November made it clear that His Majesty's Government had not necessarily decided to exclude any other Arab leader; that he was glad to have the assurance I was able to give him that the discussions were intended to be with His Majesty's Government, as he had feared at first that the Arab delegates might be expected to negotiate with the Jews; and that he is disposed to send his second son, His Highness the Amir Feisal, as Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, to represent him at the discussions.

3. The chief points in a long conversation about Palestine which I had with the King on the 14th November were sent to you in my telegram No. 164, dated the 16th November. The world situation, said His Majesty, had changed for the worse, and His Majesty's Government must take this into account. He was as much convinced as ever that the interests of His Majesty's Government were identical with those of the Arab and Moslem world, and it was in his own interests that he had always preached this doctrine. It was therefore in his own interests that he wished to see the Palestine question settled. His Majesty's Government could not ignore the value of Arab friendship in case of war. Three "fingers" were interfering in Palestine: the Italian, the German and the Turkish. The Arabs did not trust the Germans and the Italians, but a desperate man would accept help from any quarter. The Turks were doing a great deal of propaganda. They jeered at the Palestine Arabs, who had objected to Turkish domination and got the Jews in exchange. Turkey, they reminded the Arabs, would have given the Jews short shrift. This sort of argument had considerable weight with many Arabs. He adhered to his opinion that the Turks were only awaiting a chance to seize Jazira and Mosul. All this must be taken into account. There was no doubt that, if the Palestine Arabs did not get what they wanted, they would continue their struggle. They could not make war on Great Britain, but the armed struggle would continue, if necessary, until the Palestine Arabs were wiped out. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not find themselves obliged to act towards the Palestine Arabs as the Germans were acting towards the Jews. If the London discussions came to nothing and His Majesty's Government tried to carry on their present policy, they could only do it by force.

4. To distract the King's attention from this melancholy prospect, I turned the conversation to the negotiations about the proposed discussions. I asked him whether he thought there were perhaps several possible solutions of the Palestine problem, or only one, but he laughed and said that it was for His Majesty's Government to find a solution. I fancy he supposed that they already had a scheme ready.

5. As the King repeated the too-simple statement that the Balfour Declaration violated the promise given by His Majesty's Government to the Arabs, I went into this point and made the best of the rather flimsy arguments which can be found to justify the declaration. I also took up a question he asked as to what right the United States had to interfere in the Palestine business. I reminded him that the victory of the Allies in the Great War was partly due to the assistance afforded by the United States, and said that when His Majesty's Government spoke of their international obligations in regard to Palestine, this was a serious matter; many countries took a deep interest in the application of the Balfour Declaration, and His Majesty's Government had to take this into account. At this Ibn Saud said that it was useless to think of theoretical rights and obligations; one had to think of what was possible. How many obligations enshrined in the Versailles Treaty had gone by the board! Look at Czechoslovakia! A sacrifice had had to be made to avoid a greater evil: Czechoslovakia had had to give up part of her territory, but she continued to exist, instead of being destroyed in a general war. In these days, with the menace of war never far away, and the Palestine problem threatening to drive the Arabs into the



arms of the enemies of Great Britain. His Majesty's Government must consider what was possible. I have condensed his remarks; the general tenor was that the continuance of our Palestine policy was impossible, since it would be fatal to His Majesty's Government. In fact, said the King, he was so worried by the problem that he felt that if he heard one day that Palestine had ceased to exist he would be glad.

6. His Majesty, who, as usual, had divided his subject under three heads—"Palestine, Syria and a personal matter"—turned to Syria. His Majesty's Government must not think, he said, that the Syrian Government had encouraged the Palestine rebels. Jamil Mardom had suggested to him that it was perhaps the French who provided arms to be smuggled into Palestine. After all, the French had command of the coasts of Syria. I received this very coldly, and for the first time in my acquaintance with him the King looked somewhat confused. He was not speaking from his own knowledge, he explained, but was merely repeating information which had been given to him, and he indicated in rather roundabout language that the theory about the French might account for the impression we had received that the Palestinians were expecting help from Saudi Arabia. The King then made the odd suggestion that His Majesty's Government should try to come to some understanding with the Syrians, perhaps through him. It was all rather vague, and the purpose of the proposal was not clear, but, in any case, the matter went no further, as I said that His Majesty's Government could hardly deal with the Syrians behind the backs of the French Government, and the King dropped the subject.

7. His Majesty now explained what he meant by the personal question. He had incurred great odium by his refusal to indulge in propaganda about Palestine, to take part in conferences on the subject, and so on, and compared his position unfavourably with that of the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taufiq Suaidi, with his triumphal return from London and Paris. I reminded him of the assurances which His Majesty's Government had sent him on this very point, that they had not taken any representative of Iraq or Egypt more fully into their confidence than His Majesty; I suggested that some of Taufiq Suaidi's statements were clever guesses based on conversations with private persons; and I pointed out that the statement of policy issued by His Majesty's Government did not bear out all Taufiq Suaidi's claims. The King then made a remark which seemed at first to be merely an expansion of what he had already said. He said he hoped His Majesty's Government would not call in other people to help rather than their old friend and supporter, Ibn Saud, and I repeated the assurance which I had already quoted. I talked this over afterwards with the Legation interpreter, who was present, and we came to the conclusion that, although the language was very vague, Ibn Saud was thinking not of consultation for the purposes of finding a scheme for the settlement of the Palestine problem, but of co-operation in the execution of the scheme eventually adopted, and that his old enmity with the Amir Abdullah was at the back of his mind. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on this occasion Ibn Saud had turned out Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and the assistant secretary, Rushdi Malhas, before he began to speak, though perhaps he was also ashamed to make his accusations against the French in their presence. In any case, since it would clearly be impossible to give preference over the Amir Abdullah to Ibn Saud or one of his sons in Palestine affairs, it is as well that the reference was so vague. The subject was not referred to again.

8. It was immediately after this conversation that the violent German attacks on our Palestine policy began, and Ibn Saud referred to them with apprehension at a subsequent interview. As you are aware, he has the important foreign broadcasts taken down every day, and he had thus learned of the attack from the Berlin broadcast in English. He may have been mistaken in attributing to Herr Hitler himself the attack of which he had heard, but he was correct as to the nature of the attack, and it made him very apprehensive. I have no doubt that he considers that our behaviour in Palestine is little, if at all, better than the German treatment of the Jews (Fuad Bey, who returned to Riyadh just before I left, was openly amused at the dilemma in which the Palestine policy places His Majesty's Government in their attitude towards the ill-treatment of Jews in Germany); but the point is that the King regrets our giving the Germans a weapon to use against us because a successful attack on our position weakens his position also. He said that this German attack was only the beginning. His Majesty's Government must take warning from it.

9. In the last interview I had with His Majesty, an hour or two before I left on the 24th November, the talk was all of Palestine. Much of it was about the tendency of Iraq, and apparently Egypt also, to lay down conditions before agreeing to take part in the discussions in London. This tendency the King was trying to discourage. He was beginning by argument, but if necessary he would tell Iraq and Egypt that they were wrong. It was still the best policy for the Arab world to remain on good terms with His Majesty's Government, in spite of the advances he had received from "certain other Powers." I did not ask for a list of the other Powers: the comment afforded interesting confirmation of the news sent to the Foreign Office in Bagdad telegram No. 88 of the 8th November, indicating that the Germans wish to be represented at Jedda, where they have no positive interests whatever and can only have the interest of anti-British activity. Ibn Saud went on to speak of his long acquaintance with British officials, and of his conviction, based on that acquaintance, that the British were decent people and in the long run would do justice to Palestine. It was true that there were certain matters—here he waved his hand as though hesitating to define the matters in question, but the reference to the painful subject of the eastern frontier was clear enough. If he thought that the British were hostile to the Arab cause and to Islam he would be one of the first to fight against them in person, but he had no such belief. He believed that His Majesty's Government were now going to give the Arabs their rights—not, perhaps, everything they claimed, but pretty nearly. I forbore to press him to say on what point or points the Arabs would make some concession, but I am sure that it is not on the question of immigration. He has accepted the decision of His Majesty's Government that to suspend Jewish immigration until the termination of the London discussions is not possible, though he might have been more difficult if the suggested date for the discussions had not been so near; he asked me on one occasion whether His Majesty's Government could not undertake to suspend immigration, if the discussions broke down, until they should have decided upon their own policy, though in the end he agreed that it would be reasonable to await the result of the discussions; and, as I have reported above, he declared that if the negotiations in London ended in failure and His Majesty's Government decided to continue their present policy, they could only do so by force. It would be quite easy, the King said, to safeguard the rights and interests of His Majesty's Government in Palestine: if the Arabs made any difficulty on this subject he would take them in hand. He was the leader of the Arab world, not certain people who put themselves forward and talked very loudly. He referred in particular to Taufiq Suaidi: "as if British statesmen would be likely to tell him all their secrets."

10. It was clear to me that Ibn Saud felt that his confidence in His Majesty's Government was at last to be justified in the eyes of the world by their acceptance at the London discussions of a scheme approximating closely to the Arab demands. Having in mind the fourth paragraph of your telegram No. 124 of the 4th November, which suggests that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the restriction of Jewish immigration to a maximum of about 12,000 a year is a handsome concession to Arab feeling and fears, I felt that there must be a great divergence of opinion between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud on this point, and in my telegram No. 178, which I wrote in the last moments before leaving Riyadh, I thought it my duty to inform you that if Ibn Saud thought that His Majesty's Government not only proposed to continue immigration, but apparently expected the Arabs, himself included, to acquiesce in this policy, he would be both astonished and disgusted. It is conceivable, I suppose, that the other terms which His Majesty's Government may be able to offer to the Arabs will be so favourable that to secure them they may give way to some extent on the question of Jewish immigration, and it might be safer to wait and see and not to risk a forecast of Ibn Saud's attitude. But I feel strongly that if His Majesty's Government's proposals include Jewish immigration on a considerable scale (and the rate of 12,000 a year seems to me a considerable scale, in view of the huge addition to the Jewish population of Palestine which has been brought about by His Majesty's Government since the War), Ibn Saud will feel—to put it bluntly—that he has been made a fool of. It is true that he knows that immigration is to be one of the subjects for discussion in London, but I am sure that he does not believe His Majesty's Government can have something like 12,000 in mind as the irreducible minimum. I was careful not to



enter into any discussion of the immigration question, for fear of frightening him into withdrawing his acceptance of the invitation to send a delegate to London: but I feel fairly confident in hazarding the guess that he would regard as reasonable the rounding off of Jewish families already in Palestine by the immigration of near relatives, and perhaps even the completion of the six months' schedule upon which His Majesty's Government have already embarked, but not much more than that.

11. I venture to repeat what I said in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 180 dated the 28th November. It seems to me that so far as Ibn Saud is concerned this is our last chance. He has been able to stave off for nearly two years the obligation to come to an open decision, thanks to the two commissions; but His Majesty's Government are now obliged to adopt a definite policy, and if it is one which the Arabs as a whole refuse to accept I fear that he will conclude that His Majesty's Government are hostile to the Arabs after all, and that he will feel that he has been humiliated: the smart young Arab politicians who refused to share his confidence in His Majesty's Government will have the laugh of him.

12. In the third paragraph of my above-quoted telegram No. 180 I have perhaps ventured further into the realm of world politics than my functions warrant, but I do so because many Arabs must be considering with some envy the methods adopted by Germany in dealing with the Jews, and must be saying that if Jews can be turned out of a country in which many of them have lived for centuries without hindrance, surely they can rightly be ejected from a country into which they have been thrust by a foreign Power against the wishes of the inhabitants. It seems to me that unless we can find a policy which the Arabs will accept, if not support, we shall be in a very dangerous position in the Near and Middle East in case of conflict with Germany. Even the German propaganda must do us great harm, and we cannot meet it by broadcasting news about the ill-treatment of the Jews in Germany. Moslems will tend to think that the Germans may be pardoned for finding, as Mahomet did, that the Jews were impossible people, and will in any case consider that our Palestine policy estops us from criticising the Germans. The partition policy, though perhaps never feasible because of the opposition of the Arabs, could at least be honestly recommended to the Arabs as offering a definite physical frontier which the Jews would not be able to pass without Arab permission. Partition being now ruled out, it seems to be desirable to draw the line in some other way, and the simplest way, which is also the way that appeals to Arab opinion, is to put a stop to Jewish immigration. I suggest that the reports of the two commissions provide plenty of ground for deciding to stop Jewish immigration, at any rate for a considerable period of years, and I venture to think that it would be less humiliating to come to this decision as a result of examination of the two reports and of the discussions which are to take place in London, than either to have to abandon immigration as the result of unwillingness or inability to force it upon an unwilling country, or to have to bear for a long period the odium of holding Palestine down by means of a large military force. I trust that my forebodings will be falsified by the course of events, and that a policy which the Arabs as a whole will accept will be discovered.

13. The intensity of Ibn Saud's sympathy with the Palestine "rebels" is well known to the Foreign Office. During one of the talks at Riyadh he reminded me that when he received me in January and spoke of Palestine he could not, for all his efforts, keep the tears out of his eyes. His sympathy could be understood even if we did not know of the influence which the Koran must have on the attitude of a pious Moslem towards the Jews. Ibn Saud is usually restrained in his language, but when I pointed out the inconsistency between the claim of the Arab Higher Committee to represent all the Arabs of Palestine and the elimination by murder of very many opponents of the committee, Ibn Saud said that in the circumstances the Arabs might well regard the removal of one traitor as more important than the killing of fifty Jews. What he will do if there is no agreed settlement in Palestine, and His Majesty's Government decide to allow Jewish immigration on a considerable scale to continue, I do not know, though I have tried to indicate what he will feel. The Government of Palestine consider they have good reason to believe that for some months he has been furnishing aid to the Arab malcontents in secret. If he feels that his confidence in the good intentions of His Majesty's Government has been misplaced and decides to come out openly in favour of the Arab nationalists, if, for example, he declares that

he can no longer prevent Arabs from Saudi Arabia from entering Transjordan and Palestine to assist their co-religionists there in what he regards as a righteous struggle to be free, we may remonstrate, but we can hardly be surprised.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7677/1/31]

No. 138.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 20.)*

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, December 20, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 19th December.

Fuad, who has just arrived, tells me that—

(1) Ibn Saud is in touch with Egypt as well as Iraq.

(2) Palestinian Arabs have dropped all demands about discussions except that the delegates should be chosen by Arab Higher Committee and have decided in any case to await arrival at Beirut of deportees from Seychelles.

Fuad and new Egyptian Minister, Azzam, are suggesting to their respective Governments that persons representing Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia should meet in Cairo to try to secure acceptance of an agreed list of delegates by the Palestine Arabs. This would ensure a united action by three Arab Governments which, Fuad says, is otherwise complicated and slow, and would prevent Mufti from trying to play one against the other, and as the activities would be restricted to one specified point, they would not be open to the objection which His Majesty's Government found to Ibn Saud's proposal for preliminary discussions in London. (Repeated to Cairo, No. 41; Jerusalem, No. 42; and Bagdad, No. 45.)

[E 7692/1/31]

No. 139.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 21.)*

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, December 20, 1938.*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 205.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. (End of R.)

He understands the position and accepts responsibility, but argued that additional names must be suggested in the first instance by the Mufti. He finally agreed that Iraq and other Governments would put forward names, but he made it tolerably clear that, apart from representatives of the Arab Higher Committee, they would at the best be "neutrals" (including Palestine Defence party) and that all names would be submitted to the Mufti.

The latter looms larger than before on his horizon, due, I suspect, to his communications with the Egyptian Government. He even [? pretended] to have heard from Egypt that His Majesty's Government were prepared to abandon their veto on the Mufti's attendance, but this I denied.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Jedda, and Cairo.)

[E 7748/1/31]

No. 140.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 25.)*

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, December 25, 1938.*

IBN SAUD has received a telegram from the Mufti expressing readiness to comply with his wishes and authorising the selection of delegates, provided that His Majesty's Government will obtain permission from the French Government

[19309]



for deportees from the Seychelles to enter Lebanon and for Palestinian leaders to move about the assembly freely in order to confer and to select delegates. Mufti promises that if this is done, choice will be made quickly.

2. Ibn Saud supports these proposals.

3. Project for meeting in Egypt of representatives of the three Arab States to influence the Mufti in selection of delegates is not necessarily set aside, but the Egyptian Minister has received no reply from his Government. Ibn Saud is ready to agree if Egypt approves.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 42; Jerusalem, No. 43; Bagdad, No. 46; and Beirut and Damascus.)

[E 7740/1/31]

No. 141.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 25.)

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 25, 1938.

(R.) MY telegram No. 212.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed oriental secretary this morning that Iraqi Consul-General at Beirut had reported that the French authorities would not permit any of the Arab leaders released from the Seychelles to visit the Mufti, and that the Mufti was insisting that he could come to no decision concerning representation of Palestinian Arabs at London discussions until he had consulted with certain members of the Arab Higher Committee, who were amongst them. The Mufti had declared that French action had been taken at the request of His Majesty's Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that unless this difficulty could be overcome, Arab Government would not be able to put forward names for the Arab delegation. (End of R.)

My own inclination, therefore, as against obstruction on the part of the Mufti and subservience on the part of the Iraqi (and possibly other Governments), would be to inform the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that I gather that, for reasons which seemed to me quite inadequate, he is unable to fulfil undertaking referred to in my telegram No. 211, and that I have advised my Government of this circumstance.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 45, and Cairo, No. 34.)

[E 7819/1/31]

No. 142.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.*—(Received December 28.)

(No. 217.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 27, 1938.

PALESTINE. I asked Nuri this morning whom he proposed to send to London in place of Taufiq Suwaidi.

He replied by a lengthy dissertation, the gist of which was that he thought His Majesty's Government would be too much occupied with Italian visit to think about Palestine; that it was very necessary for a basis to be fixed for conference; that he would produce such a basis as soon as Prime Minister returned from Rome; that essential point to his mind was that Palestine should be kept quite apart from general Jewish question—by this he meant that Palestine should be dealt with on the basis of her existing population; our pledges to establish Jewish national home would be fulfilled if in addition to 400,000 Jews resident in Palestine other Jews were free to visit Palestine even for a prolonged period, but without acquiring Palestinian nationality, or in any way becoming involved in the political life of the country; these visiting Jews would draw spiritual and cultural refreshment from their national home just as Indian Moslems to-day profited from visit to Mecca without there being any question of establishment of an Indian Moslem State there.

I told his Excellency that all this was very disappointing. Preparations for London Conference, as he must know, were already far advanced and further delays were to be deprecated. Palestine Arabs had as much to lose as anyone from diminution of interest in the question which might be expected if the conference were further postponed. I recapitulated the points which had been settled with previous Government and urged his Excellency to take up the matter where they had left off.

After some further argument, his Excellency reverted to the question of authorisation for Palestine Arab delegates to visit the Mufti at Beirut (please see my telegram No. 214). If His Majesty's Government could induce the French Government to allow this visit, he was prepared himself to fly to Beirut and meet the delegates and Mufti there and arrange for addition of two or three further delegates, amongst whom he wished to include Raghib Nashashibi. He would then himself go to London, leaving the Minister of the Interior in charge here.

I told him that I had reported his predecessor's request on this subject to you, but that I had myself regarded it as pretext for delay. His Excellency urged that the Mufti was entitled to see the delegates before they went to London.

I could not get him beyond this point, and if the conference is not to be postponed indefinitely or held without Iraqi participation, I would urge that the French Government should be approached in the desired sense.

My immediately following telegram deals with other matters discussed with Nuri.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 46; Jedda, No. 30; and Cairo, No. 35.)

[E 7748/1/31]

No. 143.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 171.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 29, 1938.

YOUR telegram No. 207 [of 25th December: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

You may inform Ibn Saud that there may be difficulty in persuading the French Government to reverse their decision not to allow deportees from the Seychelles to enter the Lebanon. There is no foundation for the rumour which, according to the Iraqi Government, is being put about by the Mufti, that the French decision not to admit these people was taken at the request of His Majesty's Government. On the contrary, when the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs were informed by the British Embassy that two of the deportees wished to proceed to Beirut, they replied that the French Government had already decided not to grant visas, and added that they could hold out no hope of the decision being reversed.

2. His Majesty's Government are now, however, approaching the French Government again and are explaining the special circumstances which now render it desirable for the Palestinian leaders to be given facilities to confer with each other in connexion with selection of Palestinian Arab delegates. French Government are being asked whether in these circumstances they would be prepared to grant visas which would enable all five deportees to visit Beirut for a short period only, perhaps a week.

3. It is to be hoped that the French Government, in the light of this further approach, may be willing to reconsider their decision; but if not, perhaps the best course will be to try to arrange for one of the Palestine leaders from the Lebanon to visit Egypt to confer with the deportees from the Seychelles.

4. You should add that I earnestly hope that all these preparations may be completed at the earliest possible date in order to enable London discussions to begin on 18th January.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 678; Jerusalem, No. 680; and Bagdad, No. 213.)



[E 7819/1/31]

No. 144.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, December 29, 1938.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 214 and 217 [of 25th and 27th December: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

You may speak to Iraqi Government on the lines of my telegram No. 171 to Jedda.

2. You should also take an early opportunity of explaining to Nuri Pasha that His Majesty's Government are very anxious for London discussions on Palestine to start about 18th January, after Rome visit has taken place. I shall be grateful for his co-operation in regard to the arrangements under consideration for ensuring selection of a Palestine delegation which shall be really representative of all the Palestine Arabs. I am sure that the Iraqi Government, in co-operation with the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will do their best to solve the difficulties which have arisen in this respect and ensure that all the Arab delegates are ready in London by the date suggested.

## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

[E 3881/29/89]

No. 145.

*Mr. Morgan to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Istanbul, June 30, 1938.*

MY telegram No. 156.

Prime Minister referred to question of Aleppo in the course of a speech in Grand National Assembly yesterday. Principal points were as follows:—

Sanjak is and will remain Turkish and cannot be left to its fate. Turkey demands only her national right and will not weaken in doing so.

Situation is as follows:—

League of Nations Commission has left territory and at Turkey's expressed request; elections have been adjourned in order that they may be held on a more satisfactory basis; discussions regarding defence of territorial conditions—I can only say that they will result in a friendly arrangement. Our friendship with France has undergone a severe test; it can be re-established when this problem is settled. A friendly arrangement can only be realised by creating in the sanjak a Government "within the framework" of a Turkish majority. Question no longer has a character of gravity and a "calmer wind is beginning to blow."

Concluding, the Prime Minister asked for and obtained full powers during parliamentary vacation to take all necessary steps to defend national [group undecipherable].

(Please send to Paris.)

[E 3885/29/89]

No. 146.

*Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 442. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Paris, July 1, 1938.*

M. BONNET informed representatives of the press on 1st July, in the presence of the Turkish Ambassador, that the negotiations between France and Turkey over Alexandretta had been successfully concluded. France had admitted that the arrangements of 1921 conferred by implication a special position on the Turkish elements in the sanjak, and Turkey, on her side, had confirmed her territorial disinterestedness. A military agreement, defining the conditions in which France and Turkey would exercise the guarantee which they had jointly assumed in the sanjak, had been drawn up. A protocol, signed by the two General Staffs, fixed the practical methods of co-operation between the French and Turkish forces. A tripartite convention was also on the road to conclusion, which would regularise the frontier relations between Turkey and Syria. To complete the whole, a treaty of friendship was on the point of being signed between France and Turkey, with the object of consolidating the existing equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean. The negotiations which led to these results had been conducted in that spirit of confidence which had always inspired Franco-Turkish relations, and could only tend to draw the two countries closer to each other.

The Turkish Ambassador in his turn declared that the question of the sanjak had been a decisive test of Franco-Turkish friendship, which had emerged not only intact, but stronger than ever from the negotiations. A new era had now opened in Franco-Turkish relations.

The *Temps* (Right) adds that the texts have not yet been finally completed, and that the definite signature of the treaty will probably take place when M. Bonnet visits Syria in September next. It goes on to say that the importance of the treaty of friendship consists in the engagement by the two parties to maintain the political *status quo* in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to consult when their mutual interests are concerned.

(Copy sent to Angora.)



[E 4067/29/89]

No. 147.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 53. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Bagdad, July 5, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 89.

1. I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning on lines suggested.

2. He thanked me, but maintained with some vigour that all efforts to give effect to decisions of League Council Committee had now broken down and that France and Turkey were dealing with the matter regardless of Geneva. The Iraqi Government felt strongly that lasting settlement could only be established on basis of partition of sanjak. His information from Angora was to the effect that Turks agreed in principle but demanded Antioch. Was it not possible, he asked (now that League arrangements had collapsed) for His Majesty's Government to intervene at Angora with a view to persuading Turks to be more amenable on this point? Conditions upon which Turkey would accept partition were a natural frontier, exchange of populations, a free port for Syria at Alexandretta, both Alexandretta and Antioch to go to Turkey. Both Syria and Iraq would accept all these conditions except the surrender of Antioch. To include Antioch in the Turkish share meant in reality not partition but sacrifice of practically the whole of the sanjak. If there was Turkish majority in Antioch, there was equally Arab majority in Alexandretta. Given acceptance of principle of exchange of populations, the one cancelled the other. Nevertheless, in the last resort the Arabs would regard partition even with the loss of Antioch as better than the indeterminate solution evolved at Geneva.

3. As regards *locus standi* of His Majesty's Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled intervention of His Majesty's Government in many international questions, including that of the Sudeten Germans, in which they had no standing other than that of a Great Power interested in promoting peace, and again stressed the point that as League arrangements had now broken down, the way was clear for His Majesty's Government to take initiative in promoting fair settlement on basis of partition.

4. I said that I thought that he took too gloomy a view of recent developments. So far as I knew, Turkish troops had only entered sanjak temporarily to maintain order.

5. At the same time I undertook to report his Excellency's remarks to you and to communicate to him any further advice which you might care to offer.

(Repeated to Istanbul, No. 1, Saving.)

[E 4172/1982/93]

No. 148.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 56. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, July 12, 1938.*

MY despatch No. 310.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, in referring to this matter this morning, mentioned that Turkey now seemed to be most serious menace to Iraq, and indicated that he thought plan of defence should deal in particular with possibility of Turkish attack.

This view was based on his conviction that Turks would be encouraged by their success over Alexandretta ultimately to revive claims to Mosul.

However improbable Iraqi apprehensions might appear, this definition of them may help War Office to furnish new Inspector-General with some material for a reply.

[E 4218/29/89]

No. 149.

*Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Istanbul, July 16, 1938.*

SIR M. PETERSON'S telegram No. 53, Saving.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Iraqi Minister pressed Turkish Government with some vigour to partition sanjak with Syria, and that these representations were listened to with friendly courtesy and with an expressed desire to consider favourably any reasonable or practical views. It was pointed out to Iraqi Minister that, before Turkish Cabinet could consider the matter, specific proposals would have to be prepared taking into consideration Turkey's known desiderata as regards Antioch and a "natural" frontier, and that French as well as Syrians must be consulted.

No such proposals have emerged, and Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has politely indicated that matter must lapse so far as Turkey is concerned. Turkey does not desire partition and prefers to stand by Geneva settlement. She also dislikes the idea of any further compulsory exchanges of population.

See my immediately following telegram.

Please send to Paris.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 4067/29/89]

No. 150.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).*

(No. 15. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 17, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 53, Saving, [of 5th July: Alexandretta].

I have not yet studied text of Franco-Turkish Agreement, but, from summaries which have appeared in the press, I am quite prepared to believe that it does not represent an ideal settlement of the Alexandretta problem. I will bear in mind views expressed to you by Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency will, however, appreciate that the two parties directly concerned, viz., Turkey on the one hand, and France representing the Syrian Arabs on the other, are now in agreement, and it would in practice be very difficult for His Majesty's Government, who are less directly concerned, to intervene with a proposal for some completely new solution. In principle, His Majesty's Government have welcomed the fact that Turkey and France, with both of whom, as with Iraq, they are on terms of special friendship, have been able to reach an agreed settlement of the dispute. They would be very reluctant to take any step which might lead to a revival of the differences between Turkey and France.

2. In any case, it is not certain that an ideal solution of the Alexandretta problem is now practicable. Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs advocates partition of the sanjak, and suggests that His Majesty's Government should intervene at Angora with a view to persuade the Turks to give up their demand for Antioch in return for acquisition of Alexandretta. There is, I consider, no chance of persuading Turks to be more amenable on this point. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated months ago that, if it came to partition, his Government would not entertain any suggestion that did not give the town of Antioch to Turkey. Recent developments will only have strengthened the Turkish Government's determination on this point. If His Majesty's Government were now to approach the Turkish Government on lines suggested by Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, they would only meet with the reply that the Turkish Government had no intention or wish other than loyally to adhere to their agreed settlement with France.

3. I note that, in the last resort, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs would regard partition even with the loss of Antioch as better than Geneva settlement. This is, however, not a point of view on which His Majesty's Government could base a positive recommendation for a fresh solution of the Alexandretta problem. If it represents the view of the Syrian Government, they must put it to the French Government.



4. I should have thought that, from the point of view of Syria and Iraq, the Geneva settlement, which I understand it is proposed to continue in a modified form under the Franco-Turkish Agreement, possesses certain definite advantages, *e.g.*, demilitarisation. Surely it would in many respects be far more advantageous to Syria, than an arrangement by which the greater part of the sanjak, including Antioch, would be handed over to Turkey in full sovereignty.

5. Unless you see objection, please speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this telegram.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 25, Saving, and Paris, 173, Saving (by bag).)

[E 4241/29/89]

No. 151.

*Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 338.)

My Lord,

*Istanbul, July 11, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Mr. Morgan's telegram No. 30 of the 5th July, to transmit to your Lordship herewith the texts, as published by the Anatolia Agency, of the Turco-French Treaty of Friendship and joint declaration of the 4th July.

2. The French Embassy have confirmed that the text as published by the agency is authoritative.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

Enclosure 1 in No. 151.

*Traité d'Amitié entre la France et la Turquie.*

LE Président de la République française et le Président de la République turque, animés du désir de raffermir, dans l'intérêt commun des deux pays, les liens d'une amitié sincère, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : M. le Dr. Tevfik Aras, Député d'Izmir, Ministre des Affaires étrangères;

Le Président de la République française : M. Henri Ponsot, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire en Turquie;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à n'entrer dans aucune entente d'ordre politique ou économique et dans aucune combinaison dirigées contre l'une d'elles.

ARTICLE 2.

Si l'une des hautes parties contractantes, malgré son attitude pacifique, est attaquée par une ou plusieurs autres Puissances, l'autre partie, pendant toute la durée du conflit, ne prêterait aucune aide ou assistance, de quelque nature que ce soit, à l'agresseur ou aux agresseurs.

ARTICLE 3.

Egalement attachées au maintien de la paix générale et de la sécurité en Méditerranée orientale, les hautes parties contractantes, en présence de toute situation dont le développement apparaîtrait comme pouvant conduire à faire

jouer l'engagement de garantie qui résulte pour elles du Traité de Garantie de l'Intégrité territoriale du Sandjak du 29 mai 1937, se concerteront en vue d'assurer l'exécution de leurs obligations et de s'accorder mutuellement les facilités nécessaires à cet effet.

ARTICLE 4.

L'acte général d'arbitrage, dans toute la mesure où il est en vigueur entre les deux hautes parties contractantes au moment de la signature du présent traité, continuera, pendant toute la durée de celui-ci, à fixer entre elles les méthodes de règlement des différends et conflits.

ARTICLE 5.

Le présent traité ne déroge pas aux dispositions par lesquelles, à l'égard de certains différends, une méthode particulière de règlement a été établie entre les deux hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent traité ne pourra pas être interprété comme restreignant la mission dévolue à la Société des Nations ou comme portant atteinte aux obligations qui découlent pour les hautes parties contractantes du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 7.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées aussitôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur à compter de l'échange des ratifications. Il aura une durée de dix ans et, sauf dénonciation intervenue six mois avant la date de son expiration, il sera considéré comme renouvelé par tacite reconduction pour une période de cinq années et ainsi de suite.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 4 juillet 1938.

Enclosure 2 in No. 151.

*Protocole relatif aux Optants.*

LES personnes ayant opté pour la Turquie, par application de l'article 31 du Traité de Lausanne, et les personnes ayant opté pour la Syrie et le Liban conformément aux stipulations de l'article 3 de la convention signée à Ankara le 30 mai 1926, qui n'ont pas encore transféré leurs domiciles respectifs en Turquie d'une part, en Syrie et au Liban d'autre part, perdent définitivement le bénéfice de leur option et acquerront d'office la nationalité syrienne ou libanaise d'une part, la nationalité turque d'autre part, dans les conditions suivantes :

1. Si, avant le 15 août prochain, elles ne confirment pas leur déclaration d'option antérieure auprès des autorités compétentes, ou

2. Si, ayant régulièrement confirmé leur déclaration d'option dans le délai prévu, elles ne transfèrent pas leur domicile dans le pays pour lequel elles ont opté avant le 15 janvier 1939.

La déclaration requise pour conserver le bénéfice de l'option, sous la condition de transfert de domicile, sera faite, pour les optants turcs auprès des autorités consulaires turques en Syrie et au Liban, et pour les optants syriens et libanais auprès des autorités consulaires françaises en Turquie. Les nouvelles listes, closes le 15 août prochain, seront communiquées à l'autre partie avant le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre.

Toutes dispositions administratives ou réglementaires seront prises pour permettre aux optants qui doivent transférer leur domicile dans le pays de leur option de disposer librement de leurs biens au plus tard à partir du 1<sup>er</sup> septembre prochain.

Ces personnes seront libres de conserver les biens immobiliers qu'elles possèdent en territoire turc ou en territoire syrien ou libanais.



Elles pourront emporter leurs biens meubles de toute nature. Il ne leur sera imposé, de ce fait, aucun droit ou taxe, soit de sortie, soit d'entrée.

Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de 18 ans suivront la condition de leurs parents pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions qui précèdent.

Le 3 juillet 1938.

Enclosure 3 in No. 151.

*Déclaration commune.*

LE Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc, vu le Traité d'Amitié signé aujourd'hui, et destiné à remplacer le Traité d'Amitié, de Conciliation et d'Arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930, entre la France et la Turquie, constatent par la présente déclaration leur accord en vue :

1. De poursuivre la mise en vigueur et l'application du statut du Sandjak d'Alexandrette, et de la loi fondamentale adoptée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations le 29 mai 1937, dans l'esprit de l'Accord d'Ankara du 20 octobre 1921, qui, en reconnaissant la prépondérance à l'élément turc au sandjak, a amené le Gouvernement turc à affirmer, de son côté, que la question du sandjak ne constitue pas pour la Turquie une question territoriale.

2. De maintenir entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage établies sous le régime du mandat, par la Convention d'Ankara du 30 mai 1926, et, pour éviter toute interruption dans ces relations à la suite de la venue à terme de cette convention et des accords qui la complètent, d'en proroger la validité pour une période d'un an, étant toutefois entendu que les dispositions de ces accords relatives au droit de pacage et de transhumance sont supprimées à dater de ce jour.

3. De maintenir en vigueur pour la même durée les procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage établies entre la Turquie et les pays placés sous l'autorité de la République française, par le protocole joint au Traité franco-turc d'Amitié, de Conciliation et d'Arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930.

4. De fixer les dernières modalités en vue du règlement de la question des optants par un nouveau protocole qui se substitue au paragraphe 1 de l'échange de lettres du 29 mai 1937 entre le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Turquie et l'Ambassadeur de France, étant entendu que ce protocole entrera en vigueur le jour même de la signature de la présente déclaration, à laquelle il est annexé.

5. D'admettre au bénéfice du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, en ce qui concerne les droits et les conditions d'établissement et notamment la compétence judiciaire, les ressortissants turcs en Syrie et au Liban et les ressortissants syriens et libanais en Turquie.

6. Les deux Gouvernements conviennent, aussitôt que le Gouvernement syrien sera en situation de le faire, de transformer et de compléter la convention actuelle de bon voisinage, maintenue en vigueur dans les conditions précisées au paragraphe 2 de la présente déclaration, en traité d'amitié tripartite entre la Turquie, la Syrie et la France, en l'adaptant aux conditions nouvelles de l'évolution du mandat.

7. La Convention d'Amitié et de Bon Voisinage du 30 mai 1926 ayant été conclue entre le Gouvernement turc et le Gouvernement de la République française, agissant en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont reconnus par les actes internationaux sur la Syrie et le Liban, il est entendu que, pour autant que ces dispositions intéressent le Liban, elles feront, le moment venu, l'objet d'un accord spécial.

Il est par ailleurs convenu que des négociations seront ouvertes aussitôt que possible pour assurer le développement des relations commerciales entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban.

8. Les Gouvernements français et turc conviennent enfin de négocier prochainement un traité d'établissement pour fixer la situation des Français en Turquie et des Turcs en France.

Fait, en double exemplaire, à Ankara, le 4 juillet 1938.

[E 4296/29/89]

No. 152.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 29.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, July 11, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 5th July, 1938, I have the honour to report that a week of comparative calm has followed the entrance of the Turkish troops into the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Martial law having been abolished and the festivities organised by local Turks in honour of the troops' arrival being terminated, all elements of the population have returned to their normal occupations. A few persons whose anti-Turkish activities during the recent electoral operations gave them cause to fear reprisals have taken refuge in Aleppo or Beirut, but on the whole the victors have behaved with conspicuous moderation and there have been no proscriptions to record.

2. The popular welcome accorded to the Turkish troops appeared to be tremendous. Every town and village in the sanjak was decorated with triumphal arches in the Turkish national colours, portraits of Kemal Ataturk and other Turkish leaders, Turkish flags, and addresses in the new Turkish script hailing the "liberators" of the sanjak. A photograph showing the scene in Alexandretta itself when the troops arrived is enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup> Every car, every bicycle on the road was decorated with red and white streamers and bore a Turkish flag. The French flag was hardly to be seen anywhere, the Syrian flag nowhere at all. In the East, however, one learns to discount such displays of popular enthusiasm, and on this occasion it was noticeable that the most lavish decorations were in evidence in Armenian and Arab centres, not purely Turkish ones.

3. Critical observers were not greatly impressed by the appearance of the Turkish troops. On the march from the frontier to Alexandretta, a matter of 25 kilom., a number of the men collapsed though the heat was by no means exceptional. Already some fifty of the men are in hospital at Alexandretta, principally with malaria. Uniforms and equipment are anything but smart, and the rank and file present an unintelligent and dejected appearance. The officers have so far made themselves remarked only for their arrogance and for their demands on the peasantry for supplies and services, naturally without payment.

4. Administration is now entirely in the hands of the Turkish element in the sanjak. Arabs and other minority officials have been replaced, and the remaining French officials and advisers are in a most uncomfortable position, snubbed and ignored by all. The sanjak officials themselves, however, though Turks appointed with the approval of Angora, are beginning to feel a little uneasy at the outside interference to which they have to submit. Definite orders from the People's party in Turkey come through to its branches in the sanjak, and these orders the local officials have no option but to obey. They may shortly find themselves no better off than the Austrian Nazis after the *Anschluss*.

5. Speculation regarding the future of the sanjak is unanimous on one point: no one believes that the Turkish army will ever move out of the sanjak. On the question of the future government of the sanjak, the general opinion is that either new elections will be begun without the formality of League supervision, in which case none but Turkish votes will be cast, or the delegates will be appointed administratively without any elections at all, which will give precisely the same result. The Arab and Armenian minorities appear, however, not to be unduly concerned at this prospect. They feel that they will be able to live and work with and under the Turks so long as they know definitely what their position is going to be. Their animus is bitter against the French who, having led them to believe that there were to be free elections and having encouraged them to organise themselves and vote against the Turks, have now handed them over body and soul to their adversaries.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Istanbul, and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.  
A. W. DAVIS.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.



[E 4710/47/89]

No. 153.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, August 3, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 14th May, 1938, on the subject of the situation in the Jezireh, I have the honour to report that as a counterblast to the recent congress of the Syrian Nationalist bloc at Kudsaya some 200 of the Jezireh Separatist leaders met in convention at the end of last month at a village near Amuda. It is understood that the principal resolutions adopted by the convention were as follows:—

- (1) To continue the demand for local autonomy with a French Governor and the maintenance in perpetuity of French armed forces in the Jezireh.
- (2) To continue the boycott of all officials appointed by the Syrian Government to posts in the Jezireh, even though they are natives of the Jezireh.
- (3) To refuse to recognise laws and regulations established by the Syrian Government.
- (4) To refuse to pay all taxes imposed by the Syrian Government and to resist by force any attempt that may be made to collect such taxes.
- (5) To insist upon the liberation of all persons arrested or deported for participation in the Separatist movement.
- (6) To stop the subsidies paid to sheikhs of tribes supporting the Syrian Government and to pay subsidies instead to tribal leaders supporting the Separatist movement, in particular Majjo Agha, Sheikh Tay Mohammed Abdurrahman, Nayef Mustafa Pasha, Abdul Aziz Masallat and Izzet Cherkessi.

2. From accounts received here it appears that, while no disorders have taken place in the Jezireh since April last, the population of the province has shown remarkable persistence and solidarity in its boycott of all Syrian Government officials and institutions. All disputes that arise are submitted to special local tribunals set up by the Separatists, and the decisions of these tribunals are accepted voluntarily by all parties and are said to compare more than favourably with those of the regular Syrian courts, both for speed and for impartiality.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Istanbul and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 4830/47/89]

No. 154.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 17.)*

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, August 8, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 21st June, 1938, on the subject of the political situation at Aleppo, I have the honour to report that on Thursday last, the 4th August, the Syrian Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam, paid a visit to Aleppo accompanied by Saadullah Bey-el-Jabri and Dr. Abdurrahman Kayali, the two members of his Cabinet who are natives of Aleppo.

2. Several motives can be surmised to account for this move on the part of the Prime Minister: in the first place, the recent return to Syria of Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar, the real leader of the opposition to the Nationalist bloc, and its possible consequences must be causing him anxiety, the more so as he is on the point of leaving on one of his periodical trips to Paris; in the second place, it must have become necessary to demonstrate to Syria in general and to Aleppo in particular, the unbroken unity of the Nationalist bloc after its recent congress at Koudsaya, where it was at one stage seriously imperilled by the resignation, subsequently withdrawn, of the two Aleppo members of the Ministry; and in the third place, it must have been felt that the time had come for some move to

instil fresh vigour into the Aleppo Nationalists, shaken by the successes of Turkey in the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the schism so narrowly averted on the recent resignation of the popular Aleppo leader, Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha.

3. In order to ensure that the due measure of popular enthusiasm should not be lacking on the occasion of the Prime Minister's visit, the Finance Department of Aleppo was authorised to distribute £12,000 Syrian (about £1,300 sterling) through the heads of the various quarters of the city to their henchmen, who were called out to line the streets by which the Ministers entered Aleppo; and subsequently a procession was formed which paraded in front of the Hotel Baron, on the balcony of which the Ministers were seated, from 7 p.m. onwards. In this procession the steelshirts of Aleppo refused to take part. At 8.30 p.m., the Prime Minister made a speech at a local cinema to a concourse of some 3,000 people, in the course of which he declared that Iraq, by rebellion against Great Britain, had gained her independence contrary to the intentions of the British, that the Arabs of Palestine, by rebellion, would similarly gain their independence whether Great Britain wished to grant it or not, and that Syria, which had made a treaty of friendship with France, would likewise gain her independence through rebellion if France failed to ratify or respect the treaty; that as regards Alexandretta, Syria would never accept the Franco-Turkish settlement to which she had not been a party; and that while he was away in Europe defending the interests of Syria he relied on the people to rally unitedly to the support of the Nationalist Government and to have no truck with the so-called opposition, which was composed of enemies and traitors to the cause of Syrian independence.

4. Jamil Mardam's speech was followed by one from Saadullah-el-Jabri, who uttered a violent diatribe against the Opposition which was, he said, trying to rob the Nationalists of the fruit of their long struggle for independence; against the Lebanon, which he characterised as a parasite battenning on the life-blood of Syria; and against the imperialists, who wished to keep the noble Syrian nation in permanent bondage. He was followed by Dr. Abdurrahman Kayali, who, in more moderate terms, congratulated the Christian minorities on their co-operation with the Nationalist Government which would, he said, do its utmost to protect them from every aggression. He also concluded with an attack on the opposition, enemies of the Franco-Syrian treaty whom the Government would certainly root out.

5. The local press was not allowed to print a full account of these speeches, but was obliged to content itself with an official communiqué, which was published in identical terms by all newspapers.

6. The Prime Minister and his two colleagues left Aleppo on Friday, the 5th August, for Hama, Homs and Damascus.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 4967/29/89]

No. 155.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Campbell (Paris).*

(No. 1911.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 26, 1938.*

IN view of the approaching meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the question naturally arises whether or not the opportunity will be taken to discuss the question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the bearing of the recent Franco-Turkish Agreement on the Geneva settlement of May 1937.

2. At the present moment, the question does not figure on the agenda of the meeting, and, in order that it should do so, it would have to be placed on it at the instigation of some member of the Council.

3. In the past the situation in the sanjak has not been considered by the Mandates Commission of the League, who are concerned only with the administration of mandates. The question, as discussed by the Council, was a constitutional question, and therefore outside the commission's scope. But now that the statute of the sanjak has been adopted by the Council, it forms part of the mandate, and it is possible that the Mandates Commission, at their next session, may find it difficult to avoid reporting that the administration of the sanjak, since the entry



of Turkish troops and the departure of the Electoral Commission, has not been in accordance with the statute and Fundamental Law.

4. His Majesty's Government have no desire themselves to raise the question at Geneva, or, indeed, to take any action in the matter which might be embarrassing to the French or Turkish Government. Nevertheless, as a member of the Council, they cannot feel devoid of all responsibility as regards the proper execution of the Geneva settlement. I therefore request that you will raise the matter informally with the French Government, and let them know that His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether they propose to take action, and, if so, what action, in order to regularise the present position *vis-à-vis* of the Council.

5. A copy has just been received in my Department, though not yet studied, of the report made by the Electoral Commission to the Council. It is understood that advance copies were sent to the French and Turkish Governments, but that neither have thought fit to make any comments.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 5047/29/89]

No. 156.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 386.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 63, Saving, dated the 3rd August, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a letter dated the 6th August, 1938, from his Excellency Sabih Najib, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting the Alexandretta question.

*Bagdad, August 13, 1938.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 156.

*Sabih Najib to Captain Holt.*

My dear Captain Holt,

*Bagdad, August 6, 1938.*

I UNDERSTAND from his Excellency the Minister that he has promised to send you a copy of the note addressed to the Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary regarding the Alexandretta question. I therefore forward herewith copy of the note in question.

Yours sincerely,

SABIH NAJIB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 156.

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Turkish Minister.*

My dear Minister,

*Bagdad, July 20, 1938.*

YOUR Excellency will remember the message which you gave to me orally on the 27th June concerning the Alexandretta question and the request which you then made to me that I should give you my reply as soon as possible. In communicating a reply to your Excellency's Government, I think it desirable to set out the developments which have taken place concerning the settlement of this question from the beginning up to the present time, so that it may be seen whether we have, in fact, made any progress towards our object, or whether it is still necessary to make further efforts to realise our aims.

The Iraqi Government, bearing in mind the relations of true friendship which they enjoy with their neighbours, the Turkish Government; having regard

at the same time to the ties of race and brotherhood which link their country to the sister-State of Syria; in furtherance of their desire to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two neighbouring peoples, the Turks and the Arabs, with a view to preventing the occurrence of anything which might lead to an increase of foreign intervention and seeking for advantages at the expense of the peoples interested in the question under consideration; and in pursuit of the policy habitually followed by the Government of this country, which aims constantly at the strengthening of peace and confidence in the Near East; have considered it their duty to both of the countries above mentioned, that is to say, Turkey and Syria, to do their utmost to remove all possible causes of misunderstanding concerning the question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

For these reasons, and animated by the motives already referred to, I asked your Excellency on the 4th June to be so good as to visit me at the Ministry. I then explained to you in detail the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the statements published in the Iraqi press and also public sentiment regarding the events which were then taking place in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. I explained that the Government were unable to silence the press, which were defending the legitimate rights of Syria, but that they considered it more advantageous to open conversations with the Turkish and Syrian Governments with a view to offering advice as to the manner in which this matter should be settled. I suggested that the best course was to await the results of the elections, which were being carried out in accordance with the statute of the sanjak which had been approved by the Turkish Government. I explained that the purpose of the statute was to safeguard the rights of the Turks in the sanjak, and I pointed out the great harm which would be caused by any serious disagreement between the Arabs and the Turks such as might conceivably result from a prolongation of the circumstances which had given rise to the disturbed conditions in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

I also pointed out to your Excellency that failure to find a solution of the problem satisfactory to the interests of both sides would serve foreign interests, and in particular the interests of France and Italy. Your Excellency was so good as to undertake to telegraph a summary of my conversation to your Government. Our next meeting was at the Ministry on the 12th June. You then told me of the contents of a telegram which you had received from your Government concerning our conversations. You said that you had been asked to reaffirm the good intentions of the Turkish Government, their desire to prevent any serious differences arising between the Turks and Arabs and their wish to do all that was possible to preserve good understanding and peace in the Near East. You added that your Government was ready fully to recognise and respect the independence of the Arab countries and to give their support to the preservation of that independence.

You were, moreover, so good as to explain to me what you knew of the policy of your Government concerning the execution of the statute to which they had agreed, and of their intention to prevent anything which might lead to an abuse of the provisions of this statute by any of the different racial elements in the sanjak.

When I next met your Excellency on the 18th June, I said that it seemed to me that the situation in Alexandretta was deteriorating and that, in consequence, it appeared urgently necessary to take steps to close the widening breach between the Turks and the Arabs. It did not, I said, appear that the execution of this statute would in itself be sufficient to dispel the misunderstandings which would develop in the future, because, in my opinion, it was impracticable to give full effect to the provisions of that instrument. Consequently I felt convinced that it was necessary to evolve an alternative and final solution which would put an end to all these difficulties by dividing the sanjak into two parts. The precise extent of each part could be determined later in agreement between the two sides after the matter had been studied by experts. The points to be observed would be that the Arab part should remain to the Arabs and the Turkish part should be surrendered to Turkey. If it was found necessary, the principle of the transfer of populations could also at the same time be accepted. I asked you to be so good as to communicate these views to your Government and to let me know later what they thought of them.

At the interview which I had with your Excellency on the 27th June you were so good as to communicate to me the thanks of the Turkish Minister for

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Foreign Affairs for the message which had been sent to him, through you, concerning our view of the need for the speedy and final settlement of the outstanding differences between the Turks and the Arabs by means of a partition of the Sanjak of Alexandretta between Turkey and Syria. You also informed me that the Turkish Government appreciated that our proposals were intended to serve the best interests of good relations and of peace. In addition, you explained to me that efforts which had been made by the Turkish Government to induce the French Government to give proper effect to the agreements which had been concluded with them concerning Alexandretta, especially in regard to the creation of a Turkish majority which would have control over the administration of the sanjak. You said that the Turkish Government had not themselves been considering any solution based on a partition of the sanjak. It was true that the French and the Syrians had put forward proposals for a partition which provided that the city of Alexandretta, with the adjacent mountains down to the River Asi, should be included in the Turkish part, but the Turkish Government had replied that such a proposal was unacceptable, since the town of Antioch and its surrounding villages contained a large majority of Turkish inhabitants and that for this reason they should also be included in the Turkish part of any partition which might be considered. Discussions of the partition had, you explained, ended at this point.

Your Excellency further informed me that the Turkish Government would welcome in principle any proposals which the Iraqi Government might think it useful to put forward concerning the partition of the sanjak, provided that it should be remembered that the inclusion of Antioch and its surrounding villages in the portion to be assigned to Turkey was absolutely imperative. I undertook to study the matter and to consult interested persons both on the Syrian and on the French sides. At the same time, I ventured to draw your Excellency's attention to one point, which was that, if Turkey desired the annexation of Antioch on the grounds that the majority of its inhabitants were Turkish, what was their attitude towards Alexandretta, in which city the Arab inhabitants were in a majority? I asked you whether in these circumstances it was not better to accept the principle of an exchange of populations and to solve the problem, not on a racial basis, but on a basis which would be concerned principally with economic and political interests. Your Excellency said that you would bring my remarks to the notice of your Government.

Shortly after this interview with your Excellency, I received from the Iraqi Minister at Angora a communication, in which he informed me that a conversation had taken place between Adil Arslan and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which it had been agreed that the sanjak should be divided on the basis of leaving Antioch to Syria and Alexandretta to Turkey, provided that there should be given to Syria the right to enjoy the privilege of a free port at Alexandretta. The same communication informed me that Adil Arslan had telegraphed to his Government at Damascus suggesting that the Iraqi Government should be invited to offer their mediation with a view to reaching a settlement of the dispute on this basis.

I communicated a summary of our conversations to our Minister at Angora by telegram on the 28th June, and I requested him to get into touch with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to ask whether they could confirm what Adil Arslan had told us concerning the settlement of the Alexandretta dispute by a partition of the sanjak which would leave Antioch to Syria and Alexandretta to Turkey. I also asked that he should inform the Turkish Government of the willingness of the Iraqi Government to use their good offices with a view to bringing about a satisfactory conclusion to the question.

At a conversation which I had with your Excellency at this Ministry on the 30th June you spoke to me about the attitude of the Turkish Government. You said that you had received a telegram from his Excellency Rüstü Aras expressing the Turkish Government's appreciation of the Iraqi offer of good offices. The Turkish Government were quite willing to make use of this offer, provided that it was understood that any negotiations based on the principle of the partition of the sanjak must recognise that it was impossible for Turkey to surrender Antioch to Syria. In discussing the Turkish point of view with your Excellency, I said that I feared that the Turkish Government's insistence on this point did not take full account of the benefits which would accrue to Turkey from a solution of this question which would be satisfactory to the Arabs. Moreover,

it must be remembered that, though there was in Antioch a Turkish majority, there was an Arab majority in Alexandretta. If Turkey remained determined to annex Antioch, no good offices which we could use in this matter could be expected to lead to an understanding. I invited your Excellency's attention to the understanding reached by Turkey and Persia concerning the common frontier only a few years ago and of the beneficial results to which that understanding had led. I added that, if Turkey and Persia had both remained obstinate concerning the assignment of this or that village, no agreement would have been possible. Similarly, the question now was one of a general understanding between the Arabs and the Turks, and I did not believe that the Turks would fail to deal with the matter in a generous manner. I begged your Excellency to represent my views to your Government and to do your best to join me in persuading them to adopt a more conciliatory policy, the advantage of which, I was convinced, would be very great. I then spoke to your Excellency on the contradiction which I had noticed between the report made by Adil Arslan on the attitude of the Turkish Government and the statement which your Excellency had made to me on the same subject. I also told you that I had instructed our Minister at Angora to enquire from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether they could confirm Adil Arslan's report and to offer the good offices of the Iraqi Government to help a settlement in accordance with the principles which Adil Arslan had reported the Turkish Government were willing to accept.

The Minister in Angora soon afterwards replied that he had spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with my instructions, and that the Minister had informed him that such a settlement must include the following conditions:—

- (1) The partition of the sanjak between Turkey and Syria in accordance with the natural features of the country, provided that Antioch should be left to Turkey.
- (2) An exchange of populations.
- (3) That Alexandretta should be under the complete sovereignty of Turkey, assurances being given that facilities would be provided for Syrian trade by means of a free zone.
- (4) That negotiations should be opened on the basis of the three above-mentioned points between the Governments of Turkey, France and Syria.

In reply, I instructed our Minister at Angora to thank the Turkish Government, but to explain that the Turkish insistence on the inclusion of Antioch in Turkey would make any settlement of the dispute on the basis of partition quite impossible, since Syria would never agree to surrender that city. I also informed the Minister that I had explained to you in detail the reasons for which the Iraqi Government considered it undesirable that the Turkish Government should insist on receiving Antioch and that I had asked you to do your best to convince your Government of the fears of my Government. I concluded by saying that, unless the Turkish Government were able to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards this question, I feared that very grave harm would be done to the relations between the Turks and the Arabs.

While we were thus engaged in preparing the way to a final solution, I received a telegram from our Legation at Angora, dated the 7th July, informing us that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the result of the entry into Alexandretta of Turkish forces and the agreement of the French Government to recognise a Turkish majority in the sanjak in accordance with the agreement concluded at Angora on the 4th July, 1938, had decided to give up further consideration of the question of partition. The same telegram explained that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had not confirmed the arrangements concerning partition which Adil Arslan had reported. The Turkish Minister had added that the Turkish General Staff considered that it was essential that Antioch should be included in the Turkish share. The Iraqi Minister added that he had received the impression that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs preferred the settlement concluded latterly with France to a settlement by partition. On the same day the Iraqi Minister in Angora sent a second telegram to me informing me that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had invited both him and Adil Arslan to visit him. He reported that at that visit the Minister had informed him that the proposal of partition of the sanjak



would not, in his opinion, even if adopted, lead to the desired result, which was to remove the causes of friction between the Arabs and the Turks. He had observed that, after the conclusion of the recent agreement between France and Turkey concerning the sanjak, the press of Syria and Iraq had begun to attack the Turkish Government and to attribute to them aims and objects which they had, in fact, never taken into consideration. He thought that discussions about partition in such an atmosphere would not lead to any satisfactory conclusion, rather they would tend to irritate public opinion both among the Turks and among the Arabs. He explained, in the name of his Government, that the Turks had no territorial ambitions in Syria or in any other country and that Turkey hoped to see all the Arab countries enjoying the independence for which they were striving. The only feelings of the Turks towards the Arabs were feelings of friendship and sympathy and Turkey had no designs in the sanjak, other than that the Turkish inhabitants should enjoy political independence and individual liberty. For this reason the Turkish Government at the present time considered that it would be better to drop the question of partition until France had ratified her treaty with Syria. In the meanwhile, both sides should endeavour to create an atmosphere which would, if the Syrians desired, facilitate at a later date the reopening of this question. The Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded by expressing his thanks to Iraq for the friendly manner in which she had offered her good offices to help a friendly settlement of this problem.

Your Excellency will observe from what I have recorded above that the efforts which we made regarding this question have yielded no results and we still remain far removed from the possibility of improving relations between the Turks and the Arabs. This is a case for much regret, because the settlement concluded between Turkey and France does not appear to us the most suitable settlement, and its shortcomings are apparent when the agreement is examined critically. In the first place, the sanjak is not protected from the intrigues of extremist elements incited by foreign propaganda, who will no doubt endeavour to strengthen bad feeling between the Turks and the Arabs. Secondly, the agreement must be regarded as having been achieved outside the framework laid down by the League of Nations, a fact which will expose it to criticism as being contrary to the special statute evolved by the League. Moreover, this agreement has been concluded without the concurrence of Syria, a fact which is contrary to the spirit of independence which was exhibited by Turkey towards Iraq when, in 1926, Turkey desired that an Iraqi representative should take part in the negotiations for the conclusion and signature of the tripartite treaty which was concluded in August of that year, and it will therefore be an obstacle to the establishment of that good understanding between Turkey and Syria for which we have all striven for so long.

Turkey has declared her desire to endeavour to overcome all difficulties which might lead to misunderstandings and differences between her and Syria and between her and Iraq, but I regret to have to say that it is difficult to perceive in the agreement recently concluded between Turkey and France anything which will help towards the realisation of this purpose. I feel convinced of the necessity for the settlement of the Alexandretta question on the basis of a just partition. I am happy, therefore, to observe that the Turkish Government are willing to continue to accept Iraqi intervention in this matter, although they consider that further discussions should be postponed until after the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. Nevertheless, it is our belief that there is little to be gained from such a postponement, for the way is still open before us and delay will achieve nothing. We consider, on the contrary, that there is every advantage in the speedy settlement of the difficulty, regardless of the question of the ratification of the treaty.

I sincerely hope that negotiations will soon begin for the completion of a settlement on the basic principle of a just partition and that thereby the Turkish people will once more show their good will towards the Arabs.

I beg your Excellency to be so good as to communicate this memorandum to your Government, trusting that it will be given a sympathetic and favourable reception.

Accept, &c.

(Copy unsigned.)

[E 5049/29/89]

No. 157.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 36.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, August 6, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 3, Saving, of the 19th July, 1938, regarding the elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the registration of electors, continued under Franco-Turkish control from the point at which the League Commission left off, was concluded on Monday last, the 1st August, the number of electors having inscribed themselves as Turks up to that date being sufficient to give the Turkish community twenty-two Deputies out of the total number of forty.

2. The number of Deputies allotted to the various communities in the sanjak has now been revised as follows:—

	Deputies.
Turks ... ..	22
Alawites ... ..	9
Armenians ... ..	5
Greek Orthodox ... ..	2
Sunni Arabs ... ..	2
Other minorities ... ..	—
Total ... ..	40

It will be observed that to raise the number of Turkish Deputies from eighteen to twenty-two the twelve Deputies formerly allotted to the Alawites have been reduced to nine, and the one Deputy formerly assigned to the other minorities has been eliminated.

3. Preparations for the second degree elections are now being pressed forward, and it is believed that they will be completed in time to allow the Assembly of the sanjak to hold its first meeting before the end of the current month. With this end in view efforts are being made to induce each of the five communities concerned to submit an agreed list of candidates exactly equal in number to the seats assigned for it, so that the secondary elections will in effect be reduced to the merest formality. The Armenian community has already submitted an agreed list; the other communities will probably submit their lists shortly unless the Turkish community itself fails to achieve unanimity. At the moment it is divided into five contending groups, followers respectively of Dr. Abdurrahman Malak (the present Vali of the Sanjak), Subhi Bey Barakat, Mahomed Bey Adali, Mustafa Bey Kosseiri, and Taifur Bey. The divisions between these groups appear, however, to be rather of a personal than of a political nature.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Istanbul and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5125/29/89]

No. 158.

*Mr. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 1.)*

(No. 1003.)

My Lord,

*Paris, August 31, 1938.*

I LEFT with the head of the African Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 31st August an aide-mémoire in the sense of the first three paragraphs of your despatch No. 1911 of the 26th August on the subject of the recent Franco-Turkish Agreement with regard to the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the possibility that the question might be raised at the approaching meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. In doing so I spoke to M. Lagarde in the sense of paragraph 4 of your despatch.

[19309]

q 3



2. M. Lagarde said that, with regard to any action *vis-à-vis* the Council of the League of Nations, the French Government would have to concert with the Turkish Government. They would keep His Majesty's Government informed of developments. The French Government had to bear in mind that the agreement, of which they were not particularly proud, was a fragile one, both because Turkey might be expected to attempt to get more for herself than she had succeeded in securing under the agreement, and because the agreement was not at all pleasing to the Syrians.

3. If nothing further has been heard from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the 6th September a further enquiry will be made.

I have, &c.

RONALD CAMPBELL.

[E 5252/29/89]

No. 159.

*Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 398.)

My Lord,

*Bagdad, August 21, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 63, Saving, of the 3rd August, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a note which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs containing the observations of the Iraqi Government on the views of His Majesty's Government concerning the Alexandretta question, which were communicated to me in your telegram No. 15, Saving, of the 17th July.

2. As you are aware, this is one of the subjects which Saiyid Taufiq-al-Suwaïdi wishes to discuss with your Lordship when he meets you at Geneva or later on in London.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Angora.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 159.

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall.*

My dear Chargé d'Affaires,

*Bagdad, August 18, 1938.*

WITH reference to your letter No. 410 of the 3rd August concerning the Alexandretta question, I enclose herein a summary of the views of the Iraqi Government on the résumé of the message from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which was enclosed with your letter under reference. I shall be glad if you will kindly communicate these views to the Secretary of State.

I avail, &c.

Yours sincerely,

TAUFIQ-AL-SUWAIDI.

Sub-Enclosure in No. 159.

*Views of Iraqi Government on the Alexandretta Question.*

(Translation.)

THE Iraqi Government greatly appreciate the kindness of the British Secretary of State in communicating to them his observations on the views of the Iraqi Government concerning the Alexandretta question. In this connexion they think it desirable to explain that the Iraqi Government keenly desire to eliminate all possible causes of friction between the Arabs and the Turks in the Alexandretta Sanjak, for they appreciate that any such friction would lead to harmful consequences both for the Arabs and for the Turks. In the opinion of the Iraqi Government, the settlement concluded between France and Turkey

cannot lead to the establishment of stability and confidence in the sanjak, because it is in essence unjust and because it is not in harmony with the proposals adopted by the League of Nations.

For these reasons the Iraqi Government thought that the best course open to them would be to invite the help of their ally Great Britain, with a view to persuading Turkey to reconsider this matter on the basis of partition. Such a basis seemed to the Iraqi Government to be more equitable than that which had been adopted for the Franco-Turkish Agreement; moreover, the Turkish Government, in a communication to the Iraqi Government, had themselves left open the door for a revised settlement on the basis of partition. It is also to be noticed that the Franco-Turkish Agreement provides that it shall be a temporary arrangement to be reconsidered after the elections.

The Iraqi Government, bearing in mind the ties of friendship which bind them to Great Britain, appreciating the sincere desire of the British Government to remove all international differences and to restore stability in the Middle East, and considering the importance which Great Britain attaches to her traditional friendship with the Arabs and to the effective implementation of the principles and resolutions of the League of Nations, have strong hopes in the readiness of Great Britain to help Iraq. They believe, moreover, that the help of His Majesty's Government would be of great value in persuading the Turks to realise that the recently concluded agreement is contrary to the spirit of the settlement prescribed by the League of Nations last year, and that the results to which this agreement have already led show clearly that it will not establish peace in the sanjak.

The modifications which have been introduced into the Geneva settlement have established a dominant Turkish influence in the sanjak, since they have granted to the Turks a legal majority and have thereby placed it under effective Turkish control. The demilitarisation of the sanjak will not affect its general situation, and will not, it is thought, yield the advantages suggested by the Secretary of State, because Syria has a common frontier with Turkey at many points outside the sanjak.

The stimulus which has been given to Turkish territorial ambitions through the establishment of her influence over the Sanjak of Alexandretta is shown day by day by such incidents as the sending of invitations to the representatives of Aleppo newspapers to visit the sanjak (though no such invitations have been sent to any other Syrian newspapers) and the constant dissemination of pro-Turkish propaganda by all possible means. Moreover, as a result of the circumstances which have strengthened Turkish influence in the sanjak, the Arabs are being compelled to leave. The total number of those Arabs who have fled amounts to about 7,000 persons, and those who have remained have refused to take part in the elections. Consequently, the Arabs will be quite unrepresented in the Legislative Assembly of the sanjak. The Iraqi Government have also been informed that a number of exceptional administrative measures are being carried out in the sanjak, such as the dissolution of the clubs belonging to some of the communities and the closing of the Arab schools. It is also a matter of surprise to the Iraqi Government that the Alaouite and Orthodox communities have not been regarded as Arabs, and that these communities have not been given representation in the Assembly commensurate with their numbers.

The Iraqi Government are confident that, having regard to the close ties of friendship which unite Great Britain to the Arabs, His Majesty's Government will endeavour to find a remedy for the consequences of the defects of French policy during these latter years, and that they will try to strengthen Arab Syria and to ward off the Turkish menace. The Iraqi Government feel sure that His Majesty's Government will agree with them in thinking that the presence of a strong and independent Arab State on the shores of the Mediterranean will be of great value in bringing about political stability, and will be an important factor in establishing peace in the Middle East. For these reasons the Iraqi Government hope that their ally Great Britain will share with them the conviction that it is necessary to endeavour to arrive at a just solution of the Alexandretta question on the basis of a partition of the sanjak between the Turks and the Arabs, thereby removing finally all causes of dispute and friction.



[E 5289/29/89]

No. 160.

*Mr. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 1039.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Paris despatch No. 1002 of the 31st August, has the honour to transmit a copy of an aide-mémoire from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 9th September, 1938, respecting Alexandretta.

*Paris, September 10, 1938.*

Enclosure in No. 160.

*Aide-mémoire.*

A L'AVIS du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, il convient de ne pas priver le Conseil de la Société des Nations de l'occasion d'examiner, au cours de sa session présente, l'affaire d'Alexandrette. Le moyen le plus expédient d'y pourvoir serait, non pas d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour l'examen du rapport de la Commission électorale, mais de profiter de la discussion du rapport de la Commission permanente des Mandats pour donner sur les raisons de notre attitude les éclaircissements nécessaires.

Le délégué de la France aurait évidemment à montrer comment, tenue à la fois par ses engagements politiques de 1921 envers la Turquie, par la tutelle dont elle n'était pas momentanément déchargée, enfin, par les textes de 1937, la Puissance mandataire avait à concilier des obligations disparates, voire divergentes, et comment elle s'est efforcée de les harmoniser. Par là-même, elle s'est employée à sauvegarder tant la paix locale que la paix extérieure. Au demeurant, les ajustements que les nécessités ont astreint les parties en cause à apporter à certaines dispositions de la loi fondamentale et du statut l'ont été dans le cadre et dans l'esprit de ces actes. L'installation des pouvoirs publics est en voie d'achèvement. Le moment venu, les intéressés ne manqueront pas de faire part au Conseil de l'ensemble des mises au point qui ont paru indispensables.

Tel serait le canevas d'un exposé qui devrait être à la fois bref et condensé. L'Ambassade de France en Turquie a été chargée de soumettre à M. Rüstü Aras ce projet de procédure.

*Paris, le 9 septembre 1938.*

[E 5478/29/89]

No. 161.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 42.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, September 9, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5, Saving, of the 2nd September, 1938, I have the honour to report that I was present with Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni at the inauguration of the First Parliament of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which took place at Antioch on that date. In the absence of a special building for the Assembly, its first meeting was held in the local cinema, which had been specially decorated and illuminated for the occasion. The whole town of Antioch, and, indeed, the whole sanjak, was *en fête* for the day, and every house was plentifully bedecked with Turkish flags, bunting in the red and white Turkish colours, and portraits of Kemal Ataturk and prominent Turkish statesmen. The guest of honour at the opening of the Parliament was his Excellency Cevat Açikalin, Special Envoy of the Turkish Government in the sanjak, who was seated with the Officer Commanding the Turkish Troops on his right and the delegate of the French High Commissioner on his left. The proceedings opened with the playing of the Turkish national anthem, and, in fact, it was hard to realise that we were not on Turkish soil, but in French mandated territory. True, the "Marseillaise" was played later, but so unobtrusively that no one paid much attention to it.

2. The Parliament was declared open by Hacı Mehmet Adali, Turkish Deputy for Antioch, the oldest member, who took the chair and invited the Assembly to appoint its president, two vice-presidents and two secretaries. Abdulgenni Turkmen, a Turk, was elected as president, one Turk and one Alaouite as vice-presidents, and two Turks as secretaries. Each of these officers was solemnly elected by forty votes to nil, although no other candidates ventured to offer themselves in opposition to the official nominees. The fact that the persons chosen must have voted for themselves did not trouble anybody. From beginning to end the proceedings were entirely in Turkish. The officers elected were then duly installed, and the Deputies took the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, some of them not without difficulty, as they either did not know Turkish or could not read and write. The leader of each community represented in the Assembly then read a speech thanking the President and Government of the Turkish Republic for the efforts they had made, this day crowned with success, to secure for ever the independence of the sanjak.

3. The Assembly then proceeded to designate the President of the Independent Sanjak, a post to which Taifur Bey Sukmen was unanimously elected.

4. A lively discussion arose at this point when one Turkish Deputy rose to ask what was the name of the State of which Taifur Bey had been elected head, what was its flag, and where was its capital. It was noticeable, however, that the discussion was confined to the Turkish Deputies, and that none of the minority members ventured to say a word. These questions were eventually referred to a Select Committee, and the House was thereupon adjourned.

5. Further meetings of the Assembly took place on the 6th and the 7th September, also at Antioch, during which Taifur Bey was installed as President of the Sanjak and took the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, and the following decisions were reached:—

- (i) The Sanjak of Alexandretta will in future be known as the Republic of Hatay.
- (ii) The town of Antioch will be the capital and seat of government of the republic.
- (iii) The flag of the republic shall be the Turkish flag (white crescent and star on a red ground), with a smaller red star superimposed on the white star.
- (iv) The first Cabinet of the republic shall be composed as follows:—  
 Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence: Dr. Abdurrahman Malak.  
 Minister of Justice: Cemil Yurtman.  
 Minister of Finance, Economics and Customs: Cemal Baki.  
 Minister of Public Instruction and Health: Ahmet Faik.  
 Minister of Public Works and Agriculture: Kemal Alpar.

All these being Turks, it is to be anticipated that the Turkification of the administration of the sanjak will now proceed apace.

6. The Assembly has now been prorogued until the 1st November, 1938.

7. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Istanbul, the acting consul-general at Beirut and the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5813/29/89]

No. 162.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, September 29, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 42 of the 9th September, 1938, I have the honour to transmit herewith a French version of the programme adopted by Dr. Abdurrahman Malak, Prime Minister of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and



his Ministry on their accession to office, and approved unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Istanbul and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.  
A. W. DAVIS.

Enclosure in No. 162.

*Programme adopted by Dr. Abdurrahman Malak.*

- RESPECT de tous les engagements internationaux.
2. Assurer l'ordre à l'intérieur de la république.
  3. Égalité dans les droits et les devoirs de tous les citoyens sans distinction de race, de religion ou de tendance.
  4. Renforcer les engagements et les liens d'amitié avec les pays limitrophes.
  5. Assurer l'économie du pays par des accords commerciaux et économiques avec les pays limitrophes en ayant en considération, tout d'abord, l'intérêt du pays.
  6. Assurer la santé publique par les méthodes modernes en usage dans les pays les plus évolués. Travailler à l'édification du village.
  7. Modifier les habitudes sociales périmées en s'inspirant des lois et des régimes des États les plus progressistes.
  8. Application de la législation des pays développés dans la justice et le droit.
  9. Protection de la main-d'œuvre ouvrière, artisanale et intellectuelle.
  10. Elaboration d'un budget équilibré et application d'un système d'impôts équitables.
  11. Exploitation de la terre par les méthodes les plus récentes et les plus productives pour améliorer la condition du paysan.
  12. Encourager le commerce intérieur et le "transit."
  13. Commencer de grandes fouilles dans la terre "Hatayenne" pour en découvrir les vestiges antiques et faire du pays une terre de tourisme et d'estivage.
  14. Créer un grand réseau de routes et lier les centres urbains aux villages et faire d'Alexandrette un port égal à ceux de la Méditerranée. Assèchement des marais pour en faire des terres défrichables et saines.

[E 6347/47/89]

No. 163.

*Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 1242.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 28, 1938.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 2393 of the 18th October on the subject of the Iraqi Government's concern at the delay in the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty and their preoccupation at the possibility that a special régime might be established in the Upper Jezirah, I have the honour to report that an aide-mémoire, a copy of which is enclosed herein, in the sense of your instructions was handed to the head of the African Department at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd October.

2. After expressing his appreciation of the terms of the memorandum, M. Lagarde said that the request for information contained therein was a very proper one, which he thoroughly understood. The Iraqi Government, however, had really no cause for preoccupation, as whatever régime was established in the Jezirah, it would still remain an integral part of Syria. Negotiations were proceeding at present, and he hoped that they would be concluded by the middle of November. M. Lagarde was asked for a statement in writing for communication to your Lordship.

3. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an aide-mémoire which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the above representations, in which it is stated that Taufiq Suwaidi had himself raised the question on the occasion of his visit to Paris, and that discussions had taken place at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which had made it possible to remove certain misunderstandings, and which had seemed to reassure Taufiq Suwaidi in regard to the objectives of the French Government.

I have, &c.  
ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 163.

*Aide-Mémoire handed to French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

IN the course of his recent visit to London the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Iraqi Government was seriously perturbed at the delay in the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. The Iraqi Government understood that this delay was due to fundamental additions and alterations which the French Government wished to impose. Of the new proposals which, according to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, were delaying ratification, the one which caused the gravest preoccupation to the Iraqi Government as a neighbouring Power was the possibility that a special régime might be established in the Upper Jezirah. The Iraqi Government feared that such a régime in the Upper Jezirah could have no permanence, and might even expose the territory to the same political fate as Alexandretta. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore requested that His Majesty's Government would use their influence with the Government of the Republic for the early ratification of the treaty and against any suggestion for the setting up of special régimes in Syria, especially the Upper Jezirah, which in his Excellency's view could only promote discord.

His Majesty's Government do not, in fact, regard the question of the future régime in Syria as one which directly concerns them and, as the Government of the Republic are aware, they have at no time attempted to persuade them either to ratify or not to ratify the treaty. His Majesty's Government would themselves have no sort of objection to the entry into force of the treaty, which they would regard as a happy sequel to their own settlement with Iraq eight years ago, and they trust that the negotiations between the Government of the Republic and the Syrian Government may be concluded to the satisfaction of both parties. At the same time they understand and appreciate that there may be special difficulties in the way of an early settlement. If the Government of the Republic think it desirable to obtain far-reaching guarantees for the inhabitants of the Jezirah and for the minorities in other districts before ratifying the treaty, His Majesty's Government have no wish to urge them to take any other course.

For the above reasons, Viscount Halifax did not feel able to comply with the Iraqi Government's request, and he made this clear to Taufiq Suwaidi in the interviews which he had with him in London. Lord Halifax, however, said that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to bring to the notice of the Government of the Republic the anxiety which his Excellency had expressed, more especially as regards the position in the Jezirah, and to ask for any information which the French Government could give as to the progress of negotiations.

Lord Halifax considers that it is not unreasonable that the Iraqi Government should be closely interested in the future of Syria, and more particularly in the fate of the Jezirah, which may directly affect the position of their own country. Any information which the Government of the Republic may be in a position to give to His Majesty's Embassy with a view to allay these anxieties would no doubt be greatly appreciated.

October 21, 1938.



Enclosure 2 in No. 163.

*Aide-Mémoire from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR un aide-mémoire du 21 de ce mois, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire part au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des vues dont Tewfik Soueidi s'est ouvert à Lord Halifax au sujet des rapports franco-syriens.

Le Département ne peut manquer d'observer que Tewfik Soueidi a saisi l'occasion que lui offrait sa présence à Paris, pour s'enquérir de l'état des négociations actuellement en cours à ce sujet. Répondant à cette demande, dont l'auteur s'est, d'ailleurs, plu lui-même à souligner le caractère personnel, le ministère a marqué à Tewfik Soueidi que Djemil Mardam, interprète qualifié du peuple et du Gouvernement de Syrie, avait été précisément invité à venir à Paris pour exposer son sentiment sur les relations de son pays avec la France. Les pourparlers engagés avaient permis de franches explications à la faveur desquelles il avait été aisé de dissiper certains malentendus et d'où semblait devoir très prochainement sortir un accord complet. Il allait de soi que le règlement des questions en suspens devait avoir pour cadre les frontières de la Syrie. Autant, en effet, la France s'attachait à veiller à ce que sa politique au Levant ne débordât pas des limites des territoires relevant de son autorité, autant elle tenait à ce que la réserve à laquelle elle s'astreignait dans ce domaine fût, par ses voisins, payée de retour.

Ces éclaircissements ont paru rassurer Tewfik Soueidi sur les objectifs de l'action du Gouvernement de la République dans ces parages.

*République française,  
Paris, le 27 octobre 1938.*

[E 6550/47/89]

No. 164.

*Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Damascus, November 7, 1938.*

YOUR despatch No. 193, enclosing a copy of your despatch No. 2393 to Paris.

May I be authorised to deny, either by interview or official *démenti*, reports that have reached Syrian press from French newspapers reproducing report of correspondent of Associated Press in Paris alleging that "British Ambassador in Paris had intervened with French Government for the purpose of delaying a settlement of Syrian question until the situation in Palestine had been cleared up." These reports first appeared in mid-August, and have been repeated often since and commented on locally and in Paris newspapers.

[E 6550/47/89]

No. 165.

*Viscount Halifax to Consul MacKereth (Damascus).*

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 10, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 39 [of 7th November: Alleged intervention by His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to delay settlement of Syrian question].

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated recently that they hoped Franco-Syrian negotiations would be concluded by the middle of November. If, however, you think that denial of these unfounded press reports would still serve a useful purpose, you may act in either manner you suggest.

[E 6654/47/89]

No. 166.

*Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 11.)*

(No. 71.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, November 2, 1938.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Lebanese Cabinet headed by the Emir Khaled Chehab, the formation of which was reported in my despatch No. 20 of the 23rd March, resigned on the 27th October. Constant intrigues amongst Deputies anxious to taste the sweets of office had, as usual, steadily weakened its position; one minister, Selim Bey Tacla, had resigned on the 29th August and the final fall of the Cabinet was precipitated by the resignation of four more ministers on the 26th October.

2. Maître Abdullah Yafi, a young Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, was immediately charged by the President of the Lebanese Republic with the formation of a Cabinet and lengthy discussions and some hard bargaining took place between the members of the various ill-defined parties in the Chamber. Maître Yafi at first failed, as did the Emir Khaled Chehab, who was next charged with the task; but on the 1st November Maître Yafi made a second attempt and this time succeeded in forming the following Cabinet:—

President of the Council and Justice: Maître Abdullah Yafi.

Interior, War, Foreign Affairs: Khalil Kseib.

Finance and National Economy: Maître Hamid Frangieh.

Public Works and Agriculture: Sabry Hamadi.

Education, Health, Posts and Telegraphs: Maître Roukos Abou Nader.

3. Khalil Kseib, who is the only member of the previous Cabinet to be included in the present one, is also the only one with previous ministerial experience. He is No. 31 in "Lebanese Personalities." The following are notes on the remainder:—

*Maître Abdullah Yafi.*—A Sunni lawyer of Beirut, born about 1900, and a Deputy. Neither well-connected nor prominent in his profession, and considered of mediocre intelligence. He is a fanatical pan-Arabist and was one of the unofficial Lebanese delegation to the Arab Congress on Palestine held in Cairo in October last.

*Maître Hamid Frangieh.*—A Maronite lawyer belonging to a prominent family of Zghorta (near Tripoli) who practises in Beirut and is a Deputy. Intelligent and well-educated.

*Sabry Hamadi.*—A Shia Moslem belonging to a prominent family of Hermel in the Beqaa. Deputy in both this and the previous Chamber. Considered honest and energetic but lacks education.

*Maître Roukos Abou Nader.*—A Maronite lawyer from Baskinta in the Metn who practises in Beirut and has been *Bâtonnier* of the Beirut bar. Deputy in the present and several previous Chambers. Like Kseib, a protégé of President Eddé. Very intelligent but notoriously corrupt.

4. The remarks in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 20 of the 23rd March apply equally to the present Cabinet.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, and to His Majesty's Consuls in Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 6911/29/89]

No. 167.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 50. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, October 17, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 46 of the 30th September, 1938, regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that among



the Turks of the sanjak signs of dissension are now becoming apparent. They are dividing into the following three groups:—

- (1) The party of extreme Turcophiles, headed by Taifur Bey Sokmen, the president of the Hatay, aiming at the incorporation of the sanjak in Turkey.
- (2) The party of Dr. Abdurrahman Malak, Prime Minister of the Hatay, aiming at the realisation of true autonomy under the joint guarantee of France and Turkey.
- (3) The party of Subhi Barakat, Mohammed Adali, Mustafa Kosseiri and Sureya Khalaf, notables belonging to the old Turkish families of Antioch who have been antagonised by the new régime which has ignored them completely and has filled all important posts with *émigrés* returning to the sanjak from Turkey thoroughly impregnated with Kemalist ideas.

2. In addition to these dissensions among the Turks themselves, there is in progress in the Hatay a battle of influence between France and Turkey. The French, hoping that with the passing of the crisis in Europe they may be free to take a firmer line in the Near East, appear for the moment less disposed to let the Turks have everything their own way in the sanjak. For instance, they have not yet consented to the dismissal of a number of French officials whose contracts have been terminated by the Hatay Government, and the French magistrates becoming unemployed as a result of the judicial reorganisation mentioned in my despatch referred to above have been instructed to remain at their posts. Again, a recent instruction of the Hatay Ministry of Public Works that all vessels entering the port of Alexandretta must fly the Hatay flag was countered by an order from the French that such vessels must fly the French flag. Such conflicts of authority are inevitable while the French mandate remains technically in force, the authority of the new Sanjak Government being in that sense no more than permissive; but the Turks seem determined to make it absolute without waiting for the formal termination of the mandate, and will in the meantime take neither suggestion, advice nor order from the mandatory Power.

3. One glaring defect of the new régime is its costliness. This has already brought about a complete disequilibrium of the finances of the sanjak. A budget hitherto amounting to some £S. 800,000 per annum cannot be expected to accommodate a President of the Republic at £S. 1,500 per month, a President of the Chamber at £S. 500 a month, a Prime Minister at £S. 400 a month, four ministers at £S. 300 a month each, and forty Deputies at £S. 100 a month each; a total of almost £S. 100,000 per annum before the administration of the territory is even begun. It is estimated that the annual expenditure of the Hatay will in future amount to £S. 3 million annually, a sum four times as great as its present revenue and out of all proportion to the resources of a population of some 250,000 with an extremely low standard of living. Though there is talk of a Turkish loan of £T. 2 million to the Hatay, the prospect of increased taxation is already alarming the business community in Alexandretta. At the same time the Hatay Government, apparently with the approval of Angora, is contemplating the inception of expensive development works such as the modernisation of the Port of Alexandretta and the draining of the Amouk marshes in the Antioch plain, works which the new State certainly could not undertake unaided. There is already some talk of creating a "Hatay Development Corporation" on Turkish lines and with Turkish participation to undertake such works in return for the grant of privileges of a monopolistic character. If any of these projects materialise, they will assuredly only increase Turkey's hold on the nominally autonomous sanjak and will checkmate any belated hopes France may yet entertain of limiting the effects of her past abdications in the sanjak.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Istanbul and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.  
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 6938/29/89]

No. 168.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 22.)*

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, November 14, 1938.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 128 of the 31st October, 1938, regarding the situation in the Hatay, I have the honour to report that a delegation, composed of the President and five members of the Hatay Parliament accompanied by a number of journalists, which went to Angora to attend the festivities of the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, returned to Alexandretta on the 8th November. They reported that they had a very cordial reception in Turkey and that the Turkish Minister of the Interior had made the following official statement to them:—

- (1) That there has never been and will never be any question of the annexation of the Hatay by Turkey.
- (2) That the enlargement of the port of Alexandretta will shortly be undertaken, and that a preliminary credit of £T. 500,000 has been allotted for this purpose.
- (3) That the Amouk marshes will be drained and reclaimed.
- (4) That the railway will be extended from Alexandretta to Antioch, and that a credit of £T. 600,000 has been allocated to this enterprise.
- (5) That the customs barrier will be abolished, and free trade established between Turkey and the Hatay.

It is announced that as a step towards the realisation of this last article the Hatay Government has authorised the importation into the Hatay of goods of Turkish origin free of customs duty.

2. While free trade between Turkey and the Hatay may thus become a reality, free trade between Syria and the Hatay is already becoming a thing of the past. Following the taking over of the Alexandretta Customs Administration by the Hatay Government, the French have established customs posts on all frontiers between the Hatay and Syria and are collecting customs duties on all products of the Hatay at the rates prescribed by the tariff for goods of foreign origin. They are also treating as foreign vehicles all means of transport registered in the Hatay, which, beside being obliged to pay a considerable sum as customs deposit on entry into Syria, are only allowed to transport goods as far as the Aleppo custom-house. Determined efforts are also being made to divert import and export traffic from its normal route via Alexandretta to Lattakia and Tripoli, but so far these efforts have not met with much success owing to the greater cost of transport from Aleppo to those ports and the much poorer ware-house and shipping facilities available in them.

3. So far the Hatay has made no attempt at retaliation and is not levying customs duties on goods of Syrian origin; and free transit through the Hatay is accorded to all imports into Syria via Alexandretta and all exports via that port.

4. One cannot but doubt the wisdom of the French authorities in thus accentuating the *de facto* separation between Syria and the Hatay, which for the sake of their good relations with Syria it might have been advisable to minimise or gloss over.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Angora, His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut and His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.  
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 7069/47/89]

No. 169.

*Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 1380. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Paris, November 24, 1938.*

WITH reference to Mr. Campbell's letter of the 17th November to Mr. Baxter on the subject of the signature of the Franco-Syrian Supplementary Agreement on the 14th November, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship



herewith a copy of a *note verbale* which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs enclosing the text of the agreement concluded on that date. It will be observed that the ministry state that a further arrangement regulating the relations between the French army and the Syrian army has also been concluded.

2. I have the honour to request that the enclosed documents may be treated as very confidential until they have been published.

I have, &c.  
ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 169.

*Note verbale.*

LE Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir, sous ce pli, à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique le texte des arrangements conclus, le 14 de ce mois, entre la France et la Syrie, pour compléter, sur certains points, le traité du 22 décembre 1936.

Ces accords ont pris corps dans un protocole et une déclaration commune.

D'autre part, un arrangement d'ordre interne a été conclu entre les parties pour régler les relations entre l'armée française et l'armée syrienne.

Paris, le 23 novembre 1938.

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

*Protocole.*

LE Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, soucieux de ne rien négliger qui puisse contribuer à rendre plus étroites et plus confiantes l'amitié et la collaboration des deux pays, ont repris l'examen des différentes questions que soulève l'avenir de leurs rapports :

1. Le Gouvernement syrien rappelle des mesures par lesquelles il se propose de donner leur plein effet aux engagements énoncés dans l'échange de notes du 11 décembre 1937. Il souligne qu'il a également prorogé le privilège de l'institut d'émission et stabilisé, dans des conditions conformes aux intérêts permanents du pays, le régime de la recherche et de l'exploitation des gîtes pétrolifères. Il ajoute qu'il est dans son intention de solliciter, le plus rapidement possible, du Parlement l'approbation dudit accord ainsi que des textes qui en ont procédé.

2. En ce qui concerne le cadre permanent des fonctions à confier à des agents placés à la disposition de la Syrie par la France, le Gouvernement syrien confirme que le conseiller affecté au Département de l'Intérieur sera assisté de deux adjoints, dont l'un sera détaché à demeure dans les confins septentrionaux.

3. Insistant sur la nécessité d'apaiser certaines préoccupations auxquelles la France, tenue par la pérennité de ses traditions, ne pourrait, sans déroger, rester indifférente, le Gouvernement de la République se réjouit de constater que la Syrie est résolue à garantir efficacement à tous la liberté de conscience ainsi que l'exercice des droits qui en découlent; et, en particulier, à reconnaître aux chrétiens, en toute matière, la faculté de récuser les canons et la juridiction coraniques.

4. Encore que la convention scolaire ne doive, en vertu du traité du 22 décembre 1936, être conclue que postérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur de ce dernier, le Gouvernement syrien aura, dans ce domaine, à cœur de veiller à ce que le régime des examens n'ait, à aucun degré, pour effet de restreindre la place du français dans les programmes, ni, non plus, à porter atteinte à la faveur dont jouit actuellement auprès des élèves l'enseignement de cette langue.

Soucieux, de son côté, de raffermir les liens moraux qui unissent les deux pays, le Gouvernement français prendra, au bénéfice des étudiants syriens, les mesures propres à leur permettre de parfaire en France leur formation dans les conditions les plus avantageuses.

5. Conscientes de leur intérêt mutuel à développer leurs échanges commerciaux, les parties contractantes, chacune en ce qui la concerne, prendront, à cet effet, les mesures appropriées.

En matière financière, le Gouvernement français prêter, de son côté, son concours au Gouvernement syrien.

6. Convaincu de l'intérêt mutuel des parties contractantes à mettre le plus promptement possible en vigueur le traité, ainsi que tous les textes qui en dérivent, et désireux de donner à la Syrie une nouvelle preuve d'amitié et de confiance, le Gouvernement français ne verrait pas d'inconvénient à ce que le terme du délai prévu par l'article 4 du préambule du traité et par l'alinéa premier du protocole 5 fût fixé au 30 septembre 1939. Il se propose de soumettre aux Chambres cette novation symbolique, qui acquerrait valeur contractuelle par l'insertion, dans le corps des instruments de ratification, du présent protocole dûment revêtu de l'approbation du Parlement syrien et du Parlement français.

7. Dès l'échange des instruments de ratification, la Syrie accréditera un représentant diplomatique à Paris.

Fait en double à Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

GEORGES BONNET.

Enclosure 3 in No. 169.

*Déclaration commune.*

APRES la signature du protocole en date de ce jour, le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement syrien ont, d'un commun accord, reconnu qu'il était de l'intérêt des deux parties de hâter le plus possible l'entrée en vigueur du statut défini par le traité du 22 décembre 1936 et par les actes annexes et complémentaires.

Ils estiment, en conséquence, qu'il serait à souhaiter que le Parlement syrien donnât son approbation au plus tard le 20 janvier 1939 et que le Parlement français, saisi, avant le 10 décembre prochain, des rapports des commissions compétentes, autorisât la ratification desdits textes avant le 31 janvier 1939.

Dans ces conditions, la dévolution à l'administration syrienne des attributions encore retenues par l'autorité mandataire aurait lieu dans le courant du mois de février prochain.

Fait en double à Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

GEORGES BONNET.

[E 7283/29/89]

No. 170.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, November 26, 1938.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 14th November, 1938, regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that at a session of the Hatay Chamber of Deputies held on the 22nd November it was decided to reduce by 40 per cent. the customs tariff on goods imported from abroad into the Hatay except those of Turkish origin, which are subjected to a symbolical tax of 1 per cent. only.

2. This decision is doubtless a reply to the restrictions recently imposed by the French authorities as reported in the second paragraph of my above-mentioned despatch, the effect of which has been to render virtually impossible the transport by road of merchandise from Alexandretta to Aleppo, with

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disastrous results to the shipping and transit trade of the Hatay. With the customs tariff at 25 per cent. *ad valorem* in Syria and only 15 per cent. in the Hatay it is anticipated that smuggling from the Hatay into Syria will become a profitable enterprise calculated to bring back to the port of Alexandretta the traffic which it has temporarily lost through the suspension of its traditional transit trade.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Angora, Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 7695/29/89]

No. 171.

*Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 21.)*

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 13, 1938.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 54 of the 26th November, 1938, regarding the situation in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that a certain feeling of disillusionment and uncertainty has recently become apparent among prominent officials of the Hatay Government. This uncertainty appears to have its fount and origin in a message alleged to have been received by them from Ismet İnönü, the new President of the Turkish Republic, to the effect that the independent existence of the Hatay was based on the Geneva Agreement of May 1937; that this was an international agreement which the Turkish Government intended to respect and carry out integrally; that certain recent acts and decisions of the Hatay Government had in his view contravened or gone beyond the terms of the Geneva Agreement; and that the Hatay Government must be prepared for a rebuff if it turned to the Turkish Government for support in any act or policy which was not strictly in conformity with the Geneva Agreement. I am, of course, not in a position to say whether the alleged or any similar message was communicated to the Hatay Government, but the fact remains that there is now a widespread feeling in the Hatay that the process of cutting adrift from Syria has gone rather too far, and that in the near future some amicable arrangement with that country must be sought, probably on the lines of the Geneva Agreement, with a French Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations and a customs, postal and monetary union with Syria. It is also said that the French Government has promised Jamil Mardam Bey that it will insist on the Turkish Government carrying out the Geneva Agreement and maintaining the connexion of the Hatay with Syria unimpaired, and that the Syrian Prime Minister, for his part, has promised to obtain the Syrian Parliament's ratification of the agreement, provided it is honestly carried out.

2. It is possible that financial difficulties have contributed to the present noticeable diffidence of the Hatay Administration. The separation of the Hatay from Syria for customs purposes has, in fact, diminished by 60 or 70 per cent. the traffic of the port of Alexandretta, and the income from customs duties is so reduced that the Government has had difficulty in meeting its financial obligations. The salaries of some officials are already two months in arrears, and there is much talk of economy cuts, among the measures proposed being the reduction of the number of Deputies from forty to twenty-four.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Angora, Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 7850/7850/89]

No. 172.

*Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 29.)*

(No. 93.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 20, 1938.

WITH reference to Mr. Furlonge's despatch No. 82 of the 18th August, 1936, in which was enclosed the text of the High Commissioner's Decree No. 60/L.R. of the 13th March, 1936, regarding the regulation of religious communities in this country, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the text of the High Commissioner's Decree No. 146/L.R. of the 18th November, 1938, which modifies certain of the articles of the former decree. The following three points of interest arise from it:—

2. Article 13 of the 1936 decree accorded to schismatic bodies the right to a proportion of the property of the community. Article 3 of the present decree excepts from this provision dedicated property, which continues to be governed by the wishes of the founder.

3. Article 24 of the present decree rules that marriages celebrated according to a rite to which neither of the parties belongs shall be held illegal. This point is of some importance in the Lebanon, where the multiplicity of religions and venality of a section of the priesthood result occasionally in a marriage of this type taking place.

4. Article 25 of the present decree admits the legality of marriages contracted abroad between Lebanese or Syrians and foreigners where those marriages were in accordance with local law.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, and without enclosure to His Majesty's Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 172.

*Arrêté No. 146/L.R. du 18 novembre 1938 modifiant et complétant l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses.*

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'acte de mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban, notamment à l'article 6;

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1920 et 16 juillet 1933;

Vu le titre I, chapitre 2, de la Constitution libanaise du 23 mai 1926;

Vu le titre I, chapitre 2, de la Constitution syrienne du 22 mai 1930;

Vu l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses;

Arrête :

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. L'article 10 de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, est abrogé et remplacé par les dispositions suivantes :

Les membres syriens et libanais des communautés à statut personnel reconnues sont soumis en matière de statut personnel au statut légal de leur communauté et, sur les points non régis par ce statut, aux dispositions de la loi civile.

Les membres syriens et libanais d'une communauté de droit commun ainsi que ceux qui n'appartiennent à aucune communauté, sont régis en matière de statut personnel par la loi civile.

Les étrangers, fussent-ils membres d'une communauté à statut personnel reconnue, sont régis en matière de statut personnel par les dispositions de leur loi nationale.

Art. 2. L'article 12 de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, est abrogé et remplacé par les dispositions suivantes :

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En cas de sécession des conjoints ou de l'un d'eux les enfants mineurs suivent la condition du père; les inscriptions des registres de l'état civil les concernant sont maintenues ou rectifiées en conformité de la condition du père.

Les dispositions précédentes sont applicables en cas de rupture des liens du mariage par suite du décès du père, d'annulation du mariage, de répudiation, de divorce ou de séparation, alors même que la garde des enfants ou leur tutelle appartiendrait à la mère.

Art. 3. L'article 13 de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, est complété ainsi qu'il suit :

Ajouter *in fine* :

" à l'exception toutefois des biens dédiés, qui restent régis par les volontés des fondateurs."

Art. 4. L'article 22 de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, est abrogé.

Art. 5. Le titre III de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, est abrogé et remplacé par les dispositions suivantes :

#### Titre III.—Dispositions générales.

Art. 22. L'acte de mariage des Syriens et Libanais appartenant à une communauté à statut personnel reconnue est dressé immédiatement après la célébration et rédigé dans la langue usuelle de la communauté. Le ministre du culte qui a célébré le mariage en donne immédiatement avis par un certificat rédigé en langue arabe, et, en tous cas, dans le délai maximum de cinq jours après la célébration, à l'agent de l'état civil du lieu de la résidence des conjoints.

L'agent de l'état civil, après avoir reçu le certificat, fera mention du mariage dans les 24 heures, sur les registres de l'état civil, conformément à la législation en vigueur. L'inobservation par les ministres du culte des dispositions précédentes, est passible des peines prévues par l'article 20.

Art. 23. En cas de sécession d'un des conjoints, le mariage ainsi que les actes ressortissant au statut personnel, restent régis par la loi sous le régime de laquelle ils ont été célébré, accomplis ou contractés.

En cas de sécession des deux conjoints, le mariage ainsi que les actes ou obligations ressortissant au statut personnel, seront, à dater du jour où la sécession aura été inscrite sur les registres de l'état civil, régis par la loi de leur nouveau statut.

Dans ce cas, toutefois, la sécession de leurs père et mère ne pourra enlever aux enfants leur qualité d'enfant légitime.

Art. 24. Sauf exception prévue par l'article 25 ci-dessous, le mariage, ainsi que les actes ou obligations ressortissant au statut personnel, célébré, accomplis ou contractés selon une loi au régime de laquelle aucun des contractants n'est soumis, sont nuls et sans effet légal.

Le ministre du culte ou l'officier de l'état civil qui les aurait célébré, reçus ou constatés, sera passible des peines prévues à l'article 20.

La nullité prévue ci-dessus sera couverte si les contractants obtiennent ultérieurement la modification des inscriptions des registres de l'état civil les concernant, et se trouvent soumis à la loi sous l'empire de laquelle leur mariage, ainsi que les actes ou obligations ressortissant au statut personnel ont été célébré, accomplis ou contractés.

Art. 25. Le mariage contracté en pays étranger entre Syriens ou Libanais et entre Syrien ou Libanais et étranger est valable, s'il a été célébré dans les formes usitées dans le pays.

Si la forme ainsi que les effets du mariage tels qu'ils résultent de la loi sous l'empire de laquelle le mariage a été contracté, ne sont pas admis par le statut personnel de l'époux, le mariage sera en Syrie et au Liban régi par la loi civile.

Art. 26. Sans préjudice, s'il y a lieu, des sanctions de droit commun, les auteurs, coauteurs ou complices de contraventions formelles ou d'infractions aux statuts en vigueur ou aux dispositions du présent arrêté, sont civilement responsables des dommages ou préjudices qui en auraient résulté pour les parties intéressées.

Art. 27. Dans chaque Etat, il sera institué une juridiction supérieure chargée de statuer sur les conflits surgis entre les juridictions de statut personnel ou entre ces juridictions et les tribunaux de droit commun.

Cette juridiction sera, en outre, compétente pour statuer :

1. Si un jugement rendu par une juridiction de statut personnel autre que le tribunal civil, déferé aux fins d'exécution au bureau exécutif, a été rendu compétemment et doit être exécuté;

2. Sur les contraventions formelles ou les infractions prévues par l'article 20 de l'arrêté du 13 mars 1936 fixant le statut des communautés religieuses et par l'article 26 du présent arrêté;

3. Sur toutes les questions qui lui sont soumises par le Gouvernement des Etats ou les chefs de communautés, relatives à l'interprétation ou l'application des dispositions du présent arrêté.

Dans le cas où cette juridiction devra statuer sur un conflit ou sur la compétence, elle comprendra, outre le président et les membres la composant, un représentant désigné par chacun des chefs des communautés intéressées.

Art. 28. La communauté protestante est comprise dans l'annexe I de l'Arrêté No. 60/L.R. du 13 mars 1936, fixant le statut des communautés religieuses, au nombre des communautés jouissant d'une reconnaissance de droit et de fait.

Art. 6. Le secrétaire général du haut-commissariat est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Le Haut-Commissaire,  
D. DE MARTEL.

Beyrouth, le 18 novembre 1938.



## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 3659/880/91]

No. 173.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1938.*

YOUR telegram No. 112 [of 20th June: Attitude of Saudi Arabian Government to Anglo-Italian Agreement regarding the Middle East].

Although His Majesty's Government are prepared to give Saudi Arabian Government any explanations desired, it might be exceedingly embarrassing to them to have to concert with the Italian Government upon a reply to an identic communication.

2. Full statement of position of His Majesty's Government leaves by bag of 30th June, including copy of my reply to Bagdad despatch No. 204 [of 4th May]. If essential, a summary could be telegraphed, but if Saudi Arabian Government can be persuaded to wait till my despatch reaches you, that will be much more satisfactory.

3. You may, in any case, assure Saudi Arabian Government that nothing in agreement places any time-limit on recognition of independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 84. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 93.)

[E 4046/880/91]

No. 174.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, June 21, 1938.*

IN my telegram No. 112, dated the 20th June, I informed you of the intention of the Saudi Government to send identic notes to the British and Italian Governments asking for the elucidation of certain obscure points in the Anglo-Italian Treaty. I now have the honour to transmit translations of the draft note to His Majesty's Government and of the covering memorandum.

2. The memorandum is incorrect in saying that the Saudi Arabian Government had informed us of the receipt of a copy of the Iraqi Government's note on the subject. What they told me is reported in my letter to Mr. Baxter, dated the 17th May, viz., that the King had received a letter on the subject from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. However, the fact that they have studied the Iraqi memorandum might be deduced from their own, which only overlaps the other on the question of "privileged position of a political character." It will be noticed that the Saudi Government speak in quite general terms about treaty arrangements which the parties to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance might wish to make, and do not ask whether union with Iraq or certain specified methods of co-operation on which the Iraqi Government are known to be keen would be considered objectionable by His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government in the light of the agreement of the 16th April, 1938.

3. The Saudi Government have found one objection of their own, in the time limit in article 8 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. The wording of that article, and the fact that none of the other letters, declarations, &c., exchanged at the same time contains a time limit, lead them to ask whether the signatories to the agreement place a time limit upon their recognition of the independence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. They have perhaps forgotten that the Treaty of Jedda itself contains a time limit.

4. In your telegram No. 53, dated the 11th April, addressed to Bagdad, you set forth in paragraph 7 the reason for the acceptance of "a self-denying ordinance, applying inevitably to all Powers without distinction, whether friendly neighbours or not of" Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. This information will have been passed on to Ibn Saud by the Iraqi Government, and will have been in his mind when he made the ingenious suggestion that his notes would assist His Majesty's Government by "inducing the Italian Government to agree with them

in interpreting the provisions of that agreement in such a way as to remove the ambiguity which it contains and which appears to destroy or limit our independence."

5. The note enclosed in translation is still only the draft which has been shown to me beforehand in confidence. I will report to you again when I receive the note itself, after examining it to see whether it differs in any respect from the draft. I beg to be instructed in due course as to the reply to be sent to the Saudi Government.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad.

I have, &amp;c.

R. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

*Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

OUR confidence in His Majesty's Government is, as they know, unlimited, and we are confident that our interests are bound up with theirs. For that reason we exchange views and information with them at every opportunity and on every subject of importance to us, and we therefore declare our opinion in the matter of the Anglo-Italian Agreement in order that we may know their opinion as to how best to act in the matter.

It was only a few days ago that we received a full translation of the whole text of the agreement, and, after an attentive examination, we have found in it provisions which affect our independence. As to what is in those provisions, we are confident that His Majesty's Government only entered into them in order to bind the Italian Government by an obligation which would compel her to remain far from interference in the independence of the Arabian Peninsula. We trust the aims of Great Britain with regard to us.

It is our conviction that Great Britain did not bind herself to Italy in this except in order to induce her, by co-operating with her, to do what she has induced her to do; and as this is our conviction we wish to place before the British and Italian Governments certain questions which we hope will be of assistance to His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* of the Italian Government in inducing the Italian Government to agree with them in interpreting the provisions of that agreement in such a way as to remove the ambiguity which it contains and which appears to destroy or limit our independence.

We owe this to our people, whose anxiety has been aroused by this agreement, and to the Arab States, and to the necessity to safeguard our good name among all States. But we do not wish to communicate the note officially without first informing His Majesty's Government. We shall transmit the two notes to the British and Italian Governments after receiving Great Britain's reply. The Italian note will differ in certain expressions from the British, but in essence the notes will be identical.

After receiving the reply of His Majesty's Government our Government must get into touch with the Yemeni Government and explain their point of view on the subject. We have already informed the British Government that we received a copy of the Iraqi note on the subject.

We wish to assure His Majesty's Government that when we examine the questions between us and Great Britain it is not possible that we should be influenced by the opinions and views of people who misinterpret, who have private interests, or who are ignorant and have no responsibility to bear; we are influenced by the motive of our personal interest and of our common interests with Great Britain and of the friendship that is between us and them. And because of the policy we have adopted with regard to His Majesty's Government, we explain to them anything that occurs to us, especially if it relates to political matters between us and them.

This memorandum is secret between us and His Majesty's Government, and it is impossible that anyone else should be aware of it.



Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

(Draft) Note.

(Translation.)

SINCE Sir R. Bullard made the communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Anglo-Italian Agreement there have already been discussions on more than one occasion in which friendly views have been exchanged as to the aims His Majesty's Government had in view in making their agreement of the 16th April, 1938, with Italy regarding the integrity of the Arabian Peninsula.

Having now obtained a complete copy of the agreement, my Government have examined the whole text very carefully, and have considered its articles attentively in that spirit in which Sir R. Bullard communicated to them a summary of the agreement.

My Government now reiterate their thanks to His Majesty's Government for what the latter have said as to the spirit with which they were animated in concluding the agreement, and they hope to obtain from the British Government clear and distinct replies to the questions as to which my Government wish to have an explanation, so that there may remain no doubt as to the good intentions which our Government are confident the British Government entertain towards this friendly Government. Before setting forth these questions, however, my Government wish to draw attention to two points on which they reserve their rights:—

- (1) My Government reserve the legal principle which says that no agreement between two parties can bind any third party in any matter whatsoever unless the third party accepts that agreement.
- (2) Inasmuch as my Government have not signed the agreement between Great Britain and Italy, they wish to state that they are not bound in any way in any point that is laid upon them by the agreement, and consider that they have a perfect right to use their natural absolute right as a completely and absolutely independent State in any agreements they may make with any Power, and in this they have in mind the interests which it is incumbent upon them to safeguard in their capacity as an independent State enjoying all the rights and competence which are enjoyed by completely independent States.

The Saudi Arabian Government do not consider themselves bound as against the British and Italian Governments except in so far as they have taken obligations upon themselves on a basis of reciprocity in the treaties concluded separately with Great Britain and Italy. What the Saudi Government have taken upon themselves in mutual treaties they have observed and will continue to observe.

As therefore our Government are confident that the British Government and the Italian Government were not aiming at anything tending to diminish the independence of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom or of her ally the Yemen, they wish to enquire as to certain points in the agreement in order to dissipate the ambiguities they contain. These points are as follows:—

(1) In article 3 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement about certain areas in the Middle East there occur the words: "The two parties recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other Power should acquire or seek to acquire," &c.

Our Government would like to know what is the meaning of the expression "the common interest of both" and what is the scope of that interest.

For instance: if some third party obtained something from the Saudi Arabian Kingdom or from the Yemen by means of an agreement with them or by some other means, what would be the position of Great Britain and Italy in consequence of the agreement for the safeguarding of their common interests?

(2) In the same article of the agreement, after the sentence referred to in point (1) above, occur the following words: "no other Power should acquire sovereignty or any privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to Saudi Arabia or to the Yemen. . . ."

- (a) Our Government wish to enquire as to what is meant by "a privileged position of a political character" and to have an example of it. Our Government is keenly desirous of knowing with complete clarity what

is the real object of this, as this point touches closely the independence of our State, and our Government are confident that the friendship existing between ourselves and Great Britain and Italy makes it impossible that they should aim at diminishing that independence in any manner whatsoever.

- (b) To take an example: there is a treaty of alliance between ourselves and Iraq and the Yemen; is there anything in the provisions of that alliance or any other similar alliance which is considered contrary to the interests of Great Britain and Italy; or would there be if any other Arab Power entered into that alliance?
- (c) If an agreement was concluded between us and any other Power on any political, economic or other matter to which we attach importance, would it be considered contrary to the interests of Great Britain and Italy?

(3) Do not His Majesty's Government consider that the text of article 3 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement conflicts with article 1 of the Treaty of Jedda, which runs as follows: "His Britannic Majesty recognises the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of the Nejd and its dependencies"?

(4) The request for explanation in points (1) and (2) above includes a request to know the meaning of those two expressions wherever they occur in the said agreement.

(5) In article 8 of the agreement there occur the words: "Should either party at any time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances obtaining at the time of the entry into force of the present agreement, such as to necessitate a modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with a view to the revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement."

"2. At any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the entry into force of this agreement either party may notify the other of its intention to terminate the agreement. Any such notification shall take effect three months after the date on which it is made."

Now in so far as the agreement does not affect our independence, my Government is not concerned with the question whether the duration of the agreement is limited or unlimited. My Government observe that no period is fixed for all the (other) agreements and letters exchanged between Great Britain and Italy, but only in this agreement. They therefore regard it as important to learn from His Majesty's Government whether there is any time limit to that recognition of the independence of Saudi Arabia and of the Yemen to which the two parties, Great Britain and Italy, are impelled by considerations in various articles of the treaty, and in particular in articles 1 and 2; and whether that means a desire to modify that recognition at some time or other.

If this is limited in time, do not His Majesty's Government consider that it conflicts with the sense of article 1 and of the introduction to (the opening passage of) article 2 of the Treaty of Jedda between us and His Majesty's Government?

I await the reply of His Majesty's Government, and I am, &c.

[E 4188/10/31]

No. 175.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 133.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Jedda telegram No. 116, dated the 28th June, 1938, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a statement by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz to Sir R. Bullard, for transmission to the British Government, respecting the Palestine question.

Jedda, June 28, 1938.



## Enclosure.

(Translation.)

*Statement by His Majesty the King to Sir R. Bullard for Transmission to the British Government.*

WE have read the note handed by Sir R. Bullard to our Deputy for Foreign Affairs on the 14th Rabi-al-Awwal, 1357 (the 13th May, 1938), concerning the news stated by the British Government to have reached them from Syria and Iraq about assistance said to have been promised to the insurgents in Palestine. We have also learned of other accusations directed against some of our men according to information which, the British Government informed us, had reached them concerning the transport of arms to the insurgents from Haql and Jauf.

We thank the British Government for informing us of everything they learn about us, and especially in such circumstances and conditions as those relating to Palestine, since these, in the nature of the case, cause much gossip which may be believed or disbelieved and which is disseminated by people with aims and interests of their own. We consider that this frankness on the part of the British Government gives us an opportunity to set forth to them everything which we have in mind on this subject, and which there would have been no call to set forth but for this occasion. We are sure that the frankness shown in all British Government communications, whether written or oral, which have passed or are passing between us and them is the greatest and best means of strengthening the friendship between us and them. This has, in fact, been our custom from the beginning of our political career until now.

The British Government will recollect that when there occurred in our country those events which were not directed against any party but against us personally and against the foundation of our monarchy, we used to inform the British Government of the news and statements that reached us, both in the days of the movement of Al Dawish and his meetings with certain British officials, and at the time when Ibn Rifada came out from Aqaba in broad daylight within sight and sound of the officials there. The best way to deal with such incidents was found to be frankness and the communication of news received so that it might be dealt with.

When we learned of such accusations against ourselves it had not an important influence on us in itself, since a man who is conscious of his innocence is not disturbed in mind when he hears of accusations made against him. The fact of the matter is that, when the people of Palestine found the British Government determined to partition their country and saw the position resulting from the latest measures adopted, they believed that the British Government wished to destroy them all and to replace them by Jews; and, having arrived at that conviction, there was no door of defence at which they did not knock, no path of help they did not tread, and among those from whom they proposed to obtain assistance in money or arms or men was ourselves in person, just as they proposed to obtain it from the people of our country also.

We have already informed the British Government of the impression made upon the souls of the people of our country. The impression made on the souls of the women and children, if not greater than that made upon the souls of the men, who realise the present and future danger to which all Arabs are exposed from the Jews, is at least equal to it.

Had it not been for fear of my personal power and my anger and penalties, the women would have vied with one another in selling their jewellery in the bazaar in order to assist the people of Palestine.

If I said that there was one atom of my body which did not call upon me to fight the Jews I should be telling an untruth; and if it was a question of the Jews alone I should prefer that the (? my) wealth and children and posterity should be destroyed rather than that a kingdom should be established for the Jews in Palestine.

But it is the British Government that is concerned in the matter, not the Jews alone, and between us and the British Government there are friendly obligations in writing and obligations (on matters) of common interest. Moreover, it is our firm conviction that it is best for the present and future interests of the Arabs that they should always be friendly with Great Britain, and if the people of Palestine would listen to us they would put forward their claims by peaceful methods as the only means of attaining their objects with Great Britain, for

we do not believe that the methods they have adopted recently will lead to the attainment of their aims. This is our belief and conviction in our friendship with Great Britain, and what they know of us is the best witness and strongest proof of what we wish to express in this statement.

We wish to assure the British Government that, in spite of the attempts and efforts which have been made to obtain help from us for the insurrection in Palestine, we have not furnished any help, and it is impossible, we hope (in sha'llah—"if God wills"), for us to take any action contrary to the undertakings between us and Great Britain. If such assistance be considered, it will be realised that it would be impossible for us, with our experience of the world, to do what we are alleged to have done; for Palestine is not face to face with the Jews, but with Great Britain, and Palestine, in comparison with Great Britain, is but a small thing and incapable of withstanding the forces of Britain. Let it be supposed that the Arabs around them joined with them to fight Britain; could all this assembly defeat Britain? And if this is a fact, could it enter into our heads to help the people of Palestine with arms which would not be worth a straw to them, and thus involve them in difficulties with Britain which might be the cause of their destruction?

As to what people say, it is not possible that we should be blamed for the inventions of people who are either enemies desirous of causing trouble between us and Great Britain or else Palestinians who wish to strengthen the morale of the insurgents by telling them "Ibn Saud is helping us or giving us so-and-so," and making similar allegations. It is desirable that reason should consult with reason and that careful consideration should be given to the history of our relations with Great Britain and our political views, viz., our conviction that friendship with Britain is of advantage to the Arabs.

We wish that the British Government could hear, as against those rumours, the rumours which are spread about concerning us. Many Arabs have interpreted our silence in the matter of Palestine as proof that we are acting in concert with Great Britain in return for a guarantee of our special interests as a reward for our acceptance of partition. These accusations have been made against us both secretly and openly even by those who have the greatest confidence in our zeal for Islam and for the Arabs at the sight of our silence at a moment when they found others declaring what is going on in Arab and other Moslem souls with regard to the Palestine question.

We therefore summarise the position here so that Britain may be sure of the facts about the allegation:—

- (1) The people of Palestine and many (other) Arabs are now sure that the British Government are determined to partition them and, if they do not agree to the partition scheme, will destroy them to the last man, annihilate them and replace them by Jews.
- (2) This conviction has prevailed among the people of Palestine, and other Arabs and Moslems have become sure of it too.
- (3) Several messages have reached us from some Arab Governments and from many societies urging us to ask (? and asking us) for assistance and help.
- (4) The people of Palestine are endeavouring by various means to secure the largest possible quantity of ammunition and men from any quarter whatsoever, in order to continue the struggle, for he who feels that he is perishing will not care what method he adopts so long as it offers some hope.
- (5) Public feeling in our country is affected in the highest possible degree by the Palestine question, and, had the people not been afraid of me, they would have committed acts which would have increased the gravity of the situation.
- (6) As for ourselves, we have kept, and will continue to observe, our undertakings towards Great Britain; and we continue to believe that Great Britain cannot fail to look upon the Arabs with the eye of justice and to deal justly with them, and that it is better for the Arabs to be in accord with Great Britain at all times.
- (7) We have refused to furnish any financial help to the insurrection in Palestine and have refused to help the insurgents with arms. We have made a close enquiry into what the British Government said about the smuggling of arms from Haql but could find no trace of it, so it



appears that the allegation was untrue. We also made enquiries in the direction of Jauf after receiving the information from the British Government; we had suspicions about two persons who had come for trade and we expelled them. We then ascertained that they had tried to purchase some cartridges, and although the sale and purchase of arms in that part is not forbidden, yet, since we understood that what was purchased would be used against Britain, we confiscated what they had purchased.

- (8) We investigated the allegation of the British Government as to the statements of Yusuf Yasin, and we have ascertained incontrovertibly that Yusuf did not say what was reported to the British Government.
- (9) The policy we follow in the matter of Palestine is to give Great Britain our frank advice and our views, as from one friend to another.

But it is our conviction that the establishment of a State for the Jews in Palestine is contrary to the interests of the Arabs and threatens to destroy the Arabs not only in Palestine but in other Arab lands also, and that it is also contrary to the interests of Great Britain. We therefore continue to give our advice and to appeal to the British Government to give up this policy, and at the same time we continue to give our personal advice to the people of Palestine to adopt the policy of conciliation with Great Britain as the most certain method of attaining their object.

We wish Great Britain to be sure that we have not ceased, and shall not cease, to be her friend, and that we have not lost our trust in their sense of justice.

[E 4415/10/31]

No. 176.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).*

(No. 952.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1938.*

DURING the course of a conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister this morning, Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha raised the question of Palestine, which he said was becoming in an increasing degree a source of anxiety to him in Egypt. He greatly hoped that we might be able before long to do something that would effect improvement in the present anxious situation. I told him that we were not less alive than he was to all the difficulties and the reactions of the present position, and that I knew it was the hope of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that, after the present commission had made its report, it would be possible for him to lay definite proposals before His Majesty's Government for dealing with the situation. I expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would find time to have some talk with Mr. MacDonald on the subject.

2. The Prime Minister went on to say that he knew the Mufti personally and was confident that he was not so objectionable a person as was sometimes represented. He himself thought that, if he were to see the Mufti, he could exercise a moderating influence upon his judgment.

I am, &amp;c.

HALIFAX.

[E 4546/880/91]

No. 177.

*Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 149.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, July 18, 1938.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 252 of the 29th June, 1938, I have the honour to inform you that, bearing in mind the terms of Sir R. W. Bullard's note No. 139 to the Amir Feisal, dated the 1st July, as well as those of your telegram No. 84 of the 29th June, 1938, I considered that the best way of carrying out your Lordship's instructions to endeavour to dissuade the Saudi Arabian Government from sending in an identic note was to answer, in the terms authorised in your despatch, all the questions which the draft identic note asked. I enclose herewith a copy of the note by which I did so.

2. The only question which was not specifically answered by your Lordship's despatch was question No. 2 (c), which asked whether a future agreement concluded by the Saudi Arabian Government would be considered contrary to the interests of the two parties to the Middle Eastern Agreement. It is clearly impossible for anyone to answer fully such a hypothetical question. I therefore answered it in general terms taken from your despatch, leaving it to the Saudi Arabian Government to draw the inference that it is impossible to predict the effects of a treaty the terms of which are unknown.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Cairo, to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 177.

*Mr. Trott to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(No. 159.)

Your Royal Highness,

*Jedda, July 18, 1938.*

IN his note No. 139 of the 1st July, 1938, Sir R. W. Bullard informed Your Royal Highness that a full statement from His Majesty's Government with regard to the Anglo-Italian Treaty of the 16th April, 1938, was on its way to Jedda and would be communicated on arrival. Sir R. W. Bullard added that His Majesty's Government trusted that the Saudi Arabian Government would await the arrival of the above-mentioned statement, which, it hoped, would make the presentation of the notes which the Saudi Arabian Government had drafted unnecessary. On the 5th July, 1938, your Royal Highness was good enough to inform Sir R. W. Bullard that the Saudi Arabian Government would await the arrival of that statement and would refrain from sending the proposed notes.

2. I now have the honour to inform your Royal Highness that the statement mentioned above has arrived, and that its terms are as follows:—

3. In the first place, I am to state this His Majesty's Government appreciate the spirit in which the questions in the draft notes were put and were brought to the notice of His Majesty's Minister, and have examined them attentively in the hope of being able to furnish a reply which will reassure the Saudi Arabian Government, who may meanwhile rest assured that nothing in the agreement was intended to place any time-limit on the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia.

4. Your Royal Highness's draft note begins by stating that the Saudi Arabian Government reserve their rights on two points, viz., that no agreement between two parties can bind a third party unless the third party accepts that agreement; and that, in view of the fact that the Saudi Arabian Government have not signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement, they do not consider themselves bound by it in any way. In reply to these two points, I am to state that His Majesty's Government agree that the Saudi Arabian Government are not bound by the agreement, to which they are not parties.

5. Your Royal Highness's draft note then set forth several questions, the answers to which are as follows:—

6. The first question was the meaning and the scope of the expression "common interest." His Majesty's Government reply that, as is already stated above, the Saudi Arabian Government are not bound by the provisions of the agreement, and are therefore free, so far as the agreement is concerned, to take any action which they may think desirable in their own interest, as to which they are, and must remain, the sole judges, subject only to their treaty obligations to other Powers. But the phrase "common interest" relates to the obligation of one of the two parties to the other. His Majesty's Government consider that, where certain events happen which are recognised in the agreement to infringe a "common interest" of the two parties, either party may claim to be free from its obligations to the other of non-intervention arising from the agreement. This does not mean, of course, that any new right of intervention is given to either

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party by the agreement. All that the two parties have done is to declare that, as a matter of general principle, it is their common interest that intervention by other Powers shall not take place.

7. Your Royal Highness's second question was divided into three parts:—

- (a) The first part enquired the meaning of the phrase "a privileged position of a political character," and requested an example of it. His Majesty's Government do not, for their part, consider that it is possible or desirable to define with precision a phrase which is meant to refer rather to the spirit which will inspire the policies of the two parties than to lay down a precise code of conduct for their guidance; nevertheless, to take an example, they do not consider that the existing Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, whose terms were known before the Anglo-Italian Agreement was concluded, gives any of the Arab parties such a position in the territories of the other. The main object of the Anglo-Italian Agreement is that the independence and the integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen shall be maintained, and the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance does not deprive any of the Arab parties of their independence or integrity.
- (b) Your Royal Highness asked whether the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance was considered contrary to the interests of Great Britain and Italy; from the answer given under (a) above it will be seen that His Majesty's Government do not consider that such a treaty is contrary to the "common interest" mentioned in the agreement.
- (c) Your Royal Highness enquired whether an agreement concluded between the Saudi Arabian Government and any other Power on any political, economic or other matter to which the Saudi Arabian Government attached importance would be considered contrary to the interests of the two parties to the Anglo-Italian Agreement. To this His Majesty's Government reply that one of the objects of the agreement was to safeguard the true interests of Saudi Arabia, and to preserve it from falling under foreign domination by discouraging certain forms of intervention by other Powers which might endanger its independence and integrity; and that the provisions of the agreement do not restrict the freedom of action of the Saudi Arabian Government or any other Government which is not a party to that agreement.

8. Your Royal Highness's third question enquired whether His Majesty's Government consider that the text of article 3 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement conflicts with article 1 of the Treaty of Jedda. The answer is in the negative. His Majesty's Government do not understand how an article which declares that it is in the interests of Great Britain and Italy that all other Powers should refrain from doing certain things prejudicial to the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia can be regarded as incompatible with an article which states that His Britannic Majesty recognises the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies.

9. The fourth question asked for an elucidation of the meaning of two expressions wherever they occurred in the agreement. The general principles set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 (a) above reply to this question.

10. The Saudi Arabian Government enquire whether the wording of article 8 of the agreement, taken in conjunction with other parts of the agreement, means that there is any time-limit to the recognition of the independence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, or that the parties mean that they desire to modify that recognition at some future time. His Majesty's Government reply that article 8 certainly places no time-limit on the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the independence of Saudi Arabia. The agreement is one between Great Britain and Italy, in which each party promises the other not to do certain things, and recognises that certain other things may be regarded by the other party as contrary to that other's interest. The fact that the agreement has been made, or the fact that it may be terminated, does not or will not in any way affect the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government. Moreover, the agreement deals with other questions besides the position of Saudi Arabia (for instance, article 7). Many of these questions differ from the provisions of the agreement relating to Saudi Arabia and from the rest

of the Anglo-Italian settlement, inasmuch as they are not merely affirmations of general principles, but impose definite obligations on both sides in regard to matters which do not affect the rights and interests of any third Power. It is only natural that a term should be set to obligations of this kind, and the Saudi Arabian Government can rest assured that, so far as the Saudi Arabian Government are concerned, the fact that the whole agreement is terminable after ten years is without significance.

11. Should your Royal Highness desire to put any further questions on this subject, I trust that you will inform me in order that I can place them before my Government. His Majesty's Government hope, however, that the answers which they have sent through me will set your mind at rest and will render it unnecessary to forward the two notes to which you referred in the fourth paragraph of your memorandum.

I have, &c.  
A. C. TROTT.

[E 4658/10/31]

No. 178.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Bateman (Cairo).*

(No. 1009.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1938.*

Sir,

I TOLD the Egyptian Prime Minister this morning that I wished to discuss a matter which, although strictly an internal concern of Egypt, was, nevertheless, of interest to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I had received reports that it had been arranged that a congress, promoted by the Parliamentary Committee for the Defence of Palestine and Egypt, should take place in Cairo in the autumn.

2. I said that it was obvious that from our point of view it would be best if this congress were not held in Egypt at all. I recognised, however, that it might be very difficult to prevent its being held, and, if it could not be prevented, I hoped that the Egyptian Government would at least avoid giving it any form of official recognition. His Excellency said that, though the congress would certainly be a great nuisance to himself, he did not see how he could well prevent its being held. He would, however, certainly see that no official recognition should be given to it.

3. His Excellency said that he was very concerned about the question of Palestine. I said that I also was concerned, and that when the report of the Technical Commission was presented in the near future the whole question would receive our closest attention.

I am, &c.  
HALIFAX.

[E 4643/1573/25]

No. 179.

*Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 337.)

*Bagdad, July 19, 1938.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 371 of the 29th June, and to inform you that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and left with him an aide-mémoire embodying the explanations contained in paragraphs 28 to 35 thereof on the subject of the Anglo-Italian Agreement concluded in April last. I added orally the explanations outlined in paragraphs 3 and 36.

2. The Minister seemed gratified to receive so full a reply to his note of the 3rd May, and appeared to understand the difficulties created for His Majesty's Government during the negotiation of the agreement by the Italian Government's suspicions lest Great Britain, as the ally of Iraq, might, through Iraq, pursue an imperialistic policy towards Saudi Arabia. The only doubt which he expressed was whether His Majesty's Government were, in fact, deriving any advantage



from the agreement. I instanced the reduction of the Italian garrison in Libya and the discontinuance of objectionable broadcasting to show that they were.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Cairo and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 6341/10/31]

No. 180.

*Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).*

(No. 2498.)

*Foreign Office, November 4, 1938.*

Sir,

THE French Ambassador called here recently and alluded to the present position in Palestine.

2. M. Corbin said that the French Government were naturally interested in all subjects connected with the Arabs and were looking forward to seeing in due course the report of the Woodhead Commission. In the meanwhile, his Excellency had received instructions to bring to my notice the fact that various newspapers, including *The Times*, had recently contained allusions to the possibility of some form of Arab confederation receiving the blessing of His Majesty's Government.

3. This suggestion had greatly disconcerted the French Government, who were always desirous of being of assistance to His Majesty's Government in those areas. In this instance, they hoped most earnestly that nothing of this nature would materialise. The French Government's own position *vis-à-vis* of Syria was always difficult, and any idea of a confederation could not but add to their difficulties. Even were the inclusion of Syria in the proposed confederation not contemplated—and to this the French Government attached the utmost importance—nevertheless such a confederation would act as a magnet and augment disquiet and agitation in Syria.

4. Your Excellency will remember that the views of His Majesty's Government upon the question of closer union between the Arab States were set forth in paragraph 8 of my predecessor's note of the 20th October, 1937, to the French Ambassador. The views expressed in that paragraph are, I consider, still true in general of the question of confederation, although the idea has certainly gained ground during the last year among the Arab peoples and some form of re-union between Palestine and Syria, and possibly Transjordan, would be so natural that it is difficult to believe that it will not come to pass one day.

5. Your Excellency has already, however, been authorised (in my telegram No. 415 of the 2nd November respecting a possible invitation to the Governments of Syria and the Lebanon to send representatives to the proposed London conference about Palestine) to explain to the French Government, should they raise this point, that His Majesty's Government do not themselves intend to put forward any scheme of confederation at the proposed London conference, but that the intentions of the Arab participants are not yet known.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad and Jedda, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 6508/10/31]

No. 181.

*Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 1142.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, October 24, 1938.*

I HAVE reported in a number of telegrams and despatches on the proceedings and resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress and the Arab Women's Congress held consecutively this month in Cairo to discuss the Palestine question.

2. The Inter-Parliamentary Congress was characterised by orderliness and relative moderation, due no doubt largely to the influence of the Prime Minister and Ali Maher Pasha, who had impressed on Allouba Pasha and others concerned the necessity of abstention from violent polemics.

3. The Wafd boycott, due to internal political reasons, deprived the Inter-Parliamentary Congress of an atmosphere of popular enthusiasm, but Nahas Pasha received the foreign delegates and explained to them that the abstention of the Wafd did not signify any coolness to the Palestine cause, which it had powerfully befriended. The absence of delegates from Saudi Arabia in particular and from Turkey and Iran deprived the congress of an oecumenical character, but the delegates of the countries represented at the congress were, on the whole, nationalists of prominence in virtue both of their functions and their personality.

4. The Inter-Parliamentary Congress thus brought together a considerable number of Moslem personalities from the Near and Middle East and from North Africa, who have discussed a matter of common concern in Cairo, which is increasingly becoming the nerve-centre of the Moslem world. Such a gathering cannot fail to increase the sense of unity existing between them, both in the particular aspect of opposition to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine and in the more general aspect of Moslem co-operation against Western encroachment. The establishment of a permanent committee in Cairo (see my telegram No. 161, Saving, of the 12th October) to continue the work begun by the congress shows that the development of this co-operative movement is being contemplated. In this connexion, it is interesting to note that Sheikh Al-Maraghi, in his speech to the delegates visiting Al Azhar, expressed the hope that this congress would be the forerunner of others at which problems common to oriental and Islamic countries could be discussed, and that these consultations would lead to a drawing together of the beliefs and aspirations of the whole Moslem world.

5. The familiar oriental inter-play of personal ambitions and antipathies may well impede these co-operative efforts, but it would be imprudent to underestimate the danger of this movement, which has been provoked by our Palestine policy. Whatever may be the practical results of the congress, an impetus has been given to a sentimental solidarity which will have its practical effects in an Eastern world governed by sentiment more than by reason. This sentimental bond will be strengthened by the gathering of women from different Arab countries in the same cause. Though their congress was more emotional, less well directed, less practical in its objections, its indirect effects will not be negligible, for the power of women in the East, as in France, is far greater than their legal disabilities indicate. Moreover, through these more excitable mediums will be strengthened the growing and dangerous legend of British "atrocities" in Palestine. The Cromwellian repression in Ireland left behind it a lasting legacy of hatred hardly extinguished to-day. Repression so long drawn out and at times inevitably severe in so important a centre of Islam gives hostile propaganda—Arab, German and Italian—the opportunity of spreading a similar legend in the Islamic world.

6. In view of our particular embarrassments in the Eastern Mediterranean and our grave difficulties in Europe and the Far East, I must repeat once more my warning that, as I see it, we cannot afford to neglect the growing danger to us in this Arab-Moslem movement of co-operation centring on opposition to our Palestinian policy. As recorded in previous reports, I approach this matter mainly from the strategic angle and as affecting our position from that angle in the Eastern Mediterranean: not from the angle of the Jew or the Arab, but from the angle of British safety. I have long felt that our predominance in these parts should rest not so much on actual force of arms as on a basis of mutual interest and co-operation in the Near and Middle East against the common Italo-German threat.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.



*Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 30.)*

(No. 58. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Damascus, November 19, 1938.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 38 of the 5th November, I have the honour to inform you that Fares Bey Al Khoury was stopped in Istanbul by the French Consul there and dissuaded from continuing his journey to London.

2. After Fares Bey had called on me, I informed the French delegate of his intention to visit London, and of my own abortive attempt to discourage him from going there at the present time to accomplish the mission that the President of the Syrian Republic had, he said, given him. I thought it better that there should be complete frankness between myself and the delegate in this matter in view of the interest the English and Syrian press is showing in the recently-revived project to form an Arab *bloc* of Syria, Transjordan and Palestine.

3. I find among French officials a growing suspicion that the scheme to unite Syria with other Arabic-speaking countries is yet another plot hatched by an Anglo-Arab caucus to elbow the French out of the Eastern Mediterranean. The talk of Fares Bey Al Khoury, since he came back from Egypt, where he attended the recent Arab Congress, may have something to do with this. It has been reported to me, and doubtless to the French also, that, during a reception of welcome on his return to Damascus, Fares Bey said that Syria could not live alone. When he was in Egypt, he added, he had been in contact with important Englishmen, who had emphatically told him that they much desired to see an Arab unit formed of Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan. In London, he went on to say, he would endeavour to persuade English politicians to bring this about. Questioned regarding French reaction to the plan, Fares Bey said he did not know what it was, but that he knew that, when the English see there is an interest to be gained from such amalgamation, there was no doubt but that the French would be forced to give way to the English will in the matter.

4. Your Lordship is already aware of the scepticism with which many French experts view pan-Arabism; in their eyes it is chimerical. On the other hand, those Frenchmen who are prepared to admit the possibility of Arab unity fear the dangerous influence it might exercise in their North African possessions. Others who feel there may be something tangible in Anglo-Arab friendship, realising that international friendships and enmities are not eternal, wonder whether their country might not become, to the detriment of her interests, a junior partner to England in such an enterprise.

5. Syrian political acquaintances frequently wish to discuss with me the idea of joining Syria, Palestine and Transjordan under a combined Anglo-French guarantee as a means of solving the problem of the establishment of Jews in Palestine. I invariably point out to them that such a result could only arise at the present time out of direct discussions between the two mandatory Powers—Great Britain and France. Mr. Ogden (see this consulate's chancery note to the Egyptian Department of the 12th October) was at pains to warn Squadron Leader Hindle James of the dangers of discussions with Syrians of plans for the disposal of Syria. I am aware, however, that distinguished private persons in England, who have shown an interest in furthering Arab ideas concerning their own destiny, have not observed the same discretion. Their position and influence in England have frequently been misunderstood by the Syrians, who have received letters from them or who have talked with them.

6. Mutual Anglo-French confidence in the Near East is a delicate plant. It would be unfortunate, therefore, if this plant, now in tender growth, should be checked through the propagation of a belief that whilst abstaining from direct discussion with France we were encouraging intrigue concerning Syria behind her back. This would be the more unfortunate at the present time in face of the steady increase in the boldness of German attempts to sour our own and France's relations with the Arabs to their own advantage—a subject on which I shall address your Lordship in another despatch.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Aleppo, Beirut, Jerusalem and Paris.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

*Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 28.)*

(No. 220.)

My Lord,

*Jedda, December 4, 1938.*

IN my telegram No. 177 which I had the honour to address to your Lordship from Riyadh on the 24th November, I stated that the Saudi Government had again raised the question of the interpretation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and that I thought the least that would satisfy them would be to make a declaration such as the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had apparently made before the League of Nations, and that the best we could do was to keep them to general principles and to avoid details.

2. The subject was raised by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who, in the absence of Fuad Bey, was dealing with foreign affairs; he brought me the document which forms, in translation, the first enclosure to the present despatch. I had not studied very closely your despatch No. 253 of the 29th June, which reached Jedda when I was on leave, but I steered a course which I knew was within your instructions, deprecating hypothetical questions and the presentation of interrogatories which could never be so long that some critic would not find an omission and demand yet more questions. It was clear, however, that the Saudi Government were determined to make their position clear to the world in some way, so I concentrated on trying to convince Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that, in any case, their wisest course was to stick to statements of principle. The subject was taken up later by Fuad Bey, who returned to Riyadh shortly before I left, and he was inclined to agree as to the advisability of sticking to principles; but he said that the Saudi Government felt obliged to address some sort of written communication to the Italian Government as well as to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. He consented to take no action until I should have had time to study your instructions. Having studied the papers, on my return to Jedda, I was inclined to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note based on the considerations set forth in the latter part of paragraph 6 of your above-mentioned despatch, but having now received your telegram No. 153 dated the 3rd December, I have decided to send Ibn Saud a message (copy attached), which will, I hope, induce him to postpone a decision until I can see Fuad Bey, who should be coming to the Hejaz with the King a month or so hence, if not earlier. The matter is far better suited to oral discussion than to written correspondence.

3. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome, Cairo and Bagdad, His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut, and to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 183.

*Statement to be forwarded in the form of a Note Verbale to the British Minister.*

HIS Highness the Amir Feysal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has read the note sent to His Highness by Mr. Trott of the 18th July, 1938, containing the statement sent by the British Government, as to which Sir Reader Bullard had already informed His Highness in his note No. 139 that it was on its way to Jedda.

2. The Government of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom thank the British Government for their explanations, and in this respect make the following statement:—

3. The British Government know that the Anglo-Italian Agreement concerns the Italian and British Governments. The assurances, explanations and undertakings given by the British Government in their statement in the note of Mr. Trott bind the British Government alone; they do not bind Italy, because we have not yet communicated our questions to the Italian Government.

4. The note containing the statement of the British Government was not in reply to any letter from our Government, and the British Government suggested



that it was unnecessary to send the note which our Government had prepared for transmission to the Italian and the British Governments. It is well known in international practice that published official agreements cannot be affected, as to their interpretation, by secret notes or oral conversations. His Majesty's Government therefore consider:—

- (a) That in order that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom may inform Great Britain and Italy that they are not bound in regard to them except by the treaties and the agreements concluded between the Saudi Arabian Government and each of them separately,
- (b) In order to announce that they are not bound to them except by their own interests,
- (c) And in order to announce to the world and before their own people that they are not bound in their affairs and in their independence except by their interests, and that they are not compelled to execute what relates to the common interests of Britain and Italy referred to in article 3 (of the agreement), my Government think that they must forward the two notes officially to the two Governments so that they may have their replies thereon officially, and that they should then publish the official notes in order to preserve their international reputation in the world.

5. It is not unknown to the British Government that the agreement in its present form, and in particular by the forms of articles 3 and 8, puts the Governments of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the Yemen within their sphere of influence so that no other country may conclude any agreement with the Government of this country without observing the common interests of Italy and Britain—a condition for which there is no precedent in connexion with any independent Government.

6. Of course, my Government do not mean by this that they desire to seek out some State in order to grant to it in their country concessions that might affect their independence. On the contrary, they will be most careful at all time (D.V.) to do their utmost to maintain the integrity of their country and to safeguard their independence against interference by any foreign hand. What we say in respect to the Anglo-Italian Agreement is that the Saudi Arabian Government must not be placed in a position which might be considered by people and in international practice as derogatory to their independence, as they would do if they agreed to bind themselves in their actions as an independent State to preserve the common interests of Italy and Great Britain.

7. My Government therefore think it better to send the two notes to the two Governments and await their reply in order to publish it.

8. The thing which my Government request the British Government to be good enough to do is this: in view of the fact that the relations of my Government with Italy and Great Britain are governed by the treaties concluded with each of the two Governments separately, we request that either all reference to us in that agreement may be struck out and the treaties concluded between us and each of the two Governments may be held to be sufficient, or, alternatively, that a declaration may be made to the effect that each of the two States undertakes that its relations with the Saudi Arabian Kingdom shall be on the basis of the treaties in force between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom on the one hand and Italy and Great Britain respectively on the other. If neither of these courses is possible, we should at least place on record, publicly, after receipt of replies to our notes from the two Governments, that we refuse to accept anything in the said agreement that is inconsistent with our interests.

9. This is the opinion of my Government regarding the notes. Apart from that, there are some points in the note of Mr. Trott about which my Government would like to have some explanation.

10. The interpretation given by the British Government to the expression "common interest" mentioned in the agreement, appears to show that the two Governments give themselves the right to interfere, whether we approve or not, in a matter which might happen between us and a third Government. To this my Government cannot agree, nor can we accept the interference of any Government in the affairs of our country unless this is a previous agreement between them and our Government.

11. Mr. Trott's note, in article 7, paragraph (1), says: His Majesty's Government do not for their part consider that it is possible or desirable to define

with precision a phrase which is meant to refer rather to the spirit which will inspire the policies of the two parties than to lay down a precise code of conduct for their guidance. They then gave as an example the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance concluded with Iraq, which, they say, is not to be considered as giving any of the Arab parties such a privileged political position in the territories of the other [and therefore] as inconsistent with the common interests of Britain and Italy. This reply is given by the British Government alone, and my Government do not know what Italy would say in this respect, in view of the fact that Italy orally expressed some apprehension about that alliance. Again, would it be possible for the British Government to mention an example of what the Anglo-Italian Agreement would consider "of a political character" and inconsistent with their interests?

12. It is stated in the note, article 7, paragraph (c), that one of the objects of the agreement was to safeguard the real interests of the Arab countries and to protect them from falling under foreign domination by discouraging certain forms of interference by another State. Our Government thank the British Government for the desire which they have shown to see the Saudi Arabian Kingdom independent; but what interpretation does international practice place upon the expression of the desire of the two Governments to keep it independent? Has it any other meaning than protection, which we do not believe that the Governments of Britain or Italy have aimed at in regard to our Government? The independence which the Italian and the British Governments desire for our kingdom and the Kingdom of the Yemen is established in international law and is, moreover, recognised by Great Britain and Italy in their treaties with this country and the Yemen.

*Riyadh, November 13, 1938.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 183.

*Note Verbale handed to the Saudi Deputy for Foreign Affairs at Jedda.*

HIS Majesty's Minister regrets the delay in dealing with the question of the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government towards the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1938. It is due to the complexity of the case and to the time which it has taken to find out what was said on this subject at Geneva by the Iraqi Foreign Minister in a speech to which his Excellency Sheikh Yusuf Yasin referred.

The alleged declaration seems to have consisted of a brief passage in a long speech made before the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 19th September. After referring to the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance his Excellency proceeded as follows: "This alliance is not and will not be affected in any way by the Anglo-Italian Agreement signed at Rome on the 16th April last—an agreement which was welcomed by Iraq, in so far as it is an agreement designed to maintain the integrity of its allies."

Sir R. Bullard transmits the assurance of his Government that they are acting in this matter as much in the interests of the Saudi Arabian Government as in their own interests, and asks whether there is any hope of his having an opportunity to discuss this important matter again orally with a representative of the Saudi Arabian Government, now that he has been able to study the papers and to receive instructions from his Government.

*Jedda, December 4, 1938.*